

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 11

September 28, 2020

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Monday, 28 September 2020
 2 (9.30 am)
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Greaney.
 4 MR GREANEY: Sir, good morning. We are now starting
 5 chapter 5 of the inquiry oral evidence hearings and
 6 we'll hear, first of all, from Mr Cooper on behalf of
 7 the 11 families that he represents. But I know, sir,
 8 that first of all you want to make some short
 9 introductory remarks.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 11 Mr Cooper, please understand that what I am about to
 12 say is not in any way directed at what you or any other
 13 of the CPs are about to say; it is about other matters,
 14 which have been brought to my attention.
 15 MR COOPER: We understand.
 16 Opening remarks by THE CHAIRMAN
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 18 We are going to hear opening statements from the
 19 families first. One of the matters that they will deal
 20 with is the ambit of and arrangements for the closed
 21 hearing on what is described as the preventability
 22 evidence. In due course they will make submissions as
 23 to what steps can be taken to make them more open to the
 24 families and what input the families can have into them.
 25 Those are all matters which I will rule on in due

1

1 course.
 2 But before we hear what the families have to say,
 3 I want to make clear what the current position is,
 4 although it will be subject to change depending on any
 5 rulings I might make.
 6 As the chairman of this inquiry, I am under a duty
 7 to ensure that the public and press can attend or see
 8 and hear the transmission of its proceedings. I intend
 9 to ensure that that duty is rigorously applied. This is
 10 only subject to any restrictions on public access that
 11 I impose where I am satisfied that it is necessary. One
 12 important reason for that may be to prevent damage to
 13 national security.
 14 It is the position of the families and the inquiry
 15 team that as much of the evidence as possible should be
 16 heard in open session, that is open to the public, the
 17 families and the press. There will be parts of some
 18 sessions that will be closed to the public but will be
 19 open to the families and the press. I will ensure that
 20 such restricted sessions are kept to the minimum
 21 necessary.
 22 The evidence at those restricted access sessions
 23 will cover evidence that is operationally sensitive.
 24 That means that it relates to procedures at the arena or
 25 procedures of the emergency services which, if known

2

1 publicly, would be capable of assisting terrorists in
 2 carrying out an attack or making an attack more
 3 successful.
 4 All of that operationally sensitive information is
 5 known to the core participants in this inquiry and they
 6 have agreed to the need for restricted sessions. For
 7 that good reasons, the restricted sessions will not be
 8 open to the public and will not be reportable unless and
 9 until I decide if it can be reported.
 10 The press, who will be present at those sessions,
 11 will be able to direct arguments to me as to why
 12 evidence should be reportable if that is the view that
 13 they take. If I conclude that making the information
 14 public would not assist terrorists then I shall allow it
 15 to be reported.
 16 The evidence to be heard in a closed hearing will,
 17 on the basis of my present rulings, be heard in the
 18 absence of the public and all core participants except
 19 the government and Counter-terrorism Police. The reason
 20 for that is that in the closed hearings I shall consider
 21 what was known or should have been known to the security
 22 services and to Counter-terrorism Police about the
 23 perpetrators of this attack and whether they should have
 24 taken steps in the light of that knowledge, which could
 25 or might have prevented the attack.

3

1 I have previously ruled, when this inquiry was an
 2 inquest, that at least some of the evidence on the topic
 3 of preventability will have to be given in private. It
 4 could not be given in open because to do so would damage
 5 national security. If the steps taken by law
 6 enforcement agencies when trying to prevent terrorist
 7 attacks were made public, it would make it easier for
 8 terrorists to avoid detection, that may result in more
 9 people dying on our streets as a result of terrorist
 10 attacks. No one, and particularly the families, wants
 11 that to happen, although they understandably wish to
 12 know as much as they can of what the authorities knew
 13 about the murderers before the explosion. I will keep
 14 any decisions about what evidence must be held in
 15 private under review. I will ensure that the least
 16 possible evidence is heard in private.
 17 It is unavoidable that some will have to be, but
 18 wherever it is possible, I will ensure that evidence is
 19 heard in public and that claims for the need to protect
 20 national security are robustly tested. I am setting
 21 this out now not in anticipation of submissions which
 22 may be made on behalf of the families, but to put on
 23 record what the position is and why a closed hearing is
 24 necessary.
 25 Concerns have been expressed that this inquiry may

4

1 be more secret than inquests into the 7/7 bombings and
2 the terrorist attacks at Westminster and London Bridge.
3 There need be no such concern. The reason why this is
4 an inquiry and not an inquest is because, having
5 considered material from the security services,
6 I determined that it would not be possible to hold an
7 Article 2 compliant inquest.

8 An Article 2 inquest is one that looks in detail at
9 whether the state contributed to the death, amongst
10 other things. I considered that there were matters
11 concerning the state's response which could only be
12 considered in closed session because of the damage to
13 national security which would be caused if they were
14 heard in open.

15 There is no provision for having a closed hearing in
16 an inquest. The coroners in the 7/7 bombings and at
17 Westminster and London Bridge, having considered
18 material from the security services, considered that it
19 was possible to hold an Article 2 compliant inquest
20 without considering in evidence matters which could
21 damage national security.

22 A representative of the security services did give
23 evidence in those hearings but could not be asked
24 questions which might damage national security. At
25 least one member of the security service, in a similar

5

1 position to those who gave evidence at those inquests,
2 will give evidence in public at this inquiry and will be
3 able to answer any questions, provided the answers would
4 not damage national security. That will be the same
5 procedure as adopted in the 7/7, Westminster and London
6 Bridge inquests.

7 But in addition to what happened in those inquests,
8 that same witness and other witnesses from the security
9 service and Counter-terrorism Police will give evidence
10 on matters which can't be given in public for reasons of
11 national security. It is this evidence which will be
12 heard in closed session.

13 The Intelligence and Security Committee of
14 Parliament in the course of their investigations into
15 the Manchester bombing held closed sessions. They made
16 significant redactions in their report for reasons of
17 national security. They also said that they wished they
18 could have made all the evidence they heard public but
19 couldn't in the interests of protecting the public.
20 We will take the same approach. We will make public as
21 much as we can, having taken into account the effect of
22 disclosure on national security, as we are bound to do
23 as a matter of law.

24 In conclusion, I wish to make two things absolutely
25 clear. Firstly, my investigation of matters in the

6

1 closed hearings, in whatever form they ultimately take
2 as a result of my rulings, will be no less robust than
3 will occur in open. I am committed to achieving this.

4 Secondly, insofar as it is possible, and to the
5 extent that it is possible without damaging national
6 security, where I identify or uncover any failings or
7 things which should have been done better in the course
8 of the closed hearings, I will make those public as part
9 of my open report.

10 MR GREANEY: Sir, thank you very much. We will now invite
11 Mr Cooper to address you on behalf of the 11 bereaved
12 families that he represents.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Sorry for that delay,
14 Mr Cooper.

15 Opening statement by MR COOPER

16 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.

17 Sir, the progress towards this inquiry has been
18 rigorous, painstaking and long, perhaps even longer than
19 expected as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
20 meant that you, your team and all of us have had to
21 think in ways about presentation and practical
22 arrangements for a hearing of this magnitude in ways we
23 could have hardly imagined.

24 Recently, we are aware of the increased COVID threat
25 and further steps we know will probably have to be taken

7

1 to protect the ongoing process of this inquiry. The
2 families who we represent are grateful to you and your
3 team and to the administrative support staff behind the
4 scenes that have made so far the smooth running of this
5 inquiry possible.

6 Characteristic collaboration has brought us to this
7 state. Throughout this process, those who we represent
8 have had but one objective and that objective is to
9 achieve a thorough, fearless and critical examination of
10 all material which can answer a fundamental question:
11 how could it happen that people simply going to
12 a concert in one of the most vibrant and exciting cities
13 in Britain should lose their lives?

14 It was in fact, in terms of loss, the worst
15 terrorist outrage in this city's history. And as we all
16 know, this inquiry has a huge burden of expectation upon
17 its shoulders. The words we speak today in this opening
18 statement are directed by you to be non-critical. We
19 respect that directive. It is a fair and sensible
20 requirement of us all at this early stage of the
21 inquiry.

22 You, sir, have heard no evidence, had no analysis
23 and testing of the wealth of material disclosed to you
24 and have not yet seen witnesses forensically tested.
25 Over the next months that will happen. For now, we

8

1 address you, with the families at the centre of what
 2 we have to say.
 3 What their imperatives are, what they expect and,
 4 with the greatest of respect to this inquiry, what they
 5 demand.
 6 And the essence of all this is full participation,
 7 and to that effect we ask the inquiry to be vigilant and
 8 protective, so far as it is reasonable, as to the open
 9 nature of these hearings, and we are reassured by your
 10 observations, sir, at the start of this morning as to
 11 your diligence and determination to ensure that that
 12 takes place.
 13 That the inquiry be aware that as a result of the
 14 COVID-19 pandemic there are restrictions placed upon
 15 those who can attend in person in this main hearing room
 16 and that you at all times, sir, please, prioritise the
 17 families when it comes to direct presence to sit and
 18 listen to the evidence, which will ultimately hold
 19 people and organisations to account.
 20 The purpose, of course, of this opening statement is
 21 to indicate to this inquiry what those we represent ask
 22 of this inquiry, and there are fundamental questions,
 23 but participation is at the centre of the families'
 24 involvement in this inquiry, and we know, sir, that
 25 you will be vigilant to achieve that.

1 John Atkinson, Kelly Brewster, Georgina Callander,
 2 Wendy Fawell, Martyn Hett, Megan Hurley, Nell Jones,
 3 Angelika Klis, Marcin Klis, Lisa Lees, Eilidh MacLeod,
 4 Elaine McIver, and ten others who are equally
 5 representative, went to a concert at Manchester Arena on
 6 22 May 2017. It was a place where they were entitled --
 7 entitled -- to feel safe. It was a place where they and
 8 their families expected -- expected -- and trusted that
 9 those charged with their safety would ensure that they
 10 would be returned to their families and loved ones,
 11 talking of nothing other than the excitement of
 12 wonderful experiences, listening to one of their
 13 favourite singers.
 14 Tragically, that did not happen, and it is the
 15 solemn aim of this inquiry to dig deep and find out why
 16 that did not happen, for any organisation or person who
 17 fell short of their duties and responsibilities to be
 18 held fairly but clearly accountable, and for the many,
 19 on the night, individuals and members of the public,
 20 strangers and friends alike, who were nothing short of
 21 heroes in the aftermath of this atrocity, to be
 22 recognised for their compassion, courage and simple
 23 humanity.
 24 Each of those who we represent, and indeed those who
 25 will be spoken of by their own representatives, were

1 individuals. We've heard their names. We have listened
 2 with pride, hearing about their lives and timeless
 3 memories and influence that they have left upon
 4 countless people. They had much ahead of them and their
 5 legacies will never be far from our thoughts in the work
 6 ahead of us in this inquiry.
 7 For all of them and the brave dignified families who
 8 it has been our honour to represent and come to know
 9 over the last two and a half years or so whilst we've
 10 been preparing for this inquiry, it is vitally important
 11 that lessons which need to be learned are learned and
 12 well learned, because the track record of many
 13 organisations we may hear from during the course of this
 14 inquiry charged with keeping us safe is that they simply
 15 do not learn lessons and do not heed warnings.
 16 It may be that in the course of evidence during
 17 these hearings it will become apparent that some
 18 organisations upon which we rely to keep us safe have
 19 failed to learn lessons, with tragic consequence, and
 20 that their failure has played a significant part in
 21 what was done and how emergency services conducted
 22 themselves in the aftermath of this cruel detonation.
 23 For those we represent, that can no longer be tolerated.
 24 Was the terrible act committed by Salman and
 25 Hashem Abedi supported or encouraged by others who will

1 always lurk in the dark crevices of depravity something
 2 which could have been avoided and may it be said that we
 3 could have done better? If that's the case, we demand
 4 that this time the lessons of this inquiry are learned.
 5 Before, I listed the names of the families who we
 6 represent in alphabetical order, and of course there is
 7 no hierarchy; all of those who lost their lives at the
 8 end of the Ariana Grande concert did so within close
 9 proximity to each other and although they died in
 10 a shared and unified tragedy, they will always remain
 11 individuals and individuals with distinct lives.
 12 Neither do we forget the appalling suffering and
 13 life-changing impact upon those who survived and
 14 suffered injuries. Quite properly, this inquiry will
 15 focus upon the events which led to the deaths of
 16 22 victims, but we know that the experience of many who
 17 survived will be an important part of this process which
 18 we encourage, some of them families or friends of those
 19 who were murdered.
 20 One of them, for instance, is Bradley Hurley, the
 21 brother of Megan Hurley. He had been with his sister
 22 when the bomb was detonated and he was lying on
 23 a makeshift stretcher when seen by emergency services
 24 after an incredibly long wait. In fact, Bradley was one
 25 of the last to be carried from the City Room, over

1 an hour and 8 minutes after the detonation of the bomb.
 2 His mother was with him, his father remained with Megan,
 3 in a terrible division of responsibility . The clear
 4 focus for this inquiry is upon the individual victims
 5 and it is in applying this fundamental approach that
 6 I'll spend some time addressing you, sir , of them, what
 7 happened to them on the night, 22 May 2017.

8 I raise with you now examples of their concerns and
 9 imperatives that we respectfully submit this inquiry
 10 should be seized of and will do so individual by
 11 individual , although I add, sir , if I need to add, that
 12 many are common concerns, many are common questions and
 13 many are common worries.

14 John Atkinson. John loved music. Ariana Grande was
 15 one of his favourite singers . He was a popular,
 16 hard-working, caring young man, blessed with a wonderful
 17 sense of humour. For many people he was a role model,
 18 loved son, much-missed brother, idolised uncle and
 19 loving partner . He left home on the afternoon of 22 May
 20 to go to the Ariana Grande concert with his lifelong
 21 friend , Gemma O'Donnell. The tickets, like a number of
 22 those whose lives were cruelly taken from them, were in
 23 fact Christmas presents . He and Gemma had been looking
 24 forward to the concert for months.

25 Timing is important for John Atkinson. At

13

1 22.30.48 hours, John and Gemma were walking across the
 2 City Room heading towards the stairs that lead back down
 3 the stairs to the NCP car park, which is where John had
 4 parked his car.

5 22.31 hours is the moment of detonation. As it
 6 clear , John can be seen on his hands and knees crawling
 7 along the City Room floor. It is not the purpose of
 8 this opening, sir , I'm sure you will take it from me, to
 9 add to the distress and trauma already inflicted upon
 10 the bereaved and we are ever conscious of the
 11 vulnerability of all families who listen to these
 12 proceedings and who listen now, but central to the
 13 concerns of the family of John are how he was cared for ,
 14 how he was treated, and how he was protected after this
 15 vicious attack had taken place .

16 Was he attended to quickly enough? We emphasise the
 17 murderous intent of Salman Abedi on the night brought
 18 about John's injuries , but the question which must be
 19 asked about him is: could he have survived? Could he
 20 have survived? Were things done or, more to the point ,
 21 were there failures in the treatment and care of John
 22 which meant that he did not survive when he could have
 23 lived ?

24 Could John have been saved? Immediately after the
 25 bomb was exploded John was clearly conscious and the

14

1 inquiry might consider that time was of the essence . At
 2 23.20.09 hours, he seemed to start trying to roll over
 3 on to his back. At 23.20.25 hours, John stretches out
 4 both of his arms above his head. He then rolls himself
 5 back towards his stomach. John tries to get up at
 6 23.20.50 hours. He puts his arms underneath his body
 7 and starts to push himself up by his elbows.

8 I spoke earlier of heroes. Here now is one such
 9 individual . His name is Ronald Blake, a complete
 10 stranger to John and yet one who compassionately tended
 11 to him in the most desperate of moments. He spoke to
 12 John, gave him water, applied a bandage to his leg .
 13 Mr Blake explained that it felt like ages before anyone
 14 came to help. And when the paramedic did arrive , he
 15 recalls John saying, "I'm going to die, aren't I?" to
 16 which the paramedic responded, "Not on my watch you're
 17 not". But as we tragically know, John was to die.

18 There were no stretchers for John. There were
 19 simply not enough. Metal queue barriers were improvised
 20 as stretchers for the injured , but there were no metal
 21 queue barriers for John. A British Transport Police
 22 officer retrieved an advertisement board made of
 23 cardboard -- an advertisement board, sir -- that was
 24 John's stretcher . It was this upon which he was
 25 precariously taken down the steps to the

15

1 Victoria Station area.

2 We've seen the footage. During this time, he's seen
 3 to lift his head slightly and appears to look around
 4 over the top of the board to see where he is being
 5 carried to. The time is 23.23.13 hours, and at this
 6 stage John is described as conscious and breathing, "But
 7 his appearance was as waxy as hell ". He was virtually
 8 naked and had a makeshift tourniquet on his lower limbs.
 9 This is, in our submission, in this opening statement on
 10 behalf of John's family, important: it was clear that he
 11 had lost a lot of blood and the inquiry may conclude,
 12 having heard the evidence, that this is an important
 13 piece of evidence when it comes to survivability .

14 A pulse oximeter was applied to him to measure his
 15 heart rate, but he had no circulatory volume due to
 16 chronic blood loss . John was not moved from the scene
 17 for about 46 minutes. Forty-six minutes.

18 At 23.24.25 hours, John is carried through the
 19 casualty clearing station and can be seen being laid
 20 down. He remains at this location for the next
 21 24 minutes with little being done for him. Then he is
 22 attended to by a number of North West Ambulance Service
 23 personnel .

24 At 23.46.12 hours, John is lifted on to an ambulance
 25 trolley and at 23.47.45 hours, CPR is commenced; John

16

1 had gone into cardiac arrest . John is put into an
2 ambulance at 23.59.37 hours and it leaves the arena,
3 arriving at hospital some 6 to 7 minutes later , but John
4 does not survive .

5 For John, the CCTV evidence from the City Room and
6 the body worn footage of police officers is vital . It
7 graphically shows the pathetic inadequacy of a cardboard
8 advertising board substituting for a stretcher , despite
9 the very best efforts of those struggling with it , we
10 emphasise. They need a trolley or a stretcher to
11 support John, but nothing comes. John can actually be
12 seen desperately holding on to the piece of cardboard as
13 he's carried towards the stairs .

14 At some time a metal barrier is brought to John and
15 he is lifted using the cardboard advertisement board
16 he is laid upon. It begins to break. It gives way.
17 And John is clearly seen to drop from about knee height
18 on to the metal barrier positioned below.

19 The inquiry will hear this evidence and it will be,
20 of course, a matter for you, sir , to decide whether this
21 is anywhere near acceptable and who is accountable for
22 this .

23 The family of John Atkinson would like to know why
24 it is that a venue of the size of Manchester Arena,
25 which can cater for a capacity of over 20,000 people,

17

1 assisted by emergency services , between them, between
2 them, could only provide John with a cardboard
3 advertisement board and lately a metal queue barrier
4 during his critical moments. The combined resources of
5 those responsible -- and we'll come on to them later --
6 for the care and protection of those that attended
7 Manchester Arena, assisted by the emergency services ,
8 fire , ambulance, what you will , mustered between them
9 a cardboard piece of advertisement board, which
10 ultimately broke and allowed John to fall from knee
11 height on to the metal barrier .

12 Provision to our families that we represent and
13 indeed particularly for those bereaved of John Atkinson
14 is vital . Provision or the chronic lack of it . How can
15 those responsible for the safety and security of
16 children , young people and the adults collecting them
17 justify this hopeless provision , we ask? How is it that
18 equipment under the control of all these services seems
19 to have been inadequately deployed, because you'll hear,
20 sir , during the course of evidence -- and the families
21 ask you, as we know you will , to focus particularly on
22 this -- that some of the equipment needed, stretchers
23 and otherwise, which may have assisted John Atkinson at
24 this time were actually with the Ambulance Service, were
25 even with the Fire Services , but they were simply not

18

1 deployed.

2 So it's not just a simple matter, we ask this
3 inquiry to look into as far as the provision of these
4 matters, stretchers and so forth , in the arena, but why
5 it is the vast resources , certainly one would hope so
6 far as stretchers and equipment is concerned, which was
7 within the immediate province of the emergency services,
8 was simply not used, so much so John Atkinson is carried
9 down on a piece of cardboard, which breaks under his
10 body.

11 In many respects, sir , the quality of experts
12 provided to you, on a range of issues ranging from the
13 police and fire services through to the security of the
14 arena and national security , ambulance and blast effects
15 have been fearless and searching . But for John,
16 pathology and cardiology is at the centre of their focus
17 and for good reason, and they respectfully ask, and we
18 know that it will be so, that it is also central for
19 your consideration .

20 John died in hospital at 00.24 hours on 23 May 2017.
21 The cause of death was recorded by Dr Naomi Carter,
22 a forensic pathologist , as leg injuries and, crucially ,
23 ischaemic heart disease . It was found that he had lost
24 a considerable quantity of blood, and you'll remember,
25 sir , I referred to that a moment ago as perhaps central

19

1 to this issue . And the opinion expressed was that he
2 died principally from the effects of blood loss from his
3 leg wounds.

4 Post-mortem examination found that John had
5 significant heart disease, one of his coronary arteries
6 contained a point stenosis , a blockage, by atheroma,
7 a fatty substance, which causes furring-up of the
8 coronary arteries . There was a fibrotic scar on his
9 heart which had clearly been present for months or
10 years, most likely due to the partial blockage to the
11 artery causing damage to the heart muscle. In medical
12 terms John had a condition called ischaemic heart
13 disease . The pathologist opined that the disease could
14 have made his heart more susceptible to failure in
15 a setting of hypovolaemia as a result of his leg
16 injuries , thereby hastening his death and it could have
17 reduced the chances of successful resuscitation .

18 Of course, receipt of this information caused the
19 inquiry and the bereaved to ask troubling questions .
20 Could John have survived the devastating injuries
21 inflicted by Salman Abedi? The cardiologist , in
22 a report prepared for this inquiry , states that if it
23 had been possible to get John from the scene and deliver
24 him to a pre-alerted trauma team at hospital before
25 cardiac arrest then survival might have been possible .

20

1 It seems that John was untreated for 46 to
 2 47 minutes. Was this crucial to John's survivability ?
 3 Did the delays in getting him to hospital , exacerbated
 4 by the inappropriate and hopelessly , we submit,
 5 inadequate method of transporting him count against him
 6 in his battle to live ?

7 If John were here now, he would be asking about the
 8 procedures and protocols which dictated how many
 9 responders from the ambulance and fire services could
 10 quickly and effectively have got to him to provide him
 11 with vital , potentially life -saving help. He is not
 12 here but we are, and we are now his voice .

13 I spoke a moment ago about the cardboard
 14 advertisement board upon which John's stricken body was
 15 carried . Those who we represent ask about compliance
 16 with the so-called Purple Guide, which states that event
 17 organisers must provide medical provision at every
 18 event, no matter the size . The scale of the provision
 19 will depend, says the guide, upon the size and type of
 20 the event -- and sir, you will have in mind this
 21 particular event -- and adequate medical provision for
 22 the build-up and the derigging of an event , and
 23 verification of the capability of medical services that
 24 they contract to ensure they have suitable experience
 25 and qualifications .

1 Some of the earlier work in this inquiry , in fact
 2 work coming up within chapter 7, may well be looking at
 3 exactly how this was interpreted by those responsible
 4 for the protection and safety of children , young people
 5 and the adults there to collect them.

6 It is the responsibility of the event organiser to
 7 ensure that appropriate medical, ambulance and welfare
 8 provision is available to all those involved in their
 9 events. They are required , as we've seen from
 10 disclosure , to provide a comprehensive risk assessment
 11 and John's family require this inquiry to carefully
 12 consider the adequacy of that risk assessment.

13 We expect the inquiry to carefully examine the
 14 communications between SMG, ShowSec and Live Nation, and
 15 to decide if one of the reasons that security at the
 16 arena, and even medical provision , was perhaps
 17 underwhelming was, to put it bluntly , penny-pinching.

18 The inquiry may come to the view that an attack such
 19 as happened in the City Room on 22 May 2017 of its type,
 20 scale and complexity should have been entirely
 21 foreseeable . John and his family are right to have
 22 expected that sufficient arrangements were in place to
 23 meet the needs of potential victims at such
 24 a foreseeable incident and foreseeability for the
 25 families is an important question they ask the inquiry

1 to delve into .

2 As a fact , Patrick Ennis, a North West Ambulance
 3 Service advanced paramedic, was the first of NWAS'
 4 personnel to be present at the scene. He was
 5 responsible for the initial ambulance assessment of the
 6 scene and for reporting back to ambulance control.

7 Further resources arrived at Manchester
 8 Victoria Station, and ambulance commanders decided to
 9 focus on the ensuing clinical needs of those who were
 10 injured there. Only, if I may use that word, sir , three
 11 members of ambulance staff were allocated to care for
 12 patients in the City Room.

13 The majority of those in the City Room giving care
 14 and dignity to the dead, dying and stricken were, like
 15 Ronald Blake with John Atkinson, members of the public,
 16 some looking for their own loved ones, some police,
 17 rail , and indeed arena staff .

18 Mr Ennis was the only paramedic in the City Room for
 19 the first 40 minutes. The families ask why? Why
 20 is that? What palpably went wrong?

21 Forty crucial minutes for John Atkinson.

22 A police officer presciently asked, "Where are the
 23 ambulances, please?"

24 The family of John Atkinson require this inquiry to
 25 consider : whether North West Ambulance Service had

1 learned lessons from previous training exercises ; how
 2 effective the ambulance command structure was; why was
 3 it that although an initial team of specially trained
 4 responders were present at the scene, only two of those
 5 were allocated to the City Room where John and others
 6 lay seriously injured ; why no stretcher or bulk medical
 7 supplies were supplied to the City Room despite being
 8 available within the Ambulance Service; and just how
 9 effective was the intra-agency communication and
 10 coordination ; and where was the Fire Service with all
 11 their specialist life -saving equipment?

12 As I will deal with later , their response was
 13 delayed for a full 2 hours despite -- and the families
 14 find this startling and ask for an inquiry into the
 15 matter -- despite being notified of the attack within
 16 3 minutes of it? The Fire Service were notified of the
 17 attack within 3 minutes and yet, effectively , they were
 18 delayed from responding and helping these poor people
 19 for 2 hours.

20 Neither should the inquiry apply any less diligence
 21 to the role of Manchester Arena in providing an adequate
 22 first medical response. In the period from 22 March to
 23 19 June 2017, the UK was subject to four separate
 24 terrorist -related events. This is 22 March to
 25 19 June 2017, the precise time block that blighted

1 Manchester Arena. Four separate terrorist - related
 2 events, causing devastation to families up and down the
 3 country and beyond. We ask the inquiry to look
 4 carefully at how SMG, ShowSec, Live Nation, and all
 5 those responsible for protecting these people took that
 6 into account, if at all, in protecting lives .

7 The official UK terror threat level on 22 May 2017
 8 was severe. Put another way, a terrorist attack of
 9 precisely the type directly perpetrated by Salman Abedi
 10 was highly likely . What happened at Manchester Arena in
 11 the City Room following the Ariana Grande concert
 12 tragically can, or certainly should, not have come as
 13 any surprise to any of the emergency services, the
 14 security services , or indeed the local or national
 15 government, let alone those responsible for the care of
 16 people in the arena .

17 Accountability . John’s family and all those who we
 18 represent ask the central and fundamental question: were
 19 they prepared or did they leave the deceased vulnerable
 20 and exposed to murderers like Salman Abedi and those who
 21 helped or encouraged him? Of course, that is a key
 22 question for this inquiry .

23 In the names of all our families , this inquiry will
 24 most carefully examine the role of the emergency
 25 responders. In demanding this they will say on a number

1 of other occasions that it must not be taken as
 2 a detraction from the heroic and courageous work done by
 3 many of the rank and file working in the emergency
 4 services that dreadful night. For the police ,
 5 ambulance, fire and members of the public, the records
 6 of selflessness and professionalism to the highest
 7 standards is laced throughout the statements we have
 8 read on countless occasions .

9 Many of those responders themselves have been left
 10 with psychological legacies as a result of what they saw
 11 and what they had to do that night , which may never
 12 leave them, and we are palpably aware of that. But this
 13 will not distract us from assisting this inquiry to
 14 fulfil its primary duty to our families : fearless and
 15 independent scrutiny of how emergency services and
 16 others responded and, for John, whether his life might
 17 have been saved .

18 For many, the role of the Fire Service is central
 19 around keeping us safe from fires , but their expertise
 20 goes far beyond that. They had expertise which, if
 21 deployed, could have provided specialist care and
 22 equipment to those injured in the City Room and
 23 crucially those, like John, who may have had a chance of
 24 survival .

25 The Fire Service too were impacted by the police

1 declaration of Operation Plato, which we know, and the
 2 families expect the inquiry to look carefully into. All
 3 of the families who we represent are crucially concerned
 4 that the inquiry should analyse multi-agency operations
 5 and decide whether they were effective or not and
 6 particularly whether the lessons of the previous
 7 multi-agency exercise Winchester Accord held at the
 8 Trafford Centre taught or presented any lessons .

9 The Winchester Accord for those we represent is
 10 central , we respectfully submit, to this inquiry 's
 11 investigation as to the adequacy of responding services .
 12 To put the matter colloquially , it 's not like they
 13 weren't warned.

14 The Winchester Accord exercise was specifically
 15 tasked to test the response of emergency services to
 16 a given scenario , taking place, poignantly, we add, on 9
 17 to 11 May 2016, a year before this awful event. During
 18 the exercise , systemic issues and points of failure were
 19 highlighted -- that's the point of these things, to
 20 highlight these things -- that were to be virtually
 21 identical to those which occurred exactly a year later
 22 to the day.

23 Winchester should have been a timely wake-up call
 24 for the emergency services . We ask the inquiry to
 25 examine whether it was. It was designed to test

1 inter -agency communication, strategy, command and
 2 control , and amongst other things, talking to each
 3 other.

4 The Fire Service's connectivity with the police
 5 operation room was also examined. It was designed so
 6 that lessons could be learned, it was designed so that
 7 the public, who deserve the protection of the emergency
 8 services , barely a year later , could rely upon them and
 9 trust them.

10 Winchester Accord delivered and lessons were taught
 11 over the period in May 2016 and the families will want
 12 to know if anyone was listening to those lessons . And
 13 if not, why not.

14 For those who lost loved ones, there is no doubt
 15 solace that now, after 22 people lost their lives ,
 16 we will hear no doubt of lessons studiously learned . No
 17 doubt this inquiry will hear from organisations how,
 18 this time, they have finally got it right .

19 But for those people who we have heard so much about
 20 during the pen portraits , one cannot avoid this question
 21 and ask the inquiry to have it firmly in mind: is this
 22 too little ? And even if it 's not, how does it come that
 23 for 22 people and their families it has been palpably
 24 too late for the emergency services to learn their
 25 lessons ?

1 We will hear, no doubt, and the families again will
 2 have solace to hear, what now has been done since this
 3 tragedy. Whilst marking all that, the questions we ask
 4 this inquiry to remain steadfastly focused to primarily
 5 is: why did it take the loss of 22 lives for it to be
 6 done?
 7 One of the most important lessons provided by
 8 Winchester Accord was that police commanders, tactical
 9 firearm commanders and Greater Manchester Police Gold,
 10 who had overall command, poorly communicated -- this was
 11 the lesson of Winchester -- with other responding
 12 services, leading to "significant delays" -- a familiar
 13 refrain on 22 May 2017, a year after this warning was
 14 given -- in deploying Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue
 15 Service and North West Ambulance Service.
 16 Sir, you cannot underestimate the concern -- I don't
 17 even say anger because these families, I say now, are so
 18 dignified and have such integrity that it's hard even to
 19 use that word, but I'll use it -- and anger that must be
 20 there as to why it was in Winchester Accord there were
 21 significant delays recorded in deploying
 22 Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North
 23 West Ambulance Service and it happened again a year
 24 later. All of our families cling to the hope that the
 25 lessons of Winchester Accord have been learned, but if

1 they have not, they demand accountability and not simply
 2 be told that it's better now. They want to know why it
 3 wasn't then.
 4 The families need to know whether the critically
 5 injured could have been evacuated quicker and for John
 6 that was the particular imperative. His family would
 7 like to know if specialists within the Fire Service were
 8 sent directly to the arena without delay -- the evidence
 9 says differently -- and need to be reassured that
 10 specialist units were not misdirected, perhaps wasting
 11 valuable time, particularly for those who could or might
 12 have been saved, and why it was that the Fire Service
 13 remained playing no meaningful role for over 2 hours
 14 after the attack, having been made aware of it 3 minutes
 15 after it happened.
 16 They were all trained for this at Winchester Accord,
 17 a year before. Those we represent need to know how this
 18 training impacted upon the performances of the emergency
 19 services on 22 May 2017. While the whole concept of
 20 bringing a major incident to an effective conclusion
 21 relies on each integral part of emergency services'
 22 response working closely to save lives, prevent further
 23 harm, reduce risk and return to normality, it may be
 24 that no single agency can achieve this in isolation.
 25 There are and were proposals in place to ensure that

1 a multi-agency approach worked. The joint decision
 2 model, JESIP, principles for joint working, co-location,
 3 communication and coordination, joint understanding and
 4 shared situational awareness, accurate METHANE messaging
 5 from responders on the scene. Our families ask, did
 6 these work? For John, and without doubt those we
 7 represent, these are some of the most crucial questions
 8 for you, sir, eclipsed by one most simple and poignant
 9 question by the family of John Atkinson: could our son,
 10 brother, loved one still be with us now?
 11 Kelly Brewster. Kelly went to the concert with her
 12 sister and her niece, Hollie Booth. Hollie, another one
 13 of those brave survivors -- I met her in fact last week.
 14 Another survivor, she was here watching Kelly's pen
 15 portrait as well, emphasising again the impact upon
 16 those who are left with us.
 17 They left the event as soon as Ariana Grande had
 18 left the stage and the main lights had come on. All
 19 three entered the concourse inside the arena, shoulder
 20 to shoulder with crowds of other people. The City Room
 21 was busy, teeming with happy, excited people, and others
 22 waiting for them to take them back to the safety of
 23 their homes.
 24 Claire was in front, Hollie behind her and Kelly
 25 close behind Hollie. It was an order which they decided

1 upon to make sure that everyone was safe, kept together
 2 and did not get lost. What happened next is but one
 3 example of the hideously random consequences of Abedi's
 4 murderous actions.
 5 Within seconds, a noise is heard and intense heat
 6 flashes across the area. Claire was knocked off her
 7 feet and Hollie was thrown to the floor, seriously
 8 injured, but Kelly was nowhere to be seen. Hollie's
 9 injuries were so serious that she could not be left
 10 alone. A short distance away, Kelly lay injured and
 11 unresponsive. A member of the public remained with
 12 Kelly for some time. She was not alone as a number of
 13 courageous people tried desperately to save her life.
 14 Again this, is important for her family and other
 15 families too, that their loved ones were not alone when
 16 they died.
 17 Like all of those who were lost on the night, Kelly
 18 was loved by all who knew her. She loved travelling and
 19 in 2012/2013 travelled to Australia, backpacking across
 20 the country. And then it was off to America, New York,
 21 Chicago, Los Angeles and the Grand Canyon. Of course,
 22 she also loved music.
 23 Her partner, Ian, describing her as a loving,
 24 caring, independent, fun-loving and ambitious woman.
 25 She and Ian had put down a deposit for their home on

1 22 May. Upon paying the deposit, Ian received a folder
 2 from the builder, which he photographed and sent to
 3 Kelly on WhatsApp. He did not speak to her again.
 4 There was chaos and panic all around those trying to
 5 help Kelly. The City Room was a scene of utter
 6 devastation, some people were alive, some injured, some
 7 dead, their faces covered by makeshift dignity, an
 8 Ariana Grande T-shirt, a scrunched-up hoodie as a
 9 pillow. It was an area described by one PC as "hell".
 10 Because of the lack of trained personnel in the
 11 City Room, Kelly's family and all those who were
 12 suffering would like to know whether this panic and
 13 chaos would have been reduced by a more immediate
 14 presence of trained responders. Were too many demands
 15 being placed upon too few and, at times, heroic people?
 16 Those we represent would like to ask how it came to
 17 pass that Salman Abedi, his brother Hashem, and others
 18 were not caught and neutralised long before Salman
 19 walked into Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017. It is
 20 important to all our families that this inquiry
 21 carefully examine the role of the security services, the
 22 police service, and the Prison Service during the days,
 23 months and years leading up to this murderous attack.
 24 Kelly's family, and indeed all of those who we
 25 represent, completely understand and accept the need to

1 protect the important work done by our security services
 2 in protecting the country, especially during these
 3 dangerous times, and heed again your timely
 4 observations, sir, this morning. Nothing that they ask
 5 is meant to jeopardise or put in harm's way the men and
 6 women who undertake this work and often bravely. And we
 7 are vigilant that nothing publicly disclosed during this
 8 inquiry reveals or exposes strategic or tactical
 9 information which might provide an advantage to
 10 terrorists.
 11 Indeed, we recognise now the very fact that we sit
 12 here today in a public inquiry rather than an inquest is
 13 a direct result of you, sir, recommending that it be so
 14 to enable you to receive and consider sensitive evidence
 15 from the security services that even we, as counsel for
 16 the families, are not allowed to see or hear.
 17 Having acknowledged this, our families and no doubt
 18 others as well require that all material which can
 19 either be placed in the public domain with safety or be
 20 disclosed to the families is done and that your
 21 continued vigilance that redacted or otherwise
 22 restricted material at the request of the security
 23 services is only so treated after a careful and rigorous
 24 process by this inquiry, and it is a concern, sir, of
 25 the families.

1 Moving on, perhaps from the perfectly understandable
 2 closed hearing situation, that careful vigilance and
 3 rigorous examination is made of any request by the
 4 security services or otherwise to redact or delete
 5 material from documentation. And I know that is
 6 a matter that is at the forefront of your mind; it
 7 certainly is for the families. For those we represent,
 8 transparency goes hand in hand with accountability.
 9 Salman Abedi was known to the security services and
 10 had been known to them for some time before this
 11 atrocity. Our families and those who died would like to
 12 know about the role of Abdalraouf Abdallah and how it
 13 came to be that Salman Abedi was in communication with
 14 him, how this was allowed and whether it was known by
 15 the security services or any other law enforcement
 16 agency.
 17 Abdallah is a convicted terrorist, who in 2017 was
 18 in custody at HMP Altcourse. He was convicted of
 19 facilitating the provision of men, weapons and money to
 20 be used for terrorist purposes in Syria. In fact, he
 21 facilitated the travel of three males who eventually
 22 joined the Islamic State.
 23 I will deal with the facts without comment.
 24 Salman Abedi visited him or planned to visit him in
 25 prison on multiple occasions. One visit by Salman to

1 Abdallah on 26 February 2015 lasted for 1.5 hours.
 2 There was a planned visit on 17 January 2017 and an
 3 actual visit on 18 January 2017, for an hour, with
 4 another planned visit to prison on 6 March 2017.
 5 The visit on 18 January by Salman directly coincided
 6 with Hashem facilitating the purchase of sulphuric acid.
 7 In fact, Salman first communicated with him on
 8 14 September 2013. He had also been speaking to
 9 Abdallah between 24 July 2014 and 28 August 2014. These
 10 visits were not monitored. There was no regulation of
 11 Investigatory Powers Act authority applied for. It is
 12 unknown what was discussed, but what we do know and what
 13 the families want to know more of is how it came that
 14 Salman Abedi was permitted to speak to Abdallah whilst
 15 he was imprisoned. Were there any restrictions placed
 16 on Abdallah whilst in custody? He was, after all, an
 17 influential extremist with links to Islamic State.
 18 Abdallah and Abedi discussed, amongst other things,
 19 for instance, martyrdom. The families ask, was Abdallah
 20 imposing extremist views upon Salman, encouraging him
 21 and assisting him in his murderous enterprise? In what
 22 way, if any, did Abdallah influence, motivate or even
 23 plan the attack upon Manchester Arena? Did the security
 24 services know of these meetings? Why did the Prison
 25 Service allow them to happen?

1 Georgina Callander. For the bereaved of Georgina,
2 that most poignant of needs, that their loved one did
3 not die alone is stark and it needs to be established .
4 Sir, you'll recall that I referred to one PC,
5 Justin Casson, in fact, calling what he saw at the arena
6 as "hell". In fact, he lived in the same village as
7 Georgina and she worked in his local supermarket. The
8 inquiry will readily accept that whole communities have
9 been devastated by this tragedy and the death of each
10 and every victim .
11 Another Christmas present, a ticket to the
12 Ariana Grande concert. Georgina loved life . She had
13 a very close relationship with her mother. Recently she
14 had secured a place at university to study paediatrics .
15 A happy, content 18-year-old on the edge of adulthood
16 and life experiences .
17 At the end of the concert, they left their seats and
18 walked into the City Room, where the box office is
19 located. An area of interest, we ask in passing: did
20 this box office have bulletproof glass when it was
21 installed -- and if so, why -- and what was the risk
22 that caused its installation ?
23 Georgina headed towards the merchandise stall to buy
24 an Ariana Grande T-shirt. She turned and smiled at her
25 friend, Aliya Rule, with whom she'd attended the

37

1 concert. Georgina was excitedly running towards the
2 stall . Aliya was about to run towards the stall as well
3 when she described being:
4 "... surrounded by bright lights and things were
5 floating in the air like what you get at a bonfire."
6 She was injured and fled for safety and was
7 eventually carried to a double-decker bus which carried
8 her to hospital. Some time later Aliya learned that,
9 sadly, her friend had died .
10 I want to speak to you now, sir, of another
11 courageous officer of the Greater Manchester Police, PC
12 Lauren Moore, who, amongst others, was with Georgina.
13 At her feet were Bradley Hurley and Megan Hurley.
14 PC Moore spoke to Bradley, who could not feel his legs,
15 and she watched as Megan and Bradley's parent arrived
16 grief-stricken . More of that later .
17 PC Moore was with Georgina as people were working on
18 her trying to save her. She took her belt off and used
19 it as a tourniquet beneath her knee. She watched as
20 Georgina, like many before and after her, was carried
21 away on a makeshift stretcher .
22 Paramedic Patrick Ennis, one of the few who attended
23 swiftly to the scene, you'll recall, noted, "She's one
24 of the highest priorities ." Georgina was 18 when she
25 died .

38

1 How is it that a young man of similar age could have
2 become so grossly perverted and murderous? How
3 Salman Abedi was radicalised is an important question
4 which needs to be answered. Following the downfall of
5 the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, Salman Abedi
6 travelled to Libya and got a job locating Gaddafi
7 supporters . He returned to the UK 9 months later and
8 started at Manchester College.
9 Again, on 18 July 2014, he travelled from Manchester
10 to Tripoli and, on 14 August 2014, Salman and his
11 brother were evacuated to the United Kingdom and
12 returned once again to Manchester.
13 Salman now moved in different circles and began to
14 express support for ISIS. About one year before the
15 attack on Manchester Arena, Salman Abedi significantly
16 changed, on the documentation we've received, and
17 expressed extreme religious views, including discussions
18 about jihad . The change to many seemed rapid. During
19 the search of Salman's home in Elsmore Road after this
20 atrocity, numerous images were recovered of him and his
21 brother in military uniform with weapons taken,
22 startlingly, in 2011. This may seem to indicate that
23 even then, they had received a level of military
24 training .
25 Salman Abedi ultimately returned to the

39

1 United Kingdom on 18 May 2017, days before this
2 atrocity, when he immediately commenced hostile
3 surveillance of the Manchester Arena complex on the
4 18th, 21st and 22 May.
5 The inquiry may conclude that this attack was
6 ideologically motivated by Islamist extremism. This was
7 certainly quickly concluded by the criminal
8 investigation team on the basis of the type of attack,
9 the early identifies of the bombers' recent movements,
10 and the terrorist severe threat level at the time.
11 The families require, sir, clear answers as to how
12 Salman Abedi became radicalised. The criminal inquiry
13 has failed to do this and so this task now falls to this
14 public inquiry .
15 Was the role of their parents or siblings
16 significant in radicalising them? The criminal inquiry
17 considers that this is likely to be significant . In any
18 event, the criminal inquiry seemed to conclude that
19 radicalisation would have happened between 2015 and
20 2017, and that their actions to prepare for the attack
21 started in late 2016.
22 Were the security services or law enforcement
23 authorities aware of this radicalisation ? Were the
24 parents being monitored? There is evidence, for
25 instance, that their father took both Salman and Hashem

40

1 to train with weapons and to fight in Libya at various
 2 points. Was this known to security services or law
 3 enforcement agencies, and if so, what was done about it?
 4 Wendy Fawell. Wendy was waiting in the City Room
 5 following the concert to meet her daughter,
 6 Charlotte Fawell, who was attending with her boyfriend
 7 Lee Davis, aged 17, and his brother Ben, aged 12.
 8 Wendy had driven them all from Yorkshire to
 9 Manchester. At the end of the concert, arena was
 10 performing her last song, Dangerous Woman, when young
 11 Ben felt ill and left with Charlotte. Caroline and Ben
 12 and Lee's mother said they would meet them on the
 13 stairs.
 14 Again, the evidence with this victim, as with many
 15 of the others, speaks of the awful random nature of this
 16 attack. As they walked down the stairs, the entire
 17 arena just shook, say the witnesses. Wendy had come to
 18 meet them at the end of the concert. She waited with
 19 Caroline in the place many people waited at the end of
 20 the concert in the arena. This was the time when it was
 21 at its busiest. It's an important matter for many of
 22 our families, and obviously for those of Wendy, to ask
 23 questions of those responsible for arena security as to
 24 how conscious they were and what steps were placed to
 25 protect not just concertgoers but mothers, fathers,

1 members of families, who were standing at the most
 2 obvious place where they always stood to greet and meet
 3 their loved ones. What steps were taken for them?
 4 For a moment, Caroline lost sight of Wendy. The
 5 bomb detonated. Caroline was taken to hospital with her
 6 injuries and it was not until the Wednesday following
 7 the attack that she found out that her friend Wendy had
 8 died.
 9 Wendy was known as the life and soul of the party;
 10 you've heard the pen portrait, sir. She loved life and
 11 people loved her. She tried to mother everyone.
 12 Whether it was reading, sitting in the sun or simply
 13 spending time with family and friends, Wendy was loved
 14 by all who knew her and, as a school dinner lady, she
 15 loved children, who adored her back in return.
 16 She wasn't going to the concert. ShowSec was the
 17 company employed to protect and provide security to the
 18 arena for everyone who was rightfully there. Wendy was
 19 rightfully there. SMG is the parent company which runs
 20 the arena and ultimately organises the security
 21 providers who are responsible for security. This was
 22 a concert which would clearly attract young people and
 23 it was obvious that many of the youngsters would be
 24 picked up by parents and others at the end to be taken
 25 safely home. These people would habitually gather in

1 the City Room and SMG well knew it.
 2 Absolutely central to the concerns of all our
 3 families, whether the deceased was a concertgoer or
 4 collecting concertgoers, is the state of preparedness of
 5 security in the arena on 22 May and indeed before the
 6 attack, especially when Salman Abedi was conducting his
 7 hostile surveillance on, as the inquiry will recall,
 8 3 days: the 18th, 21st and 22 May.
 9 To do this, we suggest that the inquiry will be
 10 concerned with a number of questions to be directed at
 11 SMG, ShowSec and additionally Live Nation, connected
 12 with putting on the concert.
 13 We anticipate that there will be no doubt that SMG
 14 and ShowSec management accept they are responsible for
 15 the safety and security of those in the arena. We urge
 16 the inquiry to consider the arena risk assessments and
 17 decide whether it was adequate or flawed. Was it
 18 appropriate to simply refer to a risk assessment on an
 19 annual basis? Was the risk assessment suitable for
 20 large crowded venues? Did it properly take into account
 21 the severe risk level on a national basis of a terrorist
 22 threat?
 23 We know, and you will hear in evidence, the risk
 24 assessment provided by those responsible for security
 25 at the arena was assessed as low for this concert. At

1 a time in the middle of four national atrocities, with
 2 a national security level of severe, high risk,
 3 Manchester Arena considered they knew better and that it
 4 should be low. It is a primary question of those we
 5 represent, sir, as to why this is so and did the
 6 attitude to risk of those responsible for safety at the
 7 arena contribute to the loss of these people?
 8 If the risk assessment was flawed, what are the
 9 consequences and what danger, for instance, might Wendy
 10 and others have been exposed to? Did in fact the risk
 11 assessment tool even consider the risk of a terrorist
 12 attack? How reliable was the SMG/ShowSec algorithm?
 13 Did SMG/ShowSec understand thoroughly their security
 14 responsibilities?
 15 There's a big difference, sir, and we ask the
 16 inquiry to be vigilant as to what SMG/ShowSec say their
 17 responsibilities are as to what they thought they were
 18 then on 22 May 2017. Were they doing enough? Was the
 19 searching and screening of people attending the arena
 20 fit for purpose? And, in particular, was it capable of
 21 detecting someone like Salman Abedi with a rucksack that
 22 was so heavy on his back that he was struggling to walk?
 23 It may well be that bag checks are relevant or
 24 irrelevant to this particular attack, but they are
 25 relevant, sir, in the submission of those we represent,

1 in terms of the overall approach to security and whether
2 or not bag checks, one way or the other, would have
3 detected or stopped Abedi. The effect and
4 conscientiousness of those bag checks is important when
5 it comes it a mindset, we submit, as to how security was
6 being dealt with at this time.

7 Salman Abedi had a rucksack so heavy on his back
8 that he was struggling to walk. Should there have been
9 more private security personnel? Were those security
10 guards present properly trained? Who decided upon the
11 level of security and positioning of them? What impact
12 did cost have upon security? Finally, what influence
13 did those representing Ariana Grande's team have upon
14 the final provision of security?

15 Martyn Hett. Could security at the arena have
16 stopped or at least curtailed this tragedy? A question
17 which has become a lifelong campaign for the family of
18 Martyn Hett. Legacy, sir, is important to those we
19 represent, that the loss of their loved ones can at
20 least ensure that mistakes which might have been made,
21 misjudgements perhaps or even worse, if established,
22 never happen again.

23 Figen Murray is Martyn Hett's mother. She is
24 a passionate and eloquent speaker and instigator of
25 Martyn's Law. She puts it this way: as well as trying

1 to track down terrorists before they commit atrocities,
2 we also need to get better at protecting the public from
3 attacks we cannot foil. No one could possibly disagree,
4 we submit, with that.

5 Martyn's Law proposes that basic security procedures
6 are put in place at every venue and public space.
7 Martyn's Law does not advocate a one-size-fits-all
8 approach; it is simply about having a plan relevant to
9 the threat. Whilst this may ultimately be a job for
10 legislators, this inquiry and you, sir, in particular
11 have significant powers to make recommendations, so much
12 so that they are likely to be followed. It is this
13 aspect of your work upon which the family of Martyn Hett
14 are particularly engaged or, as Figen put it, to help
15 others.

16 Figen is a woman of humility, courage and deserves
17 to be listened to. She calls for the introduction of
18 new legislation to provide better protection from
19 terrorists for the British public, to create clarity of
20 responsibility and encourage good and protective
21 security practice, be it something as simple as
22 searching bags on entry to premises or a more
23 sophisticated approach for larger crowded places.
24 Martyn's Law proposes that training and awareness are
25 made available and adopted.

1 For those who do not wish to be deradicalised and
2 shun Prevent or simply slip through the police and
3 security net, Martyn's Law will help provide further and
4 additional protection from these people. Figen and no
5 doubt many others call upon you, sir, to consider
6 recommending the full implementation of Martyn's Law for
7 venues and spaces to: engage with freely available
8 counter-terrorism advice and training; conduct
9 vulnerability assessments of their operating places and
10 spaces; mitigate the risks created by vulnerabilities;
11 put in place a counter-terrorism plan; make it
12 a requirement for local authorities to plan for threats
13 of terrorism.

14 As you will have seen from his pen portraits during
15 the commemorative hearings, Martyn was a remarkable
16 young man and deserves this legacy. He loved music, he
17 had planned to tour America and was due to leave on
18 24 May. He's described by those who knew him as
19 a bubbly and lovely person who spent much of the concert
20 characteristically, on 22 May, dancing with others, some
21 he'd only just met and chatting to them. Evidence like
22 this is important to the families.

23 Mercifully, those who died were completely unaware
24 of what was about to befall them and it is some solace
25 that the evidence you will hear will establish that they

1 were enjoying the concert, the music and being amongst
2 like-minded fans.

3 On behalf of Figen and those who we represent, we
4 commend to you, sir, the recommendations of
5 Martyn's Law.

6 Megan Hurley. You'll recall me mentioning
7 Bradley Hurley, Megan's older brother earlier in this
8 opening statement. He's a survivor of the attack. His
9 sister was 15 when she died, a normal teenager, who had
10 just had a great time at the concert. The evidence
11 you'll hear concerning this family is as heartbreaking
12 as it is inspiring.

13 At the time that Bradley was being treated for very
14 serious injuries, from which he has still not recovered,
15 Megan was already dead. Bradley had, amongst other
16 things, shrapnel wounds to his lower legs, cuts to the
17 bone by the nuts, bolts and coins that Salman Abedi had
18 viciously packed around the bomb. He had sustained
19 broken legs and was losing blood.

20 Megan's parents, Michael, Joanne, had dropped
21 Bradley and Megan off at the arena and then went about
22 their evening. They enjoyed a meal in Manchester while
23 waiting for the concert to finish.

24 Upon realising a serious incident had happened
25 at the arena, nothing was going to keep Mike and Jo from

1 their children : "Look, mate, my kids are up there , so
2 unless you're going to shoot me, I'm going up there",
3 were Mike's words to an armed police officer who
4 initially refused him entry and warned him against what
5 he might see, but let him through when properly
6 realising that Mike's priority to find his children was
7 unshakeable. Determined with pure willpower and the
8 positive instinct of a parent, Mike, and then later Jo,
9 got into the City Room and were soon with Bradley and
10 Megan.

11 Again, as was the case for many, there were no
12 proper stretchers and people were improvising with metal
13 barriers and cardboard advertisement boards. Whilst
14 Bradley was carried away with Jo, Mike stayed at Megan's
15 side under the watchful protection of the police , who
16 respectfully gave a grieving father the space he needed
17 to be with his daughter. Mike was the last civilian to
18 leave the room.

19 Bethany Crook, another one of those heroes
20 I referred to earlier , was an off-duty nurse who was
21 with her daughter at the concert. Bethany cared for
22 a number of victims and had a memorable interaction with
23 Jo Hurley. She says in her statement about Jo:

24 "I cannot comprehend her pain. I am in awe of her.
25 As Jo sat amongst the carnage of the arena, and must

49

1 have known now that her 15-year-old daughter was dead
2 and her son severely injured , she gave Bethany her
3 mobile phone and said, 'Call your daughter.'

4 Bethany Crook tells you, sir , that it was an act of
5 kindness by a lady who had just lost her own daughter.
6 Bethany's daughter was mercifully safe .

7 Megan must have been close to the detonation site ,
8 as Mike could see the area of the marble floor around 10
9 to 15 feet away from Megan, which was pitted. He also
10 spoke of nuts and bolts over the floor .

11 All the families will want to know just how
12 Salman Abedi could have got to close but remained so
13 close to innocent concertgoers and those there to
14 collect them. The inquiry will learn that there were
15 numerous sightings of Abedi in the arena before
16 detonation and we will want you to look carefully
17 whether there were opportunities to detect , stop and
18 neutralise him before he detonated the bomb or at least
19 to restrict detonation to when there were fewer people
20 around.

21 On the night Salman Abedi was dressed in all black.
22 He was a young man in his early 20s, alone. He was seen
23 hiding behind a wall looking suspicious , carrying
24 a heavy rucksack weighing 36 kilograms. The public did
25 not like the look of him and reported him to ShowSec's

50

1 Kyle Lawler, a member of the arena stewarding team. The
2 family require of this inquiry a full examination of why
3 Abedi was not detected earlier and, once brought to the
4 attention of arena security , nothing -- nothing -- was
5 done about him.

6 A number of witnesses saw Abedi acting suspiciously
7 and reported the fact. He was in the City Room on and
8 off for about 1.5 hours before detonation and struggling
9 with the weight of 36 kilograms of rucksack so much so
10 that a member of the public had to help him with it .

11 Mohammed Agha, another ShowSec steward, had his
12 attention brought to Abedi by a member of the public at
13 22.14 hours, evidence of which we will hear and consider
14 in detail in chapter 7 of the oral hearings .

15 Mohammed will say that he discussed this with Kyle
16 but yet nothing was done, no challenge was made.
17 Salman Abedi was allowed, if I can use that expression ,
18 to detonate his home-made improvised device in full view
19 of those charged with keeping the arena visitors safe .

20 It will surely be an important passage of this
21 inquiry to consider if this was effective security , for
22 the families are equally concerned with the training and
23 support offered to stewards on the floor of the arena as
24 they are with the personal conduct of others .

25 On Saturday of this weekend, we received a statement

51

1 of Kyle Lawler -- and you'll forgive me, sir , if I just
2 briefly deal with that because we only had it on
3 Saturday -- dated 9 September. It will be for this
4 inquiry to decide where the facts speak truth, whether
5 there is an organisational systemic breakdown on behalf
6 of ShowSec, SMG, even perhaps Live Nation, as far as
7 their communications are concerned, or whether there was
8 individual fault . That is a matter for this inquiry .

9 But on Saturday, we received a statement from
10 Kyle Lawler, and he raises , if they have merit and this
11 inquiry will decide it , some very worrying issues . In
12 essence, he says that their radios weren't working. The
13 passage of fact was that Mohammed Agha, so says
14 Kyle Lawler, told Kyle about the suspicions he had about
15 Salman Abedi. Kyle Lawler in his statement on
16 9 September says he tried to radio this through, as he'd
17 been trained to do, if a member of the public reports
18 suspicions . He tells you, sir , in his statement,
19 Mr Lawler, that he tried multiple times to get through,
20 carrying on whilst looking at Abedi. He could not get
21 through to the control room to report their suspicions .

22 Lawler says that had he got through to the control
23 room, he would have told them about Abedi and what he
24 saw and that he presumes that Abedi would have been put
25 under CCTV surveillance and further action considered .

52

1 In short, sir, the radio channels at this crucial time
2 were jammed. During all this time, Salman Abedi,
3 according to Lawler, was watching.

4 Still at 22.25.46 hours, Kyle Lawler will tell you
5 that he could not get through to the control room. The
6 families will want to know, sir, as a result of this
7 document we received on Saturday whether the radios were
8 jammed, why they were jammed, and whether the
9 frequencies and technology being used at the arena that
10 night were fit for purpose.

11 Because if Lawler is right -- and we don't say one
12 way or the other, you will decide -- but if Lawler is
13 right, the equipment he was provided with by the arena
14 was not fit for purpose and prevented him, if he's
15 right, from reporting Abedi to the control room.

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, I hesitate to interrupt.
17 I have already read Mr Kyle Lawler's statements, I'm
18 afraid some time before you did, but these things need
19 to be checked. My recollection, and I'll be corrected
20 if I'm wrong, is he said he couldn't get through. You
21 said the phone wasn't working. I just don't want that
22 to be perhaps inaccurately reported. He said he tried
23 to ring but couldn't get through. Whether that was
24 because it was being used by other people or not --
25 I quite agree, your point is a good one and will need to

53

1 be investigated.

2 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir. The expression he used in my
3 note was that he said, "The radio channels were jammed."
4 That was the expression he used.

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

6 MR COOPER: As you will understand, sir, we only got this at
7 the weekend --

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do understand and it's perfectly
9 accurate what you were saying; I just didn't want it to
10 be misunderstood.

11 MR COOPER: I am grateful for that, sir, and again we make
12 no criticism of the receipt. For perfectly reasonable
13 reasons, work is ongoing.

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, thank you.

15 MR COOPER: As I indicated, Abedi was in the arena for
16 1.5 hours or so before detonation. In addition, and
17 very pressingly on behalf of the family of Megan Hurley,
18 they are particularly concerned also, sir -- and I won't
19 repeat the issues, you have them well in hand -- of the
20 role of the national security services and all of the
21 points we've made prior to this about Prevent, about
22 surveillance, and about the behaviour and visiting of
23 Abedi of two terrorists are of particular concern to the
24 family of Megan Hurley.

25 How was it that Abedi, to put it shortly for them,

54

1 was left free to commit this atrocity?

2 Nell Jones. Mary Nell Jones was known as Nell. She
3 was given a ticket by her friend Freya Lewis.
4 Arrangements were made for Freya's dad, Nick, to take
5 them both to the concert and to wait for them outside
6 until it had finished. She loved dancing, was gifted
7 and talented in maths and English, but modest for all
8 her achievements.

9 She was 14 when she died. She was in the City Room
10 for barely 2 minutes before the bomb was detonated. The
11 family of Nell are particularly concerned about the work
12 of the security services again and again we ask this
13 inquiry to provide as much clarity and transparency as
14 possible in relation to this aspect of the evidence.

15 Our families ask how you can have a man who is known
16 to the security services and who has been under
17 surveillance leave the country to get to Libya and is
18 then known to return to the United Kingdom and not be
19 either interviewed or apprehended. Those bereaved now
20 ask for this inquiry to examine carefully and robustly
21 the cooperation or otherwise between the security
22 services and the police and whether more could have been
23 done or ought to have been done from preventing Abedi
24 from planning and carrying out this terrible attack.

25 All the more expectation, of course, upon this

55

1 inquiry to do so when, for perfectly proper reasons,
2 those representing the families will not have access, no
3 doubt, to these questions.

4 Angelika and Marcin Klis. Angelika was 39 years of
5 age when she was murdered by Salman Abedi. As a result
6 of Abedi's evil actions, two children were deprived of
7 their mother and their father. Angelika was the loving
8 wife of Marcin, proud parents of Aleksandra and Patrycja
9 Klis. They died at each other's side, soulmates, as
10 Alex described them.

11 On 22 May, Marcin drove the family to Manchester and
12 Aleksandra and Patrycja went to the concert. Alex noted
13 how cursory the search was when they went into the
14 arena, not even her bags were checked and simply that,
15 as she put it, "the outside of our bags were felt".
16 That's all. Why was this?

17 Again, they are anxious to understand the rationale
18 of SMG, ShowSec and Live Nation as to the level of
19 security. Alex and Pat, as they are called, arranged to
20 meet their parents after the concert. Angelika and
21 Marcin were waiting in the City Room. At
22 22.30.55 hours, Angelika and Marcin stand with their
23 arms around each other, their final moments, these two
24 soulmates embrace each other, oblivious to what was to
25 come. Seconds later, the bomb detonates.

56

1 Angelika was attended to by Philip Clegg of
 2 Northern Rail, who speaks to a passing member of arena
 3 personnel. He says, "This lady needs more medical
 4 assistance than I can give her." The reply is, sir,
 5 "There is nothing we can do."
 6 Two police officers were heard talking on their
 7 body-worn cameras, "We need ambulances, mate,
 8 massively." It goes on:
 9 "I know they need to get them here, don't they? We
 10 need paramedics [and you'll forgive me, sir, I'm quoting
 11 it] like fucking yesterday. I know it's a daft
 12 question, but are the ambulances coming?"
 13 Both in the case of Angelika and Marcin, sadly, even
 14 if medical attention had swiftly arrived there was
 15 nothing that could have been done to save them, their
 16 injuries were catastrophic. But the question for the
 17 bereaved remains, as expressed clearly and earlier in
 18 this opening statement: was medical help got to the
 19 crucial and critical areas of Manchester Arena quickly
 20 enough and if not why not?
 21 Both of the deceased were devoted to each other.
 22 They quite literally died in each other's arms. Their
 23 children were their world, two children brutally
 24 deprived of their parents in one devastating moment.
 25 Alex now looks after her young sister in

1 a relationship of her own, happily married. You'll hear
 2 her and heard her say in her pen portrait:
 3 "I've had to grow up quite quickly and deal with
 4 things that I never imagined I would ever have to deal
 5 with. My focus now is to look after Pat."
 6 They've lost their parents, their protectors, and
 7 she trusts and puts her faith in this inquiry to leave
 8 nothing uncovered.
 9 Lisa Lees. Lisa too was waiting to collect her
 10 daughter who had attended the concert. Lisa met her
 11 partner, Anthony, in 1994 when she was 20. They married
 12 on 29 October 1999 and on 1 April 2002 their daughter,
 13 India, was born. India was at the concert with her
 14 friend.
 15 Lisa and Alison arrived approximately 4 minutes
 16 after (sic) the bomb detonated. Again, they went to the
 17 most obvious area of the arena to meet their children;
 18 clearly Salman Abedi was also in the City Room.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's actually 4 minutes before. You
 20 just misread it, sorry, Mr Cooper.
 21 MR COOPER: Sorry, I'll read it again.
 22 India was at the concert with her friend. Lisa and
 23 Alison arrived approximately 4 minutes before the bomb
 24 detonated. Again, they went into the most obvious area
 25 of the arena to meet their children.

1 Like many of the families, sir, Lisa's are no
 2 different. They are incredulous that Abedi should have
 3 been allowed into the country without close security,
 4 let alone in the City Room.
 5 Preventability is the key question. There were
 6 a number of occasions when security services and the law
 7 enforcement agencies could have intervened.
 8 Salman Abedi, the murderer, was overlooked for
 9 referral to Prevent. The families ask why. Material
 10 recently disclosed to us reveals that he should have
 11 been considered for a Prevent referral back in
 12 July 2014. It is concerning that there is no evidence
 13 presently of any discussions between Counter-terrorism
 14 Police and MI5 as to any referral. Why not?
 15 Surprise is expressed by the families that at no
 16 point were any members of the Abedi family referred to
 17 the Prevent programme. Neither was there at any stage
 18 any active consideration by any agency as to whether
 19 they should be referred. Why not?
 20 Salman Abedi was investigated only briefly in 2014
 21 and then discounted. How can it be, we ask, on their
 22 behalf, that this terrorist, who freely travelled,
 23 associated, read and communicated in a manner which was
 24 surely worthy of close investigation be left to
 25 ultimately turn up at Manchester Arena, virtually

1 buckled over with the weight of explosives on his back,
 2 and commit this devastating deed? A man who hardly
 3 covered his tracks or displayed any degree of
 4 intellectual prowess -- he even had trouble operating
 5 the public toilet gate earlier that night -- and yet it
 6 seems he had the better of those who we expect to
 7 protect us. He couldn't even get into the toilet.
 8 Would referral have had any effect on Salman Abedi?
 9 Would he even have engaged? We will never know. Those
 10 we represent want to know why that question will forever
 11 remain unanswered.
 12 Social media seems to provide important material and
 13 those we represent ask this inquiry to closely examine
 14 how effectively social media was examined by the
 15 security services and law enforcement agencies.
 16 The family of Salman Abedi would probably have been
 17 of interest to security services. Ismail Abedi's
 18 Facebook account was viewed and assessed in July 2015
 19 inferentially by MI5. This account is described as
 20 containing, inter alia, images of Ismail holding
 21 a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, sitting on an
 22 anti-aircraft gun, and wearing a camouflage clothing,
 23 holding a machine gun with an IS logo imprinted on the
 24 image.
 25 Ismail was then port stopped on 3 September 2015 and

1 his telephone seized and the contents downloaded. That
2 telephone was apparently used by both Hashem and Ismail
3 and, when analysed, was seen to contain ISIS recruitment
4 videos and literature . Of course, Salman was visiting
5 Abdallah, and in a phone seized from Abdallah
6 in November 2014, it can be seen that there 's
7 significant contact between Salman Abedi and Abdallah.
8 The messages sent between them include startlingly
9 references to martyrs, martyrdom, suicide and maidens of
10 paradise .

11 What exactly were the security services doing when
12 all this was happening? The families we represent are
13 requiring this inquiry to rigorously question the
14 security services on their state of knowledge not only
15 of Salman Abedi but of those clearly associated with him
16 and what actions were taken or not taken. These
17 questions should be, so far as possible, given what
18 we have already acknowledged, in an open forum,
19 transparent and accessible to families , ensuring their
20 effective participation in a matter of significant
21 concern to them. We mark your observations, sir , but we
22 ask there to be a very high threshold for these
23 hearings .

24 Eilidh MacLeod. Eilidh came from the beautiful Isle
25 of Barra in the Outer Hebrides, emphasising that victims

61

1 of this atrocity came from far and wide. She was a
2 talented musician and excelled at playing the bagpipes.
3 Eilidh attended the concert with her 15-year-old
4 friend . They were leaving through the foyer when the
5 bomb went off. She was just 14. How she was exposed to
6 the risk encapsulates the questions asked throughout
7 this opening statement.

8 Elaine McIver. Elaine was a police officer and
9 lived in Cheshire. She was in the foyer of the arena
10 with her partner, Paul Price, waiting to collect his
11 daughter and her friends who had been at the concert .

12 Elaine's family are fiercely proud of their daughter
13 and her committed, compassionate work as a police
14 officer . They embody the view of all those we represent
15 that whilst we must honour and respect the work of the
16 many individual police officers at the scene, the
17 inquiry should be fearless in its investigation to
18 establish accountability in all responding services . It
19 is not a matter of disrespect to them, it 's a matter of
20 accountability : to honour where honour is due and to
21 hold accountable those who may have failed them without
22 fear or favour of rank or standing .

23 They ask, as do all families , why it is that clear
24 lessons were failed to be learned , previous joint
25 training exercises through the Local Resilience Forum,

62

1 which exposed flaws in the way the emergency services
2 coped with catastrophic events, such as that which
3 befell the Ariana Grande concert, were not acted upon?
4 Why it was that the Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
5 failed to deploy resources in the arena for nearly
6 2 hours? Why the Ambulance Service failed to get
7 trained and appropriate responders to the scene and into
8 the City Room in those vital minutes after the
9 detonation and, in any event, why ultimately did only
10 three paramedics of any training at all enter the
11 City Room? And whether the police responsible for
12 overall coordination of efforts established command and
13 control in such a way as to assist with the effective
14 and efficient functioning of the emergency services , or
15 rather did their reaction to this terrible event cripple
16 any chance of effective and swift assistance to victims
17 through a combination of poor decisions , understaffing
18 and inadequate communications? And, ultimately, how did
19 those responsible for the safety of their loved ones at
20 Manchester Arena undertake that duty and to understand
21 whether they hopelessly failed ?

22 Perhaps the final question the families have is why
23 was Salman Abedi at liberty to even perpetrate this
24 outrage and why were those clearly assisting him and
25 helping him apparently doing so with impunity? Just

63

1 where were the security services in all this?

2 This inquiry represents the only chance that the
3 bereaved have of finding some answers to the questions
4 every single one of them never imagined that they would
5 have to ask: why did our loved ones die after going to
6 a music concert, and what can be done to keep all our
7 loved ones safe in the future?

8 Thank you.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Cooper. Thank you very
10 much.

11 MR GREANEY: Sir, we'll resume at 11.35, please, when we'll
12 hear from Mr Weatherby on behalf of the bereaved
13 families that he represents .

14 (11.16 am)

(A short break)

16 (11.35 am)

17 MR GREANEY: Sir, we're now going to hear from Mr Weatherby.
18 As you can see, he is for good reason appearing by live
19 link .

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Mr Weatherby.

21 Opening statement by MR WEATHERBY

22 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you.

23 Pen portraits are a modern phenomenon. So far as
24 I am aware the idea first came from then Canadian
25 Commission of Inquiry into the 1985 Air India flight 182

64

1 bombing, which published a preliminary report 23 years
2 later containing memorials to some of those who died,
3 prompted by the appalling way in which the families had
4 been treated up to that point. That inquiry report
5 noted that the government had treated the families of
6 the victims as adversaries.

7 During the 1990 first Hillsborough inquest, at times
8 the deceased had been referred to by the body number
9 assigned by the pathologists. In contrast, at the
10 outset of the fresh 2014-2016 inquests, the bereaved
11 gave evidence of the lives of their lost ones in pen
12 portraits and that process has subsequently been
13 followed in many other inquests and inquiries, including
14 the Grenfell Inquiry and the London and
15 Westminster Bridge inquests.

16 You will have noted the reference of
17 Charlotte Hodgson, mother of Olivia Campbell-Hardy,
18 asserting her relief that Olivia, Ollie, had been
19 treated by this inquiry as a person and not a number.

20 Pen portraits are evidence as much as any other
21 section of these processes. They are direct evidence of
22 who the deceased was in life and this is vital to any
23 process that requires and values the effective
24 participation of the bereaved.

25 In 2020 it now seems bizarre that anyone thought it

65

1 either acceptable or sensible to exclude the bereaved
2 from the process and to treat their loved ones as
3 two-dimensional mere names. At worst this was
4 maintaining control of the process and product of
5 official state investigations; at best it was an
6 outdated patrician approach to investigate for rather
7 than with those who are most central to the facts.

8 A public acknowledgement by various of the families
9 of the sensitivity and care with which you and your team
10 have approached and listened to the pen portraits is
11 real and heartfelt. The pen portrait chapter has
12 provided a powerful start to the evidential stage of
13 this inquiry and it has established the standard going
14 forward for the inclusion of the bereaved in each and
15 every stage.

16 Ken Mullen, Philip Tron's uncle, when delivering his
17 pen portrait, stated that you had given the family
18 confidence that you would leave no stone unturned,
19 joking that you might need a translation. In reply you
20 noted that you'd heard every word and you did not need
21 the translation.

22 The message was clear: you referred in your remarks
23 at the end of the pen portraits to:

24 "... the huge responsibility resting on me to try
25 and find answers to the families and the survivors."

66

1 Indeed so.

2 In his opening, Mr Greaney has outlined many key
3 questions this inquiry must investigate and seek to
4 answer. In doing so, he's made reference to previous
5 reviews and inquiries that have already taken place and
6 he's referred in some detail to the key expert reports
7 that you've already commissioned and received and
8 disclosed to the families and all other core
9 participants.

10 In doing so, Mr Greaney highlighted that the
11 previous reports and the expert opinions will inform and
12 assist you, but you will be in no way bound by them.
13 This is an important point.

14 We are not criticising Lord Kerslake or
15 Lord Anderson or Dominic Grieve and the Intelligence and
16 Security Committee of Parliament. Their reviews were
17 for different purposes. None of them had sight of
18 anywhere near the extent of the material this inquiry
19 has gathered. None had the powers or the resources or
20 the time to take evidence in the same way or with the
21 same degree of scrutiny --

22 MR GREANEY: Mr Weatherby, I'm very sorry to interrupt you.
23 Would you forgive me? It has been drawn to my attention
24 that what you have been saying is not currently being
25 broadcast on YouTube and we take the view, and we're

67

1 certain you will, that it's important that that should
2 occur. So may we just pause for what I hope will be a
3 few moments to put that right, please?

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm very sorry about that, Mr Weatherby.

5 MR WEATHERBY: No problem.

6 (11.43 am)

7 (A short break)

8 (11.48 am)

9 MR GREANEY: Sir, it proved to be the case that there was no
10 live stream, either on YouTube or to the family annex,
11 and in the circumstances I have spoken to Mr Weatherby
12 and invited him to start again and he's content to do
13 so.

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, we're sorry, please do
15 start again. It's worth hearing twice.

16 MR WEATHERBY: No problem. These things happen.

17 Pen portraits are a modern phenomenon. So far as
18 I am aware, the idea first came from the Canadian
19 Commission of Inquiry into the 1985 Air India flight 182
20 bombing, which published a preliminary report 23 years
21 later containing memorials to some of those who died,
22 prompted by the appalling way in which the families had
23 been treated up to that point in that process. The
24 inquiry report noted that the government had treated the
25 families of the victims as adversaries.

68

1 During the 1990 first Hillsborough inquest, at times
 2 the deceased had been referred to by the body number
 3 assigned by pathologists. In contrast, at the outset of
 4 the fresh 2014-2016 inquest, the bereaved gave evidence
 5 of the lives of their lost loved ones in pen portraits,
 6 and that process has subsequently been followed in many
 7 other inquests and inquiries, including the
 8 Grenfell Inquiry and the London and Westminster Bridge
 9 inquests.

10 You will have noted the reference of
 11 Charlotte Hodgson, mother of Olivia Campbell-Hardy,
 12 asserting her relief that Olivia, Ollie, had been
 13 treated by this inquiry as a person and not a number.

14 Pen portraits are evidence as much as any other
 15 section of these processes. They are direct evidence of
 16 who the deceased was in life. This is vital to any
 17 process which requires and values the effective
 18 participation of the bereaved.

19 In 2020, it now seems bizarre that anyone thought it
 20 either acceptable or sensible to exclude the bereaved
 21 from the process and to treat their loved ones as
 22 two-dimensional mere names or numbers. At worst this
 23 was maintaining control of the process and product of
 24 official state investigations, at best it was an
 25 outdated patrician approach to investigate for, rather

1 than with, those who are most central to the facts.

2 The public acknowledgement by various of the
 3 families of the sensitivity and care with which you and
 4 your team have approached and listened to the pen
 5 portraits is real and heartfelt. The pen portrait
 6 chapter has provided a powerful start to the evidential
 7 stage of this inquiry and it has established the
 8 standard going forward of the inclusion of the bereaved
 9 in each and every stage.

10 Ken Mullen, Philip Tron's uncle, in delivering his
 11 pen portrait, stated that you had given the family
 12 confidence that you would leave no stone unturned,
 13 joking that you might need a translation. In reply you
 14 noted that you'd heard every word and you did not need
 15 a translation. The message was clear. You referred in
 16 your remarks at the end of the pen portraits to:

17 "... the huge responsibility resting on me to try
 18 and find answers for the families and the survivors."

19 Indeed so.

20 In his opening, Mr Greaney has outlined many key
 21 questions this inquiry must investigate and seek to
 22 answer. In doing so he's made reference to previous
 23 reviews and inquiries that have already taken place, and
 24 he has referred in some detail to the key expert reports
 25 which you've already commissioned and received and

1 disclosed to the families and all other core
 2 participants.

3 In doing so, Mr Greaney highlighted that the
 4 previous reports and the expert opinions will inform and
 5 assist you. You will be in no way bound by them. This
 6 is an important point. We are not criticising
 7 Lord Kerslake or Lord Anderson or Dominic Grieve and the
 8 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.
 9 Their reviews were for different purposes. None of them
 10 had sight of anywhere near the extent of the material
 11 this inquiry has gathered, none had the powers or the
 12 resources or the time to take evidence in the same way
 13 or with the same degree of scrutiny, and none of them
 14 involved the bereaved to any real extent.

15 This inquiry process must be one of maximum
 16 scrutiny. It is not a kindness to the bereaved to try
 17 to sugar-coat the extremities of the evidence or what
 18 happened to their loved ones. Together with us, their
 19 lawyers and your team, the families will manage their
 20 engagement with pathology and those stages which are
 21 most difficult for them, but this management of the
 22 process must not confuse or diminish the degree of
 23 inquiry.

24 Likewise, line-by-line scrutiny of the planning,
 25 preparation and performance of various public

1 authorities and corporate entities must pull no punches.
 2 If any authority or corporation escapes legitimate
 3 censure for a failure to stop or mitigate the arena
 4 outrage, or even a failure which might stop or mitigate
 5 a future incident, there is no victory for them or
 6 anyone else. A successful public inquiry must deliver
 7 as full answers as it can in the full public glare,
 8 warts and all. Any departure from a fully open process
 9 must be recognised as the aberration it is and any
 10 restricted or closed aspect of this inquiry must adhere
 11 to the axiomatic principle that interference with
 12 transparency and openness must be limited to that which
 13 is absolutely necessary.

14 Our observation by way of introduction is that the
 15 inquiry has made a hugely positive start through the pen
 16 portrait chapter and it has laid the foundations for
 17 a full and proper investigation of arena security, what
 18 happened on the night, and the emergency response, with
 19 full disclosure requests for detailed opening statements
 20 including assessments of performance and recognition of
 21 failings by relevant core participants, and detailed
 22 expert opinions on key areas of inquiry.

23 What we have grave misgivings about, however, is the
 24 obsessive secrecy which surrounds the security services'
 25 approach to evidence and I'll deal with that in some

1 detail a little later on.
 2 As you know, I speak on behalf of seven of the
 3 bereaved families : the family of Saffie -Rose Roussos,
 4 aged 8; the family of Sorrell Leczkowski aged 14; the
 5 mother and stepfather of Olivia Campbell-Hardy, aged 15;
 6 the father of Georgina Callander, aged 18; the family of
 7 Phil Tron, aged 32; the mother, brother and daughter of
 8 Lisa Lees, aged 43; and the family of Alison Howe, aged
 9 44. All lives taken away in a moment of unspeakable,
 10 senseless cruelty and horror by Salman Abedi, assisted
 11 by his brother and, no doubt, others.
 12 I list those who died in ascending age order only to
 13 highlight this was a targeted attack on children and
 14 those who died were mainly children and young people and
 15 those who were picking them up.
 16 On their behalf we have already submitted a written
 17 opening statement and I am now going to expand on
 18 aspects of that statement rather than repeat it, in
 19 particular in light of written openings of other core
 20 participants and aspects of Mr Greaney's opening.
 21 At no point have the families lost sight of the fact
 22 that the bomber and associates committed this outrage.
 23 At every stage, in common with others, they recognise
 24 the heroic efforts of emergency service workers and
 25 passers-by in rushing to the aid of the injured and the

1 dying.
 2 However, as hinted at in Mr Greaney's opening, the
 3 issues for this inquiry are not so much what the Abedis
 4 and their associates did but why they were not spotted
 5 and stopped and not just recognising the individual
 6 heroes of the emergency response, but looking at why
 7 there was a near absence of command and control and an
 8 abject failure of interoperability between the main
 9 emergency services.
 10 These remain areas of acute concern to families ,
 11 which will be of no surprise . We will pull no punches
 12 in raising them because the imperative for this inquiry
 13 is to achieve some degree of truth and justice for the
 14 families and to do everything it can to prevent
 15 a recurrence and all that overrides any sensibilities
 16 involved .
 17 Any inquiry must focus on its terms of reference .
 18 In this circumstance the terms of reference have been
 19 set widely, and include matters relating to the
 20 protection of life . The inquiry therefore must focus on
 21 three matters: firstly , establishing a definitive
 22 factual narrative regarding what happened and allaying
 23 rumours about that which did not happen; secondly, where
 24 appropriate, determining accountability for identified
 25 failures ; and, thirdly , making recommendations to

1 prevent future similar deaths.
 2 In any inquiry the role of core participants is to
 3 assist the chair in reaching those goals, although some
 4 CPs may have their own interests to protect , this is not
 5 a forum to establish liability , the corollary of which
 6 is that no CP can properly seek to use the inquiry to
 7 avoid censure or criticism . You have recognised these
 8 principles in the detailed requests you have made of
 9 public authority and corporate CPs with respect to their
 10 opening statements, and we will hear more about them
 11 later .
 12 As outlined by your counsel, there are three key
 13 questions for this inquiry regarding the bombing and its
 14 immediate aftermath. Should the plot have been
 15 discovered and stopped or at least disrupted? And
 16 that is primarily a question for the security services .
 17 Should the physical and human security at the arena on
 18 the night have prevented the bombing? And that's
 19 a question for the corporate operators but also for
 20 public authorities involved in safeguarding crowded
 21 places . Was the emergency response as organised , swift
 22 and effective as was necessary to save as many lives as
 23 possible? And that is a question for each of the
 24 emergency services .
 25 With respect to the second and third questions ,

1 physical security at the arena and emergency response,
 2 we've heard a good deal already . The inquiry has
 3 committed and received detailed expert opinions to
 4 assist you in your task . There has been extensive
 5 disclosure and there will be weeks of witness evidence,
 6 scrutiny writ large .
 7 In sharp contrast the topic regarding whether the
 8 bombing could and should have been prevented is to be
 9 heard, we are told , largely in closed session .
 10 Everybody listening understands fully the default
 11 position is that evidence is heard in open hearing with
 12 access to the families , their lawyers, all other CPs,
 13 the media and the general public . All potentially
 14 relevant material is disclosed prior to hearings so that
 15 everyone can collaborate on honing the issues and
 16 assisting the inquiry in determining which witnesses
 17 should be heard and what questions should be asked.
 18 A closed hearing, on the other hand, will exclude
 19 the families , their lawyers, the media and the public .
 20 Evidence will be heard by you privately with only your
 21 legal team and the security services ' lawyers present .
 22 As we understand the position , the only security
 23 service witness who will be heard in open hearings is an
 24 anonymous witness, J. We are told only that he is
 25 a deputy director -general of MI5 and that he has no

1 personal knowledge of any of the topics with which this
2 inquiry is concerned. He is an institutional witness,
3 not a witness to the facts or to when, how or why
4 decisions were taken.

5 The families have no problem, no problem,
6 understanding that there may well be aspects of the
7 security service evidence which must be treated
8 carefully. The families will be grateful for the
9 clarifications you've added this morning. The families
10 have no problem understanding that national security
11 should not be compromised. They have no problem
12 understanding that the security services have
13 a difficult job.

14 However, the current position essentially removes
15 the whole of a central issue from public scrutiny and
16 their right to effectively participate in that most
17 important area of evidence and investigation.

18 On 6 September 2020, the night before the inquiry
19 commenced, the mum and dad of the youngest victim of the
20 bombing, Saffie-Rose Roussos, gave an emotional and
21 heartfelt interview which was broadcast by the BBC.
22 Lisa Roussos, herself gravely injured in the bombing,
23 asked for maximum transparency regarding whether the
24 outrage could have been pressed. Maximum transparency,
25 that is, of the security services evidence.

1 Andrew Roussos asked why the families cannot be
2 represented in the room when sensitive evidence was
3 being heard. Mr Roussos added to those comments,
4 respectfully and forcefully, at the end of his pen
5 portrait.

6 Let me set out clearly exactly what the alarm of the
7 families is with respect to the closed evidence via the
8 example of a key person in this inquiry already
9 mentioned this morning.

10 Abdalraouf Abdallah was highlighted by Mr Greaney in
11 his opening. Abdalraouf Abdallah is a man who fought in
12 Libya and was shot and paralysed, leaving him wheelchair
13 bound. Undeterred, he returned to Manchester where he
14 encouraged and assisted other young men to go and join
15 IS in Syria. He was arrested on 28 November 2014 and
16 remanded in custody, but later freed on bail.
17 Subsequently, in 2016, he was convicted and continues to
18 serve a 9.5-year extended sentence for terrorism
19 offences.

20 He was in very regular contact with Salman Abedi
21 before his arrest in 2014, when in custody, initially
22 whilst on bail, and when in custody again following
23 conviction, right up until shortly before the bombing.
24 But what do we actually know about Abdalraouf Abdallah,
25 where do we know it from and why do I start with him?

1 According to a report in the Financial Times,
2 Salman Abedi's father, Ramadan Abedi, cared for
3 Abdalraouf Abdallah in Tripoli after he was shot in
4 2012. According to his cousin, in 2016 Salman Abedi
5 would bring Abdalraouf Abdallah to his barber shop in
6 Manchester and, in conversation Abdallah, openly
7 espoused pro-ISIS views to the extent that the cousin
8 told him that they were not welcome. Salman Abedi and
9 Hashem Abedi's uncle echoed these reports, saying that
10 they both expressed support for IS around this time.

11 From documents disclosed from the police
12 investigation, we now know Abdalraouf Abdallah was in
13 regular contact with Salman Abedi, as I say, prior to
14 his imprisonment, and then, via a contraband mobile
15 phone in 2017, from his prison cell.

16 All of that is strongly suggestive of at least -- at
17 least -- a substantial influence on Salman Abedi and
18 Hashem Abedi. The authorities, the security services in
19 particular, we'll say, and with some justification,
20 unless someone had flagged these things to them, the
21 relationship between them would remain unknown.
22 Of course as we know, however, the relationship between
23 Salman Abedi and Abdalraouf Abdallah was not hidden from
24 the authorities and was there for all to see. Because,
25 as we have already heard this morning, Salman Abedi

1 visited Abdalraouf Abdallah in Belmarsh Prison in 2015
2 and Altcourse Prison in 2017.

3 The relationship, the influence, the collaboration
4 between the Abedis plural and Abdalraouf Abdallah is
5 a matter, as already flagged, for scrutiny by the
6 inquiry. However, this was evidence that came to public
7 light and into view of the families not from the
8 security services or previous reviews and inquiries but
9 from the media. Although there was reference to visits
10 to a prisoner in the ISC report, the name was redacted.
11 There was no mention at all of the visits in the
12 published report of Lord Anderson. Those redactions and
13 omissions, we understand, are requested by the security
14 services.

15 Why did Abdalraouf Abdallah's name need to be
16 redacted or omitted? He was a convicted prisoner. It
17 doesn't seem to us that there was any legitimate privacy
18 right as regards him and no national security to redact
19 his association with the Abedis. So why the secrecy?

20 In evidence to this inquiry, the security service
21 witness statement makes reference to visits to
22 "a prisoner convicted of terror offences" but no name,
23 again, and the prisoner is referred to by a letter.
24 Why? The only people or organisations protected by
25 Abdalraouf Abdallah's anonymity, his redaction from

1 reports and witness statements are, it may be said, the
2 security services .

3 In summary, we don't understand the justification
4 for why the security services sought and achieved
5 redaction or omission of reference to
6 Abdalraouf Abdallah in the Anderson and ISC reports and
7 why he was referred to anonymously in the security
8 service statement of this inquiry or, frankly, why the
9 inquiry has allowed this .

10 Of interest also is that Witness X's statement, the
11 MI5 statement, asserts that the prisoner he refers to
12 was not category A. In paragraph 70 of the ISC report
13 it is stated that the first time Salman Abedi visited
14 the prisoner he was category A. In the same report
15 Counter-terrorism Police are quoted as indicating that
16 the prisoner was not category A, although it may be that
17 this is a reference to the second visit, by which time
18 it appears that Abdalraouf Abdallah had been
19 decategorised .

20 For the uninitiated this might not seem to be much
21 of an issue, but it most certainly is. A category A
22 prisoner or provisional category A prisoner, if he is a
23 remand prisoner, as Abdalraouf Abdallah was when visited
24 in Belmarsh, will be subject to the Approved Visitor
25 Scheme where visitors have to be vetted before they can

1 be visited or be on the prisoner's telephone list. If
2 Abdalraouf Abdallah was a category A or provisional
3 category A prisoner, Salman Abedi would have gone
4 through the vetting process. It appears that those
5 convicted of grooming others to commit terrorist
6 offences were not subject to the most basic of
7 monitoring and an interest in apprentice terrorists,
8 such as Salman Abedi was in 2015, was not triggered.
9 Why not?

10 The failure to recognise the association between
11 Salman Abedi and Abdalraouf Abdallah was a real missed
12 opportunity. The redaction and omission of
13 Abdalraouf Abdallah's name from reports and the witness
14 statement is an indication of a lack of transparency by
15 the security services and, frankly, in our submission,
16 calls for a re-think by this inquiry. Without the media
17 exposure, would there have been an attempt to keep
18 Abdalraouf Abdallah's name out of this process? It's
19 difficult to read the redactions, submissions, or
20 anonymous reference in Witness X's statement in any
21 other way.

22 Staying with Abdalraouf Abdallah, given his
23 well-known links to violent extremism in both Libya,
24 where he was injured, and Syria, for which he was
25 convicted, one might have thought not only might MI5

1 have been interested in his associates and associations
2 but also MI6. As far as we are aware, there is no MI6
3 witness. There is evidence of close cooperation between
4 MI5 and CTP, Counter-terrorism Police, on their own
5 evidence, including in local hubs. Were they working
6 with MI6 too or was that further problem?

7 One might have thought that MI6 and indeed GCHQ
8 would be able to provide a lot of intelligence regarding
9 groups and contacts relating to extremism in Libya and
10 Syria which would assist the identification of those in
11 this country who might be plotting outrages such as
12 happened at the arena.

13 For example, there are many references in open
14 source articles to Ramadan Abedi's connections and
15 involvements in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, at
16 one time an affiliate of Al Qaeda and for a long time
17 a banned organisation in the UK and elsewhere. That
18 must have been known to the security services, in
19 particular MI6.

20 Presumably, MI6 would have been aware of the brigade
21 which fought in Libya in and around 2011 known as the
22 Manchester Fighters. Apart from Abdalraouf Abdallah,
23 there were others known to have fought with IS and
24 groomed others to do so living within the same general
25 area of Manchester as the Abedis. We know this not from

1 the one security services witness statement we have or
2 indeed from the opening statement filed on behalf of
3 MI5, but we know it from the media.

4 On 25 February 2017, less than 3 months prior to the
5 bombing, The Guardian newspaper published an article
6 referring to what it referred to as 16 jihads who lived
7 within a 2.5-mile radius of South Manchester, the exact
8 area where Salman Abedi lived. These 16 were either
9 convicted or known to have gone and fought for IS in
10 Syria and elsewhere. Several were dead in suicide
11 attacks or drones.

12 Abdalraouf Abdallah was one of those named, as was
13 his brother Mohammed Abdallah, who fought for IS in
14 Syria, and who was also serving a sentence in this
15 country for terrorist offences. Of course, at the time
16 this article was published, the Abedi plot was in full
17 swing.

18 Others named in the article include Raphael Hostey,
19 who died whilst in Syria with IS. On 25 May 2017, in
20 a special report, Sky News quoted counter-terrorism
21 sources who said that Hostey was one of those who had
22 radicalised Salman Abedi. The New York Times, on
23 22 May 2017, quoted an unnamed law enforcement official
24 saying that Salman Abedi knew Raphael Hostey prior to
25 the latter going to Syria, and he was his hero.

1 On 28 May, The Guardian reported that the police
 2 suspected Raphael Hostey radicalised Salman Abedi.
 3 According to the Daily Telegraph, Hostey's brother was
 4 Facebook friend of Hashem Abedi and their posts were
 5 supportive of another man who'd gone to Syria to fight
 6 with Islamic State.

7 One of the questions the families want answered is:
 8 how of these 16 were associated to the Abedis and how?
 9 Why did these associations known to the media not
 10 trigger proper interest in the Abedis by the security
 11 services ?

12 Unlike other recent attacks, the publicly disclosed
 13 parts of the Anderson Review and the ISC report have
 14 raised serious questions regarding whether the
 15 Manchester outrage could and should have been prevented.
 16 The disclosure by the inquiry has added almost nothing
 17 to what was already in the public domain in this regard.

18 With respect to the security services, their
 19 corporate statement, that of Witness X, sets out that
 20 MI5 had information about Salman Abedi since 2010.
 21 Between then and the bombing, the statement concedes
 22 that MI5 had information linking Salman Abedi to three
 23 separate unnamed live subjects of interest and a string
 24 of other unnamed terrorist contacts, including in Libya.

25 The information included meetings and contacts by

1 telephone and second-level contact. During that period
 2 Salman Abedi had himself been opened and closed as
 3 a subject of interest. His father had been stopped at
 4 a port and questioned under terrorism powers, his
 5 brother, Ismail, as we've heard, had been stopped and
 6 questioned under schedule 7 of the terrorism provisions
 7 and pro-IS material found on his phone, and Salman Abedi
 8 had, of course, visited the convicted
 9 Abdalraouf Abdallah twice in jail.

10 Security services held information informing them of
 11 frequent travel to and from Libya by Salman and
 12 Hashem Abedi. The fact that Salman Abedi kept such
 13 company did not make him a terrorist, but the families
 14 might be forgiven for asking: what exactly does one have
 15 to do to get the attention of the security services ?

16 If the security services had looked carefully at
 17 Salman Abedi, what might they have seen? Firstly, he
 18 came from a radicalised Islamist family. Ramadan Abedi
 19 had come to this country claiming asylum from Gaddafi.
 20 He was a member or closely associated to the Libyan
 21 Islamic Fighting Group, who had waged a violent fighting
 22 campaign in Libya, including an assassination attempt on
 23 Gaddafi that failed but killed several others. In the
 24 late 1990s, ex-MI5 officer David Shayler very publicly
 25 alleged that MI6 had funded that assassination attempt.

1 Mr Shayler has said many other things over the years and
 2 he is what might be euphemistically be called a
 3 colourful character.

4 The families have absolutely no idea whether the
 5 allegations about MI6's role are well-founded or
 6 fantasy. Whether Shayler's allegations were true or not
 7 however, they were the stuff of front page exclusives.
 8 It is clear that the nature of the LIFG was well-known
 9 to the security services from the 1990s.

10 Then, after 9/11, the LIFG was subject to sanctions
 11 by the United Nations. It was banned in the
 12 United Kingdom because of its affiliation to Al Qaeda.

13 Ramadan Abedi was also a friend of Abu Anas al-Libi,
 14 another LIFG member who had fled to Manchester. He,
 15 al-Libi, was arrested for terrorism offences in
 16 Manchester in 1999 but released. When the police went
 17 to rearrest him in 2000, he had skipped abroad, leaving
 18 an extremist text subsequently referred to as "the
 19 Manchester Manual".

20 Al-Libi was a family friend of the Abedis.
 21 Salman Abedi's mother had been at college with al-Libi's
 22 wife. Al-Libi was eventually captured by the US in 2013
 23 and accused of two embassy bombings claimed by Al Qaeda,
 24 which had resulted in huge loss of life; 224 people were
 25 killed.

1 According to the Manchester Evening News when
 2 al-Libi was captured, Ramadan Abedi posted a photo with
 3 a supportive message on Facebook on an open page,
 4 referring to him as "a lion", a description we will see
 5 again applied to his son.

6 A near neighbour of the Abedis in Manchester was
 7 another LIFG refugee, Abd al-Baset Azzouz. According to
 8 the Daily Express, he was investigated by
 9 Counter-terrorism Police in 2006 for his Al Qaeda links,
 10 before leaving the UK in 2009 to join al-Zawahiri in
 11 Pakistan. Al-Zawahiri was the successor to Osama Bin
 12 Laden as Al Qaeda's leader. According to The Guardian,
 13 al-Zawahiri sent out al-Baset Azzouz to Libya to build
 14 a fighting force there.

15 That the security services were interested in LIFG
 16 members in Manchester is well-documented in the media.
 17 According to The Guardian, the Tripoli papers, documents
 18 discovered after the fall of Gaddafi disclosed that
 19 Gaddafi's intelligence agencies were invited to the UK
 20 in 2006, when the UK Government were on good terms with
 21 the Libyan regime, in a joint operation regarding the
 22 LIFG. On that visit, Libyan security services officers
 23 visited Manchester with British security services
 24 officers on a joint intelligence operation against the
 25 LIFG.

1 In 2011, the Daily Mail reported that the Tripoli
 2 papers showed that Libyan dissidents had been placed on
 3 control orders at the behest of Gaddafi, prompting then
 4 Shadow Home Secretary David Davis to complain that the
 5 government had used control orders to appease Gaddafi,
 6 rather than to protect national security .
 7 When the Libyan regime began to fall it was
 8 well-known that young men were travelling from
 9 Manchester to Libya to join the uprising against
 10 Gaddafi. On 29 November 2011, the BBC's Newsbeat
 11 programme ran a story about five young armed
 12 South Manchester men involved in rounding up Gaddafi
 13 loyalists in Tripoli . The Home Affairs Committee heard
 14 evidence on 18 March 2014 from James Brokenshire, then
 15 Minister for Security , acknowledging that those who
 16 travelled to Syria to fight the Assad regime might be
 17 radicalised and pose a threat on their return to the
 18 United Kingdom because they would come into contact with
 19 Al Qaeda and other extremist groups who had ambitions to
 20 attack the West.
 21 The Home Affairs Committee report also commented on
 22 the rise of Al Qaeda in Libya too.
 23 That the UK Government were aware of extremist
 24 elements fighting in the Libyan uprising is clearly
 25 evidenced. Former Chief of Defence Staff Lord Richards

1 gave evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee in
 2 2016, asserting that it had been "wishful thinking that
 3 militant Islamist militias would not benefit from the
 4 rebellion ."
 5 On 11 February 2016, a BBC security correspondent,
 6 Frank Gardner, reported Whitehall sources saying there
 7 was no specific evidence of IS operatives leaving Libya
 8 to target Europe but, "We know it's coming down the
 9 track, it's just a question of when." I emphasise,
 10 2016, just over a year before this outrage.
 11 According to Witness X, as early as 2010, the Joint
 12 Terrorism Analysis Centre, JTAC, conducted a regional
 13 assessment of Islamic extremism and the terrorism threat
 14 in Manchester. The report specifically considered
 15 radicalisation in the Manchester Libyan community and
 16 concluded that it was influenced by elder generations'
 17 historical links to extremist groups including the LIFG.
 18 In August 2011, according to the ISC report,
 19 Ramadan Abedi, Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi travelled
 20 to Tripoli . Ramadan Abedi was obviously of some
 21 interest as he was subject to a port stop on
 22 17 November 2011 when transiting out of the UK, when he
 23 stated that they were not going to fight but to provide
 24 medical supplies to rebel forces .
 25 However, multiple media sources report otherwise .

1 The Times has asserted that Ramadan Abedi and his sons
 2 fought as part of the Manchester Fighters, a part of the
 3 17 February Martyrs' Brigade, the same militia
 4 Abdalraouf Abdallah was fighting with when shot and
 5 paralysed . The Financial Times reported the same.
 6 On 25 May 2017, BBC's Newsnight cited three separate
 7 sources saying that Salman Abedi fought "in his school
 8 holidays ". Photos seized from two different sources and
 9 disclosed in the Hashem Abedi trial strongly suggest
 10 Salman Abedi was with the 17 February Militia in 2017,
 11 corroborating the media reports .
 12 By September 2012, as reported by BuzzFeed,
 13 Ramadan Abedi had posted to his Facebook page the now
 14 notorious photo of Hashem with heavy weaponry with the
 15 legend, "Hashem the lion". Apparently, al- Libi ,
 16 implicated in bombings resulting in 242 deaths and
 17 Hashem were both lions to Abedi Senior .
 18 In 2013, Ramadan Abedi posted a photo of a large
 19 heavily armed band of al-Nusra Front fighters , the
 20 Al Qaeda affiliate group in Syria, with the legend, "May
 21 they be victorious against the infidels ".
 22 To anyone with a computer and an interest in
 23 Ramadan Abedi, he left nothing to the imagination .
 24 The New York Times reported unnamed US and European
 25 intelligence sources as asserting that Salman Abedi

1 travelled to camps in Sabratha in 2015 where he met with
 2 the Libyan affiliate to IS, Katiba al- Bittar al- Libi ,
 3 KBL for short. Whereas we have no way of assessing the
 4 reliability of reports such as this , we do note that the
 5 KBL slogan is, "We come to slaughter", which was used in
 6 an email account used by the Abedis to source precursor
 7 chemicals on Amazon in 2017.
 8 The New York Times reported that the Paris attacks
 9 in November 2015 were perpetrated by members of the KBL.
 10 If it is correct that Salman Abedi was known by US
 11 and European intelligence agencies to be associating
 12 with this group, one might assume this was shared with
 13 UK intelligence agencies. Was it? I'll return to
 14 shared intelligence in a moment and ask a similar
 15 question from other reports .
 16 Furthermore, the ISC report and the statement of
 17 Witness X both concede that MI5 received information as
 18 to Salman Abedi expressing pro-IS views on several
 19 occasions in 2015, but no investigation was launched as
 20 a result .
 21 I have already referred to Abdalraouf Abdallah, his
 22 brother Mohammed Abdallah, and Raphael Hostey as
 23 associates of the Abedis, and raised the prevalence of
 24 those with similar intent within a small radius of the
 25 Abedi family home in Manchester. What about others?

1 The Benhammedi family were to feature in the case
 2 against Hashem Abedi as he went to Germany in 2016,
 3 where they have a property business. Hashem Abedi
 4 stayed a month, and then went back for 2 months,
 5 returning to the UK right at the end of 2016, so it's
 6 clear the relationship was close.

7 Back in 2006, according to the Liverpool Echo,
 8 Mohammed Benhammedi was arrested in connection with
 9 funding the LIFG, by then a banned Al Qaeda affiliate.

10 In 2014, the BBC reported that Benhammedi was
 11 charged with terrorist offences relating to content on
 12 a USB stick seized from him on a trip to Libya, although
 13 he was later cleared. A letter from Mr Benhammedi was
 14 recovered from the Abedi family home on Elsmore Road and
 15 the police investigation uncovered evidence that
 16 Abdullah Benhammedi and Salman Abedi were good friends
 17 and attended the same business studies course at south
 18 Trafford College in 2014.

19 The communication data used in the case against
 20 Hashem Abedi indicated he'd been communicated with
 21 another member of the Benhammedi family within a few
 22 minutes of placing a failed order for hydrogen peroxide
 23 on 19 March 2017. There have been various claims that
 24 people in the community reported Salman Abedi to the
 25 police and anti-terror hotlines. As we understand it,

1 these claims have not turned up any records, but no
 2 doubt the inquiry will look into them closely.

3 On 24 May 2017, the NBC network reported that
 4 multiple US intelligence and law enforcement officials
 5 had stated that Salman Abedi was known to the US
 6 intelligence community prior to the attack.

7 In addition, the Mail on Sunday reported on 28 May, from
 8 an unnamed security source, that the FBI had told MI5 in
 9 January 2017 that Salman Abedi was part of a
 10 North African IS group and was plotting an attack in the
 11 UK, possibly on a political target. It was reported
 12 that the information came from US agents who had been
 13 intercepting communications and the US had put
 14 Salman Abedi on a watch list.

15 On 13 June 2017, the Manchester Evening News
 16 reported that Libyan security services had the Abedi
 17 brothers and their father under surveillance for more
 18 than a month before the bombing. As their relationship
 19 and cooperation with the UK had not been as good as it
 20 had been with the CIA, it is unclear whether this was
 21 passed on or claimed to be.

22 Families, of course, have no way of assessing the
 23 accuracy or veracity of these reports. The inquiry
 24 obviously can. They would like to know whether foreign
 25 intelligence agencies, or indeed others, had tipped the

1 UK authorities off. If the reports are not true, false
 2 rumours should be allayed. That has long since been
 3 recognised as the role of an inquest or similar process.

4 As we have stated, the families are concerned at the
 5 assertion in Mr Greaney's opening that most of the
 6 preventability evidence will be heard in closed
 7 hearings. Of course, that means the security services
 8 evidence. There remain issues, as you have carefully
 9 set out this morning, to be determined here, and that's
 10 one reason why I deal with them in some little detail.

11 We have no doubt at all that there is evidence in
 12 this case which might adversely affect national security
 13 publicly. We have repeatedly said this.

14 The families recognise that prevention of a future
 15 similar outrage requires a responsible approach.
 16 However, they also recognise that a veil of secrecy is
 17 likely to do the opposite. Healthy public authorities
 18 are ones which are subject to public scrutiny.
 19 Overbearing secrecy does not protect national security,
 20 it does the opposite: it protects failure, it prevents
 21 progress and undermines confidence.

22 In providing for restricted hearings via section 19,
 23 Parliament recognised there were real life intractable
 24 problems which defied a complete solution. The strong
 25 public interest in open justice cannot be absolute and

1 on occasion some other countervailing public interest
 2 will trump open justice and require another imperfect
 3 approach. Section 19 does not provide an alternative
 4 process where ordinary authorities abide by transparency
 5 and open scrutiny and the security services are
 6 permitted to be supervised behind closed doors. The law
 7 binds us all; there is no special law for the security
 8 services.

9 The application of restrictions to evidence must be
 10 robustly limited to that which is absolutely necessary
 11 to meet the legitimate aim of protecting national
 12 security. Each document, each witness, must be
 13 anxiously considered so as to allow only those parts of
 14 the evidence which are truly likely to compromise
 15 national security to be kept closed.

16 Allowing the security services evidence to be closed
 17 save for a corporate witness makes the opposite
 18 approach. It assumes the security service evidence
 19 should be closed and then drips out some facts, shrouded
 20 in anonymity, and partial accounts make them opaque.

21 With respect to the corporate MI5 witness, he is not
 22 a witness to the facts he recounts. He is therefore
 23 a witness chosen by MI5, not circumstances. The issue
 24 of anonymity should therefore not arise. In this
 25 process, we have not only an application for anonymity

1 for the corporate Witness X but also his replacement
2 Witness J. The law requires witnesses to be named other
3 than in exceptional and narrow circumstances. That does
4 not appear to be the case under these applications .

5 The anonymity applications are themselves largely
6 closed, meaning that we have a limited avenue of
7 challenge. If they are made out for Witness J, MI5
8 should be invited to choose another institutional
9 witness .

10 MI5 has a policy of naming only their
11 director-general. Is the real reason for applying for
12 anonymity the policy? Is MI5 prepared to assert that
13 Witness J, a current deputy director-general, will be
14 ineligible to become director-general in the future
15 because the director-general is a publicly named
16 official? The inquiry must apply the law, not MI5
17 policy .

18 During the course of Mr Greaney's opening, we
19 learned for the first time that there is to be
20 a security services expert. If we may say so, the
21 inquiry has commissioned and instructed a series of
22 experts in this case with the greatest care and to
23 considerable effect. We have no objection in principle
24 to the instruction of a security services expert, but we
25 do raise considerable caution because independence will

1 be virtually impossible .

2 Since the opening, we've enquired as to the identity
3 of the expert and his or her CV and the letter of
4 instruction. The inquiry team has indicated that the
5 identity of the expert will remain secret as will his or
6 her CV and the letter of instruction. I am unaware of
7 expert anonymity having been suggested in any Article 2
8 process before. It is anathema to open justice and we
9 urge a re-think .

10 Let me recap. The inquiry has upheld every
11 application from the security services for material to
12 be withheld from disclosure. It has ruled against a
13 submission seeking disclosure of the extent of the
14 material withheld. Although it remains to be finally
15 determined, from the CTI opening, it is clear that most
16 of the preventability evidence will be in closed
17 hearing. The only open security services evidence will
18 be from a corporate witness chosen by MI5 and, as under
19 the current application, he will be anonymous. It
20 appears there will be no evidence, at least no open
21 evidence, from MI6 or GCHQ. The inquiry will commission
22 a security services expert, he or she will be anonymous,
23 his or her CV will not be disclosed, and neither will
24 the letter of instruction .

25 Standing back from that summary, and giving the

1 greatest respect to what has been said this morning,
2 it's difficult to see how this approach complies with
3 the axiomatic principle that any interference with open
4 justice has to be the minimum interference necessary to
5 meet the legitimate aim. The reasonably informed
6 bystander would have difficulty recognising this process
7 as part of a public inquiry .

8 In our written submissions we have robustly
9 commented on what we have referred to as "virtue
10 signalling" by the security services. In the course of
11 submissions, the security services have in effect argued
12 that they act with complete integrity and within the law
13 and that they always strive to learn lessons. The
14 families and, no doubt, the general community require
15 integrity from public servants, however integrity and
16 propriety are matters of evidence and not assertion .
17 The rule of law is based upon scrutiny and not trust .
18 We have no interest in going off piste and dwelling on
19 matters outwith the remit of this inquiry and its terms
20 of reference. However, where the inquiry has signalled
21 that it intends to hear almost all of the security
22 services' evidence in closed hearings, from which the
23 families and their lawyers, the public and the media
24 will be excluded, we are left with no choice but to
25 remind the inquiry that the security services do not

1 always act within the law, with integrity, and that is
2 well-documented.

3 I'm not going to repeat the detail here, we've set
4 it out in the written statement. But in modern times
5 the UK Intelligence Services have engaged in
6 reprehensible conduct with respect to complicity and
7 rendition in countries where people have been subject to
8 torture. Libya, as it happens. In those cases, the UK
9 intelligence community unsuccessfully argued up to
10 Supreme Court level that the claims in those cases were
11 beyond the law and shouldn't be aired .

12 The cases subsequently settled with monetary
13 payments of millions of pounds and public apologies,
14 in the case of Abdul Hakim Belhaj, by the
15 Prime Minister. Subsequently, the Investigatory Powers
16 Tribunal held that the UK intelligence agencies had
17 unlawfully listened into legal consultations between
18 those same men and their lawyers. These are not my
19 assertions, they are matters of record in the Belhaj and
20 al-Saadi cases. We all hope that lessons have been
21 learned, but the reality is that without a high degree
22 of open scrutiny, we will not know.

23 We respectfully urge this inquiry to ignore
24 self-serving assertions of integrity, not because
25 they're untrue but because they are irrelevant. The

1 rule of law requires scrutiny, not acceptance on trust
2 of what one part of the state says about another.

3 In submissions concerning disclosure and closed
4 hearings, much reference has been made to the so-called
5 mosaic effect. The mosaic effect is a reference to a
6 seemingly innocuous snippet of information becoming
7 highly relevant when viewed in the context of other
8 evidence. As a matter of common sense, the mosaic
9 effect is real and important.

10 At the start of my speech, I referred to the
11 Canadian Commission of Inquiry into the bombing of
12 Air India flight 182 in 1985. The second footnote to
13 the Commission report reads as follows:

14 "The mosaic effect' is the term used by
15 intelligence agencies often as an argument against the
16 release of information to the public. It suggests that
17 an individual piece of information, though seemingly
18 insignificant on its own, may serve as the missing piece
19 to a puzzle that allows a hostile group to see a pattern
20 or draw conclusions about sensitive government secrets.
21 This same process of gathering and piecing together even
22 seemingly insignificant information can equally be
23 exploited to further an agency's own intelligence
24 (inaudible: distorted)."

25 The Commission was concerned that the intelligence

101

1 service had managed to limit disclosure for many years
2 and the Commission were commenting that, in their
3 defence, the intelligence services were atomising the
4 information they had in an attempt to argue that they
5 could not have been expected to have seen the Air India
6 bombing coming. If it is legitimate to say that
7 material must be considered in the context of other
8 information for the purposes of disclosure, then the
9 same approach must be applied in determining whether
10 action should have been taken to frustrate the plotters.
11 Snippets of information might have meant little on their
12 own, but putting them together creates the mosaic.

13 It is vital that the same approach is applied here.
14 The fact that Salman Abedi visited Abdalraouf Abdallah
15 in prison in 2015 is, in isolation, not much more than
16 eyebrow raising. If considered in the light of the fact
17 that Salman Abedi had been a subject of interest in his
18 own right in 2014, then one might think the visit should
19 have prompted a closer look. When Salman Abedi visited
20 Abdalraouf Abdallah a second time in early 2017, one
21 might think that the security services would consider
22 not only that Salman Abedi had been a subject of
23 interest in his own right in 2014, but also the offences
24 Abdalraouf Abdallah was serving for, essentially
25 grooming other young men to commit terrorist offences.

102

1 One might have thought that the security services would
2 have taken account of the information that they concede
3 they had by this time that Salman Abedi had been
4 connected to the three other subjects of interest and
5 had espoused pro-IS views himself.

6 A cursory investigation into Salman Abedi's
7 background would have turned up the information I've
8 already referred to regarding his father and the port
9 stop of his older brother in 2015, which turned up the
10 pro-IS material. Putting all these snippets together
11 would have started to sketch a picture and should have
12 prompted or triggered a further look.

13 Further scrutiny and practical measures. The use of
14 several premises from February onwards and the purchase
15 of a series of cars would have started to colour that
16 sketch in and, looking a little deeper, if any of these
17 pieces of information and intelligence had triggered
18 a further look, might the sourcing of chemicals or other
19 bomb components have been spotted?

20 Salman Abedi had context: a radicalised family,
21 he had quite a number of dodgy associates, he was
22 travelling to and from Libya.

23 The sourcing of chemicals involved a number of other
24 persons, large amounts of chemicals with limited
25 domestic use were ordered over the internet to addresses

103

1 connected to them. An email account with the IS slogan
2 "We come to slaughter" was used. Transactions were
3 reported as fraudulent. There was a lot to go wrong.
4 It was hardly a well-crafted, covert plot.

5 Moving on from the mosaic of evidence available to
6 be seen, if anyone was looking, let me pick up the
7 chemicals evidence. We've heard that the explosive used
8 by Salman Abedi was TATP and the evidence clearly
9 suggests he and his brother sourced the precursor
10 chemicals through associates, mainly through the
11 internet.

12 Open source material indicates that TATP was the
13 explosive used by the shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001.
14 It was used in the 7/7 bombings in 2005. It was used
15 in the more recent European bombings, including the
16 Bataclan and the Stade de France in 2015. The precursor
17 chemicals, acetone and hydrogen peroxide, and the
18 catalyst, sulphuric acid, all have legitimate uses
19 of course, however the amounts sourced by the Abedis
20 appear to have been way in excess of any normal domestic
21 use.

22 This inquiry will note that since the Manchester
23 bombing regulations have changed to make these chemicals
24 less accessible. Why, after a near miss in 2001 when
25 Richard Reid almost managed to bring down an airliner or

104

1 after 52 people were murdered in London in 2005 on 7/7
 2 or when 130 were killed in France in 2015 were these
 3 changes not made? Why did another 22 have to die before
 4 change was effected?

5 The inquiry will also have to consider whether the
 6 new regulations go far enough, but much more importantly
 7 given the prevalence of the use of TATP in terrorist
 8 outrages in recent years, the inquiry will have to ask
 9 questions as to why their open purchase in such
 10 quantities did not trigger alarm bells. Why were the
 11 security services apparently not looking? Why did
 12 Home Office policymakers not see the purchase and
 13 sourcing of substantial quantities of these chemicals
 14 from the open market as a way to stop or detect such
 15 plots?

16 Why did the security services not raise this as
 17 a key issue for policymakers after the Reid bomb or
 18 after 7/7 and Lady Hallett made an issue of it asserting
 19 with alarm that hydrogen peroxide was easier to buy than
 20 aspirin, or after the Paris attacks?

21 Before I round up our opening comments regarding the
 22 preventability evidence and the security services,
 23 there's one further issue I want to address. In the
 24 aftermath of the bombing, media outlets mentioned
 25 admissions made by Hashem Abedi to Libyan authorities.

1 From the CPS evidence we know that Hashem Abedi's
 2 lawyers raised the fact that he'd made a 40-page
 3 confession, both at the first appearance at Westminster
 4 Magistrates' Court after his extradition and in
 5 preliminary legal argument at his trial.

6 Where is it? In August, Senior Investigating
 7 Officer Barraclough made a very substantial statement,
 8 a very helpful substantial statement, detailing the
 9 evidence gathered by the extensive GMP investigation
 10 into the bombing. That statement runs to 253 pages and
 11 doesn't mention the confession.

12 In the disclosure statement, the senior prosecuting
 13 lawyer of the CPS states that the CPS has not seen or
 14 got it. A similar statement from Government lawyers
 15 indicates they do not have it either. Requests for an
 16 explanation as to what steps have been taken to get the
 17 confession have not received an answer.

18 One would think that a 40-page confession would have
 19 been of considerable interest to GMP, who were
 20 investigating the circumstances of the bombing and who
 21 was involved in the plot. A reasonable assumption
 22 is that there would be a substantial amount of detail in
 23 a document that long. One might think that the CPS, as
 24 a prosecuting authority, might want the confession for
 25 the purposes of both the extradition and the

1 prosecution. Finally, one might expect that MI5 and MI6
 2 would want the confession for the amount of intelligence
 3 it would contain. Apparently not.

4 There are various holes in the evidence, as there
 5 are in most investigations. For example, who procured
 6 the switch used in the bomb and where from? Who
 7 purchased the acetone and where from? The confession
 8 might fill those gaps. But perhaps more importantly
 9 there may be information in that 40-page document that
 10 will implicate others involved in the conspiracy and
 11 help bring them to justice and prevent them from going
 12 on to do a similar outrage in the future.

13 Of course, I have left one detail out of this issue:
 14 Hashem Abedi's lawyers asserted that the confession had
 15 been obtained under duress. Undoubtedly, that could
 16 become an issue for obvious reasons. However, it is not
 17 so at the moment. There is no evidence from
 18 Hashem Abedi himself that a confession was obtained
 19 through torture or coercion. There is no objective
 20 evidence that would lead to such a conclusion absent
 21 such evidence.

22 In our submission, the inquiry should obtain and
 23 disclose the confession and should use it in fulfilling
 24 its terms of reference until and unless a proper founded
 25 argument to the contrary is made and determined.

1 We have set out the relevant law in a written submission
 2 which is yet to be dealt with and there is no reason to
 3 repeat it here.

4 It is bizarre, in our submission, that the police,
 5 the prosecuting authority, the intelligence services and
 6 also this inquiry have all apparently not seen fit to
 7 take steps to obtain a copy of a lengthy confession of
 8 the only living known perpetrator. We respectfully
 9 repeat our earlier written submission on that.

10 Before I move briefly to other subjects, I will
 11 summarise our opening comments on preventability and the
 12 security services evidence. Firstly, the question of
 13 closed evidence is not one of trust, either of the
 14 security services or this inquiry. Justice requires
 15 that light is shone into the darkest corners.
 16 Provisions for restricted evidence are an imperfect yet
 17 practicable compromise where there are two
 18 irreconcilable public interests. Parliament plainly
 19 meant for the statutory restrictions to be limited to
 20 the minimum necessary to meet the legitimate aim, here
 21 of protecting national security.

22 It cannot have been intended to essentially remove
 23 a central area of this inquiry, whether the attack could
 24 or should have been prevented, almost entirely from
 25 public view and, in doing so, remove the effective

1 participation of the bereaved families from it.
 2 Secondly, we don't know what the undisclosed
 3 material contains or how much of it there is. However,
 4 we do know that the security services have redacted
 5 matters such as the identity of Abdalraouf Abdallah, for
 6 reasons which are entirely unclear to us. We do know
 7 that they have chosen a corporate witness and then
 8 claimed anonymity for him.
 9 As I have stated, the confidence of the families in
 10 this inquiry is high precisely because there has been
 11 effective engagement through the pen portraits and
 12 because the inquiry has demonstrably indicated it will
 13 leave no stone unturned by requiring full disclosure and
 14 by requesting detailed opening statements from the
 15 public authority and corporate CPs. If the security
 16 services are seen to be treated in a different way to
 17 others, then confidence will inevitably wane, and
 18 findings based on evidence heard behind closed doors
 19 will be met with scepticism.
 20 Thirdly, the mosaic effect is paramount in
 21 understanding preventability. It may well be that many
 22 of the pieces of information that the security services
 23 held did not mean much on their own, but seen together
 24 those pieces of intelligence and context painted a clear
 25 picture. Whatever scrutiny of the evidence shows,

109

1 Salman Abedi did not come out of nowhere.
 2 Fourthly, was there a systemic failure with respect
 3 to a lack of triggers from procurement of the precursor
 4 chemicals? Could better restrictions have prevented
 5 those chemicals from being sourced? Could better
 6 regulation have led to automatic reporting of the
 7 ordering of large amounts of chemicals?
 8 And finally, fifthly, how on earth was it that
 9 Salman Abedi and Ismail Abedi in particular were not
 10 referred to Prevent, for example following closure of
 11 subject of interest status or, in Ismail's case, when IS
 12 material was found on his phone?
 13 The 2010 JTAC review had highlighted generational
 14 radicalisation in the Manchester Libyan community and
 15 here it was evidenced in the clearest of terms. Why,
 16 when they were triggers, which MI5 concede ought to have
 17 led to Salman Abedi being held on a ports action, did
 18 that not occur?
 19 Prevent is a controversial programme and may or may
 20 not have altered Salman Abedi's mindset. Even if it had
 21 not, referral to the programme would have alerted
 22 Salman Abedi to the fact that he had been noticed. The
 23 ISC report commented that the failure was highly
 24 disappointing.
 25 Likewise, on 18 May 2017, when Salman Abedi returned

110

1 alone to the UK through Manchester Airport, we know that
 2 he got a bus to a bus station and then a taxi to
 3 Manchester and his bomb factory car. Having been
 4 subject to a schedule 7 stop, is it likely that
 5 Salman Abedi would have left that airport, bought his
 6 SIM card, rung the estate agent, rented the Granby House
 7 flat, and travelled to the car park to retrieve the
 8 chemicals and then spent the following few days
 9 preparing the bomb, or would he have feared that his
 10 plot had been uncovered and his every move watched, his
 11 every communication trapped?
 12 We reiterate that Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi were
 13 personally responsible for the Manchester Arena outrage,
 14 not the security services. Not every attack can be
 15 prevented. However, as the security services themselves
 16 state, many can. Lord Anderson commented that MI5 had
 17 two pieces of intelligence, undisclosed to us, which
 18 were highly relevant to the attack. The state is
 19 obliged by Article 2 to provide and ensure the
 20 effectiveness of a framework of laws, regulations,
 21 systems and policies to protect life to the maximum
 22 extent reasonably possible from known or predictable
 23 threats. In addition, there is an operational duty to
 24 react to information which it holds to prevent real and
 25 immediate threats to life.

111

1 In the current context, the security services hold
 2 the primary responsibility and resources to prevent
 3 bombing outrages. We all rely on them. Was this a case
 4 of an attack that occurred out of the blue or were real
 5 opportunities to prevent the bombing missed because of
 6 systemic or operational failures?
 7 Having dealt at some length with the issue of
 8 whether the security services should have prevented the
 9 outrage, I turn very briefly to the next issue: should
 10 it have been prevented on the night? I know that
 11 Mr Atkinson and Mr Welch who follow me are going to
 12 concentrate on arena security, so I'm simply going to
 13 make a few bullet points.
 14 (1). The UK threat was severe. The corporate and
 15 public authority bodies knew that an attack was highly
 16 likely, even acknowledging the threat was not specific
 17 to the arena.
 18 (2). The November 2015 attacks included a gun and
 19 bomb attack on the Bataclan, a music venue. The arena
 20 is one of the largest indoor concert venues in the
 21 world, therefore its potential as a target was obvious.
 22 (3). Salman Abedi did not just get off a train,
 23 walk into the City Room and detonate his device. As we
 24 have heard and seen, he wanted the around before
 25 settling down in the City Room for almost an hour

112

1 unchallenged. In a few short recesses, he had worked out
2 that the raised area was not covered by CCTV and was not
3 patrolled. On any view, these were catastrophic
4 failures, both systemic and operational, by those
5 responsible, SMG and ShowSec.

6 Although plainly there was individual fault too,
7 attempts in opening statements to blame individuals or
8 point the finger at each other or BTP or to attack the
9 experts will have now to be unpicked through evidence.
10 We doubt this aspect of the case will be as complex for
11 you as others, although with the passing of the buck it
12 might be one of the more unseemly.

13 We comment, through the lens of Lisa Lees' mum,
14 brother and daughter, and the family of Alison Howe,
15 that two wrongs do not make a right and the fact that
16 SMG might have been at fault does not exonerate ShowSec
17 or vice versa.

18 These are the questions Georgina Callander's father
19 and the family of Sorrell Leczkowski want answering.
20 They don't want a book of excuses, complaining about the
21 experts or shifting responsibility to individuals.

22 (4). While the corporates SMG and ShowSec are
23 accountable for their failures to spot and prevent
24 Salman Abedi carrying out this outrage, we urge you not
25 to overlook the general Article 2 duties on the state to

113

1 provide and enforce a regulatory and policy framework to
2 ensure public safety, even where responsibility lies
3 with private entities. Was and is a CTSA guidance
4 appropriate? Was and is the licensing regime
5 sufficient? Guidance that was not binding, licensing
6 which stopped short of any sufficient provision to
7 ensure effective counter-terrorism security. Should
8 corporations operating in arenas and stadiums and
9 shopping malls where thousands of people congregate be
10 required to employ or contract specialist
11 counter-terrorism directors as SMG apparently now does?

12 Should action plans devised by CTSAs be mandatory
13 and not mere discretionary guidance? Should there have
14 been regulations mandating joint security arrangements
15 for large scale events by the operator, the police and
16 the licensing authority?

17 Finally, the emergency response. It has often been
18 said that every major incident starts with chaos:
19 a train crash, a stadium crash, a fire, a terrorist
20 attack. Even where they can be foreseen as likely to
21 happen, the place and time and manner rarely can. There
22 is inevitably a cold start. Major incident planning,
23 contingencies and preparedness are therefore predicated
24 on having oven-ready deployments of resources and
25 policies to roll out and establish command and control

114

1 in the shortest possible time. These are trained and
2 exercises are held. Learning is then supposed to
3 follow. But successive defective responses to major
4 incidents have highlighted key problems,
5 interoperability and communications being the most
6 obvious.

7 As set out by Mr Greaney, the response to the arena
8 outrage was heroic by many individuals, including police
9 officers, ambulance personnel, passers-by, including
10 off-duty nurses and doctors, and arena staff who
11 responded without regard to their own safety, with the
12 single aim to save life and tend to the survivors.

13 On the other hand, major questions arise from the
14 fact that only one NNAS paramedic was in the City Room
15 in the first 40 minutes after the detonation and only
16 another two followed him after that.

17 The Fire Service, as is well-known, didn't attend
18 for almost 2 hours, and the police failed to set up any
19 command post at the scene or coordinate any joined-up
20 response. Only out of order, the establishment of
21 command and control, comes an efficient response. In
22 our view, the emergency response should be looked at as
23 a wheel, with various responding agencies around its
24 circumference and the lead agency command at its centre.

25 In this circumstance, the GMP control room and

115

1 command structure was at the centre with armed and
2 ordinary GMP and BTP police units, NNAS and GMFRS
3 resources as prime responders, supported by arena
4 medical and other stewards and members of the public
5 including off-duty medics and police officers, joined
6 later by specialist counter-terrorism and other
7 resources and secondary responders.

8 Looked at in this way, the performance of the
9 individual services can be assessed, but responsibility
10 for making the whole response work effectively and
11 swiftly falls on senior managers of Greater Manchester
12 Police. Despite operation Winchester Accord, already
13 mentioned this morning, having identified that the force
14 duty officer would quickly become overwhelmed in a major
15 incident such as this, lessons were apparently not
16 learned. The evidence suggests he was quickly
17 overwhelmed. He did not set in motion the steps
18 necessary to establish effective command and control
19 swiftly. He was uncontactable and he failed to inform
20 other services of the declaration of Operation Plato or
21 any declaration of a major incident, and he failed to
22 establish situational awareness or pass it on to others.

23 Greater Manchester Police will make their position
24 clear on this. In their written opening it is not clear
25 to us whether they say this view is accepted or whether

116

1 the failures fall at the FDO's door with decisions which
 2 were not in accordance with policy . They appear to be
 3 placing an each-way bet.
 4 Once senior officers populated command and control
 5 roles , it appears they failed to set up a forward
 6 command post or establish meaningful communications and
 7 thereby interoperability with the other services . The
 8 experts have referred to "an information vacuum and
 9 a situational information void". Overall, the experts
 10 say, through their capping report, that
 11 interoperability , as is understood through the JESIP
 12 principles , substantially failed .
 13 The other services appear to have failed to mobilise
 14 effective or sufficient resources to the scene. There
 15 appears to have been little or no coordination of
 16 treatment of casualties for a significant period of time
 17 and a failure to coordinate or direct the clearance of
 18 casualties to available ambulances. Families were left
 19 without information for hours because of failures to
 20 establish any effective casualty bureau. There appears
 21 to have been a lack of tourniquets and pressure pads to
 22 stem bleeding and a virtual absence of stretchers on
 23 which to clear casualties . There's little evidence of
 24 deployment of specialist resources by the police , NWAS
 25 or the FRS, and no joint communications established.

1 All of these will be matters to be determined
 2 through careful analysis of the evidence. The expert
 3 reports have provided significant assistance in raising
 4 the right questions and will no doubt assist in the
 5 right conclusions being reached. The written opening
 6 statements and statements of some officers in response
 7 to the expert reports will no doubt assist the inquiry
 8 up to the important issues and move swiftly on from
 9 those issues that are not controversial . However, as
 10 with the arena security , the degree of candour leaves
 11 something to be desired . Although some concessions are
 12 made, each emergency service has been quick to look
 13 through the book of excuses and shed responsibility to
 14 others.
 15 The families seek answers, not sympathy;
 16 accountability , not prevarication or obfuscation . The
 17 families know this process can only bring them answers,
 18 not a mitigation of their real loss , but they also know
 19 that it can lead to positive change and may stop other
 20 families suffering the same tragedy. Could and should
 21 the bombing have been prevented? Could its effects have
 22 been minimised and mitigated? Were lives lost
 23 unnecessarily? How can a similar outrage be prevented
 24 from happening again? Were there systems or policy
 25 failures and were there operational failures ? Did

1 resource issues play a part? Was there sufficient
 2 clarity regarding responsibility for counter- terrorism
 3 precautions and security and enforcement mechanisms or
 4 is legislative change required?
 5 Only with rigorous forensic scrutiny from the
 6 inquiry and genuine candour from the CPs can these
 7 questions be answered and the families can achieve some
 8 degree of truth and justice and real change for the
 9 future .
 10 Thank you very much.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.
 12 MR GREANEY: Sir, would you rise now, please, and we'll
 13 resume at 2.10, when we'll hear from Mr Atkinson on
 14 behalf of further families ?
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you very much.
 16 (1.05 pm)
 17 (Lunch adjournment)
 18 (2.09 pm)
 19 MR GREANEY: Sir, as I indicated, we are now going to hear
 20 from Mr Atkinson on behalf of the families that he
 21 represents .
 22 Opening statement by MR ATKINSON
 23 MR ATKINSON: It is my privilege, together with
 24 Victoria Ailes , Adam Payter, and the superb team from
 25 Hogan Lovells -- Sarah McQuillan, Scott Baxter and

1 Haylea Campbell -- to represent and now to make this
 2 opening statement on behalf of the following families :
 3 Lisa and Mark Rutherford, parents of Chloe Rutherford, a
 4 17-year-old who was coming to the end of her BTEC in
 5 music performance with plans for university and work as
 6 a travel specialist and, above all, plans for her future
 7 with her much loved boyfriend, Liam, a 17-year-old, as
 8 you, sir , have heard, with considerable talent as
 9 a singer .
 10 Caroline Curry, mother of Liam Curry, a 19 year-old
 11 sportsman who adored Chloe, and whose death deprived him
 12 of attending his graduation with first class honours
 13 from university and all the achievements that would have
 14 followed .
 15 Harriet , Lily and Isabelle Taylor, the much-loved
 16 daughters of a Jane Tweddle, a 51 year-old, who brought
 17 up her girls in a house, as they told you, full of love
 18 and laughter . Jane Tweddle, who was employed by the
 19 South Shore Academy in Blackpool, was a great cook,
 20 devoted to her family , and brightened the lives of all
 21 those she met.
 22 Andrew Hardy and Sharon Cain, the father and
 23 stepmother of Olivia Campbell-Hardy. A 15-year-old
 24 highly motivated school student, noted for her kindness
 25 and concern for others and who, as you again, sir , have

1 had the opportunity to see, had considerable skill as
 2 both a dancer and a singer .
 3 Deborah Hutchinson, Deb, mother of Courtney Boyle,
 4 a 19-year-old student showing significant promise in her
 5 study of criminology at Leeds, who shared with Chloe and
 6 Olivia a love of music and who, as her boyfriend ,
 7 Callum, told you, sir , made the good times great and the
 8 bad times bearable .
 9 Tony Kiss, husband of Michelle Kiss, a 45-year-old
 10 mother of three adored children , a natural homemaker
 11 with an eye for colour and design, who loved life and
 12 filled every moment of it .
 13 These six families come from different parts of the
 14 north of England. Until May 2017, save for the families
 15 of Chloe and Liam, they knew nothing of each other, but
 16 what brought them together was and remains the tragedy
 17 that brings all those involved in this inquiry together :
 18 the detonation of an improvised explosive device in the
 19 City Room at the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017 .
 20 The pen portraits provided by these families speak
 21 more eloquently than I ever could of those six lives
 22 whose richness and promise Salman Abedi ended so
 23 callously , who they were, who they were yet to become
 24 and what an unfathomable void each has left in the lives
 25 of those who knew and loved them .

1 Sir, those I represent are extremely grateful for
 2 having had the chance to share their cherished memories
 3 of their loved ones with you and they, through me,
 4 thank you, sir , and your inquiry team for your
 5 compassion and sensitivity .
 6 They now welcome this opportunity at the outset of
 7 this inquiry , for which they have waited for so long, to
 8 set out briefly their concerns about the circumstances
 9 that bring them here and their hopes for this process .
 10 It was indicated by the inquiry legal team that the
 11 purpose of this statement on behalf of those I represent
 12 should be to identify the topics and issues from within
 13 the terms of reference that are of specific interest to
 14 them and an explanation of why those topics will be
 15 their focus during the course of the oral hearings .
 16 In making this statement, I have well in mind that
 17 those acting for the other families have this morning
 18 and will later this afternoon be undertaking the same
 19 exercise . As is to be expected, and as we have seen
 20 this morning, the topics and issues within the terms of
 21 reference that are of specific interest to those that
 22 I represent are of the same intense interest to those
 23 others .
 24 Those I represent are determined to work with those
 25 others to pursue those common topics and issues in the

1 same spirit of collaboration that has marked our
 2 collective preparations for this inquiry to date. Where
 3 possible , I will identify topics and issues that, whilst
 4 of specific interest to us, will inevitably be or have
 5 been developed by others without detailed replication of
 6 their analysis .
 7 In what I say, I will refer to my clients as "the
 8 families " without intending any discourtesy to the other
 9 families that are equally core participants in this
 10 inquiry through their shared grief .
 11 As a starting point, the families support the core
 12 purpose of this inquiry of investigating how and in what
 13 circumstances the 22 innocent persons, for six of whose
 14 families for whom I appear, lost their lives . In
 15 a direct sense, and by reference to the terms of the
 16 coronial process from which this inquiry has emerged,
 17 the answer to the question of how they died was that
 18 they were unlawfully killed in a murderous terrorist
 19 attack, executed by Salman Abedi, aided and abetted by
 20 his brother, Hashem, as his jury has already found .
 21 As Mr Greaney rightly said, those two set out to
 22 cause, and did cause, death, destruction and misery on
 23 a massive scale .
 24 In terms of the immediate circumstances in which
 25 these deaths occurred, again this is a question that can

1 be factually answered quite shortly .
 2 Olivia Campbell-Hardy and Chloe Rutherford were at the
 3 arena because they were fans of the music of
 4 Ariana Grande. Liam Curry was at the Arena because
 5 he was the biggest fan of Chloe. All three were in the
 6 City Room because, like so many others, it was their
 7 route out of the arena at the end of the night .
 8 Jane Tweddle, Michelle Kiss and Courtney Boyle were
 9 all in the City Room because they were waiting to meet
 10 concertgoers, again like so many others. In Jane's
 11 case, she was there to meet the daughter of the friend
 12 she'd spent the evening with, in Courtney's case her
 13 younger sister , and in Michelle's her young daughter .
 14 I am very conscious, as the last 2 weeks have made
 15 so very clear , that these coincidences , putting them in
 16 absolutely the wrong place at so very the wrong time,
 17 are far from unique to them. In relation to the
 18 question of how and in what circumstances they died and
 19 by reference to the terms of reference 6 and 7, the
 20 families , of course, have a specific interest in the
 21 cause and mechanism of the death of each of their loved
 22 ones, their experience before they died, and their
 23 treatment thereafter .
 24 Given the very clear evidence submitted to the
 25 inquiry in relation to the blast wave analysis and

1 pathology, we do not anticipate that there will be any
 2 issue in the case of any of the six whose families
 3 I represent that there was any chance of them surviving
 4 their injuries . Therefore there will be by us no
 5 explanation of issues of medical causation .
 6 Equally, the combination of the CCTV footage from
 7 the arena and evidence from those that were in contact
 8 with them before they entered the room make clear how
 9 the six came to be in the positions that they were in ,
 10 by reference to the position Salman Abedi adopted at the
 11 moment of his detonation . We do not therefore
 12 anticipate any issue will arise in that regard .
 13 However, the families do have a desire to know who
 14 took any steps in relation to their six loved ones after
 15 the detonation , any who sought to check on them, to
 16 speak to them, to tend to them, to cover them, so that
 17 both the families can have the fullest understanding of
 18 their final moments but also so that where members of
 19 the emergency services and others took steps of that
 20 kind, the families hope to put faces and names to those
 21 who sought to help their loved ones in these various
 22 ways and, where possible , to thank them. Equally, where
 23 decisions were taken to stay away, they want to
 24 understand whether those were the right decisions or
 25 indicative of defects in the system for responding to

1 such a bomb attack.
 2 We are also keen to consider other aspects of the
 3 aftermath: how the bodies of those who died were
 4 treated , whether they remained in the City Room for
 5 longer than was necessary, whether communication with
 6 their families was as efficient and effective as it
 7 should have been, and whether any improvements to the
 8 process of identification of those who died in such
 9 terrible circumstances and the handling of their bodies
 10 by the emergency services can be made.
 11 The broad purpose of how and in what circumstances
 12 these six and those other innocent persons lost their
 13 lives does, of course, as has been made clear this
 14 morning, have a much wider ambit. In terms of how
 15 Salman Abedi was able to construct and detonate a bomb
 16 in so public a location , a location in which the
 17 families should have been entitled to consider their
 18 loved ones would be safe , and whether this most heinous
 19 act could have been prevented, either by reference to
 20 the identification and apprehension of Abedi before
 21 he was able to build his bomb or by his detection or
 22 exclusion before he was able to deploy it at the arena.
 23 There are a number of topics raised under the other
 24 terms of reference of the inquiry that are of specific
 25 interest to the families in that regard. First , by

1 reference to term of reference 1, whether the attack by
 2 Salman Abedi could have been prevented by the
 3 authorities . The families wish to understand what was
 4 known of Salman Abedi by the authorities , what was done
 5 by the authorities in relation to him and, crucially ,
 6 what more could and should have been done.
 7 This is of specific interest to the families because
 8 they wish to understand whether what Salman Abedi did
 9 was in that sense preventable . If it was, they wish to
 10 understand why it was not prevented and if , by reference
 11 to procedures and practice at the time, it was not, they
 12 wish to understand whether steps can be taken that would
 13 render such an attack preventable in the future .
 14 In particular , as term of reference 1 makes clear ,
 15 this involves questions of what was known to, processes
 16 employed by and the actions or omissions of the security
 17 service , the police and others .
 18 This is an area, as the inquiry is aware, that has
 19 been under a degree of investigation already . By way of
 20 example, in November 2017 Lord Anderson of Ipswich, then
 21 the independent reviewer of terrorist legislation ,
 22 undertook an independent assessment of a series of
 23 internal reviews that had by then been undertaken by MI5
 24 and the Counter-terrorism Police in the wake of the four
 25 attacks in London and Manchester between March

1 and June 2017; Mr Cooper referred to this morning.
 2 Lord Anderson considered, through his significant
 3 access to the security services and its material, the
 4 sufficiency of those internal reviews and the learning
 5 from them. Lord Anderson, in relation to the
 6 Manchester Arena, considered the extent to which Abedi
 7 had come to the attention of, in particular , MI5, from
 8 as early as 2014, becoming a subject of interest ,
 9 an SOI, and then what is termed a closed subject of
 10 interest . He noted that Abedi was not under active
 11 investigation in 2017 and alluded to two occasions
 12 in the months before the bombing when MI5 acquired
 13 intelligence to which, to use his words, "in retrospect
 14 can be seen to have been highly relevant to the planned
 15 attack."
 16 He noted that MI5's post-attack review had accepted
 17 that an opportunity was missed by MI5 to place
 18 Salman Abedi on ports actions following his travel to
 19 Libya in April of 2017.
 20 A year later , November 2018, the Intelligence and
 21 Security Committee of Parliament, then chaired by the
 22 Right Honourable Dominic Grieve QC MP, produced its
 23 report into the 2017 attacks and the learning points for
 24 the intelligence and security community to be derived
 25 from them. The select committee's approach was

1 wide-ranging and in many respects it pre-shadowed the
 2 terms of reference of this inquiry .
 3 For example, it considered the approach of the
 4 security service to "low priority investigations and low
 5 level subjects of interest ", those who have appeared on
 6 the periphery of investigations and SOIs who have been
 7 closed and whether, in relation to Salman Abedi, MI5's
 8 systems moved too slowly.
 9 The committee also considered the decision not to
 10 use travel monitoring and travel restriction
 11 capabilities in the case of the Manchester Arena
 12 attacker , allowing him to return to the UK undetected
 13 in the days immediately before he carried out his
 14 attack .
 15 The Secretary of State in her written opening
 16 statement points to the internal reviews conducted by
 17 the security services and describes them as rigorous and
 18 intensely self - critical . However, as Lord Anderson
 19 observed in his 2017 assessment of those same internal
 20 reviews:
 21 "To act as a gadfly on the hide of the beast is not
 22 the same as to direct a fully independent review."
 23 The families' fervent hope, sir , is that this
 24 inquiry will represent that fully independent review .
 25 If the reality is that the security services and police

1 had done all that anyone could expect of them, the
 2 families will accept that to be shown and will perhaps
 3 draw some degree of comfort from it . But if,
 4 alternatively , the reality is that more could and should
 5 have been done, if opportunities were missed, and if the
 6 attack may potentially have been averted but for those
 7 missed opportunities or occasions when information could
 8 have been handled differently , then it is right , in
 9 answering the central question of how and in what
 10 circumstances these innocent lives were lost , that this
 11 is made clear so that the authorities can learn and be
 12 held accountable in the clear public interest .
 13 It is in that context that the families remain
 14 concerned at the unresolved issues addressed by you,
 15 sir , at the beginning of this morning as to what
 16 evidence is to be called from the security services and
 17 to what extent the families or their legal
 18 representatives will be permitted to see any witness
 19 called to address term of reference 1, questions of
 20 preventability , or to hear from such witnesses ,
 21 particularly witnesses of fact , and of course the expert
 22 who we now understand is also to provide an analysis of
 23 their performance.
 24 As things stand, it remains to be determined whether
 25 the families are even to know how many witnesses as to

1 fact the inquiry will hear from who are called from MI5
 2 or what their roles in relation to any investigation or
 3 assessment of Abedi were between his first tentative
 4 steps on to the intelligence community's stage back in
 5 2014 and his last steps through the City Room 3 years
 6 later .
 7 It remains our submission on behalf of the families
 8 that we represent that confidence in this inquiry's
 9 transparency of process and integrity of conclusion
 10 requires access by the families to the evidence that it,
 11 the inquiry , receives and the witnesses from whom it
 12 receives it .
 13 As I submitted on an earlier occasion, but with no
 14 apology for repetition , the families have been the
 15 victims of terrorism . The last thing that they would
 16 wish to do is to assist terrorists or to put life at
 17 risk . Taking full account, sir , of your observations at
 18 the beginning of this morning, we will continue to
 19 explore with your legal team and others how the balance
 20 is properly to be struck between the families being
 21 afforded the centrality for the investigation of its
 22 terms of reference that has long been welcomed by them
 23 as the prime motivation for this inquiry whilst not
 24 putting any aspect of national security at risk in the
 25 process .

1 With that very significant caveat and by reference
 2 to term of reference 1, the families have a specific
 3 interest in particular in the following areas and
 4 in relation to the following questions .
 5 Putting terms of reference 1(iii) and (iv) together ,
 6 the topic of the knowledge the security service , police
 7 and others had it to Salman Abedi's radicalisation and
 8 associates and the intelligence and other relevant
 9 information available to them, engages questions as to
 10 what was known about Abedi in 2014 when he became
 11 a subject of interest , what information led to his
 12 closure as an SOI, and what information was received
 13 about him thereafter .
 14 In terms of his associates , this raises questions
 15 about the prisoner that he sought to visit ,
 16 Abdalraouf Abdallah, whose history was addressed by
 17 Mr Weatherby this morning, and what was known about his
 18 brother, who helped him to construct his bomb .
 19 The inquiry will also want to consider carefully by
 20 reference to term of reference 2(iii) those who
 21 associated with the Abedi brothers during their period
 22 of preparation for their attack, many of whom were
 23 identified as persons of interest by the police
 24 investigation into the attack, some of whom were
 25 arrested , and to assess whether anyone else beyond

1 Hashem Abedi was at fault.
 2 Putting terms of reference 1 (v) and (vi) together,
 3 the topic of when intelligence or information about
 4 Abedi became available and the assessment,
 5 interpretation, dissemination and investigation of that
 6 intelligence. This raises questions, we submit, sir, as
 7 to the nature and weight of the information that led to
 8 Abedi becoming a subject of interest and the assessment
 9 that led to the closure of that status in his case,
 10 whether the decision to close him was correct, but more
 11 particularly, the extent to which Abedi's status as
 12 a closed SOI was kept under review and was flagged up as
 13 further intelligence came to light, for example, as to
 14 his contact with other subjects of interest, highlighted
 15 again by Mr Weatherby this morning, during the course of
 16 2015 and beyond that, flags being raised as to his
 17 expressed pro-ISIS views and the extent to which the
 18 pieces of intelligence that became available were fitted
 19 into the jigsaw that might identify a potential risk to
 20 life and to national security.
 21 Questions as to whether sufficient resources were
 22 being devoted to those appearing on the periphery of
 23 investigations and, as the Intelligence and Security
 24 Committee report put it:
 25 "Resources as to joining the dots between their two

133

1 unconnected pieces of information and identifiers."
 2 So that the cumulative effect of such pieces of
 3 information was assessed and quantified in a timely
 4 manner, the mosaic effect.
 5 For example, whether there should have been
 6 follow-up on the occasions when Abedi visited or booked
 7 to visit Abdalraouf Abdallah detained in relation to
 8 terrorist offences, whether there should have been
 9 investigation of the telephone contact between them in
 10 the year before the attack or whether, as the
 11 Intelligence and Security Committee observed, the lack
 12 of action where there was a clear risk that these were
 13 meetings between two extremists was, to put it mildly,
 14 unsatisfactory.
 15 In the latter stages before the attack, this raises
 16 questions about the information which the
 17 Secretary of State concedes in her written opening
 18 statement could have been handled differently, about the
 19 information that led Abedi in 2017 to be assessed by
 20 what is described as the Clematis process, and whether
 21 this was prioritised and handled both correctly and
 22 expeditiously.
 23 In that regard the families would wish to understand
 24 the reasons for the chronology that the
 25 Secretary of State sets out in her written statements,

134

1 namely that Abedi hit a priority indicator in March of
 2 2017 on the basis of information received in the middle
 3 of 2016 and yet, by the time he carried out his attack
 4 towards the end of May, that process had not been taken
 5 further, even to the extent of what are described as
 6 "low-level investigative enquiries".
 7 In particular, perhaps, putting together terms of
 8 reference 1(vii), (viii) and (ix), what steps were or
 9 were not taken by the security service, the police and
 10 others in relation to Abedi before his attack, their
 11 adequacy and rationale. Questions, for example, such as
 12 whether Abedi should have been considered for a Prevent
 13 referral, for example at the time of his closure as
 14 an SOI in 2014, and whether there should have been
 15 discussion between the police and MI5 at that stage
 16 about that.
 17 Whether the monitoring of those in contact with
 18 extremist prisoners by MI5, the police and Prison
 19 Services were sufficiently joined-up, thorough and
 20 forward-thinking, especially when those prisoners were
 21 category A, but, irrespective of their categorisation,
 22 if they were terrorists, and as to the access by such
 23 extremist prisoners to means of communication by a visit
 24 or illicit phone with others who shared their extremist
 25 views.

135

1 In particular, whether visits to an extremist,
 2 whatever their categorisation, by a closed SOI should
 3 have been investigated and assessed.
 4 Whether the purchase of the chemical components for
 5 TATP and the other elements of Abedi's explosive device
 6 ought to have been identified and investigated.
 7 Echoing Mr Weatherby this morning, whether in this
 8 regard the procedures employed by the Home Office,
 9 security service and the police in relation to the
 10 purchase of precursor chemicals of a kind recognised as
 11 components of IEDs were then and are now sufficiently
 12 robust to identify persons who should be investigated.
 13 In this regard, by reference to terms of
 14 reference 2(ii) and (iv), we submit the inquiry will
 15 wish to consider whether suspicion action reports ought
 16 to have been completed in relation to the purchases made
 17 by the Abedi brothers and their associates, friends and
 18 family, for example, in relation to their purchases of
 19 sulphuric acid and hydrogen peroxide, and what learning
 20 can be derived from the absence of such reports:
 21 Whether, as the Intelligence and Security Committee
 22 considered, Salman Abedi should have been subject to
 23 travel monitoring and/or travel restrictions.
 24 Whether more generally the travel of a closed SOI
 25 ought to be the subject of some degree of monitoring.

136

1 Whether the port stop system was operating
 2 adequately when it did not provide any sufficient
 3 monitoring of the travel by the Abedi brothers or
 4 analysis of the electronic media that they may have been
 5 carrying. Were there in this respect very real missed
 6 opportunities?
 7 And, in those latter stages, the efficacy and,
 8 crucially, the efficiency of the process that led Abedi
 9 in 2017 to be assessed, the beginnings of an assessment
 10 through the Clematis process.
 11 Sir, I make clear on their behalf that it is not the
 12 intention of the families to seek to criticise for the
 13 sake of it. It is not the intention of the families to
 14 apply an unrealistic counsel of perfection to those who
 15 are doing their best to protect our society in the
 16 difficult circumstances that confronted this country in
 17 the first half of 2017. The families share the
 18 determination of Mr Greaney and your inquiry team to
 19 ensure that further terror attacks are prevented rather
 20 than assisted by this inquiry process.
 21 However, we submit that the public is better served
 22 and public confidence is better secured when those
 23 entrusted and empowered with the means and
 24 responsibility to provide that protection are required
 25 to explain what they did or did not do and why when

137

1 something so terrible happens as occurred in Manchester
 2 on 22 May 2017. It is the fervent hope of the families
 3 that national security can and will be enhanced rather
 4 than in any way undermined by this process.
 5 Allied to these issues, the families also have
 6 a specific interest by reference to term of
 7 reference 1(ii) in what can be learned about the path of
 8 Salman and Hashem Abedi to radicalisation, a topic
 9 already addressed, sir, this morning by Mr Cooper.
 10 This, again, is of such interest as part of the
 11 gaining by the families of an understanding of what led
 12 Salman Abedi to undertake and Hashem Abedi to aid such
 13 a callous act, and whether there were steps along their
 14 journey together to the City Room when something could
 15 have been done to divert them. This involves, for
 16 example, consideration of the operation of the Prevent
 17 system and its potential utility in relation to
 18 Salman Abedi.
 19 The Secretary of State observes in her written
 20 opening statement that neither Salman Abedi nor any
 21 member of his immediate family was ever the subject of
 22 a referral to Prevent. As a result, there was no
 23 opportunity for Salman Abedi's risk, or that of any of
 24 his immediate family members, to be managed.
 25 That, we submit, is at one level a statement of the

138

1 obvious, but it does beg more questions than it answers.
 2 It begs questions as to whether he should have been
 3 referred, for example when closed as an SOI in 2014, and
 4 why he was not referred, and whether that was another
 5 missed opportunity.
 6 This topic also involves consideration of what the
 7 places of education and worship attended by the Abedi
 8 brothers could have identified and what could have been
 9 done about it.
 10 In further investigating how and in what
 11 circumstances these innocent persons lost their lives,
 12 and whether this was something that could have been
 13 prevented, the families have a specific interest in term
 14 of reference 4, the security arrangements within and
 15 outside the arena.
 16 The families are anxious to understand how the
 17 security operation at the arena failed to identify and
 18 act upon an individual who was present in the City Room
 19 twice whilst the concert was ongoing for a total of
 20 an hour and 17 minutes before he detonated his bomb and
 21 who, in that time, caused alarm to numerous members of
 22 the public.
 23 Put another way, how could it have been that a young
 24 man who was clearly out of place in the City Room by
 25 reference to the type of event it was hosting and by

139

1 reference to the large and obviously heavy backpack
 2 he was carrying was allowed to carry out the attack in
 3 a place and at a time where those who lost their lives
 4 should have been entitled to feel protected.
 5 Again, sir, this is not through a desire to
 6 apportion blame or some form of witch-hunt, rather,
 7 it is to identify, if it be the case, where those
 8 responsible for ensuring that those who died were safe
 9 failed to protect them, whether this was through
 10 a failure properly to assess the risks, a failure to
 11 identify that the risk had arisen, or a failure to take
 12 the necessary measures to safeguard against that risk,
 13 or a combination of all three.
 14 The families note that a number of both the public
 15 authorities and corporate bodies in their written
 16 statements, corporate bodies and public authorities
 17 variously concerned with security arrangements at the
 18 arena, have sought in a brief departure from the
 19 carousel of blame between themselves to deflect
 20 investigation of issues which they argue were not
 21 directly causative of the carnage caused by Abedi's
 22 bomb.
 23 Causation is, of course, a matter for the inquiry to
 24 consider, but the families would suggest that to limit
 25 the investigation of this inquiry, as is contended by

140

1 those corporate bodies, would be to take too narrow an
 2 approach to issues which are clearly encompassed by the
 3 terms of reference. Moreover, in considering causation,
 4 if the arena was a location with avoidable
 5 vulnerabilities to its security or in relation to which
 6 improvements could have been made, then these were
 7 factors that made it the type of target attractive to
 8 someone set on such carnage and misery, and if those
 9 vulnerabilities remain, they could make such a venue
 10 attractive again.

11 Looking forward with a determination that other
 12 families should not suffer as they have suffered, this
 13 is a process by which the inquiry, with the assistance
 14 of the families, can address the issue of what lessons
 15 can be learned to ensure, insofar as is practical, that
 16 music concerts and other such crowded events are safe
 17 in the future.

18 For those reasons, the families have a specific
 19 interest in all aspects of the security arrangements
 20 within and outside the arena, and, in particular, in the
 21 following areas and in relation to the following
 22 questions.

23 By reference to term of reference 4(i), the security
 24 provided and arranged by the owner and operator of the
 25 arena venue, SMG, and those contracted by them to

141

1 provide security, ShowSec. The families wish to assist
 2 the inquiry to scrutinise the planning, assessment of
 3 risk, training and preparation of both SMG and ShowSec
 4 and to ask, amongst other questions, what risk
 5 assessments had in fact been undertaken by either SMG or
 6 ShowSec in relation to the risks of terrorist attack
 7 and, in particular, the terrible risks of person-borne
 8 IED attack.

9 The families note that in their written opening
 10 statements, ShowSec accept its efforts in this regard
 11 were inadequate and that SMG accepts that there were
 12 shortcomings with theirs. This raises questions also as
 13 to what plans and procedures had actually been put in
 14 place to mitigate those risks, particularly the risk of
 15 a person-borne IED attack. It raises questions as to
 16 whether SMG and ShowSec collaborated sufficiently with
 17 each other in the risk assessment process and whether
 18 one organisation was even aware of the assessments of
 19 the other.

20 It raises questions as to whether either SMG or
 21 ShowSec, given the shortcomings and inadequacies that
 22 they accept, whether either adequately analysed and
 23 appreciated the risk of a terrorist attack against the
 24 arena generally and in relation to that concert, the
 25 Ariana Grande concert, on 22 May specifically.

142

1 As part of that analysis and assessment, questions
 2 are raised as to whether they identified the risk of a
 3 person-borne IED attack and, if so, what measures they
 4 had considered, what measures they had trained for, and
 5 what measures they had actually implemented.

6 Given the focus, understandably, on the City Room,
 7 questions are raised in relation to what SMG and ShowSec
 8 understood their responsibilities to be for the security
 9 of that location. There will, no doubt, sir, be much as
 10 to the technical questions of ownership of that
 11 location, but moving beyond those, there are questions
 12 about the practical security of those attending the
 13 arena through that obvious and important point of access
 14 and egress, described by the experts in this area as
 15 "the main entrance to the arena".

16 The inquiry will want to consider the varying
 17 opinions of relevant witnesses: from SMG, from ShowSec,
 18 from the emergency services, from city planners and from
 19 others as to the responsibilities for the City Room
 20 at the time of this event at the arena, because the
 21 divergence in their views may itself indicate a lack of
 22 necessary planning and certainly a lack of necessary
 23 cooperation.

24 In that regard also, the inquiry may wish to
 25 consider whether SMG should have sought to extend its

143

1 venue perimeter back from the doors of the arena as it
 2 has done since the attack. Whilst noting the
 3 observation on behalf of SMG that the mere fact that any
 4 given system is capable of improvement does not mean
 5 that it fails unless it is improved, and recognising the
 6 dangers of hindsight, this inquiry, we submit, will want
 7 to consider whether extending the perimeter was
 8 a measure that other similar venues had already carried
 9 out in the wake of the Paris attacks in November 2015
 10 and closer to home, whether this was a move that SMG's
 11 senior staff had been informed about at
 12 a counter-terrorism security seminar in April of 2016,
 13 and therefore whether they themselves could have
 14 introduced such measures in the intervening year as they
 15 did very shortly after, too late, in May of 2017.

16 Consideration will also need to be given to whether
 17 moving the perimeter simply relocates the target, as SMG
 18 suggest, or whether moving the perimeter serves to
 19 mitigate the extent of any attack to a crowded venue.

20 There are other questions raised. Were SMG and
 21 ShowSec staff sufficiently trained and knowledgeable to
 22 address the risks of a terrorist attack? This includes
 23 an assessment of the extent of provision by the
 24 management of SMG and ShowSec of an adequate internal
 25 and external counter-terrorism training programme.

144

1 A number of counter-terrorism training programmes,
 2 Project Griffin , Project Argus, will be raised in the
 3 evidence, but the extent to which the learning from
 4 those had in fact been imparted to staff is a separate
 5 question, we submit, from whether programmes had taken
 6 place at all.

7 As an aspect of counter-terrorism training, it is
 8 submitted that it will be necessary to review the extent
 9 and content of regular refresher training for staff and
 10 the provision of up-to-date guidance to staff, for
 11 example in relation to the identification of and the
 12 action to be taken in relation to hostile reconnaissance
 13 and suspicious activity, together with the regularity
 14 and the sufficiency of its inclusion in briefings so as
 15 properly to inculcate counter-terrorism awareness in the
 16 culture of the security operation at the arena.

17 The actions of Salman Abedi on his visits to the
 18 arena fall to be considered, we submit, in this context.
 19 If sufficient suspicious activity training had been
 20 provided, how did relevant staff miss and/or ignore what
 21 untrained members of the public saw and, at least in one
 22 case, reported to them? Was a man with an obviously
 23 heavy rucksack who was not passing through the City Room
 24 to or from the station, but was lurking on that raised
 25 mezzanine for so very long, really not even a little bit

145

1 suspicious as ShowSec appear, in their written statement
 2 to suggest, despite the training in relation to terror
 3 risks, hostile reconnaissance and to suspicious activity
 4 that ShowSec and SMG both assert had been provided to
 5 their staff.

6 If such activities, such hostile reconnaissance,
 7 such suspicious activity had been noted, did SMG and
 8 ShowSec management adequately review, analyse and act on
 9 staff reports? Ultimately, do any failings on SMG or
 10 ShowSec's part, either on the night or in the lead-up to
 11 it, demonstrate a lack of risk awareness, strategic
 12 planning and/or care in their approach to security and
 13 the threat from terrorism?

14 By reference to term of reference 4(ii) and the
 15 security provided by relevant public or state
 16 organisations, questions arise by way of example as to
 17 the interrelationship of the GMP, who were responsible
 18 for policing Manchester, and the BTP, who were
 19 responsible for policing at Victoria Station,
 20 in relation to their policing of the arena.

21 Did the Manchester Arena fall down the crack between
 22 the two? In terms of contingency planning by those two
 23 forces, what planning realistically was there for the
 24 concert on 22 May through the use of out-of-date
 25 contingency plans for an event for which one, Greater

146

1 Manchester Police, appears to have not even been
 2 officially aware?

3 It will also be necessary to consider the approach
 4 of the British Transport Police, for example in relation
 5 to the following questions: were BTP officers on duty
 6 adequately briefed, in particular as to the risks from
 7 terrorism? Why was there, if it was the case, no direct
 8 supervision of those officers? Why for significant
 9 periods was there no officer patrolling the City Room in
 10 accordance with the deployment instructions?

11 Those same instructions appear to have been ignored
 12 by those officers in relation to the staggering of their
 13 breaks. Why were the four officers present in the arena
 14 and the Victoria Station at the relevant time all
 15 inexperienced, whilst the only experienced officer with
 16 knowledge of the site, whose practice it was to position
 17 himself on the very mezzanine in the City Room, metres
 18 from where Abedi had positioned himself during egress,
 19 was away dealing with an enquiry elsewhere?

20 How was it that instead of that strategically placed
 21 and very experienced officer, the loved ones of the
 22 families were allowed to wait in or enter the City Room
 23 at that critical time with no BTP presence at all?

24 In relation to terms of reference 4(iv) and (v), and
 25 the planning, preparation, arrangements and

147

1 communications, if any, between the security providers
 2 prior to the attack and their compliance with relevant
 3 planning, preparations, policies, systems and practices,
 4 the families have a specific interest in understanding
 5 the process by which operational and safety planning for
 6 the arena was audited or inspected by the wider
 7 emergency services.

8 This will also include the operation in relation to
 9 the arena of the regulation and guidance provided by the
 10 National Counter-terrorism Security Office and by the
 11 Counter-terrorism Security Adviser, the CTSA, in the
 12 north-west for both Greater Manchester and British
 13 Transport Polices.

14 This is because the families are anxious to assist
 15 the inquiry to evaluate how that system was operating,
 16 its ability to provide security for a venue like the
 17 arena, and the degree to which the liaison between CTSA's
 18 and the arena was in fact achieving this.

19 Central, of course, to this evaluation is the use of
 20 the protective security improvement activity, the PSIA
 21 scoring tool, and the action plan.

22 Questions, it is submitted, which arise in this
 23 context include whether, as its opening statement
 24 appears to suggest, SMG acted incorrectly on the basis
 25 that the GMP's CTSA had provided a risk assessment or

148

1 security audit for the arena and had approved the
2 arena's security arrangements. If that was their
3 understanding, questions arise as to whether the CTSA
4 contributed to that false impression.

5 Why were there outstanding actions on the PSIA
6 action plan for the arena, including actions in relation
7 to training concerning suspicious activity and hostile
8 reconnaissance under the banner of Project Argus? Was
9 SMG aware of the outstanding actions and why, if it
10 proves to be the case, was SMG not provided with a copy
11 of the action plan by the CTSA?

12 Why, if ShowSec's account is accepted, were those
13 actually providing the security at the arena not in the
14 loop on the evaluation of security between SMG on the
15 one hand and the CTSA on the other? Should that PSIA
16 process have addressed not only the arena itself but
17 safety- critical external areas such as the City Room?
18 And in relation to CT training and especially
19 multi-agency tabletop CT training exercises, to what
20 extent were these both actually multi-agency in their
21 organisation, application and involvement and to what
22 extent were those directly responsible for the security
23 of the arena, in terms of SMG and ShowSec, involved as
24 participants rather than just as a passive audience?

25 In relation to term of reference 4(vi), finally, the

149

1 impact of any inadequacies in the security arrangements.
2 The families have a specific interest in understanding
3 whether different, better or more safety-compliant
4 actions in relation to the security of the arena on
5 22 May itself could have prevented or at least mitigated
6 the consequences of the attack.

7 For example, questions raised in this category
8 include: did SMG and ShowSec staff, including those
9 deployed in the City Room on the night of the attack,
10 understand their responsibilities in relation to the
11 security of the City Room? Was ShowSec's bag-checking
12 operation fit for the purpose of reducing the risk of
13 someone entering the arena or its environs carrying an
14 explosive device? To what extent, given their
15 concession that it was occurring at all, were non-SIA
16 staff being utilised in relation to bag checks, and if
17 so, should they have been?

18 We agree with Mr Cooper's submission this morning
19 that it is no answer to these concerns to say that
20 a better bag check would not have detected Abedi because
21 he did not pass the bag check line. Had that line been
22 further from the perimeter, that may not have been the
23 case. In any event, if there was a laxness in relation
24 to one important aspect of security, what does that say
25 about the security regime and the security culture that

150

1 was in place at the arena and of which that was a part?

2 Why did members of ShowSec staff, like Mr Lawler,
3 Mr Agha, and PC Bullough of the BTP present in the
4 City Room fail to identify Salman Abedi, fail to
5 challenge him and/or to report him to the relevant
6 control rooms, even when he was drawn to their attention
7 by members of the public? What does their behaviour say
8 of the adequacy of their training in relation to the
9 risk of terrorism and especially the risk of
10 a person-borne IED attack?

11 Were ShowSec and SMG staff adequately briefed,
12 supervised and supported by their management during
13 their shift on the night of the attack? As Mr Cooper
14 said this morning, were communication systems at the
15 arena up to the job? Was CCTV being used proactively to
16 identify suspicious activity during the concert and,
17 specifically, in the City Room? Which members of SMG
18 staff were responsible for monitoring that CCTV and were
19 they trained? Why did some senior members of SMG staff
20 think that it was the responsibility of the
21 Sierra Control to monitor CCTV trained on the City Room
22 during events when others appear to have thought it was
23 the Whiskey Control's job?

24 Whichever it was, why did neither identify
25 Salman Abedi? Were ShowSec's pre-egress checks, which

151

1 are accepted not to have had a counter-terrorism
2 element, and equally BTP's precautions for the egress
3 stage thorough and focused on the vulnerability of the
4 arena to a terrorist attack at such a critical time?

5 Those who have been on visits to the arena, sir,
6 were told that people would arrive at the arena over
7 a period of time, but they would all leave together. It
8 was that time, we submit, that was critical in relation
9 to a potential terrorist attack. Would
10 a counter-terrorism element have involved, as ShowSec
11 appears to suggest, intensive specialist training and/or
12 PPE or would it have involved checking, for example, the
13 City Room and its mezzanine for persons who
14 counter-terror training would identify as being of
15 potential risk, and then perhaps enlisting the
16 assistance of colleagues in security and law enforcement
17 to manage any such risk?

18 We submit that it can be no answer to these concerns
19 that the City Room was beyond the arena's perimeter.
20 SMG were contractually responsible for security in the
21 City Room at all times, ShowSec were responsible for it
22 during events. More than that, sir, this was the
23 arena's doorstep. It was the place where those
24 responsible for security that night were happy to let
25 people wait to collect their loved ones and into which

152

1 security were about to let those loved ones walk without
2 any check, apparently, on the risk of terror .

3 I am conscious that others representing groups of
4 families of those who died have and will address term of
5 reference 5, the emergency response to the bombing, and
6 those who have done so this morning, in particular
7 Mr Cooper, have done so in detail .

8 It perhaps suffices to say that the families
9 I represent share the real interest of those others in
10 how the emergency services planned and prepared to
11 respond to an act of terrorism that occasioned mass
12 casualties , as this attack did, and how their plans held
13 up in practice .

14 We therefore join the other families in seeking to
15 examine what Lord Kerslake's review of preparedness for
16 and the emergency response to the bombing described as
17 "the lessons of what went less well ".

18 We recognise in doing so that many individual
19 members of the emergency services showed, in the words
20 of Tony Kiss, one of those I represent , "great
21 sensitivity and true professionalism ".

22 Our questions are directed rather to the training ,
23 the procedures, the coordination and the tactical
24 decision -making which gave shape to the emergency
25 response as a whole rather than as to those individual

1 acts of heroism.

2 It has been accepted, it seems, to greater or lesser
3 extent, by all of the emergency services in their
4 written opening statements that things might have been
5 done better . Yet real questions remain and the inquiry ,
6 we submit, will want carefully to consider whether that
7 which is accepted by them goes far enough. It is
8 striking , for example, that the North West Ambulance
9 Service considers in its written statement that, by any
10 standard, the immediate response and deployment of
11 resources by NNAS was quick and effective, when, as we
12 heard from Mr Greaney in his opening and from Mr Cooper
13 this morning, only one paramedic entered the City Room
14 in the first 40 minutes after the explosion to be
15 followed only by a couple more.

16 The families want to understand the policies and
17 decisions which led to that situation , to the even
18 greater delay in attendance by the Greater Manchester
19 Fire and Rescue Service and the reasons for what seems
20 to have been acknowledged on all sides to have been
21 weakness in communication and cooperation between the
22 services on the night.

23 This raises questions in particular as to the
24 effectiveness of the Greater Manchester Local Resilience
25 Forum in securing real cooperation and real coordination

1 between the emergency services in terms of their
2 communication, planning, co-location and cohesive
3 response to fast-moving, unexpected and challenging
4 events .

5 This involves , we submit, consideration of the
6 extent to which guidance that was in place to secure
7 such cooperation and coordination was in fact being
8 followed , whether it be the Joint Emergency Service
9 Interoperability Principles , or JESIP, which is easier
10 to say, which the Secretary of State rightly described
11 as a critical element of the emergency response to major
12 incidents , and also the joint operating principles , the
13 JOPs, that applied if , as GMP considered but others did
14 not, that this was an Operation Plato situation .

15 It also involves consideration of whether these
16 critical principles were even properly understood, given
17 that each of the emergency services appears to accept
18 the JESIP principles were not followed as they should
19 have been, and the extent to which multi-agency
20 exercises under the auspices of the Greater Manchester
21 Local Resilience Forum had enhanced a real multi-agency
22 response to emergencies rather than a veneer of one.

23 This can, we submit, be tested by reference to the
24 multi-agency exercise referred to by Mr Cooper this
25 morning, Winchester Accord, at the Trafford Centre in

1 May 2015. Greater Manchester Police asserts that it has
2 a good record for holding such exercises . We submit
3 that the question is whether it had and whether the
4 other organisations involved had such a good record for
5 learning from them.

6 We agree with Mr Greaney and his assessment that
7 Operation Sherman similarly needs to be considered both
8 as an exploration of the resilience of
9 Greater Manchester to terrorism , which it was designed
10 to test , and to what its use of the City Room as
11 a hypothetical target should have said of that venue as
12 a real target for real terrorism .

13 The various experts have considered this exercise
14 and the learning points there were or should have been
15 raised from it , they have done the same in relation to
16 Winchester Accord, and the inquiry will be assisted by
17 them in considering Winchester Accord and asking
18 questions such as: what that exercise foreshadowed of
19 the interaction between Greater Manchester Police
20 directing officers in the immediate aftermath of the
21 attack and others engaged at that critical time in an
22 emergency response, which was meant to have been
23 collaborative .

24 In particular , in this regard, what plans were made
25 to prevent the force duty officer from becoming

1 overwhelmed, given that GMP accepts that it was
 2 identified in debriefs that the force duty officer was
 3 overstretched and at times uncontactable during the
 4 training exercise Winchester Accord, and indeed given
 5 that GMP states that it was widely known that an FDO
 6 might be overwhelmed in such circumstances.
 7 Questions also as to what the exercise highlighted
 8 as to the importance of and limitations to communication
 9 and coordination between the emergency services,
 10 particularly when an incident was interpreted as
 11 a marauding terrorist firearms attack and what, if
 12 anything, was done about the limitations identified
 13 through that training process.
 14 Beyond that questions are raised, we submit, as to
 15 the multi-agency radio communications, communicational
 16 interoperability, and the role of the tri-service
 17 communication service and/or Airwave communication, and
 18 shared situational awareness.
 19 Questions as to the adequacy of contingency planning
 20 arrangements by both British Transport Police and
 21 Greater Manchester Police in relation to the arena,
 22 whether there should have been a site-specific plan for
 23 the Ambulance Service.
 24 Whether there were issues with the updating and
 25 analysis of such plans and whether a multi-agency

1 up-to-date accessible and credible emergency plan would
 2 have improved the multi-agency emergency response when
 3 it was most needed.
 4 Questions as to the adequacy and effectiveness of
 5 the command structure, in particular the tactical
 6 command structure of the Greater Manchester Police in
 7 its immediate response to the attack, and the
 8 effectiveness of multi-agency scene command more
 9 generally. This also involves consideration of the
 10 apparent non-activation of pertinent multi-agency
 11 emergency plans, the reasons for that and the
 12 consequences of that non-activation.
 13 Questions as to the degree of proactive multi-agency
 14 engagement and situational awareness exhibited by the
 15 emergency services generally and by the
 16 Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service in
 17 particular. This will, for example, include
 18 consideration of GMP's acceptance that it did not share
 19 the declaration of Operation Plato as it should, the
 20 acceptance by both the Fire Service and North West Fire
 21 Control that they should have been more proactive in
 22 seeking information from others engaged in responding to
 23 the attack.
 24 The Fire Service has also quite properly accepted
 25 the criticism of the expert that there was a leadership

1 gap and a lack of operational grip in the early stages
 2 of the emergency response.
 3 We submit the inquiry will need to explore how that
 4 situation arose and, importantly, whether it might arise
 5 again.
 6 Questions are raised about the failure to establish
 7 an effective casualty bureau, leaving those who needed
 8 answers most without those answers for so painfully long
 9 and, echoing Mr Cooper's observations this morning,
 10 questions arise as to the availability of necessary
 11 first aid equipment and, for example, the availability
 12 of stretchers and dressing packs, whether the responders
 13 had the right training to understand what equipment was
 14 available from where.
 15 The families seek through examination of such
 16 questions as these to ensure that the lessons that can
 17 be learned from this terrible incident and the emergency
 18 response to it are identified and indeed are learned --
 19 learned too late for the families themselves, but not,
 20 we hope, too late for the community of which they are
 21 a part.
 22 Again, in doing so, the families are not interested
 23 in identifying scapegoats for institutional failings,
 24 not least because in doing so the families recognise, as
 25 Lord Kerslake's review did, that there is a lot to be

1 proud of in the response both for the city-region of
 2 Greater Manchester and its emergency services.
 3 The families also seek to acknowledge through the
 4 inquiry, again to use Lord Kerslake's words, "the
 5 hundreds, if not thousands, of acts of individual
 6 bravery and selflessness" that the evidence this inquiry
 7 will hear will amply demonstrate.
 8 But in this way, through the recognition of the
 9 service given to the public as well as the ways in which
 10 that service can be improved for the future, a positive
 11 legacy of a kind, some glint of silver can be derived
 12 for the families from this blackest of clouds.
 13 Thank you, sir.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Atkinson.
 15 MR GREANEY: Sir, we'll rise now and return, please, at
 16 3.40, when we will hear the final opening statement for
 17 today.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 19 (3.14 pm)
 20 (A short break)
 21 (3.40 pm)
 22 MR GREANEY: Sir, we are finally today going to hear from
 23 Mr Welch on behalf of a fourth group of bereaved
 24 families.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

1 Opening statement by MR WELCH
 2 MR WELCH: Sir, this opening statement is made on behalf of
 3 Robert Boyle, the father of Courtney Boyle, Paul Hett,
 4 the father of Martyn Hett, and Paul Price, the partner
 5 of Elaine McIver.
 6 At shortly before 10.30 pm on Monday, 22 May 2017,
 7 Courtney Boyle, Martyn Hett and Elaine McIver all found
 8 themselves in the City Room foyer of the
 9 Manchester Arena. Martyn Hett had attended the concert
 10 and was waiting for friends before going on to another
 11 venue. He was celebrating as he was due to be
 12 travelling to America the following Wednesday for
 13 a two-month holiday.
 14 Courtney Boyle was waiting to pick up her younger
 15 sister who had been to the concert.
 16 Elaine McIver, who was in the company of her partner
 17 Paul Price, was waiting to pick up Paul's teenage
 18 daughter and her friend, who had also been to the
 19 concert.
 20 Courtney, Martyn and Elaine did not know one
 21 another. They had never met and they had never spoken
 22 together. However, they did share one thing in common,
 23 that they had also shared with other members of the
 24 public who were waiting for their loved ones in the
 25 City Room on 22 May: they believed the area was safe and

161

1 they believed that they were safe. Tragically, they
 2 were all mistaken.
 3 You have indicated, sir, that you will be assisted
 4 by statements from the family teams that identify topics
 5 within the terms of reference that are of specific
 6 interest to us and to explain why those topics will be
 7 our clients' focus during the course of the oral
 8 hearings.
 9 Before we do that, on behalf of the family members
 10 we represent, we wish to thank you and the inquiry legal
 11 team for the compassion and empathy that was shown
 12 during the commemorative hearings.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 14 MR WELCH: This is an inquiry into the deaths of 22 people
 15 who, through an act of hatred and cowardice, were taken
 16 away from their families too soon. It was right that
 17 this inquiry began with a celebration of their lives and
 18 a dedication to their memories.
 19 You have heard the detailed opening statement
 20 provided by Mr Greaney. It is clear that this inquiry
 21 will be wide-ranging and thorough. It is clear from
 22 Mr Greaney's opening statement that the inquiry legal
 23 team have worked tirelessly to identify the causes of
 24 the tragic events of 22 May 2017. Those we represent
 25 are grateful for the work that has already been

162

1 undertaken by your team.
 2 There are many questions to be answered in relation
 3 to what happened on 22 May 2017 at the Manchester Arena
 4 and the events that led to it. Many individuals and
 5 representatives of corporate organisations and public
 6 authorities who appear before the inquiry will have to
 7 explain their actions.
 8 However, there are two primary questions that
 9 Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price have and which
 10 they hope the inquiry will be able to answer. Firstly,
 11 how was it that Salman Abedi was allowed to be in
 12 a position whereby he could detonate a bomb in the
 13 City Room at 10.31: pm on 22 May 2017?
 14 Secondly, could the tragic events of 22 May 2017 and
 15 the deaths of their loved ones have been avoided?
 16 We have chosen our words in relation to the first
 17 question carefully and deliberately. The disclosure of
 18 material by the inquiry legal team to the families and
 19 other core participants over the past 18 months has
 20 given rise to concerns that there were a series of
 21 mistakes, errors and missed opportunities by state
 22 agencies, corporate bodies and individuals charged with
 23 ensuring the safety of members of the public generally,
 24 attendees at events in the arena, and people attending
 25 the City Room itself.

163

1 The attack at the Manchester Arena was tragically
 2 not exceptional, nor should it have been unforeseeable.
 3 The actions of all core participants in this inquiry,
 4 but particularly those involved in security, both at
 5 a national level and in relation to the arena and the
 6 Victoria Station complex specifically, must be viewed in
 7 the proper context of the threat posed by terrorism on
 8 and before 22 May 2017.
 9 In 2016 there had been 16 Islamist terrorist attacks
 10 in Europe. The multi-sited attacks in Paris, which
 11 included the attack at a concert at the
 12 Bataclan Theatre, had occurred only 18 months before the
 13 Manchester attack. Prior to 22 May, there had already
 14 been five Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe in 2017,
 15 and only 2 months before, on 22 March 2017, five people
 16 were killed and 50 injured when an Islamist terrorist
 17 drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge and stabbed
 18 an unarmed police officer.
 19 In response to the March 2017 Westminster attack,
 20 Prime Minister Theresa May gave a statement to
 21 Parliament and said as follows:
 22 "We know the threat from Islamist terrorism is very
 23 real, but while the public should remain utterly
 24 vigilant, they should not and will not be cowed by this
 25 threat. As Acting Deputy Commissioner Rowley has made

164

1 clear , we are stepping up policing to protect
 2 communities across the country and to reassure the
 3 public , and as a precautionary measure this will mean
 4 increasing the number of patrols in cities across the
 5 country with more police and more armed police on the
 6 streets . But the greatest response lies not in the
 7 words of politicians but in the everyday actions of
 8 ordinary people, for beyond these walls today, in scenes
 9 repeated in towns and cities across the country,
 10 millions of people are going about their days and
 11 getting on with their lives . The streets are as busy as
 12 ever, the offices full , the coffee shops and cafés
 13 bustling . It is in these actions, millions of acts of
 14 normality, that we find the best response to terrorism ,
 15 a response that denies our enemies their victory , that
 16 refuses to let them win, that shows we will never give
 17 in."

18 On the same day, NaCTSO, the National
 19 Counter-terrorism Security Office , provided a security
 20 update in the following terms:
 21 "Following the tragic incident on Westminster Bridge
 22 and at the Palace of Westminster on 22 March 2017, it is
 23 important that the police security stance and the
 24 private sector are joined up. To ensure this , NaCTSO
 25 recommended businesses consider some protective security

1 tactics to aid their security , whilst remembering that
 2 the threat level remains at severe. The attack
 3 incorporated multiple methodologies, as such no one
 4 security element will wholly mitigate such attacks. We
 5 understand that people responsible for building security
 6 have differing priorities , some being responsible for
 7 large iconic sites and others for small businesses , but
 8 the message remains the same: effective security and
 9 effective communities defeat terrorism .

10 "We know that terrorists will undertake hostile
 11 reconnaissance ahead of conducting an attack and
 12 increased vigilance by staff and the creation of
 13 a hostile environment combats such hostile
 14 reconnaissance. You should refresh the knowledge of
 15 staff who have received Project Argus and
 16 Project Griffin training and deploy staff who have
 17 received training in behavioural detection ... Staff
 18 should be encouraged to proactively challenge visitors ,
 19 vehicles and anything out of place .

20 "It is important that you review your security
 21 plans; consider the following options from the national
 22 stakeholder menu of options, particularly around crowded
 23 places, night-time economy and iconic sites . It is
 24 recommended that businesses look at the full menu and
 25 consider any other options that suit their premises or

1 organisation ."
 2 On 22 May 2017, the threat level remained at severe ,
 3 meaning that an attack was highly likely , yet
 4 Courtney Boyle, Martyn Hett and Elaine McIver fulfilled
 5 their part of the bargain in responding to that threat .
 6 They went about their daily lives as before, they
 7 engaged in acts of normality , and there can be nothing
 8 more normal than a young man celebrating with his
 9 friends by going to a pop concert or parents and older
 10 siblings waiting in an area with hundreds of others to
 11 meet and take home their family members, teenage girls
 12 who had attended a pop concert.

13 Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price now believe
 14 that whilst their family members fulfilled their part of
 15 the bargain, those charged with ensuring the safety of
 16 their loved ones did not.

17 The first topics within the terms of reference that
 18 our clients are most concerned with are those relating
 19 to the security arrangements within and outside the
 20 arena, term of reference 4.

21 This matter has become the cause of anguish and
 22 distress to our clients because of what they now
 23 understand in relation to the security measures that
 24 were employed at the arena and the events of the evening
 25 of 22 May. These concerns have given rise to a number

1 of questions that our clients hope will be answered by
 2 this inquiry .

3 The sequence of events setting out Salman Abedi's
 4 movements from when he arrived at Victoria Station at
 5 just after 8.30 pm until he detonated the explosive
 6 device he was carrying in the City Room at 10.31 pm is
 7 truly shocking.

8 The very fact that this man, who did not fit the
 9 audience profile for the concert , who can be seen on
 10 CCTV struggling with the weight of his bag containing
 11 the device and who, we say, stood out like a sore thumb
 12 and went unchallenged in the complex for 2 hours, raises
 13 the most serious questions and concerns about the
 14 systems and procedures that were employed at the arena
 15 to ensure the safety and security of those who attended
 16 the City Room and its surrounds.

17 The fact that Salman Abedi was allowed to go
 18 unchallenged for such a significant period of time is
 19 concerning enough; matters are compounded by the fact
 20 that he did not go unnoticed .

21 Firstly , Julie Merchant appears to have had some
 22 form of discussion regarding Salman Abedi's presence
 23 in the City Room with PC Bullough at shortly before
 24 10 pm. Nothing appears to have been done.

25 Secondly, and shortly afterwards , a member of the

1 public not only noticed Salman Abedi acting suspiciously
 2 in the City Room but was so concerned that he approached
 3 Abedi to ask what he was doing and, at 10.14 pm, also
 4 approached a ShowSec security staff member in the
 5 City Room to report his concerns. While the ShowSec
 6 security staff member mentioned this to another staff
 7 member 9 minutes later, and whilst Abedi was clearly
 8 seen by the ShowSec staff, he was allowed to remain in
 9 the City Room unchallenged until he detonated the
 10 device.

11 We suggest that on the basis of those facts it is
 12 irrefutable that on the evening of 22 May there were
 13 missed opportunities to prevent the attack happening,
 14 that the tragic events that followed were avoidable, and
 15 that the attack and consequent loss of life were allowed
 16 to happen. The family members we represent want to know
 17 why.

18 The risk of a further terrorist attack in 2017
 19 in the United Kingdom was well-known. The particular
 20 risk to crowded places, such as the arena, was known
 21 about and emphasised time and time again. The words of
 22 the Prime Minister and the advice of NaCTSO provided
 23 less than 2 months before should have been at the
 24 forefront of the minds of those who were responsible for
 25 the management, safety and security of the arena.

1 Those messages and warnings should have fed through
 2 into everything those organisations were doing.
 3 However, the deep concern of our clients and what we ask
 4 this inquiry to explore is whether, in actual fact,
 5 insufficient attention and focus was placed on the
 6 threat posed by terrorism and this fed into the training
 7 and briefing of staff, the response to potential hostile
 8 reconnaissance the night before the attack, the risk
 9 assessments for the arena and the Ariana Grande concert
 10 in particular, and whether this lack of focus meant that
 11 the systems and procedures for ensuring safety within
 12 the City Room and its surrounds were inadequate.

13 The greater concern is that ensuring the safety of
 14 concertgoers and others against a terrorist attack was
 15 not the priority of those responsible for security in
 16 the City Room when it clearly should have been. When
 17 hearing the evidence in relation to these matters, we
 18 ask you to consider how much of this terrible attack was
 19 caused by oversight, how much was caused by error or
 20 mistake, and how much of it was caused by putting profit
 21 before safety.

22 There are grave concerns in relation to the security
 23 provided by British Transport Police within the
 24 Victoria Station complex. Four police officers from the
 25 British Transport Police attended at Victoria Station by

1 policing for the evening and to provide a visual
 2 deterrent. Despite the fact that Salman Abedi moved
 3 throughout the station and that certain officers went on
 4 patrol in the City Room, where they seem to have been
 5 stood only a few metres away from where he was located,
 6 no challenge was made to him by the police.

7 Amongst other matters, the family members we
 8 represent want to know the following: what were the
 9 officers doing over the course of the evening? What was
 10 their focus and why did not know notice or challenge
 11 Salman Abedi? What was their briefing? What were they
 12 instructed to do and what did they understand they were
 13 there to do? Why, given the terror threat and the
 14 promise of an increased number of officers, including
 15 armed officers to patrol the streets, was it left to
 16 three PCSOs and one police constable with only 8 months'
 17 experience in that role to provide the police presence
 18 at Victoria Station that evening? Why was PC Corke, an
 19 officer of 30 years' experience, who had experience of
 20 policing at concerts at the arena and who was meant to
 21 be at Victoria Station on 22 May throughout the evening,
 22 absent and why was more not done when it was realised he
 23 would be absent?

24 The primary focus of our clients is summed up in
 25 term of reference 4(vi): the impact, if any, of any

1 inadequacies in the security arrangements, including
 2 whether any inadequacies contributed to the extent of
 3 the loss of life that occurred. Why is this of
 4 particular interest? Because of the belief that this
 5 terrible attack and the loss of life that followed could
 6 and indeed should have been avoided.

7 The concern that this attack could and should have
 8 been avoided brings us to the second area of particular
 9 interest to the family members we represent, term of
 10 reference 1: whether the attack by Salman Abedi could
 11 have been prevented by the authorities.

12 The attack of 22 May 2017 did not happen
 13 spontaneously. It had been planned and developed over
 14 weeks, months and perhaps even years. Salman Abedi was
 15 not unknown to the security services. He had displayed
 16 signs of radicalisation and extremist views. The
 17 concern that our clients have is that there were
 18 numerous missed opportunities, chances for intervention
 19 and markers that were not picked up.

20 The overriding concern is that had these things been
 21 done differently by the security services and others,
 22 this attack could have been prevented before
 23 Salman Abedi entered Victoria Station on 22 May 2017.

24 The background and radicalisation of Salman Abedi
 25 are significant matters in this inquiry. It became

1 clear in the days that followed the attack that
2 Salman Abedi was not an unknown lone wolf but an
3 individual who had started on the path towards the
4 events of 22 May 2017 many years earlier and had come to
5 the attention of the authorities on a number of previous
6 occasions.

7 You have heard about this in detail, particularly
8 from Mr Weatherby this morning, but there are a number
9 of facts relating to Salman Abedi's background that
10 cause our clients particular concern: his father's links
11 to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an armed Islamist
12 group that had been designated as a terrorist
13 organisation; his and his family's frequent and
14 apparently unmonitored travel between Libya and the
15 United Kingdom, including the suggestion that he may
16 have fought with other Islamist fighters from the
17 United Kingdom in the 2011 uprising against
18 Colonel Gaddafi; his and his brother Hashem's
19 association with known extremists, including, as
20 you have heard, attendance at UK prisons to visit
21 a convicted Islamist terrorist in the period preceding
22 the attack.

23 Crucially important is the knowledge that the
24 United Kingdom security services had of Salman Abedi.
25 From publicly available sources it is known that he'd

1 first come to the attention of the security services in
2 2010. He became a subject of interest in 2014 and
3 appears to have been the subject of reporting on
4 a number of occasions from mid-2015 onwards. And we now
5 know that Salman Abedi had been flagged for a review as
6 being a person of concern and subject for further
7 investigation in the weeks before the attack.

8 In spite of all the issues relating to
9 Salman Abedi's background, despite the warning signs,
10 despite him being known to the authorities as a subject
11 of interest, neither Salman Abedi nor any member of his
12 family was ever referred to the Prevent programme and no
13 consideration appears to have been given to it.

14 To appreciate the significance of this, one need
15 only look to the words of Mr Andrew Parker, former head
16 of MI5, in open session to the Intelligence and Security
17 Committee on 7 November 2013:

18 "As you rightly say [he said], Prevent is also
19 an important pillar of the Government's
20 counter-terrorist strategy and this is the one that gets
21 at dealing with the problem of vulnerable individuals
22 who are exposed to this toxic and twisted message of
23 violence. It is certainly part of what we do with the
24 police to refer people into that programme wherever
25 we can, wherever it offers a sensible way for dealing

1 with the problem."

2 It is also clear from publicly available reports
3 that some of the issues and concerns arising in relation
4 to the way in which the authorities dealt with, or
5 rather did not deal with, Salman Abedi were issues that
6 had been previously highlighted following the tragic
7 murder of Lee Rigby in the Woolwich report of 2014 and
8 following the 2006 London bombings in the 7/7 report of
9 2009.

10 Our clients hope to understand through this inquiry
11 why deficiencies in the authority's terrorism prevention
12 systems, which were known about 8 years earlier, were
13 still not remedied in 2017.

14 It is difficult, when presented with these facts,
15 for the three family members we represent not to have
16 the gravest concerns that there was far more that the
17 authorities could have done in the years preceding the
18 attack, and even in the days prior to the attack, to
19 monitor Salman Abedi and potentially deter him from
20 committing the atrocity on 22 May.

21 The two issues of the security arrangements at and
22 outside the arena and whether the authorities could have
23 prevented the attack by Salman Abedi are of the most
24 significance for our clients because of the real and
25 justified concern that this attack was preventable, that

1 Salman Abedi could have been stopped, that there were
2 numerous missed opportunities, and that whilst
3 politicians were telling members of the public that the
4 best way to deal with terrorism was to go about living
5 their day-to-day lives, those responsible for ensuring
6 the safety and security of the public in general, and in
7 particular the public who attended the City Room, failed
8 in their duties to protect those who died.

9 A great deal of time and publicity outside of this
10 inquiry has been focused on the emergency response to
11 the attack, and rightly so. We make it clear now that
12 this is of lesser focus to our three clients than the
13 matters I've previously mentioned. However, it remains
14 a key concern for two reasons.

15 Firstly, as the loved ones of people who lost their
16 lives at the Manchester Arena, all three of our clients
17 hope that mistakes made in the emergency response will
18 be identified, recognised and accepted in the hope that
19 lessons will be learned from those mistakes so that if
20 there is another tragedy such as the arena attack, lives
21 may be saved in the future.

22 Secondly, Paul Price, as well as losing
23 Elaine Mclver on 22 May 2017, is himself a survivor of
24 the attack. He suffered life-changing injuries and so
25 has a particular concern in relation to the adequacy of

1 the emergency response.
 2 We wish to make clear that all three of the family
 3 members we represent wish to acknowledge and express
 4 their gratitude to those involved in the emergency
 5 response. During the course of this inquiry you, sir,
 6 will hear accounts of a number of police officers,
 7 paramedics and members of the public who put concerns
 8 about their own safety to one side and went to try and
 9 assist the casualties in the City Room, not knowing what
 10 danger awaited them.

11 No words of thanks will be sufficient, no public
 12 acknowledgement of their bravery will do their actions
 13 justice. On behalf of the three family members we
 14 represent, we offer them nevertheless.

15 But it does appear that mistakes were made,
 16 particularly mistakes at senior and command and control
 17 levels. All five of the matters listed under term of
 18 reference 5 are of concern to our clients, but what they
 19 do not want in consideration of these matters is to
 20 necessarily blame individuals and find individual fault.
 21 Of greater importance to them is to address why certain
 22 mistakes were made on 22 May 2017 so that they will not
 23 be repeated.

24 This is particularly relevant because, quite
 25 properly, the emergency services and others spent time

177

1 and resources planning for events such as the attack
 2 that occurred at the Manchester Arena and, as you have
 3 heard, a number of exercises were conducted in the years
 4 preceding the attack.

5 It is a striking and concerning fact that a number
 6 of mistakes that were identified in these exercises were
 7 repeated again on the night of the attack. This concern
 8 goes further: mistakes that had been made in the
 9 emergency responses to earlier terrorist attacks,
 10 mistakes that have been subsequently identified and
 11 recognised, were nevertheless repeated on 22 May.

12 It is perhaps worth considering a passage from the
 13 JESIP Interoperability Framework second edition,
 14 published in July 2016, as of particular relevance to
 15 the emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack:

16 "The need for a joint response is not new. The
 17 findings and lessons identified by public inquiries and
 18 inquests have highlighted cases where the emergency
 19 services could have worked better together and shown
 20 much greater levels of communication, cooperation and
 21 coordination."

22 Above all else in relation to the emergency
 23 response, Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price hope
 24 that there will be recognition of what went wrong,
 25 actual and effective changes made, and constructive

178

1 solutions found to ensure that such mistakes are not
 2 made again.

3 In conclusion, the three family members we represent
 4 use this opening statement to make an appeal to all of
 5 the core participants in this public inquiry. The
 6 Manchester Arena attack occurred over 3 years ago.
 7 Perhaps not everyone will remember where they were when
 8 they heard of the attack. Every right-minded person
 9 will remember the horror that they felt when they first
 10 heard the details of what happened that night. The
 11 deliberate targeting of our young people, our children,
 12 their parents and loved ones at a pop concert was
 13 a sickening act of barbarism. The revulsion and horror
 14 that we felt as members of the public is but a modicum
 15 of the suffering and pain that the families of those who
 16 died have gone through.

17 The commemorative hearings of the past 2 weeks have
 18 given us but a glimpse of the pain that they have
 19 suffered. We all now know a little more about the
 20 22 lives that were so cruelly taken away.

21 Those family members have waited patiently and with
 22 great dignity for this day to arrive. They have waited
 23 over 3 years for answers to the many questions that they
 24 have, including how this terrible attack was allowed to
 25 happen. The response to such an act of barbarism ought

179

1 not to be for individuals and corporate core
 2 participants to adopt defensive, litigious positions.
 3 The appropriate response and one that might convey
 4 a sense of dignity and respect for the deceased and
 5 their families would be for core participants to
 6 approach this inquiry in a spirit of honesty, openness
 7 and cooperation.

8 We invite all core participants to approach the
 9 inquiry in this way as a mark of respect for those who
 10 died, out of sympathy for the families, and in
 11 recognition that such an approach will provide you, sir,
 12 with the ability to make meaningful findings and
 13 recommendations to have the best chance of ensuring that
 14 such a tragedy might not happen again.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Welch.

16 MR GREANEY: Sir, that concludes the hearing for today, save
 17 that I will indicate what the programme is for tomorrow,
 18 with the approximate times at which we expect you'll
 19 hear from particular advocates.

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

21 MR GREANEY: First we'll hear from Mr O'Connor on behalf of
 22 SMG at about 9.30 am. Secondly from Mr Laidlaw on
 23 behalf of ShowSec at about 10.30 am. Thirdly, from
 24 Mr Gibbs on behalf of British Transport Police at about
 25 midday. Fourthly, from Mr Horwell on behalf of Greater

180

1 Manchester Police at approximately 2 pm. Fifthly , from
 2 Mr Butt on behalf of National Counter-terrorism Policing
 3 Headquarters; that will be at about 3 pm. And finally
 4 from Ms Roberts on behalf of the North West Ambulance
 5 Service at about 4 pm.

6 Sir, having indicated that, we now invite you to
 7 rise and, as we've indicated , we will resume at 9.30 am
 8 tomorrow.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

10 (4.17 pm)

11 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on
 12 Tuesday, 29 September 2020)

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

181

I N D E X

1
2
3 Opening remarks by THE CHAIRMAN1
4
5 Opening statement by MR COOPER7
6
7 Opening statement by MR WEATHERBY64
8
9 Opening statement by MR ATKINSON119
10
11 Opening statement by MR WELCH161
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

182

183

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | A | | | | | |
| | | 69:20 | addressing (1) 13:6 | aided (1) 123:19 | ambulances (4) 23:23 | 117:2,13 123:14 146:1 |
| | | acceptance (3) 101:1 | adequacy (7) 22:12 27:11 | aides (1) 119:24 | 17:2 18:8,24 19:14 21:9 | 147:11 151:22 163:6 |
| | | 158:18,20 | 135:11 151:8 157:19 158:4 | aim (5) 10:15 96:11 99:5 | 22:7 23:2,5,6,8,11,25 | 177:15 |
| abd (1) 88:7 | | accepted (8) 116:25 128:16 | 176:25 | 108:20 115:12 | 24:2,8 26:5 29:15,23 63:6 | appearance (2) 16:7 106:3 |
| abdallah (41) 35:12,17 | | 149:12 152:1 154:2,7 | adequate (4) 21:21 24:21 | air (5) 38:5 64:25 68:19 | 115:9 154:8 157:23 181:4 | appeared (1) 129:5 |
| 36:1,9,14,16,18,19,22 | | 158:24 176:18 | 43:17 144:24 | 101:12 102:5 | ambulations (4) 23:23 | appearing (2) 64:18 133:22 |
| 20:21 25:9,20 33:17 | | accepts (2) 142:11 157:1 | adequately (5) 137:2 142:22 | aired (1) 100:11 | 57:7,12 117:18 | appears (15) 16:3 81:18 82:4 |
| 79:3,5,6,12,23 80:1,4 | | access (8) 2:10,22 56:2 | 146:8 147:6 151:11 | airliner (1) 104:25 | 38:12 48:1,15 49:25 142:4 | 98:20 117:5,15,20 147:1 |
| 81:6,18,23 82:2,11,22 | | 76:12 128:3 131:10 135:22 | adhere (1) 72:10 | airport (2) 111:1,5 | 161:12 | 148:24 152:11 155:17 |
| 83:22 84:12,13 86:9 91:4 | | 143:13 | adjourned (1) 181:11 | airwave (1) 157:17 | amongst (9) 5:9 28:2 36:18 | 168:21,24 174:3,13 |
| 92:21,22 102:14,20,24 | | accessible (3) 61:19 104:24 | adjudgment (1) 119:17 | al (9) 83:16 87:12,23 88:9,12 | 171:7 | appease (1) 89:5 |
| 109:5 132:16 134:7 | | 158:1 | administrative (1) 8:3 | 89:19,22 91:20 93:9 | amount (2) 106:22 107:2 | application (5) 96:9,25 |
| abdallahs (4) 80:15,25 | | accord (13) 27:7,9,14 28:10 | admissions (1) 105:25 | alarm (4) 78:6 105:10,19 | 143:1 157:25 | 98:11,19 149:21 |
| 82:13,18 | | 29:8,20,25 30:16 116:12 | adopt (1) 180:2 | 139:21 | amounts (3) 103:24 104:19 | applications (2) 97:4,5 |
| abdalraouf (31) 35:12 | | 155:25 156:16,17 157:4 | adopted (3) 6:5 46:25 | albaset (2) 88:7,13 | 110:7 | applied (8) 2:9 15:12 16:14 |
| 78:10,11,24 79:3,5,12,23 | | accordance (2) 117:2 147:10 | 125:10 | albittar (1) 92:2 | amply (1) 160:7 | 36:11 88:5 102:9,13 |
| 80:1,4,15,25 81:6,18,23 | | according (11) 53:3 79:1,4 | adored (3) 42:15 120:11 | aleksandra (2) 56:8,12 | analyse (2) 27:4 146:8 | 155:13 |
| 82:2,11,13,18,22 83:22 | | 85:3 88:1,7,12,17 90:11,18 | 121:10 | aligned (1) 110:21 | analysed (2) 61:3 142:22 | apply (3) 24:20 97:16 137:14 |
| 84:12 86:9 91:4 92:21 | | 93:7 | adulthood (1) 37:15 | alex (4) 56:10,12,19 57:25 | analysis (9) 8:22 90:12 118:2 | applying (2) 13:5 97:11 |
| 102:14,20,24 109:5 132:16 | | account (11) 6:21 9:19 25:6 | adults (2) 18:16 22:5 | algorithm (1) 44:12 | 123:6 124:25 130:22 137:4 | apportion (1) 140:6 |
| 134:7 | | 43:20 60:18,19 92:6 103:2 | advances (1) 23:3 | alia (1) 60:20 | 143:1 157:25 | appreciate (1) 174:14 |
| abdul (1) 100:14 | | 104:1 131:17 149:12 | advantage (1) 34:9 | alike (1) 10:20 | anas (1) 87:13 | appreciated (1) 142:23 |
| abdullah (1) 93:16 | | accountability (7) 25:17 30:1 | adversaries (2) 65:6 68:25 | alison (4) 58:15,23 73:8 | anathema (1) 98:8 | apprehended (1) 55:19 |
| abedi (182) 11:25 14:17 | | 35:8 62:18,20 74:24 | adversely (1) 95:12 | 113:14 | anderson (10) 67:15 71:7 | apprehension (1) 126:20 |
| 20:21 25:9,20 33:17 | | 118:16 | advertisement (7) 15:22,23 | alive (1) 33:6 | 80:12 81:6 85:13 111:16 | apprentice (1) 82:7 |
| 35:9,13,24 36:14,18 | | accountable (5) 10:18 17:21 | 17:15 18:3,9 21:14 49:13 | aliya (3) 37:25 38:2,8 | 127:20 128:2,5 129:18 | approach (23) 6:20 13:5 |
| 39:3,5,15,25 40:12 43:6 | | 62:21 113:23 130:12 | advertising (1) 17:8 | allayed (1) 95:2 | almer (6) 136:23 145:20 | 31:1 45:1 46:8,23 66:6 |
| 44:21 45:3,7 48:17 | | accounts (2) 96:20 177:6 | advice (2) 47:8 169:22 | allaying (1) 74:22 | 146:12 151:5 152:11 | 69:25 72:25 95:15 96:3,18 |
| 50:12,15,21 51:3,6,12,17 | | accuracy (1) 94:23 | adviser (1) 148:11 | allegations (2) 87:5,6 | 157:17 | 99:2 102:9,13 128:25 |
| 52:15,20,23,24 53:2,15 | | accurate (2) 31:4 54:9 | advocate (1) 46:7 | alleged (1) 86:25 | andrew (3) 78:1 120:22 | 129:3 141:2 146:12 147:3 |
| 54:15,23,25 55:23 56:5 | | accused (1) 87:23 | advocates (1) 180:19 | alibi (7) 87:13,15,20,22 88:2 | 174:15 | 180:6,8,11 |
| 58:18 59:2,8,16,20 60:8,16 | | acetone (2) 104:17 107:7 | affairs (3) 89:13,21 90:1 | 91:15 92:2 | angeles (1) 32:21 | approached (4) 66:10 70:4 |
| 61:7,15 63:23 73:10 78:20 | | achieve (5) 8:9 9:25 30:24 | affect (1) 95:12 | allibis (1) 87:21 | angelika (8) 10:3 | 169:2,4 |
| 79:2,4,8,13,17,18,23,25 | | 74:13 119:7 | affiliate (4) 83:16 91:20 92:2 | allied (1) 138:5 | 56:4,4,7,20,22 57:1,13 | appropriate (6) 22:7 43:18 |
| 81:13 82:3,8,11 | | achieved (1) 81:4 | 93:9 | allotted (2) 23:11 24:5 | anger (2) 29:17,19 | 63:7 74:24 114:4 180:3 |
| 84:8,16,22,24 85:2,4,20,22 | | achievements (2) 55:8 | affiliation (1) 87:12 | allowed (3) 3:14 36:25 96:13 | anguish (1) 167:21 | approved (2) 81:24 149:1 |
| 86:2,7,12,12,17,18 87:13 | | 120:13 | afforded (1) 131:21 | allowed (13) 18:10 34:16 | annex (1) 68:10 | approximate (1) 180:18 |
| 88:2 90:19,19,19,20 | | achieving (2) 7:3 148:18 | afraid (1) 53:18 | 35:14 51:17 59:3 81:9 | annual (1) 43:19 | approximately (3) 58:15,23 |
| 91:1,7,9,10,13,17,18,23,25 | | acid (3) 36:6 104:18 136:19 | african (1) 94:10 | 140:2 147:22 163:11 | anonymity (8) 80:25 | 181:1 |
| 92:10,18,25 | | acknowledge (2) 160:3 177:3 | after (33) 12:24 13:1 | 168:17 169:8,15 179:24 | 96:20,24,25 97:5,12 98:7 | april (3) 58:12 128:19 144:12 |
| 94:5,9,14,16 | | acknowledged (3) 34:17 | 14:14,24 28:15 29:13 | allowing (2) 96:16 129:12 | 109:8 | area (17) 16:1 32:6 33:9 |
| 102:14,17,19,22 103:3,20 | | 61:18 154:20 | 30:14,15 34:23 36:16 | allows (1) 101:19 | anonymous (4) 76:24 82:20 | 37:19 50:8 58:17,24 77:17 |
| 104:8 105:25 107:18 | | acknowledgement (3) 66:8 | 38:20 39:19 56:20 57:25 | alluded (1) 128:11 | 98:19,22 | 83:25 84:8 108:23 113:2 |
| 110:1,9,9,17,22,25 | | 70:2 177:12 | 58:5,16 63:8 64:5 79:3 | almost (6) 85:16 99:21 | anonymously (1) 81:7 | 127:18 142:14 161:25 |
| 111:5,12,12 112:22 113:24 | | acknowledging (2) 89:15 | 87:10 88:18 104:24 | 104:25 108:24 112:25 | another (23) 25:8 31:12,14 | 167:10 173:8 |
| 121:22 123:19 125:10 | | 112:16 | 105:1,17,18,20 106:4 | 115:18 | 36:4 37:11 38:10 49:19 | areas (6) 57:19 72:22 74:10 |
| 126:15,20 127:2,4,8 | | acquired (1) 128:12 | 115:15,16 125:14 144:15 | almsra (1) 91:19 | 91:11 85:5 87:14 88:7 | 132:3 141:21 249:17 |
| 128:6,10,18 129:7 131:3 | | across (6) 14:1 32:6,19 | 154:14 168:5 | alone (8) 25:15 32:10,12,15 | 53:21 96:2 97:8 101:2 | arena (126) 1:24 10:5 |
| 132:10,21 133:1,4,8 | | 165:2,4,9 | aftermath (6) 10:21 11:22 | 37:3 50:22 59:4 111:1 | 105:3 115:16 139:4,23 | 17:2,24 18:7 19:4,14 22:16 |
| 134:6,19 135:1,10,12 | | acted (2) 63:3 148:24 | 75:14 105:24 126:3 156:20 | along (2) 14:7 138:13 | 161:10,21 169:6 176:20 | 23:17 24:21 25:1,10,16 |
| 136:17,22 137:3,8 | | acting (4) 51:6 122:17 | 129:10 88:18 122:18 | alphabetical (1) 12:6 | answer (9) 6:3 8:10 67:4 | 30:8 31:19 39:19 36:23 |
| 138:8,12,12,18,20 139:7 | | 164:25 169:1 | afterwards (1) 168:25 | already (23) 14:9 48:15 | 70:22 106:17 123:17 | 37:5 39:15 40:3 |
| 145:17 147:18 150:20 | | action (10) 52:25 102:10 | again (38) 29:1,23 31:15 | 53:17 61:18 67:5,7 | 150:19 152:18 163:10 | 41:9,17,20,23 42:18,20 |
| 151:4,25 163:11 168:17 | | 110:17 114:12 134:12 | 32:14 33:3 34:3 39:9,12 | 70:23,25 71:6 76:2 78:8 | answered (6) 39:4 85:7 | 43:5,15,16,25 44:3,7,19 |
| 169:1,3,7 171:2,11 | | 136:15 145:12 148:21 | 41:14 45:22 49:11 54:11 | 79:25 80:5 85:17 92:21 | 119:7 124:1 163:2 168:1 | 45:15 48:21,25 49:25 |
| 172:10,14,23,24 173:2,24 | | 149:6,11 | 55:12,12 56:17 | 103:8 116:12 123:20 | answering (2) 113:19 130:9 | 50:15 51:1,4,19,23 53:9,13 |
| 174:5,11 175:5,19,23 | | actions (16) 32:4 40:20 56:6 | 58:16,21,24 68:12,15 | answers (12) 6:3 40:11 64:3 | 66:25 70:18 72:7 | 54:15 56:14 57:2,19 |
| 176:1 | | 61:16 127:16 128:18 | 78:22 80:23 88:5 118:24 | 164:13 | anxiety (3) 56:17 139:16 | 58:17,25 59:25 62:9 |
| abedis (31) 32:3 56:6 60:17 | | 145:17 149:5,6,9 150:4 | 120:25 123:25 124:10 | also (41) 100:20 | 118:15,17 139:1 159:8,8 | 63:5,20 72:3,17 75:17 76:1 |
| 74:3 79:2,9 80:4,19 | | 163:3 164:3 165:7,13 | 133:15 138:10 140:5 | also (44) 6:17 19:18 28:5 | 179:23 | 83:12 111:13 112:12,17,19 |
| 83:14,25 85:8,10 87:20,21 | | 177:12 | 141:10 159:5,22 160:4 | 32:22 36:8 46:2 50:9 54:18 | anthony (1) 58:11 | 115:7,10 116:3 118:10 |
| 88:6 92:6,23 103:6 104:19 | | active (2) 59:18 128:10 | 169:21 178:7 179:2 180:14 | 58:18 75:19 81:10 83:2 | antiaircraft (1) 60:22 | 121:19 124:3,4,7 125:7 |
| 106:1 107:14 110:20 132:7 | | activities (1) 146:6 | against (13) 21:5 49:4 88:24 | 84:14 87:13 89:21 95:16 | anticipate (3) 43:13 125:1,12 | 126:22 128:6 129:11 |
| 133:11 136:5 138:23 | | activity (7) 145:13,19 | 89:9 91:21 93:2,19 98:12 | 97:1 102:23 105:5 108:6 | anticipation (1) 4:21 | 139:15,17 140:18 |
| 140:21 168:3,22 173:9 | | 146:3,7 148:20 149:7 | 101:15 140:12 142:23 | 118:18 125:18 126:2 129:9 | antiterror (1) 93:25 | 141:4,20,25 142:24 |
| 174:9 | | 151:16 | 170:14 173:17 | 130:22 132:19 138:5 139:6 | anxious (3) 56:17 139:16 | 143:13,15,20 144:1 |
| aberration (1) 72:9 | | acts (4) 154:1 160:5 165:13 | age (3) 39:1 56:5 73:12 | 142:12 143:24 144:16 | 148:14 | 145:16,18 146:20,21 |
| abetted (1) 123:19 | | 167:7 | aged (9) 41:7,7 | 147:3 148:8 155:12,15 | anxiously (1) 96:13 | 147:13 148:6,9,17,18 |
| abide (1) 96:4 | | actual (3) 36:3 170:4 178:25 | 73:4,4,5,6,7,8,8 | 157:7 158:9,24 160:3 | anyone (9) 15:13 28:12 | 149:1,6,13,16,23 150:4,13 |
| ability (2) 148:16 180:12 | | actually (8) 17:11 18:24 | agencies (12) 4:6 4:13 59:7 | 161:18,23 169:3 174:18 | 65:25 69:19 72:6 91:22 | 151:1,15 152:4,5,6 157:21 |
| abject (1) 74:8 | | 58:19 78:24 142:13 143:5 | 60:15 88:19 92:11,13 | 175:2 | 104:6 130:1 132:25 | 161:9 163:3,24 164:1,5 |
| able (7) 3:11 6:3 83:8 | | 149:13,20 | 94:25 100:16 101:15 | altcourse (2) 35:18 80:2 | anything (2) 157:12 166:19 | 167:20,24 168:14 |
| ableness (3) 11:6 22:16 103:10 | | acute (1) 74:10 | 115:23 163:22 | altered (1) 110:20 | anywhere (3) 17:21 67:18 | 169:20,25 170:9 171:20 |
| above (3) 15:4 120:6 178:22 | | adam (1) 119:24 | agency (5) 30:24 35:16 | alternative (1) 96:3 | 71:10 | 175:22 176:16,20 178:2,15 |
| abroad (1) 87:17 | | add (4) 13:11,11 14:9 27:16 | 59:18 115:24 157:25 | alternatively (1) 130:4 | apart (1) 83:22 | 179:6 |
| absence (4) 3:18 74:7 | | added (3) 77:9 78:3 85:16 | agencys (1) 101:23 | although (13) 2:4 4:11 12:9 | apologies (1) 100:13 | arenas (4) 114:8 149:2 |
| 117:22 136:20 | | addition (4) 6:7 54:16 94:7 | agent (1) 111:6 | 13:11 24:3 75:3 80:9 81:16 | apology (1) 131:14 | 152:19,23 |
| absent (3) 107:20 171:22,23 | | 111:23 | agents (1) | | | |

85:8 86:20 132:21
associates (9) 73:22 74:4
 83:1 92:23 103:21 104:10
 132:8,14 136:17
associating (1) 92:11
association (3) 80:19 82:10
 173:19
associations (2) 83:1 85:9
assume (1) 92:12
assumes (1) 96:18
assumption (1) 106:21
asylum (1) 86:19
atheroma (1) 20:6
atkinson (18) 10:1 13:14,25
 17:23 18:13,23 19:8
 23:15,21,24 31:9 112:11
 119:13,20,22,23 160:14
 182:9
atomising (1) 102:3
atrocities (2) 44:1 46:1
atrocity (7) 10:21 35:11
 39:20 40:2 55:1 62:1
 175:20
attack (104) 3:2,2,23,25
 14:15 22:18 24:15,17 25:8
 30:14 33:23 36:23 39:15
 40:5,8,20 41:16 42:7 43:6
 44:12,24 48:8 55:24 73:13
 89:20 94:6,10 108:23
 111:14,18 112:4,15,19
 113:8 114:20 123:19 126:1
 127:1,13 128:15 129:14
 130:6 132:22,24 134:10,15
 135:3,10 140:2
 142:6,8,15,23 143:3
 144:2,19,22 148:2 150:6,9
 151:10,13 152:4,9 153:12
 156:21 157:11 158:7,23
 164:1,11,13,19 166:2,11
 167:3 169:13,15,18
 170:8,14,18
 172:5,7,10,12,22 173:1,22
 174:7 175:18,18,23,25
 176:11,20,24 178:14,7,15
 179:6,8,24
attacker (1) 129:12
attacks (18) 4:7,10 5:2 46:3
 84:11 85:12 92:8 105:20
 112:18 127:25 128:23
 137:19 144:9 164:9,10,14
 166:4 178:9
attempt (4) 82:17 86:22,25
 102:4
attempts (1) 113:7
attend (3) 2:7 9:15 115:17
attendance (2) 154:18
 173:20
attended (15) 14:16 16:22
 18:6 37:25 38:22 57:1
 58:10 62:3 93:17 139:7
 161:9 167:12 168:15
 170:25 176:7
attendees (1) 163:24
attending (5) 41:6 44:19
 120:12 143:12 163:24
attention (11) 1:14 51:4,12
 57:14 67:23 86:15 128:7
 151:6 170:5 173:5 174:1
attitude (1) 44:6
attract (1) 42:22
attractive (2) 141:7,10
audience (2) 149:24 168:9
audit (1) 149:1
audited (1) 148:6
august (4) 36:9 39:10 90:18
 106:6
auspices (1) 155:20
australia (1) 32:19
authorities (24) 4:12 40:23
 47:12 72:1 75:20 79:18,24
 95:1,17 96:4 105:25
 127:3,4,5 130:11
 140:15,16 163:6 172:11
 173:5 174:10 175:4,17,22
authority (8) 36:11 72:2 75:9
 106:24 108:5 109:15

112:15 114:16
authorities (1) 175:11
automatic (1) 110:6
availability (2) 159:10,11
available (12) 22:8 24:8
 46:25 47:7 104:5 117:18
 132:9 133:4,18 159:14
 173:25 175:2
avenue (1) 97:6
averted (1) 130:6
beg (1) 4:8 28:20 75:7
avoidable (2) 141:4 169:14
avoided (4) 12:2 163:15
 172:6,8
awaited (1) 177:10
aware (14) 7:24 9:13 26:12
 30:14 40:23 64:24 68:18
 83:2,20 89:23 127:18
 142:18 147:2 149:9
awareness (7) 31:4 46:24
 116:22 145:15 146:11
 157:18 158:14
away (10) 32:10 38:21 49:14
 50:9 73:9 125:23 147:19
 162:16 171:5 179:20
awe (1) 49:24
awful (2) 27:17 41:15
axiomatic (2) 72:11 99:3
azzouz (2) 88:7,13

B

back (15) 14:2 15:3,5 23:6
 31:22 42:15 44:22 45:7
 59:11 60:1 93:4,7 98:25
 131:4 144:1
background (4) 103:7 172:24
 173:9 174:9
backpack (1) 140:1
backpacking (1) 32:19
bad (1) 121:8
bag (7) 44:23 45:2,4
 150:16,20,21 168:10
bagchecking (1) 150:11
bagpipes (1) 62:2
bags (3) 46:22 56:14,15
bag (1) 78:16,22
balance (1) 131:19
band (1) 91:19
bandage (1) 15:12
banned (3) 83:17 87:11 93:9
banner (1) 149:8
barbarism (2) 179:13,25
barber (1) 79:5
barely (2) 28:8 55:10
bargain (2) 167:5,15
barra (1) 61:25
barraclough (1) 106:7
barrier (4) 17:14,18 18:3,11
barriers (3) 15:19,21 49:13
based (2) 99:17 109:18
basic (2) 46:5 82:6
basis (7) 3:17 40:8 43:19,21
 135:2 148:24 169:11
батацлан (3) 104:16 112:19
 164:12
battle (1) 21:6
baxter (1) 119:25
bbc (3) 77:21 90:5 93:10
bbcs (2) 89:10 91:6
bearable (1) 121:8
beast (1) 129:21
beautiful (1) 61:24
became (6) 40:12 132:10
 133:4,18 172:25 174:2
become (8) 11:17 39:2 45:17
 97:14 107:16 116:14
 121:23 167:21
becoming (4) 101:6 128:8
 133:8 156:25
befall (1) 47:24
befell (1) 63:3
before (59) 2:2 4:13 12:5
 15:13 20:24 27:17 30:17
 33:18 35:10 38:20 39:14
 40:1 43:5 46:1 50:15,18
 51:8 53:18 54:16 55:10

58:19,23 77:18 78:21,23
 81:25 88:10 90:1,10 94:18
 98:8 105:3,21 108:10
 112:24 124:22 125:8
 126:20,22 128:12 129:13
 134:10,15 135:10 139:20
 161:6,10 162:9 163:6
 164:8,12,15 167:6 168:23
 169:23 170:8,21 172:22
 174:7
beg (1) 139:1
began (3) 39:13 89:7 162:17
beginning (2) 130:15 131:18
beginnings (1) 137:9
begins (1) 17:16
begs (1) 139:2
behalf (29) 1:6 4:22 7:11
 16:10 48:3 52:5 54:17
 59:22 64:12 73:2,16 84:2
 119:14,20 120:2 122:11
 131:7 137:11 144:3 160:23
 161:2 162:9 177:13
 180:21,23,24,25 181:2,4
behaviour (2) 54:22 151:7
behavioural (1) 166:17
behest (1) 89:3
behind (6) 8:3 31:24,25
 50:23 96:6 109:18
being (29) 16:4,19,21
 24:7,15 33:15 38:3 40:24
 45:6 48:1,13 53:9,24 67:24
 78:3 110:5,17 115:5 118:5
 131:20 133:16,22 150:16
 151:15 152:14 155:7 166:6
 174:6,10
belhaj (2) 100:14,19
belief (1) 172:4
believe (1) 167:13
believed (2) 161:25 162:1
bells (1) 105:10
belmarsh (2) 80:1 81:24
below (1) 17:18
belt (1) 38:18
ben (3) 41:7,11,11
beneath (1) 38:19
benefit (1) 90:3
benhammed (6)
 93:1,8,10,13,16,21
bereaved (22) 7:11 14:10
 18:13 20:19 37:1 55:19
 57:17 64:3,12 65:10,24
 66:1,14 69:4,18,20 70:8
 71:14,16 73:3 109:1
 160:23
best (7) 17:9 66:5 69:24
 137:15 165:14 176:4
 180:13
bet (1) 117:3
bethany (4) 49:19,21 50:2,4
bethanys (1) 50:6
better (15) 7:7 12:3 30:2
 44:3 46:2,18 60:6 110:4,5
 137:21,22 150:3,20 154:5
 178:19
between (35) 1:1,8 22:14
 36:9 40:19 55:21 59:13
 61:7,8 74:8 79:21,22 80:4
 82:10 83:3 85:21 100:17
 127:25 131:3,20 133:25
 134:9,13 135:15 140:19
 146:21 148:1,17 149:14
 154:21 155:1 156:19 157:9
 173:14
beyond (9) 25:3 26:20
 100:11 132:25 133:16
 143:11 152:19 157:14
 165:8
big (1) 44:15
biggest (1) 124:5
bin (1) 88:11
bindings (1) 114:5
binds (1) 96:7
bit (1) 145:25
bizarre (3) 65:25 69:19 108:4
black (1) 50:21
blackest (1) 160:12

blackpool (1) 120:19
blake (3) 15:9,13 23:15
blame (4) 113:7 140:6,19
 177:20
blast (2) 19:14 124:25
bleeding (1) 117:22
blessed (1) 13:16
blighted (1) 24:25
block (1) 24:25
blockage (2) 20:6,10
blood (5) 16:11,16 19:24
 20:2 48:19
blue (1) 112:4
bluntly (1) 22:17
board (8) 15:22,23 16:4
 17:8,15 18:3,9 21:14
boards (1) 49:13
bodies (7) 112:15 126:3,9
 140:15,16 141:1 163:22
body (6) 15:6 17:6 19:10
 21:14 65:8 69:2
bodyworn (1) 57:7
bolts (2) 48:17 50:10
bomb (24) 12:22 13:1 14:25
 42:5 48:18 50:18 55:10
 56:25 58:16,23 62:5
 103:19 105:17 107:6
 111:3,9 112:19
 126:1,15,21 132:18 139:20
 140:22 163:12
bomber (2) 73:22 104:13
bombers (1) 40:9
bombing (24) 6:15 65:1
 68:20 75:13,18 76:8
 77:20,22 78:23 84:5 85:21
 94:18 101:11 102:6 104:23
 105:24 106:10,20 123:3,5
 118:21 128:12 153:5,16
bombings (7) 5:1,16 87:23
 91:16 104:14,15 175:8
bone (1) 48:17
bonfire (1) 38:5
book (2) 113:20 118:13
booked (1) 134:6
booth (1) 31:12
born (1) 58:13
both (26) 15:4 40:25 55:5
 57:13,21 61:2 79:10 82:23
 91:17 92:17 106:3,25
 113:4 121:2 125:17 134:21
 140:14 142:3 146:4 148:12
 149:20 156:7 157:20
 158:20 160:1 164:4
bought (1) 111:5
bound (4) 6:22 67:12 71:5
 78:13
box (2) 37:18,20
boyfriend (3) 41:6 120:7
 121:6
boyle (10) 121:3 124:8
 161:3,3,7,14 163:9
 167:4,13 178:23
bradley (10) 12:20,24
 38:13,14 48:7,13,15,21
 49:9,14
bradleys (1) 38:15
brave (2) 11:7 31:13
bravely (1) 34:6
bravery (2) 160:6 177:12
break (4) 17:16 64:15 68:7
 160:20
breakdown (1) 52:5
breaks (2) 19:9 147:13
breathing (1) 16:6
brewster (2) 10:1 31:11
bridge (7) 5:2,17 6:6 65:15
 69:8 164:17 165:21
brief (1) 140:18
briefed (2) 147:6 151:11
briefings (2) 170:7 171:11
briefings (1) 145:14
briefly (5) 52:2 59:20 108:10
 112:9 122:8
brigade (2) 83:20 91:3
bright (1) 38:4
brightened (1) 120:20

bring (5) 79:5 104:25 107:11
 118:17 122:9
bringing (1) 30:20
brings (2) 121:17 172:8
britain (1) 8:13
british (9) 15:21 46:19 88:23
 147:4 148:12 157:20
 170:23,25 180:24
broad (1) 126:11
broadcast (2) 67:25 77:21
broke (1) 18:10
broken (1) 48:19
brokenshire (1) 89:14
brother (20) 12:21 13:18
 31:10 33:17 39:11,21 41:7
 48:7 73:11 84:13 85:3
 86:5 92:22 103:9 104:9
 113:14 123:20 132:18
 173:18
brothers (5) 94:17 132:21
 136:17 137:3 139:8
brought (8) 1:14 8:6 14:17
 17:14 51:3,12 120:16
 121:16
brutally (1) 57:23
btec (1) 120:4
btp (6) 113:8 116:2 146:18
 147:5,23 151:3
btps (1) 152:2
bubblly (1) 47:19
buck (1) 113:11
bucked (1) 60:1
bucket (2) 88:13 126:21
builder (1) 33:2
building (1) 166:5
buildup (1) 21:22
bulk (1) 24:6
bullet (1) 112:13
bulletproof (1) 37:20
bulrough (2) 151:3 168:23
burden (1) 8:16
bureau (2) 117:20 159:7
bus (3) 38:7 111:2,2
busiest (1) 41:21
business (2) 93:3,17
businesses (3) 165:25
 166:7,24
bustling (1) 165:13
busy (2) 31:21 165:11
butt (1) 181:2
butp (2) 37:23 105:19
buzzfeed (1) 91:12
bystander (1) 99:6

C

cafs (1) 165:12
cain (1) 120:22
call (3) 27:23 47:5 50:3
callander (3) 10:1 37:1 73:6
callenders (1) 113:18
called (6) 20:12 56:19 87:2
 130:16,19 131:1
calling (1) 37:5
callous (1) 138:13
callously (1) 121:23
calls (2) 46:17 82:16
callum (1) 121:7
came (13) 15:14 33:16 35:13
 36:13 61:24 62:1 64:24
 68:18 80:6 86:18 94:12
 125:9 133:13
cameras (1) 57:7
camouflage (1) 60:22
campaign (2) 45:17 86:22
campbell (1) 120:1
campbellhardy (5) 65:17
 69:11 73:5 120:23 124:2
camp (1) 92:1
canadian (3) 64:24 68:18
 101:11
candour (2) 118:10 119:6
cannot (7) 28:20 29:16 46:3
 49:24 78:1 95:25 108:22
cant (1) 6:10
canyon (1) 32:21
capabilities (1) 129:11

capability (1) 21:23
capable (3) 3:1 44:20 144:4
capacity (1) 17:25
capping (1) 117:10
captured (2) 87:22 88:2
car (4) 14:3,4 111:3,7
card (1) 111:6
cardboard (9) 15:23
 17:7,12,15 18:2,9 19:9
 21:13 49:13
cardiac (2) 17:1 20:25
cardiologist (1) 20:21
cardiology (1) 19:16
care (10) 14:21 18:6
 23:11,13 25:15 26:21 66:9
 70:3 97:22 146:12
careful (3) 14:13 49:21 79:2
careful (3) 34:23 35:2 118:2
carefully (14) 22:11,13
 25:4,24 27:2 33:21 50:16
 55:20 77:8 86:16 95:8
 132:19 154:6 163:17
caring (2) 13:16 32:24
carnage (3) 49:25 140:21
 141:8
caroline (5) 41:11,19 42:4,5
 120:10
carousel (1) 140:19
carried (13) 12:25 16:5,18
 17:13 19:8 21:15 38:7,7,20
 49:14 129:13 135:3 144:8
carry (1) 140:2
carrying (9) 3:2 50:23 52:20
 55:24 113:24 137:5 140:2
 150:13 168:6
cars (1) 103:15
carter (1) 19:21
cases (5) 100:8,10,12,20
 178:18
casson (1) 37:5
casualties (5) 117:16,18,23
 153:12 177:9
casualty (3) 16:19 117:20
 159:7
catalyst (1) 104:18
catastrophic (3) 57:16 63:2
 113:3
categorisation (2) 135:21
 136:2
category (9)
 81:12,14,16,21,22 82:2,3
 135:21 150:7
cater (1) 17:25
caught (1) 33:18
causation (3) 125:5 140:23
 141:3
causative (1) 140:21
cause (6) 19:21 123:22,22
 124:21 167:21 173:10
caused (8) 5:13 20:18 37:22
 139:21 140:21
 170:19,19,20
causes (2) 20:7 162:23
causing (2) 20:11 25:2
caution (1) 97:25
caution (1) 132:1
cctv (8) 17:5 52:25 113:2
 125:6 151:15,18,21 168:10
celebrating (2) 161:11 167:8
celebration (1) 162:17
cell (1) 79:15
ensure (2) 72:3 75:7
central (13) 14:12 19:18,25
 25:18 26:18 27:10 43:2
 66:7 70:1 77:15 108:23
 130:9 148:19
centrality (1) 131:21
centre (8) 9:1,23 19:16 27:8
certain (3) 68:1 171:3 177:21
chair (1) 75:3
chaired (1) 128:21
chairman (3) 1:16 2:6 182:3
challenge (6) 51:16 97:7
 151:5 166:18 171:6,10
challenging (1) 155:3

chance (6) 26:23 63:16 64:2
 122:2 125:3 180:13
chances (2) 20:17 172:18
change (6) 2:4 39:18 105:4
 118:19 119:4,8
changed (2) 39:16 104:23
changes (2) 105:3 178:25
channels (2) 5:31 54:3
chaos (3) 33:4,13 114:18
chapter (6) 1:5 22:2 51:14
 66:11 70:6 72:7
character (1) 87:13
characteristic (1) 8:6
characteristically (1) 47:20
charged (6) 10:9 11:14 51:19
 93:11 163:22 167:15
charlotte (4) 41:6,11 65:17
 69:11
chatting (1) 47:21
check (4) 125:15 150:20,21
 153:2
checked (2) 53:19 56:14
checking (1) 152:12
checks (5) 44:23 45:2,4
 150:16 151:25
chemical (1) 136:4
chemicals (14) 92:7
 103:18,23,24
 104:7,10,17,23 105:13
 110:4,5,7 111:8 136:10
cherished (1) 122:2
cheshire (1) 62:9
chicago (1) 32:21
chief (1) 89:25
children (14) 18:16 22:

- clarity (3) 46:19 55:13 119:2
- class (1) 120:12
- clear (32) 2:3 6:25 13:3 14:6
16:10 40:11 62:23 66:22
70:15 87:8 93:6 98:15
109:24 116:24,24 117:23
124:15,24 125:8 126:13
127:14 130:11,12 134:12
137:11 162:20,21 165:1
173:1 175:2 176:11 177:2
- clearance (1) 117:17
- cleared (1) 93:13
- clearest (1) 110:15
- clearing (1) 16:19
- clearly (16) 10:18 14:25
17:17 20:9 42:22 57:17
58:18 61:15 63:24 78:6
89:24 104:8 139:24 141:2
169:7 170:16
- clegg (1) 57:1
- clematis (2) 134:20 137:10
- clients (14) 123:7 162:7
167:18,22 168:1 170:3
171:24 172:17 173:10
175:10,24 176:12,16
177:18
- cling (1) 29:24
- clinical (1) 23:9
- close (11) 12:8 31:25 37:13
50:7,12,13 59:3,24 83:3
93:6 133:10
- closed (34) 1:20 2:18 3:16,20
4:23 5:12,15 6:12,15 7:1,8
35:2 72:10 76:9,18 78:7
86:2 95:6 96:6,15,16,19
97:6 98:16 99:22 101:3
108:13 109:18 128:9 129:7
133:12 136:2,24 139:3
closely (4) 30:22 60:13 86:20
94:2
- closer (2) 102:19 144:10
- closure (4) 110:10 132:12
133:9 135:13
- clothing (1) 60:22
- clouds (1) 160:12
- coercion (1) 107:19
- coffee (1) 165:12
- cohesive (1) 155:2
- coincided (1) 36:5
- coincidences (1) 124:15
- coins (1) 48:17
- cold (1) 114:22
- collaborate (1) 76:15
- collaborated (1) 142:16
- collaboration (3) 8:6 80:3
123:1
- collaborative (1) 156:23
- colleagues (1) 152:16
- collect (5) 22:5 50:14 58:9
62:10 152:25
- collecting (2) 18:16 43:4
- collective (1) 123:2
- college (3) 39:8 87:21 93:18
- colloquially (1) 27:12
- colocation (2) 31:2 155:2
- colonel (1) 173:18
- colour (2) 103:15 121:11
- colourful (1) 87:3
- combats (1) 166:13
- combination (3) 63:17 125:6
140:13
- combined (1) 18:4
- come (17) 11:8 18:5 22:18
25:12 28:22 31:18 41:17
56:25 86:19 89:18 92:5
104:2 110:1 121:13 128:7
173:4 174:1
- comes (5) 9:17 16:13 17:11
45:5 115:21
- comfort (1) 130:3
- coming (5) 22:2 57:12 90:8
102:6 120:4
- command (17) 24:2 28:1
29:10 63:12 74:7 114:25
115:19,21,24 116:1,18
117:4,6 158:5,6,8 177:16
- commanders (3) 23:8 29:8,9
- commemorative (3) 47:15
162:12 179:17
- commenced (3) 16:25 40:2
77:19
- command (1) 48:4
- comment (2) 35:23 113:13
- commented (4) 89:21 99:9
110:23 111:16
- commenting (1) 102:2
- comments (3) 78:3 105:21
108:11
- commission (7) 64:25 68:19
98:21 101:11,13,25 102:2
- commissioned (3) 67:7 70:25
97:21
- commissioner (1) 164:25
- commit (5) 46:1 55:1 60:2
82:5 102:25
- committed (5) 7:3 11:24
62:13 73:22 76:3
- committee (12) 6:13 67:16
71:8 89:13,21 90:1 128:21
129:9 133:24 134:11
136:21 174:17
- committees (1) 128:25
- committing (1) 175:20
- common (7) 13:12,12,13
73:23 101:8 122:25 161:22
- communicated (4) 29:10
36:7 59:23 93:20
- communication (15) 24:9
28:1 31:3 35:13 93:19
111:11 126:5 135:23
151:14 154:21 155:2
157:8,17,17 178:20
- communicational (1) 157:15
- communications (9) 22:14
52:7 63:18 94:13 115:5
117:6,25 148:1 157:15
- communities (3) 37:8 165:2
166:9
- community (8) 90:15 93:24
94:6 99:14 100:9 110:14
128:24 159:20
- communists (1) 131:4
- company (4) 42:17,19 86:13
161:16
- compassion (3) 10:22 122:5
162:11
- compassionate (1) 62:13
- compassionately (1) 15:10
- complain (1) 89:4
- complaining (1) 113:20
- complete (3) 15:9 95:24
99:12
- completed (1) 136:16
- completely (2) 33:25 47:23
- complete (5) 40:3 113:10
164:6 168:12 170:24
- complexity (1) 22:20
- compliance (2) 21:15 148:2
- compliant (2) 5:7,19
- complicity (1) 100:6
- complices (1) 99:2
- components (3) 103:19
136:4,11
- compounded (1) 168:19
- comprehend (1) 49:24
- comprehensive (1) 22:10
- compromise (2) 96:14
108:17
- compromised (1) 77:11
- computer (1) 91:22
- concede (3) 92:17 103:2
110:16
- concedes (2) 85:21 34:17
- concentrate (1) 112:12
- concept (1) 30:19
- concern (19) 5:3 29:16 34:24
54:23 61:21 74:10 120:25
170:3,13 172:7,17,20
173:10 174:6 175:25
176:14,25 177:18 178:7
- concerned (14) 19:6 27:3
43:10 51:22 52:7 54:18
55:11 77:2 95:4 101:25
130:14 140:17 167:18
169:2
- concerning (7) 5:11 48:11
59:12 101:3 149:7 168:19
178:5
- concerns (16) 4:25 13:8,12
14:13 43:2 122:8 150:19
152:18 163:20 167:25
168:13 169:5 170:22
175:3,16 177:7
- concert (48) 8:12 10:5 12:8
13:20,24 25:11 31:11
37:12,17 38:1 41:5,9,18,20
42:16,22 43:12,25 47:19
48:1,10,23 49:21 55:5
56:12,20 58:10,13,22
62:3,11 63:3 64:6 112:20
139:19 142:24,25 146:24
151:16 161:9,15,19 164:11
167:9,12 168:9 170:9
179:12
- concertgoer (1) 43:3
- concertgoers (5) 41:25 43:4
50:13 124:10 170:14
- concerts (2) 141:16 171:20
- concession (1) 150:15
- concessions (1) 118:11
- conclude (4) 3:13 16:11
40:5,18
- concluded (2) 40:7 90:16
- concludes (1) 180:16
- conclusion (5) 6:24 30:20
107:20 131:9 179:3
- conclusions (2) 101:20 118:5
- concourse (1) 31:7
- condition (1) 20:12
- conduct (3) 47:8 51:24 100:6
- conducted (4) 11:21 90:12
129:16 178:3
- conducting (2) 43:6 166:11
- confession (11)
106:3,11,17,18,24
107:2,7,14,18,23 108:7
107:6 118:7 60:18 70:12
95:21 109:9,17 131:8
137:22
- confronted (1) 137:16
- confuse (1) 71:22
- congregate (1) 114:9
- connected (3) 43:11 103:4
104:1
- connection (1) 93:8
- connections (1) 83:14
- connectivity (1) 28:4
- conscientiousness (1) 45:4
- conscious (6) 14:10,25 16:6
41:24 124:14 153:3
- consequence (1) 11:19
- consequences (4) 32:3 44:9
150:6 158:12
- consequent (1) 169:15
- consider (26) 3:20 15:1
22:12 23:25 34:14 43:16
44:11 47:5 51:13,21
102:21 105:5 126:2,17
132:19 136:15 140:24
143:16,25 144:7 147:3
154:6 165:25 166:21,25
170:18
- considerable (6) 19:24
97:23,25 106:19 120:8
121:1
- consideration (11) 19:19
59:18 138:16 139:6 144:16
155:5,15 158:9,18 174:13
177:19
- considered (23)
5:5,10,12,17,18 44:3 52:25
59:11 90:14 96:13
102:7,16 128:2,6 129:3,9
135:12 136:22 143:4
145:18 155:13 156:7,13
157:14 178:12
- considers (2) 40:17 154:9
- conspiracy (1) 107:10
- constable (1) 171:16
- construct (2) 126:15 132:18
- constructive (1) 178:25
- consultations (1) 100:17
- contact (9) 61:7 78:20 79:13
86:1 89:18 125:7 133:14
134:9 135:17
- contacts (3) 83:9 85:24,25
- contain (2) 61:3 107:3
- contained (1) 20:6
- containing (4) 60:20 65:2
68:21 168:10
- contains (1) 109:3
- contended (1) 140:25
- content (4) 37:15 68:12
93:11 145:9
- contents (1) 61:1
- context (9) 101:7 102:7
103:20 109:24 112:1
130:13 145:18 148:23
164:7
- contingencies (1) 114:23
- contingency (3) 146:22,25
157:19
- continue (1) 131:18
- continued (1) 34:21
- continues (1) 78:17
- contraband (1) 79:14
- contract (2) 21:24 114:10
- contracted (1) 141:25
- contractually (1) 152:20
- contrary (1) 107:25
- contrast (3) 65:9 69:3 76:7
- contribute (1) 44:7
- contributed (3) 5:9 149:4
172:2
- control (22) 18:18 23:6 28:2
52:21,22 53:5,15 63:13
66:4 69:23 74:7 89:3,5
114:25 115:21,25 116:18
117:4 151:6,21 158:21
177:16
- controls (1) 151:23
- controversial (2) 110:19
118:9
- conversation (1) 79:6
- convey (1) 180:3
- convicted (10) 35:17,18
78:17 80:16,22 82:5,25
84:9 86:8 173:21
- conviction (1) 78:23
- cook (1) 120:19
- cooper (22) 1:6,11,15
7:11,14,15,16 53:16
54:2,6,11,15 58:20,21 64:9
128:1 138:9 151:13 153:7
154:12 155:24 182:5
- cooperation (9) 55:21 83:3
94:19 143:23 154:21,25
155:7 178:20 180:7
- coopers (2) 150:18 159:9
- coordinate (2) 115:19 117:17
- coordination (9) 24:10 31:3
63:12 117:15 153:23
154:25 155:7 157:9 178:21
- coped (1) 63:2
- copy (2) 108:7 149:10
- core (15) 3:5,18 67:8 71:1
72:21 73:19 75:2 123:9,11
163:19 164:3 179:5
180:1,5,8
- corke (1) 171:18
- corners (1) 108:15
- cornolly (1) 75:5
- coronary (2) 20:5,8
- coroners (1) 5:16
- coronial (1) 123:16
- corporate (17) 72:1 75:9,19
85:19 96:17,21 97:1 98:18
109:7,15 112:14 140:15,16
141:1 163:5,22 180:1
- corporates (1) 113:22
- corporation (1) 72:2
- corporations (1) 114:8
- correct (2) 92:10 133:10
- corrected (1) 53:19
- correctly (1) 134:21
- correspondent (1) 90:5
- corroborating (1) 91:11
- cost (1) 45:12
- countd (4) 6:19 53:20,23
60:7
- counsel (3) 34:15 75:12
137:14
- count (1) 21:5
- counterterror (1) 152:14
- counterterrorism (26)
3:19,22 6:9 47:8,11 59:13
81:15 83:4 84:20 88:9
114:7,11 116:6 119:2
127:24 144:12,25
145:1,7,15 148:10,11
152:1,10 165:19 181:2
- counterterrorist (1) 174:20
- countervailing (1) 96:1
- countering (2) 11:4 26:8
- countries (1) 100:7
- country (12) 25:3 32:20 34:2
55:17 59:3 83:11 84:15
86:19 137:16 165:2,5,9
- couple (1) 154:15
- courage (2) 10:22 46:16
- courageous (3) 26:2 32:13
38:11
- course (35) 1:22 2:1 6:14 7:7
9:20 11:13,16 12:6 17:20
18:20 20:18 25:21 32:21
55:25 61:4 79:22 84:15
86:8 93:17 94:22 95:7
97:18 99:10 104:19 107:13
122:15 124:20 126:13
130:21 133:15 140:23
148:19 162:7 171:9 177:5
courtney (7) 121:3 124:8
161:3,7,14,20 167:4
- courtneys (1) 124:12
- cousin (2) 79:4,7
- cover (2) 2:23 125:16
- covered (3) 33:7 60:3 113:2
- covert (1) 104:4
- covid (1) 7:24
- covid19 (2) 7:19 9:14
- cowardice (1) 162:15
- cowed (1) 164:24
- cp (1) 75:6
- cpr (1) 16:25
- cps (10) 1:13 75:4,9 76:12
106:1,13,13,23 109:15
119:6
- crack (1) 146:21
- crash (2) 114:19,19
- crawling (1) 14:6
- create (1) 46:19
- created (1) 47:10
- creates (1) 102:12
- creation (1) 166:12
- credible (1) 158:1
- crevices (1) 12:1
- criminal (4) 40:7,12,16,18
- criminology (1) 121:5
- cripple (1) 63:15
- critical (9) 8:9 18:4 57:19
147:23 152:4,8 155:11,16
156:21
- critically (1) 30:4
- criticise (1) 137:12
- criticising (2) 67:14 71:6
- criticism (3) 54:12 75:7
158:25
- crook (2) 49:19 50:4
- crowded (7) 43:20 46:23
75:20 141:16 144:19
166:22 169:20
- crowds (1) 31:20
- crucial (5) 21:2 23:21 31:7
53:1 57:19
- crucially (6) 19:22 26:23
27:3 127:5 137:8 173:23
- cruel (1) 11:22
- cruelly (2) 13:22 179:20
- cruelty (1) 73:10
- ct (2) 149:18,19
- cti (1) 98:15
- ctp (1) 83:4
- ctsa (6) 114:3 148:11,25
149:3,11,15
- ctsas (2) 114:12 148:17
- culture (2) 145:16 150:25
- cumulative (1) 134:2
- current (5) 2:3 77:14 97:13
98:19 112:1
- currently (1) 67:24
- curry (3) 120:10,10 124:4
- curisory (2) 56:13 103:6
- curtailed (1) 45:16
- custody (5) 35:18 36:16
78:16,21,22
- cuts (1) 48:16
- cv (3) 98:3,6,23
- D**
- d (1) 182:1
- dad (2) 55:4 77:19
- daff (1) 57:11
- daily (4) 85:3 88:8 89:1
167:6
- damage (7) 2:12 4:4
5:12,21,24 6:4 20:11
- damaging (1) 7:5
- dancer (1) 121:2
- dancing (2) 47:20 55:6
- danger (2) 44:9 177:10
- dangerous (2) 34:3 41:10
- dangers (1) 144:6
- dark (1) 12:1
- darkest (1) 108:15
- data (1) 93:19
- date (1) 123:2
- dated (1) 52:3
- daughter (16) 41:5 49:17,21
50:1,3,5,6 58:10,12
62:11,12 73:7 113:14
124:11,13 161:18
- daughters (1) 120:16
- david (2) 86:24 89:4
- davis (2) 41:7 89:4
- day (3) 27:22 165:18 179:22
- days (8) 33:22 40:1 43:8
111:8 129:13 165:10 173:1
175:18
- daytoday (1) 176:5
- de (1) 104:16
- dead (5) 23:14 33:7 48:15
50:1 84:10
- deal (12) 1:19 24:12 35:23
52:2 58:3,4 72:25 76:2
95:10 175:5 176:4,9
- dealing (3) 147:19 174:21,25
dealt (4) 45:6 108:2 112:7
175:4
- death (7) 5:9 19:21 20:16
37:9 120:11 123:22 124:21
- deaths (6) 12:15 75:1 91:16
123:25 162:14 163:15
- deb (1) 121:3
- deborah (1) 121:3
- debriefs (1) 157:2
- deceatored (1) 81:19
- deceased (8) 25:19 43:3
57:21 65:8,22 69:2,16
180:4
- decide (8) 3:9 17:20 22:15
27:5 43:17 52:4,11 53:12
70:24 73:1 95:10 100:3
106:22 107:13 153:7 173:7
- detailed (7) 72:19,21 75:8
76:3 109:14 123:5 162:19
- detailing (1) 106:8
- details (1) 179:10
- detained (1) 134:7
- detect (2) 50:17 105:14
- detected (3) 45:3 51:3
150:20
- detecting (1) 44:21
- detection (3) 4:8 126:21
166:17
- deter (1) 175:19
- determination (3) 9:11
- defective (1) 115:3
- defects (1) 125:25
- defensive (1) 180:2
- deficiencies (1) 175:11
- defied (1) 95:24
- definitive (1) 74:21
- deflect (1) 140:19
- degree (13) 60:3 67:21
71:13,22 74:13 100:21
118:10 119:8 127:19 130:3
136:25 148:17 158:13
- delay (3) 7:13 30:8 154:18
- delayed (2) 24:13,18
- delays (3) 21:3 29:12,21
- delete (1) 35:4
- deliberate (1) 179:11
- deliberately (1) 163:17
- deliver (2) 20:23 72:6
- delivered (1) 28:10
- delivering (2) 66:16 70:10
- delve (1) 23:1
- demand (3) 9:5 12:3 30:1
- demanding (1) 25:25
- demands (1) 33:14
- demonstrably (1) 109:12
- demonstrate (2) 146:11
160:7
- denies (1) 165:15
- departure (2) 72:8 140:18
- depend (1) 21:19
- depending (1) 2:4
- dependency (3) 63:5 126:22
166:16
- deployed (4) 18:19 19:1
26:21 150:9
- deploying (2) 29:14,21
- deployment (3) 117:24
147:10 154:10
- deployments (1) 114:24
- deposit (2) 32:25 33:1
- deprived (1) 12:1
- deprivation (3) 56:6 57:24
120:11
- deputy (3) 76:25 97:13
164:25
- deradicalised (1) 47:1
- derigging (1) 21:22
- derived (3) 128:24 136:20
160:11
- described (12) 1:21 16:6
33:9 38:3 47:18 56:10
60:19 134:20 135:5 143:14
153:16 155:10
- describes (1) 129:17
- describing (1) 32:23
- description (1) 28:7
- deserve (1) 88:4
- deserves (2) 46:16 47:16
- design (1) 121:11
- designed (1) 173:12
- designed (4) 27:25 28:5,6
156:9
- desire (2) 125:13 140:5
- desired (1) 118:11
- desperate (1) 15:11
- desperately (2) 17:12 32:13
- despite (9) 17:8 24:7,13,15
116:12 146:2 171:2
174:9,10
- destruction (1) 123:22
- detail (11) 5:8 51:14 67:6
70:24 73:1 95:10 100:3
106:22 107:13 153:7 173:7
- detailed (7) 72:19,21 75:8
76:3 109:14 123:5 162:19
- detailing (1) 106:8
- details (1) 179:10
- detained (1) 134:7
- detect (2) 50:17 105:14
- detected (3) 45:3 51:3
150:20
- detecting (1) 44:21
- detection (3) 4:8 126:21
166:17
- deter (1) 175:19
- determination (3) 9:11

137:18 141:11
determined (8) 5:6 49:7 95:9
98:15 107:25 118:1 122:24
130:24
determining (3) 74:24 76:16
102:9
deterrent (1) 171:2
detonate (4) 51:18 112:23
126:15 163:12
detonated (9) 12:22 42:5
50:18 55:10 58:16,24
139:20 168:5 169:9
detonates (1) 56:25
detonation (13) 11:22 13:1
14:5 50:7,16,19 51:8 54:16
63:9 115:15 121:18
125:11,15
detraction (1) 26:2
devastated (1) 37:9
devastating (3) 20:20 57:24
60:2
devastation (2) 25:2 33:6
developed (2) 123:5 172:13
device (8) 51:18 112:23
121:18 136:5 150:14
168:6,11 169:10
devised (1) 114:12
devoted (3) 57:21 120:20
133:22
dictated (1) 21:8
didn't (2) 54:9 115:17
die (5) 15:15,17 37:3 64:5
105:3
died (28) 12:9 19:20 20:2
32:16 35:11 38:9,25 42:8
47:23 48:9 55:9 56:9 57:22
65:2 68:21 73:12,14 84:19
123:17 124:18,22 126:3,8
140:8 153:4 176:8 179:16
180:10
difference (1) 44:15
different (8) 39:13 59:2
67:17 71:9 91:8 109:16
121:13 150:3
differently (4) 30:9 130:8
134:18 172:21
differing (1) 166:6
difficult (6) 71:21 77:13
82:19 99:2 137:16 175:14
difficulty (1) 99:6
dig (1) 10:15
dignified (2) 11:7 29:18
dignity (4) 23:14 33:7
179:22 180:4
diligence (2) 9:11 24:20
diminish (1) 71:22
dinner (1) 42:14
direct (9) 3:11 9:17 34:13
65:21 69:15 117:17 123:15
129:22 147:7
directed (4) 1:12 8:18 43:10
153:22
directing (1) 156:20
directive (1) 8:19
directly (5) 25:9 30:8 36:5
140:21 149:22
directorgeneral (5) 76:25
97:11,13,14,15
directors (1) 114:11
disagree (1) 46:3
disappointing (1) 110:24
disclose (1) 107:23
disclosed (12) 8:23 34:7,20
59:10 67:8 71:1 76:14
79:11 85:12 88:18 91:9
98:23
disclosure (13) 6:22 22:10
72:19 76:5 85:16 98:12,13
101:3 102:1,8 106:12
109:13 163:17
discounted (1) 59:21
discourtesy (1) 123:8
discovered (2) 75:15 88:18
discretionary (1) 114:13
discussed (3) 36:12,18 51:15
discussion (2) 135:15 168:22

discussions (2) 39:17 59:13
disease (4) 19:23 20:5,13,13
displayed (2) 60:3 172:15
disrespect (1) 62:19
disrupted (1) 75:15
dissemination (1) 133:5
dissidents (1) 89:2
distance (1) 32:10
distinct (1) 12:11
distorted (1) 101:24
distract (1) 26:13
distress (2) 14:9 167:22
divergence (1) 143:21
divert (1) 138:15
division (1) 13:3
doctors (1) 115:10
document (4) 53:7 96:12
106:23 107:9
documentation (2) 35:5
39:16
documents (2) 79:11 88:17
dodgy (1) 103:21
does (16) 17:4 28:22 46:7
86:14 95:19,20 96:3 97:3
113:16 114:11 126:13
139:1 144:4 150:24 151:7
177:15
doesnt (2) 80:17 106:11
doing (15) 44:18 61:11 63:25
67:4,10 70:22 71:3 108:25
137:15 153:18 159:22,24
169:3 170:2 171:9
domain (2) 34:19 85:17
domestic (2) 103:25 104:20
dominic (3) 67:15 71:7
128:22
done (33) 7:7 11:21 12:3
14:20 16:21 26:2 29:2,6
34:1,20 41:3 51:5,16
55:23,23 57:15 64:6
127:4,6 130:1,5 138:15
139:9 144:2 153:6,7 154:5
156:15 157:12 168:24
171:22 172:21 175:17
dont (7) 29:16 53:11,21 57:9
81:3 109:2 113:20
door (1) 117:1
doors (3) 96:6 109:18 144:1
doorstep (1) 152:23
dots (1) 133:25
doubledecker (1) 38:7
doubt (17) 28:14,16,17 29:1
31:6 34:17 43:13 47:5 56:3
73:11 94:2 95:11 99:14
113:10 118:4,7 143:9
down (12) 14:2 15:25 16:20
19:9 25:2 32:25 41:16 46:1
90:8 104:25 112:25 146:21
downfall (1) 39:4
downloaded (1) 61:1
dr (1) 19:21
draw (2) 101:20 130:3
drawn (2) 67:23 151:6
dreadful (1) 26:4
dressed (1) 50:21
dressing (1) 159:12
drips (1) 96:19
driven (1) 41:8
drones (1) 84:11
drop (1) 17:17
dropped (1) 48:20
drove (2) 56:11 164:17
due (7) 1:22,25 16:15 20:10
47:17 62:20 161:11
duress (1) 107:15
during (29) 11:13,16 16:2
18:4,20 27:17 28:20 33:22
34:2,7 39:18 47:14 53:2
65:7 69:1 86:1 97:18
122:15 132:21 133:15
147:18 151:12,16,22
152:22 157:3 162:7,12
177:5
duties (3) 10:17 113:25
176:8
duty (9) 2:6,9 26:14 63:20

111:23 116:14 147:5
156:25 157:2
dwelling (1) 99:18
dying (3) 4:9 23:14 74:1
E
e (1) 182:1
eachway (1) 117:3
earlier (12) 15:8 22:1 48:7
49:20 51:3 57:17 60:5
108:9 131:13 173:4 175:12
178:9
early (7) 8:20 40:9 50:22
90:11 102:20 128:8 159:1
earth (1) 110:8
easier (3) 4:7 105:19 155:9
echo (1) 93:7
echoed (1) 79:9
echoing (2) 136:7 159:9
eclipsed (1) 31:8
economy (1) 166:23
edge (1) 37:15
edition (1) 178:13
education (1) 139:7
effect (13) 6:21 9:7 45:3
60:8 97:23 99:11
101:5,5,9,14 109:20
134:2,4
effected (1) 105:4
effective (23) 24:2,9 27:5
30:20 51:21 61:20
63:13,16 65:23 69:17
75:22 108:25 109:11 114:7
116:18 117:14,20 126:6
154:11 159:7 166:8,9
178:25
effectively (5) 21:10 24:17
60:14 77:16 116:10
effectiveness (4) 111:20
154:24 158:4,8
effects (3) 19:14 20:2 118:21
efficacy (1) 137:7
efficiency (1) 137:8
efficient (3) 63:14 115:21
126:6
efforts (4) 17:9 63:12 73:24
142:10
egress (3) 143:14 147:18
152:2
eilidh (4) 10:3 61:24,24 62:3
either (13) 34:19 55:19 66:1
68:10 69:20 84:8 106:15
108:13 126:19 142:5,20,22
146:10
elaine (9) 10:4 62:8,8
161:5,7,16,20 167:4
176:23
elaines (1) 62:12
elbows (1) 15:7
elder (1) 90:16
electronic (1) 137:4
element (4) 152:2,10 155:11
166:4
elements (2) 89:24 136:5
eloquent (1) 45:24
eloquently (1) 121:21
else (3) 72:6 132:25 178:22
elsewhere (3) 83:17 84:10
147:19
elsmore (2) 39:19 93:14
email (2) 92:6 104:1
embassy (1) 87:23
embody (1) 62:14
embrace (1) 56:24
embraced (1) 123:16
emergencies (1) 155:22
emergency (60) 2:25 11:21
12:23 18:1,7 19:7 25:13,24
26:3,15 27:15,24 28:7,24
30:18,21 63:1,14 72:18
73:24 74:6,9 75:21,24 76:1
114:17 115:22 118:12
125:19 126:10 143:18
148:7 153:5,10,16,19,24
154:3 155:1,8,11,17
156:22 157:9

158:1,2,11,15 159:2,17
160:2 176:10,17
177:1,4,25 178:9,15,18,22
emotional (1) 77:20
empathy (1) 162:11
emphasise (3) 14:16 17:10
90:9
emphasised (1) 169:21
emphasising (2) 31:15 61:25
employ (1) 114:10
employed (6) 42:17 120:18
127:16 136:8 167:24
168:14
empowered (1) 137:23
enable (1) 34:14
encapsulates (1) 62:6
encompassed (1) 141:2
encourage (2) 12:18 46:20
encouraged (4) 11:25 25:21
78:14 166:18
encouraging (1) 36:20
end (13) 12:8 37:17
41:9,18,19 42:24 66:23
70:16 78:4 93:5 120:4
124:7 135:4
ended (1) 121:22
enemies (1) 165:15
enforce (1) 114:1
enforcement (10) 4:6 35:15
40:22 41:3 59:7 60:15
84:23 94:4 119:3 152:16
engage (1) 47:7
engaged (6) 46:14 60:9
100:5 156:21 158:22 167:7
engagement (3) 71:20
109:11 158:14
engages (1) 132:9
england (1) 121:14
english (1) 55:7
enhanced (2) 138:3 155:21
enjoyed (1) 48:22
enjoying (1) 48:1
enlisting (1) 152:15
ennis (3) 23:2,18 38:22
enough (7) 14:16 15:19
44:18 57:20 105:6 154:7
168:19
enquired (1) 98:2
enquiries (1) 135:6
enquiry (1) 147:19
ensuing (1) 23:9
ensure (20) 2:7,9 19:4 15:18
9:11 10:9 21:24 22:7 30:25
45:20 111:19 114:2,7
137:19 141:15 159:16
165:24 168:15 179:1
ensuring (8) 61:19 140:8
163:23 167:15 170:11,13
176:5 180:13
enter (2) 63:10 147:22
entered (4) 31:19 125:8
154:13 172:23
entering (1) 150:13
enterprise (1) 36:21
entire (1) 41:16
entirely (3) 22:20 108:24
109:6
entities (2) 72:1 114:3
entitled (4) 10:6,7 126:17
140:4
entrance (1) 143:15
entrusted (1) 137:23
entry (2) 46:22 49:4
environment (1) 166:13
environs (1) 150:13
equally (7) 10:4 51:22
101:22 123:9 125:6,22
152:2
equipment (8) 18:18,22 19:6
24:11 26:22 53:13
159:11,13
error (1) 170:19
errors (1) 163:21
escapes (1) 72:2
especially (5) 34:2 43:6
135:20 149:18 151:9

espoused (2) 79:7 103:5
essence (3) 9:6 15:1 52:12
essentially (3) 77:14 102:24
108:22
establish (9) 47:25 62:18
75:5 114:25 116:18,22
117:6,20 159:6
established (6) 37:3 45:21
63:12 66:13 70:7 117:25
establishing (1) 74:21
establishment (1) 115:20
estate (1) 111:6
euphemistically (1) 87:2
europe (3) 90:8 164:10,14
european (3) 91:24 92:11
104:15
evacuated (2) 30:5 39:11
evaluate (1) 148:15
evaluation (2) 148:19 149:14
even (34) 7:18 18:25 22:16
28:22 29:17,18 34:15
36:22 39:23 44:11 45:21
52:6 56:14 57:13 60:4,7,9
63:23 72:4 101:21 110:20
112:16 114:2,20 130:25
135:5 142:18 145:25 147:1
151:6 154:17 155:16
172:14 175:18
evening (10) 48:22 88:1
94:15 124:12 167:24
169:12 171:1,9,18,21
event (15) 21:16,18,20,21,22
22:6 27:17 31:17 40:18
63:9,15 139:25 143:20
146:25 150:23
events (19) 12:15 22:9 24:24
25:2 63:2 114:15 141:16
151:22 152:22 155:4
162:24 163:4,14,24 167:24
168:3 169:14 173:4 178:1
eventually (3) 35:21 38:7
87:22
ever (6) 14:10 58:4 121:21
138:21 165:12 174:12
every (16) 21:17 37:10 46:6
64:4 66:15,20 70:9,14
73:23 98:10 111:10,11,14
114:18 121:12 179:8
everybody (1) 76:10
everyday (1) 165:7
everyone (5) 32:1 42:11,18
76:15 179:7
everything (2) 74:14 170:2
evidence (103) 1:5,22
2:15,22,23 3:12,16
4:2,14,16,18 5:20,23
6:1,2,9,11,18 8:22 9:18
11:16 16:12,13 17:5,19
18:20 30:8 34:14 40:24
41:14 43:23 47:21,25
48:10 51:13 55:14 59:12
65:11,20,21 67:20
69:4,14,15 71:12,17 72:25
76:5,11,20 77:7,17,25
78:2,7 80:6,20 83:3,5
101:8 104:5,7,8 105:22
106:1,9 107:4,17,20,21
108:12,13,16 109:18,25
113:9 116:16 117:23 118:2
124:24 125:7 130:16
131:10 145:3 160:6 170:17
evidenced (2) 89:25 110:15
evidential (2) 66:12 70:6
evil (1) 56:6
exacerbated (1) 21:3
exact (1) 84:7
exactly (5) 22:3 27:21 61:11
78:6 86:14
examination (5) 8:9 20:4
35:3 51:2 159:15
examine (7) 25:13 25:24
27:25 33:21 55:20 60:13
153:15

examined (2) 28:5 60:14
example (22) 32:3 78:8
83:13 107:5 110:10 127:20
129:3 133:13 134:5
135:11,13 136:18 138:16
139:3 145:11 146:16 147:4
150:7 152:12 154:8 158:17
159:11
examples (1) 13:8
excelled (1) 62:2
except (1) 3:18
exceptional (2) 97:3 164:2
excited (1) 104:20
excited (1) 31:21
excitedly (1) 38:1
excitement (1) 10:11
exciting (1) 8:12
exclude (3) 66:1 69:20 76:18
excluded (1) 99:24
exclusion (1) 126:22
exclusives (1) 87:7
excuses (2) 113:20 118:13
executed (1) 123:19
exercise (9) 27:7,14,18
122:19 155:24 156:13,18
157:4,7
exercises (8) 24:1 62:25
115:2 149:19 155:20 156:2
178:3,6
exhibited (1) 158:14
exmi5 (1) 86:24
exonerate (1) 113:16
expand (1) 73:17
expect (7) 9:3 22:13 27:2
60:6 107:1 130:1 180:18
expectation (2) 8:16 55:25
expected (6) 7:19 10:8,8
22:22 102:5 122:19
expeditiously (1) 134:22
experience (6) 12:16 21:24
124:22 171:17,19,19
experienced (2) 147:15,21
experiences (2) 10:12 37:16
expert (16) 67:6,11 70:24
71:4 72:22 76:3 97:20,24
98:3,5,7,22 118:2,7 130:21
158:25
expertise (2) 26:19,20
experts (8) 19:11 97:22
113:9,21 117:8,9 143:14
156:13
explain (3) 137:25 162:6
163:7
explained (1) 15:13
explanation (3) 106:16
122:14 125:5
exploded (1) 14:25
exploited (1) 101:23
exploration (1) 156:8
explore (3) 131:19 159:3
170:4
explosion (2) 4:13 154:14
explosive (6) 104:7,13
121:18 136:5 150:14 168:5
explosives (1) 60:1
exposed (5) 25:20 44:10
62:5 63:1 174:22
exposes (1) 34:8
exposure (1) 82:17
express (3) 39:14 88:8 177:3
expressed (7) 4:25 20:1
39:17 57:17 59:15 79:10
133:17
expressing (1) 92:18
expression (3) 51:17 54:2,4
extend (1) 143:25
extended (1) 78:18
extending (1) 144:7
extensive (2) 76:4 106:9
extent (23) 7:5 67:18
71:10,14 73:7 98:13
111:22 128:6 130:17
133:11,17 135:5 144:19,23
145:3,8 149:20 152:14
154:3 155:6,19 172:2
external (2) 144:25 149:17

extradition (2) 106:4,25
extreme (1) 39:17
extremely (1) 122:1
extremism (4) 40:6 82:23
83:9 90:13
extremist (11) 36:17,20
87:18 89:19,23 90:17
135:18,23,24 136:1 172:16
extremists (2) 134:13 173:19
extremities (1) 71:17
eye (1) 121:11
eyebrow (1) 102:16
F
facebook (4) 60:18 85:4
88:3 91:13
faces (2) 33:7 125:20
facilitated (1) 35:21
facilitating (2) 35:19 36:6
factors (1) 141:7
factory (1) 111:3
factual (1) 74:22
factually (1) 124:1
fail (2) 151:4,4
failed (18) 11:19 40:13
62:21,24 63:5,6,21 86:23
93:22 115:18 116:19,21
117:5,12,13 139:17 140:9
176:7
failings (4) 7:6 72:21 146:9
159:23
fails (1) 144:5
failure (15) 11:20 20:14
27:18 72:3,4 74:8 82:10
95:20 110:2,23 117:17
140:10,10,11 159:6
failures (9) 14:21 74:25
112:6 113:4,23 117:1,19
118:25,25
fair (1) 8:19
fairly (1) 10:18
faith (1) 58:7
fall (6) 18:10 88:18 89:7
117:1 145:18 146:21
falls (2) 40:13 116:11
false (2) 95:1 149:4
familial (1) 29:12
families (17) 1:7,19,24,24
2:2,14,17,19 4:10,22 7:12
8:2 9:1,17,23 10:8,10 11:7
12:5,18 14:11 18:12,20
22:25 23:19 24:13 25:2,23
26:14 27:3 28:11,23
29:1,17,24 30:4 31:5 32:15
33:20 34:16,17,20,25
35:7,11 36:13,19 40:11
41:22 42:1 43:3 47:22
50:11 51:22 53:6 55:15
56:2 59:1,9,15 61:12,19
62:23 63:22 64:13 65:3,5
66:8,25 67:8 68:22,25
70:3,18 71:1,19 73:3,21
74:10,14 76:12,19 77:5,8,9
78:1,7 80:7 85:7 86:13
87:4 94:22 95:4,14
99:14,23 109:1,9 117:18
118:15,17,20 119:17,14,20
120:2 121:13,14,20 122:17
123:8,9,11,14 124:20
125:2,13,17,20
126:6,17,25 127:3,7
129:23 130:2,13,17,25
131:7,10,14,20 132:2
134:23 137:12,13,17
138:2,5,11 139:13,16
140:14,24 141:12,14,18
142:1,9 147:22 148:4,14
150:2 153:4,8,14 154:16
159:15,19,22,24
160:3,12,24 162:16 163:18
179:15 180:5,10
family (57) 14:13 16:10
17:23 22:11,21 23:24
25:17 30:6 31:9 32:14
33:11,24 42:13 45:17
46:13 48:11 51:2 54:17,24

55:11 56:11 59:16 60:16
62:12 66:17 68:10 70:11
73:3,4,6,8 86:18 87:20
92:25 93:1,14,21 103:20
113:14,19 120:20 136:18
138:21,24 162:4,9
167:11,14 169:16 171:7
172:9 174:12 175:15
177:2,13 179:3,21
families (1) 173:13
fan (1) 124:5
fans (2) 48:2 124:3
fantasy (1) 87:6
far (16) 8:4 9:8 11:5 19:3,6
26:20 52:6 61:17 62:1
64:23 68:17 83:2 105:6
124:17 154:7 175:16
fastmoving (1) 155:3
father (13) 13:2 40:25 49:16
56:7 73:6 79:2 86:3 94:17
103:8 113:18 120:22
161:3,4
athers (2) 41:25 173:10
fatty (1) 20:7
fault (5) 52:8 113:6,16 133:1
177:20
favour (1) 62:22
favourite (2) 10:13 13:15
fawell (3) 10:2 41:4,6
fbf (1) 94:8
fdo (1) 157:5
fdos (1) 117:1
fear (1) 62:22
feared (1) 111:9
fearless (4) 8:9 19:15 26:14
62:17
feature (1) 93:1
february (6) 36:1 84:4 90:5
91:3,10 103:14
fed (2) 170:1,6
feel (3) 10:7 38:14 140:4
feet (3) 32:7 38:13 50:9
fell (1) 10:17
felt (5) 15:13 41:11 56:15
179:9,14
fervent (2) 129:23 138:2
few (8) 33:15 38:22 68:3
93:21 111:8 112:13 113:1
171:5
fewer (1) 50:19
fibrotic (1) 20:8
fiercely (1) 62:12
fifthly (2) 110:8 181:1
figen (5) 45:23 46:14,16 47:4
48:3
fight (4) 41:1 85:5 89:16
90:23
fighters (4) 83:22 91:2,19
173:16
fighting (7) 83:15 86:21,21
88:14 89:24 91:4 173:11
file (1) 26:3
filed (1) 84:2
fill (1) 107:8
filled (1) 121:12
final (5) 45:14 56:23 63:22
125:18 160:16
finally (9) 28:18 45:12 98:14
107:1 110:8 114:17 149:25
160:22 181:3
financial (2) 79:1 91:5
find (7) 10:15 24:14 49:6
66:25 70:18 165:14 177:20
finding (1) 64:3
findings (3) 109:18 178:17
180:12
finger (1) 113:8
finish (1) 48:23
finished (1) 55:6
fire (22) 18:8,25 19:13 21:9
24:10,16 26:5,18,25 28:4
29:14,22 30:7,12 63:4
114:19 115:17 154:19
158:16,20,20,24
firearm (1) 29:9
firearms (1) 157:11

fires (1) 26:19
firmly (1) 28:21
first (26) 1:6,8,19 23:3,19
24:22 36:7 64:24 65:7
68:18 69:1 81:13 97:19
106:3 115:15 120:12
126:25 131:3 137:17
154:14 159:11 163:16
167:17 174:1 179:9 180:21
firstly (7) 6:25 74:21 86:17
108:12 163:10 168:21
176:15
fit (6) 44:20 53:10,14 108:6
150:12 168:8
fitted (1) 133:18
five (4) 89:11 164:14,15
177:17
flagged (4) 79:20 80:5
133:12 174:5
flags (1) 133:16
flashes (1) 32:6
flat (1) 111:7
flawed (2) 43:17 44:8
flaws (1) 63:1
fled (2) 38:6 87:14
flight (3) 64:25 68:19 101:12
floating (1) 38:5
floor (5) 14:7 32:7 50:8,10
51:23
focus (16) 12:15 13:4 18:21
19:16 23:9 58:5 74:17,20
122:15 143:6 162:7
170:5,10 171:10,24 176:12
focused (3) 29:4 152:3
176:10
foil (1) 46:3
folder (1) 33:1
follow (2) 112:11 115:3
followed (11) 46:12 65:13
69:6 115:16 120:14 154:15
155:8,18 169:14 172:5
173:1
following (21) 25:11 39:4
41:5 42:6 78:22 110:10
111:8 120:2 128:18
132:3,4 141:21,21 147:5
161:12 165:20,21 166:21
171:8 175:6,8
follows (2) 101:13 164:21
followup (1) 134:6
footage (3) 16:2 17:6 125:6
footnote (1) 101:12
force (4) 88:14 116:13
156:25 157:2
forcefully (1) 78:4
forces (2) 90:24 146:23
forefront (2) 35:6 169:24
foreign (2) 90:1 94:24
gadfly (1) 129:21
gaining (1) 138:11
gap (1) 159:1
gaps (1) 107:8
gardner (1) 90:6
gate (1) 60:5
gather (1) 42:25
gathered (3) 67:19 71:11
106:9
gathering (1) 101:21
gave (10) 6:1 15:12 49:16
50:2 65:11 69:4 77:20 90:1
153:24 164:20
gchq (2) 83:7 98:21
gemma (3) 13:21,23 14:1
general (5) 76:13 83:24
99:14 113:25 176:6
generally (5) 136:24 142:24
158:9,15 163:23
generational (1) 110:13
generations (1) 90:16
genuine (1) 119:6
georgina (13) 10:1
37:1,1,7,12,23
grenade (1) 60:21
grenfell (2) 65:14 69:8
grief (1) 123:10
griefstricken (1) 38:16
germany (1) 93:2
get (17) 15:5 20:23 32:2
38:5 46:2 52:19,20

fourth (1) 160:23
fourthly (2) 110:2 180:25
foyer (3) 62:4,9 161:8
framework (3) 111:20 114:1
178:13
france (2) 104:16 105:2
frank (1) 90:6
frankly (2) 81:8 82:15
fraudulent (1) 104:3
free (1) 55:1
freed (1) 78:16
freely (2) 47:7 59:22
frequencies (1) 53:9
frequent (2) 86:11 173:13
fresh (2) 65:10 69:4
freya (1) 55:3
freyas (1) 55:4
friends (8) 10:20 12:18 42:13
62:11 93:16 136:17 161:10
167:9
front (3) 31:24 87:7 91:19
frs (1) 117:25
frustrate (1) 102:10
fucking (1) 57:11
fulfil (1) 26:14
fulfilled (2) 167:4,14
fulfilling (1) 107:23
full (15) 9:6 24:13 47:6
51:2,18 72:7,7,17,19 84:16
109:13 120:17 131:17
165:12 166:24
fullest (1) 125:17
fully (4) 72:8 76:10
129:22,24
functioning (1) 63:14
fundamental (4) 8:10 9:22
13:5 25:18
funded (1) 86:25
funding (11) 93:9
funloving (1) 32:24
furringup (1) 20:7
further (20) 7:25 23:7 30:22
47:3 52:25 83:6 101:23
103:12,13,18 105:23
119:14 133:13 135:5
137:19 139:10 150:22
169:18 174:6 178:8
furthermore (1) 92:16
future (12) 64:7 72:5 75:1
95:14 97:14 107:12 119:9
120:6 127:13 141:17
160:10 176:21

G

53:5,20,23 55:17 57:9 60:7
63:6 86:15 106:16 112:22
gets (1) 174:20
getting (2) 21:3 165:11
gibbs (1) 180:24
gifted (1) 55:6
girls (2) 120:17 167:11
give (5) 5:22 6:2,9 57:4
165:16
given (26) 4:3,4 6:10 27:16
29:14 55:3 61:17 66:17
70:11 82:22 105:7 124:24
142:21 143:6 144:4,16
150:14 155:16 157:1,4
160:9 163:20 167:25
171:13 174:13 179:18
gives (1) 17:16
giving (2) 23:13 98:25
glare (1) 72:7
glass (1) 37:20
glimpse (1) 179:18
glint (1) 160:11
gmfrs (1) 116:2
gmp (8) 106:9,19 115:25
116:2 146:17 155:13
157:1,5
gmrs (2) 148:25 158:18
goals (1) 75:3
goes (5) 26:20 35:8 57:8
154:7 178:8
going (24) 1:18 8:11 15:15
42:16 48:25 49:2,2 64:5,17
66:13 70:8 73:17 84:25
90:23 99:18 100:3 107:11
112:11,12 119:19 160:22
161:10 165:10 167:9
gold (1) 29:9
gone (5) 17:1 82:3 84:9 85:5
179:16
good (13) 1:4 3:7 19:17
46:20 53:25 64:18 76:2
88:20 93:16 94:19 121:7
156:2,4
government (9) 3:19 25:15
65:5 68:24 88:20 89:5,23
101:20 106:14
governments (1) 174:19
graduation (1) 120:12
granby (1) 111:6
grand (1) 32:21
grande (12) 12:8 13:14,20
25:11 31:17 33:8 37:12,24
63:3 124:4 142:25 170:9
grandes (1) 45:13
graphically (1) 17:7
grateful (5) 8:2 54:11 77:8
122:1 162:25
gratitude (1) 177:4
grave (2) 72:23 170:22
gravely (1) 77:22
gravest (1) 175:16
greaney (24) 1:3,4 7:10
64:11,17 67:2,10,22 68:9
70:20 71:3 78:10 115:7
119:12,19 123:21 137:18
154:12 156:6 160:15,22
162:20 180:16,21
greaneys (5) 73:20 74:2 95:5
97:18 162:22
great (6) 48:10 120:19 121:7
153:20 176:9 179:22
greater (24) 29:9,14,22
38:11 116:11,23 146:25
148:12 154:2,18,18,24
155:20 156:1,9,19 157:21
158:6,16 160:2 170:13
177:21 178:20 180:25
greatest (4) 9:4 97:22 99:1
165:6
greet (1) 42:2
grenade (1) 60:21
grenfell (2) 65:14 69:8
grief (1) 123:10
griefstricken (1) 38:16
grieve (3) 67:15 71:7 128:22
grieving (1) 49:16

griffin (2) 145:2 166:16
grip (1) 159:1
groomed (1) 83:24
grooming (2) 82:5 102:25
grossly (1) 39:2
grow (9) 83:15 86:21 91:20
92:12 94:10 101:19 160:23
173:11,12
groups (4) 83:9 89:19 90:17
153:3
grow (1) 58:3
guardian (4) 84:5 85:1
88:12,17
guards (1) 45:10
guidance (6) 114:3,5,13
145:10 148:9 155:6
guide (2) 21:16,19
gun (3) 60:22,23 112:18

H

habitually (1) 42:25
hakim (1) 100:14
half (2) 11:9 137:17
hallett (1) 105:18
hand (6) 35:8,8 54:19 76:18
115:13 149:15
handled (3) 130:8 134:18,21
handing (1) 126:9
hands (1) 14:6
happen (14) 4:11 8:11,25
10:14,16 36:25 45:22
68:16 74:23 114:21 169:16
172:12 179:25 180:14
happened (15) 6:7 13:7
22:19 25:10 29:23 30:15
32:2 40:19 48:24 71:18
72:18 74:22 83:12 163:3
179:16
happening (3) 61:12 118:24
169:13
happens (2) 100:8 138:1
happily (1) 58:1
happy (3) 31:21 37:15
152:24
hard (1) 29:18
hardly (3) 7:23 60:2 104:4
hardworking (1) 13:16
hardy (1) 120:22
harm (1) 30:23
harms (1) 34:5
harriet (1) 120:15
haschem (26) 11:25 33:17
36:6 40:25 61:2 79:9,18
85:4 86:12 90:19
91:9,14,15,17 93:2,3,20
105:25 106:1 107:14,18
111:12 123:20 133:1
138:8,12
hashems (1) 173:18
hastening (1) 20:16
hatred (1) 162:15
having (15) 5:4,15,17 6:21
16:12 30:14 34:17 46:8
98:7 111:3 112:7 114:24
116:13 122:2 181:6
haylea (1) 120:1
head (3) 15:4 16:3 174:15
headed (1) 37:23
heading (1) 14:2
headquarters (1) 181:3
healthy (1) 95:17
hear (31) 1:6,18 2:2,8 11:13
17:19 18:19 28:16,17
29:1,2 34:16 43:23 47:25
48:11 51:13 58:1 64:12,17
75:10 99:21 119:13,19
130:20 131:1 160:7,16,22
177:6 180:19,21
heard (40) 2:16 3:16,17
4:16,19 5:14 6:12,18 8:22
11:1 16:12 28:19 32:5
42:10 57:6 58:2 66:20
70:14 76:2,9,11,17,20,23
78:3 79:25 86:5 89:13 95:6
104:7 109:18 112:24 120:8

154:12 162:19 173:7,20
178:3 179:8,10
hearing (14) 1:21 3:16 4:23
5:15 7:22 9:15 11:2 35:2
68:15 76:11,18 98:17
170:17 180:16
hearings (20) 1:5 3:20 5:23
7:1,8 9:9 11:17 47:15
51:14 61:23 76:14,23
95:7,22 99:22 101:4
122:15 162:8,12 179:17
heart (7) 16:15 19:23
20:5,9,11,12,14
heartbreaking (1) 48:11
heartfelt (3) 66:11 70:5
77:21
heat (1) 32:5
heavily (1) 91:19
heavy (6) 44:22 45:7 50:24
91:14 140:1 145:23
hebrides (1) 61:25
hed (5) 47:21 52:16 93:20
106:2 173:25
heed (2) 11:15 34:3
height (2) 17:17 18:11
heinous (1) 126:18
held (11) 4:14 6:15 10:18
27:7 86:10 100:16 109:23
110:17 115:2 130:12
153:12
hell (3) 16:7 33:9 37:6
help (9) 15:14 21:11 33:5
46:14 47:3 51:10 57:18
107:11 125:21
helped (2) 25:21 132:18
helpful (1) 106:8
helping (2) 24:18 63:25
here (13) 15:8 21:7,12 31:14
34:12 57:9 95:9 100:3
102:13 108:3,20 110:15
122:9
hero (1) 84:25
heroes (4) 10:21 15:8 49:19
74:6
heroic (4) 26:2 33:15 73:24
115:8
heroism (1) 154:1
herself (1) 77:22
hes (9) 16:2 17:13 47:18
48:8 53:14 67:4,6 68:12
70:22
hesitate (1) 53:16
hett (12) 10:2 45:15,18
129:18 137:21 161:22
167:4,13 178:23
hetts (1) 45:23
hidden (1) 79:23
hide (1) 129:21
hideously (1) 32:3
hiding (1) 50:23
hierarchy (1) 12:7
high (4) 44:2 61:22 100:21
109:10
highest (2) 26:6 38:24
highlight (2) 27:20 73:13
highlighted (10) 27:19 67:10
71:3 78:10 110:13 115:4
133:14 157:7 175:6 178:18
highly (8) 25:10 101:7
110:23 111:18 112:15
120:24 128:14 167:3
hillsborough (2) 65:7 69:1
himself (8) 15:4,7 86:2 103:5
107:18 147:17,18 176:23
hindsight (1) 144:6
hinted (1) 74:2
historical (1) 90:17
history (2) 8:15 132:16
hit (1) 135:1
hmp (1) 35:18
hodgson (2) 65:17 69:11
hogan (1) 119:25
hold (5) 5:6,19 9:18 62:21
112:1
holding (4) 17:12 60:20,23
156:2

I

ian (3) 32:23,25 33:1
iconic (2) 166:7,23
idea (3) 64:24 68:18 87:4
idental (1) 27:21
identification (4) 83:10
126:8,20 145:11
identified (13) 74:24 116:13
132:23 136:6 139:8 143:2
157:2,12 159:18 176:18
178:6,10,17
identifiers (1) 134:1

identifies (1) 40:9
identify (14) 7:6 122:12
123:3 133:19 136:12
139:17 140:7,11
151:4,16,24 152:14
162:4,23
identifying (1) 159:23
identity (3) 98:2.5 109:5
ideologically (1) 40:6
idolised (1) 13:18
ied (4) 142:8,15 143:3
151:10
ieds (1) 136:11
ignore (2) 100:23 145:20
ignored (1) 147:11
ill (7) 13:6 29:19 41:11 53:19
58:1 72:25 92:13
illicit (1) 135:24
im (10) 14:8 15:15 49:2
53:17,20 57:10 67:22 68:4
100:3 112:12
image (1) 60:24
images (2) 39:20 60:20
imagination (1) 91:23
imagined (3) 7:23 58:4 64:4
immediate (10) 19:7 33:13
75:14 111:25 123:24
138:21,24 154:10 156:20
158:7
immediately (3) 14:24 40:2
129:13
impact (5) 12:13 31:15
45:11 150:1 171:25
impacted (2) 26:25 30:18
impacted (1) 145:4
imperative (2) 30:6 74:12
imperatives (2) 9:3 13:9
imperfect (2) 96:2 108:16
implementation (1) 47:6
implemented (1) 143:5
implicate (1) 107:10
implicated (1) 91:16
importance (2) 157:8 177:21
important (30) 2:12 11:10
12:17 13:25 16:10,12
22:25 29:7 32:14 33:20
34:1 39:3 41:21 45:4,18
47:22 51:20 60:12 67:13
68:1 71:6 77:17 101:9
118:8 143:13 150:24
165:23 166:20 173:23
174:19
importantly (3) 105:6 107:8
159:4
impose (1) 2:11
imposing (1) 36:20
impossible (1) 98:1
impression (1) 149:4
imprinted (1) 60:23
imprisoned (1) 36:15
imprisonment (1) 79:14
improved (3) 144:5 158:2
160:10
improvement (2) 144:4
148:20
improvements (2) 126:7
141:6
improved (3) 15:19 51:18
121:18
improvising (1) 49:12
impunity (1) 63:25
inaccurately (1) 53:22
inadequacies (4) 142:21
150:1 172:1,2
inadequacy (1) 17:7
inadequate (4) 21:5 63:18
142:11 170:12
inadequately (1) 18:19
inappropriate (1) 21:4
inaudible (1) 101:24
incident (11) 22:24 30:20
48:24 72:5 114:18,22
116:15,21 157:10 159:17
165:21
incidents (2) 115:4 155:12
include (7) 61:8 74:19 84:18

148:8,23 150:8 158:17
included (3) 85:25 112:18
164:11
includes (1) 144:22
including (19) 39:17 65:13
69:7 72:20 83:5 85:24
86:22 90:17 104:15
115:8,9 116:5 149:6 150:8
171:14 172:1 173:15,19
179:24
inclusion (3) 66:14 70:8
145:14
incorporated (1) 166:3
incorrectly (1) 148:24
increased (3) 7:24 166:12
171:14
increasing (1) 165:4
incredibly (1) 12:24
incredulous (1) 59:2
inculcated (1) 145:15
independence (1) 97:25
independent (6) 26:15 32:24
127:21,22 129:22,24
india (7) 58:13,13,22 64:25
68:19 101:12 102:5
indicate (4) 9:21 39:22
143:21 180:17
indicated (9) 54:15 93:20
98:4 109:12 119:19 122:10
162:3 181:6,7
indicates (2) 104:12 106:15
indicating (1) 81:15
indication (1) 82:14
indicative (1) 125:25
indicator (1) 135:1
individual (16) 13:4,10,11
15:9 52:8 62:16 74:5
101:17 113:6 116:9 139:18
153:18,25 160:5 173:3
177:20
individuals (12) 10:19 11:1
12:11,11 113:7,21 115:8
163:4,22 174:21 177:20
180:1
indoor (1) 112:20
ineligible (1) 97:14
inevitably (3) 109:17 114:22
123:4
inexperienced (1) 147:15
inferentially (1) 60:19
infidels (1) 91:21
inflicted (2) 14:9 20:21
influence (5) 11:3 36:22
45:12 79:17 80:3
influenced (1) 90:16
influential (1) 36:17
inform (3) 67:11 71:4 116:19
information (38) 3:4,13
20:18 34:9 85:20,22,25
86:10 92:17 94:12
101:6,16,17,22 102:4,8,11
103:2,7,17 107:9 109:22
111:24 117:8,9,19 130:7
132:9,11,12 133:3,7
134:1,3,16,19 135:2
158:22
informed (2) 99:5 144:11
informing (1) 86:10
initial (2) 23:5 24:3
initially (2) 49:4 78:21
injured (14) 15:20 23:10
24:6 26:22 30:5 32:8,10
33:6 38:6 50:2 73:25 77:22
82:24 164:16
injuries (11) 12:14 14:18
19:22 20:16,20 32:9 42:6
48:14 57:16 125:4 176:24
innocent (5) 50:13 123:13
126:12 130:10 139:11
innocuous (1) 101:6
input (1) 1:24
inquest (11) 4:2
5:4,7,8,16,19 34:12 65:7
69:1,4 95:3
inquests (10) 5:1 6:1,6,7
65:10,13,15 69:7,9 178:18

inquiries (6) 65:13 67:5 69:7
70:23 80:8 178:17
inquiry (194) 1:5 2:6,14 3:5
4:1,25 5:4 6:2 7:17
8:1,5,16,21
9:4,7,13,21,22,24 10:15
11:6,10,14 12:4,14 13:4,9
15:1 16:11 17:19 19:3
20:19,22 22:1,11,13,18,25
23:24 24:14,20 25:3,22,23
26:13 27:2,4,24 28:17,21
29:4 33:20 34:8,12,24 37:8
40:5,12,14,16,18 43:7,9,16
44:16 46:10 50:14 51:2,21
52:4,8,11 55:13,20 56:1
58:7 60:13 61:13 62:17
64:2,25 65:4,14,19 66:13
67:3,18 68:19,24 69:8,13
70:7,21 71:11,15,23
72:6,10,15,22
74:3,12,17,20 75:2,6,13
76:2,16 77:2,18 78:8
80:6,20 81:8,9 82:16 85:16
94:2,23 97:16,21
98:4,10,21 99:7,19,20,25
100:23 101:11 104:22
105:5,8 107:22
108:6,14,23 109:10,12
118:7 119:6 121:17
122:4,7,10 123:2,10,12,16
124:25 126:24 127:18
129:2,24 131:1,11,23
132:19 136:14 137:18,20
140:23,25 141:13 142:2
143:16,24 144:6 148:15
154:5 156:16 159:3
160:4,6
162:10,14,17,20,22
163:6,10,18 164:3 168:2
170:4 172:25 175:10
176:10 177:5 179:5
180:6,9 181:11
inquirys (2) 27:10 131:8
inside (1) 31:19
insignificant (2) 101:18,22
insofar (2) 7:4 141:15
inspected (1) 148:6
inspiring (1) 48:12
installation (1) 37:22
installed (1) 37:21
instance (4) 12:20 36:19
40:25 44:9
instead (1) 147:20
instigator (1) 45:24
instinct (1) 49:8
institutional (3) 77:2 97:8
159:23
instructed (2) 97:21 171:12
instruction (4) 97:24
98:4,6,24
instructions (2) 147:10,11
insufficient (1) 170:5
integral (1) 30:21
integrity (7) 29:18
99:12,15,15 100:1,24
131:9
intellectual (1) 60:4
intelligence (38) 6:13 67:15
71:8 83:8 88:19,24 91:25
92:11,13,14 94:4,6,25
100:5,9,16 101:15,23,25
102:3 103:17 107:2 108:5
109:24 111:17
128:13,20,24 131:4 132:8
133:3,6,13,18,23 134:11
136:21 174:16
intend (1) 2:8
intended (1) 108:22
intending (1) 123:8
intends (1) 99:21
intense (2) 32:5 122:22
intensely (1) 129:18
intensive (1) 152:11
intent (2) 14:17 92:24
intention (2) 137:12,13
inter (1) 60:20

interaction (2) 49:22 156:19
interagency (1) 28:1
intercepting (1) 94:13
interest (45) 37:19 60:17
81:10 82:7 85:10 23 86:3
90:21 91:22 95:25 96:1
99:18 102:17,23 103:4
106:19 110:11
122:13,21,22 123:4 124:20
126:25 127:7 128:8,10
129:5 130:12 132:3,11,23
133:8-14 138:6,10 139:13
141:19 148:4 150:2 153:9
162:6 172:4,9 174:2,11
interested (3) 83:1 88:15
159:22
interests (3) 6:19 75:4
108:18
interference (3) 72:11 99:3,4
internal (5) 127:23 128:4
129:16,19 144:24
internet (2) 103:25 104:11
interoperability (7) 74:8
115:5 117:7,11 115:9
157:16 178:13
interpretation (1) 133:5
interpretation (2) 22:3 157:10
interrelationship (1) 146:17
interrupt (2) 53:16 67:22
intervened (1) 59:7
intervening (1) 144:14
intervention (1) 172:18
interview (1) 77:21
interviewed (1) 55:19
into (40) 1:24 5:1 6:14,21
17:1,1 19:3 23:1 24:14
25:6 27:2 33:19 37:18
43:20 49:9 56:13 58:24
59:3 60:7 63:7 64:25 68:19
80:7 89:18 94:2 100:17
101:11 103:6 106:10
108:15 112:23 128:23
132:24 133:19 152:25
162:14 164:17 170:2,6
174:24
intraagency (1) 24:9
intractable (1) 95:23
introduced (1) 144:14
introduction (2) 46:17 72:14
introductory (1) 1:9
investigate (4) 66:6 67:3
69:25 70:21
investigated (6) 54:1 59:20
88:8 136:3,6,12
investigating (4) 106:6,20
123:12 139:10
investigation (22) 6:25 27:11
40:8 59:24 62:17 72:17
77:17 79:12 92:19 93:15
103:6 106:9 127:19 128:11
131:2,21 132:24 133:5
134:9 140:20,25 174:7
investigations (7) 6:14 66:5
69:24 107:5 129:4,6
133:23
investigative (1) 135:6
investigatory (2) 36:11
100:15
invite (3) 7:10 180:8 181:6
invited (3) 68:12 88:19 97:8
involved (15) 22:8 71:14
74:16 75:20 89:12 103:23
106:21 107:10 121:17
149:23 152:10,12 156:4
164:4 177:4
involvement (2) 9:24 149:21
involvements (1) 83:15
involves (6) 127:15 138:15
139:6 155:5,15 158:9
ipswich (1) 127:20
irreconcilable (1) 108:18
irrefutable (1) 169:12
irrelevant (2) 44:24 100:25
irrespective (1) 135:21
isabelle (1) 120:15
isc (7) 80:10 81:6,12 85:13

90:18 92:16 110:23
ischaemic (2) 19:23 20:12
isis (2) 39:14 61:3
islamist (7) 35:22 36:17 83:15
85:6 86:21 90:13 173:11
islamist (10) 40:6 86:18 90:3
164:9,14,16,22
173:11,16,21
isle (1) 61:24
isma'il (6) 60:17,20,25 61:2
86:5 110:9
isma'is (1) 110:11
isolation (2) 30:24 102:15
issues (24) 19:12 27:18
52:11 54:19 74:3 76:15
95:8 118:8,9 119:1
122:12,20,25 123:3 125:5
130:14 138:5 140:20 141:2
157:24 174:8 175:3,5,21
its (52) 2:8 8:17 19:2 22:19
26:14 27:12 28:22 29:18
30:2 37:22 41:21,21 54:8
57:11 58:19 62:17,19
68:1,15 74:17 75:13 82:18
87:12 90:8,9 93:5 99:2,19
101:18 107:24 112:21
115:23,24 118:21 128:3,22
131:21 138:17 141:5
142:10 143:25 145:14
148:16,23 150:13 152:13
154:9 156:10 158:7 160:2
168:16 170:12
itself (4) 143:21 149:16
150:5 163:25
iv (2) 132:5 136:14
ive (3) 58:3 103:7 176:13
ix (1) 135:8
J
j (4) 76:24 97:2,7,13
jail (1) 86:9
james (1) 89:14
jammed (4) 53:2,8,8 54:3
jane (3) 120:16,18 124:8
janes (1) 124:10
january (4) 36:2,3,5 94:9
jeopardise (1) 34:5
jesip (5) 31:2 117:11
155:9,18 178:13
jigsaw (1) 133:19
jihad (1) 39:18
jihads (1) 84:6
jo (6) 48:25 49:8,14,23,23,25
joanne (1) 48:20
job (5) 39:6 46:9 77:13
151:15,23
john (77) 1:3,10,17 7:13
10:1 13:14,14,25
14:1,3,6,13,21,24,25
15:3,5,10,12,15,17,18,21
16:6,16,18,24,25
17:1,3,5,11,11,14,17,23
18:2,10,13,23 19:8,15,20
20:4,12,20,23 21:1,7 22:21
23:15,21,24 24:5 26:16,23
30:5 31:6,9 53:16
54:5,8,14 58:19 64:9,20
68:4,14 119:11,15
160:14,18,25 162:13
180:15,20 181:9
johns (7) 14:18 15:24 16:10
21:2,14 22:11 25:17
join (4) 78:14 88:10 89:9
153:14
joined (3) 35:22 116:5
165:24
joinedup (2) 115:19 135:19
joining (1) 133:25
joint (12) 31:1,2,3 62:24
88:21,24 90:11 114:14
117:25 155:8,12 178:16
joking (2) 66:19 70:13
jones (3) 10:2 55:2,2
jops (1) 155:13
journey (1) 138:14
jtac (2) 90:12 110:13

july (1) 168:21
july (5) 36:9 39:9 59:12
60:18 178:14
june (4) 24:23,25 94:15
128:1
jury (1) 123:20
justification (2) 79:19 81:3
justified (1) 175:25
justify (1) 18:17
justin (1) 37:5
K
katiba (1) 92:2
kbl (3) 92:3,5,9
keen (1) 126:2
keep (5) 4:13 11:18 48:25
64:6 82:17
keeping (3) 11:14 26:19
51:19
kelly (10) 10:1 31:11,11,24
32:8,10,12,17 33:3,5
kellys (3) 31:14 33:11,24
ken (2) 66:16 70:10
kept (5) 2:20 32:1 86:12
96:15 133:12
kerslake (2) 67:14 71:7
kerslakes (3) 153:15 159:25
160:4
key (12) 25:21 59:5 67:2,6
70:20,24 72:22 75:12 78:8
105:17 115:4 176:14
kids (1) 49:1
killed (5) 86:23 87:25 105:2
123:18 164:16
kilograms (2) 50:24 51:9
kind (3) 125:20 136:10
160:11
kindness (3) 50:5 71:16
120:24
kingdom (9) 39:11 40:1
55:18 87:12 89:18 169:19
173:15,17,24
kiss (4) 121:9,9 124:8 153:20
klis (4) 10:3,3 56:4,9
knees (1) 124:10
knee (3) 17:17 18:10 38:19
knees (1) 14:6
knew (10) 4:12 32:18 42:14
43:1 44:3 47:18 84:24
112:15 121:15,25
knocked (1) 32:6
know (58) 1:7 4:12 7:25 8:16
9:24 11:8 12:16 15:17
17:23 18:21 19:18 27:1
28:12 30:2,4,7,17 33:12
35:5 12 36:12 13:24 43:23
50:11 53:6 57:9,11 60:9,10
73:8 78:24,25 79:12,22
83:25 84:3 90:8 94:24
100:22 106:1 109:2,4,6
111:1 112:10 118:17,18
125:13 130:25 161:20
164:22 166:10 169:16
171:8,10 174:5 179:19
knowing (1) 177:9
knowledge (7) 3:24 61:14
77:1 132:6 147:16 166:14
173:23
knowledgeable (1) 144:21
known (32) 2:25 3:5,21,21
35:9,10,14 41:2 42:9 50:1
55:2,15,18 83:18,21,23
84:9 85:9 92:10 94:5 108:8
111:22 127:4,15 132:10,17
157:5 169:20 173:19,25
174:10 175:12
kyle (9) 51:1,15
52:1,10,14,14,15 53:4,17
L
laced (1) 26:7
lack (11) 18:14 33:10 82:14
110:3 117:21 134:11
143:21,22 146:11 159:1
170:10
laden (1) 88:12

lady (4) 42:14 50:5 57:3
105:18
laid (3) 16:19 17:16 72:16
laidlaw (1) 180:22
large (8) 43:20 76:6 91:18
103:24 110:7 114:15 140:1
166:7
largely (2) 76:9 97:5
larger (1) 46:23
largest (1) 112:20
last (8) 11:9 12:25 31:13
41:10 49:17 124:14
131:5,15
lasted (1) 36:1
late (6) 28:24 40:21 86:24
144:15 159:19,20
lately (1) 18:3
later (22) 17:3 18:5 24:12
27:21 28:8 29:24 38:8,16
39:7 49:8 56:25 65:2 68:21
73:1 75:11 78:16 93:13
116:6 122:18 128:20 131:6
169:7
latter (3) 84:25 134:15 137:7
laughter (1) 120:18
launched (1) 92:19
launcher (1) 60:21
lauren (1) 38:12
lawler (12) 51:1
52:1,10,14,15,19,22
53:3,4,11,12 151:2
lawyers (1) 53:17
lawyer (1) 106:13
lawyers (9) 71:19
76:12,19,21 99:23 100:18
106:2,14 107:14
laxness (1) 150:23
lay (2) 24:6 32:10
lead (4) 14:2 107:20 115:24
118:19
leader (1) 88:12
leadership (1) 158:25
leading (2) 29:12 33:23
leadup (1) 146:10
learn (6) 11:15,19 28:24
50:14 99:13 130:11
learned (19) 11:11,11,12
12:4 24:1 28:6,16 29:25
38:8 62:24 97:19 100:21
116:16 138:7 141:15
159:17,18,19 176:19
learning (7) 115:2 128:4,23
136:19 145:3 156:5,14
least (13) 4:2,15 5:25
45:16,20 50:18 75:15
79:16,17 98:20 145:21
150:5 159:24
leave (10) 25:19 26:12 47:17
49:18 55:17 58:7 66:18
70:12 109:13 152:7
leaves (2) 17:2 118:10
leaving (6) 62:4 78:12 87:17
88:10 90:7 159:7
leczkowski (2) 73:4 113:19
led (11) 12:15 110:6,17
132:11 133:7,9 134:19
137:8 138:11 154:17 163:4
lee (2) 41:7 175:7
lees (1) 121:5
lees (5) 10:3 41:12 58:9 73:8
113:13
left (18) 11:3 13:19 26:9
31:16,17,18 32:9 37:17
41:11 55:1 59:24 91:23
99:24 107:13 111:5 117:18
121:24 171:15
leg (4) 15:12 19:22 20:3,15
legacies (2) 11:5 26:10
legacy (3) 45:18 47:16
160:11
legal (9) 76:21 100:17 106:5
122:10 130:17 131:19
162:10,22 163:18
legend (2) 91:15,20
legislation (2) 46:18 127:21
legislative (1) 119:4

legislators (1) 46:10
legitimate (7) 72:2 80:17
96:11 99:5 102:6 104:18
108:20
legs (3) 38:14 48:16,19
length (1) 112:7
lengthy (1) 108:7
lens (1) 113:13
less (6) 7:2 24:20 84:4
104:24 153:17 169:23
lesser (2) 154:2 176:12
lesson (1) 29:11
lessons (23) 11:11,15,19
12:4 24:1 27:6,8
28:6,10,12,16,25 29:7,25
62:24 99:13 100:20 116:15
141:14 153:17 159:16
176:19 178:17
let (9) 25:15 49:5 59:4 78:6
98:10 104:6 152:24 153:1
165:16
letter (5) 80:23 93:13
98:3,6,24
level (13) 25:7 39:23 40:10
43:21 44:2 45:11 56:18
100:10 129:5 138:25 164:5
166:2 167:2
levels (2) 177:17 178:20
lewis (1) 55:3
liability (1) 75:5
liaison (1) 148:17
liam (4) 120:7,10 121:15
124:4
liberty (1) 63:23
libya (20) 39:5,6 41:1 55:17
78:12 82:23 83:9,21 85:24
86:11,22 88:13 89:9,22
90:7 93:12 100:8 103:22
128:19 173:14
libyan (13) 83:15 86:20
88:21 102:22 89:7,24 90:15
92:2 94:16 105:25 110:14
173:11
licensing (3) 114:4,5,16
lies (2) 114:2 165:6
life (20) 26:16 32:13
37:12,16 42:9,10 65:22
69:16 74:20 87:24 95:23
111:21,25 115:12 121:11
131:16 133:20 169:15
172:5,3
lifechanging (2) 12:13
176:24
lifelong (2) 13:20 45:17
lifesaving (2) 21:11 24:11
lifig (9) 87:8,10,14
88:7,15,22,25 90:17 93:9
lift (1) 16:3
lifted (2) 16:24 17:15
light (6) 3:24 73:19 80:7
102:16 108:15 133:13
lights (2) 31:18 38:4
like (25) 13:21 15:13 17:23
23:14 25:20 26:23 27:12
30:7 32:17 33:12,16 35:11
38:5,20 44:21 47:21 50:25
57:11 59:1 94:24 124:6,10
148:16 151:2 168:11
112:16 114:20 167:3
likeminded (1) 48:2
likewise (2) 71:24 110:25
lily (1) 120:15
limbs (1) 16:8
limit (2) 102:1 140:24
limitations (2) 157:8,12
limited (5) 72:12 96:10 97:6
103:24 108:19
line (2) 150:21,21
linebyline (1) 71:24
link (1) 64:19
linking (1) 85:22
links (5) 36:17 82:23 88:9
90:17 173:10
lion (2) 88:4 91:15

lions (1) 91:17
lisa (10) 10:3 58:9,10,15,22
73:8 77:22 113:13 120:3
lisas (1) 59:1
list (3) 73:12 82:1 94:14
listed (2) 12:5 177:17
listen (3) 9:18 14:11,12
listened (5) 11:1 46:17 66:10
70:4 100:17
listening (3) 10:12 28:12
76:10
literally (1) 57:22
literature (1) 61:4
litigious (1) 180:2
little (10) 16:21 28:22 73:1
95:10 102:11 103:16
117:15,23 145:25 179:19
live (9) 21:6 22:14 25:4
43:11 52:6 56:18 64:18
68:10 85:23
lived (5) 14:23 37:6 62:9
84:6,8
liverpool (1) 93:7
lives (29) 8:13 11:2 12:7,11
13:22 25:6 28:15 29:5
30:22 65:11 69:5 73:9
75:22 118:22 120:20
121:21,24 123:14 126:13
130:10 139:11 140:3
162:17 165:11 167:6
176:5,16,20 179:20
living (3) 83:24 108:8 176:4
local (7) 25:14 37:7 47:12
62:25 83:5 154:24 155:21
located (2) 37:19 171:5
locating (1) 39:6
location (6) 16:20 126:16,16
141:4 143:9,11
logo (1) 60:23
london (8) 5:2,17 6:5 65:14
69:8 105:1 127:25 175:8
lone (1) 107:2
long (10) 7:18 12:24 33:18
83:16 95:2 106:23 122:7
131:22 145:25 159:8
longer (3) 7:18 11:23 126:5
look (15) 16:3 19:3 25:3
27:2 49:1 50:16,25 58:5
94:2 102:19 103:12,18
118:12 166:24 174:15
looked (3) 86:16 115:22
116:8
looking (10) 13:23 22:2
23:16 50:23 52:20 74:6
103:16 104:6 105:11
141:11
looks (2) 5:8 57:25
loop (1) 149:14
lose (1) 32:21
loss (1) 8:13
losing (2) 48:19 176:22
loss (11) 8:14 16:16 20:2
29:5 44:7 45:19 87:24
118:18 169:15 172:3,5
lost (20) 12:7 16:11 19:23
28:14,15 32:2,17 42:4 50:5
58:6 65:11 69:5 73:21
118:22 123:14 126:12
130:10 139:11 140:3
176:15
lot (4) 16:11 83:8 104:3
159:25
love (2) 120:17 121:6
loved (43) 10:10 13:14,18
23:16 28:14 31:10
32:15,18,18,22 37:2,12
42:3,10,11,13,15 45:19
47:16 55:6 63:19 64:5,7
66:2 69:5,21 71:18 120:7
121:11,25 122:3 124:21
125:14,21 126:18 147:21
152:25 153:1 161:24
163:15 167:16 176:15
179:12
lovells (1) 119:25
lovely (1) 47:19

loving (3) 13:19 32:23 56:7
low (4) 43:25 44:4 129:4,4
lower (2) 16:8 48:16
lowlevel (1) 135:6
loyalists (1) 89:13
lunch (1) 119:17
lurk (1) 12:1
lurking (1) 145:24
lying (1) 12:22
M
machine (1) 60:23
macleod (2) 10:3 61:24
magistrates (1) 106:4
magnitude (1) 7:22
maidens (1) 61:9
mail (2) 89:1 94:7
main (4) 9:15 31:18 74:8
143:15
mainly (2) 73:14 104:10
maintaining (2) 66:4 69:23
major (8) 30:20 114:18,22
115:3,13 116:14,21 155:11
majority (1) 23:13
makes (3) 80:21 96:17
127:14
makeshift (4) 12:23 16:8
33:7 38:21
making (5) 3:2,13 74:25
116:10 122:16
males (1) 35:21
malls (1) 114:9
man (12) 13:16 39:1 47:16
50:22 55:15 60:2 78:11
85:5 139:24 145:22 167:8
168:8
manage (2) 71:19 152:17
managed (3) 102:1 104:25
138:24
management (6) 43:14
71:21 144:24 146:8 151:12
169:25
managers (1) 116:11
manchester (82) 6:15 10:5
17:24 18:7 23:7 24:21
25:1,10 29:9,14,22 33:19
36:23 38:11 39:8,9,12,15
40:3 41:9 44:3 48:22 56:11
57:19 59:25 63:4,20 78:13
79:6 83:22,25 84:7 85:15
87:14,16,19 88:1,6,16,23
89:9,12 90:14,15 91:2
92:25 94:15 104:22 110:14
111:1,3,13 116:11,23
121:19 127:25 128:6
129:11 138:1 146:18,21
147:1 148:12 154:18,24
155:20 156:1,9,19 157:21
158:6,16 160:2 161:9
163:3 164:1,13 176:16
178:2,15 179:6 181:1
mandating (1) 114:14
mandatory (1) 114:12
134:4
manual (1) 87:19
many (44) 10:18 11:12 12:16
13:12,12,13,17 19:11 21:8
26:3,9,18 33:14 38:20
39:18 41:14,19,21 42:23
47:5 49:11 59:1 62:16
65:13 67:2 69:6 70:20
75:22 83:13 87:1 102:1
109:21 111:16 115:8
124:6,10 129:1 130:25
132:22 153:18 163:2,4
173:4 179:23
marauding (1) 157:11
marble (1) 50:8
march (10) 24:22,24 36:4
89:14 93:23 127:25 135:1
164:15,19 165:22
marcin (7) 10:3
56:4,8,11,21,22 57:13
mark (3) 61:21 120:3 180:9
marked (1) 123:1

markers (1) 172:19
market (1) 105:14
marking (1) 29:3
married (2) 58:1,11
marty (1) 10:2
45:15,18,23 46:13 47:15
161:4,7,9,20 167:4
martyrs (7) 45:25 46:5,7,24
47:3,6 48:5
martyrdom (2) 36:19 61:9
martyrs (2) 61:9 91:3
mass (1) 153:11
massive (1) 123:23
massively (1) 57:8
mate (2) 49:1 57:7
material (22) 5:5,18 8:10,23
34:18,22 35:5 59:9 60:12
67:18 71:10 76:14 86:7
98:11,14 102:7 103:10
104:12 109:3 110:12 128:3
163:18
maths (1) 55:7
matter (16) 6:23 17:20 19:2
21:18 24:15 27:12 35:6
41:21 52:8 61:20 62:19,19
80:5 101:8 140:23 167:21
matters (22) 1:13,19,25
5:10,20 6:10,25 19:4
74:19,21 99:16,19 100:19
109:5 118:1 168:19 170:17
171:7 172:25 176:13
177:17,19
maxinum (4) 71:15
77:23,24 111:21
mciver (7) 10:4 62:8
161:5,7,16 167:4 176:23
mcquellan (1) 119:25
meal (1) 48:22
mean (3) 109:23 144:4 165:3
meaning (2) 97:6 167:3
meaningful (3) 30:13 117:6
180:12
means (4) 2:24 95:7 135:23
137:23
meant (8) 7:20 14:22 34:5
102:11 108:19 156:22
170:10 171:20
measure (3) 16:14 144:8
165:3
measures (7) 103:13 140:12
143:3,4,5 144:14 167:23
mechanism (1) 124:21
mechanisms (1) 119:3
media (14) 60:12,14
76:13,19 80:9 82:16 84:3
85:9 88:16 90:25 91:11
99:23 105:24 137:4
medical (14) 20:11
21:17,21,23 22:7,16
24:6,22 57:3,14,18 90:24
116:4 125:5
medics (1) 116:5
meet (14) 22:23 41:5,12,18
42:2 56:20 58:17,25 96:11
99:5 108:20 124:9,11
167:11
meetings (3) 36:24 85:25
134:13
megan (13) 10:2 12:21 13:2
38:13,15 48:6,15,21 49:10
50:7,9 54:17,24
megans (3) 48:7,20 49:14
member (16) 5:25 32:11
51:1,10,12 52:17 57:2
86:20 87:14 93:21 138:21
168:25 169:4,6,7 174:11
members (34) 10:19
23:11,15 26:5 42:1 59:16
88:16 92:9 116:4 125:18
138:24 139:21 145:21
151:2,7,17,19 153:19
161:23 162:9 163:23
167:11,14 169:16 171:7
172:9 175:15 176:3
177:3,7,13 179:3,14,21

memorable (1) 49:22
memorials (2) 65:2 68:21
memories (3) 11:3 122:2
162:18
men (7) 34:5 35:19 78:14
89:8,12 100:18 102:25
mention (2) 80:11 106:11
mentioned (5) 78:9 105:24
116:13 169:6 176:13
mentioning (1) 48:6
menu (2) 166:22,24
merchandise (1) 37:23
merchant (1) 168:21
mercifully (2) 47:23 50:6
mere (4) 66:3 69:22 114:13
144:3
merit (1) 52:10
message (5) 66:22 70:15
88:3 166:8 174:22
messages (2) 61:8 170:1
messaging (1) 31:4
met (7) 31:13 47:21 58:10
92:1 109:19 120:21 161:21
metal (7) 15:19,20 17:14,18
18:3,11 49:12
methane (1) 31:4
method (1) 21:5
methodologies (1) 166:3
metres (2) 147:17 171:5
mezzanine (3) 145:25
147:17 152:13
mi5 (29) 59:14 60:19 76:25
81:11 82:25 83:4 84:3
85:20,22 92:17 94:8
96:21,23 97:7,10,12,16
98:18 107:1 110:16 111:16
127:23 128:7,12,17 131:1
135:15,18 174:16
mifs (2) 128:16 129:7
mi6 (9) 83:2,2,6,7,19,20
86:25 98:21 107:1
mifs (1) 87:5
michael (1) 48:20
michelle (2) 121:9 124:8
michelles (1) 124:13
mid2015 (1) 174:4
middle (1) 180:25
midday (2) 44:1 135:2
might (42) 2:5 3:25 5:24
15:1 20:25 26:16 30:11
34:9 44:9 45:20 49:5 66:19
70:13 72:4 81:20 82:25,25
83:7,11 86:14,17 87:2
89:16 92:12 95:12
102:11,18,21 103:1,18
106:23,24 107:1,8
113:12,16 133:19 154:4
157:6 159:4 180:3,14
mike (5) 48:25 49:8,14,17
50:8
mikes (2) 49:3,6
mildly (1) 134:13
militant (1) 90:3
military (2) 39:21,23
militia (2) 91:3,10
miltias (1) 90:3
millions (3) 100:13 165:10,13
mind (4) 21:20 28:21 35:6
122:16
minds (1) 169:24
mindset (2) 45:5 110:20
minimised (1) 118:22
minimum (3) 2:20 99:4
108:20
minister (4) 89:15 100:15
164:20 169:22
minutes (21) 13:1
16:17,17,21 17:3 21:2
23:19,21 24:16,17 30:14
55:10 58:15,19,23 63:8
93:22 115:15 139:20
154:14 169:7
misdirected (1) 30:10
misery (2) 123:22 141:8
misgivings (1) 72:23
misjudgements (1) 45:21

misread (1) 58:20
miss (2) 104:24 145:20
missed (11) 82:11 112:5
128:17 130:5,7 137:5
139:5 163:21 169:13
172:18 176:2
missing (1) 101:18
mistake (1) 170:20
mistaken (1) 162:2
mistakes (11) 45:20 163:21
176:17,19 177:15,16,22
178:6,8,10 179:1
misunderstood (1) 54:10
mitigate (6) 47:10 72:3,4
142:14 144:19 166:4
mitigated (2) 118:22 150:5
mitigation (1) 118:18
mobile (2) 50:3 79:14
mobilise (1) 117:13
model (2) 13:17 31:2
modern (3) 64:23 68:17
100:4
modest (1) 55:7
modicum (1) 179:14
mohammed (6) 51:11,15
52:13 84:13 92:22 93:8
moment (10) 21:5 19:25
21:13 42:4 57:24 73:9
92:14 107:17 121:12
125:11
moments (5) 15:11 18:4
56:23 68:3 125:18
monday (2) 1:1 161:6
monetary (1) 100:12
money (1) 35:19
monitor (2) 151:21 175:19
monitored (2) 36:10 40:24
monitoring (7) 82:7 129:10
135:17 136:23 137:3
151:18
month (2) 93:4 94:18
months (14) 8:25 13:24 20:9
33:23 39:7 84:4 93:4
128:12 163:19 164:12,15
169:23 171:16 172:14
moore (3) 38:12,14,17
more (38) 1:23 3:2 4:8 5:1
14:20 20:14 33:13 36:13
38:16 45:9 46:22 55:22,25
57:3 75:10 94:17 102:15
104:15 105:6 107:8 113:12
121:21 127:6 130:4 133:10
136:24 139:1 150:3 152:22
154:15 158:8,21 165:5,5
167:8 171:22 175:16
179:19
moreover (1) 141:3
morning (26) 1:4 9:10 34:4
77:9 78:9 79:25 95:9 99:1
116:13 122:17,20 126:14
128:1 130:15 131:18
132:17 133:15 136:7 138:9
150:18 151:14 153:6
154:13 155:25 159:9 173:8
mosaic (8) 101:5,5,8,14
102:12 104:5 109:20 134:4
most (27) 8:12 15:11 20:10
25:24 29:7 31:7,8 37:2
42:1 58:17,24 66:7 70:1
71:21 77:16 81:21 82:6
95:5 98:15 107:5 115:5
126:18 158:3 159:8 167:18
168:13 175:23
mother (14) 13:2 37:13
41:12 42:11 45:23 56:7
65:17 69:11 73:5,7 87:21
120:10 121:3,10
mothers (1) 41:25
motion (1) 116:17
motivate (1) 36:22
motivated (2) 40:6 120:24
motivation (1) 131:23
move (4) 108:10 111:10
118:8 144:10
moved (4) 16:16 39:13 129:8
171:2

movements (2) 40:9 168:4
moving (5) 35:1 104:5
143:11 144:17,18
mp (1) 128:22
ms (1) 181:4
much (31) 2:15 4:12 6:21
7:10 11:4 19:8 28:19 46:11
47:19 51:9 55:13 64:10
65:20 69:14 74:3 81:20
101:4 102:15 105:6
109:3,23 119:10,15 120:7
126:14 143:9 170:18,19,20
178:20 180:15
muchloved (1) 120:15
muchmissed (1) 13:18
mullen (2) 66:16 70:10
multi (1) 157:25
multiagency (13) 27:4,7 31:1
149:19,20 155:19,21,24
157:15 158:2,8,10,13
multiple (5) 35:25 52:19
90:25 94:4 166:3
multisited (1) 164:10
mum (2) 77:19 113:13
murder (1) 175:7
murdered (3) 12:19 56:5
105:1
murderer (1) 59:8
murderers (2) 4:13 25:20
murderous (6) 14:17 32:4
33:23 36:21 39:2 123:18
murray (1) 45:23
muscle (1) 20:11
music (10) 13:14 32:22
47:16 48:1 64:6 112:19
120:5 121:6 124:3 141:16
musician (1) 62:2
must (27) 4:14 14:18 21:17
26:1 29:19 49:25 50:7
62:15 67:3 70:21 71:15,22
72:1,6,9,10,12 74:17,20
77:7 83:18 96:9,12 97:16
102:7,9 164:6
mustered (1) 18:8
N
n (1) 182:1
nacto (3) 165:18,24 169:22
naked (1) 16:8
name (6) 15:9 80:10,15,22
82:13,18
named (4) 84:12,18 97:2,15
namely (1) 135:1
names (6) 11:1 12:5 25:23
66:3 69:22 125:20
naming (1) 97:10
naomi (1) 19:21
narrative (1) 74:22
narrow (2) 97:3 141:1
nation (5) 22:14 25:4 43:11
52:6 56:18
national (33) 2:13 4:5,20
5:13,21,24 6:4,11,17,22
7:5 19:14 25:14 43:21
44:1,2 54:20 77:10 80:18
89:6 95:12,19 96:11,15
108:21 131:24 133:20
138:3 148:10 164:5 165:18
166:21 181:2
nations (1) 87:11
natural (1) 121:10
nature (4) 9:9 41:15 87:8
133:7
nbc (1) 94:3
ncp (1) 14:3
near (6) 17:21 67:18 71:10
74:7 88:6 104:24
nearly (1) 63:5
necessarily (1) 177:20
necessary (16) 2:11,21 4:24
72:13 75:22 96:10 99:4
108:20 116:18 126:5
140:12 143:22,22 145:8
147:3 159:10
need (25) 3:6 4:9 5:3 11:11
13:11 17:10 30:4,9,17

33:25 46:2 53:18,25
 57:9,10 66:19,20
 70:13,14 80:15 144:16
 159:3 174:14 178:16
 needed (4) 18:22 49:16
 158:3 159:7
 needs (7) 22:23 23:9 37:2,3
 39:4 57:3 156:7
 neighbour (1) 88:6
 neither (7) 12:12 24:20
 59:17 98:23 138:20 151:24
 174:11
 nell (5) 10:2 55:2,2,2,11
 net (1) 47:3
 network (1) 94:3
 neutralise (1) 50:18
 neutralised (1) 33:18
 never (9) 11:5 26:11 45:22
 58:4 60:9 64:4 161:21,21
 165:16
 nevertheless (2) 177:14
 178:11
 news (3) 84:20 88:1 94:15
 newsbeat (1) 89:10
 newsnight (1) 91:6
 newspaper (1) 84:5
 next (4) 8:25 16:20 32:2
 112:9
 nick (1) 55:4
 niece (1) 31:12
 night (22) 10:19 13:7 14:17
 26:4,11 32:17 50:21 53:10
 60:5 72:18 75:18 77:18
 112:10 124:7 146:10 150:9
 151:13 152:24 154:22
 170:8 178:7 179:10
 nighttime (1) 166:23
 noise (1) 32:5
 nonactivation (2) 158:10,12
 noncritical (1) 8:18
 none (5) 67:17,19 71:9,11,13
 nonsia (1) 150:15
 nor (3) 138:20 164:2 174:11
 normal (3) 48:9 104:20 167:8
 normality (3) 30:23 165:14
 167:7
 north (10) 16:22 23:2,25
 29:15,22 94:10 121:14
 154:8 158:20 181:4
 northern (1) 57:2
 northwest (1) 148:12
 note (5) 54:3 92:4 104:22
 140:14 142:9
 noted (12) 38:23 56:12
 65:5,16 66:20 68:24 69:10
 70:14 120:24 128:10,16
 146:7
 nothing (17) 10:11,20 17:11
 34:4,7 48:25 51:4,4,16
 57:5,15 58:8 85:16 91:23
 121:15 167:7 168:24
 notice (1) 171:10
 noticed (2) 110:22 169:1
 notified (2) 24:15,16
 noting (1) 144:2
 notorious (1) 91:14
 november (10) 61:6 78:15
 89:10 90:22 92:9 112:18
 127:20 128:20 144:9
 174:17
 nowhere (2) 32:8 110:1
 number (26) 13:21 16:22
 25:25 32:12 43:10 49:22
 51:6 59:6 65:8,19 69:2,13
 103:21,23 126:23 140:14
 145:1 165:4 167:25 171:14
 173:5,8 174:4 177:6
 178:3,5
 numbers (1) 69:22
 numerous (5) 39:20 50:15
 139:21 172:18 176:2
 nurse (1) 49:20
 nurses (1) 115:10
 nuts (2) 48:17 50:10
 nwas (5) 23:3 115:14 116:2
 117:24 154:11

O
 obfuscation (1) 118:16
 objection (1) 97:23
 objective (3) 8:8,8 107:19
 obliged (1) 111:19
 oblivious (1) 56:24
 observation (2) 72:14 144:3
 observations (5) 9:10 34:4
 61:21 131:17 159:9
 observed (2) 129:19 134:11
 observes (1) 138:19
 obsessive (1) 72:24
 obtain (2) 107:22 108:7
 obtained (2) 107:15,18
 obvious (9) 42:2,23 58:17,24
 107:16 112:21 115:6 139:1
 143:13
 obviously (5) 41:22 90:20
 94:24 140:1 145:22
 occasion (2) 96:1 131:13
 occasioned (1) 153:11
 occasions (10) 26:1,8 35:25
 59:6 92:19 128:11 130:7
 134:6 173:6 174:4
 occur (3) 7:3 68:2 110:18
 occurred (8) 27:21 112:4
 123:25 138:1 164:12 172:3
 178:2 179:6
 occurring (1) 150:15
 oconnor (1) 180:21
 october (1) 58:12
 odonnell (1) 13:21
 offduty (3) 49:20 115:10
 116:5
 offences (9) 78:19 80:22
 82:6 84:15 87:15 93:11
 102:23,25 134:8
 offer (1) 177:14
 offered (1) 51:23
 offers (1) 174:25
 office (6) 37:18,20 105:12
 136:8 148:10 165:19
 officer (16) 15:22 23:22
 38:11 49:3 62:8,14 86:24
 106:7 116:14 147:9,15,21
 156:25 157:2 164:18
 171:19
 officers (20) 17:6 57:6 62:16
 88:22,24 115:9 116:5
 117:4 118:6 147:5,8,12,13
 156:20 170:24
 171:3,9,14,15 177:6
 offices (1) 165:12
 official (5) 25:7 66:5 69:24
 84:23 97:16
 officially (1) 147:2
 officials (1) 94:4
 often (3) 34:6 101:15 114:17
 okay (1) 119:15
 older (3) 48:7 103:9 167:9
 Olivia (8) 65:17,18 69:11,12
 73:5 120:23 121:6 124:2
 ollie (2) 65:18 69:12
 omission (2) 81:5 82:12
 omissions (2) 80:13 127:16
 omitted (1) 80:16
 once (3) 39:12 51:3 117:4
 ones (28) 10:10 23:16 28:14
 32:15 42:3 45:19 63:19
 64:5,7 65:11 66:2 69:5,21
 71:18 95:18 122:3 124:22
 125:14,21 126:18 147:21
 152:25 153:1 161:24
 163:15 167:16 176:15
 179:12
 onesizefitsall (1) 46:7
 ongoing (3) 8:1 54:13 139:19
 onwards (2) 103:14 174:4
 opaque (1) 96:20
 open (28) 1:23 2:16,16,19
 3:8 4:4 5:14 7:3,9 9:8
 61:18 72:8 76:11,23 83:13
 88:3 95:25 96:2,5
 98:8,17,20 99:3 100:22
 104:12 105:9,14 174:16

opened (1) 86:2
 opening (50) 1:16 18 7:15
 8:17 9:20 14:8 16:9 48:8
 57:18 62:7 64:21 67:2
 70:20 72:19 73:17,20 74:2
 75:10 78:11 84:2 95:5
 97:18 98:2,15 105:21
 108:11 109:14 113:7
 116:24 118:5 119:22 120:2
 129:15 134:17 138:20
 142:9 148:23 154:4,12
 160:16 161:1,2 162:19,22
 179:4 182:3,5,7,9,11
 openings (1) 73:19
 openly (1) 79:6
 openness (2) 72:12 180:6
 operating (6) 47:9 60:4
 114:8 137:1 148:15 155:12
 operation (14) 27:1 28:5
 88:21,24 116:12,20 138:16
 139:17 145:16 148:8
 150:12 155:14 156:7
 158:19
 operational (6) 111:23 112:6
 113:4 118:25 148:5 159:1
 operationally (2) 2:23 3:4
 operations (1) 27:4
 operatives (1) 90:7
 operator (2) 114:15 141:24
 operators (1) 75:19
 opined (1) 20:13
 opinion (1) 20:1
 opinions (5) 67:11 71:4
 72:22 76:3 143:17
 opportunities (9) 50:17
 112:5 130:5,7 137:6
 163:21 169:13 172:18
 176:2
 opportunity (6) 82:12 121:1
 122:6 128:17 138:23 139:5
 opposite (3) 95:17,20 96:17
 options (3) 166:21,22,25
 oral (4) 1:5 51:14 122:15
 162:7
 order (5) 12:6 31:25 73:12
 93:22 115:20
 ordered (1) 103:25
 ordering (1) 110:7
 orders (2) 89:3,5
 ordinary (3) 96:4 116:2 165:8
 organisation (6) 10:16 83:17
 142:18 149:21 167:1
 173:13
 organisational (1) 52:5
 organisations (9) 9:19
 11:13,18 28:17 80:24
 146:16 156:4 163:5 170:2
 organised (1) 75:21
 organiser (1) 22:6
 organisers (1) 21:17
 organises (1) 42:20
 osama (1) 88:11
 others (55) 10:4 11:25 24:5
 26:16 31:21 33:17 34:18
 38:12 41:15 42:24 44:10
 46:15 47:5,20 51:24 56:9
 57:22 73:11,23 82:5
 83:23,24 84:18 86:23
 92:25 94:25 107:10 109:17
 113:11 116:22 118:14
 120:25 122:23,25 123:5
 124:6,10 125:19 127:17
 131:19 132:7 135:10,24
 143:19 151:22 153:3,9
 155:13 156:21 158:22
 166:7 167:10 170:14
 172:21 177:25
 otherwise (5) 18:23 34:21
 35:4 55:21 90:25
 ought (6) 55:23 110:16
 136:6,15,25 179:25
 outdated (2) 66:6 69:25
 outer (1) 61:25
 outlets (1) 105:24
 outlined (3) 67:2 70:20 75:12
 outofdate (1) 146:24

outrage (14) 8:15 63:24 72:4
 73:22 77:24 85:15 90:10
 95:15 107:12 111:13 112:9
 113:24 115:8 118:23
 outrages (3) 83:11 105:8
 112:3
 outset (3) 65:10 69:3 122:6
 outside (7) 55:5 56:15
 139:15 141:20 167:19
 175:22 176:9
 outstanding (2) 149:5,9
 outwith (1) 99:19
 overready (1) 114:24
 over (19) 8:25 11:9 12:25
 15:2 16:4 17:25 28:11
 30:13 50:10 60:1 87:1
 90:10 103:25 152:6 163:19
 171:9 172:13 179:6,23
 overall (4) 29:10 45:1 63:12
 117:9
 overbearing (1) 95:19
 overlook (1) 113:25
 overlooked (1) 59:8
 overrides (1) 74:15
 overriding (1) 172:20
 oversight (1) 170:19
 overstretched (1) 157:3
 overwhelmed (4) 116:14,17
 157:1,6
 own (14) 10:25 23:16 50:5
 58:1 75:4 83:4 101:18,23
 102:12,18,23 109:23
 115:11 177:8
 owner (1) 141:24
 ownership (1) 143:10
 oximeter (1) 16:14

P
 packed (1) 48:18
 packs (1) 159:12
 pads (1) 117:21
 paediatrics (1) 37:14
 pages (1) 106:10
 pain (3) 49:24 179:15,18
 painfully (1) 159:8
 painstaking (1) 7:18
 painted (1) 109:24
 pakistan (1) 88:11
 palace (1) 165:22
 palpably (3) 23:20 26:12
 28:23
 pandemic (2) 7:19 9:14
 panic (2) 33:4,12
 papers (2) 88:17 89:2
 paradise (1) 61:10
 paragraph (1) 81:12
 paralysed (2) 78:12 91:5
 paramedic (7) 15:14,16
 23:3,18 38:22 115:14
 154:13
 paramedics (3) 57:10 63:10
 177:7
 paramount (1) 109:20
 parent (3) 38:15 42:19 49:8
 parents (11) 40:15,24 42:24
 48:20 56:8,20 57:24 58:6
 120:3 167:9 179:12
 paris (4) 92:8 105:20 144:9
 164:10
 park (2) 14:3 111:7
 parked (1) 14:4
 parker (1) 174:15
 parliament (7) 6:14 67:16
 71:8 95:23 108:18 128:21
 164:21
 part (18) 7:8 11:20 12:17
 30:21 91:2 92:2 94:9 99:7
 101:2 119:1 138:10 143:1
 146:10 151:1 159:21
 167:5,14 174:23
 partial (2) 20:10 96:20
 participants (15) 3:5,18 67:9
 71:2 72:21 73:20 75:2
 123:9 149:24 163:19 164:3
 179:5 180:2,5,8
 participate (1) 77:16

participation (6) 9:6,23
 61:20 65:24 69:18 109:1
 particular (32) 21:21 30:6
 44:20,24 46:10 54:23
 73:19 79:19 83:19 110:9
 127:14 128:7 132:3 135:7
 136:1 141:20 142:7 147:6
 153:6 154:23 156:24
 158:5,17 169:19 170:10
 172:4,8 173:10 176:7,25
 178:14 180:19
 particularly (17) 4:10
 18:13,21 27:6 30:11 46:14
 54:18 55:11 130:21 133:11
 142:14 157:10 164:4
 166:22 173:7 177:16,24
 partner (6) 13:19 32:23
 58:11 62:10 161:4,16
 parts (4) 2:17 85:13 96:13
 121:13
 party (1) 42:9
 pass (3) 33:17 116:22 150:21
 passage (3) 51:20 52:13
 178:12
 passed (1) 94:21
 passersby (2) 73:25 115:9
 passing (4) 37:19 57:2
 113:11 145:23
 passionate (1) 45:24
 passive (1) 149:24
 past (2) 163:19 179:17
 pat (2) 56:19 58:5
 path (2) 138:7 173:3
 pathetic (1) 17:7
 pathologist (2) 19:22 20:13
 pathologists (2) 65:9 69:3
 pathology (3) 19:16 71:20
 125:1
 patiently (1) 179:21
 patients (1) 23:12
 patrician (2) 66:6 69:25
 patrick (2) 23:2 38:22
 patrol (2) 171:4,15
 patrolled (1) 113:3
 patrolling (1) 147:9
 patrols (1) 165:4
 patrycja (2) 56:8,12
 pattem (1) 101:19
 paul (11) 62:10 161:3,4,17
 163:9,9 167:13,13 176:22
 178:23,23
 pauls (1) 161:17
 pause (1) 68:2
 paying (1) 33:1
 payments (1) 100:13
 payer (1) 119:24
 pc (8) 33:9 37:4 38:11,14,17
 151:3 168:23 171:18
 pcsos (1) 171:16
 pedestrians (1) 164:17
 pen (23) 28:20 31:14 42:10
 47:14 58:2 64:23 65:11,20
 66:10,11,17,23 68:17
 69:5,14 70:4,5,11,16 72:15
 78:4 109:11 121:20
 28:15,19,23 31:20,21
 32:13 33:6,15 38:17 41:19
 42:11,22,25 44:7,19 47:4
 49:12 50:19 53:24 73:14
 80:24 87:24 93:24 100:7
 105:1 114:9 152:6,25
 162:14 163:24 164:15
 165:8,10 166:5 174:24
 176:15 179:11
 perfection (1) 137:14
 perfectly (4) 35:1 54:8,12
 56:1
 performance (5) 71:25 72:20
 116:8 120:5 130:23
 performances (1) 30:18
 performing (1) 41:10
 perhaps (17) 7:18 19:25

22:16 30:10 35:1 45:21
 52:6 53:22 63:22 107:8
 130:2 135:7 152:15 153:8
 172:14 178:12 179:7
 perimeter (6) 144:1,7,17,18
 150:22 152:19
 period (8) 24:22 28:11 86:1
 117:16 132:21 152:7
 168:18 173:21
 periods (1) 147:9
 periphery (2) 129:6 133:22
 permitted (3) 36:14 96:6
 130:18
 peroxide (4) 93:22 104:17
 105:19 136:19
 perpetrate (1) 63:23
 perpetrated (2) 25:9 92:9
 perpetrator (1) 108:8
 perpetrators (1) 3:23
 person (8) 9:15 10:16 47:19
 65:19 69:13 78:8 174:6
 179:8
 personal (2) 51:24 77:1
 personally (1) 111:13
 personborne (4) 142:7,15
 143:3 151:10
 personnel (6) 16:23 23:4
 33:10 45:9 57:3 115:9
 persons (7) 103:24 123:13
 126:12 132:23 136:12
 139:11 152:13
 pertinent (1) 158:10
 perverted (1) 39:2
 phenomenon (2) 64:23 68:17
 phil (1) 73:7
 philip (3) 57:1 66:16 70:10
 phone (7) 50:3 53:21 61:5
 79:15 86:7 110:12 135:24
 photo (3) 88:2 91:14,18
 photographed (1) 33:2
 photos (1) 91:8
 physical (2) 75:17 76:1
 pick (3) 104:6 161:14,17
 picked (2) 42:24 172:19
 picking (1) 74:15
 picture (2) 103:11 109:25
 piece (6) 16:13 17:12 18:9
 19:9 101:17,18
 pieces (7) 103:17 109:22,24
 111:17 133:18 134:1,2
 piecing (1) 101:21
 pillar (1) 174:19
 pillow (1) 33:9
 piste (1) 99:18
 pitted (1) 50:9
 place (25) 9:12 10:6,7 14:15
 22:22 27:16 30:25 37:14
 41:19 42:2 46:6 47:11 67:5
 70:23 114:21 124:16
 128:17 139:24 140:3
 142:14 145:6 151:1 152:23
 155:6 166:19
 placed (8) 9:14 33:15 34:19
 36:15 41:24 89:2 147:20
 170:5
 places (6) 46:23 47:9 75:21
 139:7 166:23 169:20
 placing (2) 93:22 117:3
 plainly (2) 108:18 113:6
 plan (9) 36:23 46:8 47:11,12
 148:21 149:6,11 157:22
 158:1
 planned (7) 35:24 36:2,4
 47:17 128:14 153:10
 172:13
 planners (1) 143:18
 planning (14) 55:24 71:24
 114:22 142:2 143:22
 146:12,22,23 147:25
 148:3,5 155:2 157:19
 178:1
 plans (10) 114:12 120:5,6
 142:13 146:25 153:12
 156:24 157:25 158:11
 166:21
 plato (4) 27:1 116:20 155:14

158:19
 play (1) 119:1
 played (1) 11:20
 playing (2) 30:13 62:2
 please (8) 1:11 9:16 23:23
 64:11 68:3,14 119:12
 160:15
 plot (5) 75:14 84:16 104:4
 106:21 111:10
 plots (1) 105:15
 plotters (1) 102:10
 plotting (2) 83:11 94:10
 plural (1) 80:4
 pm (14) 119:16,18 160:19,21
 161:6 163:13 168:5,6,24
 169:3 181:1,3,5,10
 poignant (2) 31:8 37:2
 poignantly (1) 27:16
 points (7) 27:18 41:2 54:21
 112:13 128:23 129:16
 156:14
 police (72) 3:19,22 6:9 15:21
 17:6 19:13 23:16,22
 26:4,25 28:4 29:8,9 33:22
 38:11 47:2 49:3,15 55:22
 57:6 59:14 62:8,13,16
 63:11 79:11 81:15 83:4
 85:1 87:16 88:9 93:15,25
 108:4 114:15 115:8,18
 116:2,5,12,23 117:24
 127:17,24 129:25 132:6,23
 135:9,15,18 136:9 147:1,4
 156:1,19 157:20,21 158:6
 164:18 165:5,23
 170:23,24,25 171:6,16,17
 174:24 177:6 180:24 181:1
 policies (1) 148:13
 policies (4) 111:21 114:25
 148:3 154:16
 policing (7) 146:18,19,20
 165:1 171:1,20 181:2
 policy (6) 97:10,12,17 114:1
 117:2 118:24
 policymakers (2) 105:12,17
 political (1) 94:11
 politicians (2) 165:7 176:3
 poor (2) 24:18 63:17
 poorly (1) 29:10
 pop (3) 167:9,12 179:12
 popular (1) 131:15
 populated (1) 117:4
 port (5) 60:25 86:4 90:21
 103:8 137:1
 portrait (9) 31:15 42:10 58:2
 66:11,17 70:5,11 72:16
 78:5
 portraits (14) 28:20 47:14
 64:23 65:12,20 66:10,23
 68:17 69:5,14 70:5,16
 109:11 121:20
 ports (2) 110:17 128:18
 pose (1) 89:17
 posed (2) 164:7 170:6
 position (11) 2:3,14 4:23 6:1
 76:11,22 77:14 116:23
 125:10 147:16 163:12
 positioned (2) 17:18 147:18
 positioning (1) 45:11
 positions (2) 125:9 180:2
 positive (4) 49:8 72:15
 118:19 160:10
 possible (17) 2:15 4:16,18
 5:6,19 7:4,5 8:5 20:23,25
 55:14 61:17 75:23 111:22
 115:1 123:3 125:22
 possibly (

pounds (1) 100:13
powerful (2) 66:12 70:6
powers (6) 36:11 46:11
pfe (1) 152:12
practicable (1) 108:17
practical (4) 7:21 103:13
141:15 143:12
practice (4) 46:21 127:11
147:16 153:13
practices (1) 148:3
prealered (1) 20:24
precarioisly (1) 15:25
precautionary (1) 165:3
precautions (2) 119:3 152:2
preceding (3) 173:21 175:17
178:4
precise (1) 24:25
precisely (2) 25:9 109:10
precursor (5) 92:6 104:9,16
110:3 136:10
predicated (1) 114:23
predictable (1) 111:22
preegress (1) 151:25
preliminary (3) 65:1 68:20
106:5
premises (3) 46:22 103:14
166:25
preparation (4) 71:25 132:22
142:3 147:25
preparations (2) 123:2 148:3
prepare (1) 40:20
prepared (4) 20:22 25:19
97:12 153:10
preparedness (3) 43:4
114:23 153:15
preparing (2) 11:10 111:9
presciently (1) 23:22
presence (5) 9:17 33:14
147:23 168:22 171:17
present (11) 3:10,17 20:9
23:4 24:4 37:11 45:10
76:21 139:18 147:13 151:3
presentation (1) 7:21
presented (2) 27:8 175:14
presently (1) 59:13
presents (1) 13:23
reshadowed (1) 129:1
press (4) 2:7,17,19 3:10
pressed (1) 77:24
pressingly (1) 54:17
pressure (1) 117:21
presumably (1) 83:20
presumes (1) 52:24
prevalence (2) 92:23 105:7
prevarication (1) 118:16
prevent (24) 2:12 4:6 30:22
47:2 54:21 59:9,11,17
74:14 75:1 107:11
110:10,19 111:24 112:2,5
113:23 135:12 138:16,22
156:25 169:13 174:12,18
preventability (9) 1:21 4:3
59:5 95:6 98:16 105:22
108:11 109:21 130:20
preventable (3) 127:9,13
175:25
prevented (21) 3:25 53:14
75:18 76:8 85:15 108:24
110:4 111:15 112:8,10
118:21,23 126:19 127:2,10
137:19 139:13 150:5
172:11,22 175:23
preventing (1) 55:23
prevention (2) 95:14 175:11
prevents (1) 95:20
previous (9) 24:1 27:6 62:24
67:4,11 70:22 71:4 80:8
173:5
previously (3) 4:1 175:6
176:13
price (7) 62:10 161:4,17
163:9 167:13 176:22
178:23
pride (1) 11:2
primarily (2) 29:4 75:16

primary (5) 26:14 44:4 112:2
163:8 171:24
prime (5) 100:15 116:3
131:23 164:20 169:22
principally (1) 20:2
principle (3) 72:11 97:23
99:3
principles (7) 31:2 75:8
117:12 155:9,12,16,18
prior (9) 54:21 76:14 79:13
84:4,24 94:6 148:2 164:13
175:18
priorities (2) 38:24 166:6
prioritise (1) 9:16
prioritised (1) 134:21
priority (4) 49:6 129:4 135:1
170:15
prison (9) 33:22 35:25
36:4,24 79:15 80:1,2
102:15 135:18
prisoner (12) 80:10,16,22,23
81:11,14,16,22,22,23 82:3
132:15
prisoners (4) 82:1
135:18,20,23
prisons (1) 173:20
privacy (1) 80:17
private (6) 4:3,15,16 45:9
114:3 165:24
privately (1) 76:20
privilege (1) 119:23
proactive (2) 158:13,21
proactively (2) 151:15
166:18
probably (2) 7:25 60:16
problem (9) 68:5,16
77:5,5,10,11 83:6 174:21
175:1
problems (2) 95:24 115:4
procedure (1) 6:5
procedures (10) 2:24,25 21:8
46:5 127:11 136:8 142:13
153:23 168:14 170:11
proceedings (2) 2:8 14:12
process (41) 8:1,7 12:17
34:24 65:12,23 66:2,4
68:23 69:6,17,21,23
71:15,22 72:8 82:4,18 95:3
96:4,25 98:8 99:6 101:21
118:17 122:9 123:16 126:8
131:9,25 134:20 135:4
137:8,10,20 138:4 141:13
142:17 148:5 149:16
157:13
processes (3) 65:21 69:15
127:15
procured (1) 107:5
procurement (1) 110:3
produced (1) 128:22
product (2) 66:4 69:23
professionalism (2) 26:6
153:21
profile (1) 168:9
profit (1) 170:20
programme (8) 59:17 89:11
110:19,21 144:25
174:12,24 180:17
programmes (2) 145:1,5
progress (2) 7:17 95:21
prois (4) 86:7 92:18 103:5,10
prois (2) 79:7 133:17
project (5) 145:2,2 149:8
166:15,16
promise (3) 121:4,22 171:14
prompted (4) 65:3 68:22
102:19 103:12
prompting (1) 89:3
proper (6) 49:12 56:1 72:17
85:10 107:24 164:7
property (11) 12:14 43:20
45:10 49:5 75:6 131:20
140:10 145:15 155:16
158:24 177:25
property (1) 93:3
proposals (1) 30:25
proposes (2) 46:5,24

propriety (1) 99:16
prosecuting (3) 106:12,24
108:5
prosecution (1) 107:1
protect (14) 4:19 8:1 34:1
41:25 42:17 60:7 75:4 89:6
95:19 111:21 137:15 140:9
165:1 176:8
protected (3) 14:14 80:24
140:4
protecting (7) 6:19 25:5,6
34:2 46:2 96:11 108:21
protection (8) 18:6 22:4 28:7
46:18 47:4 49:15 74:20
137:24
protective (4) 9:8 46:20
148:20 165:25
protectors (1) 58:6
protects (1) 95:20
protocols (1) 21:8
proud (3) 56:8 62:12 160:1
proved (1) 68:9
proves (1) 149:10
provide (23) 18:2 21:10,17
22:10 34:9 42:17 46:18
47:3 55:13 60:12 83:8
90:23 96:3 111:19 114:1
130:22 137:2,24 142:1
148:16 171:1,17 180:11
provided (21) 76:20
26:21 29:7 43:24 53:13
66:12 70:6 118:3 121:20
141:24 145:20 146:4,15
148:9,25 149:10 162:20
165:19 169:22 170:23
providers (2) 42:21 148:1
providing (3) 24:21 95:22
149:13
province (1) 19:7
provision (15) 5:15
18:12,14,17 19:13
21:17,18,21 22:8,16 35:19
45:14 114:6 144:23 145:10
provisional (2) 81:22 82:2
provisions (2) 86:6 108:16
prowess (1) 60:4
proximity (1) 12:9
psia (3) 148:20 149:5,15
psychological (1) 26:10
public (83) 2:7,10,16,18
3:8,14,18 4:7,19
6:2,10,18,19,20 7:8 10:19
23:15 26:5 28:7 32:11
34:12,19 40:14 46:2,6,19
50:24 51:10,12 52:17 60:5
66:8 70:2 71:25 72:6,7
75:9,20 76:13,19 77:15
80:6 85:17 95:17,18,25
96:1 99:7,15,23 100:13
101:16 108:18,25 109:15
112:15 114:2 116:4 126:16
130:12 137:21,22 139:22
140:14,16 145:21 146:15
151:7 160:9 161:24
163:5,23 164:23 165:3
169:1 176:3,6,7 177:7,11
178:17 179:5,14
publicity (1) 176:9
publicly (8) 3:1 34:7 85:12
86:24 95:13 97:15 173:25
175:2
published (6) 65:1 68:20
80:12 84:5,16 178:14
pull (2) 72:1 74:11
pulse (1) 16:14
punches (2) 72:1 74:11
purchase (6) 36:6 103:14
105:9,12 136:4,10
purchased (1) 107:7
purchases (2) 136:16,18
pure (1) 49:7
purple (1) 21:16
purpose (9) 9:20 14:7 44:20
53:10,14 122:11 123:12
126:11 150:12
purposes (5) 35:20 67:17

71:9 102:8 106:25
pursue (1) 122:25
push (1) 15:7
puts (3) 15:6 45:25 58:7
putting (9) 43:12 102:12
103:10 124:15 131:24
132:5 133:2 135:7 170:20
puzzle (1) 101:19
Q
qaeda (8) 83:16 87:12,23
88:9 89:19,22 91:20 93:9
qaedas (1) 88:12
qc (1) 128:22
qualifications (1) 21:25
quality (1) 19:11
quantified (1) 134:3
quantities (2) 105:10,13
quantity (1) 19:24
question (29) 8:10 14:18
22:25 25:18,22 28:20 31:9
39:3 44:4 45:16 57:12,16
59:5 60:10 61:13 63:22
75:16,19,23 90:9 92:15
108:12 123:17,25 124:18
130:9 145:5 156:3 163:17
questioned (2) 86:4,6
questions (68) 5:24 6:3 9:22
13:12 20:19 29:3 31:7
41:23 43:10 56:3 61:17
62:6 64:3 67:3 70:21
75:13,25 76:17 85:7,14
105:9 113:18 115:13 118:4
119:7 127:15 130:19
132:4,9,14 133:6,21
134:16 135:11 139:1,2
141:22 142:4,12,15,20
143:1,7,10,11 144:20
146:16 147:5 148:22 149:3
150:7 153:22 154:5,23
156:18 157:7,14,19
158:4,13 159:6,10,16
163:2,8 168:1,13 179:23
queue (3) 15:19,21 18:3
rebel (1) 90:24
quick (2) 118:12 154:11
quicker (1) 30:5
quickly (7) 14:16 21:10 40:7
57:19 58:3 116:14,16
quite (8) 12:14 53:25 57:22
58:3 103:21 124:1 158:24
177:24
quoted (3) 81:15 84:20,23
quoting (1) 57:10
R
radicalisation (8) 40:19,23
90:15 110:14 132:7 138:8
172:16,24
radicalised (7) 39:3 40:12
84:22 85:2 86:18 89:17
103:20
radicalising (1) 40:16
radio (4) 52:16 53:1 54:3
157:15
radios (2) 52:12 53:7
radius (2) 84:7 92:24
rail (2) 23:17 57:2
raise (3) 13:8 97:25 105:16
raised (15) 85:14 92:23
106:2 113:2 126:23 133:16
143:2,7 144:20 145:2,4
150:7 156:15 157:14 159:6
raises (9) 52:10 132:14 133:6
134:15 142:12,15,20
154:23 168:12
raising (3) 74:12 102:16
118:3
ramadan (11) 79:2 83:14
86:18 87:13 88:2 90:19,20
91:1,13,18,23
ran (1) 89:11
random (2) 32:3 41:15
range (1) 19:12
ranging (1) 19:12
rank (2) 26:3 62:22

raphael (4) 84:18,24 85:2
93:22
rapid (1) 39:18
rarely (1) 114:21
rate (1) 16:15
rather (14) 34:12 63:15 66:6
69:25 73:18 89:6 137:19
138:3 140:6 149:24
153:22,25 155:22 175:5
rational (2) 56:17 135:11
reached (1) 118:5
reaching (1) 75:3
react (1) 111:24
reaction (1) 63:15
read (5) 26:8 53:17 58:21
59:23 82:19
readily (1) 37:8
reading (1) 42:12
reads (1) 101:13
real (21) 66:11 70:5 71:14
82:11 95:23 97:11 101:9
111:24 112:4 118:18 119:8
137:5 153:9 154:5,25,25
155:21 156:12,12 164:23
175:24
realised (1) 171:22
realising (2) 48:24 49:6
realistically (1) 146:23
reality (3) 100:21 129:25
130:4
really (1) 145:25
rearest (1) 87:17
reason (8) 2:12 3:19 5:3
19:17 64:18 95:10 97:11
108:2
reasonable (3) 9:8 54:12
106:21
reasonably (2) 99:5 111:22
reasons (13) 3:7 6:10,16
22:15 54:13 56:1 107:16
109:6 134:24 141:18
154:19 158:11 176:14
reassure (1) 165:2
reassured (2) 9:9 30:9
rebel (1) 90:24
rebellion (1) 90:4
recall (4) 37:4 38:23 43:7
48:6
recalls (1) 15:15
recap (1) 98:10
reces (1) 113:1
receipt (2) 20:18 54:12
receive (1) 34:14
received (15) 33:1 39:16,23
51:25 52:9 53:7 67:7 70:25
76:3 92:17 106:17 132:12
135:2 166:15,17
receives (2) 131:11,12
recent (4) 40:9 85:12 104:15
105:8
recently (3) 7:24 37:13 59:10
recognise (7) 34:11 73:23
82:10 95:14,16 153:18
159:24
recognised (8) 10:22 72:9
75:7 95:3,23 136:10
176:18 178:11
recognising (3) 74:5 99:6
144:5
recognition (4) 72:20 160:8
178:24 180:11
recollection (1) 53:19
recommendations (4) 46:11
48:4 74:25 180:13
recommended (2) 165:25
166:24
recommending (2) 34:13
47:6
reconnaissance (7) 145:12
146:3,6 149:8 166:11,14
170:8
record (5) 4:23 11:12 100:19
156:2,4
recorded (2) 19:21 29:21
records (2) 26:5 94:1
recounts (1) 96:22

recovered (3) 39:20 48:14
93:14
recruitment (1) 61:3
recurrence (1) 74:15
redact (2) 35:4 80:18
redacted (4) 34:21 80:10,16
109:4
redaction (3) 80:25 81:5
82:12
redactions (3) 6:16 80:12
82:19
reduce (1) 30:23
reduced (2) 20:17 33:13
reducing (1) 150:12
refer (3) 43:18 123:7 174:24
reference (59) 65:16 67:4
69:10 70:22 74:17,18
80:9,21 81:5,17 82:20
99:20 101:4,5 107:24
122:13,21 123:15
124:19,19 125:10
126:19,24 127:1,1,10,14
129:2 130:19 131:22
132:1,2,5,20,20 133:2
135:8 136:13,14 138:6,7
139:14,25 140:1
141:3,23,23 146:14,14
147:24 149:25 153:5
155:23 162:5 167:17,20
171:25 172:10 177:18
references (2) 61:9 83:13
referral (7) 59:9,11,14 60:8
110:21 135:13 138:22
referred (26) 19:25 37:4
49:20 59:16,19 65:8 66:22
67:6 69:2 70:15,24 80:23
81:7 84:6 87:18 92:21 99:9
101:10 103:8 110:10 117:8
128:1 139:3,4 155:24
174:12
referring (2) 84:6 88:4
refers (1) 81:11
refrain (1) 29:13
refresh (1) 166:14
refresher (1) 145:9
refugee (1) 88:7
refused (1) 49:4
refuses (1) 165:16
regard (10) 85:17 115:11
125:12 126:25 134:23
136:8,13 142:10 143:24
156:24
regarding (11) 74:22 75:13
76:7 77:23 83:8 85:14
88:21 103:8 105:21 119:2
168:22
regards (1) 80:18
regime (6) 39:5 88:21
89:7,16 114:4 150:25
regional (1) 90:12
regul (3) 78:20 79:13 145:9
regularity (1) 145:13
regulation (3) 36:10 110:6
148:9
regulations (4) 104:23 105:6
111:20 114:14
regulatory (1) 114:1
reid (3) 104:13,25 105:17
reiterate (1) 111:12
relates (1) 2:24
relating (6) 74:19 83:9 93:11
167:18 173:9 174:8
relation (48) 55:14
124:17,25 125:14 127:5
128:5 129:7 131:2 132:4
134:7 135:10 136:9,16,18
138:17 141:5,21 142:6,24
143:7 145:11,12 146:2,20
147:4,12,24 148:8
149:6,18,25
150:4,10,16,23 151:8
152:8 156:15 157:21
163:2,16 164:5 167:23
170:17,22 175:3 176:25
178:22
relationship (7) 37:13 58:1

79:21,22 80:3 93:6 94:18
release (1) 101:16
released (1) 87:16
relevance (1) 178:14
relevant (17) 44:23,25 46:8
72:21 76:14 101:7 108:1
111:18 128:14 132:8
143:17 145:20 146:15
147:14 148:2 151:5 177:24
reliability (1) 92:4
reliable (1) 44:12
relief (2) 65:18 69:12
relies (1) 30:21
religious (1) 39:17
relocates (1) 144:17
rely (3) 11:18 28:8 112:3
remain (12) 12:10 29:4
60:11 74:10 129:21 95:8
98:5 130:13 141:9 154:5
164:23 169:8
remained (6) 13:2 30:13
32:11 50:12 126:4 167:2
remains (9) 16:20 57:17
98:14 121:16 130:24 131:7
166:2,8 176:13
remand (1) 81:23
remanded (1) 78:16
remarkable (1) 47:15
remarks (5) 1:9,16 66:22
70:16 182:3
remedied (1) 175:13
remember (3) 19:24 179:7,9
remembering (1) 166:1
remind (1) 99:25
remit (1) 99:19
remove (2) 108:22,25
removes (1) 77:14
render (1) 127:13
rendition (1) 100:7
rented (1) 111:6
repeat (5) 54:19 73:18 100:3
108:3,9
repeated (4) 165:9 177:23
178:7,11
repeatedly (1) 95:13
repetition (1) 131:14
replacement (1) 97:1
replication (1) 123:5
reply (3) 57:4 66:19 70:13
report (29) 6:16 7:9 20:22
52:21 65:4 68:20 93:24 79:1
80:10,12 81:12,14 84:20
85:13 89:21 90:14,18,25
92:16 101:13 110:23
117:10 128:23 133:24
151:5 169:5 175:7,8
reportable (2) 3:8,12
reported (20) 3:9,15 50:25
51:7 53:22 85:1 89:1 90:6
91:5,12,24 92:8 93:10,24
94:3,7,11,16 104:3 145:22
reporting (4) 23:6 53:15
110:6 174:3
reports (20) 52:17 67:6,11
70:24 71:4 79:9 81:1,6
82:13 91:11 92:4,15 94:23
95:1 118:3,7 136:15,20
146:9 175:2
representable (1) 100:6
represent (44) 8:2,7 9:21
10:24 11:8,23 12:6 18:12
21:15 25:18 27:3,9 30:17
31:7 33:16,25 35:7 44:5,25
45:19 48:3 60:10,13 61:12
62:14 120:1
122:1,11,22,24 125:3
129:24 131:8 153:9,20
162:10,24 169:16 171:8
172:9 175:15 177:3,14
179:3
representative (2) 5:22 10:5
representatives (3) 10:25
130:18 163:5
represented (1) 78:2
representing (3) 45:13 56:2
153:3

represents (5) 1:7 7:12
64:2,13 119:21
request (2) 34:22 35:3
requested (1) 80:13
requesting (1) 109:14
requests (3) 72:19 75:8
106:15
require (7) 22:11 23:24
34:18 40:11 51:2 96:2
99:14
required (4) 22:9 114:10
119:4 137:24
requirement (2) 8:20 47:12
requires (7) 65:23 69:17
95:15 97:2 101:1 108:14
131:10
requiring (2) 61:13 109:13
rescue (5) 29:14,22 63:4
154:19 158:16
resilience (4) 62:25 154:24
155:21 156:8
resource (1) 119:1
resources (16) 18:4 19:5
23:7 63:5 67:19 71:12
112:2 114:24 116:3,7
117:14,24 133:21,25
154:11 178:1
respect (14) 8:19 9:4 62:15
75:9,25 78:7 85:18 96:21
99:1 100:6 110:2 137:5
180:4,9
respectfully (7) 13:9 19:17
27:10 49:16 78:4 100:23
108:8
respects (2) 19:11 129:1
respond (1) 153:11
responded (3) 15:16 26:16
115:11
responders (10) 21:9 24:4
25:25 26:9 31:5 33:14 63:7
116:3,7 159:12
responding (8) 24:18 27:11
29:11 62:18 115:23 125:25
158:22 167:5
response (4) 5:11 24:12,22
27:15 30:22 72:18 74:6
75:21 76:1 114:17
115:7,20,21,22 116:10
118:6 153:5,16,25 154:10
155:3,11,22 156:22
158:2,7 159:2,18 160:1
164:19 165:6,14,15 170:7
176:10,17 177:1,5
178:15,16,23 179:25 180:3
responses (2) 115:3 178:9
responsibilities (6) 10:17
44:14,17 143:8,19 150:10
responsibility (13) 13:3 22:6
46:20 66:24 70:17 112:2
113:21 114:2 116:9 118:13
119:2 137:24 151:20
responsible (29) 18:5,15 22:3
23:5 25:5,15 41:23 42:21
43:14,24 44:6 63:11,19
95:15 111:13 113:5 140:8
146:17,19 149:22 151:18
152:20,21,24 166:5,6
169:24 170:15 176:5
resting (2) 66:24 70:17
restrict (1) 50:19
restricted (8) 2:20,22 3:6,7
34:22 72:10 95:22 108:16
restriction (1) 129:10
restrictions (7) 2:10 9:14
36:15 96:9 108:19 110:4
136:23
result (12) 4:8,9 7:2,19 9:13
20:15 26:10 34:13 53:6
56:5 92:20 138:22
resulted (1) 87:24
resulting (1) 91:16
resume (3) 64:11 119:13
181:7
resuscitation (1) 20:17
rethink (2) 82:16 98:9
retrieve (1) 111:7

retrieved (1) 15:22
retrospect (1) 128:13
return (7) 30:23 42:15 55:18
89:17 92:13 129:12 160:15
returned (6) 10:10
39:7,12,25 78:13 110:25
returning (1) 93:5
reveals (2) 34:8 59:10
review (13) 4:15 85:13
110:13 128:16 129:22,24
133:12 145:8 146:8 153:15
159:25 166:20 174:5
reviewer (1) 127:21
reviews (9) 67:5,16 70:23
71:9 80:8 127:23 128:4
129:16,20
revulsion (1) 179:13
richard (2) 104:13,25
richards (1) 89:25
richness (1) 121:22
rigby (1) 175:7
rightfully (2) 42:18,19
rightly (4) 123:21 155:10
174:18 176:11
rightminded (1) 179:8
rigorous (5) 7:18 34:23 35:3
119:5 129:17
rigorously (2) 2:9 61:13
ring (1) 53:23
rise (6) 89:22 119:12 160:15
163:20 167:25 181:7
risk (39) 22:10,12 30:23
37:21 43:16,18,19,21,23
44:2,6,8,10,11 62:6
131:17,24 133:19 134:12
138:23 140:11,12
142:3,4,14,17,23 143:2
146:11 148:25 150:12
151:9,9 152:15,17 153:2
169:18,20 170:8
risks (8) 47:10 140:10
142:6,7,14 144:22 146:3
147:6
road (2) 39:19 93:14
robbed (4) 161:3 163:9
167:13 178:23
roberts (1) 181:4
robust (2) 7:2 136:12
robustly (4) 4:20 55:20
96:10 99:8
rocketpropelled (1) 60:21
role (14) 13:17 24:21 25:24
26:18 30:13 33:21 35:12
40:15 54:20 75:2 87:5 95:3
157:16 171:17
roles (2) 117:5 131:2
roll (2) 15:2 114:25
rolls (1) 15:4
ronald (2) 15:9 23:15
room (79) 9:15 12:25 14:2,7
17:5 22:19 23:12,13,18
24:5,7 25:11 26:22 28:5
31:20 33:5,11 37:18 41:4
43:1 49:9,18 51:7 52:21,23
53:5,15 55:9 56:21 58:18
59:4 63:8,11 78:2
112:23,25 115:14,25
121:19 124:6,9 125:8
126:4 131:5 138:14
139:18,24 143:6,19 145:23
147:9,17,22 149:17
150:9,11 151:4,17,21
152:13,19,21 154:13
156:10 161:8,25 163:13,25
168:6,16,23 169:2,5,9
170:12,16 171:4 176:7
177:9
rooms (1) 151:6
round (1) 105:21
rounding (1) 89:12
rousseau (5) 73:3 77:20,22
78:1,3
route (1) 124:7
rowley (1) 164:25
rucksack (5) 44:21 45:7
50:24 51:9 145:23

ruled (2) 4:1 98:12
rulings (3) 2:5 3:17 7:2
rumours (2) 74:23 95:2
run (1) 38:2
rung (1) 111:6
running (2) 8:4 38:1
runs (2) 42:19 106:10
rushing (1) 73:25
rutherford (3) 120:3,3 124:2
S
sabrattha (1) 92:1
sadly (2) 38:9 57:13
safe (13) 10:7 11:14,18
26:19 32:1 50:6 51:19 64:7
126:18 140:8 141:16
161:25 162:1
safeguard (1) 140:12
safeguarding (1) 75:20
safely (1) 42:25
safety (21) 10:9 18:15 22:4
31:22 34:19 38:6 43:15
44:6 63:19 114:2 115:11
148:5 163:23 167:15
168:15 169:25
170:11,13,21 176:6 177:8
safetycompliant (1) 150:3
safecritical (1) 149:17
safferoses (2) 73:3 77:20
sake (1) 137:13
salman (136) 11:24 14:17
20:21 25:9,20 33:17,18
35:9,13,24,25 36:5,7,14,20
39:3,5,10,13,15,25
40:12,25 43:6 44:21 45:7
48:17 50:12,21 51:17
51:25 53:2 56:5 58:18
59:8,20 60:8,16 61:4,7,15
63:23 73:10 78:20
79:2,4,8,13,17,23,25 81:13
82:3,8,11 84:8,22,24
85:2,20,22 86:2,7,11,12,17
87:21 90:19 91:7,10,25
92:10,18 93:16,24
94:5,9,14 102:14,17,19,22
103:3,6,20 104:8
110:1,9,17,20,22,25
111:5,12 112:22 113:24
121:22 123:19 125:10
126:15 127:2,8 128:18
129:7 132:7 136:22
138:8,12,18,20,23 145:17
151:4,25 163:11
168:3,17,22 169:1
171:2,11 172:10,14,23,24
173:2,9,24 174:5,9,11
175:5,19,23 176:1
salmans (1) 39:19
same (27) 6:4,8,20 37:6
67:20,21 71:12,13 81:14
83:24 91:3,5 93:17 100:18
101:21 102:9,13 118:20
122:18,22 123:1 129:19,22
147:11 156:15 165:18
166:8
sanctions (1) 87:10
sarah (1) 119:25
sat (1) 49:25
satisfied (1) 2:11
saturday (4) 51:25 52:3,9
53:7
saunders (22) 1:3,10,17 7:13
53:16 54:5,8,14 58:19
64:9,20 68:4,14 119:11,15
160:14,18,25 162:13
180:15,20 181:9
save (9) 30:22 32:13 38:18
57:15 75:22 96:17 115:12
121:14 180:16
saved (4) 14:24 26:17 30:12
176:21
saw (5) 26:10 37:5 51:6
52:24 145:21
saying (7) 15:15 54:9 67:24
79:9 84:24 90:6 91:7

scale (4) 21:18 22:20 114:15
123:23
scapegoats (1) 159:23
scar (1) 20:8
scenario (1) 27:16
scene (13) 16:16 20:23
23:4,6 24:4 31:5 33:5
38:23 62:16 63:7 115:19
117:14 158:8
scenes (2) 8:4 165:8
scepticism (1) 109:19
schedule (2) 86:6 111:4
scheme (1) 81:25
school (3) 42:14 91:7 120:24
scoring (1) 148:21
scott (1) 119:25
screening (1) 44:19
scrunchedup (1) 33:8
scrutinise (1) 142:2
scrutiny (16) 26:15 67:21
71:13,16,24 76:6 77:15
80:5 95:18 96:5 99:17
100:22 101:1 103:13
109:25 119:5
search (2) 39:19 56:13
searching (3) 19:15 44:19
46:22
seats (1) 37:17
second (6) 75:25 81:17
101:12 102:20 172:8
178:13
secondary (1) 116:7
secondlevel (1) 86:1
secondly (7) 7:4 74:23 109:2
163:14 168:25 176:22
180:22
seconds (2) 32:5 56:25
secrecy (4) 72:24 80:19
95:16,19
secret (2) 5:1 98:5
secretary (6) 89:4 129:15
134:17,25 138:19 155:10
secrets (1) 101:20
section (4) 65:21 69:15
95:22 96:3
sector (1) 165:24
secure (1) 155:6
secured (2) 37:14 137:22
securing (1) 154:25
security (219) 2:13 3:21
4:5,20
5:5,13,18,21,22,24,25
6:4,8,11,13,17,22 7:6
18:15 19:13,14 22:15
25:14 33:21 34:1,15,22
35:4,9,15 36:23 40:22
41:2,23 42:17,20,21
43:5,15,24 44:2,13
45:1,5,9,9,11,12,14,15
46:5,21 47:3 51:4,21 54:20
55:12,16,21 56:19 59:3,6
60:15,17 61:11,14 64:1
67:16 71:8 72:17,24
75:16,17 76:1,21,22
77:7,10,12,25 79:18
80:8,13,18,20 81:2,4,7
82:15 83:18 84:1 85:10,18
86:10,15,16 87:9
88:15,22,23 89:6,15 90:5
94:8,16 95:7,12,19
96:5,7,12,15,16,18
30:7,12 33:22,22 36:25
63:4,6 73:24 76:23 77:7
80:20 81:8 96:18 102:1
115:17 118:12 127:17
129:4 132:6 135:9 136:9
154:9,19 155:8 157:17,23
158:16,20,24 160:9,10
181:5
services (134) 2:25 3:22
5:5,18,22 11:21 12:23
18:1,7,18,25 19:7,13
21:9,23 25:13,14 26:4,15
27:11,15,24 28:4,8,24
29:12 30:19,21 33:21
34:1,15,23 35:4,9,15 36:24
40:22 41:2 54:20

149:1,2,13,14,22
150:1,4,11,24,25,25
152:16,20,24 153:1 164:4
165:19,19,23,25
166:1,4,5,8,20 167:19,23
168:15 169:4,6,25
170:15,22 172:1,15,21
173:24 174:1,16 175:21
176:6
see (13) 2:7 16:4 34:16 49:5
50:8 64:18 79:24 88:4 99:2
101:19 105:12 121:1
130:18
seek (7) 67:3 70:21 75:6
118:15 137:12 159:15
160:3
seeking (3) 98:13 153:14
158:22
seem (4) 39:22 80:17 81:20
171:4
seemed (3) 15:2 39:18 40:18
seemingly (3) 101:6,17,22
seems (8) 18:18 21:1 60:6,12
65:25 69:19 154:2,19
seen (26) 8:24 12:23 14:6
16:2,2,19 17:12,17 22:9
32:8 47:14 50:22 61:3,6
86:17 102:5 104:6 106:13
108:6 109:16,23 112:24
112:19 128:14 168:9 169:8
seized (5) 13:10 61:1,5 91:8
93:12
select (1) 128:25
selfcritical (1) 129:18
selflessness (2) 26:6 160:6
180:22
selfserving (1) 100:24
seminar (1) 144:12
senior (8) 91:17 106:6,12
116:11 117:4 144:11
151:19 177:16
sense (5) 13:17 101:8 123:15
127:9 180:4
senseless (1) 73:10
sensibilities (1) 74:15
sensible (4) 8:19 66:1 69:20
174:25
sensitive (5) 2:23 3:4 34:14
78:2 101:20
sensitivity (4) 66:9 70:3
122:5 153:21
sent (4) 30:8 33:2 61:8 88:13
sentence (2) 78:18 84:14
separate (5) 24:23 25:1
85:23 91:6 145:4
september (8) 1:1 36:8
52:3,16 60:25 77:18 91:12
181:12
sequence (1) 168:3
series (4) 97:21 103:15
127:22 163:20
serious (5) 32:9 48:14,24
85:14 168:13
serve (1) 79:2
servants (2) 24:6 32:7
servants (1) 99:15
serve (2) 78:18 101:18
served (1) 137:21
serves (1) 144:18
service (47) 5:25 6:9 16:22
18:24 23:3,25 24:8,10,16
26:18,25 29:15,15,22,23
30:7,12 33:22,22 36:25
63:4,6 73:24 76:23 77:7
80:20 81:8 96:18 102:1
115:17 118:12 127:17
129:4 132:6 135:9 136:9
154:9,19 155:8 157:17,23
158:16,20,24 160:9,10
181:5
services (134) 2:25 3:22
5:5,18,22 11:21 12:23
18:1,7,18,25 19:7,13
21:9,23 25:13,14 26:4,15
27:11,15,24 28:4,8,24
29:12 30:19,21 33:21
34:1,15,23 35:4,9,15 36:24
40:22 41:2 54:20

55:12,16,22 59:6 60:15,17
61:11,14 62:18 63:1,14
64:1 72:24 74:9 75:16,24
76:21 77:12,25 79:18
80:8,14 81:2,4 82:15 83:18
84:1 85:11,18 86:10,15,16
87:9 88:15,22,23 94:16
95:7 96:5,8,16 97:20,24
98:11,17,22
99:10,11,22,25 100:5
102:3,21 103:1
105:11,16,22 108:5,12,14
109:4,16,22 111:14,15
112:1,8 116:9,20 117:7,13
125:19 126:10 128:3
129:17,25 130:16 135:19
143:18 148:7 153:10,19
154:3,22 155:1,17 157:9
158:15 160:2 172:15,21
173:24 174:1 177:25
178:19
serving (2) 84:14 102:24
session (5) 2:16 5:12 6:12
76:9 174:16
sessions (7) 2:18,20,22
3:6,7,10 6:15
set (12) 74:19 78:6 95:9
100:3 108:1 115:7,18
116:17 117:5 122:8 123:21
141:8
sets (2) 85:19 134:25
setting (3) 4:20 20:15 168:3
settled (1) 100:12
settling (1) 112:25
seven (1) 73:2
several (4) 84:10 86:23
92:18 103:14
severe (7) 25:8 40:10 43:21
44:2 112:14 166:2 167:2
severely (1) 50:2
shadow (1) 89:4
shall (2) 3:14,20
shape (1) 153:24
share (5) 122:2 137:17 153:9
158:18 161:22
shared (9) 12:10 31:4
92:12,14 121:5 123:10
135:24 157:18 161:23
sharon (1) 120:22
sharp (1) 76:7
shayler (2) 86:24 87:1
shaylers (1) 87:6
shed (3) 37:25 118:13 124:12
sherman (1) 156:7
shes (1) 38:23
shift (1) 151:13
shifting (1) 113:21
shocking (1) 168:7
shoe (1) 104:13
shone (1) 108:15
shook (1) 41:17
shoot (1) 49:2
shop (1) 179:5
shopping (1) 114:9
shops (1) 165:12
shore (1) 120:19
short (11) 1:8 10:17,20
32:10 53:1 64:15 68:7 92:3
113:1 114:6 160:20
shortcomings (2) 142:12,21
shortest (1) 115:1
shortly (7) 54:25 78:23 124:1
144:15 161:6 168:23,25
shot (3) 78:12 79:3 91:4
should (78) 2:15 3:12,21,23
7:7 8:13 13:10 22:20 24:20
25:12 27:4,23 44:4 45:8
59:2,10,19 61:17 62:17
68:1 75:14,17 76:8,17,17
77:11 85:15 95:2 96:19,24
97:8 102:10,18 103:11
107:22,23 108:24 112:8,9
114:7,12,13 115:22 118:20
122:12 126:7,17 127:6
130:4 134:5,8 135:12,14
136:2,12,22 139:2 140:4

141:12 143:25 149:15
150:17 155:18 156:11,14
157:22 158:19,21
164:2,23,24 166:14,18
169:23 170:1,16 172:6,7
shoulder (2) 31:19,20
shoulders (1) 8:17
shouldnt (1) 100:11
showed (2) 89:2 153:19
showing (1) 121:4
shown (3) 130:2 162:11
178:19
shows (3) 17:7 109:25
165:16
showsec (34) 22:14 25:4
42:16 43:11,14 51:11 52:6
56:18 113:5,16,22
142:1,3,6,10,16,21
143:7,17 144:21,24
146:1,4,8 149:23 150:8
151:2,11 152:10,21
169:4,5,8 180:23
shrapnel (1) 48:16
shrouded (1) 96:19
shun (1) 47:2
siblings (2) 40:15 167:10
sic (1) 58:16
sickening (1) 179:13
side (3) 49:15 56:9 177:8
sides (1) 154:20
sierra (1) 151:21
sight (4) 42:4 67:17 71:10
73:21
sightings (1) 50:15
signalled (1) 99:20
signalling (1) 99:10
significance (2) 174:14
175:24
significant (18) 6:16 11:20
20:5 29:12,21 40:16,17
46:11 61:7,20 117:16
118:3 121:4 128:2 132:1
147:8 168:18 172:25
significantly (1) 39:15
signs (2) 172:16 174:9
silver (1) 160:11
sim (1) 111:6
similar (11) 5:25 39:1 75:1
92:14,24 95:3,15 106:14
107:12 118:23 144:8
similarly (1) 156:7
simple (4) 10:22 19:2 31:8
46:21
since (6) 29:2 85:20 95:2
54:2 104:22 144:2
singer (2) 120:9 121:2
singers (2) 10:13 13:15
single (3) 30:24 64:4 115:12
sir (99) 1:3,4,7,10,17
7:10,13,16,17 8:22
9:10,16,24 13:6,11 14:8
15:23 17:20 18:20
19:11,25 21:20 23:10
29:16 31:8 34:4,13,24 37:4
38:10 40:11 42:10
44:5,15,25 45:18 46:10
47:5 48:4 50:4 52:1,18
53:1,6,16
54:2,5,6,8,11,14,18
57:4,10 58:19 59:1 61:21
64:9,11,17,20 68:4,9,14
119:11,12,15,19 120:8,25
121:7 122:1,4 129:23
130:15 131:17 133:6
137:11 138:9 140:5 143:9
152:5,22
160:13,14,15,18,22,25
161:2 162:3,13 177:5
180:11,15,16,20 181:6,9
sister (6) 12:21 31:12 48:9
57:25 124:13 161:15
sit (2) 9:17 34:11
site (2) 50:7 147:16
sites (2) 166:7,23

sitespecific (1) 157:22
sitting (2) 42:12 60:21
situation (4) 35:2 154:17
155:14 159:4
situational (5) 31:4 116:22
117:9 157:18 158:14
six (7) 121:13,21 123:13
125:2,9,14 126:12
size (3) 17:24 21:18,19
sketch (2) 103:11,16
skill (1) 121:1
skipped (1) 87:17
sky (1) 84:20
slaughter (2) 92:5 104:2
slightly (1) 16:3
slip (1) 47:2
slogan (2) 92:5 104:1
slowly (1) 129:8
small (2) 92:24 166:7
smg (39) 22:14 25:4 42:19
43:1,11,13 52:6 56:18
113:5,16,22 114:11 141:25
142:3,5,11,16,20
143:7,17,25
144:3,17,20,24 146:4,7,9
148:24 149:9,10,14,23
150:8 151:11,17,19 152:20
180:22
smgs (1) 144:10
smgshowsec (3) 44:12,13,16
smiled (1) 37:24
smooth (1) 8:4
snippet (1) 101:6
snippets (2) 102:11 103:10
so-called (2) 21:16 101:4
social (2) 60:12,14
society (1) 137:15
soi (7) 128:9 132:12 133:12
135:14 136:2,24 139:3
sois (1) 129:6
solace (3) 28:15 29:2 47:24
solemn (1) 10:15
solution (1) 95:24
solutions (1) 179:1
someone (4) 44:21 79:20
141:8 150:13
something (6) 12:1 46:21
118:11 138:1,14 139:12
son (4) 13:18 31:9 50:2 88:5
song (1) 41:10
sons (1) 91:1
soon (3) 31:17 49:9 162:16
sophisticated (1) 46:23
sore (1) 168:11
sorrell (2) 73:4 113:19
sought (6) 81:4 125:15,21
132:15 140:18 143:25
soul (1) 42:9
soulmates (2) 56:9,24
sound (1) 20:4
source (4) 83:14 92:6 94:8
104:12
sourced (3) 104:9,19 110:5
sources (7) 84:21 90:6,25
91:7,8,25 173:25
sourcing (3) 103:18,23
105:13
south (4) 84:7 89:12 93:17
120:19
space (2) 46:6 49:16
spaces (2) 47:7,10
speak (8) 8:17 33:3 36:14
38:10 52:4 73:2 121:20
125:16
speaker (1) 45:24
speaking (1) 36:8
speaks (2) 41:15 57:2
special (2) 84:20 96:7
specialist (8) 24:11 26:21
30:10 114:10 116:6 117:24
120:6 152:11
specialists (1) 30:7
specially (1) 24:3
specific (15) 90:7 112:16
122:13,21 123:4 124:20
126:24 127:7 132:2 138:6

139:13 141:18 148:4 150:2
162:5
specifically (5) 27:14 90:14
142:25 151:17 164:6
speech (1) 101:10
spend (1) 13:6
spending (1) 42:13
spent (4) 47:19 111:8 124:12
177:25
spirit (2) 123:1 180:6
spite (1) 174:8
spoke (5) 15:8,11 21:13
38:14 50:10
spoken (3) 10:25 68:11
161:21
spontaneously (1) 172:13
sportsman (1) 120:11
spot (1) 113:23
spotted (2) 74:4 103:19
stabbed (1) 164:17
stade (1) 104:16
stairs (1) 114:19
stadium (1) 114:19
stadiums (1) 114:8
staff (8) 8:3 23:11,17 89:25
115:10 144:11,21
145:4,9,10,20 146:5,9
150:8,16 151:2,11,18,19
166:12,15,16,17
169:4,6,6,8 170:7
stage (12) 8:20 16:6 31:18
59:17 66:12,15 70:7,9
73:23 131:4 135:15 152:3
stages (4) 71:20 134:15
137:7 159:1
staggering (1) 147:12
stairs (5) 14:2,3 17:13
41:13,16
stakeholder (1) 166:22
stall (3) 37:23 38:2,2
stance (1) 165:23
stand (2) 56:22 130:24
standard (3) 66:13 70:8
154:10
standards (1) 26:7
standing (3) 42:1 62:22
98:25
stark (1) 37:3
start (10) 9:10 15:2 66:12
68:12,15 70:6 72:15 78:25
101:10 114:22
started (5) 39:8 40:21
103:11,15 173:3
starting (2) 1:4 123:11
startling (1) 24:14
startlingly (2) 39:22 61:8
starts (2) 15:7 114:18
stated (7) 66:17 70:11 81:13
90:23 94:5 95:4 109:9
statement (54) 7:15 8:18
9:20 16:9 48:8 49:23 51:25
52:9,15,18 57:18 62:7
64:21 73:17,18 80:21
81:8,10,11 82:14,20 84:1,2
85:19,21 92:16 100:4
106:7,8,10,12,14 119:22
120:2 122:11,16 129:16
134:18 138:20,25 146:1
148:23 154:9 160:16
161:3,2 162:19,22 164:20
179:4 182:5,7,9,11
statements (15) 1:18 26:7
53:17 72:19 75:10 81:1
109:14 113:7 118:6,6
134:25 140:16 142:10
154:4 162:4
states (5) 5:11 20:22 21:16
106:13 157:5
station (15) 16:1,19 23:8
111:2 145:24 146:19
147:14 164:6 168:4
170:24,25 171:3,18,21
172:23
status (3) 110:11 133:9,11
statutory (1) 108:19
stay (1) 125:23
stayed (2) 49:14 93:4

staying (1) 82:22
steadfastly (1) 29:4
stem (1) 117:22
stenosis (1) 20:6
stepfather (1) 73:5
stepmother (1) 120:23
stepping (1) 165:1
steps (17) 1:23 3:24 4:5 7:25
15:25 41:24 42:3 106:16
108:7 116:17 125:14,19
127:12 131:4,5 135:8
138:13
steward (1) 51:11
stewarding (1) 51:1
stewards (2) 51:23 116:4
stick (1) 93:12
still (4) 31:10 48:14 53:4
175:13
stomach (1) 15:5
stone (3) 66:18 70:12 109:13
stood (3) 42:2 168:11 171:5
stop (9) 50:17 72:3,4 90:21
103:9 105:14 111:4 118:19
137:1
stopped (9) 45:3,16 60:25
74:5 75:15 86:3,5 114:6
176:1
story (1) 89:11
stranger (1) 15:10
strangers (1) 10:20
strategic (2) 34:8 146:11
strategically (1) 147:20
strategy (2) 28:1 174:20
stream (1) 68:10
streets (4) 4:9 165:6,11
171:15
stretcher (6) 12:23 15:24
17:8,10 24:6 38:21
stretchers (8) 15:18,20
18:22 19:4,6 49:12 117:22
159:12
stretches (1) 15:3
stricken (2) 21:14 23:14
striking (2) 154:8 178:5
string (1) 85:23
strive (1) 99:13
strong (1) 95:24
strongly (2) 79:16 91:9
struck (1) 131:20
structure (4) 24:2 116:1
158:5,6
struggling (5) 17:9 44:22
45:8 51:8 168:10
student (2) 120:24 121:4
studies (1) 93:17
studiously (1) 28:16
study (2) 37:14 121:5
stuff (1) 87:7
subject (25) 2:4,10 24:23
81:24 82:6 86:3 87:10
90:21 95:18 100:7
102:17,22 110:11 111:4
128:8,9 132:11 133:8
136:22,25 138:21
174:2,3,6,10
subjects (5) 85:23 103:4
108:10 129:5 133:14
submit (20) 13:9 21:4 27:10
45:5 46:4 133:6 136:14
137:21 138:25 144:6
145:5,18 152:8,18 154:6
155:5,23 156:2 157:14
159:3
submitted (5) 73:16 124:24
131:13 145:8 148:22
subsequently (7) 65:12 69:6
78:17 87:18 100:12,15
178:10
substance (1) 20:7
substantial (5) 79:17 105:13
106:7,8,22
substantially (1) 117:12
substituting (1) 17:8
successful (3) 3:3 20:17 72:6
successive (1) 115:3
successor (1) 88:11

suffer (1) 141:12
suffered (4) 12:14 141:12
176:24 179:19
suffering (4) 12:12 33:12
118:20 179:15
suffices (1) 153:8
sufficiency (2) 128:4 145:14
sufficient (9) 22:22 114:5,6
117:14 119:1 133:21 137:2
145:19 177:11
sufficiently (4) 135:19
136:11 142:16 144:21
sugarcoat (1) 71:17
suggest (8) 43:9 91:9 140:24
144:18 146:2 148:24
152:11 169:11
suggested (1) 98:7
suggestion (1) 173:15
suggestive (1) 79:16
suggests (3) 101:16 104:9
116:16
suicide (2) 61:9 84:10
suit (1) 166:25
suitable (2) 21:24 43:19
sulphuric (3) 36:6 104:18
136:19
summarise (1) 108:11
summary (2) 81:3 98:25
summed (1) 171:24
sun (1) 42:12
sunday (1) 94:7
superb (1) 119:24
supermarket (1) 37:7
supervised (2) 96:6 151:12
supervision (1) 147:8
supplied (1) 24:7
supplies (2) 24:9 90:24
support (6) 8:3 17:11 39:14
51:23 79:10 123:11
supported (3) 11:25 116:3
151:12
supporters (1) 39:7
supportive (2) 85:5 88:3
supposed (1) 115:2
supreme (1) 100:10
sure (2) 14:8 32:1
surely (2) 51:20 59:24
surprise (3) 25:13 59:15
74:11
surrounded (1) 38:4
surrounds (3) 72:24 168:16
170:12
surveillance (6) 40:3 43:7
52:25 54:22 55:17 94:17
survivability (2) 16:13 21:2
survival (2) 20:25 26:24
survive (2) 14:22 17:4
survived (5) 12:13,17
14:19,20 20:20
surviving (1) 125:3
survivor (3) 31:14 48:8
176:23
survivors (4) 31:13 66:25
70:18 115:12
susceptible (1) 20:14
suspected (1) 85:2
suspicion (1) 136:15
suspicions (3) 52:14,18,21
suspicious (8) 50:23
145:13,19 146:1,3,7 149:7
151:16
suspiciously (2) 51:6 169:1
sustained (1) 48:18
swift (2) 63:16 75:21
swiftly (5) 38:23 57:14
116:11,19 118:8
swing (1) 84:17
switch (1) 107:6
sympathy (2) 118:15 180:10
syria (11) 35:20 78:15 82:24
83:10 84:10,14,19,25 85:5
89:16 91:20
system (5) 125:25 137:1
138:17 144:4 148:15
systemic (5) 27:18 52:5
110:2 112:6 113:4

164:9,14,16 169:18 170:14
173:12,21 178:9
terroristrelated (2) 24:24
25:1
terrorists (11) 3:1,14 4:8
34:10 46:1,19 54:23 82:7
131:16 135:22 166:10
test (3) 27:15,25 156:10
tested (3) 4:20 8:24 155:23
testing (1) 8:23
text (1) 87:18
thank (2) 1:10,17
7:10,13,16 54:2,5,14
64:8,9,20,22
119:10,11,15 122:4 125:22
160:13,14,18,25 162:10,13
180:15,20 181:9
takes (1) 9:12
taking (2) 27:16 131:17
talent (1) 120:8
talented (2) 55:7 62:2
talking (3) 10:11 28:2 57:6
target (7) 90:8 94:11 112:21
141:7 144:17 156:11,12
targeted (1) 73:13
targeting (1) 179:11
task (2) 40:13 76:4
tasked (1) 27:15
tatp (4) 104:8,12 105:7
136:5
taught (2) 27:8 28:10
taxi (1) 111:2
taylor (1) 120:15
team (22) 2:15 7:20 8:3
20:24 24:3 40:8 45:13 51:1
66:9 70:4 71:19 76:21 98:4
119:24 122:4,10 131:19
137:18 162:11,23 163:1,18
teams (1) 162:4
technical (1) 143:10
technology (1) 53:9
teeming (1) 31:21
teenage (2) 161:17 167:11
teenager (1) 48:9
telescope (1) 85:3
telephone (5) 61:1,2 82:1
86:1 134:9
telling (1) 176:3
tells (2) 50:4 52:18
ten (1) 10:4
tend (2) 115:12 125:16
tended (1) 15:10
tentative (1) 131:3
term (16) 101:14 127:1,14
130:19 132:2,20 138:6
139:13 141:23 146:14
149:25 153:4 167:20
171:25 172:9 177:17
termed (1) 128:9
terms (31) 8:14 20:12 45:1
74:17,18 88:20 99:19
107:24 110:15 122:13,20
123:15,24 124:19
126:14,24 129:2 131:22
132:5,14 133:2 135:7
136:13 141:3 146:22
147:24 149:23 155:1 162:5
165:20 167:17
terrible (11) 11:24 13:3
55:24 63:15 126:9 138:1
142:7 159:17 170:18 172:5
179:24
terror (6) 25:7 80:22 137:19
146:2 153:2 171:13
terrorism (21) 47:13 78:18
86:4 6 87:15 90:12,13
131:15 146:13 147:7 151:9
153:11 156:9,12 164:7,22
165:14 166:9 170:6 175:11
176:4
terrorist (36) 4:6 9 5:2 8:15
25:8 35:17,20 40:10 43:21
44:11 59:22 82:5 84:15
85:24 86:13 93:11 102:25
105:7 114:19 123:18
127:21 134:8 142:6,23
144:22 152:4,9 157:11

84:15 97:19 102:20 103:3
114:21 115:1 117:16
124:16 127:11 135:3,13
139:21 140:3 143:20
147:14,23 152:4,7,8
156:21 168:18 169:21,21
176:9 177:25
timeless (1) 11:2
timely (3) 27:23 34:3 134:3
times (18) 9:16 33:15 34:3
52:19 65:7 69:1 79:1 84:22
91:1,5,24 92:8 100:4
121:7,8 152:21 157:3
180:18
timing (1) 13:25
tipped (1) 94:25
tirelessly (1) 162:23
today (6) 8:17 34:12
160:17,22 165:8 180:16
through (17) 32:1 71:18
101:21 102:12 103:10
109:23 119:23 121:16,17
132:5 133:2 135:7 138:14
145:13 152:7 161:22
178:19
toilet (2) 60:5,7
toold (10) 30:2 52:14,23
76:9,24 79:8 94:8 120:17
121:7 152:6
tolerated (1) 11:23
tomorrow (2) 180:17 181:8
tony (2) 121:9 153:20
too (16) 26:25 28:22,24
32:15 33:14,15 58:9 83:6
89:22 113:6 129:8 141:1
144:15 159:19,20 162:16
took (5) 25:5 38:18 40:25
125:14,19
tool (2) 44:11 148:21
topic (6) 4:2 76:7 132:6
133:3 138:8 139:6
topics (10) 77:1
122:12,14,20,25 123:3
126:23 162:4 6 167:17
torture (2) 100:8 107:19
total (1) 139:19
tour (1) 47:17
tourniquet (2) 16:8 38:19
tourniquets (1) 117:21
traces (9) 7:17 14:2 15:5
17:13 37:23 38:1,2 135:4
173:3
towns (1) 165:9
toxic (1) 174:22
track (3) 11:12 46:1 90:9
tracks (1) 60:3
trafford (3) 27:8 93:18
155:25
tragedy (8) 12:10 29:3 37:9
45:16 118:20 121:16
176:20 180:14
tragic (6) 11:19 162:24
163:14 165:21 169:14
175:6
tragically (5) 10:14 15:17
25:12 162:1 164:1
train (3) 41:1 112:22 114:19
trained (12) 24:3 30:16
33:10,14 45:10 52:17 63:7
115:1 143:4 144:21
151:9,21
training (28) 24:1 30:18
39:24 46:24 47:8 51:22
62:25 63:10 142:3 144:25
145:17,9,19 146:2
149:7,18,19 151:8
152:11,14 153:22 157:4,13
159:13 166:16,17 170:6
transactions (1) 104:2
transiting (1) 90:22
translation (4) 66:19,21
70:13,15
transmission (1) 2:8
transparency (8) 3:5 55:13
72:12 77:23,24 82:14 96:4
131:9

transparent (1) 61:19
transport (7) 15:21 147:4
 148:13 157:20 170:23,25
 180:24
transporting (1) 21:5
trapped (1) 111:11
trauma (2) 14:9 20:24
travel (11) 35:21 86:11
 120:6 128:18 129:10,10
 136:23,23,24 137:3 173:14
travelled (8) 32:19 39:6,9
 59:22 89:16 90:19 92:1
 111:7
travelling (4) 32:18 89:8
 103:22 161:12
treat (2) 66:2 69:21
treated (12) 14:14 34:23
 48:13 65:4,5,19 68:23,24
 69:13 77:7 109:16 126:4
treatment (3) 14:21 117:16
 124:23
trial (2) 91:9 106:5
tribunal (1) 100:16
tried (5) 32:13 42:11
 52:16,19 53:22
tries (1) 15:5
trigger (2) 85:10 105:10
triggered (3) 82:8 103:12,17
triggers (2) 110:3,16
trip (1) 93:12
tripoli (6) 39:10 79:3 88:17
 89:1,13 90:20
triservice (1) 157:16
trolley (2) 16:25 17:10
tron (1) 73:7
trons (2) 66:16 70:10
trouble (1) 60:4
troubling (1) 20:19
true (3) 87:6 95:1 153:21
truly (2) 96:14 168:7
trump (1) 96:2
trust (4) 28:9 99:17 101:1
 108:13
trusted (1) 10:8
trusts (1) 58:7
truth (3) 52:4 74:13 119:8
try (4) 66:24 70:17 71:16
 177:8
trying (5) 4:6 15:2 33:4
 38:18 45:25
tshirt (2) 33:8 37:24
tuesday (1) 181:12
turn (2) 59:25 112:9
turned (4) 37:24 94:1
 103:7,9
tweddle (3) 120:16,18 124:8
twice (3) 68:15 86:9 139:19
twisted (1) 174:22
two-dimensional (2) 66:3
 69:22
twomonth (1) 161:13
type (6) 21:19 22:19 25:9
 40:8 139:25 141:7

U

uk (21) 24:23 25:7 39:7
 83:17 88:10,19,20 89:23
 90:22 92:13 93:5 94:11,19
 95:1 100:5,8,16 111:1
 112:14 129:12 173:20
ultimately (10) 7:1 9:18
 18:10 39:25 42:20 46:9
 59:25 63:9,18 146:9
unanswered (1) 60:11
unarmed (1) 164:18
unavoidable (1) 4:17
unaware (2) 47:23 98:6
unchallenged (4) 113:1
 168:12,18 169:9
uncle (4) 13:18 66:16 70:10
 79:9
unclear (2) 94:20 109:6
unconnected (1) 134:1
unconscionable (2) 116:19
 157:3
uncover (1) 7:6

uncovered (3) 58:8 93:15
 111:10
underestimate (1) 29:16
undermined (1) 138:4
undermines (1) 95:21
underneath (1) 15:6
understaffing (1) 63:17
understand (27) 1:11,15
 33:25 44:13 54:6,8 56:17
 63:20 76:22 80:13 81:3
 93:25 125:24
 127:3,8,10,12 130:22
 134:23 139:16 150:10
 154:16 159:13 166:5
 167:23 171:12 175:10
understandable (1) 35:1
understandably (2) 4:11
 143:6
understanding (10) 31:3
 77:6,10,12 109:21 125:17
 138:11 148:4 149:3 150:2
understands (1) 76:10
understood (3) 117:11 143:8
 155:16
undertake (4) 34:6 63:20
 138:12 166:10
undertaken (3) 127:23 142:5
 163:1
undertaking (1) 122:18
undertook (1) 127:22
underwhelming (1) 22:17
undetected (1) 129:12
undeterred (1) 78:13
undisclosed (2) 109:2 111:17
undoubtedly (1) 107:15
unexpected (1) 155:3
unfathomable (1) 121:24
unforeseeable (1) 164:2
unified (1) 12:10
uniform (1) 39:21
uninitiated (1) 81:20
unique (1) 124:17
united (10) 39:11 40:1 55:18
 87:11,12 89:18 169:19
 173:15,17,24
units (2) 30:10 116:2
university (4) 37:14 120:5,13
 160:2 179:21
 172:15 173:2
unlawfully (2) 100:17 123:18
unless (5) 3:8 49:2 79:20
 107:24 144:5
unlike (1) 85:12
unmonitored (1) 173:14
unnamed (5) 84:23 85:23,24
 91:24 94:8
unnecessarily (1) 118:23
unnoticed (1) 168:20
unpicked (1) 113:9
unrealistic (1) 137:14
unresolved (1) 130:14
unresponsive (1) 32:11
unsatisfactory (1) 134:14
unseemly (1) 113:12
unshakeable (1) 49:7
unspeakable (1) 73:9
unsuccessfully (1) 100:9
until (9) 3:9 42:6 55:6 78:23
 107:24 121:14 168:5 169:9
 181:11
untrained (1) 145:21
untreated (1) 21:1
untrue (1) 100:25
unturned (3) 66:18 70:12
 109:13
update (1) 165:20
updating (1) 157:24
upheld (1) 98:10
upon (30) 8:16 9:14 11:3,18
 12:13,15 13:4 14:9 15:24
 17:16 21:14,19 28:8 30:18
 31:15 32:1 33:1,15
 36:20,23 45:10,12,13
 46:13 47:5 48:24 55:25
 63:3 99:17 139:18
uprising (3) 89:9,24 173:17

uptodate (2) 145:10 158:1
urge (4) 43:15 98:9 100:23
 113:24
usb (1) 93:12
used (20) 19:8 35:20 38:18
 53:9,24 54:2,4 61:2 89:5
 92:5,6 93:19 101:14
 104:2,7,13,14,14 107:6
 151:15
uses (1) 104:18
using (1) 17:15
utilised (1) 150:16
utility (1) 138:17
utter (1) 33:5
utterly (1) 164:23

V

v (2) 133:2 147:24
vacuum (1) 117:8
valuable (1) 30:11
values (2) 65:23 69:17
various (9) 41:1 66:8 70:2
 71:25 93:23 107:4 115:23
 125:21 156:13
variously (1) 140:17
varying (1) 143:16
vast (1) 19:5
vehicles (1) 166:19
veil (1) 95:16
veneer (1) 155:22
venue (10) 17:24 46:6
 112:19 141:9,25 144:1,19
 148:16 156:11 161:11
venues (4) 43:20 47:7
 112:20 144:8
veracity (1) 94:23
verification (1) 21:23
versa (1) 113:17
vettled (1) 81:25
vetting (1) 82:4
vi (1) 133:2
via (3) 78:7 79:14 95:22
vibrant (1) 8:12
vice (1) 113:17
vicious (1) 14:15
viciously (1) 48:18
victim (3) 37:10 41:14 77:19
victims (9) 12:16 13:4 22:23
 49:22 61:25 63:16 65:6
 68:25 131:15
victoria (12) 16:1 23:8
 119:24 146:19 147:14
 164:6 168:4 170:24,25
 171:18,21 172:23
victorious (1) 91:21
victory (2) 72:5 165:15
videos (1) 61:4
viewed (3) 60:18 101:7 164:6
views (9) 36:20 39:17 79:7
 92:18 103:5 133:17 135:25
 143:21 172:16
vigilance (3) 34:21 35:2
 166:12
vigilant (5) 9:7,25 34:7
 44:16 164:24
viii (1) 135:8
village (1) 37:6
violence (1) 174:23
violent (2) 82:23 86:21
virtual (1) 117:22
virtually (4) 16:7 27:20
 59:25 98:1
virtue (1) 99:9
visit (13) 35:24,25 36:2,3,4,5
 81:17 88:22 102:18 132:15
 134:7 135:23 173:20
visited (10) 35:24 80:1
 81:13,23 82:1 86:8 88:23
 102:14,19 134:6
visiting (2) 54:22 61:4
visitor (1) 81:24
visitors (3) 51:19 81:25
 166:18
visits (7) 36:10 80:9,11,21
 136:1 145:17 152:5
visual (1) 171:1

vital (7) 17:6 18:14 21:11
 63:8 65:22 69:16 102:13
vitality (1) 11:10
voice (1) 21:12
void (2) 117:9 121:24
volume (1) 16:15
vulnerabilities (3) 47:10
 141:5,9
vulnerability (3) 14:11 47:9
 152:3
vulnerable (2) 25:19 174:21

W

waged (1) 86:21
wait (4) 12:24 55:5 147:22
 152:25
waited (5) 41:18,19 122:7
 179:21,22
waiting (12) 31:22 41:4
 48:23 56:21 58:9 62:10
 124:9 161:10,14,17,24
 167:10
wake (2) 127:24 144:9
wakeup (1) 27:23
walk (4) 44:22 45:8 112:23
 153:1
walked (3) 33:19 37:18 41:16
walking (1) 14:1
wall (1) 50:23
walls (1) 165:8
wane (1) 109:17
wants (1) 4:10
warned (2) 27:13 49:4
warning (2) 29:13 174:9
warnings (2) 11:15 170:1
warts (1) 72:8
wasnt (3) 30:3 42:16 53:21
wasting (1) 30:10
watch (2) 15:16 94:14
watched (3) 38:15,19 111:10
watchful (1) 49:15
watching (2) 31:14 53:3
water (1) 15:12
wave (1) 124:25
waxy (1) 16:7
way (33) 1:12 17:16 25:8
 34:5 36:22 45:2,25 53:12
 63:1,13 65:3 67:12,20
 68:22 71:5,12 72:14 82:21
 92:3 94:22 104:20 105:14
 109:16 116:8 127:19 138:4
 139:23 146:16 160:8
 174:25 175:4 176:4 180:9
ways (4) 7:21,22 125:22
 160:9
weakness (1) 154:21
wealth (1) 8:23
weaponry (1) 91:14
weapons (3) 35:19 39:21
 41:1
wearing (1) 60:22
weatherby (17)
 64:12,17,20,21,22 67:22
 68:4,5,11,14,16 119:11
 132:17 133:15 136:7 173:8
 182:7
wednesday (2) 42:6 161:12
week (1) 31:13
weekend (2) 51:25 54:7
weeks (5) 76:5 124:14
 172:14 174:7 179:17
weighing (1) 50:24
weight (4) 51:9 60:1 133:7
 168:10
welch (7) 112:11 160:23
 161:1,2 162:14 180:15
 182:11
welcome (2) 79:8 122:6
welcomed (1) 131:22
welfare (1) 22:7
wellcrafted (1) 104:4
welldocumented (2) 88:16
 100:2
wellfounded (1) 87:5
wellknown (5) 82:23 87:8
 89:8 115:17 169:19

wendy (12) 10:2
 41:4,4,8,17,22
 42:4,7,9,13,18 44:9
went (18) 10:5 23:20 31:11
 48:21 56:12,13 58:16,24
 62:5 87:16 93:2,4 153:17
 167:6 168:12 171:3 177:8
 178:24
werent (2) 27:13 52:12
west (9) 16:22 23:2,25
 29:15,23 89:20 154:8
 158:20 181:4
westminster (10) 5:2,17 6:5
 65:15 69:8 106:3
 164:17,19 165:21,22
weve (12) 11:1,9 16:2 22:9
 39:16 54:21 76:2 86:5 98:2
 100:3 104:7 181:7
whatever (3) 7:1 109:25
 136:2
whatsapp (1) 33:3
wheel (1) 115:23
wheelchair (1) 78:12
whereas (1) 92:3
whereby (1) 163:12
wherever (3) 4:18 174:24,25
whichever (1) 151:24
whilst (19) 11:9 29:3
 36:14,16 46:9 49:13 52:20
 62:15 78:22 84:19 123:3
 131:23 139:19 144:2
 147:15 166:1 167:14 169:7
 176:2
whiskey (1) 151:23
whitehall (1) 90:6
whod (1) 85:5
whole (5) 30:19 37:8 77:15
 116:10 153:25
wholly (1) 166:4
whom (5) 37:25 123:14
 131:11 132:22,24
whose (7) 13:22 120:11
 121:22 123:13 125:2
 132:16 147:16
wide (1) 62:1
widely (2) 74:19 157:5
wider (2) 126:14 148:6
wideranging (2) 129:1
 162:21
wife (2) 56:8 87:22
willpower (1) 49:7
win (1) 165:16
winchester (15) 27:7,9,14,23
 28:10 29:8,11,20,25 30:16
 116:12 155:25 156:16,17
 157:4
wish (15) 4:11 6:24 47:1
 127:3,8,9,12 131:16
 134:23 136:15 142:1
 143:24 162:10 177:2,3
wished (1) 6:17
wishful (1) 90:2
wishhunt (1) 140:6
withheld (2) 98:12,14
witness (29) 6:8 76:5,23,24
 77:2,3 80:21 81:1,10
 82:13,20 83:3 84:1 85:19
 90:11 92:17
 96:12,17,21,22,23
 97:1,2,7,9,13 98:18 109:7
 130:18
witnesses (11) 6:8 8:24
 41:17 51:6 76:16 97:2
 130:20,21,25 131:11
 143:17
wolf (1) 173:2
woman (3) 32:24 41:10
 46:16
women (1) 34:6
wonderful (2) 10:12 13:16
wont (1) 64:14
woolwich (1) 175:7
work (16) 11:5 22:1,2 26:2
 31:6 34:1,6 46:13 54:13
 55:11 62:13,15 116:10
 120:5 122:24 162:25

worked (5) 31:1 37:7 113:1
 162:23 178:19
workers (1) 73:24
working (7) 26:3 30:22 31:2
 38:17 52:12 53:21 83:5
world (2) 57:23 112:21
worn (1) 17:6
worries (1) 13:13
worrying (1) 52:11
worse (1) 45:21
worst (3) 8:14 66:3 69:22
worth (2) 68:15 178:12
worthy (1) 59:24
wounds (2) 20:3 48:16
writ (1) 76:6
written (17) 73:16,19 99:8
 100:4 108:1,9 116:24
 118:5 129:15 134:17,25
 138:19 140:15 142:9 146:1
 154:9,9
wrong (6) 23:20 53:20 104:3
 124:16,16 178:24
wrongs (1) 113:15

X

x (5) 85:19 90:11 92:17 97:1
 182:1
xs (2) 81:10 82:20

Y

year (11) 27:17,21 28:8
 29:13,23 30:17 39:14
 90:10 128:20 134:10
 144:14
yearold (2) 120:10,16
years (18) 11:9 20:10 33:23
 56:4 65:1 68:20 87:1 102:1
 105:8 131:5 171:19 172:14
 173:4 175:12,17 178:3
 179:6,23
yesterday (1) 57:11
yet (11) 8:24 15:10 24:17
 51:16 60:5 108:2,16
 121:23 135:3 154:5 167:3
york (4) 32:20 84:22 91:24
 92:8
yorkshire (1) 41:8
youd (2) 66:20 70:14
youll (10) 18:19 19:24 37:4
 38:23 48:6,11 52:1 57:10
 58:1 180:18
young (18) 13:16 18:16 22:4
 39:1 41:10 42:22 47:16
 50:22 57:25 73:14 78:14
 89:8,11 102:25 124:13
 139:23 167:8 179:11
younger (2) 124:13 161:14
youngest (1) 77:19
youngsters (1) 42:23
youre (2) 15:16 49:2
youtube (2) 67:25 68:10
youve (4) 42:10 67:7 70:25
 77:9

0

0024 (1) 19:20

1

1 (9) 58:12 112:14 127:1,14
 130:19 132:2 133:2 172:10
 182:3
10 (2) 50:8 168:24
1014 (1) 169:3
1030 (2) 161:6 180:23
1031 (2) 163:13 168:6
105 (1) 119:16
11 (4) 1:7 7:11 27:17 90:5
1116 (1) 64:14
1135 (2) 64:11,16
1143 (1) 68:6
1148 (1) 68:8
119 (1) 182:9

12 (1) 41:7
13 (1) 94:15
130 (1) 105:2
14 (5) 36:8 39:10 55:9 62:5
 73:4
15 (6) 36:1 48:9 50:9 51:8
 54:16 73:5
15yearold (3) 50:1 62:3
 120:23
16 (4) 84:6,8 85:8 164:9
161 (1) 182:11
17 (6) 36:2 41:7 90:22
17yearold (2) 120:4,7
18 (10) 36:3,5 38:24 39:9
 40:1 73:6 89:14 110:25
 163:19 164:12
182 (3) 64:25 68:19 101:12
18th (2) 40:4 43:8
18yearold (1) 37:15
19 (6) 24:23,25 93:23 95:22
 96:3 120:10
1985 (3) 64:25 68:19 101:12
1990 (2) 65:7 69:1
1990s (2) 86:24 87:9
1994 (1) 58:11
1999 (2) 58:12 87:16
19yearold (1) 121:4
ii (1) 138:7
iii (1) 132:5
lvii (1) 135:8

2

2 (20) 5:7,8,19 24:13,19
 30:13 55:10 63:6 93:4 98:7
 111:19 112:18 113:25
 115:18 124:14 164:15
 168:12

2020 (5) 1:1 65:25 69:19
 77:18 181:12
 209 (1) 119:18
 20s (1) 50:22
 210 (1) 119:13
 21st (2) 40:4 43:8
 22 (52) 10:6 12:16 13:7,19
 22:19 24:22,24 25:7
 28:15,23 29:5,13 30:19
 33:1,19 40:4 43:5,8 44:18
 47:20 56:11 84:23 105:3
 121:19 123:13 138:2
 142:25 146:24 150:5
 161:6,25 162:14,24
 163:3,13,14 164:8,13,15
 165:22 167:2,25 169:12
 171:21 172:12,23 173:4
 175:20 176:23 177:22
 178:11 179:20
 2214 (1) 51:13
 222546 (1) 53:4
 223048 (1) 14:1
 223055 (1) 56:22
 2231 (1) 14:5
 224 (1) 87:24
 23 (3) 19:20 65:1 68:20
 232009 (1) 15:2
 232025 (1) 15:3
 232050 (1) 15:6
 232313 (1) 16:5
 232425 (1) 16:18
 234612 (1) 16:24
 234745 (1) 16:25
 235937 (1) 17:2
 24 (4) 16:21 36:9 47:18 94:3
 242 (1) 91:16
 25 (3) 84:4,19 91:6
 253 (1) 106:10
 25mile (1) 84:7
 26 (1) 36:1
 28 (5) 1:1 36:9 78:15 85:1
 94:7
 29 (3) 58:12 89:10 181:12
 2ii (1) 136:14
 2iii (1) 132:20

3

3 (11) 24:16,17 30:14 43:8
 60:25 84:4 112:22 131:5
 179:6,23 181:3
 30 (1) 171:19
 314 (1) 160:19
 32 (1) 73:7
 340 (2) 160:16,21
 36 (2) 50:24 51:9
 39 (1) 56:4

4

4 (7) 58:15,19,23 113:22
 139:14 167:20 181:5
 40 (3) 23:19 115:15 154:14
 40page (3) 106:2,18 107:9
 417 (1) 181:10
 43 (1) 73:8
 44 (1) 73:9
 45yearold (1) 121:9
 46 (2) 16:17 21:1
 47 (1) 21:2
 4i (1) 141:23
 4ii (1) 146:14
 4iv (1) 147:24
 4vi (2) 149:25 171:25

5

5 (3) 1:5 153:5 177:18
 50 (1) 164:16
 51 (1) 120:16
 52 (1) 105:1

6

6 (4) 17:3 36:4 77:18 124:19
 64 (1) 182:7

7

7 (8) 17:3 22:2 51:14 86:6
 111:4 124:19 174:17 182:5
 70 (1) 81:12
 77 (7) 5:1,16 6:5 104:14
 105:1,18 175:8

8

8 (4) 13:1 73:4 171:16
 175:12
 830 (1) 168:5

9

9 (5) 27:16 39:7 52:3,16
 169:7
 911 (1) 87:10
 930 (4) 1:2 180:22 181:7,11
 95year (1) 78:18