

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 34

November 11, 2020

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Wednesday, 11 November 2020

1
 2 (9.30 am)
 3 (The inquiry sat in a restricted session)
 4 (10.22 am)
 5 MR PAUL JOHNSON (continued)
 6 Questions from MR HENDERSON (continued)
 7 MR HENDERSON: Good morning, Mr Johnson. We can now go
 8 through the rest of your evidence happily in open.
 9 Can I start by just inviting you to tell us when you
 10 began working for SMG? It was around 2000, is that
 11 correct?
 12 A. I started in March of 2000. I started as a control room
 13 operator. In 2003 I was made up to a supervisor and
 14 I think it was around about 2004 I was made deputy
 15 cleaning and security supervisor.
 16 Q. Had you previously worked at the Arndale Centre?
 17 A. Yes, the Manchester Arndale Centre and
 18 Manchester United's ground.
 19 Q. And at Old Trafford?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. So you had quite a lot of experience of working in
 22 control rooms in particular; is that right?
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. You have just said you became, I think it was security
 25 and cleaning supervisor or manager at the arena in

1

1 around 2004/2005?
 2 A. Yes, round about 2005.
 3 Q. Was that still your role in May 2017?
 4 A. That's correct, that's been my role up to the present
 5 day.
 6 Q. Who did you report to?
 7 A. I had two immediate supervisors, one was John Murphy and
 8 the other was Lee Sinnott.
 9 Q. It might be helpful to actually look at a plan of who's
 10 who, an organisational chart.
 11 Can we bring up {INQ001443/1}.
 12 Mr Johnson, can you see your name on the left-hand
 13 side?
 14 A. I can.
 15 Q. As you said, you reported to a Mr Murphy and then to
 16 Lee Sinnott?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. You manage a security team, do you not?
 19 A. I do.
 20 Q. Who is in that team? It might be helpful to look at the
 21 diagram, but I'm sure you can tell us from your own
 22 memory.
 23 A. There's eight security guards -- sorry, control room
 24 operators. One of them is an actual deputy. That's
 25 James O'Neill. He was the deputy security and cleaning

2

1 supervisor.
 2 Q. Then you have a series of operatives underneath you as
 3 direct reports. So duty control room operatives?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And security patrol officers?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. And then two sets of cleaning staff?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. What does your role involve day to day? We'll think
 10 about events in a moment, but just on a day to day
 11 basis?
 12 A. On a day-to-day basis, dealing with any incidents that
 13 have come in, ordering stock, giving the cleaners their
 14 duties. We have a system called the Pre-plan Management
 15 System. Basically it's giving all that work out and
 16 making sure everybody's okay.
 17 Q. I understand it's quite a different task during an event
 18 at the arena and you're then the fire safety officer;
 19 is that correct?
 20 A. I'm one of the fire safety officers.
 21 Q. Just very briefly what does that involve?
 22 A. Fire safety officer, mainly -- we have seven fire panels
 23 coming into Whiskey Control from around the complex. So
 24 mainly the fire safety officer's duties is monitoring
 25 them systems and anything that's fire-related throughout

3

1 the arena.
 2 Q. You just mentioned Whiskey Control there.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. That's a reference, is it, to the Whiskey Control Room,
 5 which is the main control centre for the arena?
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. Thank you. We can take that down, Ms Newman.
 8 Is it right that your employer was SMG Europe
 9 Holdings Limited?
 10 A. Correct.
 11 Q. Were you aware that the company which actually ran
 12 events at the arena was a different company,
 13 SMG (UK) Ltd?
 14 A. Only from what I've seen through the inquiry. I didn't
 15 know anything about that.
 16 Q. So that's not something you knew about when you were
 17 doing it?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. So you didn't understand there was any difference really
 20 between the companies?
 21 A. No.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you realise there's a split between
 23 events and facilities?
 24 A. To be honest with you, sir, there's two different
 25 companies and I've noticed this through the inquiry.

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1 Even though, as you say, there is a split, we are a very
 2 close team together. To explain, their offices are at
 3 the side of my offices, so generally we work as a team.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 5 MR HENDERSON: Is it right that your team, the security
 6 team, as part of facilities management, provide a 24/7
 7 security service for the whole arena complex?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. So that's not just the arena, as we think of it, within
 10 the concourse, but also the NCP car park, the offices
 11 and so on?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. So your team doesn't just provide security services for
 14 SMG Europe, but the other tenants and companies within
 15 the arena complex?
 16 A. That's part of the service level agreement, I believe.
 17 Q. And when events were taking place, you're providing
 18 security services for events for the complex?
 19 A. We assist, yes.
 20 Q. And as we have heard lots about, ShowSec provide extra
 21 services for the running of the events as well?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. That presumably means that you and your team all need to
 24 have SIA licences; is that correct?
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. What kind of licences did you have?
 2 A. Front line operator.
 3 Q. And ---
 4 A. Sorry, sorry, it was door supervisor.
 5 Q. That's where I was going. There's front line security
 6 staff ---
 7 A. It's door supervision.
 8 Q. All door supervisors?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Did any of either you or your staff have what we've
 11 understood is called public space surveillance licence,
 12 CCTV operator effectively?
 13 A. No, we didn't.
 14 Q. Do you know why that was?
 15 A. I did ask the question. I asked it to the facilities
 16 management team and the actual answer was there's no
 17 requirement for it because we were in-house.
 18 Q. Who was it told that you that? Was it you manager?
 19 A. It was Lee Sinnott.
 20 Q. You have told us, as we've seen from the organisation
 21 charts, that the two key sets of team members that
 22 you have that we're interested in are duty control room
 23 operatives and security patrol officers.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Can I ask you briefly what do they do? So first of all,

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1 control room operatives.
 2 A. To be honest with you, there's no real difference
 3 between them. They're trained exactly the same, they
 4 can all do the same duties. The patrols are shared
 5 between the patrol officer and the duty control room
 6 operator. It was just something to give the duty
 7 control room operator a bit of supervision, make a bit
 8 of a decision every now and then, but I believe
 9 everybody's equal now, there's no patrol officers any
 10 more, there's no duty control room operators, but they
 11 all do the same functions.
 12 Q. Is it right that, particularly on an event day, so not
 13 during the event but on an event day, the two key
 14 functions we're going to be interested in are --- there's
 15 patrolling around the arena complex?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And there's also --- someone will be on duty in the
 18 control room monitoring everything that's going on?
 19 A. Whiskey Control has got to be manned 24/7. There's
 20 always somebody got to be in there.
 21 Q. Is it right that if, because of sickness or leave or
 22 various other reasons, some of the shifts can't be
 23 covered by your team, you would arrange for personnel
 24 from ShowSec to come in and cover them?
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. Would those ShowSec people just do the patrols, the
 2 access control, or would they also be CCTV monitoring
 3 and doing the control room?
 4 A. We have four ShowSec staff that we've worked with for
 5 a long time. Their control room duties are monitoring
 6 CCTV but not operating it. They've been with us for
 7 around about 6 or 7 years now, on and off, so we've been
 8 teaching them little bits as they go along. That's the
 9 general idea: we need a full bank of staff, you know,
 10 that we can call on. Normally, when it gets to round
 11 about that time of year, these guys are off on other
 12 duties, so the people that --- the ShowSec people that we
 13 employ, they're there primarily just to, say, for
 14 example, they'd be receiving the radios back, booking
 15 the keys. It's generally to assist the guys on CCTV but
 16 not actually operating CCTV.
 17 Q. That's helpful, thank you. Because we just heard from
 18 Thomas Bailey yesterday and he said he hadn't realised
 19 that the ShowSec staff he would be providing for cover
 20 might do CCTV monitoring.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Because they had to have a licence for that and they
 23 didn't necessarily have one. Does that fit with what
 24 you've been telling us?
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. Finally, just before we move on to some issues of
 2 training, I want to ask you what you knew about the risk
 3 assessment process in your role in the security team and
 4 as fire safety officer. Let me bring up a document.
 5 I'm going to ask if you know about it. {INQ001359/1}.
 6 This is the SMG operational procedures. I just
 7 wanted to check with you, is this a document you would
 8 be familiar with?
 9 A. Yes, I am.
 10 Q. Did you have any input into the risk assessments in this
 11 document or is that for others?
 12 A. No, that was done by the events department.
 13 Q. Did you know anything about or have any input into the
 14 ShowSec risk assessments?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Thank you, that's very clear.
 17 Let me ask you about training. You've done the SIA
 18 door supervisor training course?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Did you hold a door supervisor licence in May 2017?
 21 A. No, I didn't. My duties were no longer front line
 22 operative, it was more administration. I've actually
 23 renewed my licence in 2018 and that was basically so
 24 I could assist in the control room again when they were
 25 short-staffed.

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1 Q. So in 2017 you were very much a manager --
 2 A. I was a manager, I was office based.
 3 Q. I understand you've done various other courses in
 4 management, in health and safety, fire safety, first
 5 aid.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. For obvious reasons we're particularly interested in the
 8 training that you've had over the years in
 9 counter-terrorism --
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. -- and in recognising suspicious behaviour.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. I would like to take a little bit more time on that.
 14 First of all, counter-terrorism. Is it right you
 15 did some training, something called Project Griffin?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about when you did that and
 18 what it involved?
 19 A. The last time I did Project Griffin, I think was round
 20 about 2017. I can't remember -- is it Eyes Wide Open,
 21 the video on that?
 22 Q. If it helps, you could refer to your statement. It's
 23 paragraphs 21 and onwards. Your main inquiry statement.
 24 It should be tab 2, hopefully, of your bundle.
 25 Do you have that?

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1 A. Yes, I do now.
 2 Q. You say there you did Project Griffin training in
 3 September 2016; does that sound about right?
 4 A. Yes, that was the last time I did Griffin, yes.
 5 Q. Again, sorry, you were telling me what you remembered
 6 from it but I interrupted.
 7 A. I think it's the -- one of the videos, I can't remember
 8 which one it was, Eyes Wide Open. The problem is I've
 9 seen that many videos now. Obviously, Run Hide and Tell
 10 was in there and the HOT procedures.
 11 Q. And you've also done something called Project Argus,
 12 training by GMP?
 13 A. Yes, I have.
 14 Q. You also mentioned doing an internal set of desktop
 15 exercises --
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. -- that were run by Miriam Stone and some people from
 18 ShowSec?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. What did that involve, particularly the last couple
 21 you've done?
 22 A. The last couple, they're all based on different
 23 scenarios, incidents which could happen outside the
 24 arena or within the arena. And the idea was you'd be
 25 put into different groups, like out of the four fire

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1 safety officers there would be one fire safety officer
 2 and one duty manager in each group and each group would
 3 come up with what they thought best procedure was
 4 in that scenario.
 5 Q. Did you get involved with something called
 6 Exercise Sherman?
 7 A. No, I didn't.
 8 Q. Was counter-terrorism -- you've suggested you've seen
 9 lots of videos, you've done lots of training on this.
 10 Was counter-terrorism covered in any of the courses
 11 you have done over the last few years?
 12 A. To my knowledge, I can't remember, sir.
 13 Q. Perhaps more importantly, did you feel you were
 14 sufficiently trained in counter-terrorism?
 15 A. Yes. The counter-terrorism inside the Whiskey Control
 16 is constantly ongoing every day because of the footfall
 17 of the station, people passing through. Just to
 18 highlight that, there is no filming or photography
 19 allowed on arena property, on Hunts Bank, so we were
 20 always -- you know, it'd be a couple of times a week,
 21 we were going up approaching people, and anything,
 22 obviously, suspicious would be reported on to BTP or the
 23 counter-terrorism hotline.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did that really apply to people coming
 25 to events and people doing selfies and things like that?

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1 A. It's very difficult to sort -- we do get people coming
 2 because it's like a tourist attraction, the
 3 Manchester Arena. People coming to events, they will
 4 have stills, but we don't primarily go for them people
 5 on event days. It's more out of the dark hours when
 6 there's no events on.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are there any signs up saying "no
 8 photography"?"
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Actually on event days, I have no doubt
 11 they all do it?
 12 A. They will do, yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 14 MR HENDERSON: In particular, did you and your colleagues
 15 feel confident that you knew what kind of behaviour
 16 would be suspicious?
 17 A. Yes. To be honest with you, the amount of people that
 18 we look at and would see on a day-to-day basis,
 19 I mean... We're attached to a train station, there's
 20 plenty of people always about, so you knew exactly what
 21 to look for. The lads that actually work in the control
 22 room are all ex ShowSec employees as well that worked at
 23 Manchester Arena, so this is what we sort of look for.
 24 They had an insight into the arena before they came to
 25 Whiskey Control, so they're very experienced in what to

13

1 look for.
 2 Q. Would you know what steps to take? You've given an
 3 example of someone filming on a dark day and you'd go
 4 and approach them?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. What would you do if you were in a the control room one
 7 day and you got a report of suspicious behaviour from
 8 a member of your team, say someone is acting in a way
 9 that suggests hostile reconnaissance? What would you
 10 do?
 11 A. Primarily, the approach that we've always had, we send
 12 someone out to speak to them. If it is hostile
 13 reconnaissance, there's a couple of reasons, one, we're
 14 on the ball, and the one thing I ask the lads to
 15 mention: excuse me, sir, we've just noticed you on the
 16 CCTV, we just wondered if you're lost and if we can
 17 help. Then, if there is something going on, that person
 18 knows we've got an image of them, if that makes sense.
 19 That was our first port of call and the main thing is
 20 you need to approach them and speak to them.
 21 Q. Would there be situations where you wouldn't approach if
 22 it was something considered more urgent or more serious?
 23 A. Say, for example, you know, we had an attack going on,
 24 it'd be obviously 999 calls straightaway. If it was
 25 something we were a little bit concerned about -- we did

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1 have an incident, it was after the actual bombing, with
 2 a male that we thought was doing hostile reconnaissance.
 3 So what we did then, we got British Transport Police
 4 en route, we monitored it on CCTV and let British
 5 Transport Police deal with it. But it's trying to suss
 6 out what that situation is. There's many, many types of
 7 different situations.
 8 Q. Let me ask you a bit about your awareness of risk in
 9 2017. Did you know what the official national terrorism
 10 threat level was?
 11 A. Yes, it'd be severe.
 12 Q. And did you know that one of the possible risks of
 13 terrorism was a person-borne IED?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. To what extent did you know that egress was a time of
 16 particular risk back in 2017?
 17 A. Can you just explain that again, please?
 18 Q. Yes. To what extent were you aware that when people are
 19 egressing from the event, at the time of exit, that
 20 might be a particular risk point?
 21 A. Yes, it could be due to the mass of people there.
 22 Q. And was that something you were aware of as a risk in
 23 terms of terrorism or were you more concerned about
 24 crowd management?
 25 A. Both, terrorism and crowd management.

15

1 Q. To what extent were you aware that the City Room exit
 2 was a particular risk as opposed to other parts of the
 3 arena complex?
 4 A. Mainly because it was attached to the transport hub,
 5 Victoria Station, and because also there was
 6 a pedestrian walkway through there. At that time it was
 7 open to the public and anybody could walk through there.
 8 So obviously, yes, there was a risk.
 9 Q. Just to press you on that, did you realise it was
 10 a particularly risky space or was it just one of many?
 11 A. It's one of many. It's one of many. I think Tom
 12 explained it yesterday. It's every door on egress. The
 13 amount of volume is still the same coming out possibly
 14 on each door, they balance out the same, so there could
 15 be potential attacks on any door, not just City Rooms.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I understand that? The same number
 17 of people are coming out and therefore the same
 18 number -- amount of risk. But from the point of view of
 19 identifying people as being suspicious on CCTV cameras,
 20 for example, would it not be more difficult in the
 21 City Room than in other places?
 22 A. I'd say it was the same, sir, on all those, the amount
 23 of people we've got.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Don't you have more people who are
 25 legitimately there for nothing to do with the arena

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1 being in and out of the City Room and other places?
 2 A. Yes, sir. I see what you mean, yes, City Room, yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So picking out someone who's out of
 4 place, it might be more difficult in the City Room than
 5 elsewhere?
 6 A. Yes, you're correct, sir.
 7 MR HENDERSON: Finally on this, were you aware in May 2017
 8 of the CCTV blind spot which we've dealt with at some
 9 length?
 10 A. The actual blind spot... I couldn't say yes and
 11 I couldn't say no, because until the inquiry, it wasn't
 12 something that I'd really realised. From my point of
 13 view, my actual cleaning team, if there was any
 14 incidents, they're out in City Rooms all day long and
 15 the Trinity Way link corridor. From my point of view,
 16 I'd never really considered it and obviously until,
 17 I think it was January 2018, when McDonald's shut down.
 18 Q. I think 2017.
 19 A. Was it 2017? Yes. Well, when McDonald's was open,
 20 there was a footfall of people going backwards and
 21 forwards through there. The actual procedures at the
 22 time was when McDonald's was open -- this was all
 23 pre--the explosion -- the City Rooms would be locked down
 24 at 10 pm each night when McDonald's, or 12 o'clock,
 25 depending on what time they shut. So it was always

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1 a closed area.
 2 So if McDonald's had an incident -- we've had it
 3 in the past with vagrants, drug abuse taking place,
 4 random areas -- McDonald's would ring us and say,
 5 "There's somebody behind the back here, somebody at the
 6 front", and obviously, we'd send somebody up there to
 7 deal with it.
 8 Q. Right. So you weren't really aware of there being
 9 a CCTV blind spot in that area, you would normally
 10 expect someone from McDonald's to say --
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. -- if there was a problem or if there was something
 13 suspicious --
 14 A. That's just a protocol I've always known since I've been
 15 there.
 16 Q. Let me move now, Mr Johnson, to --
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry. So it was never -- one of
 18 your jobs is security and you're a security supervisor.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It was never discussed within your team
 21 at any stage that there was a blind spot there?
 22 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because the blind spot was really
 24 irrelevant while McDonald's was open?
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 2 MR HENDERSON: I want to move now to the Whiskey Control
 3 Room and the procedures governing that. You and your
 4 staff that worked in the Whiskey Control Room were fully
 5 trained in the systems according to a manual,
 6 I understand.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. So let's look at that manual and we'll go through a few
 9 key topics.
 10 {INQ025127/1}. This is quite a lengthy document
 11 that sets out all the different things that are done
 12 through the Whiskey Control Room systems. I'm going to
 13 focus in on just a few things which are of particular
 14 interest to us.
 15 First of all, if we can go to {INQ025127/4}. We can
 16 see at the bottom of that page, "Section 1, CCTV". Is
 17 it correct, Mr Johnson, I think you've mentioned this
 18 already, that the CCTV is monitored by Whiskey Control
 19 Room 24 hours a day, 7 days a week?
 20 A. That's correct.
 21 Q. During events, can you just help us, we've heard a bit
 22 of evidence about this already, but things change, don't
 23 they? How does it shift to Sierra Control Room?
 24 A. Basically, what Sierra Control -- if I can just explain,
 25 there was five different banks of cameras. We call them

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1 five units. Sierra Control would have units 1 and 2 and
 2 Whiskey Control would have 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The reason
 3 Sierra Control had them ones is unit 1 was primarily
 4 internal cameras, unit 2 external cameras. So for --
 5 what Sierra Control could see is the egress routes and
 6 stuff like that. That's the way the two units were put
 7 together.
 8 Within Whiskey Control we had the other three units
 9 and that was normally landlord's stuff, staircases,
 10 internal offices, office space and stuff like that.
 11 So 1 and 2 is primarily set up for, you know, event
 12 use and we would do the rest of the monitoring
 13 downstairs in Whiskey Control if that makes sense.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does, but I do want to understand
 15 a bit more. The camera which swings round, the one that
 16 you can move.
 17 A. The one in City Room? Yes, unit 2, camera 2 at the
 18 time.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which is quite a critical camera from
 20 our point of view.
 21 A. Yes, it was, yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That monitored the queue?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So Sierra had that one?
 25 A. Sierra Control had that one. Can I just interrupt, sir,

20

1 sorry? It doesn't mean that we couldn't operate it.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, I understand that. So you can see
 3 it. Suppose Sierra has got it focused on the queue,
 4 which is quite likely.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You can see the queue as well?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And if you wanted it for any reason, say
 9 someone had rung in and said, "We want to see someone up
 10 by McDonald's", or something like that, you can then
 11 contact event control and say, "Can we take control of
 12 that camera?"
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then did they need to release
 15 something or could you just automatically take it?
 16 A. It's more a cursor, sir.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you needed their permission to do
 18 it?
 19 A. We'd phone over and say, "We're just taking unit 2,
 20 camera 2 for a minute", and then obviously they'd know
 21 we've got it and we're not just moving it without any
 22 notification to them.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. But from the point of view of,
 24 say, keeping the McDonald's stairs and the other one
 25 under observation, assuming as is likely they'd got it

1 fixed on the queues, you wouldn't be able to see it?
 2 A. No.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.
 4 MR HENDERSON: Just to be clear, picking up on the
 5 chairman's questions, we've understood the conventional
 6 practice is that Sierra Control take control of the
 7 cameras during the event, which they can see.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. The ones that you've described as being event-specific.
 10 And that would include the City Room main pan, tilt and
 11 zoom camera?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. Whiskey Control, you would still be monitoring the other
 14 cameras for the rest of the complex?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And you could still take control of any of the cameras
 17 if you needed to?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. How often, realistically, would you take control of any
 20 cameras when Sierra Control are in charge?
 21 A. It happened quite often. Just say for example that
 22 Sierra Control have got an incident going on in one
 23 area, we may get a phone call from Sierra Control
 24 saying, "There's another incident happening on the other
 25 side of the arena, can you cover that and we'll cover

1 this". We basically work -- even though they're
 2 separate control rooms we work together, if that makes
 3 sense.
 4 Q. How would you communicate Sierra Control Room? Would
 5 you use the radio or telephone?
 6 A. No, landline.
 7 Q. That then brings us to the second thing I want to ask
 8 you about, which is radios --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we go to that, I want to know how
 10 in practice the monitoring of the CCTV is actually done.
 11 So you can have a situation where someone is actually
 12 looking at the monitors all the time --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- focused on them and is looking for
 15 things? So did that happen in Whiskey Control?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: All the time?
 18 A. Yes. There will always be one person dedicated and sat
 19 there.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So they're looking at stuff
 21 themselves to see if they can see anything; is that
 22 right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: All the time?
 25 A. Yes.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They're also responsive, is that right?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So someone will ring in and say, "I'm
 4 concerned about that"?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And if on an event night -- everyone
 7 rings in to event control on event night, right?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if someone rings in to event control
 10 and says, "I'm worried about a suspicious somebody
 11 there", they are then likely to then ring you and say,
 12 "Can you put your cameras on something, we've been told
 13 there's something suspicious"?
 14 A. Yes, depending where the location was, yes. Primarily
 15 external areas. That worked vice versa. We'd sometimes
 16 get a call from, say, Victoria Station, they've seen
 17 something down the bottom and we'd do it the other way
 18 round.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that, but I'm really
 20 concerned about communications between you and event
 21 control. So everything we're talking about here
 22 happened near egress time?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Everybody coming out. So they've got
 25 plenty to do in event control?

1 A. Yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Somebody rings them up and says, "We're
 3 concerned about someone who is, we think, acting
 4 suspiciously in a particular place".
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The chances are that event control will
 7 ring you up and say, "Can you look into it?"
 8 A. Highly unlikely .
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they would deal with it as well?
 10 A. They would deal with it themselves. Just say, for
 11 example, the situation became serious, then they would
 12 ring us to contact the operators, like GMP, British
 13 Transport Police.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The normal procedure if someone appears
 15 to be suspicious is to send someone out to speak to
 16 them?
 17 A. Yes. That would be event control that'd do that, sir .
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They would do that, not you?
 19 A. Not me.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 21 MR HENDERSON: We're going to have a look at radios next.
 22 {INQ025127/11}, please, of that document.
 23 In section 4, we'll see there, deals with radios.
 24 There are two main base stations, one is in Whiskey
 25 Control Room.

25

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Did you use the same radio channels, we're not going to
 3 look at details of them, as ShowSec during events?
 4 A. As a fire safety officer , I do. Whiskey Control also
 5 do. But we also monitor all the channels that are
 6 coming in, so we can hear everything that's going on.
 7 Q. You hear all the traffic ?
 8 A. We hear all the traffic , yes.
 9 Q. Did you ever have any problems getting through on the
 10 radio when you needed to?
 11 A. Only if somebody was speaking. Then generally you could
 12 hear that conversation. If you try to key on when
 13 somebody's actually talking, it's called a channel
 14 lockout if that makes sense. What it means is if
 15 somebody's actually speaking on the radio, you can't
 16 speak, you can't go in until that person's took their
 17 finger off their button, if you understand what I'm
 18 going on about. But it'd be the length of the message.
 19 What we used to do -- if you had a very long message to
 20 send on the radio, you were told to use the landline , so
 21 if somebody was going on and on and on.
 22 But actually, not being able to get on them, you're
 23 talking 30 seconds maximum, if that. It depends on the
 24 length of the conversation the previous person's
 25 speaking.

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1 Q. We heard from Mr Bailey yesterday that there is an
 2 emergency channel, an emergency button. Did you ever
 3 actually have cause to use that?
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you know about it first?
 5 A. I just want to explain if I may, sir, the emergency
 6 button on the radios -- I don't know whether this was
 7 ever rolled out to ShowSec. I was quite surprised
 8 listening to some of the evidence in the inquiry that
 9 they knew about it. I know it had been pressed by
 10 accident and we phoned Sierra Control and said, can you
 11 get such--and--such a body, because you need to switch the
 12 radio off and switch the radio back on to get it fully
 13 functional again.
 14 But other than -- unless Lee Sinnott had said it,
 15 because he's one of the fire safety officers , he said it
 16 in a meeting... I didn't think ShowSec knew anything
 17 about that red button. The reason the red button was
 18 there because for my security officers when they're
 19 doing lone patrolling . Also each tenant around the site
 20 had a radio and one of the functions we installed was
 21 a panic alarm for them, like McDonald's, so it was
 22 a case of hitting that alarm.
 23 What actually happens to your radio is that that
 24 radio will broadcast live for 10 seconds, right over the
 25 channel it's on. Say for example you're on channel 1,

27

1 it will take over channel 1 for 10 seconds, so we can
 2 hear what's going on. Then we've got a mic that can go
 3 back to them and just say, "Right, we've got somebody on
 4 en route, whereabouts are you", blah, blah, and have the
 5 conversation then.
 6 The emergency of whatever radio number it is will
 7 show on our screen at the bottom and also show in
 8 Sierra Control. But we have a function in
 9 Whiskey Control to be able to reset that.
 10 MR HENDERSON: Would the emergency button, Mr Johnson, ever
 11 be used to report suspicious behaviour by your team?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. Not even if they thought it was urgent?
 14 A. No. The actual call, I don't know whether anybody else
 15 has said this to the inquiry at the moment, but the
 16 actual call my lads will use is, "[Whatever call sign
 17 they had], priority message". Priority message means
 18 nobody else speaks. If somebody tries to cut over them,
 19 we'd turn round and say to them, "Priority messages
 20 only". Other than pressed by accident I've never known
 21 them use it.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In the case of Mr Lawler, you know
 23 that's what we're talking about. So far as you know, he
 24 may well have known about any override button or the use
 25 of it?

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1 A. No, I don't know where that information came from, sir,
 2 how they knew about it at all. I didn't know that
 3 anybody from ShowSec knew about it.
 4 MR HENDERSON: Let me just ask you an introductory question,
 5 before we do the minute's silence, on Deister patrols.
 6 We understand the Deister patrols are a regular patrol
 7 that takes place across the entire arena complex.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Do they include looking for suspicious activities?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And I think we've heard this before, but just to confirm
 12 it from you, do they include going up on the mezzanine,
 13 as we've described it, of the City Room?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. So outside the JD Williams and the McDonald's doors?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. What was your understanding of who carried out that type
 18 of patrol during events?
 19 A. To be honest with you, I always thought it was ShowSec.
 20 Q. And did you ever have a conversation about that or was
 21 that an assumption?
 22 A. No, no.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You knew they didn't take the buzzers
 24 presumably?
 25 A. To explain, Deister has nothing to do with ShowSec.

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1 That's just mainly for my guys. They don't get involved
 2 in the same sort of patrols as we do. We are more
 3 landlord's area, you know, going back of house places.
 4 That's more or less what the Deister's for, but ShowSec,
 5 no, they don't -- even if they're doing cover with us,
 6 we wouldn't give them the Deister because the Deister
 7 point is very, very tiny and hidden to stop them being
 8 pulled off and stuff like that.
 9 MR HENDERSON: So ShowSec would never use that equipment,
 10 they wouldn't follow that pattern?
 11 A. No, no.
 12 Q. But you did think they were covering the City Room
 13 during an event?
 14 A. Like I say, sir, it was something I'd never really
 15 looked into, but yes, I did.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Anybody who would prefer not to
 17 be in the room for the two-minute silence, I think now
 18 would be a good opportunity to go.
 19 Do you want to take a break while that happens and
 20 leave or are you happy to stay here?
 21 A. I'm fine, sir.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 (A two-minute silence was observed)
 24 MR HENDERSON: The final area I want to ask you about from
 25 the manual and systems is first aid. I understand that

30

1 Whiskey Control room has a function in terms of having
 2 some first aid training.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Is it right that you had training for you and your team
 5 from someone called Ian Parry?
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. At Emergency Training UK?
 8 A. Correct.
 9 Q. And Emergency Training UK provided first aid for events
 10 at the arena?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. They also provided first aid training, including
 13 defibrillator training, to you and your team, is that
 14 right?
 15 A. That's correct.
 16 Q. Do you remember how many people roughly were trained
 17 at the arena in May 2017?
 18 A. I'd say round about 30 people. I think they did two
 19 sessions of 12... Yes, it's round about 30.
 20 Q. At any one time how many people would have been on duty
 21 who had the training?
 22 A. On a dark day, we're talking about?
 23 Q. This is on an event day.
 24 A. Just arena staff?
 25 Q. Just arena staff?

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1 A. I'd say 15, between 15 and 20.
 2 Q. Did you personally have that training?
 3 A. Yes, I have.
 4 Q. Can I ask you just about the relationship between your
 5 security team and some of the other people around who
 6 had a security function. The first and most obvious is
 7 the police.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Can you just tell us what was the relationship like
 10 between your team, the facilities management staff and
 11 security team, and the police? If there was a need to
 12 contact police officers, how would you go about doing
 13 it?
 14 A. Primarily, what we would do -- obviously there's police
 15 officers on the station, British Transport Police.
 16 We've got great communication lines with the other
 17 departments like Victoria Train Station, JD Williams,
 18 NCP car parks and stuff like that. If we needed the
 19 police urgently, we'd have a look on the station, see if
 20 there's any police officers there, and then we'd give
 21 the duty manager and ring and say, "Look, could you get
 22 one of the police officers to bob up and see us". The
 23 relationship between us and British Transport Police is
 24 fantastic. I've made many friends in the service over
 25 the 20 years. They've given me sound advice.

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1 BTP normally bob in once a week, sometimes
 2 requesting to have a look at the CCTV -- because we
 3 don't just cover the arena, we've got -- external
 4 cameras so it may be for a car that's passing the gate
 5 and they might just want to look at something like that.
 6 But we work very, very closely with them.
 7 Q. You're talking here about a general relationship. How
 8 about with GMP?
 9 A. Not so much GMP. I do know GMP officers, but mainly our
 10 first point of contact is British Transport Police.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You look on the station? Do you look
 12 physically?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have heard of people actually going
 15 out to see if they can find them.
 16 A. We could actually see, on our cameras, the concourse.
 17 So we just -- say, you know, if we can see a police
 18 officer there, either if we can't get hold of the duty
 19 manager, one of my lads, the patrol officer, would go
 20 and speak to them.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you would see where they are and then
 22 you would send them out if they were on the station?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It doesn't sound great in an emergency.
 25 A. The problem we had, sir, and I don't know whether this

1 has been mentioned at the inquiry, British Transport
 2 Police go to a call centre in Birmingham. And we found
 3 it very, very difficult to get through to them. It's
 4 something that I have spoken to British Transport Police
 5 about. The fast response was -- actually going and
 6 speaking to them and getting them up there was quicker.
 7 A lot of occasions with the BTP line, it's been engaged.
 8 MR HENDERSON: That's if you're trying to call to BTP?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. You go straight to a call centre in Birmingham?
 11 A. Yes, and the problem you have there is trying to explain
 12 where we are, because obviously there's
 13 a Victoria Station in London which they're also dealing
 14 with.
 15 Q. And the chairman raised the question of what happens in
 16 an emergency. Who would make the emergency call if
 17 something happens?
 18 A. It would be one of my operators. If it's a real
 19 emergency, it'd just be straight 999 because then we're
 20 not really interested if it's BTP or GMP that turn up as
 21 long as we have police officers there.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But if it was 999, would it be GMP?
 23 A. Normally it will be GMP that'll who turn up.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if you're ringing BTP, you have a
 25 specific number for the call centre?

1 A. We call a separate number -- yes, we have.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And no discussion about perhaps having
 3 an emergency number for you to directly contact someone
 4 somewhere?
 5 A. I think that's in place now, sir, but I don't think it
 6 was at the time.
 7 MR HENDERSON: We've been discussing this at a sort of
 8 general day-to-day level. In particular, when an event
 9 is taking place, did you have any direct contact with
 10 the police officers who would be on duty for that event?
 11 A. Only through passing the control room, you know, where
 12 they'd let on and stuff like that. But no, it was all
 13 events. If they're actually working an event, it'd be
 14 the events side of it.
 15 Q. Let's just unpack that slightly. If you had arranged
 16 for a specific police presence for a particular event,
 17 which we've heard occasionally happens --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- how would the relationship with the police officers
 20 work?
 21 A. We'd have nothing to do with it because it's an event
 22 thing. It's nothing to do with Whiskey Control.
 23 Q. If there wasn't a particular police presence being
 24 bought in, it was just a normal event and the police
 25 officers who were there were just patrolling the

1 station, was there any formal contact, did anyone from
 2 the police side contact you to say here's who's
 3 available or anything like that?
 4 A. No, no.
 5 Q. Did you ever ask why not, why there wasn't --
 6 A. Like I say, on events it was normally Sierra Control
 7 that were running the event. So primarily, it was down
 8 to them.
 9 Q. The second set of people that we've heard a bit about
 10 are the anti-bootleg merchandise security team.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Did you have any communication with them as
 13 Whiskey Control and as the security team?
 14 A. No, once again that's event-related.
 15 Q. The final topic to cover before we go on to the events
 16 of the 22nd itself is logbooks. I understand you, as
 17 one of the roles in Whiskey Control, keep a log of all
 18 key occurrences that take place.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. What kind of things would that be?
 21 A. It could be incidents, it could be people on site.
 22 Primarily, it's passing information on from the
 23 following oncoming team. They have a control room
 24 handover sheet -- it's people out patrolling, what we're
 25 actually doing and where them people are at the time.

1 If we had an incident which required an incident
 2 report, there would be only a brief line in, in the
 3 actual incident report, which would also say, "Incident
 4 report log number, blah, blah, blah". That's mainly
 5 what it's used for.
 6 Q. Let's just look, as a way of transitioning to talk about
 7 the events of the day, at the logbook for 22 May.
 8 {INQ025141/1}. If we can go to page 21 of that
 9 {INQ025141/21}.
 10 Mr Johnson, is this the logbook for 22 May? It
 11 starts on the 21st, I think.
 12 A. Yes, the bottom line is the 22nd.
 13 Q. We can see there the kinds of entries that you were
 14 talking about.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. If we flick over one page {INQ025141/22}, please.
 17 We can see, continuing down, the entries stop at 20.20,
 18 so 20 minutes past 8.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And there's nothing further after that?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Is that unusual or would you expect there only --
 23 A. No, it should have been done. Certain operators,
 24 because if it's a busy night, they would make a bullet
 25 note of times and incidents, and they would fill the

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1 duty log in when they got a moment to do it at the end
 2 of the night. As on the 22nd, because of what happened,
 3 I just think it got overlooked at times because of
 4 everything else that was going on and we were just
 5 extremely busy.
 6 Q. All right. Let's then come to the events of 22 May.
 7 First of all, I'm going to ask you in a little more
 8 detail about the events up to the time of detonation and
 9 then we'll deal with the subsequent events very quickly.
 10 A. Okay.
 11 Q. So were you working as the fire safety officer in
 12 Whiskey Control Room on 22 May?
 13 A. I wasn't -- I was the fire safety officer, but most of
 14 my evening was spent in my office, which is adjacent.
 15 Q. Were the other people in Whiskey Control Room
 16 Mike Edwards --
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. -- who we've heard from, and Steve Noone?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. Who did you report to on that day? Who was your line
 21 manager?
 22 A. Not so much line manager because we're all on the same
 23 part, but normally Miriam Stone.
 24 Q. Did you attend a pre-event briefing?
 25 A. Yes, I do.

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1 Q. Because that's a normal occurrence?
 2 A. That's normal, yes.
 3 Q. And can you remember what that briefing involved? Were
 4 there any specific things that were flagged to you?
 5 A. I don't remember that specific one, I've been to that
 6 many.
 7 Q. We've had a lot of questioning about pre-event briefings
 8 and what they covered. One thing I want to check with
 9 you is this: is your recollection there was always
 10 something about counter-terrorism or suspicious
 11 behaviour?
 12 A. Yes, there was. Also, it was also brought up by event
 13 managers, even James Allen, who's been at the inquiry,
 14 as a general manager. It was always like any other
 15 business at the end, something's going on, something's
 16 been reported, it'd be the duty managers that would
 17 bring it up to inform the supervisors, which I believe
 18 would then go on and tell the stewards.
 19 Q. The first main role that you then had, rather your team
 20 had, was to carry out the pre-event Deister patrols?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Were they all done as normal?
 23 A. No. I think looking at that, I think we did three on
 24 that day, and the last one was round about 12.38.
 25 That's primarily due to how busy we were in the control

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1 room. Different events, if you look leading up to that,
 2 just to explain how many patrols we can get in, the
 3 Take That concert, after they load-out at night-time
 4 after the shows' finished, that took until 6.30 that
 5 following morning with 200 people on site loading out.
 6 So the control room staff were extremely busy.
 7 You tend to find with American artists, they are
 8 very, very demanding, basically asking for keys,
 9 information, radios, stuff like that. So American shows
 10 were normally very, very busy.
 11 Q. So it was very busy and I think what you're saying is
 12 busy with the logistics of the event?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. So helping those who were actually running the artist
 15 and their entourage to set up?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And that meant that there would perhaps normally have
 18 been some further patrols done in the afternoon?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. But those weren't done?
 21 A. They weren't done that day.
 22 Q. There are also supposed to be specific pre-ingress
 23 checks that are done though. Were those carried out?
 24 A. There was a pre-egress sheet that Whiskey Control had --
 25 Q. Sorry, just to stop you. I'm talking about ingress.

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1 We're working through the day.
 2 A. Sorry.
 3 Q. Pre-ingress checks are done by your team before handing
 4 over to ShowSec?
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
 6 Q. Were those done on the 22nd?
 7 A. That was done. That's actually recorded in the duty
 8 log.
 9 Q. Then everything's clear to open the doors and you enter
 10 show mode; is that right?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. What does the role of Whiskey Control become once show
 13 mode is --
 14 A. Just basically, monitoring CCTV cameras, dealing with
 15 phone enquiries. Just say, for example, somebody's got
 16 an issue with their radio, they'd come back with
 17 their radio and we would check the radio or give them a
 18 new radio. People are constantly coming for keys and
 19 stuff like that. At the time in 2007 (sic), if
 20 I remember rightly, everybody in the back gate had to
 21 hand their car keys in, so people were backwards and
 22 forwards with car keys.
 23 Then you'd get contractors arriving, you know
 24 cleaning contractors, ready for the end of the show.
 25 We'd have to sign all them in. Visitors coming to site

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1 we'd have access passes for -- you know, say somebody
 2 out of the production's left a pass there for someone
 3 they are expecting, so we'll have their name.
 4 We'd have to monitor the pedestrian gate for people
 5 arriving at work, because there's an intercom there. So
 6 there was an awful lot to do.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does that go on all through the event?
 8 A. Yes. There is quiet periods, don't get me wrong, but
 9 it's like that all the time.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's being done by two people?
 11 A. That's being done by two people -- well... The way it's
 12 positioned, sir, is say the bank of cameras is there and
 13 the window's there (indicating), there's not much --
 14 it's not as if you're going into another room and doing
 15 a different role, it's all the same.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we did hear that Mr Edwards had
 17 to sort out a lift, if not two. He certainly went for
 18 one.
 19 A. Right. Where that actual lift is, where Mr Edwards
 20 went, is just virtually facing the control room. So
 21 it's just a case of going briefly out of that room,
 22 resetting the lift, and back to control room. Say
 23 he was going to be out a little bit longer, if I was in
 24 my office, he'd knock on my door and say, "Paul, can you
 25 just come into control, I've got to go there".

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1 So because of my background -- I mean one of the
 2 questions I've heard through the inquiry is: do FSOs
 3 watch CCTV? FSOs will if there's an incident that they
 4 need to look at the CCTV, like a fire alarm or something
 5 like that, but primarily, no.
 6 I do because that was part of my role and it's
 7 something I've never sort of got out of, so I know
 8 exactly how Whiskey Control works, if that makes sense.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does and we appreciate how busy you
 10 were and all the rest of it. It's just really whether
 11 during this evening, with everything going on, there
 12 really was a possibility of somebody really looking at
 13 the -- monitoring the CCTV screens most of the time.
 14 A. There will always be one, sir, sat there looking at it.
 15 MR HENDERSON: That perhaps answers my next question.
 16 I understand you, after the initial flurry of activity,
 17 went to your office and were doing paperwork next door.
 18 Who was monitoring the CCTV then?
 19 A. That'd be Steve and Mike. Normally it'd be Mike all the
 20 time and then Steve tended to do the signing in, issuing
 21 the radios and dealing with that sort of stuff, the
 22 pedestrian gate.
 23 Q. Is it right you didn't have any incidents or suspicious
 24 behaviour drawn to your attention?
 25 A. No.

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1 Q. Was your impression that it was quite a straightforward
 2 show?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Is it right you started watching the cameras again
 5 though about two songs from the end of the concert?
 6 A. Yes. It's just a habit that I've always had if I'm not
 7 there. It's looking at the egress routes, you know,
 8 going out. You probably heard in previous evidence of
 9 problems that we have with illegal merch blocking
 10 doorways and stuff like that, which causes the concourse
 11 to start backing up because the crowd flow isn't going
 12 correctly. That's the sort of stuff I'm looking for.
 13 Q. You're primarily looking for illegal merchandise?
 14 A. It's egress routes, and if I can just add to that, also
 15 I've got to have a safe route in the backyard as well
 16 for emergency vehicles coming in.
 17 Q. What time would that have been? Would that be quarter
 18 past 10, something like that?
 19 A. I would say round about -- yeah, round about quarter
 20 past 10. Between quarter past and 20 past. What might
 21 happen is I'd have the radio on and normally I'd hear,
 22 "Down to the last song now", and that's when I'd finish
 23 off what I'm doing, get ready for the egress.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you go into the room?
 25 A. Yes, I go into Whiskey Control.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the cameras that you were looking at
2 would be focused, as far as you are concerned, with
3 looking at egress routes?
4 A. Yes.
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is of course the benefit of
6 hindsight, but we do know, of course, that egress is
7 a particularly risky time for something to happen, like
8 a bomber.
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Actually, everyone's focus really is on
11 making sure everyone can get out all right rather than
12 looking for a suspicious person maybe.
13 A. Possibly, yes, sir.
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
15 MR HENDERSON: Do you remember the radio being particularly
16 busy at that time?
17 A. I can't recall.
18 Q. If someone had suggested there was something suspicious
19 at that point, what, if anything, would you in
20 Whiskey Control have done?
21 A. We would inform the duty manager and then it'd be
22 a decision made between myself, the head of security,
23 and probably Miriam Stone who was on on the night.
24 We would communicate with each because we all -- not
25 just one person makes a decision, it's the three of us

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1 combined.
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's quite a difficult decision maybe,
3 how serious is this, how dramatic do we go in our
4 response?
5 A. Yes.
6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do we send out someone to have a look
7 and speak to the person?
8 A. Yes, definitely. The first approach if you've got
9 somebody suspicious is send someone out there and speak
10 to them.
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In your experience, would you actually
12 close everything down while you're going to speak to
13 them?
14 A. I had a conversation with Miriam, sort of going back to
15 my -- this is my view, if he'd been identified, the way
16 I'd have handled it is just getting the stewards to go
17 out and speak to the people in the City Rooms and slowly
18 bring them in and try not to cause an alarm, if that
19 makes sense, and then get on to the duty manager in the
20 station, let the duty manager know what's going on and
21 we'd stop access coming out of the bridge, shut
22 Trinity Way down -- that actual area then was all
23 concealed so nobody could go into that area. And the
24 people that are in there, if we could, we would get them
25 inside the arena and shut the doors, if that makes

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1 sense.
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It makes sense. It's not actually what
3 Miriam Stone's reaction was. So we have two different
4 views now.
5 A. There was a conversation I had with Miriam -- it was
6 only a couple of weeks ago (overspeaking) --
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure this conversation would have
8 taken place, what could have happened if we'd known
9 earlier or if we'd responded. At the moment you say you
10 decide together?
11 A. Yes.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Your advice would have been to get
13 everyone inside then shut the door?
14 A. Yes.
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Her reaction was, shut the doors, leave
16 everybody outside.
17 A. That wouldn't be my view, sir.
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
19 MR HENDERSON: Had you ever had those kind of discussions
20 before, that decision to make before? It's very, very
21 difficult with the benefit of hindsight to think about
22 what you'd have done on that day.
23 A. Only if it had been brought up on -- you mentioned
24 before tabletop exercises. A lot of them decisions are
25 based around about what we'd done on tabletop exercises

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1 when we worked together as a team, so yes.
2 Q. When you'd had to think it through in those tabletop
3 exercises, we've heard you and Miriam Stone had slightly
4 different thoughts about what would have happened on
5 this event, what kind of options did you discuss on
6 those tabletops?
7 A. Just primarily how stewards would react, where to put
8 people, what we'd do -- if we'd lost a door, how we'd
9 get people out. On the actual night of the incident,
10 one of the things I always remember bringing up in
11 a tabletop exercise, because we never used to use what
12 we call -- the right-hand side of the stage is stage
13 right and on stage left there's an egress route, an easy
14 way out to the back yard and it was one of the things
15 that I'd brought up at these tabletop exercises about
16 using them because when you've got an emergency, it
17 doesn't matter, sir, it's get them out as fast as
18 possible. It doesn't matter which way they're going.
19 It was something I brought up at the meetings.
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we're all familiar in principle
21 with the sort of tabletop exercise you're talking about.
22 As you said, you have lots of different tables, they're
23 given the situation and each table reports back on what
24 they would have done. Did anyone at the end of those,
25 say, well, actually, this is the right answer and this

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1 is what we will do? Or did they just let all the
2 ideas --
3 A. No, I think after the tabletop exercises, I think there
4 was a meeting, it'd probably be Tom, Lee Sinnott at the
5 time, and Miriam that would sit down and see what we'd
6 got out of that meeting, anything that needed changing,
7 any new ideas that might have come in. So I think it
8 was like debriefed afterwards, after we'd done them, but
9 it was primarily between them three.
10 MR HENDERSON: Did you get told what the final outcome was?
11 A. Yes, if there's any changes, yes, or if we put in
12 positive feedback, that was a really good idea, that --
13 there was a lot of occasions when, like I'd said the
14 stage left, stage right, what people had never really
15 thought about. It's things like that.
16 Q. Finally, then, I just want to deal with the events after
17 the detonation of the bomb. I will deal with this quite
18 briefly at a high level and for anyone else watching,
19 I just want to give that warning.
20 Were you watching the cameras when the bomb
21 detonated?
22 A. Yes, I was.
23 Q. You simply saw a flash, as I understand it?
24 A. Just a flash, yes.
25 Q. Did you then try and ring 999?

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1 A. I think I took a step back first. I put it down in my
2 statement. I went to (inaudible) mode. There was
3 a state a period -- first of all, we didn't know what it
4 was. The screen had just gone white. So I couldn't
5 phone 999 because we didn't know what had happened. At
6 first I thought, is it a breakdown in the CCTV -- I said
7 a comment like, "Bloody CCTV", something like that.
8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does anybody want us to go through this
9 in any detail? I think we've all seen your statement.
10 This can be obviously distressing, as it is for you.
11 A. It is very distressing.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that. So if we just
13 paraphrase it. You took a step back to try and sort
14 your mind out?
15 A. Yes.
16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Then you tried to ring 999. You
17 couldn't get through?
18 A. Yes.
19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You assumed that everyone else was
20 getting through?
21 A. Yes.
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then essentially, you did your best
23 to help in the situation. People came to
24 Whiskey Control, police officers, to look and you were
25 there basically the whole night?

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1 A. I was there until round about 8.30 that morning.
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Doing what you could to assist?
3 A. Exactly, sir.
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does anybody want any more than that?
5 Thank you.
6 MR HENDERSON: I think then, sir, that is all my questions.
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
8 MR HENDERSON: I understand some others will have some
9 questions for you.
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you want a break?
11 MR HENDERSON: I'm very happy to do so, sir.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We should have a break, I think. We're
13 going to have a quarter of an hour break and then we'll
14 come back and complete your evidence.
15 (11.27 am)
16 (A short break)
17 (11.44 am)
18 Questions from MR LAIDLAW
19 MR LAIDLAW: Mr Johnson, I represent ShowSec, so just two or
20 three topics from me, please.
21 This may well be my fault, so forgive me, but
22 I wasn't entirely sure what your understanding was in
23 respect of patrols during events. Did I understand you
24 correctly to say that you had assumed this was taken up
25 by ShowSec, but that you'd not given it very much

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1 thought?
2 A. That's correct, sir. Like I say, where Whiskey Control
3 is, it's more event related.
4 Q. Yes. Let me see whether we can bring some clarity to
5 the position in this way. Just bear with me. One part
6 of FM's work, as you've explained, is the 24-hour 7-day
7 a week security service that you provide to the whole
8 arena complex?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And as we know, that's part of the agreement that one
11 corporate entity, or one corporate version of SMG, have
12 with the landlord. So that involves you looking at all
13 the buildings on the estate, including the car park,
14 offices, and of course the arena. That work is
15 concerned in part with the security of the building, is
16 it not? In other words, are these buildings secure?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And also looking at the fabric of the building to make
19 sure it's in the condition that it ought to be in?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. You accomplished that task, as we all now understand, by
22 way of the Deister patrols --
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. -- with the Deister equipment? As part of that patrol,
25 and without giving away any sensitive information, those

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1 patrols involve a visit to the mezzanine level in the
 2 City Room. Again, being careful, that visit is to check
 3 the security of the buildings at that level?
 4 A. That's correct, sir, and also surrounding areas.
 5 Q. And surrounding areas. In distinction to this aspect of
 6 facilities management work, because we're just dealing
 7 with one of a number of tasks you have, but in
 8 distinction with that aspect of your work, ShowSec's
 9 work is rather different, is it not?
 10 A. I would say so, yes.
 11 Q. They're only at work, of course, on event days.
 12 A. Unless they're covering the control room, helping out in
 13 the control room.
 14 Q. You're right to correct me. What I meant was the body
 15 of --
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. -- the ShowSec workforce but, as you say, we have to
 18 have in mind the evidence you also give. And their work
 19 is concerned with the management and the safety of the
 20 crowd, those people who are attending the event?
 21 A. That's how I understand it, sir.
 22 Q. And they're not concerned, as you would be, with the
 23 buildings, other aspects of the estate and the security
 24 of those aspects of the estate, are they?
 25 A. I couldn't comment because I don't know.

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1 Q. Just so we're absolutely clear, and you've said as much,
 2 ShowSec do not undertake Deister patrols?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Those patrols stop on event days, shortly before
 5 ShowSec, as it were, with the event manager, take charge
 6 of the arena?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And they're picked up, this is Deister patrols, once the
 9 event is at an end?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Control of the crowd, and we heard about this yesterday,
 12 obviously involves getting people into the event safely;
 13 would you agree?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Managing the crowd within the arena, again to secure
 16 their safety during the event?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And finally, egress, getting them, the crowd this is,
 19 safely away?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Although some members of ShowSec staff may be on
 22 mobile -- may have mobile duties, in other words moving
 23 around, all that they are doing is focused upon the
 24 crowd and its safety and the management of it; is that
 25 right?

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1 A. That's my understanding of it.
 2 Q. Radios, next, please. Just two or three questions about
 3 those. The radios back in 2017, at the time that the
 4 chairman is concerned with events at the arena, the
 5 radios that ShowSec used were SMG's radios, were they
 6 not?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. That particular radio, in terms of its design, had a red
 9 emergency button upon it?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. It would be pretty obvious, I would imagine, to anybody
 12 with any understanding what the red button was for,
 13 would it not?
 14 A. I wouldn't say anybody. My team, they were aware of it,
 15 because, like I said, it was used for tenants on the
 16 externals like a panic alarm. But like I said in
 17 previous evidence, I don't ever recall it being rolled
 18 out to ShowSec personnel.
 19 Q. No, that may well be right, and the question I asked you
 20 was whether it would be obvious what its function was to
 21 anybody who had some understanding of radios.
 22 Presumably, with your team --
 23 A. With my team, yes.
 24 Q. You'd give them some training and some instruction?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And those radios, which were placed in other buildings,
 2 again you'd need to --
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. -- give the radio holder some instructions. Did you
 5 know that ShowSec staff were also trained by ShowSec to
 6 use radios?
 7 A. I didn't.
 8 Q. Presumably you haven't seen their online training
 9 module?
 10 A. No. (Inaudible) seen it but watching the inquiry.
 11 Q. So I wonder whether in fact you are the right person to
 12 comment upon whether they had any understanding of the
 13 use of radios or not or is this better left to others?
 14 A. I don't know, sir.
 15 Q. The last question is this. Can I start with making this
 16 absolutely clear to you. This series of questions are
 17 not intended to cast blame or responsibility at all.
 18 I'm asking a series of questions that ShowSec witnesses
 19 have been asked and so this is simply me seeking
 20 something like a parity of approach.
 21 You have spoken of the CCTV training that those who
 22 monitored the screens in Whiskey Control had, and I can
 23 tell that you regarded these people, your staff, as
 24 well-trained --
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. -- and knowing what they were doing. During events,
 2 again as you've made perfectly clear to the chairman,
 3 your screens are all on?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And we're ignoring who has control of some of those
 6 screens for the moment. There is somebody who is
 7 monitoring those screens throughout the event?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And we know that those screens give you a view from
 10 a very large number of cameras, which were placed --
 11 A. There was 78 at the time we were looking at, sir.
 12 Q. -- which were placed around the arena. So the question
 13 is this, and it's probably one you've thought about, but
 14 it may be helpful to have your evidence. Are you able
 15 to say why it was that Abedi, who we know came into the
 16 City Rooms on two occasions with the rucksack -- do you
 17 know why his presence was not identified by staff in
 18 Whiskey Control?
 19 A. I wasn't in there, sir, so I don't know.
 20 Q. But using your experience of the nature of the City Room
 21 and the task which faces you guys in that room, are you
 22 able to help the inquiry with the sort of difficulties
 23 there may have been identifying somebody of his
 24 appearance in those areas?
 25 A. Well, to be honest with you, it wasn't uncommon to see

1 somebody like that walking through. Obviously, because
 2 we're attached to one of Manchester's major transport
 3 hubs, so it was a common occurrence for people with
 4 large bags and suitcases.
 5 Q. The other question which arises is this: it's not just
 6 a question of somebody passing through; it is, as I know
 7 you know enough about the inquiry, the fact that on two
 8 occasions he spent a not insignificant amount of time in
 9 the City Room, in other words not moving through the
 10 thing but staying there. Again, would that necessarily
 11 be an easy thing for somebody doing their best in
 12 Whiskey Control to pick up?
 13 A. No. I wouldn't say it was very, very easy because what
 14 they're actually monitoring is actually 16 cameras per
 15 screen. It's not as if you're looking at one direct
 16 camera that were coming across the bridge. Each unit is
 17 split into 16 screens -- sorry, 16 screens. So that's
 18 what they'd be looking at.
 19 MR LAIDLAW: Thank you very much.
 20 Questions from THE CHAIRMAN
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just picking up on a couple of those
 22 things, and by all means come back if I misrepresent
 23 anything.
 24 We know, or it has been said, that it's not
 25 suspicious of itself seeing somebody carrying a big

1 rucksack across the bridge going into the City Room.
 2 And that's what you -- you just wouldn't take any notice
 3 of that particularly?
 4 A. No.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What may be more suspicious is if you
 6 see someone go into an area, stay there, and not come
 7 out for a considerable period of time?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you actually even look for that?
 10 If you saw someone going up the stairs, one of the sets
 11 of stairs going up to the mezzanine, would you actually
 12 clock it and say, like a traffic warden, "I'm now going
 13 to say when they went in and when they came out"?
 14 A. If they'd actually spotted him and he hadn't come down,
 15 if one of the lads had noticed him, what we'd have done
 16 then is monitor him for a couple of minutes and then
 17 phone Sierra Control and say, this is what we've seen,
 18 I don't know whether you're aware of it.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Somebody with a big rucksack goes up one
 20 of those sets of stairs. I mean, really? Would your
 21 people clock him and say, "He's gone up, we need to
 22 watch him to see when he comes out"?
 23 A. If they'd have seen him, they'd have watched him and
 24 they'd have followed him, sir.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Someone going upstairs?

1 A. Yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just because they went upstairs?
 3 A. The -- because the retail unit was shut, I can't comment
 4 for the lads, but what I think the lads would be looking
 5 for is he's gone up the stairs, gone round the back and
 6 gone to JD Williams, it could be a member of JD Williams
 7 staff. There's a lot of staff from JD Williams going in
 8 that area carrying bags. It's all stopped now obviously
 9 but at the time it was a common occurrence. People
 10 would take that as a shortcut and come across.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you notice it or not?
 12 A. I would say on the 16 screens, no. The images are too
 13 small to pick out one person.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You also told me early on that you had
 15 asked about you going on an CCTV course.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You are doing CCTV into a public
 18 place --
 19 A. Yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- which does have some significance.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Why did you think you wanted training or
 23 it would have been a good idea to have training?
 24 A. My personal view, I actually thought it was
 25 a requirement. I brought the subject up on numerous

1 occasions with the management and was getting the same
 2 answer all the time that it was not a requirement.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's the management of the facilities?
 4 A. Of facilities management.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you think — I suppose if
 6 you haven't done the training you don't know, will you?
 7 I think you're going to do the training, aren't you,
 8 we have heard?
 9 A. I have been on furlough since March. We've got a new
 10 facilities management team now that have taken over and
 11 there's talk now with Gary Simpson, the director, and
 12 also the facilities management team that all lads now
 13 must be SIA and I believe some of the lads... I believe
 14 some of them, but I don't know whether all of them have,
 15 sir.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I want to make sure I have understood
 17 a word. You talked about the radios not being rolled
 18 out to ShowSec people.
 19 A. Can you explain that again?
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you were talking about the
 21 emergency button on the top of the radio, you were
 22 talking about them not being rolled out to ShowSec
 23 staff? Do you just mean they weren't told about it?
 24 A. That's what I mean.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, I just wanted to check that

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1 word.
 2 Questions from MR JAMIESON
 3 MR JAMIESON: Mr Johnson, as you know, I'm going to ask you
 4 some questions on behalf of the bereaved families.
 5 I just want to say something to you right at the outset:
 6 I'm not going to ask you anything about 22 May after
 7 10.30 at all.
 8 A. That's fine, thank you.
 9 Q. Nothing at all. In fact, the bulk of my questions
 10 aren't about that day at all; they're about systems and
 11 processes.
 12 A. Okay.
 13 Q. I want to start, please, by just asking about your
 14 understanding of the standard of security that FM were
 15 required to provide. All right? Mr Laidlaw's just
 16 asked you some questions about one aspect of security,
 17 which was the protection of the fabric of the building.
 18 But security had other aspects, didn't it?
 19 A. Certainly.
 20 Q. It certainly did and you are quite clear that security,
 21 as far as you were concerned, included security against
 22 terrorism?
 23 A. Correct.
 24 Q. Thank you.
 25 I would like to just short-circuit this and I think

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1 I can do it by looking at a document that we've all
 2 looked at before, but nobody's taken you to.
 3 Ms Newman, please may I have {INQ001420/1}.
 4 It's a counterpart facilities management agreement.
 5 I note the date on the first page, 15 June 2010. I'm
 6 not going to ask you about the detail of the contents.
 7 You were certainly working at the arena then?
 8 A. That's correct, yes.
 9 Q. And in fact you're named in this contract and some of
 10 your activities are set out. Could we go, please,
 11 straight to page {INQ001420/67}.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you ever seen it before?
 13 A. No, I haven't, sir.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. When you're taken to a bit, take
 15 your time to read whatever you're being asked to and, if
 16 you haven't had enough time to take it in to answer the
 17 question, please tell me.
 18 A. Thank you.
 19 MR JAMIESON: It's really only a very limited amount of this
 20 document that we're going to look at.
 21 Can you see where it says, "2.10, Site security"?
 22 A. Yes, I can.
 23 Q. Can you see underneath that, "2.10.1, Scope"?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Would you just read those two and a half lines?

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1 (Pause)
 2 So security had to be provided for the site all of
 3 the time?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Does that accord with your practice in 2017, that's what
 6 you understood?
 7 A. Yes, that's what we tried to achieve, yes.
 8 Q. Both on dark days and event days?
 9 A. Well, I'd say yes. Yes, because we're still looking
 10 after the landlord's stuff even on event days, yes.
 11 Q. I know on event days extra people come in, you've got
 12 events?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. You've got ShowSec, but the overall responsibility of
 15 security remains?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. What this document does, and I'm going to invite your
 18 attention just to the next paragraph down and then that
 19 will be the end of it —
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before we leave that paragraph, can
 21 we notice in passing, it actually says you're going to
 22 provide it from your own staff base.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You wouldn't have seen this document, so
 25 you didn't know?

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1 A. I haven't seen this document.
 2 MR JAMIESON: Although in fairness, sir, the second
 3 sentence:
 4 "Relief cover by an approved service provider."
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're quite right, thank you. On the
 6 one hand this, on the other hand that.
 7 MR JAMIESON: What this then goes on to spell out is the
 8 minimum standard of security, the baseline of security .
 9 A. Okay.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really sorry. That's actually not
 11 the point I'm making. Relief cover is one thing;
 12 regularly during events may be another. We'll
 13 obviously --
 14 MR JAMIESON: I'm sorry, sir, I did misunderstand your
 15 point.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not asking this witness to comment
 17 on it, but it may be something we can note in future.
 18 I'm sorry to interrupt. Ask the question again and
 19 we'll move on.
 20 MR JAMIESON: Tells us what the baseline for security is.
 21 Obviously, as a matter of common sense, sometimes what's
 22 necessary to meet the standard of security will go up?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. The building is empty, that's one thing. If there are
 25 14,000 people attending an event, it's going to go up.

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1 But what this suggests -- and by all means read all of
 2 this, but there are particular bits I'm going to draw
 3 your attention to. "2.10.2, minimum duties". And then
 4 underneath (c):
 5 "Monitoring, operating and testing the security
 6 alarm, intruder detection and security surveillance
 7 systems."
 8 There's a lot of words, but what I'm really
 9 interested in is:
 10 "Monitoring the security surveillance systems all of
 11 the time."
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Monitoring means, amongst other things, looking out for
 14 suspicious behaviour?
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. All of the time?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. What is also part of the minimum duties, if you look
 19 at (g):
 20 "Foot patrols of the buildings."
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. Again, I'm not suggesting somebody needs to be walking
 23 round the building continuously, but all of the time
 24 that is part of the security provision?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And I know that you trained your staff specifically that
 2 Deister patrols, the routine patrols, had
 3 a counter-terrorism element to them.
 4 A. Yes, they do.
 5 Q. So that was well-known. The other thing I just want to
 6 explore and understand with you is these two bits that
 7 I've picked out, CCTV and patrols, they work together?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. They're both part of the overarching security provision?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Because, as you've just been explaining to Mr Laidlaw,
 12 good as the CCTV system is, most of the time somebody's
 13 sitting there looking at lots of little pictures on
 14 a screen. They can choose to expand one on the side
 15 monitor.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. But there would have to be something that tells them
 18 that that's what they need to do. So we have patrols as
 19 well to go out and look. May I just explore this with
 20 you in relation to an answer you have given already?
 21 One of the shortcomings of a CCTV system is it can't see
 22 everywhere.
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. It has blind spots inevitably.
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. We know about one very significant blind spot in this
 2 case, it's turned out to be extremely significant, the
 3 large one on top of what we've called the mezzanine and
 4 others have called the JD Williams steps. There's
 5 a raised area behind it the cameras couldn't see?
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. There would have been other ones over the building?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. I'm not asking you where they are. Shouldn't a foot
 10 patrol seek to take in all of the CCTV blind spots?
 11 A. The answer to that question, I would say is yes.
 12 Q. But as I understand it, the fact that the Deister patrol
 13 went to the mezzanine --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- and the fact that that was a blind spot is in fact
 16 a coincidence. That is not by design?
 17 A. It wasn't by design, sir.
 18 Q. And I think you said candidly in relation to another
 19 question that you were asked -- you'd been in 2017,
 20 I think, at the arena for 17 years, something in that
 21 order?
 22 A. 20 years.
 23 Q. You had risen to a senior position in facilities
 24 management and I don't think you turned your mind to
 25 exactly where the blind spots were.

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1 A. No, I didn't, sir.
 2 Q. Does that mean that the patrols that were being
 3 undertaken were not directed towards CCTV blind spots?
 4 A. Can you just explain that again for me?
 5 Q. Of course I can. When you are sending your lads to go
 6 and do patrols ---
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. --- and telling them where to go and designing the
 9 process, one of the things you could have done or one of
 10 the things somebody could do is sit down, work out where
 11 all the CCTV blind spots are, and make sure that patrol
 12 goes to all of those places.
 13 A. Mm--hm.
 14 Q. Is that an exercise that you did?
 15 A. I can't recall, I really can't recall. I think it
 16 was... When we did the survey in 2006, we identified
 17 quite a lot of blind spots there. I don't know whether
 18 the so-called mezzanine was on that list, but we did
 19 identify blind spots like on Trinity Way and stuff like
 20 that and put in new stock.
 21 Q. You said 2006.
 22 A. 2016, sorry, 2016.
 23 Q. All right. Don't apologise, it's difficult to keep hold
 24 of dates. I will come back to that because in fact the
 25 2016 redesign, as it was conceived, had not been put

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1 into place ---
 2 A. No, it hadn't.
 3 Q. --- as of May 2017.
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. Perhaps there's a question that arises. If in 2016
 6 there's a discussion about, "Our new system is going to
 7 have these blind spots so we'd better think about them",
 8 was there a discussion about the current system and
 9 where those blind spots were and how they could be
 10 mitigated?
 11 A. Yes, yes, there was. Like I've just explained to you
 12 there, there was input on certain cameras like
 13 Trinity Way that I recall.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't think we want to know where they
 15 are probably.
 16 MR JAMIESON: We don't. I have not explained myself
 17 clearly. So in thinking where the new cameras were
 18 going to go, there was some thought given to where blind
 19 spots were. What I'm interested in is the interim, so
 20 before those new cameras arrive, minds are obviously
 21 focused on the issue of blind spots ---
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. --- at the end of 2016. Did anybody say, "Hang on, these
 24 new cameras aren't coming for a while, we'd better think
 25 about what our cameras currently show and what we're

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1 doing to think about the CCTV blind spots that we
 2 currently have and will have until the new system
 3 comes"?
 4 A. There was a meeting held after I'd submitted the plans
 5 to them that was taking place with Miriam --- I'm not
 6 sure whether the Toms were there from ShowSec --- and
 7 Lee Sinnott. Lee Sinnott primarily was project managing
 8 this. I had very basic involvement with it.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You weren't a party to any discussions
 10 but you can't say whether there were any?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 MR JAMIESON: There is just another thing that arises from
 13 the questions that you've been asked already.
 14 The number of Deister patrols. It was something
 15 that was originally sensitive, but I've confirmed, and
 16 in fact we've had it in open session. Normally in 2017,
 17 there would have been eight on a day?
 18 A. We would go to try and achieve eight. There was nothing
 19 ever really set in stone about how many patrols we did.
 20 Whenever we could and whenever possible, we would aim
 21 for eight. That's four per shift.
 22 Q. All right. But on 22 May, there were three?
 23 A. Yes. Once again it depends what the circumstances were
 24 and what was going on at the arena at the time, how busy
 25 we were.

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1 Q. Yes. Tell me if I've characterised your evidence
 2 correctly, that what you were saying is that's an
 3 unusual circumstance that there would be so few, it's
 4 just because we were that busy?
 5 A. It's very difficult. When we get a run of events like,
 6 say for example --- I commented about American tours. It
 7 can be very, very demanding in that room, very
 8 demanding. To be fair, sir, patrol-wise, particularly
 9 round the room, we've got people on the ground, we've
 10 got cleaners constantly there that are constantly
 11 reporting stuff back to us. We've got CCTV we can
 12 cover, we've got intruder systems on places we haven't
 13 got cameras. So from a patrolling sort of thing, that's
 14 how we place that patrol, if I can put it that way.
 15 Q. I'm not going to get into a debate, but we've looked at
 16 the minimum duties and you've agreed with me that,
 17 actually, patrol fits with CCTV?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. It's another part, it doesn't replace it.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. What I'd suggest to you is in fact, and if you want to
 22 look at the document I'll take you through it, there
 23 were events on the 18th and 19th, and I think the 20th
 24 and the 21st. It's the 18th and 19th that I've looked
 25 at. Would you accept from me there are only three

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1 Deister patrols on those days as well?
 2 A. Yes, I believe so.
 3 Q. That makes it quicker, thank you.
 4 Just again understanding — you believed that, what,
 5 ShowSec would take on the counter—terrorism
 6 responsibility for the exits on the days that there were
 7 events at the times that you weren't doing the patrol?
 8 A. That's my belief. That's what they do. But primarily,
 9 it's event—related.
 10 Q. Yes. But again just to understand it —
 11 A. What I'm trying to get across, sir, is it's run by the
 12 events team, not Whiskey Control, not by a management
 13 team.
 14 Q. What I'm trying to understand from you is that there had
 15 never been a formal conversation, a documented handover,
 16 from you to events through to ShowSec: this is what I am
 17 expecting you to do in the discharge of the
 18 responsibilities?
 19 A. The answer to that is no. Once again, anything to do
 20 with ShowSec would come from the events department, not
 21 us, unless they were working on our behalf and in
 22 Whiskey Control, but that's it.
 23 Q. I'll leave that there.
 24 The next topic I just want to deal with, very
 25 briefly, is your training.

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. As I understand facilities management generally, there's
 3 a lot of on—the—job training.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. People who come in are monitored, supervised, learn on
 6 the job?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And then they're signed off after a period of time?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. You are effectively or certainly were in 2017 — your
 11 position line—managed all of the control room operators
 12 and the patrol officers?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. So you were teaching them?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Right. Tell me if this is right: the only external
 17 training in CCTV you had, so outside of your role at
 18 SMG, an external training course from some other
 19 provider, was in 2001 and focused on data protection?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. In answers that you've given to Mr Henderson and to the
 22 chair, do I understand that you had in your own mind
 23 recognised that you would benefit from CCTV—specific
 24 training and sought to get management to agree to give
 25 it to you?

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1 A. Yes, I did.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Again, that's right, is it? Because
 3 actually that's not quite a repetition of what you said
 4 before. What you said before was that you believed you
 5 were required legally to have it.
 6 A. Oh, sorry, yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you think you would benefit as well
 8 from it?
 9 A. Oh yes, definitely, definitely.
 10 MR JAMIESON: And this is something that you raised with
 11 management more than once?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Over months, over years?
 14 A. It wasn't just me that raised it. A couple of the
 15 control room operators have asked me. So I'm passing
 16 information on to the facilities management. I can
 17 also — probably they even asked them themselves.
 18 Q. The answer you got was?
 19 A. It wasn't a requirement.
 20 Q. You don't need it?
 21 A. Not a requirement.
 22 Q. Because the SIA licence that you had, as you've told us,
 23 was the door supervisor's licence?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Which doesn't provide any training on how to profile

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1 people, undertake counter—terrorism surveillance work on
 2 closed—circuit television footage?
 3 A. I can't remember.
 4 Q. Although in fairness, you had had, as you've told us
 5 already, the general Project Griffin and Argus courses?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Just in terms of — so it follows that those who were
 8 undertaking the task of monitoring the CCTV in
 9 real time, amongst other things looking out for
 10 suspicious behaviour, none of them, whether they came
 11 from your staff or whether they are those four ShowSec
 12 temporary staff, if I can call them that, none of them
 13 had an SIA CCTV licence?
 14 A. No.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's dotted the Is and crossed the Ts.
 16 MR JAMIESON: Just in terms of the training that they did
 17 get, could we please have a look at the Whiskey Control
 18 guidebook? Let's have a look at {INQ025127/1}, please.
 19 I think you devised this document?
 20 A. Yes. I had a lot of input on this document, yes.
 21 Q. We can see from the first sentence:
 22 "Welcome to the Manchester Victoria Exchange managed
 23 by SMG Europe Limited. Your first week's training will
 24 be spent with the senior control room operator."
 25 So this is a document that's been provided to people

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1 at the outset?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Their training, this is how it's going to go. Just
 4 in relation to the CCTV material, for good reason lots
 5 of this is redacted as operationally sensitive, but
 6 could we go just to {INQ025127/4}, please, and the
 7 bottom half of the page.
 8 This is the section on CCTV training. This is what
 9 they're told. A description of the system, how many
 10 cameras.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. How they work. Next page, please. {INQ025127/5}.
 13 A description of the particular units. We don't need to
 14 know the details.
 15 {INQ025127/6}, please. It's the same, the
 16 particular units.
 17 Over the page again, please, {INQ025127/7}. Then we
 18 move on to a different -- sorry, Network Rail. And then
 19 at the bottom of the page, "Selecting a monitor". This
 20 is practical training about how the system works;
 21 is that right?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. {INQ025127/8}, please. "Functionality", so how it
 24 works.
 25 Final page, please, {INQ025127/9}, "Faults".

1 Then the guidance moves on to a different section,
 2 a different issue.
 3 So certainly in terms of the written guidance that's
 4 in this document, it's all to the functionality of the
 5 system, not the identification of suspicious behaviour?
 6 A. That's correct, sir.
 7 Q. In fairness, can we go -- I missed that reference and
 8 I will come back to it. There is a section that deals
 9 generally with Deister patrols and in that section there
 10 is -- page 42, I'm very grateful. Can we go to
 11 {INQ025127/42}.
 12 This is a section that deals with Deister patrols.
 13 Can you see that different things to be looked out for
 14 on a Deister patrol are listed, bulleted? The second
 15 bottom one:
 16 "Suspicious activities. Anything out of the
 17 ordinary or any person found loitering."
 18 All right? So in fairness, in this written
 19 guidance, the people that you're training are given that
 20 information in relation to this aspect.
 21 Just to go back on something that Mr Laidlaw, indeed
 22 the chair, were asking you about, about what the people
 23 in your control room would be looking for, and you said:
 24 well, if we saw people going into an area -- I'm
 25 paraphrasing -- we would be interested, we would want to

1 know how long they were there. In fairness to you, the
 2 people that you trained were specifically trained to
 3 look out for people who loitered?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. As well as people who looked out of place generally?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Okay. We can leave this document, thank you very much.
 8 The next issue that I want to talk to you about,
 9 please, is the Whiskey Control logbook and its use for
 10 exchanging information.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. In particular, I'm interested in hostile reconnaissance,
 13 okay, or suspected hostile reconnaissance.
 14 A. Okay.
 15 Q. The purpose of the logbook is to capture the
 16 information, make sure it's there to be passed on to the
 17 next shift?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And to make sure that anything that needs to be done is
 20 done --
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. -- in relation to an incident?
 23 Let's just understand this: your control room has
 24 got a permanent staff who rotate on shifts?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So there's some continuity there?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And even if you've got temporary cover, it's the same
 4 four people?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Compare that to an event day. So on an event day, there
 7 will be a whole new group of people that come in to
 8 work, so there will be a head of events for SMG?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. Who presumably will come from a small pool of people?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. A head of security from ShowSec?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Then many, and there are several other layers under the
 15 head of security from ShowSec, but many temporary
 16 staff --
 17 A. That's correct.
 18 Q. -- who'll come in? And there's no control over who they
 19 might be, what experience they might have of working
 20 in the arena, when they might last have been there?
 21 A. That's correct, sir.
 22 Q. All right. So capturing information and holding it
 23 there to share is a very important aspect of
 24 Whiskey Control's work?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. May I check, please, if you can, back to 2017, your
2 knowledge about what hostile reconnaissance is. Did you
3 understand that it was part of the planning of
4 something, some malign act, some attack of some nature?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So if hostile surveillance is detected, what is
7 important is reacting to it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Because it suggests that something bad is coming?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Or might be coming?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. Just to understand this, hostile reconnaissance, if it's
14 happening, it might happen on a dark day, it might
15 happen on an event day?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. An attack might happen on either?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. So there needs to be communication between facilities
20 management and events --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- about hostile reconnaissance?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And you are saying yes and you're agreeing. Was that
25 something that was as obvious to you in 2017 as it is

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1 today?
2 A. I mean, conversations are always held with us. Say
3 something had happened or they get information, the
4 events department would have informed Whiskey Control or
5 informed me or informed Lee: this is what's going on.
6 But our actual work primarily was with the events
7 department, not ShowSec.
8 Q. Yes. Sorry, when I said events, it's my shorthand;
9 I meant SMG events.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. So Miriam as one of those people.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I think you were agreeing with me that in 2017, you
14 understood that it was important that if hostile
15 reconnaissance was suspected, that was something that
16 would be shared between facilities management and
17 events?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. I would like, please, to look at some particular
20 examples of suspected hostile reconnaissance and what
21 happened and what didn't happen. All right? As I do
22 this, I just want to make plain it's the process that
23 I'm interested in, I'm not directing any of this
24 personally at you.
25 May we have, please, a document that we, the

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1 inquiry, have looked at briefly before, {INQ001451/1}.
2 Before we turn to the page, just to orientate you,
3 sir, and you, Mr Johnson, this is not a document you
4 produced or had anything to do --
5 A. No, I've never seen -- actually, I saw this document
6 yesterday for the first time.
7 Q. Okay. Sorry, you have seen it before, I'm showing it to
8 you right at this moment? Because I very much asked
9 that that happen.
10 A. Yesterday I got to see this document for the first time.
11 Q. All right. I'm sorry that it came to you in that way
12 and we'll spend as much time on it as you need to, but
13 I want to make plain to you, I'm not asking for you to
14 warrant, to verify, to tell us that what's in it is
15 accurate. All right?
16 A. Okay.
17 Q. I really want to use it as a chronology.
18 What it is supposed to be, as we understand it, is
19 a list of some of the incidents that happened at the
20 arena in the 12 months before the bombing in May 2017.
21 I'm not suggesting it's comprehensive, we don't know,
22 frankly, as we've not had the author as a witness.
23 We've heard something about a Pet Shop Boys concert and
24 I just wanted to explore that with you.
25 If we go to {INQ001451/4}, please. There's a big

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1 entry in the middle there, line 85. A Pet Shop Boys
2 concert that happened on 19 February 2017. You read it
3 to yourself and then I'll ask you...
4 (Pause)
5 A. Okay.
6 Q. So really what I want to establish from that entry is
7 this: you can see that on that occasion two males were
8 identified as not fitting the profile.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. They were adjudged to be behaving suspiciously. Amongst
11 other reasons, they were asking information about an
12 upcoming event.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. An Iron Maiden event.
15 A. According to this documentation, yes.
16 Q. Do you have any memory of this yourself?
17 A. No, no.
18 Q. All right. We'll give it that health warning: according
19 to the documentation.
20 What has happened in relation to that, this
21 documentation records, is that there is contact with the
22 police, British Transport Police.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And that's what I was asking to ask you about.
25 Chris Walker wasn't a PC who would patrol the station,

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1 was he?
 2 A. No, I think he was a detective sergeant, if I remember
 3 rightly.
 4 Q. I'm so sorry, he was?
 5 A. A detective sergeant, I think.
 6 Q. Yes. Was he in the intelligence department of British
 7 Transport Police?
 8 A. I don't know, I really don't know.
 9 Q. Was he somebody that you contacted from time to time?
 10 A. I spoke to him. We did a few operations with
 11 Chris Walker on drug sales --
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We don't need to know.
 13 A. We did a few operations with Chris, so I got to know
 14 Chris fairly well.
 15 MR JAMIESON: The last line I'm also interested in:
 16 "Images from CCTV were sent to Chris Walker
 17 following a conversation by text message."
 18 So images of those males have been selected from the
 19 system, taken off?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And sent to the police?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Is that something that Whiskey Control would do?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. What I want to do, please, is go on to the final page of

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1 this document. If we look at line 118 {INQ001451/6},
 2 that is the Iron Maiden concert?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Actually, for my purposes, the first half a dozen lines
 5 are about something entirely irrelevant. But the last
 6 two lines, can you see this?
 7 "Two IC1 males that were on the Pet Shop Boys event
 8 asking lots of questions in regards to security at the
 9 Iron Maiden event have been identified on the
 10 concourse."
 11 All right? So it looks like, if this document was
 12 accurate, the event staff on that occasion are looking
 13 out for people that have been identified on a previous
 14 occasion?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And it looks like -- well, one way in which they could
 17 have done that is if they had the CCTV images to hand of
 18 what those people had looked like.
 19 A. I don't know what arrangements were made there. It's
 20 possible they could have had them in Sierra Control,
 21 I really don't know.
 22 Q. Is that something that you've ever experienced?
 23 A. It is, yes, yes. We'd done it -- from my side, we've
 24 done it in the past, persistent offenders that we've had
 25 trouble with site wide, images we've uploaded to the

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1 police, we pass the information on, if he comes back
 2 again, can you let us know, blah, blah, blah.
 3 Q. Is it something you've done or can recall doing from
 4 a counter-terrorism perspective?
 5 A. Possibly. I can't recall. I really can't recall. I've
 6 done that many incidents, I just can't recall.
 7 Q. Let me bring this line of questioning really to the crux
 8 and it's this: although this document, it's not yours,
 9 I'm not criticising you, suggests that there weren't any
 10 incidents on 18 and 21 May 2017 -- all right?
 11 A. Okay.
 12 Q. That's not right. I just want to tell you about some
 13 things now and see if you were aware of them at the time
 14 and if anything was done in relation to them. Have you
 15 been able to follow the evidence of this inquiry?
 16 A. Yes, I have, yes.
 17 Q. Did you hear the evidence of Mr Lavery?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. He's the guy who, on 18 May, sees somebody that he
 20 thinks looks very suspicious.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. A person wearing black with a bag that he chases to the
 23 train station.
 24 A. Mm--hm.
 25 Q. And he certainly, Mr Lavery, put that up on the radio.

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Because we've seen the radio log where it's recorded.
 3 That should, that event, that suspected hostile
 4 surveillance, should be in the Whiskey Control log,
 5 shouldn't it?
 6 A. Not necessarily. If Mr Lavery's gone straight to event
 7 control, we wouldn't know.
 8 Q. But I thought you could hear all the channels?
 9 A. We can hear, but for them to pick... What had actually
 10 happened is my lads heard the conversation. If
 11 Sierra Control thought it was important enough to let
 12 Whiskey Control know, they would let us know. But prior
 13 to that, everything went through -- event-wise,
 14 everything goes through Sierra Control.
 15 Q. The team in Sierra Control can change on a day-by-day
 16 basis?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And if this is hostile surveillance, in fact it wasn't,
 19 all right, but if it was, and it requires action, the
 20 events team are going to change the next day
 21 potentially?
 22 A. The events team would pass the information on to each
 23 other.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which is what happened. It was put in
 25 the book.

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1 MR JAMIESON: It was in the radio log, but there's another
 2 event that I just want to ask you about. 21 May,
 3 a Brian Cox event. There's another suspected piece of
 4 hostile surveillance there. It's not on this document,
 5 but we heard from a steward called Couper—Phillips who
 6 said he saw somebody taking pictures or who might have
 7 been somebody taking pictures of CCTV. He put that in
 8 a supervisor's report. The conflict about whether he
 9 actually told anybody about that —
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, he put in a steward's report.
 11 MR JAMIESON: Sorry, you're right, sir. He was a steward
 12 and he put in a steward's report. It's an important
 13 distinction.
 14 So there is nothing to suggest that that would have
 15 come to the attention of Whiskey Control?
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. All right. If that had come to the attention of
 18 Whiskey Control, would you have gone back and viewed the
 19 CCTV?
 20 A. Yes. We did that on quite a lot of occasions for
 21 Sierra Control duty if they had an incident or
 22 something's gone on prior to that, can you just have
 23 a quick look back — say there's been a fight — and
 24 we'd say, no, I haven't done it, and we could rewind the
 25 system back and say, yes, there is an assault there. So

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1 yes, we would have acted on that.
 2 Q. So you can do that. Do you have any memory as to
 3 whether that — well, in fact that could have been —
 4 A. No recollection of this at all.
 5 Q. In relation to the Mr Lavery incident, a person he
 6 suspected of hostile reconnaissance the same could have
 7 happened?
 8 A. (Overspeaking).
 9 Q. Whiskey Control could have done the same thing if they
 10 had been asked to?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. I just want to ask you this: you were in the
 13 supervisors' briefing on 22 May.
 14 A. I was.
 15 Q. Not the ones that are cascaded down to the stewards, but
 16 for the supervisors.
 17 A. The supervisors' briefings. That's like the management
 18 side briefing.
 19 Q. Was there any discussion in that briefing that there had
 20 been one or two suspected occasions of hostile
 21 surveillance in the last 5 days?
 22 A. I can't recall.
 23 Q. Okay. But just thinking about that — and I know we're
 24 a very long time away now.
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. But if that had been specifically said and then what
 2 happened happened, don't you think that would have
 3 lodged in your mind?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And what would have been available — what
 6 Whiskey Control could offer, if it had been asked for,
 7 would be CCTV stills?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Of those persons that had been identified?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. For provision at that briefing and presumably for
 12 provision to the stewards?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 (Pause)
 15 MR JAMIESON: I'm coming very much to the end.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I hope so. I think you've overrun your
 17 time by a reasonable amount. It just sets the timetable
 18 back. I think you're picking up the habit of having
 19 rather a lot of subclauses in your questions, but you're
 20 not the only one who does that. Let's get on with it
 21 and let's get it done, please.
 22 MR JAMIESON: I will, sir. I'm not sure, respectfully, that
 23 you're right about the time that we'd asked for.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. If I'm being unjust to you, then
 25 I apologise. I am being told that you have gone over

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1 your allotted time, but there we are. Anyway.
 2 MR JAMIESON: I just want a couple of questions, please,
 3 about the CCTV on an event day. Let me check
 4 I understand it. There are five units?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Each of which has a number of cameras?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Your officers in the Whiskey Control retain complete
 9 responsibility for some of them?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Those units are the ones that cover the non—public
 12 areas?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. As a general description?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Two units are given over to Sierra Control?
 17 A. That's correct.
 18 Q. They deal with the arena bowl itself and the exits?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And in particular, those are the cameras that deal with
 21 the City Room?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Right. May I just — there's another witness, Patrol
 24 Officer Steve Noone, who's going to be read to the
 25 inquiry.

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. I just want your assistance on whether what he's put in
 3 his statement about his understanding of his task
 4 in relation to those units that went to Sierra Control
 5 is accurate. If he was coming, I'd ask him; he's not,
 6 so I'm going to ask you.
 7 Could we have, please {INQ036806/7}. That's his
 8 statement given to the inquiry. I'd ask you to look,
 9 please, at page 7. If we could go to page 7,
 10 paragraph 16. Please read that to yourself. It's
 11 really the first three lines of that statement I'm
 12 interested in:
 13 "As normal, as with all events, ShowSec provide
 14 staff to steward the event. In essence, ShowSec take
 15 over the running of the event and set the CCTV cameras
 16 to their liking as they enter the building."
 17 In paragraph 17, Mr Noone gives a description of the
 18 relevant people and his knowledge of them in
 19 Sierra Control. We needn't cover that unless anybody
 20 wants to.
 21 If we could go to paragraph 18, please. Next page
 22 {INQ036806/8}. This is the material portion:
 23 "Throughout the whole evening I do not recall any
 24 radio messages, telephone calls or any other verbal
 25 communication made to the effect of concern regarding

1 suspicious behaviour. Had there been anything of that
 2 nature relayed to me that I could have monitored on the
 3 CCTV system, I would have done so and, if the need
 4 arose, I would have escalated my concerns by either
 5 informing my immediate supervisor or calling the
 6 police."
 7 So is he right that ShowSec essentially take over
 8 the CCTV system or Sierra Control take over the CCTV
 9 system?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's not the same thing, forgive me.
 12 We've heard that Miriam Stone is in the events and she
 13 is not ShowSec.
 14 MR JAMIESON: Sir, you are quite right. What I was trying
 15 to do is make it broader and fairer, but you're quite
 16 right.
 17 Is he right, ShowSec take over CCTV?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Is he right? I'm going to read it precisely:
 20 "Had there been anything of the nature of suspicious
 21 behaviour I could have monitored on the CCTV system,
 22 I would have done so if the need arose."
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Reactive?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Right.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You'll just have to explain to me, who's
 3 in charge of the event on that night?
 4 A. The duty manager, Miriam Stone.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: She's in the control room?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: She's on the monitors, the screens?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Why do you say it's ShowSec then who
 10 take over the CCTV in Sierra Control?
 11 A. Because ShowSec work alongside Miriam. It's either Tom
 12 or Miriam that are doing it.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they're just working beside her?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just thought it was necessary to have
 16 that explained, really.
 17 MR JAMIESON: May I just turn my back?
 18 (Pause)
 19 Those are all my questions, thank you very much.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 21 MR HENDERSON: I understand Mr Atkinson has one question and
 22 Mr Weatherby also has one.
 23 Questions from MR ATKINSON
 24 MR ATKINSON: {INQ025127/42}.
 25 This is just to understand something you said

1 a little earlier, Mr Johnson. What you said in relation
 2 to the Deister patrols was:
 3 "There was never anything really set in stone about
 4 how many patrols we did, but we would aim for eight."
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. In the first line of this section of the induction
 7 manual that you were involved in:
 8 "The security team are required to complete a total
 9 of four full Deister patrols per shift. This makes
 10 a total of eight during 24 hours."
 11 It was set in stone, wasn't it?
 12 A. As it happens there, yes, but we went on an
 13 understanding that we couldn't always reach the eight
 14 with the management committee. So that's why I say it
 15 was a maximum of eight.
 16 MR ATKINSON: Thank you, sir.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much. That was helpful.
 18 MR WEATHERBY: I have literally one question.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine. We haven't heard from you
 20 for a long time, Mr Weatherby.
 21 Questions from MR WEATHERBY
 22 MR WEATHERBY: Just one simple clarification question,
 23 please. Am I right that there was no camera
 24 specifically in the Whiskey Control Room recording
 25 what was happening in the Whiskey Control Room?

1 A. That's correct. There's no camera.
 2 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you very much.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 4 Mr O'Connor?
 5 Questions from MR O'CONNOR
 6 MR O'CONNOR: Sir, I just have a few short points.
 7 First of all, can I just take you back to the
 8 evidence you gave about McDonald's. You described
 9 something about what it was like when that McDonald's
 10 was open.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You referred to the fact they had a radio, which linked
 13 to the Whiskey Control Room, and you gave some evidence
 14 about occasions when they would contact you.
 15 A. That's correct.
 16 Q. Can I just ask you this? In your experience, would the
 17 McDonald's staff actually go outside the shop on
 18 occasions or would they simply stay in the shop and
 19 take --
 20 A. No, they'd go outside. Obviously they had a seating
 21 area there and also any liquid spillages in there, that
 22 was their responsibility, so very frequently they were
 23 out there.
 24 Q. From your experience of receiving those calls about --
 25 you gave some examples of some of the types of problem

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1 they would report to you.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Were at least some of those, in your experience, matters
 4 that perhaps had been brought to their attention because
 5 there were outside?
 6 A. That's correct, yes.
 7 Q. Thank you.
 8 On another topic, Mr Johnson. You gave some
 9 evidence about circumstances the means by which
 10 Whiskey Control room would contact British Transport
 11 Police.
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. Clearly, if there was an emergency, you have said you
 14 would call 999.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. But you then gave some evidence about situations which
 17 fell short of that situation.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. I just want to be clear about your evidence on this,
 20 Mr Johnson. You described, I think, two stages. One
 21 stage would be that you would, I think the words you
 22 used were:
 23 "We would look to see if there was a policeman on
 24 the concourse."
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Just to be clear, two possibilities. Did that involve
 2 someone from the Whiskey Control Room actually going to
 3 the station to look or were you able to see using your
 4 screens?
 5 A. We'd be able to see off the screens. Like I say, if it
 6 was event-related, at the time when we wanted a police
 7 officer, as something that we'd do, we'd just ring
 8 Sierra Control and say, "I just need this camera
 9 a minute". Then if it was something we had to involve
 10 the events team in, then we'd do that. But the point of
 11 contact, it was primarily looking on the cameras.
 12 Q. So you'd look on the cameras?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. However way (overspeaking).
 15 A. Or contact the duty manager on his mobile.
 16 Q. Right. That was the second question I wanted to ask
 17 you. So you talked about then contacting the BTP
 18 manager? Is that right?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And that was a call you could make without going through
 21 the call centre that you described?
 22 A. Sorry, say that again, please.
 23 Q. Yes. You've described how you would look to see if
 24 there was a police officer on the concourse.
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And what I understood earlier was you said was that if
 2 you did see a police officer on the concourse, you would
 3 then contact someone at BTP to ask --
 4 A. No, no.
 5 Q. Help us. What would you do (overspeaking)?
 6 A. Like I said, we work very closely with Victoria Station
 7 and they have a duty manager phone and we are constantly
 8 in touch with each other, just say something is coming
 9 into their area that you know might cause them a problem
 10 and vice versa. So we were constantly ringing each
 11 other. So it'd be a case of -- just say for example,
 12 I'd phone the duty manager, "Is there any chance you
 13 could just bob out and let the police know we need them
 14 down to Whiskey Control?"
 15 Q. I see.
 16 A. It was a familiar thing that we did.
 17 Q. Sorry, it was my misunderstanding. So it was the
 18 station duty manager and not the BTP duty manager;
 19 is that --
 20 A. No, the station duty manager.
 21 Q. All right. And then I just want to ask you -- you did
 22 give some evidence about the problem with communications
 23 with BTP and the call centre and so on.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Can I just ask you -- we've looked before and I know

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1 you've been following the inquiry so you'll have seen
 2 some of the minutes of the multi-agency planning
 3 meetings.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. You attended some but not all of those meetings,
 6 I think.
 7 A. I'd go in Lee Sinnott's absence.
 8 Q. Can we look at the minutes for the November 2016
 9 meetings, please. That is {INQ001947/1}.
 10 We can see, just looking at the attendance, this is
 11 in fact not one of the meetings you were at.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Can we look at {INQ001947/3}, please, item 12, under any
 14 other business.
 15 We see the second bullet point there:
 16 "LS [Lee Sinnott] raising a problem with SMG going
 17 through to BTP."
 18 Is that the same problem that you described earlier
 19 this morning, Mr Johnson?
 20 A. Yes, very much so.
 21 Q. And can you tell us -- so that was November 2016.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. If you can, and maybe you can't remember, but if you
 24 can, did the problem improve after that?
 25 A. No. My honest belief, it's still the same today.

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1 There's been no improvement. I don't know whether
 2 Miriam mentioned, but I think she has a direct link with
 3 them on event-wise, but we haven't, we haven't got
 4 a number. All we've got is the call centre numbers.
 5 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just need to clarify where we are as
 7 it seemed slightly different to what you told us before.
 8 If you want a policeman you go for a British
 9 Transport Police policeman because they're closest
 10 hopefully?
 11 A. Yes, plus we're on British Rail property.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They're your first point of contact
 13 however bad the emergency may be?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You look on the cameras and see if you
 16 can see one?
 17 A. Yes, or we'll ring the duty manager.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you see one, do you send someone out
 19 to fetch them?
 20 A. No, first of all we just phone the duty manager and just
 21 say, "Can you just have a word with BTP and just send
 22 them up to the control room, to Whiskey Control?"
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Is that when you've seen there is
 24 a policeman around or irrelevant to that?
 25 A. We'd have a look first just to see if we can see one

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1 then we'd still phone the duty manager -- because he
 2 might be on a platform -- and just say, "Have you got
 3 any BTP about?"
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or, "We can see one on platform 1, can
 5 you ask him to come up?"
 6 A. If there's one there, "Can you just tell that officer we
 7 need a quick word".
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you get no response from that you
 9 then ring the BTP line?
 10 A. There's two numbers, sir. There's a non-emergency line
 11 and there is an emergency line. And on both of these --
 12 and it's not just on one occasion -- we've rang up and
 13 they've been engaged.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you get a delay if you're doing that?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And eventually, if you're just not
 17 getting anyone, you ring 999?
 18 A. Yes. If it warrants a 999 emergency we --
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How long has gone by, by now, before you
 20 ring 999?
 21 A. If it's something that warrants straightaway -- we had
 22 an incident not... Last time I was there, I think it
 23 was some time last year, where we couldn't get through
 24 to British Transport Police. It was when I was saying
 25 we had the suspect package. I couldn't get through to

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1 British Transport Police, so it was a case then of,
 2 "Forget that, I think it warrants 999", and obviously
 3 then I think the way it goes is GMP arrive.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How long before you rang 999?
 5 A. We're talking a couple of minutes. We're not talking
 6 long, long periods.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You'd go through that procedure first?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 10 MR O'CONNOR: Next subject, Mr Johnson, I want to ask you
 11 just a few more questions about Deister patrols. You
 12 gave your evidence that you would aim for eight a day.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. You told us it wasn't set in stone, we have looked at
 15 the Whiskey Control document which does contain that
 16 number.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Can I ask you, speaking as a matter of practice, did the
 19 number of Deister patrols that you would do on
 20 a day-to-day basis back in 2017 vary between event days
 21 and non-event days?
 22 A. Oh yes, definitely.
 23 Q. Can you explain?
 24 A. It was like I was trying to explain before. The lads
 25 have got to operate the pedestrian gate, sign people in

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1 and out. The duties virtual double on event days on
 2 Whiskey Control. There's so many other things that they
 3 get involved in.
 4 Q. We've heard that on 22 May there were three Deister
 5 patrols.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Starting early in the morning?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And then later in the morning and then one at about
 10 midday and no more after that?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. How many more on a normal event day would you have
 13 expected perhaps Deister patrols to be taken?
 14 A. There should have been one done around about 3 o'clock
 15 and possibly another one done, depending on what time
 16 the show finished, on lockdown, which is around about
 17 11.30. Possibly we could have got another one in
 18 between the morning period, there should have -- I think
 19 there should have been another one there, round about 5
 20 or 6, I would have expected, that day.
 21 Q. Last thing, Mr Johnson. The question of what we've
 22 described as the "what if" question. You gave us some
 23 evidence earlier about how you might have reacted to
 24 a suspicious person or rather a report of a suspicious
 25 person in the City Room. And as we all noticed what you

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1 said wasn't quite the same as the evidence that
 2 Miriam Stone gave about what she might have done.
 3 The questions you were asked started with you being
 4 asked about what you in the Whiskey Control Room would
 5 have done about something suspicious in the City Room,
 6 if you'd either seen it or it had been brought to your
 7 attention, and you said you would have contacted
 8 Miriam Stone and then the questions went on from there.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. I want to ask you about a slightly different scenario,
 11 Mr Johnson, and it's this: if on an occasion
 12 Miriam Stone in the Sierra Control Room had been
 13 informed of someone suspicious in the City Room by, for
 14 example, ShowSec staff in the City Room, would you have
 15 expected her to have contacted you before she made her
 16 decision?
 17 A. Yes, yes. Yes, I would have.
 18 Q. You would have done?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 MR O'CONNOR: All right. Thank you very much, Mr Johnson.
 21 These are all my questions.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 MR HENDERSON: Thank you, sir. It is time for the lunchtime
 24 break. I believe we're starting with Mr Rigby at 2.00.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much for your evidence.

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1 2 o'clock. We have been particularly sensitive
 2 about time today because we have a witness who it is
 3 vital we deal with very soon after he comes and for his
 4 own benefit. If I've been unjust about the time, I'm
 5 sorry, I have just been given the information about
 6 these things and I had expected it to finish earlier.
 7 Mr Cooper is about to defend you in a minute and tell
 8 you that you were entirely within your time limit.
 9 MR COOPER: It's not so much that, sir, but I have general
 10 submissions about the time estimates now and what we
 11 submit is the mounting pressure which is concerningly
 12 being placed particularly on family teams.
 13 I understand that CTI's original estimate for this
 14 witness was 45 minutes and it went up recently to
 15 2.5 hours, and they, I gather from what I'm being told,
 16 were within their 2.5 hours; it was originally
 17 45 minutes.
 18 I am concerned, and it is a concern that I've raised
 19 with my learned friends yesterday, and it's manifested
 20 itself again today, that in our submission, the
 21 perfectly reasonable questions being asked by
 22 Mr Jamieson -- and most of them were new and hopefully
 23 of assistance to you -- we should not be penalised
 24 simply for going over the time estimate as if there is
 25 the end of our efficacy, as it were, in terms of our

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1 questions.
 2 We would ask CTI and all those who are setting these
 3 time estimates to take it from us, we're being as
 4 careful as we can and as disciplined as we can, but if
 5 we go over, it's because we feel we're asking important
 6 questions to assist you.
 7 We do feel, I only speak for our team, it's up to
 8 others, that when the pressure is being placed on us
 9 then we also ask that same pressure be applied to CTI
 10 when they're on their feet.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand exactly what you're saying.
 12 You will of course know that the way inquiries operate
 13 is that the predominant amount of questions are asked by
 14 CTI. I am told, but I don't have experience, that
 15 there's a great deal more latitude being allowed in this
 16 inquiry than practically any other one as to asking
 17 questions, which is obviously right. I also personally
 18 feel, and you'll know this is a thing judges probably
 19 wrongly think, when they were just as bad themselves
 20 when they did it, that actually some of the questions
 21 are quite convoluted and it's often done in order to
 22 direct people in a particular direction.
 23 If I have been in a Criminal Court, I'd have been
 24 saying to the witness, "I'm expecting a question to come
 25 along any time soon", because sometimes it's quite

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1 difficult to know when the question is coming. So
 2 I will try and keep quieter and not upset you all. I'm
 3 certainly not trying to cut off what are perfectly
 4 reasonable questions being asked and, please, for anyone
 5 to think that, I think that is an unjust thought. But
 6 equally, perhaps everyone here can just work on
 7 shortening the questions a bit.
 8 MR COOPER: Of course, sir. What you say is taken in the
 9 spirit it was meant. I hope you take my intervention --
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, I do. We have to work a modus
 11 vivendi. I also have people saying to me that we have
 12 time limits and all the rest of it, so we'll all have
 13 learnt from it.
 14 But if I was unjust to you, I am sorry that your
 15 leader has needed to come and --
 16 MR JAMIESON: I would say on this occasion, sir, I believed
 17 I had asked for 45 minutes, and I checked and it was 30,
 18 sir, so I was wrong --
 19 MR COOPER: Might I say, sir, I only bring these matters to
 20 you effectively on instructions. As you'll understand,
 21 it's important I'm heard to raise these with you --
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I certainly hope the families don't feel
 23 that their barristers are being put under undue pressure
 24 to get on with it. It's certainly not my intention to
 25 do so and I have certainly not missed any point that's

1 been made.
 2 MR COOPER: That's reassuring, thank you, sir.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 2 o'clock.
 4 (1.01 pm)
 5 (Lunch adjournment)
 6 [REDACTED]
 7 [REDACTED]
 8 [REDACTED]
 9 [REDACTED]
 10 [REDACTED]
 11 [REDACTED]
 12 [REDACTED]
 13 [REDACTED]
 14 [REDACTED]
 15 [REDACTED]
 16 [REDACTED]
 17 [REDACTED]
 18 [REDACTED]
 19 [REDACTED]
 20 MR GREANEY: Having said that, we can now start to broadcast
 21 on YouTube and I'm going to ask that Mr Rigby be sworn,
 22 please.
 23 MR THOMAS RIGBY (affirmed)
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Rigby, can you hear me all right?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you just tell me who's in the room
 2 with you?
 3 A. Just my partner and one of the legal representatives,
 4 Beth.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. I know everyone there knows this
 6 and will do it inevitably, but it's important the public
 7 know what's happening. You're in a remote location from
 8 here. You have got two people with you. They will
 9 understand and you will understand that obviously they
 10 can't and must not prompt you with any answers or
 11 anything like that. I'm sure they understand that and
 12 I'm sure you understand it, but it's important that it's
 13 known publicly.
 14 MR GREANEY: I have been to meet Mr Rigby, as I do with all
 15 the witnesses, this lunchtime at the place that he is at
 16 and I am satisfied and CTI is satisfied the arrangements
 17 are entirely in order.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 19 Questions from MR GREANEY
 20 MR GREANEY: Would you begin, please, by tell us your full
 21 name?
 22 A. Thomas Jordan Rigby.
 23 Q. Have you worked for ShowSec since 2007?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Have you therefore worked for that company for all or

1 almost all of your working life?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. In 2015, did you become the ShowSec head of security for
 4 the Manchester Arena contract?
 5 A. Yes, I started training in 2015.
 6 Q. Was it from that date that you began to work or mainly
 7 work at the arena?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. In the 2 years between 2015 and 2017, had you managed
 10 many events at the arena as head of security?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. So would it be fair to say, therefore, that by May of
 13 2017 you were very familiar with the operation of
 14 ShowSec?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. You were familiar also with the operation of the arena?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And you were familiar with what the job of head of
 19 security involved?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. You have, I think, as you put it in your witness
 22 statement, been accredited with the Security Industry
 23 Authority for a period of 10 years?
 24 A. Correct.
 25 Q. By that, do you mean that you had, and no doubt have,

1 an SIA licence?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Do you have a door supervisor licence?
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. And do you also have a public space surveillance or CCTV
 6 licence?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. Just to complete the picture, at any rate so far as I am
 9 concerned, in relation to your career and role, have you
 10 also attended ShowSec's management development programme
 11 run by Derby University?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Did that involve training courses on security and crowd
 14 management?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And also the key phases in the running of events and, in
 17 particular, ingress and egress?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Next, Mr Rigby, I'm going to ask about the training
 20 and/or information you'd received about
 21 counter-terrorism and about your knowledge of the risk
 22 of terrorism in 2017.
 23 We know from records that have been made available
 24 that you had undertaken ShowSec's counter-terrorism
 25 training; is that correct?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And it appears from those records that you had spent
 3 adequate time over it and indeed the records we have
 4 show that you spent longer than anyone else whose record
 5 we've seen. Do you recall as part of that training
 6 watching the Fairway and Eyes Wide Open videos?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Had you also attended, before May 2017, the tabletop
 9 events run by ShowSec and SMG?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Had you received SIA training?
 12 A. Sorry, can you just repeat that?
 13 Q. Yes. Had you received training from the SIA?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Rigby, your voice has faded a bit for
 16 me. Could you come closer to the microphone or move the
 17 microphone closer to you? Is that all right? Then
 18 we'll hear you better.
 19 MR GREANEY: In fact, it's a computer that's in front of
 20 Mr Rigby. We did have a similar difficulty in relation
 21 to another witness.
 22 Perhaps if you just speak up, Mr Rigby, it might
 23 seem slightly artificial, but do your best. If your
 24 voice drops again, we'll tell you.
 25 So you had received such training and indeed do you

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1 remember that you had received from the SIA input
 2 following the Bataclan attack in November 2015?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. That's much better, in fact, your voice.
 5 Had you attended other training such as the GMP
 6 Griffin and Argus training?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. So would it be fair to conclude that, by May 2017, you
 9 were well-informed about the risk that was presented by
 10 terrorism?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. That you knew that the risk existed at the arena during
 13 events?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. That you knew that the risk presented itself in a number
 16 of different forms, including a person-borne IED?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And would it also be fair to conclude that in May of
 19 2017, you knew that the terrorism threat level in the UK
 20 set by JTAC was severe?
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. Prior to the attack upon the arena, and in relation to
 23 any particular event for which you had responsibility,
 24 so I'm not talking specifically about the Ariana Grande
 25 concert at the moment, but prior to the attack and

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1 in relation to any such event did you consider that it
 2 was important to keep that risk of a terrorist attack in
 3 mind in what you did during events themselves?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And did you also consider that it was important to keep
 6 that risk in mind in what you did in preparing for
 7 events?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Mr Rigby, I'm now moving on to ask you about your
 10 actions in the days before the Ariana Grande concert.
 11 I'm really going to be dealing with the period from
 12 Tuesday, 16 May up to the day of the attack itself.
 13 The way I've put it reflects, do you agree, the fact
 14 that although as head of security it was your job to
 15 coordinate the ShowSec resources on the evening of the
 16 concert, you also had responsibilities in the period
 17 before the concert?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. As head of security for ShowSec, was it your practice to
 20 meet with Miriam Stone and her SMG events team each
 21 week?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. Was it generally on the Tuesday of each week that you
 24 had that meeting?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Was there such a meeting on Tuesday, 16 May, that being
 2 the Tuesday before the Ariana Grande concert?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. That's the particular meeting that I'm going to direct
 5 your attention to. As a group at that meeting, did you
 6 review something called the event rider?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. Was that something that you did at every meeting of that
 9 type?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Who was it that had produced the event rider for the
 12 Ariana Grande concert?
 13 A. It's the duty manager for the event.
 14 Q. So does it follow that it's an SMG document?
 15 A. That's correct, yes. It would have been Miriam Stone.
 16 Q. So I'm going to look together with you, Mr Rigby, at the
 17 event rider that was produced for the Ariana Grande
 18 concert.
 19 It's {INQ012112/1}.
 20 We can see, can we not, that this is a document that
 21 deals with the Ariana Grande concert on 22 May?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Is this the event rider to which I've been referring?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. We can see on that first page that the timings of

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1 various events at the concert are given, including the
 2 main act being between 9 and 10.30; is that correct?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. The names of the duty staff are given, including as
 5 event duty manager, Miriam Stone, and you as head of
 6 security?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. Can we scroll down the page a little bit, please?
 9 Information was given about the audience in the
 10 final boxes on that page; do you agree?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So the attendance expected was 14,300?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And an audience profile of 14+, that being the age?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And a male to female ratio of 20 to 80?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. We've asked other witnesses who didn't know, but do you
 19 know what the D represents at the end of that rectangle?
 20 A. I think it just signifies the potential for the older
 21 element of this show to be drinkers. It stands for
 22 drinking.
 23 Q. Was that intended to indicate that alcohol might be
 24 a problem at this particular concert or just that
 25 a small number of people might have drink on board?

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1 A. I'm not entirely sure. Again, it's an SMG document, but
 2 I think it's just to highlight that there is a potential
 3 for the older element of this show to be drinking.
 4 Q. I see. Could we go on to the next page, please?
 5 {INQ012112/2}.
 6 Towards the top, can you see an entry, "Search lanes
 7 required?" and the answer is given "no"?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Were there some events at which there were search lanes?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. What was a search lane for an event? What did it look
 12 like and what was its purpose?
 13 A. It's a designated lane of entry, so customers would be
 14 filed into these lanes, for which they would need to
 15 meet some criteria, so they would need a person search
 16 or a bag search in order to be able to continue towards
 17 the venue doors, usually done with barriers and
 18 infrastructure.
 19 Q. As we've agreed, there was no search lane or there were
 20 no search lanes required for the Ariana Grande concert.
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. Would it be fair to summarise the position in this way,
 23 that essentially search lanes were used for events that
 24 had a different profile from events such as the
 25 Ariana Grande concert?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And generally, they were reserved for concerts where the
 3 risk, and we'll look at what risk means in due course,
 4 but where the risk was perceived to be higher than the
 5 risk at an Ariana Grande concert?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Where we'd reached was that there would be this meeting
 8 and there was this meeting on Tuesday, 16 May at which
 9 the event rider would be reviewed. But by the stage of
 10 that meeting, would SMG also have issued something
 11 called a purchase order?
 12 A. Yes, if not before, yes.
 13 Q. So that would be a document that you'd have available
 14 during the course of the meeting?
 15 A. Yes. So if they've not already sent it before, they
 16 would usually give it to us then.
 17 Q. Was that a document that would identify the number of
 18 staff required for the event?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. I don't know that we've seen an example of such
 21 a document or even the particular document before. So
 22 we'll just have it on the screen now without the need to
 23 analyse it in detail. It's {INQ012114/1}.
 24 Am I right that this is the SMG purchase order
 25 relating to the Ariana Grande concert?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Typically, would ShowSec be involved in the discussions
 3 that generated this document?
 4 A. Not typically, no. Not in its creation, no.
 5 Q. So who would it be that would decide how many staff
 6 there should be for any particular event?
 7 A. It would be the SMG event manager for that event.
 8 Q. Is that what happened in relation to the concert on
 9 22 May? Was it SMG that decided the numbers or did
 10 something different happen on that occasion?
 11 A. No, SMG.
 12 Q. We can take that from the screen, thank you very much.
 13 Was nonetheless the meeting an opportunity for you
 14 as a group to discuss the number of staff identified in
 15 the purchase order?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. If you as head of security for ShowSec thought that too
 18 few staff had been identified, was this your opportunity
 19 to say so?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. But am I right that in relation to this concert you did
 22 not identify any particular issue?
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. This number has been suggested to another witness, but
 25 you're the person to confirm it. In your statement, or

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1 one of your statements, you say that 164 members of
 2 ShowSec staff were on duty on the night of the
 3 Ariana Grande concert and no doubt you'd have checked
 4 that figure before stating it in your witness statement.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. I mentioned risk in relation to search lanes and we're
 7 going to come back to risk assessment as a topic on its
 8 own, but there is a document that I believe it's
 9 relevant to look at, at this stage, and it's
 10 {INQ012110/1}.
 11 Large sections of this are noted as being
 12 operationally sensitive; that isn't going to be
 13 important for our purposes because I want to deal with
 14 it in general terms.
 15 In certainly one of your witness statements, one of
 16 your earlier witness statements, you describe this as
 17 being a risk assessment, but sitting there now, do you
 18 regard that as being an accurate description?
 19 A. No, it's not a risk assessment.
 20 Q. What would you describe it as being?
 21 A. It's an allocation, it's an allocation of competency
 22 in relation to an event.
 23 Q. You slightly broke up then. Did you say it's an
 24 allocation of competency in relation to a particular
 25 event?

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1 A. Yes, correct. It's used to allocate the head of
 2 security for that event.
 3 Q. I was about to ask you what its purpose was. It's used
 4 to identify who the head of security should be?
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's allocation of competence?
 6 MR GREANEY: Allocation of competency for a particular event
 7 used to identify -- tell me if I'm getting this wrong,
 8 Mr Rigby -- who should be head of security for
 9 a particular event?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. I'm going to ask you to explain that in a little more
 12 detail. Does it follow that, so far as the arena was
 13 concerned, you were not the only head of security or
 14 only person capable of discharging that responsibility?
 15 A. Yes, that's correct. There were others.
 16 Q. Who were the others? Tom Bailey, presumably.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Anyone else?
 19 A. I think Alan Wallace was as well, although he didn't run
 20 that many shows.
 21 Q. So that's three people you've identified capable of
 22 performing that role. Were there any others, even if
 23 you can't name them?
 24 A. I think at the time, 2017, that was it, yes. There has
 25 been others since and before.

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1 Q. We're going to look at some aspects of this form in
 2 a moment, but why was it necessary to complete a form or
 3 any kind of assessment to identify who the head of
 4 security should be?
 5 A. The risks posed to each show are different, so there
 6 needs to be an assessment of the quality and competency
 7 of that person to match the expected risk towards the
 8 show.
 9 Q. Okay. You understand what this form is for, we don't
 10 necessarily at the moment, but you're helping us to
 11 become clearer.
 12 So does it follow that some heads of security were
 13 regarded as being better choices for particular events?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. I think you said along the way of your answer that the
 16 risk that a particular event presented would be what
 17 would drive the choice as to head of security.
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.
 19 Q. So if an event was regarded, and please tell me if I'm
 20 misunderstanding, as being particularly risky, then,
 21 what, you would want to have a head of security who had
 22 particular experience of managing such an event?
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. So although you don't describe this as a risk
 25 assessment, this was a document, the purpose of which,

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1 perhaps even if only indirectly , was to assess the risk
 2 presented by a particular event?
 3 A. Yes, it was used to map the event and then obviously
 4 allocate the correct head of security to go with that
 5 event.
 6 Q. But because that decision was driven by risk, it follows
 7 that what this form was doing was to assess the risk
 8 that the event presented?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Were you familiar with this form at the time we're
 11 talking about, May 2017?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Am I right that the form used a computer-based system?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Into which you would input certain information?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Is the way in which that was done that someone who was
 18 operating the form would input a score in relation to
 19 a number of categories?
 20 A. That's correct.
 21 Q. I'm not going to identify what those categories were
 22 because they're regarded as being operationally
 23 sensitive , but I can, I think, invite you to confirm
 24 this, that the categories were focused on the risks that
 25 the audience presented to itself ?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. So they did not include, those categories, the question
 3 of the risk presented to the audience by a hostile
 4 actor?
 5 A. That's correct.
 6 Q. Another way of putting it might be that the categories
 7 were concerned with internal risk as opposed to external
 8 risk ?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. I can ask you to confirm this, I think, specifically ,
 11 that the categories that you were scoring did not
 12 include the risk of a terrorist attack, did they?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. Once those scores had been input, did a formula then
 15 calculate an overall score for a particular event?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Would that score in turn produce a description of the
 18 risk the event presented, which would be either high,
 19 medium or low?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. I want to be clear that this is certainly no criticism
 22 of you, but the application of that process in relation
 23 to the Ariana Grande concert produced a risk profile of
 24 low risk ; do you agree?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. What we've understood from your witness statement,
 2 Mr Rigby, is that you can't recall whether you completed
 3 the risk assessment -- I've called it a risk
 4 assessment -- you can't recall whether you completed
 5 this form personally in relation to the Ariana Grande
 6 concert, but you might have done? Is that fair?
 7 A. Correct, yes.
 8 Q. Even if you didn't carry out, my term again, I know,
 9 even if you didn't carry out the risk assessment
 10 in relation to the Ariana Grande concert yourself, are
 11 you able to say when in relation to the concert it would
 12 have been carried out?
 13 A. Yes, it would have been carried out some time before the
 14 concert, yes. I can't say exactly when, but it would
 15 have been done -- it's usually done quarterly.
 16 Q. So it may be that we can find the answer to this
 17 question somewhere, but it might be the case that that
 18 assessment had been made weeks or even a couple of
 19 months or even 3 months before the concert itself?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Where we'd reached was the Tuesday meeting and I'm still
 22 dealing with the events leading up to 22 May, but we're
 23 making good progress through my questions, Mr Rigby.
 24 After the Tuesday meeting at which allocation would
 25 be discussed, was the next stage for you to prepare

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1 something called a supervisors' briefing document?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. I'm going to ask you about the briefing that you in fact
 4 delivered on the 22nd when we reach that stage of my
 5 questions, but we will just at this stage look at the
 6 document itself, {INQ012111/1}.
 7 Is this the supervisors' briefing document that you
 8 prepared for the Ariana Grande concert?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. In relation to the concert, when did you prepare it, on
 11 the day or before?
 12 A. On the day.
 13 Q. Did you prepare it on the basis of two documents in
 14 particular, namely the event rider --
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. -- and also the assessment that we've just been
 17 considering?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Having prepared this document, did you just use it to
 20 brief or did you actually hand over copies of it to
 21 those that you were briefing?
 22 A. I used it to brief from and also everybody who attended
 23 got a copy of that briefing sheet as well.
 24 Q. When we reach the relevant stage, I'll ask you who it
 25 was who attended the briefing on the 22nd.

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1 Mr Rigby, we will turn then to 22 May. Just as
 2 I assured you when we met at lunchtime, I'm not going to
 3 be asking you any questions about the events from 10.30
 4 and afterwards and I don't believe that anyone else will
 5 feel the need to do so either, so be assured about that,
 6 please.
 7 We'll start earlier in the day. Did you arrive at
 8 the arena at about midday?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Then at about 2 o'clock, did you attend a security
 11 meeting?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Is that something you did in relation to each event that
 14 you were responsible for?
 15 A. That's correct, yes.
 16 Q. Was that a meeting with the team from SMG?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. So that would be Miriam Stone, presumably?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. Can you recall whether anyone apart from Miriam Stone
 21 was there from SMG?
 22 A. No, not from SMG, no.
 23 Q. Would you have and did you have with you any colleague
 24 from ShowSec?
 25 A. Yes, Keith Etchells (overspeaking) — sorry.

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1 Q. Sorry, we spoke over each other and the stenographers
 2 have asked that all of us take care that that not
 3 happen; they experienced some difficulty this morning.
 4 You were telling us that from ShowSec Keith Etchells
 5 was present; what was his role, please?
 6 A. He was the backstage manager for ShowSec.
 7 Q. Was it just the two of you there from ShowSec?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Was there also at the meeting a representative of the
 10 tour security?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. Do you remember who that was?
 13 A. I believe it was Bob Fontenot, who was the lead security
 14 representative for the tour.
 15 Q. What we've understood was that this security meeting was
 16 something that commonly occurred on the occasion of
 17 events?
 18 A. Yes, every event.
 19 Q. But that nothing of any particular significance occurred
 20 during the security meeting on 22 May?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. Was that in part, no doubt, because no one regarded the
 23 event as being one with which particular risk was
 24 associated?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Was the next major event that day, as usual, the
 2 supervisors' briefing?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Did that occur at about 5 pm?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Do you recall who was present?
 7 A. Yes, generally it was — it would have been myself
 8 leading the briefing, all the supervisory team from
 9 ShowSec that were operating on that evening as well as
 10 some other key positions like access control, and then
 11 also venue representatives, so the heads of department,
 12 the event duty manager, the lead from food and beverage,
 13 the lead from the medical team, the fire safety officer,
 14 the executive on duty, all the senior parties for the
 15 event.
 16 Q. So you've identified those people by description of
 17 role. I'm just going to ask you to confirm a couple of
 18 people, a handful of people, perhaps, by name. Was
 19 Dave Middleton present at the briefing?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Who was the City Room door supervisor. And from
 22 access control were Dan Perry and Jordan Beak present?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. I said it'd be a handful. I'll just ask you to confirm
 25 those three.

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1 Now, next, please, can we go back to the
 2 supervisors' briefing document itself. That was
 3 {INQ012111/1}.
 4 Are these documents appearing on your screen okay,
 5 Mr Rigby?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. On page 1 in the top right-hand corner, there's
 8 a rectangle within which is written:
 9 "Today's briefing topic: customer service."
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Whenever a briefing was delivered to supervisors, was
 13 there a briefing topic for that day?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Was the briefing topic always customer service or did it
 16 differ?
 17 A. No, it differed, it differed.
 18 Q. Indeed, we've certainly seen one example of
 19 counter-terrorism being the day's briefing topic.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Who was it who decided what the day's briefing topic
 22 would be?
 23 A. It's usually a conversation between the head of security
 24 and the duty manager, the topic that best fit that
 25 event.

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1 Q. Would that be something you would have discussed at the
 2 Tuesday meeting, do you think?
 3 A. Not necessarily at the Tuesday meeting, no. It would
 4 have most likely have been done on the day of the event.
 5 Q. So there had been a discussion, I think, between you and
 6 Miriam Stone, where the two of you would agree what the
 7 best briefing topic would be for that particular event?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Can you help us with why it was that customer service
 10 was decided as the best briefing topic for the
 11 Ariana Grande concert?
 12 A. I can't recall exactly, but I think it's obviously
 13 in relation to the audience profile that's expected to
 14 attend the event, so there'd be a lot of youngsters with
 15 parents, potentially inexperienced gig-goers, so it
 16 was -- again, it's to remind all staff that they need to
 17 be looking out for somebody who may need an extra bit of
 18 assistance or some guidance or some reassurance.
 19 Q. Next, and we're not going to read through anything apart
 20 from some very short sections of this document, can you
 21 see towards the bottom right-hand corner of the screen,
 22 as we have the form displayed, it reads:
 23 "Thorough pre-event/egress checks must [and 'must'
 24 is in capitals and underlined] be carried out before and
 25 during the event."

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1 Do you see that?
 2 A. Correct, yes.
 3 Q. Was that a standard thing to be on the briefing sheet?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Is that in fact something that you would orally brief
 6 the supervisors before an event?
 7 A. Yes, it will have been briefed every show, yes.
 8 Q. Can you tell us what -- you may have an actual
 9 recollection of what you said on this occasion, and if
 10 you do, please tell us. But failing that, could you
 11 tell us in general terms what you would say about
 12 carrying out pre-event and egress checks? What was the
 13 nature of your instruction given orally?
 14 A. I can't remember the exact wording, but usually I would
 15 say something along the lines of: just ensure that the
 16 checks are completed and all reports are given to the
 17 event control room in good time prior to the event so if
 18 there are any issues we have adequate time to address
 19 them.
 20 Q. Would you have emphasised that the checks should be
 21 thorough?
 22 A. Not necessarily, no, no. I think it's quite clear from
 23 the briefing sheet.
 24 Q. From the sheet itself?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. As you'll appreciate, we're going to come on to the
 2 issue of pre-egress checks in due course.
 3 Just to complete the picture in relation to the
 4 supervisors' briefing sheet, could we go to page 2,
 5 please? {INQ012111/2}.
 6 Can you see "access control"? In capitals it reads:
 7 "LOOK OUT FOR SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS."
 8 Do you see that?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Was that a standard instruction on all supervisors'
 11 briefing sheets?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Am I right that so far as this particular concert was
 14 concerned, what you had in mind so far as suspicious
 15 characters was concerned was lone males who might have
 16 an unhealthy interest in female children?
 17 A. Yes, yes, that's one of them, yes.
 18 Q. What might be the other types of suspicious characters
 19 at the Ariana Grande concert?
 20 A. Just anybody who doesn't look like they fit the event
 21 profile, anybody who doesn't look like they are
 22 a genuine concertgoer. Basically, if they're not there
 23 to attend the concert legitimately.
 24 Q. Would that be something that you'd also brief orally,
 25 that staff ought to keep their eyes open for people who

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1 didn't fit the event profile and other things?
 2 A. Yes, yes, yes.
 3 Q. I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, but I don't believe
 4 within this briefing sheet there is any explicit
 5 reference to counter-terrorism, but was it nonetheless
 6 your practice to give a briefing in relation to
 7 counter-terrorism to supervisors?
 8 A. Yes. That's correct, yes, we briefed counter-terrorism
 9 on every single show, whether it was or wasn't the
 10 topic. We discussed it at every single show.
 11 Q. This is what I want to be clear about. Can you be
 12 confident that in relation to this particular show,
 13 Ariana Grande, you did give an oral briefing about
 14 counter-terrorism?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Do you have an actual recollection of having done so or
 17 is your answer based upon what you know to be your usual
 18 practice?
 19 A. I don't explicitly remember. I'm very confident that
 20 I did. I did that every single show as practice. It'd
 21 be extremely uncommon for that not to happen.
 22 Q. Whilst appreciating you don't have a specific
 23 recollection, what did you say when you gave your
 24 briefing about counter-terrorism?
 25 A. We discussed the HOT procedures, we discussed Run Hide

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1 Tell, and again just dove into looking for suspicious
 2 characters and behaviour and also the reporting
 3 mechanisms that are attached with that. Although it's
 4 not in the briefing sheet as a template, there was
 5 literature in the briefing room stuck on the walls which
 6 included things like Run Hide Tell and some general more
 7 assistive briefing topics like the phonetic alphabet,
 8 for example, for people who are using the radios and
 9 that was on the walls of the briefing room.

10 Q. Was it your expectation that those you were briefing
 11 about counter—terrorism would keep that to themselves or
 12 they would disseminate it to those they were going on to
 13 brief?

14 A. No, it was definitely to be disseminated, yes.

15 Q. We were dealing with the events of the day of the
 16 Ariana Grande concert in the order in which they
 17 occurred. Would the next event of significance after
 18 you had briefed the supervisors be for the supervisors
 19 to themselves brief their staff?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Was it the practice that that should happen a relatively
 22 short time before the doors opened?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. At this stage, Mr Rigby, I'm going to ask you to go in
 25 your main inquiry statement, so the statement dated

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1 12 November 2019 — I'm afraid I was given an index to
 2 your bundle but I haven't brought it through.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it could be 4 if it's like mine.

4 MR GREANEY: The chairman's helping me. Divider 4.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Would you go to {INQ025754/14} of that statement,
 7 please?

8 Can I indicate that I'm going to read out two short
 9 passages from this statement and I'm doing so at the
 10 request of counsel for Mr Lawler with a view to saving
 11 time and cutting down on the questions others need to
 12 ask.

13 Do you have paragraph 44 on that page, Mr Rigby?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I'm just going to read out two short passages and ask
 16 you to confirm that they are correct. First of all:
 17 "City Rooms door supervisor (Dave Middleton — SIA):
 18 responsible overall for the City Rooms entrance of the
 19 venue, for crowd management throughout the event and all
 20 ticket—scanning stewards on the doors. He is situated
 21 venue side of the City Rooms door throughout the event."
 22 Can you confirm that is correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That's obviously a description of one of the staff
 25 members that night. Over the page to the top of

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1 {INQ025754/15}, please, there's a heading:
 2 "Station bridge and emergency exit (the 'grey
 3 doors') (Kyle Lawler and Mohammed Agha for ingress and
 4 egress — SIA): these staff assist with the crowd
 5 management of customers entering and leaving the venue
 6 across the bridge and prevent ingress and egress via the
 7 emergency exit."

8 Again, can you confirm that that was the role of
 9 those two members of staff?

10 A. Yes.

11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just confirm in relation to
 12 Dave Middleton that, as far as you were concerned, you'd
 13 expect to find him at any time situated on the
 14 concourse, on the concourse side of the City Rooms?

15 A. Yes. On the concourse or at the City Room doors, sir,
 16 yes.

17 MR GREANEY: Indeed, Mr Rigby, you may not have seen it, but
 18 we've seen a good deal of footage of Mr Middleton being
 19 in precisely that position and a little later in my
 20 questioning I'm going to ask you about Mohammed Agha and
 21 what you'd have expected him to have done, but let's
 22 just carry on with the events of 22 May for the time
 23 being.

24 So the supervisors have given their briefing. Was
 25 the next thing that would happen on the occasion of

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1 events, and that did happen on 22 May, that a series of
 2 pre—event safety checks would be carried out and were
 3 carried out?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Were those carried out by ShowSec supervisors?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Using a form that had been supplied to ShowSec by SMG?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Such checks were carried out on the occasion of the
 10 Ariana Grande concert?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And as would usually occur, that was then communicated
 13 to the events manager, Miriam Stone; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Once that had happened, did the venue enter what was
 16 known as show mode?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. On 22 May, did that happen at about 6 pm?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is that really marking the stage at which people can
 21 enter the venue itself?

22 A. Yes, the doors are usually opened shortly after that
 23 time, yes.

24 Q. During show mode, where would you generally be?

25 A. In the event control room.

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1 Q. Is that the room that we've described most commonly as
 2 Sierra Control?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Would you generally be there with three other people,
 5 first of all the SMG event manager?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Secondly, the event radio controller?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Who would be a ShowSec employee?
 10 A. Correct, yes.
 11 Q. And thirdly, the event medical controller?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. A person who worked for ETUK?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Am I right -- and we'll take a break in just one
 16 moment -- that on the night of 22 May that is where you
 17 were, namely in Sierra Control?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And that you were there with Miriam Stone, the SMG event
 20 manager?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Michelle Ramsbottom, the event radio controller?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And Jade Duxbury, who was the medic from ETUK?
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 MR GREANEY: Mr Rigby, we will take a break at that stage
 2 and then, when we return, I'll have some basic questions
 3 for you about the operation within Sierra Control and
 4 about the night itself .
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is 10 minutes sufficient?
 6 MR GREANEY: Mr Rigby, is 10 minutes a sufficient period?
 7 A. That's fine, yes, thank you very much.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 3 o'clock, please.
 9 (2.48 pm)
 10 (A short break)
 11 (3.00 pm)
 12 MR GREANEY: Mr Rigby, can I check that that break was long
 13 enough for you?
 14 A. Yes, sir, thank you.
 15 Q. And you're comfortable to carry on?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. As I indicated, I'm going to ask you next just a small
 18 number of general questions about the operation of
 19 Sierra Control. What I'm not to go to do, and I dare
 20 say no one will feel the need to do, is to delve into
 21 a lot of detail or analyse the relationship between
 22 Sierra and Whiskey, those kind of things, because we've
 23 had a lot of other evidence about it.
 24 What I will ask you is this: within Sierra Control,
 25 out of you and Miriam Stone, who was in charge?

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1 A. Miriam Stone.
 2 Q. Who was the person within Sierra Control whose
 3 responsibility it was or would have been to make
 4 a decision about whether to prevent egress into the
 5 City Room, even for a short period, if the need arose?
 6 A. Again, Miriam Stone.
 7 Q. Do you agree with the evidence that Miriam Stone gave,
 8 and indeed James Allen, that if the need arose, the
 9 doors between the arena and the City Room could be shut
 10 very quickly, indeed during the 20 or 30 minutes prior
 11 to egress?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Next, a general issue about Sierra Control: was it your
 14 job to monitor the CCTV within Sierra Control?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Was it the job of anyone within Sierra Control to
 17 monitor CCTV?
 18 A. No, not the primary role, no.
 19 Q. What was the purpose of having the CCTV system in
 20 Sierra Control during events and indeed during ingress
 21 to and egress from events?
 22 A. It was allowing us, as a tool, to be able to effectively
 23 crowd--manage the attendees of the concert, effectively.
 24 Q. The way in which you put it in your principal witness
 25 statement at paragraph 109 {INQ025754/32} is this:

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1 "It is neither of our roles [you're talking about
 2 Miriam Stone and yourself] to constantly monitor the
 3 CCTV, but we will use it to manage ingress and egress
 4 and also investigate reports that we receive from staff
 5 on the ground."
 6 Is that correct?
 7 A. That's correct, yes.
 8 Q. You said that, certainly from your perspective, it was
 9 the role of the Whiskey Control Room to monitor the
 10 CCTV?
 11 A. That's my understanding, yes.
 12 Q. Is that how things operated as you understood it on the
 13 night of 22 May?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't know where event control is, nor
 16 do I wish to know, but from where you're sitting in that
 17 box, can you see directly into the arena or are you
 18 looking at what's going on in the arena via the CCTV?
 19 A. No, sir, you can see directly into the auditorium
 20 through the window.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 22 MR GREANEY: Would there be periods during an event when you
 23 would watch the show?
 24 A. Yes, sir, yes.
 25 Q. Next, I'm going to ask you about the night itself.

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1 Until the explosion, from a security point of view, was
 2 the evening uneventful?
 3 A. Largely, yes.
 4 Q. At any point that night did you note Salman Abedi on the
 5 CCTV system?
 6 A. No, sir.
 7 Q. At any stage did anyone within Sierra Control or outside
 8 Sierra Control draw his presence within the City Room to
 9 your attention?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. I believe it's the case that you didn't watch the
 12 evidence given by Mohammed Agha; is that right?
 13 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
 14 Q. But you are aware of the key aspects of his account; is
 15 that correct?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. So you understand that at about 10.15, a member of the
 18 public, Christopher Wild, approaches him on the grey
 19 doors and explains that he has concerns about a man who,
 20 as we now know, was Salman Abedi?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 Q. We know that in the period that followed, certainly for
 23 a good deal of it, David Middleton was on the City Room
 24 side of the arena doors?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. As the head of security, just in general terms at the
 2 moment before we turn to deal with what you'd have
 3 expected Mohammed Agha to do, in general terms what
 4 instructions would you have expected the door supervisor
 5 to give to the person on the grey doors?
 6 A. In terms of what, sorry?
 7 Q. In terms of whether they should stay there throughout
 8 and, if not, under what circumstances they should leave
 9 those doors.
 10 A. In general, the briefing's gone out to the staff,
 11 obviously, remain in your positions, that's where you've
 12 been allocated to, that's where we expect to find you,
 13 and obviously you have duties in that position. That
 14 being said, if there was a need for that person or there
 15 was a feeling from that person that they needed to
 16 report something of urgency, they could leave that
 17 position. It's just to prevent people idly walking away
 18 from their position because they are bored or they don't
 19 like it, for example. But yes, they could say if they
 20 needed to.
 21 Q. You weren't the person who had given the instruction to
 22 Mohammed Agha, we know that, but what would you have
 23 expected of Mohammed Agha in the situation in which he
 24 found himself at about 10.15?
 25 A. I would have expected him to report it.

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1 Q. We know that he didn't have a radio. To whom would
 2 you have expected him to report it?
 3 A. The briefing goes out to the staff that they should
 4 report it to the nearest radio holder or the nearest
 5 supervisor. There will always be one of those two, if
 6 not two of those, two close by. If he didn't have
 7 a radio holder within his eyesight, the person who
 8 briefed him for his shift and was his acting supervisor
 9 was a short distance away. I would expect him to go and
 10 speak to him. There's somebody always on them doors,
 11 they will not move away from them, so there's always
 12 someone who could be found there.
 13 Q. How quickly would you have expected Mohammed Agha to
 14 have drawn what he had been told and seen to the
 15 attention of one of the persons that you've described?
 16 A. Straightaway.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are we leaving that?
 18 MR GREANEY: I was going to move on to a separate but
 19 connected topic.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I want to ask a couple more questions
 21 about that, if you don't mind. You have said that
 22 everyone has their positions and that's where you'd
 23 normally expect to find them, but in necessity they
 24 could move away, in an emergency. People being on fire
 25 doors are in a rather different position, aren't they,

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1 from people who were, say, stationed on the bridge like
 2 Mr Lawler was? Is that right?
 3 A. Yes. There's a lot of freedom for that position, sir,
 4 that's correct, yes, compared to the (inaudible:
 5 distorted), there's a lot more movement in that but the
 6 (overspeaking) --
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I spoke across you.
 8 So people on fire doors are expected to stay where
 9 they should be unless they're being relieved to go off
 10 for a break or something like that?
 11 A. Yes, essentially, yes, that's the briefing. They're to
 12 remain in that position because, you know...
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Just the other side of that --
 14 have you got the statement in front of you? Could you
 15 go back to paragraph 44 of your long statement? It's
 16 divider 4.
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Reading about Dave Middleton and using
 19 its normal meaning, you'd expect to find him by the
 20 doors but on the venue side; is that right?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know he came through into the
 23 City Room, but you'd expect to find him on the inside of
 24 the door?
 25 A. Yes. Obviously, his role is not fixed as well, so he'll

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1 be between all of those doors that are open, dealing
 2 with issues. So he would -- it's widely known that the
 3 supervisors for the City Room will be found at those
 4 doors. If they can't physically see them from the
 5 outside as they approach the doors, they could find them
 6 straightaway.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: By getting someone to let them in
 8 through the door? If I wanted to find Mr Middleton and
 9 he's on the far side of the doors from the City Room,
 10 I would need to be let through the doors by somebody?
 11 A. Yes, sorry, yes. There's always somebody on those
 12 doors, yes. We have staff and a supervisor on those
 13 doors at all times, so that is acceptable, yes.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 15 MR GREANEY: Again, I've been asked to draw a part of your
 16 statement to your attention by counsel representing
 17 Mr Lawler. I'm not going to read all of the part out
 18 that I've been invited to because part of it doesn't
 19 seem to me to be a proper part to read out, but would
 20 you go, please, to {INQ025754/40} of the statement we've
 21 been looking at, where you'll find paragraph 140.
 22 You're dealing with the events that we've just been
 23 looking at concerning Mr Agha and now Mr Lawler as well.
 24 Have you got that, Mr Rigby?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. You say:
 2 "I note that Mohammed Agha did report suspicious
 3 activity to a colleague with a radio, Mr Lawler. They
 4 both went to investigate it. This is what we would
 5 expect them to do. I note that Lawler states that he
 6 attempted to radio the report into the ECR, but the
 7 radio channels were too busy. Since we were preparing
 8 for egress they would have been busy at around this
 9 time. When someone else is speaking on the radio,
 10 another person cannot make a call and the other person
 11 hears a dead tone, which is essentially a beep."
 12 Is that correct?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. So during the period that we're concerned with, the
 15 radios might well be busy?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. So a person might not get through straightaway?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Where a person isn't able to get through straightaway,
 20 based upon your experience how long might they have to
 21 wait before they could do so?
 22 A. No longer than a minute or two. Again, they can hear
 23 the conversations that are happening, so it's evident
 24 when those conversations have happened on the radio. If
 25 they're trying to use the radio, they can hear that

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1 someone is talking and they obviously won't be able to
 2 speak over them.
 3 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm moving away from 22 May on to some
 4 more general topics.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 6 MR GREANEY: These are going to be some short general
 7 topics, Mr Rigby.
 8 First, bag checks and bag searches. Back in
 9 May 2017, did you understand there to be any difference
 10 between those two things?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. As head of security for ShowSec, did you understand at
 13 that point in time that an SIA licence was required for
 14 one, both or neither of those things?
 15 A. One of those things.
 16 Q. Which of those things did you understand an SIA licence
 17 was required for?
 18 A. A bag search or a person search.
 19 Q. It follows that at that point in time, you thought that
 20 a licence was not required for a bag check?
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. Just so we're talking about the same thing, when I say
 23 bag check, I'm talking about what witnesses have
 24 described as having a look inside a bag, but not putting
 25 one's hands inside, whereas a bag search is obviously

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1 something more intrusive. Is that what you mean by
 2 those terms as well?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Next short topic: CCTV. In 2017 did you have a good
 5 deal of experience of the CCTV system at the arena?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. In May of that year, did you know that there was a CCTV
 8 blind spot on the mezzanine area?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. When did you first become aware that there was such
 11 a blind spot?
 12 A. During this inquiry process.
 13 Q. Next topic, a topic I mentioned earlier: pre-egress
 14 checks. When you were head of security for a concert or
 15 other event, did you expect a pre-egress check to take
 16 place?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or more than one?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 MR GREANEY: I should have said: did you expect pre-egress
 21 checks to take place, and your answer would have been
 22 yes.
 23 Did you expect those checks to be undertaken by
 24 ShowSec staff?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And did you expect them to take place in accordance with
2 a checklist that we've seen many times during the course
3 of the inquiry?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. We've seen it what feels like hundreds of times now, but
6 I'll just make sure you're talking about the same
7 document. We'll have {INQ036769/1}.
8 Is that the check sheet that you're talking about?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. We can see:
11 "Pre-egress check sheet. City Room. Check 1.
12 Check 2. Check 3. Check 4."
13 And the areas to check are the same under each. The
14 second bullet point under each check reads:
15 "Entire City Room area including McDonald's and
16 JJ Williams entrance."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Are you aware that we have been describing the raised
19 area within the City Room as the mezzanine during the
20 course of the inquiry?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. A number of ShowSec witnesses have agreed that the
23 language of that bullet point is plain and as a matter
24 of language would seem to include the mezzanine area;
25 would you agree with that?

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1 A. No, that wasn't my understanding.
2 Q. So there are two stages to this and I should have made
3 that clear. I'm going to look at what your
4 understanding was, but first of all, when you read
5 through that bullet point, and if you hadn't been told
6 anything different, you would assume that check was to
7 include the mezzanine area; do you agree?
8 A. No, no, I don't, sorry.
9 Q. Let me just put it this way and I'll move on. Where the
10 term used is "entire City Room", if you hadn't been told
11 anything else, you would expect it to include the
12 mezzanine, which is part of the City Room? Does that
13 make sense?
14 A. Yes, it makes sense, yes.
15 Q. Anyway, the most important part of my questioning
16 I suppose is: what was your understanding of what the
17 pre-egress check within the City Room involved and
18 included?
19 A. It was a pre-egress check for all of the egress routes
20 that the concertgoers were going to take out of the
21 City Rooms area, of which, I'm sure you are aware, there
22 are several. And it was checked to make sure all of
23 those egress routes were safe to do so.
24 Q. Did you expect it to include a ShowSec employee going on
25 to the mezzanine area physically?

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1 A. No.
2 Q. So that was your understanding of what the pre-egress
3 check involved. From where had you gained that
4 understanding? Had you read something or had someone
5 told you that was what was to be done?
6 A. It was a combination of things. It was what I was
7 taught when I was training to be head of security at the
8 venue. It's been the practice for a long time. That
9 was the case. I just ... That's what I was taught.
10 It's the way I know it to be.
11 Q. Next topic: ShowSec's counter-terrorism awareness
12 document. Can we have the first page on the screen,
13 please? It's {INQ012031/1}.
14 We can see that it's dated 6 January 2017. It is
15 specific to the Manchester Arena and your name is given
16 as primary contact. Do you see that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr Rigby, are you familiar with this document?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Were you the author of it or one of the authors of it?
21 A. Yes.
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which?
23 MR GREANEY: Were you the sole author or one of the authors?
24 A. I think at this time there was a few people. This was
25 the first time it had been used, I think, in Manchester,

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1 possibly. So I think there was a few people who were
2 involved in the creating of this document and I'm the
3 primary contact for it.
4 Q. Do you remember who else was involved with you in
5 creating this document?
6 A. Not exactly. I think possibly Alan, the regional
7 manager at the time. I think he definitely was the
8 driver for this document. And then I can't remember if
9 Tom Bailey was involved in that or not as well, I don't
10 know.
11 Q. I'm not going to press you if you can't recall.
12 Can you remember why this document was prepared?
13 A. It was used as... Sorry, I'm trying to think of the
14 best way to explain it. It was a supplementary document
15 to dovetail into others, the other risk assessment.
16 Q. So was it something that was to support the risk
17 assessment process?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. To whom was this document sent, if it was sent to
20 anyone?
21 A. It was distributed amongst ShowSec key personnel and
22 also sent to the venue as well, to Miriam and James
23 from the venue.
24 Q. Was there any respect in which this was a form of
25 advertising?

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1 A. Sorry, sir, I don't understand what you're saying.
 2 Q. Well, was it a way of advertising to the venue that
 3 ShowSec had counter-terrorism expertise? Was that any
 4 part of its purpose?
 5 A. No, definitely not, no.
 6 Q. You were one of the authors of this document. Did you,
 7 in January of 2017, regard yourself as being an expert
 8 in counter-terrorism?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. Can you say whether you had the support in the part that
 11 you played in preparing this document of an expert in
 12 counter-terrorism?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. The document speaks for itself and indeed we looked at
 15 some parts of it yesterday, I'm not going to do so
 16 nearly as extensively, but there are just three passages
 17 I would like to help with if you're able to provide it.
 18 First of all, {INQ012031/5}, please. I hope these
 19 references are correct. It reads:
 20 "Our staff are the key to the success of our
 21 operation and the gatherings we work on."
 22 Do you have that paragraph on the screen?
 23 A. Yes. Sorry, it's really quite fuzzy. I can't read the
 24 writing.
 25 Q. It's been enlarged, is that any better?

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1 A. It is, thank you.
 2 Q. The end of that paragraph reads -- and you're dealing
 3 with the briefing and training of your staff in
 4 counter-terrorism. It reads:
 5 "We have also engaged communications with
 6 counter-terrorism units in the police forces across the
 7 country, even having speakers come in and talk to our
 8 staff and supervisors."
 9 According to your recollection, was it correct that
 10 ShowSec in Manchester had engaged communications with
 11 counter-terrorism units in police forces?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. Do you recall speakers coming in and talking to staff
 14 and supervisors about counter-terrorism?
 15 A. I think that would have been in the form of specific
 16 training modules like Project Griffin, for example, when
 17 that was set up, but other than that, no, I don't recall
 18 it to be.
 19 Q. Next, {INQ012031/6}, please. It's the wrong reference.
 20 Let's go straight to {INQ012031/7}, please, and the
 21 bottom half of the page.
 22 Are you able to read the section that's on the
 23 screen, Mr Rigby?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 Q. This is, as we have agreed, a Manchester Arena-specific

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1 document headed "Patrols":
 2 "The building operation includes various different
 3 patrols to ensure it is constantly being checked."
 4 Do you see that?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. "On a non-event day or out of event hours, the patrols
 7 are undertaken by the SMG Whiskey Control Room staff.
 8 These checks span the whole of the venue and cover all
 9 key vulnerable areas, such as entrances and/or lifts."
 10 Then this sentence:
 11 "During events these patrols are undertaken by
 12 ShowSec security staff."
 13 Do you read that?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. I'm just going to ask you what I hope is a simple
 16 question: how to your mind does that fit with the
 17 evidence you gave about what you would expect of
 18 a pre-egress check?
 19 A. Sorry, I don't understand the question probably. What
 20 specifically?
 21 Q. That would be my fault. What this section of the
 22 document that you authored in part indicates is that
 23 during dark days extensive patrols would be undertaken
 24 by SMG but that during events those patrols would be
 25 undertaken by ShowSec security staff.

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1 A. Yes. It's not necessarily the patrols in the same
 2 format, I don't believe. When the access control team
 3 or incident response teams -- once the ingress has
 4 finished, those teams are then redeployed inside the
 5 venue, so those teams would then patrol on the inside of
 6 the venue, checking out for areas within the venue, so
 7 they would patrol inside the venue at that time.
 8 Q. So you mean within the arena itself?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Next issue. Were you working at the arena as head of
 11 security on 18 May when there was a Take That concert?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. What we've understood is that one of the ShowSec
 14 supervisors that evening was a retired police officer
 15 whose name was Jonathan Lavery. Are you familiar with
 16 his name?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. As we in fact heard earlier today, he was positioned
 19 looking into the City Room carrying out profiling, as he
 20 described it, where he saw a man who looked out of place
 21 and appearing to film. He pursued the man, who boarded
 22 a train, and he then spoke to a BTP officer. Did you
 23 become aware of that, that night, the 18th?
 24 A. Yes, I think I was aware when possibly it was radioed
 25 through to control. I'd have had the message passed on

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1 to me then.
 2 Q. Were you aware that Mr Lavery prepared a report?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And so far as you understood it, what was done with that
 5 report?
 6 A. Jon obviously reported that directly to the police
 7 at the time and it was logged in the event control log
 8 and Jon wrote his report on that and that was then
 9 passed to the venue at the end of the night with all the
 10 remaining reports.
 11 Q. Did that event make any difference to how ShowSec
 12 managed the Ariana Grande concert?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Was it even, so far as you can recall, something that
 15 was discussed between you and Miriam Stone at the
 16 Tuesday meeting?
 17 A. I can't remember, I'm afraid.
 18 Q. Final topic and then I'll be finished. It's risk
 19 assessment.
 20 Had you received any training in the assessment of
 21 risk?
 22 A. Yes. I'd done an IOSH course.
 23 Q. Do you recall when or whenabouts you'd done that course?
 24 A. Not from memory, no.
 25 Q. Was that a general course or a course that was focused

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1 on the assessment of risk at events?
 2 A. It's managing health and safety, so it's just -- I think
 3 it's general.
 4 Q. Would I be right to assume therefore that it didn't
 5 involve any specific training in the assessment of
 6 a terrorism risk?
 7 A. Definitely not, no.
 8 Q. Had you ever, prior to May 2017, seen the risk
 9 assessment of SMG?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Mr Rigby, we're next going to look at the ShowSec risk
 12 assessments and, as you're aware, ShowSec accept that
 13 there were deep flaws in the way in which risk was
 14 assessed in relation to the arena and the concert, so
 15 we'll be able to deal with this very quickly indeed.
 16 Is it correct, according to your recollection, that
 17 a new system for the assessment of risk was introduced
 18 in 2017?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Who was it that introduced that new system for the
 21 assessment of risk?
 22 A. I think it would have been Sharon Pates, who's the
 23 ShowSec health and safety manager.
 24 Q. We looked right at the beginning of my questioning at
 25 one document that dealt with the assessment of risk;

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1 we're next going to look at another document and it's
 2 {INQ001477/1}.
 3 What we've been told, and tell us if this is right
 4 or not, is that this was an assessment of the risk to
 5 ShowSec staff.
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. covered a number of risks or potential risks,
 8 including, as we can see, counter-terrorism?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Just bringing those two factors together, it's an
 11 assessment of the risk that terrorism presents to
 12 members of ShowSec staff; is that correct?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. So what we've understood is that there was no
 15 counter-terrorism risk assessment undertaken for the
 16 audience at an event?
 17 A. Not by ShowSec.
 18 Q. This is a document that related to a one-year period,
 19 1 year and 1 day, 9 January 2017 to 9 January 2018.
 20 Can you see that from the top right-hand corner?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Were you the author of this particular risk assessment?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Everyone agrees, and I'm certain you will also agree,
 25 that it resulted in an inappropriately low assessment of

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1 the risk of terrorism; do you agree?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. But to be fair to you, were you yourself concerned about
 4 the approach to risk assessment at this point in time in
 5 early 2017?
 6 A. Yes, I did query it, yes.
 7 Q. I'm going to ask that we look at an email,
 8 {INQ034679/1}.
 9 The first email in the chain was from you, dated
 10 18 January 2017, so shortly after you had prepared the
 11 risk assessment we've just looked at, and it's timed at
 12 14.59 hours.
 13 It is sent to Sharon Pates, who, as you've
 14 explained, had a particular health and safety
 15 responsibility within ShowSec; is that right?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. So did you think that you were sending an email really
 18 to the expert in the business?
 19 A. Yes, in regards to this document (overspeaking) --
 20 Q. Sorry, we spoke over each other.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He was saying in relation to this
 22 document, Sharon Pates had drafted it.
 23 MR GREANEY: You copied it to Thomas Bailey, who was your
 24 line manager?
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. The subject was:
 2 "Manchester Arena risk assessment V.1 2017."
 3 I'll read it in terms and then ask you a question
 4 about it:
 5 "Hi Sharon, can you look over this risk assessment
 6 for me for the Manchester Arena? All the prior risk
 7 assessments in place seem to fit into this somewhere.
 8 However, I can't help think I've missed something.
 9 Maybe it's the new format, but it doesn't look extensive
 10 enough to be correct. Can you let me know your thoughts
 11 and changes, please, and anything I should add?
 12 Regards, Tom."
 13 That's what you wrote, is it not?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. So were you concerned that you'd been through the
 16 process that the system required of you but what had
 17 been produced just didn't look correct?
 18 A. Yes. I think this possibly was the first time I used
 19 that document for the arena.
 20 Q. So you were emailing the expert within the business on
 21 issues such as this, seeking her thoughts and inviting
 22 her to make any changes that were necessary?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. She replied, as we can see, 6 days later on 24 January,
 25 with an email timed at 14.08 hours.

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1 The email reads:
 2 "All good, Tom. S."
 3 So did you understand from that that Sharon Pates
 4 had looked at your email, looked at the risk assessment,
 5 and was effectively signing off what you had done as
 6 being appropriate?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 MR GREANEY: Mr Rigby, thank you very much indeed for
 9 answering my questions. I have asked all of them at
 10 this stage at any rate. I'm going to invite
 11 Mr O'Connor, first of all, to ask his questions on
 12 behalf of SMG, but I remind him that we need to have
 13 a break in 7 minutes.
 14 MR O'CONNOR: In fact, I have no questions.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr O'Connor.
 16 MR GREANEY: Next, with the same reminder, I'm going to ask
 17 Mr Williams whether he has any questions on behalf of
 18 Mohammed Agha.
 19 MR WILLIAMS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Greaney.
 20 MR GREANEY: I'm told that there are no questions on behalf
 21 of Kyle Lawler, so Mr Gibbs on behalf of British
 22 Transport Police, would you make yourself known if
 23 you have questions, please?
 24 MR GIBBS: I have none, thank you.
 25 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much indeed.

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1 So next, Mr Atkinson to at least begin his
 2 questioning on behalf of the bereaved families.
 3 Questions from MR ATKINSON
 4 MR ATKINSON: Mr Rigby, can you hear me all right?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 Q. I have very little for you and it's just a few questions
 7 for your further help about the system and how it was
 8 working, all right --
 9 A. Yes, sir.
 10 Q. -- rather than about 22 May in particular?
 11 A. Okay.
 12 Q. To see if this helps, I wonder if we could have on our
 13 screen {INQ034658/1}. If we could scroll down to the
 14 second page, please, {INQ034658/2}.
 15 We can see that, where the text goes from blue to
 16 black, we have an email from Alan Wallace to a number of
 17 people, not including you. So what I'm seeking your
 18 help with is as to whether the contents of this were
 19 passed on to you, either by Mr Wallace or Mr Bailey, who
 20 it was sent to, in terms of changes that were made
 21 towards the end of 2016. All right?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. So this is an email in October 2016, referring to
 24 a counter-terrorism review that identified a number of
 25 things that were talked about, which are the bullet

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1 points towards the bottom of the page as we look at it.
 2 All right?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. The first of those:
 5 "All operating plans reviewed and in place deemed as
 6 suitable."
 7 This is Mr Wallace speaking towards the end of 2016
 8 and you've told us that he was a driving force behind
 9 the counter-terrorism awareness document that you were
 10 just looking at with Mr Greaney, which came in at the
 11 beginning of 2017. Were those two things, as you
 12 understood it, connected, that there'd been a look at
 13 the operating procedures in relation to terrorism and
 14 the counter-terrorism awareness document came about as
 15 a result?
 16 A. Not specifically, no. Obviously those conversations had
 17 happened, but from my level, obviously, that
 18 dissemination just came down to: we needed to create
 19 this document.
 20 Q. The next on the list:
 21 "All risk assessments require updating and
 22 transferring to the new format."
 23 Was the document you were just looking at with
 24 Mr Greaney the result of that?
 25 A. I believe so, yes.

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1 Q. Just pausing on that document, I don't want to take you
2 back to it, but so far as you were concerned, you had
3 received your IOSH training in relation to health and
4 safety and risk assessments back in 2011.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do we understand from you that you had no further
7 training in relation to risk assessments thereafter?
8 A. No, not that I can recall.
9 Q. And in relation to the document you were just looking at
10 with Mr Greaney, were you sent it by Sharon Pates as the
11 new version that needed to be completed?
12 A. Yes, we received it as a template, yes, and were told to
13 use the template.
14 Q. Told to use it? Were you given any further instruction
15 or training about how to use it?
16 A. Not specifically, I don't think, no. Obviously I'd done
17 my IOSH course. That's it, sorry.
18 Q. Staying with this email, just because it's convenient to
19 do it in one go, we can see that in October 2016,
20 Mr Wallace was saying:
21 "Briefings are considered as inadequate."
22 Do you see that's the third bullet point down?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. "Briefings are considered as inadequate as the CT
25 element is not delivered frequently enough to new

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1 starters."
2 The next point down:
3 "CT focus needs inserting into briefings."
4 Still on the subject of that:
5 "On quieter shows the service may require a CT
6 slant, discussions surrounding evac test, live
7 scenarios, etc.
8 "Hostile reconnaissance must be engendered in every
9 action an employee takes."
10 In relation to that -- thank you, we can take that
11 off --
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we just note it's headed:
13 "CT review meeting -- Paris, one year on."
14 That was the focus of it.
15 MR ATKINSON: Against the background of those bullet points
16 from October 2016 talking about briefings, did there
17 come about a change in relation to how often
18 counter-terrorism was included in briefings towards the
19 end of 2016?
20 A. I don't recall so, no, I think counter-terrorism was
21 covered in briefings anyway. I think that might be
22 in relation to specifically picking up on the briefing
23 topic on the -- for example, on the supervisor's
24 briefing sheet, the topic of briefing for that day where
25 you would have the opportunity to dive into it a little

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1 bit more. That's my understanding.
2 Q. Just to understand that, if we go back to the
3 supervisor's briefing document that you were shown...
4 MR GREANEY: If you're moving on to a separate but connected
5 topic, it's better to have a short break at this stage.
6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 4 o'clock. Thank you.
7 (3.45 pm)
8 (A short break)
9 (4.11 pm)
10 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm sorry we're starting slightly later
11 than we intended. There is a reason for that, but I'm
12 not going to go into it, I will just invite Mr Atkinson
13 to continue his questioning.
14 MR ATKINSON: Can we go, please, to {INQ012111/1}.
15 You've already been taken again, Mr Rigby, to this,
16 the supervisor's briefing sheet for the concert. In the
17 middle column at the top, do you see, "Event:
18 Ariana Grande"?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And below that is the risk category.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Clearly, the actual category has been redacted on this
23 version of this document, but your help, please, as to
24 where the risk category would come from. And just to
25 see if this helps you, you've told us about the risk

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1 assessment that was undertaken using the new form
2 designed by Sharon Pates and you've told us about the
3 assessment process that you had done to identify what
4 category of head of security was needed for the concert.
5 Was it one of those two that led to the categorisation
6 of risk that would have been on this form?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can you help us as to which of them it would have been?
9 A. It's the event risk assessment. It's the one that
10 categorises the event.
11 Q. Again, just so that I'm clear, and it's my fault, is it
12 the one that you did to work out who the head of
13 security should be or the other one?
14 A. It's the head of security one.
15 Q. Right. So that was a document that -- you explained in
16 your witness statement what factors were taken into
17 account in assessing that level of risk and that did not
18 include counter-terrorism, did it?
19 A. No.
20 Q. So the risk category that would have been on this
21 document that went to the supervisors would not have
22 been taking any account of a risk to the audience from
23 someone outside the audience?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Would the supervisors have known that?

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1 A. Um... Yes, I think they would, yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really sorry to stop you. I'm a bit
 3 baffled at the moment as to why this is marked official
 4 sensitive. I don't think many of us have much trouble
 5 actually working out what it was.
 6 MR ATKINSON: Sir, there are different versions of this
 7 document. It's redacted on some but not on others and
 8 I'm afraid, not least because my mind was elsewhere
 9 during the break, I didn't have the opportunity to
 10 double-check. It's also right to say, as Mr Rigby will
 11 be able to help us, it's wrong on the document, but for
 12 other reasons. And that's right, isn't it, Mr Rigby?
 13 Your process that identified that you would be the head
 14 of security for this event had identified this as
 15 a low-risk event?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. By reference to, for example, the nature of the audience
 18 at the event?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. In fact, the risk categorisation as written on this form
 21 was not low, was it?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. But it should have been?
 24 A. It was an error.
 25 Q. It should have been?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Insofar as a reader of this document would have got
 3 a message from it, it was as to a higher level of risk
 4 than in fact you had assessed it as being?
 5 A. Yes. It was written in error, yes.
 6 Q. But in any event, do we understand that supervisors
 7 would have known that this was a process to identify the
 8 risk posed by the audience?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And was that because of something you'd have said to
 11 them or just because they would know how this works?
 12 A. They'd know from -- I would have covered it in the
 13 actual briefing, but historically they would have known
 14 anyway because it happened for years before this.
 15 Q. Is this fair, Mr Rigby: your supervisors would rely on
 16 a combination of what was on the piece of paper in front
 17 of them, what you told them, and also their own
 18 experience of how things worked?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind if I follow that up? It may
 21 be what you're coming to, so I'm sorry if I'm
 22 interfering unnecessarily.
 23 Do you think there is a risk in the situation where
 24 you have, looking at the audience profile, if call it
 25 low risk, but if we look at the national risk for

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1 terrorism it's called severe? And do you think there is
 2 a risk that people being told, "This is a low risk
 3 concert", begin to apply it to everything and don't keep
 4 in mind that there is another severe risk in the
 5 background and it's just one that goes on and on and on?
 6 A. I don't think that's true, sir, no. Every concert's
 7 different, so that is a continually changing briefing,
 8 it's not the same every time, so those will change.
 9 When a higher-risk show comes in, that will be discussed
 10 at length as well as covering the risk.
 11 MR ATKINSON: If we scroll down the page, please, in the
 12 bottom right-hand box, there's a description of your
 13 audience and you'd have got that, is this right,
 14 Mr Rigby, from the event rider which would have told you
 15 how many people were coming and what kind of person was
 16 coming?
 17 A. Yes, that's one place, yes, that and obviously
 18 experience of working the show or similar.
 19 Q. And any information that you received at the Tuesday
 20 meeting about the event would have then been put by you
 21 into your briefing on this document?
 22 A. Yes, if it was relevant, yes. It will have been updated
 23 by the client on the event rider.
 24 Q. Anything you thought your supervisors needed to know?
 25 A. Yes, sorry, this wasn't made at the Tuesday meeting;

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1 this was made on the event day.
 2 Q. But do we understand that you would have taken from your
 3 Tuesday meeting anything you thought the supervisors
 4 needed to know and would have put it into this document
 5 when you then produced it?
 6 A. Yes, sorry, yes.
 7 Q. In terms of the risk from terrorism in relation to this
 8 event, was anything said at the Tuesday meeting about
 9 that at all?
 10 A. No, not that I recall, no.
 11 Q. Whilst this document does tell your supervisors about
 12 who's coming to the event, the profile of people at the
 13 event, nowhere on this document does it say what the
 14 national terror risk was, does it?
 15 A. No, it doesn't say it in the document, no. That would
 16 have been delivered orally at the briefings and, if I'm
 17 right, the briefing room at the time had literature on
 18 the walls as well and the terrorist threat levels were
 19 on there as well.
 20 Q. That would help the supervisors when they got their
 21 briefing, but the stewards when they got their briefings
 22 would be wherever in the building they were going to be
 23 working, wouldn't they?
 24 A. That's correct.
 25 Q. So, for example, those who were working in relation to

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1 the City Room had their briefing just on the concourse
 2 side of the City Room doors —
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. — with no posters on the wall to help them at that
 5 point with the risk of terrorism?
 6 A. No, not at the time of briefing, no. The briefing room,
 7 once it was concluded for briefings, as also a break
 8 room for the staff, so they would have had the
 9 opportunity to go in there at some point.
 10 Q. So they in turn would have been relying on the
 11 combination of a piece of paper they picked up when they
 12 came in for work that day, their briefing sheet, and
 13 what they were told by their supervisor?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. If we go over to {INQ012111/2} of this document, the top
 16 half of the page. Can I deal, because you deal with it
 17 in your statement and it may help — under "Entrances —
 18 specifics", are you with me?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Second one down:
 21 "Searches: no. Usually random pat—down and profile
 22 search."
 23 You made clear in your witness statement that did
 24 not mean that there were to be no searches, did it?
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

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1 Q. It did mean, however, there weren't going to be search
 2 lines as there might have been if this was boxing rather
 3 than Ariana Grande?
 4 A. Correct.
 5 Q. And if there had been search lines, would there have
 6 been an SIA person on each line?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Whereas, because it wasn't such an event, there were, in
 9 terms of the City Room, actually in the City Room at the
 10 time of ingress, Mr Middleton, Mr Beak and Mr Perry as
 11 SIA people dealing with the queues?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. In relation to searches, can I just get your help on one
 14 further point? If you have your main inquiry statement
 15 that you've been taken to by a number of other people,
 16 it's {INQ025754/1}. Do you have that main statement,
 17 Mr Rigby?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. It's paragraph 35 that starts at the bottom of
 20 {INQ025754/10}.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Do you have the paragraph beginning:
 23 "Access control teams are made up of SIA staff"?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. That paragraph carries on to the top of the next page,

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1 {INQ025754/11}, and do you see at the end of the second
 2 line there's a new sentence beginning "stewards"?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. I am just going to read you a couple of lines of what
 5 you said in the statement and ask for your help on it.
 6 All right?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. What you say is:
 9 "Stewards carry out ticket checks and can ask about
 10 food and beverages in bags. However, only SIA staff can
 11 check bags. It is only SIA staff" —
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, has that been removed from the
 13 operationally sensitive part?
 14 MR GREANEY: It's certainly marked operationally sensitive
 15 in the copy of the statement that I have.
 16 MR ATKINSON: I'm so sorry, it's not in the copy I have.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm very sorry about that. It may well
 18 be it doesn't require to be, but as I saw it was in my
 19 copy I though I ought to mention it.
 20 MR ATKINSON: You are absolutely right, sir, I do apologise.
 21 MR GREANEY: It sounds like it is not at all your fault.
 22 I'm not in a position without consultation, sir, to
 23 make a judgement immediately that that is not
 24 operationally sensitive. It's only a few words that
 25 you've read out even if it is, Mr Atkinson. I'll pass

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1 my copy of the —
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't think the first sentence is...
 3 Do you want more than the first sentence? How far are
 4 you going into it?
 5 MR ATKINSON: That will, I suspect, do for my purposes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'll make an executive order and you can
 7 have the first sentence.
 8 MR ATKINSON: All I'm asking your help with, Mr Rigby, is
 9 what you appear to be saying in that statement was, in
 10 terms of bag checks, that was something only SIA staff
 11 could do. My understanding from your evidence earlier
 12 today was that stewards could check bags but they
 13 couldn't search them. I just want your help as to which
 14 of those you understood to be the position.
 15 A. Yes, it's the latter. There's been some change in the
 16 terminology since writing this, emphasis on checks and
 17 searches. My understanding was, as the latter to what
 18 you've just said, the SIA staff would always search bags
 19 and stewards would just be checking for food and
 20 beverages.
 21 Q. Do we understand that you understood that to be the
 22 position because that is what happened at the arena
 23 throughout the time you worked there?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. So was that what you were told happened from the time

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1 you started as, what, as a steward?
 2 A. Yes. That didn't change when I was training.
 3 Q. We know that the steward induction training course, when
 4 it became an online course, it said that only SIA staff
 5 could perform that role. Was that something that you
 6 saw when you were being trained or did you pre-date the
 7 online course?
 8 A. For the stewards, is that, sorry?
 9 Q. Yes, for the stewards.
 10 A. Yes, I think I started before that was done.
 11 Q. We also know the same thing is included in the
 12 ingress/egress online training. Did you do that course,
 13 Mr Rigby?
 14 A. For ShowSec, yes.
 15 Q. Did that strike you as being different from what you
 16 understood the position to be as to what non-SIA staff
 17 could do?
 18 A. Not at the time, no.
 19 Q. But is this fair: in relation to searches, as indeed as
 20 to pre-ingress checks -- pre-egress checks, I should
 21 say, and where they did or didn't go in the City Room,
 22 your information as to came from working there and what
 23 you learned from people who also worked there?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. One final point on the City Room and then I think I'm

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1 done. We know that on 14 October 2016, there was an
 2 unattended package detected up on the mezzanine at
 3 a Disney on Ice event. Does that ring a bell with you?
 4 A. It didn't. Obviously I am aware of it now it's been
 5 discussed through the inquiry, but it didn't ring a bell
 6 at the time.
 7 Q. Did you have any dealings with that yourself?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. In terms of ShowSec having a role in dealing with that,
 10 did that strike you in any way as being at odds with
 11 your understanding of jurisdiction in relation to the
 12 City Room?
 13 A. No.
 14 MR O'CONNOR: Otherwise Mr Greaney has dealt with the areas
 15 I would have dealt with, so that's all I ask.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 17 MR GREANEY: Sir, Mr Cooper indicated he also had questions
 18 on behalf of the families.
 19 Questions from MR COOPER
 20 MR COOPER: Thank you.
 21 Those we represent are interested to understand,
 22 maybe you can help us, the ambit of the role of the
 23 promoter's representative, that's Live Nation, in the
 24 determination of the final protective security measures,
 25 do you understand, so that it can be understood what

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1 role they have to play, that is Live Nation, the
 2 promoter, in determination of the final protective
 3 security measures? I want to take you to one document,
 4 please, that might assist you to start your thoughts.
 5 That document is {INQ029116/1}.
 6 This is the Ariana Grande tour hospitality rider for
 7 this particular event. If I can take you to one page,
 8 please, which is {INQ029116/6}. There we see,
 9 if we scroll down, "Searches". Under "Searches", it
 10 says this:
 11 "The show is requesting bag checks and metal
 12 detectors upon entry at the discretion of the venue.
 13 House security and supervisors (house policy)."
 14 I wonder whether you could just translate that for
 15 us, if possible, in terms of this particular document,
 16 which is the Ariana Grande tour hospitality rider dated
 17 13 January 2017. Is this an example, perhaps, of the
 18 promoter, perfectly properly, attempting to influence
 19 a certain level of security at the event?
 20 A. Sorry, I've never seen that document before, sorry.
 21 Q. I thought you might have done.
 22 A. No, sorry, I haven't seen that document before.
 23 Q. I'll ask a general question. The document is there on
 24 its face. I will put the general question to you as
 25 head of security. What role did the promoter play in

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1 determination of the final protective security measures?
 2 What influence did they have?
 3 A. Any conversation about security will have gone between
 4 the promoter and the venue directly, which I wasn't
 5 involved in. I don't know if that answers your
 6 question, but I can't really say much more. I don't
 7 know to what extent...
 8 Q. If that is the position then that is the position. What
 9 you're telling this inquiry is that, as far as you're
 10 concerned, you had no communication with Live Nation
 11 about the level of security they required, it was
 12 others?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. Do you know who it might have been? Would it have been
 15 Miriam Stone?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I must say, I find that particular line
 18 quite difficult to understand.
 19 MR COOPER: I do. That's why I wanted a translation, sir.
 20 Maybe there can be others who can assist in due course.
 21 I will ask the question, though, in terms of your
 22 ability and your experience as a security man. Looking
 23 at that line, I know you didn't write it, but can you
 24 translate it for us? That line:
 25 "The show is requesting bag checks and metal

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1 detectors upon entry at the discretion of the venue,
 2 house security and supervisors (house policy)."
 3 I can't work it out.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it may be better to leave it to
 5 someone who was part of the negotiations, if that's all
 6 right okay --
 7 MR COOPER: Then I shan't --
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- because they are more likely --
 9 I think the rest of us will be guessing.
 10 MR COOPER: I will leave it there.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 MR GREANEY: We do have witnesses from the promoter coming
 13 on the 30th.
 14 MR COOPER: I'm grateful. Mr Logan, I presume that will be?
 15 MR GREANEY: Mr Logan is also coming -- we're talking about
 16 the Live Nation witnesses.
 17 MR COOPER: Then I'll put it to them.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 19 MR COOPER: You were asked by the chair, in fact, Mr Rigby,
 20 questions concerning the national level being severe and
 21 I want to put one simple question to you: what influence
 22 upon arena security did the national level of severe
 23 have on what was done on the night of 22 May 2017? What
 24 impact did that severe level have in how people
 25 conducted their security duties that night?

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1 A. Again, that will have been reiterated through briefings,
 2 so everyone will have been aware to be extra vigilant.
 3 Again, emphasis has been raised and pointed out and made
 4 specifically aware of the importance of looking out for
 5 anything suspicious or anything that doesn't look right
 6 to that staff member and then obviously that would
 7 then -- the escalation processes would then click into
 8 play if that was the case.
 9 Q. And those escalation processes in brief, what would they
 10 have been?
 11 A. The reporting techniques, so what was required, who --
 12 yes.
 13 Q. Would it have resulted in increased staff, for instance,
 14 increased numbers of stewards on the night, given that
 15 the national level was severe?
 16 A. I don't know because we received the purchase order from
 17 SMG, so I don't know if that's --
 18 Q. All right.
 19 A. -- reflected in that, but I would receive that purchase
 20 order from them.
 21 Q. You see what I'm asking, Mr Rigby, and if it's
 22 a question you can't answer then that's fair. It's
 23 simply -- we understand clearly what influence the low
 24 level of arena security had upon the level of security,
 25 I was simply asking what effect the national severe

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1 level had on arena security. Is there anything else you
 2 want to add on that point before I move on?
 3 A. There's not really anything I can add, sorry.
 4 Q. Does the fact that Ariana Grande was an American artiste
 5 add extra concern as to the security of the venue in
 6 your view as head of security?
 7 A. Not specifically, no.
 8 Q. Were you able to hear the evidence yesterday of
 9 Mr Bailey? I'll short-circuit it this way: did you
 10 listen to the evidence of Mr Bailey yesterday?
 11 A. No, not all of it, sir, no.
 12 Q. Effectively, as far as that question is concerned,
 13 without doing him a disservice, he said, and
 14 I paraphrase, the fact that Ariana Grande was American,
 15 and there may well be specific individuals or
 16 organisations who would target America or Americans,
 17 would have no effect whatsoever upon how security was
 18 dealt with at the arena. Do you agree with that as far
 19 as that statement is concerned?
 20 A. Yes, yes, I was never made aware of any specific risks
 21 or anything like that, so I would agree with it, yes.
 22 Q. And if I can simply again, conscious as I am to be brief
 23 with you, as a man steeped in the security industry, and
 24 you've told us all about your impressive background,
 25 do you not think, and should you not have thought at the

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1 time, perhaps, that an American artiste might have added
 2 to the security risk for the safety of young people at
 3 this event?
 4 A. No (inaudible: distorted) no.
 5 Q. Do you see now perhaps, because you're still in the
 6 business, and I just want to ask you this question on
 7 behalf of the families -- can you see now why it might
 8 be a relevant criteria to consider that America was
 9 a target and American artistes may well attract certain
 10 terrorist organisations to cause them, the event and the
 11 people attending it grave harm?
 12 A. I can understand that, yes, but again we wouldn't have
 13 been able to do that without any intelligence or any
 14 information to say otherwise. I didn't --
 15 Q. (overspeaking) previous terrorist atrocities such as
 16 Bataclan and others involved American artistes?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Did that act as intelligence that might have been
 19 utilised?
 20 A. Not specifically. Obviously it's relevant but not
 21 specifically.
 22 Q. All right, I'll leave it there.
 23 The Lavery report, and then there's one other matter
 24 I'm going to deal with, so we can pace this and be
 25 reassured. The Lavery report you deal with, and I just

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1 want to look at one paragraph of your statement, please,
2 at {INQ034544/3}. Paragraph 15, please, which is your
3 statement, or one of them.

4 This is how you dealt with the matter. You've had
5 chance, have you, Mr Rigby, to refresh your memory as to
6 this statement?

7 A. (Overspeaking).

8 Q. I am only asking you about paragraph 15. Don't worry,
9 I'm not taking you to the whole lot. But by all means,
10 if you want another read of paragraph 15, by all means
11 take that time.

12 My question is simply this: looking towards the
13 bottom of it, four lines up, starting with "venue" and
14 then scan along:

15 "No changes were made to security arrangements for
16 22 May 2017, but the same 'look out for suspicious
17 behaviour' message was continued with the expectation
18 that such behaviour would be reported by staff."

19 The word "expectation". Does that mean what it
20 might mean, that is it was expected or was there some
21 directive or guidance to staff as to what they should do
22 if, as a result of Lavery, they saw something
23 suspicious? Do you understand? I'm not asking you
24 about the general processes you've been asked about, the
25 Lavery reporting processes, I'm asking you what the

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1 process was if, as a result of Lavery, on the 22nd,
2 people were concerned about what they saw, and your
3 statement:

4 "With the expectation that such behaviour would be
5 reported by staff."

6 Was that process put in writing in any way to assist
7 staff with that expectation?

8 A. I don't think it was put in writing, no. We discussed
9 this on a day-by-day basis of a show. It's part of the
10 reporting procedures. We encourage the staff to always
11 report anything that they feel suspicious or of issue
12 and escalate it to their nearest radio holder or
13 supervisor and then that would eventually be escalated
14 to the relevant people.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I may be wrong, but I'm not actually
16 sure that was the question that was being asked exactly.

17 I think what was being said is Mr Lavery had come up
18 with specific information which could be relevant to
19 what happened on the 22nd and I think Mr Cooper's
20 saying: was there any thought of putting what had
21 happened, the particular warning from Mr Lavery's
22 information, in writing for the stewards and the
23 supervisors so they got it upfront? Was any
24 consideration given to that, do you know?

25 A. No, I don't recall, sir, no. I don't recall that being

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1 an issue. I think it was discussed orally but not
2 physically written down.

3 MR COOPER: Orally? Were they told in terms: we've had
4 a rather concerning report from Mr Lavery or a person;
5 you are expected to report, particularly tonight, as
6 a result of that, anything you see to me? Was that said
7 in terms? If not written, was that said in firm and
8 clear terms?

9 A. It probably wasn't said like that, no, sir.

10 Q. Red light, Lavery? I don't mean in these particular
11 words, but: we have a red light event here, 18 May, very
12 concerning, this man has reported this, you are to
13 contact me as an imperative if you see anything. A red
14 light warning, that sort of tone. Was that given, maybe
15 not in writing, but at least in words?

16 A. No, we will encourage the staff obviously and use it as
17 an example in regards to looking out for suspicious
18 characters and the fact that we did see a suspicious
19 character and it was picked up recently. We did that
20 quite often and that would have been again delivered
21 orally to the staff, a reminder and specific emphasis on
22 making sure they are reporting anything that comes
23 through and again looking out for suspicious characters.

24 Q. So quite low-key, would you agree?

25 A. No, not low-key. Not in the terms you put it, but

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1 I wouldn't say low-key, no.

2 Q. Last set of questions. You've been asked questions
3 about the pre-egress checks. I'm not going over those.
4 What knowledge did you have of the Deister patrols?

5 A. None.

6 Q. None at all? You didn't know, for instance, and I'm not
7 going to ask you to give the answer, but you didn't know
8 where they went?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You didn't know, and this is an open session, you didn't
11 know, for instance, that they included the mezzanine
12 level?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Or indeed precisely where Salman Abedi was hiding? You
15 didn't know that?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And would you agree that the level of security offered
18 to young people at this event was far more effective
19 when the event or when the arena was dark than it was
20 when it was live?

21 A. No.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure he can say that. He's not
23 necessarily there on dark days to make a proper
24 comparison, I think.

25 MR COOPER: I'll leave it for others, although the point's

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1 already been made with other witnesses in any event.
 2 I have no further questions.
 3 MR GREANEY: Thank you, Mr Cooper.
 4 That just leaves Mr Laidlaw on behalf of ShowSec.
 5 MR LAIDLAW: No, thank you.
 6 Questions from THE CHAIRMAN
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I want to ask one question and then you
 8 can obviously change your mind.
 9 I'm going to break my own rule now and ask
 10 a question which has quite a lot of subclauses, but I'm
 11 allowed to break my own rules.
 12 Putting all this together, what happened on the
 13 night and the security measures which were in
 14 operation — and I'm not here criticising them or
 15 anything like that, I'm just putting it as a fact — we
 16 know that Salman Abedi walked through the station area
 17 and into the City Room with a backpack. Right?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know that. Nothing unusual in that,
 20 nothing to pick up from someone walking through the
 21 City Room with a backpack on.
 22 A. No.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He went and stopped for a considerable
 24 period of time on the mezzanine. You never as part of
 25 your patrols went on the mezzanine, so actually there

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1 was no hope of you seeing him, was there?
 2 A. No, not specifically .
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. Well, specifically or any other
 4 way, I think. The CCTV actually had — we know there
 5 was a blind spot on the CCTV where he was, so that
 6 wouldn't pick it up. So had it not been for a member of
 7 the public pointing out this suspicious character to one
 8 of your staff, there actually was, on the basis of the
 9 measures in existence, no hope whatsoever of you picking
 10 up Salman Abedi, was there?
 11 A. Not unless someone had reported it earlier, they'd
 12 spotted him or...
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It was relying on the members of the
 14 public, wasn't it, really, to bring it to your
 15 attention?
 16 A. Or the staff in that area. One of the two, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We know the staff didn't go up
 18 there, did they, where he was hiding?
 19 A. No.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there was no chance of them spotting
 21 him. Okay.
 22 Mr Laidlaw, still nothing? Thank you.
 23 Thank you very much.
 24 MR GREANEY: Would you bear with me for one moment, please?
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Of course.

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1 (Pause)
 2 MR GREANEY: There is nothing further that I would like to
 3 ask Mr Rigby, so he is finished .
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Rigby.
 5 Thank you for coming to give your evidence. You're now
 6 free to go, thank you.
 7 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm going to say something and then I'm
 8 going to invite Mr O'Connor to either agree or disagree
 9 and I'm going to express myself with care. Earlier
 10 today, there was a short restricted hearing.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: As this relates to the press, is there
 12 any representative of the press?
 13 MR GREANEY: Mr Gardham is about to come in.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Gardham, would you mind coming up and
 15 you can participate if need be? Take a seat somewhere
 16 in a safe position .
 17 MR GREANEY: I was indicating, as Mr Gardham knows, that
 18 earlier today there was a short restricted hearing to
 19 consider a particular issue of relevance to the SMG
 20 evidence in particular . Mr Gardham, and possibly other
 21 members of the press, have indicated that there is an
 22 aspect of what was heard in the restricted session that
 23 they would wish to report. I believe Mr O'Connor has
 24 been able to obtain instructions and those instructions
 25 are that it is not suggested any longer that what the

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1 press wish to report is operationally sensitive , but
 2 I'll ask him to say yes or no in response.
 3 MR O'CONNOR: No.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 5 MR O'CONNOR: Just to explain, ILT have prepared an extract
 6 from the transcript of this morning. They have asked us
 7 to look at it . We've been taking instructions from our
 8 clients during the course of this afternoon and very
 9 recently we have had confirmation that we are content
 10 for that transcript to be published. I think the
 11 message should have either gone through to ILT already
 12 or is in the process of doing so.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we make clear so there is, from
 14 Mr Gardham's point of view and the rest of the press, no
 15 misunderstanding about what is included that can be
 16 reported?
 17 MR O'CONNOR: Sir, I think that's precisely what was trying
 18 to be achieved by providing an extract from the
 19 transcript .
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Gardham, if you could be given the
 21 transcript and then if you could act as the agent and
 22 distribute it to anybody else, that would be helpful.
 23 Can I indicate, it's very useful to have your help, but
 24 I hope no other member of the press feels inhibited by
 25 your presence from coming as well, particularly if they

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1 have a different view.
 2 MR GARDHAM: We have canvassed opinion across the press.
 3 I'm in touch with the other members of the press and I'm
 4 happy to make sure that they are aware of that and any
 5 other issues they have.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's helpful to have an intermediary and
 7 a representative, as it were, so that's fine by me.
 8 It's my omission, I should have asked for any
 9 representations immediately we finished that part, but
 10 actually it's of benefit to everybody that we've been
 11 able to sort it out.
 12 MR GARDHAM: It was not of great concern and it's a minor
 13 detail. I'm grateful for everyone for pulling behind
 14 it. Thank you.
 15 MR GREANEY: So you'll simply need to, once there is
 16 complete agreement, vary your restriction order to
 17 permit that.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I vary the restriction order to
 19 exclude what is in this transcript, which should be
 20 identified in some way with a label, and I vary my order
 21 to that extent so it allows the press to report as from
 22 now.
 23 MR GREANEY: Sir, that achieves the result, thank you very
 24 much.
 25 There is no further evidence available today and,

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1 after all, it is 4.50. The first witness tomorrow will
 2 be Shaun Hipgrave, as everyone knows. He is the
 3 director of Protect and Prepare at the Office for
 4 Security and Counter-terrorism, the OSCT. He gives
 5 evidence about the four strands of CONTEST, but for
 6 a variety of reasons, but principally so as to ensure
 7 that there is a proper focus on chapter 7 issues,
 8 we will tomorrow be adducing evidence from him about
 9 Protect only and specifically about crowded places, or
 10 publicly accessible locations as we are now to call
 11 them, and the balance of his evidence will be adduced
 12 later at the appropriate stages.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm grateful for that. His evidence
 14 covers, as everyone will have seen, a huge area. There
 15 are also, I think, a number of questions that would need
 16 to be asked, particularly arising out of what the
 17 Intelligence Committee came across, and I think
 18 personally from my point of view I need to have time to
 19 review that in order to sensibly ask questions of it.
 20 MR COOPER: Sir, perhaps we could have guidance, and we'll
 21 take the guidance, we have no preference, as to when the
 22 Martyn's Law questions may be put.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Tomorrow.
 24 MR COOPER: Thank you.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We're dealing with that aspect of it.

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1 MR COOPER: I'm grateful for that, thank you.
 2 MR GREANEY: So could we finish and resume at 9.30 tomorrow
 3 morning, please?
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, and I'm grateful
 5 for everyone's cooperation. Thank you.
 6 (4.51 pm)
 7 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on
 8 Thursday, 12 November 2020)
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