

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 36

November 16, 2020

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1 Monday, 16 November 2020  
 2 (9.30 am)  
 3 MR GREANEY: Good morning, sir. We have a single witness  
 4 scheduled for today, who will take most if not all of  
 5 the day. That witness is Assistant Chief Constable  
 6 Sean O'Callaghan of British Transport Police and I'll  
 7 ask that he be called now, please.  
 8 ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE SEAN O'CALLAGHAN (sworn)  
 9 Questions from MR GREANEY  
 10 MR GREANEY: Tell us your name, please.  
 11 A. Sean Joseph O'Callaghan.  
 12 Q. Are you the Assistant Chief Constable for British  
 13 Transport Police, or at least one of them?  
 14 A. Yes, I am.  
 15 Q. What is your specialist portfolio, please?  
 16 A. Currently I am in charge of network policing and  
 17 specialist capabilities.  
 18 Q. What does that role involve?  
 19 A. Effectively, I am in charge of the day-to-day delivering  
 20 of policing across the railway network of England,  
 21 Scotland and Wales, and specifically that involves all  
 22 of the uniformed officers across all three countries for  
 23 British Transport Police.  
 24 Q. When did you commence that role?  
 25 A. That was in June 2018.

1

1 Q. It follows, therefore, that you assumed that role just  
 2 over a year after the arena attack?  
 3 A. That is correct, yes.  
 4 Q. When was it that you joined British Transport Police?  
 5 A. It was at the same time. Previously before that I was  
 6 an officer serving for 25 years with Essex Police.  
 7 Q. So that we're entirely clear, at the time of the attack  
 8 not only did you not have the role you currently have,  
 9 but you weren't at that stage a member of British  
 10 Transport Police?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. You'd served 25 years in Essex Police?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Could you give us a brief summary of your history  
 15 in that force, please?  
 16 A. Yes, certainly. When I left Essex Police I was a chief  
 17 superintendent, a divisional commander responsible for  
 18 policing West Essex. That included uniformed and  
 19 detective constables. Throughout my career I have been  
 20 a uniformed officer and detective through all ranks and  
 21 have worked in strategic posts, community policing posts  
 22 and local delivery posts.  
 23 Q. Bearing in mind that you were not an officer with  
 24 British Transport Police at the time of the attack, and  
 25 I don't say that in any way to be critical of you or of

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1 BTP, it follows that the matters that you are going to  
 2 be giving evidence about are not derived from your own  
 3 experience at the time; is that correct?  
 4 A. Correct, sir.  
 5 Q. But instead you have conducted research and spoken to  
 6 others in order to give the evidence you're going to  
 7 give today?  
 8 A. Absolutely.  
 9 Q. What we have all understood, and I'm sure you have  
 10 understood, is that you are going to be giving evidence  
 11 on two occasions.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. First of all, you'll be giving evidence in relation to  
 14 the security arrangements at the arena --  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. -- which evidence, of course, you will give today. And  
 17 then you'll be returning in chapter 10 in order to give  
 18 evidence about the emergency response.  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. So I will do my best to be -- I'm just going to pause  
 21 for a moment.

(Pause)

The transcript isn't working at the moment, sir, but  
 as on the previous occasion we had this problem,  
 I understand that everyone who wants to can see and hear

3

1 the proceedings and I propose that we should just  
 2 continue.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that all right with everybody?  
 4 (Pause)  
 5 MR GREANEY: You'll be giving evidence in two chapters,  
 6 chapter 7 today and chapter 10 in due course. What I'm  
 7 going to do, or attempt to do, is to be disciplined  
 8 in relation to the evidence I adduce from you and not  
 9 adduce evidence that relates to chapter 10 and we'd  
 10 invite everyone else who asks you questions to do the  
 11 same.  
 12 Let's deal first of all with the legislative  
 13 framework within which BTP operates. Do you have  
 14 a bundle of statements?  
 15 A. I do, yes.  
 16 Q. I hope that the statement I am going to be asking you  
 17 about initially is behind divider 1. It's your first  
 18 witness statement.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Is BTP the dedicated and specialist police force for the  
 21 railways?  
 22 A. Yes, it is.  
 23 Q. Responsible by statute for policing the national rail  
 24 network?  
 25 A. That is correct.

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1 Q. To whom does BTP provide policing?  
 2 A. BTP provides policing to the railway network across  
 3 England, Scotland and Wales and predominantly that is  
 4 against the infrastructure provider Network Rail, all of  
 5 what is known within the rail industry as the individual  
 6 train operating companies, which is the general  
 7 passenger services, and also the freight operating  
 8 companies and a number of other light rail arrangements  
 9 including things such as London Underground, Croydon  
 10 Tramlink and a number of other light railways around the  
 11 country.  
 12 Q. Does something called the British Transport Police  
 13 Authority also exist?  
 14 A. Yes, it does.  
 15 Q. What is the purpose of the British Transport Police  
 16 Authority or BTPA?  
 17 A. That, sir, is the governing body that checks that the  
 18 force is delivering against the agreed plans. It sets  
 19 out the strategic direction of the force and arranges  
 20 for the budget of the force. In context, so the members  
 21 of the public will understand, in parallel with  
 22 Home Office forces, that's the equivalent of a Police  
 23 and Crime Commissioner's Office and the supporting  
 24 functions.  
 25 Q. As everyone will know we have things called rail

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1 franchises in the country and from time to time those  
 2 change from on operator to another operator.  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. What is the impact of that upon the policing service  
 5 offered by BTP?  
 6 A. At point of transition absolutely none whatsoever, the  
 7 amount of policing continues, and then arrangements  
 8 under, as I said, the police services agreement are  
 9 arranged between the police authority and the said  
 10 franchise.  
 11 Q. Is it the position that when a new rail franchise is  
 12 awarded by the Department for Transport the company that  
 13 bids successfully is required as part of the franchise  
 14 to enter into a police services agreement, a PSA, with  
 15 the BTPA?  
 16 A. That is correct, yes.  
 17 Q. The next topic you deal with in your witness statement  
 18 is jurisdiction and powers. I'm going to park that for  
 19 the time being and come back to it when we deal with the  
 20 issue of primacy.  
 21 Let's move on and deal with the force structure for  
 22 British Transport Police, leadership and resources,  
 23 particularly in C Division. In May 2017, as now, for  
 24 what and for whom was the Chief Constable of BTP  
 25 responsible?

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1 A. That was for the day-to-day policing of the railway and,  
 2 just in parallel with every other police force in the  
 3 country, that was about keeping people safe, protecting  
 4 property and delivering general policing services across  
 5 the network.  
 6 Q. As you say in your witness statement at paragraph 11:  
 7 "The Chief Constable [was] responsible for the  
 8 overall command, direction and control of the force."  
 9 A. Yes, correct.  
 10 Q. Was he then, as now, supported by the Deputy  
 11 Chief Constable?  
 12 A. Correct.  
 13 Q. And by three Assistant Chief Constables?  
 14 A. At the time that is correct, yes.  
 15 Q. Has that changed since?  
 16 A. Yes, it has, sir. If I can expand on that. In January  
 17 of this year, we changed to a two Assistant  
 18 Chief Constable structure. That was my role, my  
 19 original role of specialist capabilities merging with  
 20 the network policing role, and that was done for the  
 21 benefit of the force, for the benefit of rail users, of  
 22 bringing front line policing together with specialist  
 23 back office support.  
 24 Q. But at the time, as you've said, there were three  
 25 Assistant Chief Constables and did they cover the

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1 following three areas: (1), territorial policing?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. (2), public contact and specialist crime?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. (3), specialist operations and counter-terrorism?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. In addition in 2017, was the Chief Constable also  
 8 supported by a director of capability and resources?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And also a finance director?  
 11 A. Correct.  
 12 Q. To your first witness statement you've appended  
 13 a diagram, which sets out the relevant hierarchy as  
 14 appendix 1; is that correct?  
 15 A. It is correct, yes.  
 16 Q. I'm not going to turn that up, it's there for the report  
 17 if necessary and for anyone that wishes to ask you  
 18 questions about it.  
 19 Is ACC Robin Smith currently responsible for  
 20 territorial policing?  
 21 A. No, sir. ACC Smith moved on to a different police force  
 22 in January of this year. It was his role that has now  
 23 merged with the original role I held, which was the  
 24 specialist capabilities and counter-terrorism.  
 25 Q. I understand that's obviously happened since your first

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1 witness statement. But in May 2017, was he the ACC with  
 2 responsibility for territorial policing?  
 3 A. Yes, he was.  
 4 Q. You'll tell us more about this when you return. Was he  
 5 the chief officer on call when the Manchester Arena  
 6 attack occurred?  
 7 A. Yes, he was.  
 8 Q. And did he therefore assume the role of Gold Commander?  
 9 A. Yes, he did.  
 10 Q. In common with all police forces, is British Transport  
 11 Police divided into a number of divisions?  
 12 A. Yes, it is.  
 13 Q. Are they territorial divisions?  
 14 A. Yes, they are.  
 15 Q. In May 2017, did you have divisions B, C and D?  
 16 A. We did.  
 17 Q. And were each of those territorial divisions supported  
 18 by additional resources controlled centrally?  
 19 A. Yes, they were, sir.  
 20 Q. With those resources referred to as A Division?  
 21 A. Correct.  
 22 Q. So A Division was not territorial, it was a resource  
 23 that could be applied across the three territorial  
 24 divisions of B, C and D?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. Could you tell us a little more about C Division,  
 2 please?  
 3 A. Yes, certainly. C Division is the largest policing  
 4 division within the British Transport Police structure.  
 5 It covers from coast to coast, east to west, and from  
 6 the Scottish border down to Devon and Cornwall. It is  
 7 run by a chief superintendent with some supporting  
 8 managerial staff and covers many posts up and down the  
 9 country, including the Manchester area.  
 10 Q. The way you put it in your witness statement,  
 11 paragraph 13, is:  
 12 "C Division covers the largest geographical area  
 13 and..."  
 14 We'll have on screen just a diagram which perhaps  
 15 helps us to illustrate this. It's {INQ025614/16}.  
 16 It's entitled:  
 17 "BTP subdivision boundaries 2018."  
 18 Would that have been the position also in 2017?  
 19 A. Yes, it was, sir.  
 20 Q. With that on screen, what you say is:  
 21 "C Division covers the largest geographical area and  
 22 includes the major transport hubs of Birmingham,  
 23 Manchester and Leeds."  
 24 Is that correct?  
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

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1 Q. So on the screen, which of those areas is covered by  
 2 C Division?  
 3 A. C Division, sir, is coming from the top of the map down,  
 4 includes Pennines subdivision, Midlands subdivision,  
 5 Wales subdivision and Western subdivision.  
 6 Q. As you have said, a very large geographical area.  
 7 C Division broadly covers London and the south-east?  
 8 A. Yes, on the map, sir, north and south.  
 9 Q. And D Division covers Scotland?  
 10 A. Yes, it does.  
 11 Q. Thank you very much. We can take that from the screen.  
 12 As you told us already, C Division was and continues  
 13 to be commanded by a chief superintendent?  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. And in May 2017, was that Allan Gregory?  
 16 A. It was, yes.  
 17 Q. And, as we're going to hear, on the night of the attack  
 18 he was appointed to the role of Silver Commander of  
 19 BTP's emergency response.  
 20 A. Correct, yes.  
 21 Q. Is C Division sub-divided?  
 22 A. Yes, it is, into those divisions referred to on the map  
 23 previously, sir, yes.  
 24 Q. So as you told us, the Midlands, Pennines, Wales and  
 25 Western?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Does Manchester fall within the Pennine subdivision?  
 3 A. Yes, it does.  
 4 Q. And in that subdivision, by whom is the chief  
 5 superintendent supported?  
 6 A. That is supported by the rank of superintendent and the  
 7 current base for that superintendent works from Leeds  
 8 and manages the area across the Pennines.  
 9 Q. In turn, is the superintendent supported by a chief  
 10 inspector and inspector?  
 11 A. Yes, correct.  
 12 Q. And by other officers of sergeant and constable rank  
 13 beneath the inspector?  
 14 A. Yes, correct.  
 15 Q. The headquarters for the Pennine sub-division is based  
 16 in Leeds. Within Manchester itself does BTP have police  
 17 stations?  
 18 A. Yes, it does, sir. It has three buildings within the  
 19 Manchester area. They are based at Manchester  
 20 Piccadilly Station, a building known as Peninsula House  
 21 and the C Divisional headquarters is based at  
 22 Portland Street in the city.  
 23 Q. As we know, Peninsula House is the most relevant of the  
 24 locations you have given us because that is a location  
 25 close to Manchester Victoria Railway Station?

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1 A. Yes, it is.  
 2 Q. At the time of the arena attack in 2017, did BTP have  
 3 a range of resources available?  
 4 A. Yes, it did.  
 5 Q. Did that include officers trained in additional specific  
 6 specialisms?  
 7 A. Yes, it did.  
 8 Q. Were those referred to as divisional resources?  
 9 A. Some of them were, yes.  
 10 Q. Trained and available for deployment throughout  
 11 C Division?  
 12 A. Correct.  
 13 Q. And if required, elsewhere in the force?  
 14 A. Yes, correct.  
 15 Q. In your statement you indicate that one of the  
 16 divisional resources was an explosives search dog?  
 17 A. Correct, yes.  
 18 Q. In 2017, where was the dog based?  
 19 A. That particular dog, sir, was based in Manchester.  
 20 It would have been one of a number of dogs within the  
 21 force. As you'd expect, sir, all police forces have  
 22 a dog section. BTP has one of the largest dog sections  
 23 in the country, so there's many such assets across the  
 24 country, but one specifically was based or stationed in  
 25 policing terms in Manchester.

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1 Q. Let's be clear. We're dealing with the position in  
 2 2017. I'm not asking you whether the position is the  
 3 same for different now. But it was a single dog in  
 4 Manchester in May 2017?  
 5 A. In relation to an explosives search dog, yes.  
 6 Q. And you may not be able to answer this question now and  
 7 if not could you give us the answer when you give your  
 8 evidence in the second phase: do you know where the  
 9 explosives search dog for Manchester was on the night of  
 10 the arena attack?  
 11 A. No, I don't, sir. I will find that out and respond  
 12 accordingly.  
 13 Q. Thank you very much indeed.  
 14 Does BTP also have an operational support unit?  
 15 A. Yes, it does.  
 16 Q. And what is the particular role of that unit?  
 17 A. So those officers predominantly are trained and respond  
 18 to public order situations, either when they're  
 19 occurring or as a preventative. So those incidents such  
 20 as policing protests, policing football supporters'  
 21 movements around, or indeed supporting other police  
 22 forces in the country.  
 23 Q. In 2017, additionally, did BTP have a small number of  
 24 officers trained in DVI or disaster victim  
 25 identification?

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1 A. Yes, sir, they did.  
 2 Q. Were they deployed across the division in various usual  
 3 roles, but were available for DVI if necessary?  
 4 A. Yes, they were.  
 5 Q. Was there also a dedicated divisional resilience  
 6 planning officer working as part of the operations  
 7 department?  
 8 A. Yes, that is correct; yes.  
 9 Q. Was it that officer's role to work on a range of  
 10 resilience issues across the division?  
 11 A. Yes, it was.  
 12 Q. We're dealing with the resources available to BTP and  
 13 I'm just going to jump ahead slightly in your statement  
 14 to address a connected issue.  
 15 Prior to the London 2012 Olympics, did BTP have an  
 16 armed policing capability?  
 17 A. Not prior to the Olympics, sir, no.  
 18 Q. So prior to the Olympics, if there was an incident at  
 19 a railway station or other location for which BTP was  
 20 responsible requiring an armed response, how would that  
 21 be managed?  
 22 A. That would be supplied from a local geographical force.  
 23 In practical terms, our control room would contact the  
 24 neighbouring control room of the said location and armed  
 25 assets would be despatched from that force and

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1 controlled from that force.  
 2 Q. But after the Olympics, BTP did have an armed  
 3 capability?  
 4 A. Yes, sir, in fact it came into play before the Olympics.  
 5 It was part of the planning for the Olympics that BTP  
 6 became an armed force for the first time.  
 7 Q. I see. Did BTP set up a counter-terrorism proactive  
 8 unit?  
 9 A. Yes, sir, that was the title of what went on to become  
 10 specialist operations, which is referred to in some of  
 11 the officers' evidence and within my evidence and is now  
 12 known as E Division.  
 13 Q. Was the armed capability of BTP part of what was then  
 14 known as the Counter-terrorism Proactive Unit?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. Was that unit, in 2017, based in London?  
 17 A. Yes, it was.  
 18 Q. And so does it follow that, in May 2017, BTP did not  
 19 have any firearms officers based outside of London?  
 20 A. That is correct.  
 21 Q. So it would follow that they had no armed officers based  
 22 in Manchester at the time of the attack?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. I'm going to return to where we were in your witness  
 25 statement, so paragraph 18. You're going to tell us

16

1 next about the strategic plan division and, as your  
 2 statement puts it, the mission of BTP.  
 3 Does the BTPA issue strategic plans?  
 4 A. Yes, it does.  
 5 Q. What is the purpose of those plans?  
 6 A. To set out to our stakeholders, to set out to the people  
 7 that pay and effectively fund the organisation the  
 8 direction of travel of the force in terms of what it  
 9 seeks to achieve.  
 10 Q. Was the relevant plan for the events at the arena a plan  
 11 that covered the period from 2013 to 2019?  
 12 A. That is correct, sir, yes.  
 13 Q. Did that describe BTP's vision throughout that period  
 14 in the following terms:  
 15 "To work with industry partners and stakeholders to  
 16 deliver a safe, secure, reliable and expanding transport  
 17 system"?  
 18 A. Yes, it did, sir.  
 19 Q. Was BTP's mission, as it's put, to protect and serve the  
 20 railway environment and its community?  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. Keeping levels of disruption, crime and fear of crime as  
 23 low as possible?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. Was the strategic plan underpinned by four strategic

17

1 objectives?  
 2 A. It was, yes.  
 3 Q. What were those objectives in 2017?  
 4 A. So they were regarding: integrating the policing service  
 5 with the railway providers; it was demonstrating  
 6 improved performance and reduced costs through a range  
 7 of measures regarding outsourcing, commissioning and  
 8 broadcasting to a wider customer base; it was about  
 9 focusing on reducing crime and understanding the needs  
 10 of the staff, passengers and the public on the transport  
 11 system; and it was about continuously being innovative  
 12 in the way that policing could be delivered in  
 13 anticipating the impact of new technologies that were  
 14 arriving, in summary, sir.  
 15 Q. That is how the mission was to be achieved, and as we  
 16 understand it from your statement, the strategic plan  
 17 was underpinned by four strategic objectives namely  
 18 keeping the transport systems running?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Achieving a safe and secure railway?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Promoting confidence in the use of the railway?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And delivering value for money?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. And the important one perhaps for our purposes is to  
 2 achieve a safe and secure railway?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. As we're going to learn in a few moments, "railway"  
 5 doesn't just mean the railway station or the tracks, it  
 6 has a broader meaning as a matter of statute.  
 7 A. Indeed it does, yes.  
 8 Q. That's all I wanted to ask you about strategic plan,  
 9 vision and mission, and we're going to turn next to the  
 10 issue of primacy.  
 11 Just so that you know, Mr O'Callaghan, I'm going to  
 12 deal with the basics in relation to primacy. I'm going  
 13 to seek to understand where BTP and GMP are in relation  
 14 to primacy so far as an incident at Victoria Station and  
 15 the arena is concerned. There has been some recent  
 16 correspondence in relation to that. But it's highly  
 17 likely, if not inevitable, that I will need to ask you  
 18 further questions about primacy once you return in light  
 19 of the evidence that the policing experts will give.  
 20 Does that make sense?  
 21 A. Totally, sir.  
 22 Q. As I indicated earlier, the lead-in to primacy is  
 23 jurisdiction and powers. So I'm sorry to jump around,  
 24 but I'm going now to paragraph 6 of your first  
 25 statement.

19

1 Are the powers of a BTP constable on all railway  
 2 property and outside railway property when related to  
 3 railway matters provided for in section 31 of an Act of  
 4 Parliament?  
 5 A. Yes, they are, sir. That is the Railways and Transport  
 6 Safety Act of 2003.  
 7 Q. Which, at the risk of being tedious, provides that  
 8 a constable of your force will have those powers of  
 9 a constable in certain prescribed circumstances?  
 10 A. Correct.  
 11 Q. (a) on track?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 Q. (b) on network?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. What does network mean in this context?  
 16 A. In context of understanding from the public's point of  
 17 view, that would be the rails, tracks, sidings,  
 18 et cetera. What people would understand a railway to  
 19 be.  
 20 Q. (c) in a station?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. (d) in a light maintenance depot?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. (e) on other land used for the purposes of or  
 25 in relation to a railway?

20

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. (f), and this is an important sub-paragraph for our  
 3 purposes:  
 4 "On other land in which a person who provides  
 5 railway services has a freehold or leasehold interest?"  
 6 A. Correct.  
 7 Q. And that, of course, is of particular relevance to us  
 8 because of the arena, as we'll see.  
 9 (g):  
 10 "Throughout Great Britain for a purpose connected to  
 11 a railway or to anything occurring on or in relation to  
 12 a railway?"  
 13 A. That is correct, yes.  
 14 Q. The chairman is aware that the freehold of the  
 15 Manchester Arena is owned by Network Rail.  
 16 A. That is correct, yes.  
 17 Q. As a result, as a matter of statute, does the policing  
 18 of Manchester Arena fall within BTP's jurisdiction by  
 19 reason of section 31(1)(f) of the Act?  
 20 A. It does, yes.  
 21 Q. Is it the position that subsections 2 and 3 of  
 22 section 31 give BTP officers additional powers?  
 23 A. They do, yes.  
 24 Q. And in very general terms, what are those, please?  
 25 A. Effectively they are the powers to enter property

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1 connected with the railway that have easy access, public  
 2 access, into those area, including vehicles and  
 3 carriages that are used on that railway, but it does not  
 4 include entering into certain properties that are  
 5 treated as private railway property.  
 6 Q. In any event, without getting into the technicalities,  
 7 there's no doubt that the responsibility for policing of  
 8 the arena was the responsibility of BTP?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. I'm jumping forward to your heading "Primacy" at  
 11 paragraph 35 of your first statement. You begin under  
 12 that heading by saying, as you've just identified:  
 13 "Since Manchester Arena is within BTP's policing  
 14 jurisdiction, the default position for incidents arising  
 15 there is that BTP has primacy or takes the lead."  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just so I understand this, I well  
 18 understand section 31 giving the power of — BTP  
 19 officers to have the same powers as a constable. Is  
 20 this actually the section which gives primacy?  
 21 MR GREANEY: No, it's the section which gives jurisdiction.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Quite.  
 23 MR GREANEY: You're quite right to point that out, sir.  
 24 I was just dealing with it to given the lead—in to the  
 25 issue of primacy.

22

1 So you'll understand what the chairman is driving  
 2 at. You had jurisdiction —  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. — because of section 31(1)(f). What was it that gave  
 5 BTP primacy at the arena?  
 6 A. So in simplest terms, sir, that would be a common  
 7 understanding between police forces of who is  
 8 responsible to respond to areas specific to a British  
 9 Transport Police working environment.  
 10 Q. Wherever there is a railway station, there will be areas  
 11 surrounding it, and the local police force will be  
 12 responsible for the areas surrounding it. I've  
 13 expressed that in rather imprecise terms, but you  
 14 understand what I mean?  
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 16 Q. A better way of putting might be that any railway  
 17 station is going to be within the area of a Home Office  
 18 force?  
 19 A. Absolutely.  
 20 Q. And here the Home Office force, as everybody knows, was  
 21 Greater Manchester Police?  
 22 A. Yes, it was, and still is.  
 23 Q. At what stage and in what way had agreement been reached  
 24 between GMP and BTP that BTP was to have primacy as  
 25 between the two forces at the arena?

23

1 A. No formal discussions have taken place regarding that  
 2 matter, sir. There is not in existence what one would  
 3 refer to as a memorandum of understanding. It is based  
 4 on a long-standing operational understanding of,  
 5 effectively, who covers what.  
 6 Q. Obviously, this can be no part of your responsibility,  
 7 bearing in mind when you joined the force, but I believe  
 8 what you're saying is that you're unable to point to any  
 9 document that sets out an agreement as to primacy?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.  
 11 Q. And are you able to identify any discussion between  
 12 senior officers or any officers of the two forces that  
 13 led to the establishment of BTP having primacy?  
 14 A. No, sir. My enquiries in preparation for this inquiry  
 15 have shown me that when the arena first opened and was  
 16 originally owned by the then Railtrack, the predecessor  
 17 to Network Rail, it was always an understanding, even  
 18 some 25 years back, because that was Railtrack or  
 19 railway property, that the policing of that location  
 20 would be for the British Transport Police.  
 21 Q. It might be thought surprising that there is no document  
 22 or, as you put it, memorandum of understanding that  
 23 records that fact.  
 24 A. Indeed, sir, but the same is for every railway station,  
 25 as you have said, every railway station in the country,

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1 and there are approximately some 2,500 such buildings  
2 across the country just as railway stations. There is  
3 no such documentation in existence in England, Scotland  
4 or Wales. It is that common understanding from the  
5 length of history of the force being alongside other  
6 forces, that general understanding and acceptance.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The only basis, I suppose, for saying  
8 it would be better to have something written down  
9 is that there are occasions, which we're looking at,  
10 when it becomes apparent at some stage that actually  
11 primacy can't remain with BTP because they don't have  
12 the necessary resources on the spot to deal with it?

13 A. Yes, to a certain degree, sir, but equally on some of  
14 the other stations if there was a significant incident  
15 we would absolutely be talking to our colleagues in the  
16 Home Office force and seeking assistance, wherever that  
17 was in the country, yes.

18 MR GREANEY: One can well understand how at a railway  
19 station which is simply a railway station, it would  
20 readily be understood by both the Home Office force and  
21 BTP that BTP would have primacy because it might be said  
22 there would be no reason for them not to have primacy.  
23 But here, it might be thought, and I would seek your  
24 comment on this, that there was a difference because  
25 Manchester Victoria was not just a railway station, it

25

1 was a railway station which included one of the biggest  
2 entertainment venues in Europe.

3 A. Yes, I would accept that, sir.

4 Q. And bearing in mind that that entertainment venue had  
5 existed in that location since, I think we've been told,  
6 1995, do you think that it would have been better had  
7 there been some memorandum of understanding in existence  
8 before May 2017 dealing with who had primacy at the  
9 arena?

10 A. I can see that now, and certainly the benefit now, yes,  
11 but all of the evidence that I have seen, and even  
12 working through, that understanding is demonstrated  
13 certainly on a weekly basis, and the example I may  
14 assist the inquiry with is if a member of the public had  
15 phoned Greater Manchester Police regarding a matter  
16 at the arena, the member of the public would be clearly  
17 told that that was not a Greater Manchester Police  
18 location and reference would be made or that call would  
19 be passed to the British Transport Police. So in an  
20 operational context, on a daily basis, that  
21 understanding was there.

22 Q. We're going to come on in a moment to see that there  
23 have been discussions between GMP and BTP since the  
24 arena attack about a memorandum of understanding;  
25 is that correct?

26

1 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

2 Q. And we'll see where those have reached. Is there likely  
3 to be any benefit of having a broader memorandum of  
4 understanding between BTP and Home Office forces about  
5 the type of incidents in respect of which BTP will have  
6 primacy and will not have primacy? Let me give you an  
7 example, which is an example that may not exist any  
8 longer, but did exist in May 2017.

9 A firearms incident takes place at Leeds Railway  
10 Station. As you've told us, BTP have no firearms units  
11 to deploy to that location, at least not for a number of  
12 hours. Is there benefit in there being a memorandum of  
13 understanding at a high level between Home Office forces  
14 and BTP to identify how that type of situation is to be  
15 dealt with?

16 A. Absolutely. Apologies, sir, if I may have misled the  
17 inquiry regarding the wider memorandum of understanding.  
18 For that specific case, sir, yes, there already exists  
19 a memorandum of understanding nationally, clear  
20 protocols of when BTP has primacy in firearms incidents  
21 and when not, and in that particular example, sir, BTP  
22 retained primacy and control of a firearms incident —

23 Q. We probably don't need to go into the operational —

24 A. It does exist, yes.

25 Q. So at that level it does exist; what we need to focus in

27

1 on is whether it should have existed at a local level  
2 within Manchester at the time.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You have memoranda of understanding  
4 which cover various situations nationwide?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But they didn't actually cover the  
7 situation which occurred in Manchester?

8 A. No, sir.

9 MR GREANEY: Why not?

10 A. My understanding, sir, in simplest terms, it hadn't  
11 arisen before regarding a major incident requiring — it  
12 makes perfect sense now, but it hadn't arisen before.

13 Q. A difficult question for you to answer given your role  
14 at the time, but should it have occurred to someone  
15 before May of 2017?

16 A. Yes, it makes perfect sense, and certainly that is the  
17 intention hereafter.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But still hereafter? We're a few years  
19 on.

20 A. Yes, sir. If I may qualify that statement that I made,  
21 and I know Mr Greaney will come to the correspondence,  
22 but it felt right to wait for this inquiry and for  
23 findings that you may have, sir, in how we actually take  
24 that forward.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

28



1 MR GREANEY: So we are going to turn now to that exact  
2 topic. I'm going to ask that we have on the screen,  
3 please, {INQ036998/1}.

4 This is correspondence between the deputy  
5 Chief Constables of GMP and BTP. So it is not  
6 correspondence with which you're directly involved?

7 A. Not directly involved, but I'm fully aware of the  
8 content and our response to it.

9 Q. This is correspondence between the second most senior  
10 officer in the respective forces?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. I'm not going to read all of it out, but the letter from  
13 Deputy Chief Constable Pilling of Greater Manchester  
14 Police to DCC Hanstock of British Transport Police is  
15 dated 14 September 2020. It begins by identifying the  
16 key conclusions of the policing experts in this inquiry,  
17 does it not?

18 A. It does, sir.

19 Q. I'm certain you'll be most familiar with those  
20 conclusions yourself.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. At the bottom of that page, paragraph 14.6.13 of the  
23 experts' conclusions is set out:

24 "It is our view, in light of the events at the  
25 Manchester Arena [say the experts] that it cannot

29

1 continue to be appropriate for a specialist railway  
2 transport police force to have primacy over a major  
3 public entertainment venue. The Manchester Arena could  
4 be more effectively policed and public safety enhanced  
5 by GMP so that planning, preparation and response are  
6 exerted through a single police agency applying cohesive  
7 and comprehensive integrated emergency management."

8 Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. If we go over the page to {INQ036998/2}, please. The  
11 experts continue:

12 "For BTP to have operational primacy and  
13 responsibility for planning and command response to the  
14 Manchester Arena is not, in our view, appropriate. BTP  
15 are specialists in policing the high risks of a railway  
16 network and not places of mass public entertainment; nor  
17 does BTP have the short-term capacity to command or  
18 coordinate a major incident response of the scale needed  
19 for the arena attack. We believe that primacy for  
20 places of major public entertainment, and which do not  
21 involve any railway risk, should rest with the local  
22 police force."

23 And you're going to be dealing with this in further  
24 detail when you come back in chapter 10, as I indicated,  
25 but do you have anything you'd wish to say about the

30

1 experts' conclusions in those regards at the moment?

2 A. Yes, sir. From my professional point of view and the  
3 lead that I have for the portfolios within my command,  
4 I do not agree with those findings of the experts in the  
5 context of how that is written. I'm not sure, if I'm  
6 perfectly honest, what a police force of a mass public  
7 entertainment would look like in terms of -- I think  
8 there's often confusion of the role and abilities of  
9 British Transport Police.

10 If I can in context, sir, explain that often, people  
11 think of BTP as the railway police when in fact my view  
12 is we're a police force that polices the railway and  
13 we have multiple experience on a daily basis of dealing  
14 with vast amounts of people moving in a number of  
15 arenas -- wrong use of term there -- in a number of  
16 locations.

17 Q. Obviously we're going to look a little later in your  
18 evidence today at how that all panned out on  
19 22 May 2017, but I wanted to give you an opportunity to  
20 respond directly to that.

21 As I've said a number of times now, we will come  
22 back to that in chapter 10 once we've heard from the  
23 policing experts.

24 Towards the bottom of that page, the penultimate  
25 paragraph, DCC Pilling states:

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1 "My current understanding is that BTP is of the view  
2 that the primacy arrangements should remain as they  
3 are."

4 And does that indeed remain BTP's position?

5 A. Certainly at this moment in time. The reference there,  
6 from my understanding of the correspondence, was that  
7 it'd be improper to discuss transfer between forces at  
8 this point, especially at a time when the inquiry was  
9 sitting. It does not mean that we retain that view for  
10 the future and we'll of course welcome sitting down with  
11 our colleagues to identify what is best for the arena  
12 and what is best for the people of Manchester.

13 Q. Over the page to the top of {INQ036998/3}:

14 "I therefore believe [writes DCC Pilling] that if  
15 BTP is to retain primacy of the arena, it must do so for  
16 all policing purposes including planning, general  
17 policing and contingency planning for whatever emergency  
18 might be anticipated."

19 Do you agree with that?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. "Clarity should be provided regarding when the  
22 assistance of GMP would be required and a detailed MOU  
23 in place regarding how this would take place to avoid  
24 any confusion."

25 Do you agree with that?

32

1 A. Yes, sir .  
 2 Q. "It would appear that prior to the arena attack that the  
 3 situation for ownership of some of these issues was not  
 4 clear , in particular regarding the contingency plan and  
 5 CTSA involvement and these particular areas require  
 6 clarification for everyone's benefit."  
 7 Do you agree with that?  
 8 A. I would say to that, sir , it was clear within our own  
 9 minds. What clearly that demonstrates is we could have  
 10 done and should have done more in relation to speaking  
 11 with our colleagues at GMP for clarity on that matter.  
 12 Q. The letter continues:  
 13 "For completeness, the responsibility of BTP, if it  
 14 was to remain as the lead force, would in our view  
 15 include: responsibility for all aspects of policing  
 16 at the arena."  
 17 Do you agree?  
 18 A. Yes, sir .  
 19 Q. "Ownership of all plans and contingency plans."  
 20 Do you agree?  
 21 A. Yes, sir .  
 22 Q. "The preparation of threat and risk assessments."  
 23 Do you agree?  
 24 A. Yes, I do.  
 25 Q. And obviously we're going to come on to risk assessments

1 in a little detail in due course:  
 2 "The provision of CTSA and other relevant advice."  
 3 Do you agree?  
 4 A. In the context of, as the inquiry has heard from  
 5 DAC D'Orsi to date, yes, sir , but regarding the national  
 6 network of CTSA's, I know the inquiry's heard the  
 7 complexity of how that is covered, but in context, yes.  
 8 Q. I'm not certain I've entirely understood that, which  
 9 will certainly be my fault. Obviously, we appreciate  
 10 that it's proposed that the situation should change from  
 11 a crowded places model to a publicly accessible  
 12 locations model. But as matters currently stand, CTSA's  
 13 provide advice to locations such as the arena. Do you  
 14 agree with GMP that if BTP is to remain the lead force  
 15 it should be BTP's responsibility for providing CTSA  
 16 advice to the arena?  
 17 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.  
 18 Q. "Event planning and resourcing."  
 19 Do you agree?  
 20 A. Yes, sir .  
 21 Q. "Liaison with the venue owners and operators and other  
 22 relevant agencies."  
 23 Do you agree?  
 24 A. Yes, sir .  
 25 Q. "Appropriate liaison with GMP and the documentation of

1 a formal MOU."  
 2 Do you agree?  
 3 A. Yes, sir .  
 4 Q. The letter carries on to propose a potential second  
 5 course in these terms:  
 6 "Of course, a second option is that the policing  
 7 primacy for events moves to GMP as recommended by the  
 8 experts and, for the avoidance of doubt, having  
 9 considered all of the relevant information, GMP are  
 10 persuaded by these experts and the evidence as it has  
 11 unfolded so far."  
 12 But I think what you've said to us is that BTP has  
 13 not reached that position , at least not so far?  
 14 A. Not at this moment in time, sir. We have certainly  
 15 commenced discussions. I have had conversations with  
 16 ACC Bailey, effectively my opposite number in GMP, to  
 17 start general discussions of working in liaison . But  
 18 our position there, again in context, is the policing of  
 19 the arena is far more complex than just event nights,  
 20 it's the general policing on a day-to-day basis and  
 21 responding to far less serious incidents than occurred  
 22 on the night.  
 23 Q. No one will doubt that the policing of the arena --  
 24 I say no one, most people will not doubt that the  
 25 policing of the arena is or is capable of being

1 a complex situation and that many minor crimes may be  
 2 committed there. For example, the theft of mobile  
 3 telephones by pickpockets on the occasion of events.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. But obviously, as the matters we are investigating  
 6 demonstrate, crimes of the very most serious nature may  
 7 occur there.  
 8 A. Absolutely, sir .  
 9 Q. And do you agree that the complexity of the policing  
 10 situation there is one reason, perhaps the most  
 11 important reason, why there does need to be clarity  
 12 between GMP and BTP about who has primacy?  
 13 A. Yes, I do accept that, sir .  
 14 Q. The letter continues with a passage in bold:  
 15 "To be clear, we now formally offer to take on the  
 16 policing of the arena footprint to which, if you are  
 17 agreeable, a similar though inverted MOU could be  
 18 agreed.  
 19 "I absolutely understand that there will be many  
 20 issues to consider as part of this decision--making  
 21 process, some of which I will not be aware of and I may  
 22 not fully understand their complexity. Moreover,  
 23 whichever option is chosen, we appreciate there will be  
 24 considerable work to be completed quickly to ensure that  
 25 effective arrangements are put in place."

1 You probably agree with most of that insofar as it  
 2 deals with the complexity of the situation?  
 3 A. Yes, I do.  
 4 Q. "Finally, we understand that there may have been some  
 5 concern regarding the examination of this issue so close  
 6 to the inquiry's start. However, we believe that it is  
 7 incumbent on us to develop this discussion now we have  
 8 had the final report from the experts and CTI have made  
 9 this issue so central in their opening. Naturally  
 10 we would further wish to be collectively transparent  
 11 with CTI in our ongoing discussions."  
 12 So that was DCC Pilling's letter to your deputy  
 13 chief constable of 14 September.  
 14 The reply of DCC Adrian Hanstock was dated  
 15 12 October, {INQ036997/1}. Do you agree that there's no  
 16 doubt from the letter written by GMP that they were  
 17 offering to take over primacy?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. And they were expressing the view that a decision needed  
 20 to be made sooner, rather than later, if September of  
 21 2020 is sooner.  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. This is the reply, which I will read through and then  
 24 I'll have a small number of questions for you.  
 25 DCC Hanstock thanks DCC Pilling for the letter and goes

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1 on to say:  
 2 "BTP recognises the position you have set out and  
 3 has also given due regard to the emerging  
 4 interpretations of the expert panel supporting the  
 5 inquiry. It is absolutely right that there is an  
 6 unequivocal agreement between our respective  
 7 organisations and no doubt as to which has absolute  
 8 responsibility and accountability for the arena and any  
 9 shared access spaces."  
 10 So is what the deputy chief constable is saying  
 11 there that there is unequivocal agreement that BTP has  
 12 primacy?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. "I support your proposal [the letter goes on] that we  
 15 work together to understand the respective legislative  
 16 policy and strategic policing requirements that will  
 17 inform any published position, but understandably  
 18 we will need to include the view of the British  
 19 Transport Police Authority and Department for Transport  
 20 when setting out any memorandum."  
 21 So he's making the point that there are others that  
 22 need to be consulted?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. Has consultation been taking place with the BTPA and  
 25 Department for Transport?

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1 A. Not at this moment in time, sir, no.  
 2 Q. You'll appreciate that we're now 3.5 years on from the  
 3 arena attack. Is there a reason? Is there a good  
 4 reason why the views of BTPA and the Department for  
 5 Transport have not yet been sought?  
 6 A. So the suggestion there, sir, is that those views would  
 7 need to be sought ahead of any transfer of policing  
 8 primacy for the arena. Up until this point, BTP's  
 9 position and indeed that of the authority -- and to my  
 10 knowledge there has been no question from the Department  
 11 of Transport regarding that primacy -- is that we were  
 12 continuing with the day-to-day policing of the arena as  
 13 we have done for the last 25 years.  
 14 Q. The letter goes on:  
 15 "However, while we would be amenable to developing  
 16 an understanding of how to address the observations of  
 17 the various parties that have already offered comment,  
 18 it seems prudent that we wait until the chairman has  
 19 considered all of the evidence and given his assessment  
 20 and made his recommendations before we reach or express  
 21 a determined position."  
 22 That's very much the explanation that you gave to us  
 23 earlier in your evidence.  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. As I'm sure you will appreciate, without giving any

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1 indication about the date upon which this inquiry is  
 2 likely to report, there is a long way still to go, is  
 3 there not?  
 4 A. There is indeed, sir. I accept that. As I have  
 5 mentioned, though, in terms of discussion with my  
 6 colleagues in Greater Manchester Police, we have had  
 7 those initial discussions regarding a strategic contact,  
 8 should there be a major incident of any issue at the  
 9 arena, and the immediate way in which we would engage  
 10 and discuss primacy at an early time. So it is not as  
 11 though BTP has brought down the curtains on those  
 12 discussions, so to speak. We are open to that position.  
 13 Reading those letters, certainly from a public point  
 14 of view and not understanding maybe the design and the  
 15 set-out of the arena, the complexity comes because of  
 16 the arena being part of the train station and the train  
 17 station being part of the arena, effectively. If there  
 18 was a clear divide between the two, that would be a lot  
 19 easier to sort out regarding this matter. But without  
 20 going into the specific detail, that is why the matter  
 21 is complex in terms of how that policing would work. In  
 22 truth, from my professional opinion of being currently  
 23 the lead for that, it would be extremely difficult to  
 24 have one police force police either the railway station  
 25 and a different police force for the arena because of

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1 the landlord, because of the infrastructure, because of  
 2 the whole way the public interact between the two  
 3 buildings, and the two buildings effectively being one.  
 4 Q. From what you're saying to us, BTP do not anticipate  
 5 that the debate between GMP and BTP and undoubtedly, as  
 6 we see, there is a debate about primacy, is there not?  
 7 A. Indeed, yes.  
 8 Q. From what you're saying to us, that debate is not going  
 9 to be resolved until probably well over 4 years after  
 10 the arena attack?  
 11 A. In the matter of the timings where we are, yes, it is,  
 12 that is correct. I want to ensure that the inquiry  
 13 understands this is not, and I put it in simple terms,  
 14 a turf war between two police forces.  
 15 This is very much about making sure, quite rightly,  
 16 that the public are kept safe and that appropriate  
 17 responses, made. It may well be -- and I don't want to  
 18 pre-empt necessarily the outcomes -- that there is an  
 19 agreement regarding who takes primacy in a major  
 20 incident, but day-to-day policing continues to be  
 21 delivered by BTP as an example. But those discussions  
 22 will take some time to work through. Multiple  
 23 stakeholders will need to be consulted: Network Rail,  
 24 SMG as the tenant. It is not an easy quick fix, sir.  
 25 Q. I'm not suggesting it is easy or a quick fix, but the

1 way you put it is it may be that there is an agreement  
 2 that GMP have primacy during a major incident. The  
 3 public may be sitting at home or sitting here, hearing  
 4 your evidence, and thinking to themselves, the  
 5 terrorists aren't going to wait until the inquiry has  
 6 reported, and really if that is to be the solution to  
 7 problems, if there was a problem, then that solution  
 8 ought to have been achieved before now and certainly not  
 9 to wait any further.  
 10 A. On that point, sir, I can accept that that is certainly  
 11 a perception that may be drawn. What I can add  
 12 reassurance to in relation to the inquiry is that in  
 13 standard police operating procedures, whether that would  
 14 be a firearms situation or a public order situation,  
 15 British Transport Police is well-versed with other  
 16 forces at a strategic level. One of the first things to  
 17 occur is for the strategic commanders of both forces at  
 18 the earliest opportunity to have a discussion on who  
 19 takes the lead, who takes primacy for an event, yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may transpire, and there may be no  
 21 dispute, that that didn't occur on this occasion and  
 22 that could have made the response to what happened more  
 23 difficult.  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it might be that in the interim,

1 while anything was being sorted out, at least there's an  
 2 agreement that if anything like this were to occur  
 3 anywhere, there should be an immediate decision handing  
 4 over primacy to the authority who are best capable of  
 5 dealing with it.  
 6 A. Yes, absolutely. And without diverting from where  
 7 we are here, sir, extremely briefly, an example of that.  
 8 Only in September, there was a major train crash in  
 9 Wales, early hours of the morning, a conversation  
 10 between myself and the relevant police force in Wales as  
 11 to who was best placed to lead on that major incident  
 12 response. The decision was taken between both of us and  
 13 British Transport Police led on that incident. So  
 14 that is a working example at a senior strategic level of  
 15 how that occurs and how that would occur at any future  
 16 event at the arena.  
 17 MR GREANEY: That's all I intend to ask you about the issue  
 18 of primacy at this stage. We'll return to it in due  
 19 course and indeed others may have questions about it.  
 20 It was my intention next to ask you about the  
 21 policing arrangement between BTP and SMG, but I've got  
 22 a problem with the document at the moment, so we'll move  
 23 on and I'll come back to that. We'll deal next,  
 24 therefore, with training for BTP officers.  
 25 As the inquiry understands very well, in May 2017

1 the JTAC terrorism threat level was severe.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. And of course you'll have been well aware of that at the  
 4 time and certainly know it now. Should that fact have  
 5 informed the work of BTP in planning and preparation?  
 6 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 7 Q. And should that fact have informed the work of BTP in  
 8 assessing the risks at events in the arena?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. I'm going to go to page 11 of your first statement now.  
 11 You deal in this section with the training of  
 12 Bronze, Silver and Gold Commanders, and we'll turn to  
 13 that when we get to chapter 10. I just want to ask you  
 14 about paragraph 77. Officers also receive  
 15 counter-terrorism training at training school; is that  
 16 correct?  
 17 A. Yes, it is.  
 18 Q. Are you able to help us with the extent to which new  
 19 officers received counter-terrorism awareness training  
 20 at training school in May 2017?  
 21 A. Yes, absolutely, sir. So the recruits going through  
 22 their 20-week training at our training school will  
 23 receive two specific days in counter-terrorism training  
 24 and awareness. That training is actually taken out of  
 25 the classroom and the recruits physically visit what is

1 now the E Division headquarters in London, the  
 2 specialist operations response cell. Across those  
 3 2 days, it covers many, many aspect, as one would  
 4 expect, in terms of the threat level, understanding the  
 5 threat level, what that actually means, response to  
 6 suspicious activity, things known in policing such as  
 7 what is the called the HOT principle, which is  
 8 responding to certain items, and OWL principles, known  
 9 within policing as the WHAT principle, which is  
 10 in relation to how you would approach a suspicious  
 11 person. It covers things such as identifying component  
 12 parts of an improvised explosive device and it then  
 13 moves on into the second day of a scenario based on  
 14 walking through the students in response to a terror  
 15 situation or suspicious activity.

16 In broad terms, sir, that is what is covered, both  
 17 for police constables and almost mirrored for police  
 18 community support officers, just with one or two  
 19 elements removed because of the operational response.

20 Q. So along the way of that helpful answer, you told us  
 21 that the training involved the recruits understanding  
 22 what the terrorism threat level means?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. So they would be told the threat level is severe or, if  
 25 the threat level is severe, that means that a terrorist

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1 attack is highly likely?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Will they be told how that ought to inform their  
 4 approach to policing?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And where the threat level is severe, they need to have  
 7 a high degree of vigilance?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. You mentioned a number of times suspicious activity and  
 10 suspicious persons. Does that mean that training was  
 11 given in the identification of persons who might be  
 12 terrorists?

13 A. Certainly that would have been part of the discussion,  
 14 yes.

15 Q. And that indeed, the walk-through on the second day  
 16 involved the scenario in which the officers sought to  
 17 identify whether a person was or wasn't suspicious?

18 A. Yes, indeed. It was remiss of me, but one of the key  
 19 elements of that training as well is an input into what  
 20 is referred to within policing as behavioural detection,  
 21 so a basic input or initial input into understanding  
 22 people's behaviour and reaction to police officers that  
 23 may draw attention to them being suspicious.

24 Q. In May of 2017, had many officers of BTP also  
 25 participated in something called the Ickenham terrorism

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1 immersive exercise?

2 A. Yes, they had.

3 Q. What did that exercise involve?

4 A. So the immersive training, which is commonly known  
 5 within policing nationally as a Hydra exercise, consists  
 6 of initial briefings setting out a scenario and then,  
 7 through multimedia inputs, being through computer  
 8 screens, interactive videos, a scenario, in almost  
 9 real time, would be played out on the screen. Limited  
 10 information would be supplied to the students as in what  
 11 would be -- what somebody would expect to be information  
 12 available at the time, so an initial call, for example,  
 13 from a member of the public. Then the training or video  
 14 would stop, individual officers would go off into set  
 15 groups or syndicates and discuss their responses.

16 It also gives them opportunity within that training  
 17 to interact with the training session, so they may well  
 18 ask questions such as in the experience of an IED, can  
 19 wires be seen on this package, for an example. They are  
 20 then brought back for wider discussion. That continues  
 21 through the course of the day, sir, as the scenario  
 22 plays through to conclusion.

23 Q. Had many BTP officers also received what you describe as  
 24 active shooter online training on NCALT?

25 A. Yes, sir. The common understanding of that computer

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1 system is known as NCALT. It's the national policing  
 2 system through the College of Policing. The active  
 3 shooter training, as referred to there, was at the time  
 4 when marauding terrorist firearms incidents were  
 5 occurring around the world and that was in preparation,  
 6 bringing officers up to speed on how to react should  
 7 such an incident come to the UK.

8 Q. As you say, there had in 2015/2016 been terrorist  
 9 attacks around the world. Was it well understood within  
 10 BTP at the time that one of the targets for terrorists  
 11 was a transport hub?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Was it also well understood within BTP that a target for  
 14 terrorism at the time we're concerned with was an  
 15 entertainment venue such as an arena?

16 A. Yes, it would have been discussed, yes.

17 Q. You told us that many officers in May 2017 would have  
 18 participated in the Ickenham exercise and that many  
 19 officers will have received the training on NCALT?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Bearing in mind that in May 2017 the terrorism threat  
 22 was severe, although it was increased to that level in  
 23 2017, can you say why it was only many officers that had  
 24 attended such training rather than all officers?

25 A. My understanding, sir, would have been that all officers

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1 would have been through — that may well have been my  
 2 terminology in the statement. It was all through 2017,  
 3 the threat level was at severe, yes.

4 Q. Right, so that's my memory. So I read from your  
 5 statement that many officers had received this training;  
 6 in fact, your understanding is that all officers had  
 7 received that training?

8 A. Yes, or certainly for — I'd have to check the figures,  
 9 they are not before me, but certainly if I can clarify  
 10 there, certainly there was a programme to deliver that.  
 11 It wasn't a case of selecting officers. If they hadn't  
 12 been at that time, it was definitely the intention of  
 13 the force that all front line operational officers would  
 14 receive that training. It was mandatory training for  
 15 the force.

16 Q. In 2016 did BTP also participate in Exercise Sherman?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. A multi-agency exercise arranged by GMP on behalf of the  
 19 GMRF, the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You deal with this in further detail in your statement,  
 22 dated 4 September of this year, which is at divider 3 of  
 23 the bundle you have.

24 It's described as your third corporate witness  
 25 statement. In fact, there was one in between, so this

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1 is the fourth. The one in between was the learning  
 2 lessons statement, but that may not matter.

3 As you told us, GMP ran Exercise Sherman. Where did  
 4 they run it?

5 A. The actual location I am not certain. My presumption  
 6 would be, but it would be a presumption, it would be  
 7 within a GMP training setting or a local venue.

8 Q. It was my poor question. I think the answer is that GMP  
 9 ran Exercise Sherman in each of the boroughs of  
 10 Greater Manchester.

11 A. Sorry, yes, sir.

12 Q. And was BTP invited to participate in the city centre  
 13 exercise held on 26 July?

14 A. Yes, we were.

15 Q. On that occasion, did the Greater Manchester Technical  
 16 Coordinating Group ask your force's resilience planning  
 17 officer to nominate tactical players for the event?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. In short, was the resilience planning officer of BTP  
 20 asked to identify the best people to go on this exercise  
 21 so that the greatest learning could be obtained?

22 A. That is correct, yes.

23 Q. Who was it in the result that attended?

24 A. So we sent two inspectors to that training exercise.  
 25 They would have been Police Inspector Cooper, who was

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1 part of the C Division operational planning section at  
 2 that time, and Police Inspector Wedderburn, who was what  
 3 we refer to in the force as the officer in charge of  
 4 Manchester Victoria Station.

5 Q. So far as you understand it, before the inspectors  
 6 attended the course, were they aware of what the  
 7 scenario or scenarios would be?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. But as we all know, one of the scenarios involved the  
 10 shooting of a number of people at Victoria Station —

11 A. That is correct, yes.

12 Q. — before a Disney on Ice show was due to take place  
 13 at the arena?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And the scenario involved terrorist activity within the  
 16 City Room?

17 A. It did, yes.

18 Q. What you say in your witness statement at paragraph 4  
 19 is:

20 "No exercise report was completed for the various  
 21 organisations that attended."

22 What do you mean by that?

23 A. My understanding, sir, is in such an event there would  
 24 be a closing statement by the hosts, which would be  
 25 shared, potentially with recommendations, to all

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1 participants, and my understanding, sir, is that due to  
 2 sickness of the coordinator of that event, that report  
 3 did not occur.

4 Q. I'm sure you'll agree that that would not be a reason or  
 5 excuse not to learn from the exercise.

6 A. Absolutely, and it is not my intention to suggest that  
 7 was the case.

8 Q. I wasn't indicating that that was your intention. What  
 9 you go on to add in that paragraph is:

10 "There was no learning identified by the force."  
 11 What we've understood is there was no learning by  
 12 BTP from Exercise Sherman?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Do you find that surprising?

15 A. Not particularly, because at the time, as again  
 16 I mentioned due to the training coming from national  
 17 terrorism, coming from the College of Policing, that was  
 18 all focused on what this scenario would have been,  
 19 commonly known as a marauding firearms terrorist attack.  
 20 BTP had our own plans in place for that at the time.  
 21 Accepting that I wasn't party to that exercise, my  
 22 assumption from attending similar incidents is that  
 23 there was nothing that was potentially found to be amiss  
 24 within our own plans to be shared wider.

25 Q. Bearing in mind that the one of the scenarios in the

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1 exercise had been focused on a terrorist attack in the  
 2 City Room, do you think it would be fair to suggest that  
 3 one of the learning points was that there was  
 4 a particular risk in that location?  
 5 A. Certainly I would see it as no more of a risk to the  
 6 actual station or the City Room itself, but I wouldn't  
 7 personally have taken it as identifying a specific  
 8 location as a vulnerable point, no.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Another possibility might be that the  
 10 issue of primacy and settling it really quickly could be  
 11 something that came up; it certainly did when it  
 12 happened. So wouldn't that have been shown up by the  
 13 exercise as well?  
 14 A. My understanding, sir, as I would expect, is the  
 15 exercise actually walked through the primacy being  
 16 Greater Manchester Police and the core responders, as  
 17 both Inspector Cooper and Wedderburn would have expected  
 18 at the time, that the primacy for that response to the  
 19 attack would have been Greater Manchester Police. So  
 20 I wouldn't have expected them to have identified that as  
 21 a point of learning.  
 22 MR GREANEY: So the scenario involved GMP assuming primacy  
 23 within the City Room once a terrorist incident had  
 24 started?  
 25 A. Yes, sir, and the train station.

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1 Q. But notwithstanding that, as you've told us already,  
 2 formally, primacy, so far as it was understood, rested  
 3 with BTP?  
 4 A. Yes, but again, sir, I remind you back to the point  
 5 about initial contact and understanding of who was in  
 6 charge. Certainly at that point for the exercise, BTP  
 7 would not have been in a position to respond as the  
 8 exercise played out to a shooting in the train station  
 9 and the force would have full understanding that the  
 10 primary responders for a firearms attack in the station  
 11 then would have been Greater Manchester Police. That  
 12 wouldn't have come into question in my mind from the  
 13 exercise.  
 14 Q. Whilst we're dealing with training, it's convenient to  
 15 deal with a connected but different aspect, namely the  
 16 CT training that was provided by BTP. This takes us to  
 17 your second witness statement. Once we've finished this  
 18 section, I'll invite the chairman to take a break.  
 19 The heading is:  
 20 "Counter-terrorism training BTP provided to Northern  
 21 staff at Manchester Victoria station."  
 22 You indicate that BTP has and had in 2017  
 23 a counter-terrorism engagement unit.  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. Which was part of specialist operations?

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1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. I'm not going to delve into the number of members  
 3 overall that the counter-terrorism engagement unit had,  
 4 but how many counter-terrorism security advisers did it  
 5 have?  
 6 A. I believe at that time, sir, it was one supervisor and  
 7 three CTSA's.  
 8 Q. Were the main responsibilities of the unit the review of  
 9 security at sites on the railway network in order to  
 10 identify vulnerabilities and provide protective advice  
 11 to the rail industry?  
 12 A. Yes, it was.  
 13 Q. Would it be fair to suggest that three CTSA's doesn't  
 14 sound like very many to satisfy that responsibility?  
 15 A. It is a challenge for the team, absolutely, sir, yes.  
 16 Q. And a second responsibility of the unit was the delivery  
 17 of counter-terrorism awareness across the rail industry?  
 18 A. That is correct, yes.  
 19 Q. Did a BTP CTSA ever conduct a protective security  
 20 improvement activity analysis at Manchester Victoria  
 21 Railway Station?  
 22 A. Yes, they did, yes.  
 23 Q. When was that?  
 24 A. That was in 2016.  
 25 Q. Was Manchester Arena covered by that assessment?

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1 A. No, it wasn't, sir; that was a separate assessment.  
 2 Q. Was the assessment of the arena, separate assessment of  
 3 the arena, carried out by a BTP CTSA?  
 4 A. No, it wasn't, sir, no.  
 5 Q. By whom was it carried out?  
 6 A. That was carried out by a CTSA which, in my  
 7 understanding, was either attached to Greater Manchester  
 8 Police or through the North-west Counter-terrorism Unit,  
 9 as was at the time.  
 10 Q. Bearing in mind that BTP had primacy for the whole of  
 11 the complex, including the arena, why did that CTSA, as  
 12 opposed to a BTP CTSA, carry out the analysis at the  
 13 arena?  
 14 A. So initially, sir, when the PSIA system came into being,  
 15 which, if my memory is correct, is 2014, that  
 16 requirement wasn't placed on BTP across the rail  
 17 network. The reason for that, sir, was due to the  
 18 complex and detailed national rail security programme,  
 19 which delivered a similar level of security managed  
 20 through the Department of Transport. It wasn't until  
 21 2015 that British Transport Police adopted the PSIA  
 22 procedure. The procedure was already in place through  
 23 the CTSA for the arena the previous year, so that  
 24 process, in the simplest terms, continued with the CTSA  
 25 for the arena.

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1 Q. Was Project Griffin something that was delivered by —  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, are you leaving that?  
 3 MR GREANEY: I am, yes, sir.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Clearly, in retrospect, it would have  
 5 been better for the same CTSA to do it because all the  
 6 risks can be linked into the arena and the station?  
 7 A. Certainly, sir, and when my original brief occurred,  
 8 that's exactly a question I raised.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And so far as you know, there was no  
 10 linkage or discussion between the CTSA who dealt with  
 11 Victoria Station and the CTSA who dealt with the arena?  
 12 A. That is correct, sir.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Was Project Griffin something that was  
 15 delivered by BTP CSAAs?  
 16 A. Yes, it was.  
 17 Q. To whom was it delivered?  
 18 A. Project Griffin was delivered to people within the rail  
 19 network, stakeholders within train operating companies,  
 20 generally at what I would describe as a point of contact  
 21 interaction, so people such as customer service  
 22 assistants, general station staff.  
 23 Q. Was Project Griffin subsequently replaced by ACT Aware?  
 24 A. It was, yes.  
 25 Q. During 2017, did BTP deliver ACT Aware training

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1 sessions?  
 2 A. Yes, we did.  
 3 Q. In that year, how many training sessions were there?  
 4 A. Over 200 sessions, sir.  
 5 Q. Were they delivered in Manchester, Leeds and Bradford?  
 6 A. Yes, they were.  
 7 Q. I'm not going to ask you to go through who the delegates  
 8 were, but can you confirm that SMG made arrangements for  
 9 three of its employees to attend BTP ACT Aware training  
 10 in London on 5 January 2016?  
 11 A. Yes, that is my understanding, sir, yes.  
 12 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm going to move on next to a different  
 13 and substantial topic. This would be a convenient  
 14 moment for a break.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Quarter of an hour, is that  
 16 satisfactory?  
 17 MR GREANEY: Certainly, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: About 10 past, please.  
 19 (10.53 am)  
 20 (A short break)  
 21 (11.15 am)  
 22 MR GREANEY: Mr O'Callaghan, we're going to return to  
 23 a topic that I was unable to deal with before the break  
 24 because I couldn't locate the documents.  
 25 The document is {INQ036812/1}. It's a document that

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1 dates back to, it would appear, 2003, so a decade and  
 2 a half before you joined BTP. But you are, I think,  
 3 familiar with this document?  
 4 A. Yes, I am, sir.  
 5 Q. There are two aspects to it that I want to explore with  
 6 you to the extent that's possible. First of all, the  
 7 question of payment to BTP by the venue for policing  
 8 services.  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. And secondly, the issue of licensing of the arena, which  
 11 are two topics that are dealt with within this report,  
 12 are they not?  
 13 A. Yes, sir, they are.  
 14 Q. The document is entitled:  
 15 "The application of the lease concerning the  
 16 MEN Arena [as it was then] in relation to the British  
 17 Transport Police by Inspector 1813 Lewis."  
 18 Is he an officer who's still serving?  
 19 A. He is indeed, yes.  
 20 Q. He gives his qualifications.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Legally well qualified.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Sir, you've stolen my thunder. I was going to  
 23 make the point that he's a qualified lawyer, which is no  
 24 doubt why he was selected for the task of compiling this  
 25 report.

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1 A. I couldn't comment on that, sir. I recognise his  
 2 qualifications.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He might even be more qualified than  
 4 some here.  
 5 MR GREANEY: He might well be, sir.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That includes me!  
 7 MR GREANEY: Probably not better qualified than you, sir, in  
 8 relation to licensing.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll see.  
 10 MR GREANEY: So he was looking at legal issues and he had  
 11 some legal qualifications.  
 12 I want to move through this as quickly as we can.  
 13 Could we go, please, to {INQ036812/2} of the document at  
 14 the top? Let's identify what he was exploring.  
 15 Background. He identifies that he was given an  
 16 introduction in paragraph 1.1 and he had been advised:  
 17 "The MEN Arena does not have a police services  
 18 agreement with this force but derives the right to  
 19 police because they lease their premises from Railtrack.  
 20 Unless officers were specifically invited inside the  
 21 arena for an event, the policing outside the stadium was  
 22 provided free of charge."  
 23 And having read the report, you will know that was  
 24 an important issue the inspector was being asked to look  
 25 at, was it not?

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1 A. Just for clarity, on my understanding, I'm not aware the  
2 inspector was tasked with this report. My understanding  
3 is he took it upon himself to produce the report.  
4 Q. I see. That is very helpful clarification, thank you.  
5 It goes on:  
6 "This is because as a condition of their lease they  
7 have a right to a police service from Railtrack via its  
8 [policing services agreement] with this force. The  
9 resources put to the policing of MEN Arena events were  
10 often to the detriment of policing the area objectives."  
11 What does that term "area objectives" mean or did it  
12 mean in the early 2000s?  
13 A. At that point in time, sir, the phrase subdivisions or  
14 divisions would not have applied and a common term used  
15 in policing to describe a geographical area at that time  
16 was area. My understanding of the reference to area  
17 objectives would be things such as reduce crime,  
18 increase detections, along those lines.  
19 Q. Was Inspector Lewis someone who at this point in time  
20 had any particular experience of the arena, do you know?  
21 A. Only my understanding from reading the report and my  
22 understanding which may assist there was the role of  
23 officer in charge of the Victoria Station and therefore,  
24 as previously discussed, the arena.  
25 Q. The point he seemed to have been making was that he had

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1 been told that the arena was not paying for policing  
2 outside of the arena bowl itself and that that was  
3 capable, and indeed often did, of operating to the  
4 detriment of more general policing within the area.  
5 A. Certainly that is the view of the author, yes.  
6 Q. He goes on to say in paragraph 1.2:  
7 "In light of the above information I contacted  
8 Inspector Anne Walker, the events planning officer at  
9 Bootle Street Police Station."  
10 Would that have been an officer of BTP or GMP or  
11 can't you say?  
12 A. That would be a GMP officer, sir. Bootle Street Police  
13 Station is a station belonging to Greater Manchester  
14 Police.  
15 Q. And furthermore the context seems to make plain she's  
16 a GMP inspector?  
17 A. Yes, sir.  
18 Q. "She advised me that GMP were also policing MEN Arena  
19 events free of charge."  
20 It goes on to say at the bottom bullet point:  
21 "Her force was equally dissatisfied with the MEN  
22 situation. I therefore decided to establish whether the  
23 MEN Arena had any contractual responsibility towards  
24 policing costs through its lease and Inspector Walker  
25 said she would make enquiries with Manchester City

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1 Council concerning the MEN Arena licence."  
2 And they arranged a further meeting.  
3 Can we go on, please? So that sets the background  
4 to what Inspector Lewis had decided to do. I'm not  
5 going to go through all of his views about the lease.  
6 In short, was his view that the arena operators ought to  
7 be paying for policing services not just inside the  
8 arena bowl but also outside the arena bowl?  
9 A. That's how I understand it, yes.  
10 Q. Let's go to paragraph 4.4, please, on {INQ036812/5}:  
11 "While the arena has successfully staged around  
12 100 events per year since 1995, it could be argued there  
13 are potential shortcomings in the existing policing  
14 arrangement with the MEN Arena which could have serious  
15 implications for public safety."  
16 Do you see that?  
17 A. I do, sir.  
18 Q. Back in 2003, it seems that Inspector Lewis was  
19 identifying a potential safety problem to do with the  
20 policing of the arena by BTP.  
21 A. Yes, sir.  
22 Q. In paragraph 4.7, Inspector Lewis goes on to explain how  
23 this safety problem might emerge:  
24 "There have been occasions however where there have  
25 been insufficient resources to police events

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1 satisfactorily."  
2 Do you see that?  
3 A. Yes, sir.  
4 Q. He then at paragraph 4.8 goes on to explain why, by  
5 pointing out that there may be occasions upon which an  
6 event at the arena coincides with a football match  
7 within the city of Manchester.  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. So let's draw some of those strands together before we  
10 look at licensing. Inspector Lewis was identifying, on  
11 the basis of a legal analysis which may or may not be  
12 accurate, that there were occasions upon which there  
13 seemed to have been too few BTP officers at the  
14 Manchester Arena to police it and that that was capable  
15 of giving rise to a problem with safety, at least  
16 potentially so?  
17 A. Yes, that is certainly an inference, yes.  
18 Q. Are you able to help us with what action was taken on  
19 the basis of this report, if any?  
20 A. Yes, sir. So the report was sent to the area commander  
21 at the time and then this report was sent on to the  
22 Chief Constable of British Transport Police, who in turn  
23 then sent the report on to the predecessor of the BTPA,  
24 which at that time was known as the Police Committee for  
25 discussion regarding the content.

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1 Q. In terms of substantive or hard action, did any occur on  
2 the basis of Inspector Lewis' report?  
3 A. What followed on from that, sir, was that the  
4 Police Committee arranged for legal advice regarding the  
5 matter of the lease and the report and some subsequent  
6 documents were sent on to the solicitors appointed to  
7 the force at the time. Our enquiries at this point in  
8 time and enquiries of the solicitors' office is that the  
9 outcome is unknown and that the said file, over a period  
10 of time, has been destroyed.  
11 Q. In your statement of 6 November of this year, so 10 days  
12 ago, and again it must be stressed that none of this is  
13 possibly capable of being your personal responsibility,  
14 but the final two sentences of that statement read:  
15 "It has not been possible to trace the advice and  
16 the solicitors have destroyed their file [as you've  
17 said]. No further action seems to have been taken on  
18 the contents of Inspector Lewis' report."  
19 A. Yes, it is obviously true and a fact that I was not  
20 in the force at that time. However, I can add this  
21 context from my own being and managing the portfolio at  
22 this moment in time. British Transport Police does  
23 pursue additional officers from different stakeholders  
24 in terms of payment, what are known as enhanced police  
25 service agreements, and my assumption would have been

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1 that would that have been viable or the suggested route  
2 at the time, that would have followed. The fact -- and  
3 again, my assumption from reading the evidence and  
4 knowledge of the force, the fact that that didn't happen  
5 would suggest to me that advice was to the contrary for  
6 what the report was seeking.  
7 Q. So there was this legal issue on the one hand about  
8 whether the arena should be paying for it --  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. -- for more policing services, but it might be thought  
11 that underneath that legal analysis Inspector Lewis was  
12 identifying a more fundamental issue, namely on the  
13 occasion of events at the arena, there were or might be  
14 too few BTP police officers present to ensure safety?  
15 A. That is certainly my understanding of the report, yes,  
16 sir, but equally, in making -- coming to that decision  
17 myself I'm not sighted of course of what resource levels  
18 were in place at the time.  
19 Q. I entirely understand that. We may need to explore this  
20 with other witnesses, but do you know whether any hard  
21 action was taken to address that underlying issue  
22 identified by Inspector Lewis of safety?  
23 A. I do not know the answer to that question, sir.  
24 Q. Could we go to the bottom of {INQ036812/6} of the  
25 document? That's all I wanted to ask you about the

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1 payment/safety issue of this document.  
2 We have a heading that will excite the interest of  
3 some, "The MEN Arena's licence". Here, the inspector  
4 returns to the question of the further meeting he was  
5 having with Inspector Walker, and it appears in context  
6 that what was happening was that they were thinking  
7 about ways in which they could force the arena operators  
8 to do what they wanted them to do, namely make the  
9 payment to the force that they believed was called for.  
10 That seems to be what they were doing.  
11 One idea they'd had was to see whether anything  
12 could be done by the licensing department.  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. So let's read paragraph 5.1 and what Inspector Lewis has  
15 to say:  
16 "On Wednesday, 19 March 2003, I met with  
17 Inspector Walker at Bootle Street Police Station. The  
18 information she delivered is as follows ..."  
19 And it's then necessary to read out a short part:  
20 "The licensing department at Manchester City Council  
21 has said that it would be possible to mount an objection  
22 to the arena's application for its entertainment  
23 licence, which is due for renewal in July 2003."  
24 Do you see that?  
25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. "This could be done on the grounds that (i) the MEN  
2 leaseholders are not taking proper responsibility for  
3 the safety of its patrons as they leave its premises."  
4 A. Yes, noted, sir.  
5 Q. So do you agree that it appears to be the position that  
6 Inspector Walker of GMP had gone to speak to someone in  
7 the licensing department of the council?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. Had drawn attention to the safety issue, as I've  
10 described it?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. And had been told that a potential objection could be  
13 raised to the arena's application for its entertainment  
14 licence on that safety issue?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. That's probably as far as I can take it with you;  
17 is that correct?  
18 A. Yes, sir. I'm sighted on further documents that then  
19 suggested that that did not continue along those lines.  
20 Q. Then I can take it further with you. Would you like to  
21 explain what you can add on this particular aspect of  
22 things?  
23 A. Certainly. In relation to the correspondence that I've  
24 seen, there is a suggestion in a report from  
25 Inspector Lewis -- I believe the phrase was "a change of

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1 heart" from Greater Manchester Police's view on what  
 2 could be achieved through pursuing this course of  
 3 action.  
 4 Q. Can I just ask you to pause for one moment? It would  
 5 seem likely that you're referring to correspondence that  
 6 you've seen very recently indeed, are you?  
 7 A. Yes, sir, in the last week.  
 8 Q. And even if it's not occurred already, that is  
 9 correspondence that can be made available to the  
 10 inquiry, presumably?  
 11 A. Yes, absolutely.  
 12 Q. I interrupted you, but I just wanted to be clear where  
 13 this information had come from. So there had been  
 14 a change of heart by Greater Manchester Police?  
 15 A. That was the suggestion, yes.  
 16 Q. And a change of heart from wanting to do something in  
 17 terms of licensing action or enforcement, you might say?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. And not wanting to do something?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. This is your summary; we'll need to look at the  
 22 documents themselves.  
 23 A. Indeed.  
 24 Q. And I have in mind the position of Mr Horwell, on behalf  
 25 of GMP, as he's sitting at home watching these

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1 proceedings, but let's take it as far as we can with  
 2 you. What else did the documents you have seen suggest  
 3 in relation to this issue?  
 4 A. There was certainly some correspondence at a subsequent  
 5 meeting at the arena for SMG, this is my paraphrased  
 6 memory of the documents, of agreeing to look at  
 7 additional resources for certain events.  
 8 Q. Is that where it landed or did the correspondence that  
 9 you've seen take it further?  
 10 A. That was about the conclusion, sir.  
 11 Q. So there seems to have been a discussion in which the  
 12 arena operators were involved. My memory doesn't at the  
 13 moment assist me whether it would have been SMG or its  
 14 predecessor, we'll find out. And there was a discussion  
 15 about the arena operator obtaining extra resources  
 16 during events?  
 17 A. Yes, absolutely.  
 18 Q. And by extra resources was it your understanding from  
 19 what you've seen that the extra resources were extra  
 20 policing resources?  
 21 A. Yes, and the suggestion was for at key events where  
 22 such — the discussions between parties would suggest if  
 23 further policing was required.  
 24 Q. Does the correspondence assist in relation to whether  
 25 that was to be paid for policing or policing that would

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1 generally be provided?  
 2 A. The discussion suggested regarding both, sir.  
 3 Q. Well, insofar as it's necessary to ask you further  
 4 questions, we can do that when you return on the basis  
 5 of the documents themselves. But thank you very much  
 6 for drawing them to our attention.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just so there's no misunderstanding,  
 8 this all takes place under a previous licensing  
 9 regime —  
 10 MR GREANEY: Thank you.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: — and where there was a provision for  
 12 renewal to take place?  
 13 In 2003, the new Act comes in, it's not effective  
 14 until 2005, so it's still under the old regime?  
 15 MR GREANEY: Sir, that may be part of the thinking, we'll  
 16 have to wait and see.  
 17 That's all I propose to ask you about the Lewis  
 18 report at this stage. I'm going to turn next, please,  
 19 to the connected issue of the relationship between  
 20 Manchester Victoria Railway Station and the arena. This  
 21 takes us back to your first witness statement, so  
 22 divider 1, please, Assistant Chief Constable, and  
 23 paragraph 40.  
 24 We'll take this slowly because there are some  
 25 important issues that arise out of paragraphs 40 through

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1 to 47.  
 2 You begin by observing, as we know, that:  
 3 "BTP is responsible for policing all of  
 4 Victoria Station and the Manchester Arena except for the  
 5 tram platforms that terminate in the station, which fall  
 6 under the responsibility of GMP."  
 7 Why was it that that area and only that area fell  
 8 under the responsibility of GMP?  
 9 A. In simplest terms, sir, GMP hold the policing service  
 10 agreement with the Metrolink to deliver policing across  
 11 the Metrolink network.  
 12 Q. Bearing in mind the complexities you've told us about  
 13 earlier when we were exploring primacy of having two  
 14 different police forces managing two different parts of,  
 15 in this case, a complex, how does that relationship  
 16 work, that GMP have responsibility for the tram  
 17 platforms and BTP have responsibility for the balance of  
 18 the complex? Because after all, the tram platforms are  
 19 bang slap in the middle of the train station.  
 20 A. Absolutely, sir. From my view, it works in total  
 21 partnership. BTP officers patrol and use those tram  
 22 platforms — indeed the Metrolink is the system that my  
 23 officers move about Manchester between police stations,  
 24 certainly the PCSOs do. There is absolutely no divide,  
 25 no mythical white line as such, that causes a boundary

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1 between the two. I myself have witnessed both BTP  
 2 officers and GMP's Transport Unit and the transport  
 3 officers within Greater Manchester working in  
 4 partnership on that very location.  
 5 Q. Might that suggest that the difficulties in relation to  
 6 the arena that we spoke about earlier are more imagined  
 7 than real?  
 8 A. In terms of there being no problem, sir?  
 9 Q. Or problems that aren't likely to be as significant in  
 10 practice.  
 11 A. Yes, which is what I was alluding to earlier, that  
 12 interoperability that works between the locations, yes.  
 13 Q. As we know in 2017, the arena was managed and operated  
 14 by SMG in one of its entities. Was it your  
 15 understanding that SMG was responsible for security,  
 16 including managing the crowds attending its events, both  
 17 inside and outside the arena bowl?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. You observe its responsibilities are set out in the  
 20 terms of its lease with Network Rail and in the  
 21 conditions of its entertainment licence.  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. We've looked in detail at something called the  
 24 facilities management agreement. Do you know the  
 25 document to which I'm referring?

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1 A. Not particularly, sir, no.  
 2 Q. Is that a document, and if you don't know now, tell me  
 3 when you return — the facilities management document,  
 4 is that an agreement that BTP had a copy of before  
 5 May 2017?  
 6 A. I'd be speculating, so I'll need to find that out.  
 7 Q. That's absolutely fine.  
 8 Was there in May 2017 any operating protocol between  
 9 BTP and SMG?  
 10 A. Not a written record, no.  
 11 Q. You say not a written protocol. Was there an unwritten  
 12 protocol?  
 13 A. Yes, certainly. My understanding was there was  
 14 certainly a daily working relationship both between SMG  
 15 and BTP, yes, in terms of an understanding of how things  
 16 operated.  
 17 Q. Does that apply to the occasion of events?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And to dark days as well?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. As we have agreed already, in May 2017 the risk of  
 22 a terrorist attack was very significant, was it not?  
 23 A. Indeed, sir.  
 24 Q. It was highly likely, indeed. We know that transport  
 25 hubs and arenas were targets of interest to terrorists.

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1 A. Yes, they were.  
 2 Q. So there was an obvious risk on the occasion of an event  
 3 that it may be targeted by a terrorist?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. So it was important, wasn't it, that there should be  
 6 a clear understanding of who had responsibility for the  
 7 safety of people, whether eventgoers or not, in the  
 8 public areas outside the arena at the time of events?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Was there clarity in relation to that before the arena  
 11 attack?  
 12 A. Clarity in terms of my understanding is that there was  
 13 clarity in response to that, yes.  
 14 Q. Who had responsibility for the safety of people, whether  
 15 eventgoers or not, in the public areas outside the arena  
 16 bowl at the time of events?  
 17 A. So, again, in relation to the wider areas, that was —  
 18 the day-to-day security would be through SMG or an  
 19 associated contractor. And then the police delivering  
 20 policing as it would in any area to keep people safe.  
 21 Q. Are you describing a shared responsibility?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. Did that apply to anyone, whether they were attending  
 24 the event or not?  
 25 A. Depending on the actual location within the

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1 Victoria Exchange Complex. We know, of course, it was  
 2 a public area and thoroughfare for many, so I'd say  
 3 it would be both, people attending the arena, from  
 4 a policing point of view, and members of the public  
 5 moving through that location.  
 6 Q. So we're talking, aren't we, principally about the  
 7 City Room because that of course is where bomb was  
 8 detonated? And should we understand from your answer  
 9 that responsibility for the security of those within  
 10 that room was shared between SMG and their contractors  
 11 on the one hand and British Transport Police on the  
 12 other hand?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. In terms of when the threat of a terrorist attack was  
 15 most acute, and I think you'll agree with many other  
 16 witnesses who have said that there was such a risk  
 17 in the City Room given that it was at least one of the  
 18 busiest entrances and exits from the arena?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. Given that that risk existed at all times, perhaps  
 21 certainly at all times an event was taking place, would  
 22 you agree that the risk of an attack was most acute  
 23 during egress from a concert?  
 24 A. I would disagree with most at risk. That risk, I would  
 25 see that as being present at all times, not specific to

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1 egress.  
 2 Q. I'm sure you're right, the risk was present throughout,  
 3 but during the event itself we have seen a lot of  
 4 footage, there would not be many people present within  
 5 the City Room?  
 6 A. Certainly not during an event, absolutely not. At  
 7 ingress, depending on pre doors opening, yes, it could  
 8 be as busy if not busier than egress.  
 9 Q. This is just what I wanted to understand. We're  
 10 talking, aren't we, about a terrorist attack, so we need  
 11 to think about what is going to be attractive to  
 12 a terrorist who is determined upon a person-borne IED,  
 13 and where there's a large crowd it's going to be a more  
 14 attractive proposition for such a terrible person than  
 15 when there isn't much of a crowd; do you agree?  
 16 A. Yes, I do.  
 17 Q. So the risk based on that logic is lower whilst the  
 18 event itself is taking place?  
 19 A. Yes, I do agree.  
 20 Q. And in terms of ingress, I quite agree that during  
 21 ingress there would be more people in the City Room than  
 22 during the event itself, but does experience indicate  
 23 that people arrive not all at the same time but over  
 24 a period of time that may be hours before the event?  
 25 A. Yes, absolutely, depending on the event. I'm equally

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1 aware of circumstances pre doors opening on a busy event  
 2 before search lanes are engaged or before eventgoers are  
 3 actually allowed into the bowl that the City Room  
 4 potentially could be filled to capacity, yes.  
 5 Q. Do you have familiarity with the arena yourself?  
 6 A. Yes, I do, sir. When I first took over this role, I met  
 7 with SMG, met with Miriam Stone. I have a full  
 8 understanding of the arena and have refreshed myself  
 9 physically there only last week as well.  
 10 Q. So we've dealt with during the course of an event, we've  
 11 dealt with ingress and generally how people would arrive  
 12 over a prolonged period of time. I entirely understand  
 13 that there may be events when a significant crowd does  
 14 develop during ingress and indeed we have seen  
 15 a photograph of that.  
 16 But there is a difference in relation to egress,  
 17 which is that you would expect people to be leaving over  
 18 a more compact period of time, would you not?  
 19 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.  
 20 Q. So whilst accepting that ingress would be more  
 21 attractive to a suicide bomber than the event, can we  
 22 agree that a particularly acute risk of an attack in the  
 23 City Room does arise during egress?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. Bearing in mind that BTP did have a responsibility, even

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1 if not sole responsibility, for security in the  
 2 City Room, would you therefore, bearing in mind the  
 3 analysis we've been through, have expected a BTP  
 4 presence within the City Room during egress?  
 5 A. Yes, I would do, yes, in line with the policing plan  
 6 that was set up at that time and the knowledge known for  
 7 that event, yes.  
 8 Q. When you say "policing plan at that time", which  
 9 document are you referring to?  
 10 A. Apologies, I'm talking generically, the assessment being  
 11 undertaken in whatever form that was by the person  
 12 responsible for delivering the policing.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you're talking about what the police  
 14 sergeant instructed his people to do?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which would have had one person in the  
 17 City Room?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 MR GREANEY: So you're agreeing with what Sergeant Wilson  
 20 directed, although as we know it didn't eventuate. But  
 21 I think you're agreeing in general terms that bearing in  
 22 mind the risk that existed on egress, bearing in mind  
 23 the responsibility of British Transport Police, you  
 24 would have expected, whatever Sergeant Wilson said,  
 25 there to have been a BTP policing presence in the

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1 City Room during egress?  
 2 A. Yes, sir.  
 3 Q. One of the purposes of the police officer being there  
 4 would have been to guard against the risk of terrorist  
 5 attack?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. I'm going to come on, as you'll appreciate, to ask you  
 8 some short questions about what you think about the fact  
 9 that that didn't occur on the 22nd.  
 10 In paragraph 41 of your statement you go on observe  
 11 that:  
 12 "Every 6 months, SMG arranged a multi-agency  
 13 planning meeting to review its past events and consider  
 14 security and safety for future events."  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. You're talking there about the situation in and leading  
 17 up to May 2017?  
 18 A. I am, yes.  
 19 Q. A number of organisations were invited, including BTP.  
 20 Did BTP generally attend the meetings?  
 21 A. Yes, to my knowledge, sir, all of those meetings.  
 22 Q. With the last meeting before the arena attack being held  
 23 on 30 November 2016?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 25 Q. During the course of that meeting in November 2016, as

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1 was common, did SMG provide to BTP a schedule of  
 2 upcoming events and associated information?  
 3 A. Yes, they did.  
 4 Q. You observe in paragraph 42 that:  
 5 "SMG made its own risk assessments based on audience  
 6 numbers and profile and information about recent events,  
 7 such as those involving the same performers elsewhere on  
 8 the tour."  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. Did BTP, so far as your researches reveal, ever receive  
 11 a copy of the SMG risk assessments?  
 12 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.  
 13 Q. But I'm certain you'll know now that there were two  
 14 relevant risk assessments by SMG. Are you aware of  
 15 that?  
 16 A. Yes, sir.  
 17 Q. A general risk assessment -- we won't put it on the  
 18 screen, but that's {INQ001359/1} -- where the overall  
 19 risk was assessed as "low" during the course of an event  
 20 such as that with which we're concerned, and James Allen  
 21 and Miriam Stone both agreed that that document, to put  
 22 it in very simple terms, wasn't fit for purpose.  
 23 Secondly, there was a risk assessment that was  
 24 specific to the Ariana Grande concert, {INQ001567/1},  
 25 although we don't need it on the screen, where the

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1 terrorism risk wasn't addressed at all. Again, the  
 2 witnesses from SMG agreed that that document wasn't  
 3 remotely acceptable.  
 4 You observe in your statement, as I've said, that  
 5 SMG made its own risk assessments and they did, but they  
 6 weren't good enough. Did BTP rely on the fact that SMG  
 7 carried out its own risk assessments?  
 8 A. At that time the force believed that then risk  
 9 assessments were carried out by BTP then based on that  
 10 information.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just say that again.  
 12 A. Yes, sir, BTP were aware of those assessments by SMG and  
 13 then the evidence that we've provided has said we then  
 14 conducted our own risk assessments. The reason that --  
 15 MR GREANEY: Can I just ask you to pause for a moment?  
 16 I hope you won't think I'm being rude. I will come on  
 17 to your own risk assessments, I just want to understand  
 18 what role SMG's risk assessments played in the thinking  
 19 of BTP at that time to the extent that you can inform us  
 20 of that.  
 21 I think what you're telling us is that BTP was aware  
 22 that SMG carried out its own risk assessments.  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. And the question therefore is: did BTP take any comfort  
 25 from the fact that SMG had carried out its own risk

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1 assessments?  
 2 A. I couldn't answer in those terms, sir, because I wasn't  
 3 present at those meetings. We accepted that those risk  
 4 assessments were conducted by SMG and then took  
 5 decisions thereafter based on those.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, so you either found out or BTP  
 7 either found out or were told about these risk  
 8 assessments?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was it BTP's view that SMG should carry  
 11 out risk assessments?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was it not important, therefore, that  
 14 you saw them?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you didn't?  
 17 A. I don't have that -- I can't answer whether they were  
 18 seen or not, sir.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Certainly in your study of the BTP  
 21 documentation, you have not come across the risk  
 22 assessments carried out by SMG?  
 23 A. No, sir.  
 24 Q. As you've agreed with the chairman, if any reliance at  
 25 all was going to be placed on them by BTP, they ought to

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1 have seen them?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. You had just begun to tell us that BTP conducted its own  
 4 risk assessments; is that correct?  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 Q. But that those were based on the information that SMG  
 7 had provided together with intelligence?  
 8 A. Yes, sir.  
 9 Q. What you go on to say is that the risk assessments were  
 10 not documented.  
 11 A. That is correct.  
 12 Q. The question might be posed by someone: what is such  
 13 a thing, a risk assessment that is not documented  
 14 anywhere? And if that question were to be posed,  
 15 what was your answer be?  
 16 A. So to start with, the process that we adopted in our own  
 17 risk assessments in my view was not to a suitable  
 18 standard. The reference to risk assessments that the  
 19 officers involved at the time, the process that they  
 20 undertook was during and post discussion at the  
 21 six-monthly meetings, taking into consideration the  
 22 assessment made by SMG. The officer in charge at the  
 23 time then, from those discussions, considered the risk  
 24 and then set a high, medium or low risk based on those  
 25 conversations. That thinking and rationale was not

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1 documented.  
 2 Q. But it should have been?  
 3 A. Yes, sir .  
 4 Q. As a result, are you in a position to help us with the  
 5 detail of what was taken into account in relation to the  
 6 Ariana Grande risk assessment?  
 7 A. Certainly. If I may, sir, just come back to my answer  
 8 just there. Should those risk assessments have been  
 9 documented? The answer being yes, that is my  
 10 professional opinion. There was no policy in place for  
 11 the force or process to say that they should have been,  
 12 but my view is they should have been documented, yes.  
 13 Q. It may be that everyone agrees that they ought to have  
 14 been documented.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was there a force policy that they  
 16 should be carried out?  
 17 A. No, sir, no policy in relation to specifically the  
 18 arena, no.  
 19 MR GREANEY: I suppose there are a number of — we need to  
 20 break it down a little further before we come on to what  
 21 risks were assessed. When you talk about risk  
 22 assessment, the risk assessment that was done but not  
 23 documented, are you talking about a general assessment  
 24 by someone of risk at the arena during an event or are  
 25 you talking about specific assessments for specific

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1 events?  
 2 A. Specific assessments for specific events following the  
 3 discussion as during those meetings each individual  
 4 event was discussed.  
 5 Q. How, given there is no document, do you know that a risk  
 6 assessment for the Ariana Grande concert was undertaken?  
 7 A. From information that I've been told in preparation for  
 8 this inquiry and speaking to the officer who was  
 9 conducting those processes at the time. I've had  
 10 personal conversations with that officer .  
 11 Q. With respect to you, that's perhaps the most that you  
 12 could have done. Who is the officer who has explained  
 13 to you that he did do a risk assessment in relation to  
 14 the Ariana Grande concert?  
 15 A. At that time, sir, that was Inspector Michelle  
 16 Wedderburn.  
 17 Q. Was the risk of a terrorist attack factored into that  
 18 risk assessment?  
 19 A. Certainly from what I have been told, there was  
 20 cognisance placed on the threat level. But based on the  
 21 fact there was no intelligence or information available  
 22 at the time, that thinking wasn't taken any further.  
 23 Q. What do you mean by "the thinking wasn't taken any  
 24 further"?  
 25 A. In terms of was there any information to say that the

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1 arena specifically was at threat from terrorism, had  
 2 there been any previous terrorism events at an arena  
 3 in the UK, or was there any specific threat from  
 4 terrorism from the particular artiste. That was all  
 5 taken into the consideration of the inspector in making  
 6 the assessment that there was no threat from terrorism,  
 7 specifically known threat from terrorism, specific to  
 8 that event.  
 9 Q. We'll just unpick that if we can. The risk was severe?  
 10 A. Yes, sir .  
 11 Q. So that meant that it was highly likely an attack was  
 12 going to occur?  
 13 A. Yes, sir .  
 14 Q. Somewhere, but who knew where at the time. There hadn't  
 15 been an arena or arena-type attack in the UK, but in the  
 16 very recent past there had been an attack at the  
 17 Bataclan in Paris.  
 18 A. Yes, sir, I believe some 2 years before, yes.  
 19 Q. And there had been an attack at the Stade de France?  
 20 A. Yes, sir, in the same time period.  
 21 Q. And in Germany in July 2016, there had been an attempted  
 22 attack on an outdoor concert in Ansbach in Bavaria?  
 23 A. Yes, sir .  
 24 Q. So although there hadn't been an attack on a concert  
 25 venue in the UK, it was hardly appropriate to take

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1 comfort from that, was it?  
 2 A. I'd disagree with that, sir. There are sadly many, many  
 3 attacks from multiple methodologies that occur on  
 4 mainland Europe and beyond that thankfully do not come  
 5 on to the UK mainland. The intelligence must at the  
 6 time, of course, take cognisance of what is happening  
 7 elsewhere, but there is certainly more emphasis on what  
 8 is happening within the UK and what has happened within  
 9 the UK.  
 10 Q. Certainly, as we've agreed a number of times, it was  
 11 known that terrorists were interested in transport hubs  
 12 and concert arenas.  
 13 A. Yes, certainly .  
 14 Q. What can we agree was not an appropriate approach was to  
 15 say: an attack is going to happen somewhere, or is  
 16 highly likely to do so, but I don't think it's going to  
 17 happen here and therefore I'll do nothing?  
 18 A. That is a very simple way of putting it, sir. Yes,  
 19 there would be more thought to it than that.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Maybe, but was the result to disregard  
 21 the terrorist threat at the arena?  
 22 A. I don't believe so, sir. I have no evidence and during  
 23 my discussions that certainly is not the impression that  
 24 I have found.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Looking at the City Room in particular,

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1 if that threat were considered to be severe, would you  
 2 expect more than one police officer to be based there?  
 3 A. No, I wouldn't do, sir. In my role as a strategic  
 4 commander for public order and public safety, no,  
 5 I would take all of the information into account, the  
 6 fact — absolutely recognising the threat level being  
 7 severe and an attack is highly likely. Equally, I'd be  
 8 taking into account that that threat level had been that  
 9 threat level for 2 years and 9 months, it had been the  
 10 same threat level at the previous concert for  
 11 Ariana Grande in 2015. There would be a number of  
 12 considerations that I would take.  
 13 MR GREANEY: What steps were taken by British Transport  
 14 Police to mitigate the terrorism risk which undoubtedly  
 15 existed on 22 May 2017 in the City Room?  
 16 A. So there was no specific mitigation taken in relation to  
 17 that event.  
 18 Q. What non-specific mitigation was taken in relation to  
 19 that event?  
 20 A. By the decision to put patrolling officers to that  
 21 event. There was no thinking tactically options that  
 22 would help the inquiry available, no search, no  
 23 assessment done of the site beforehand, but again, the  
 24 inquiry would be aware that in order to get there  
 25 a process would be followed to generate such activity

1 and that will always start on the information and  
 2 intelligence available to start any process.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just in practical terms — suppose  
 4 we were in the happy position of having a low threat  
 5 level of terrorism, which doesn't seem to have occurred  
 6 for quite a long time, and you simply had the situation  
 7 where maybe up to 5,000 people were coming out of the  
 8 City Room doors, a substantial number coming out all at  
 9 the same time — how many police officers would you have  
 10 had on duty in the City Room in that event?  
 11 A. For such a low number, sir, it'd be questionable whether  
 12 there'd actually be a policing response to such an  
 13 event. The reason that I just quantify that — British  
 14 Transport Police deals with large crowds, the large  
 15 movement of crowded places on a daily basis, and in  
 16 context Victoria Station itself, accepting, sir,  
 17 pre-COVID, would see a footfall of some 26,000 people  
 18 a day. Manchester Piccadilly, 160,000 people a day. So  
 19 BTP is used to working in an environment with large  
 20 crowds of people moving through it.  
 21 Again, all of the activity would be based on the  
 22 initial threat or the information towards that threat  
 23 that you were aware of at the time. So had there been  
 24 anything similar — the same way we operate on a daily  
 25 basis for all of our network currently.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So had it been the situation that I have  
 2 just posed to you now, the low threat, it may have been  
 3 there would be no BTP officer put there?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're saying the reason for  
 6 Sergeant Wilson's decision to have one in there is  
 7 likely to be or may be motivated by the threat level?  
 8 A. Possibly. Obviously, that is his evidence, sir, but  
 9 in relation to the scenario you have just put before me,  
 10 if I was to be considering a policing plan or been  
 11 approached as a Gold Commander, would I police such an  
 12 event, I can say here, professionally sitting here, I'd  
 13 probably not be policing an event of such numbers by  
 14 deploying police officers.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 16 MR GREANEY: In May 2017, was there in reality any low-risk  
 17 event?  
 18 A. Not in terms of a terrorism threat, no, sir.  
 19 Q. I'll ask you a few more questions, then we'll move on to  
 20 other paragraphs in your witness statement.  
 21 Have I correctly understood that the measure taken  
 22 on 22 May to mitigate the terrorist threat was single  
 23 and it was Sergeant Wilson giving his instruction as to  
 24 where officers were to be located?  
 25 A. It was certainly a consideration that I understand that

1 Sergeant Wilson has given his evidence to say, yes, that  
 2 that is the case.  
 3 Q. Let's move on. You go on to say in paragraph 42:  
 4 "Where there was intelligence highlighting a risk of  
 5 public disorder or organised crime, such as mobile phone  
 6 theft, an operational plan was put into place to reduce  
 7 the risks in consultation with SMG. This generally  
 8 entailed extra uniformed police officers outside the  
 9 doors or plain clothes officers deployed within the  
 10 arena."  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. I'm not going to identify the particular concerts, but  
 13 for example it was known that one artist was followed  
 14 around by a team of people who were pickpocketing mobile  
 15 telephones?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. And where that issue was identified, there would be  
 18 extra police officers in the City Room?  
 19 A. Yes, sir. I'm not aware of the specific deployments for  
 20 that operation, but, yes, absolutely, that shows the  
 21 process that information from pre-event, that an artist  
 22 was coming, and yes, so that information and  
 23 intelligence would feed into the decision-making model  
 24 to draw up a suitable policing plan.  
 25 Q. Paragraph 43:



1 "The audience profile for the Ariana Grande concert  
2 was largely teenage girls accompanied by adults and  
3 guardians. There were no specific risks associated with  
4 the concert known to BTP other than the usual crowd  
5 management considerations and the possibility that young  
6 people might become separated from their accompanying  
7 adults."

8 Would you agree to that list we ought to add the  
9 risk of a terrorist attack given the threat level at the  
10 time?

11 A. Yes, sir .

12 Q. You observe that the concert was a sellout and was  
13 taking place on a Monday night. Then this,  
14 paragraph 44:

15 "The risks associated with alcohol, anti-social  
16 behaviour and violence were low."

17 Do you see that?

18 A. Yes, sir .

19 Q. Can I ask you to consider whether there may be a problem  
20 with the analysis contained in that paragraph, which is  
21 in a witness statement dated about 2.5 years after the  
22 attack? It's this. You state the risk of violence was  
23 low: does that involve the assessment being that there  
24 was a low risk that those within the crowd would turn  
25 upon each other and use violence towards one another?

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1 A. That would be one consideration, sir. Another may be as  
2 well from -- again only speaking if I was a commander  
3 for such an event: was there any threat from people  
4 attending the location to interact or to cause trouble  
5 with people that were attending the event? In simplest  
6 terms, gang-on-gang style activity. So yes, it would be  
7 a broad understanding of the information available  
8 at the time.

9 Q. But there is, of course, another potential source of  
10 violence, which is a hostile actor, a terrorist .

11 A. Yes, sir .

12 Q. And it doesn't seem from that sentence that that risk  
13 was given any serious consideration .

14 A. Not as is written, but of course terrorism by definition  
15 will use violence. But in terms of, again -- and  
16 apologies for keep repeating myself, but it would be  
17 based on the anticipated threat for that specific  
18 location .

19 Q. I did say I was going to invite you to consider  
20 a problem or potential problem. It's one that we've  
21 seen during evidence from witnesses from SMG and  
22 ShowSec. Where those that were assessing risk were  
23 considering the risk of violence, what they were  
24 concerned about were the things you spoke about first of  
25 all, namely the crowd fighting within itself or we can

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1 add in the fact that for some artists two gangs might  
2 turn up and fight. But what isn't being thought about,  
3 at least not sufficiently, is the risk of the type of  
4 attack that occurred on 22 May. And do you think that  
5 that is or certainly was in May 2017 a real problem?

6 A. Specifically, sir, no, on the basis that what was  
7 available at the time, what was known -- no is my  
8 answer, sir .

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking at it from a slightly  
10 different point of view, you have talked about the fact  
11 that there wasn't an attack at the previous  
12 Ariana Grande concert, there hadn't been anything at the  
13 arena while the threat level was high. So that all  
14 gives the impression that somehow the threat level of  
15 terrorism at the Ariana Grande concert at that  
16 particular time had reduced, whereas in fact, the  
17 understanding of the level is: that risk of attack is  
18 severe wherever you are.

19 A. Yes, absolutely, sir, and in relation to the day-to-day  
20 operations of British Transport Police, absolutely, that  
21 threat is real in every station. I don't believe for  
22 one minute that consideration wasn't in the officers'  
23 minds. Terrorism is in the mind of every police officer  
24 in the country and every BTP officer going about their  
25 business, whether on duty or off duty.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You just perhaps you tend to think  
2 sometimes it requires an attack, sadly, to remind  
3 everyone of just how imminent it is and just how it does  
4 apply to everyone.

5 A. I would accept that, yes. If I could expand slightly  
6 further, if I may, especially regarding specific  
7 attacks. All of the training at the time was towards  
8 the emerging methodology of terrorism, so being that  
9 initially marauding firearms attack which then moved on  
10 to use of vehicle as attacks, moving on to bladed  
11 weapons. And in truth, from my professional assessment,  
12 certainly it was some 12 years prior that the UK had  
13 seen any person-borne IED as a methodology of attack  
14 in the UK.

15 So yes, absolutely, I accept that perception, yes,  
16 that reality .

17 MR GREANEY: And you talk of realities, but isn't the  
18 reality also that no steps were taken to mitigate, apart  
19 from the one you've identified, a terrorist attack,  
20 whether it took the form of a PBIED or whether it took  
21 the form of an MTFA?

22 A. Again, the reality of policing is that you have to  
23 understand what is before you and what is most likely to  
24 be before you, or even most plausible to be before you.  
25 So the information that the officers had at the time

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1 was, as we have heard, up to 100 concerts a year had  
 2 been going on at the arena. Many hundreds of concert  
 3 events had been going on up and down the country. There  
 4 was nothing to focus the mind on people planning  
 5 a policing response in truth that a person—borne IED  
 6 what was plausible at that time.

7 Q. The point I'm inviting you to consider is, even  
 8 accepting that that's correct, what was to use your word  
 9 plausible at the time was a marauding terrorist firearms  
 10 attack.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And if Salman Abedi had armed himself with a firearm  
 13 rather than a bomb, were there any greater mitigating  
 14 measures in place to prevent him killing numerous people  
 15 in that scenario than in the scenario that in fact  
 16 eventuated?

17 A. No, absolutely not. If there was that threat known,  
 18 we would have put in a suitable policing operation.  
 19 What police officers have to work through or what  
 20 commanders even in my position have to work through is  
 21 what threat is available, what information is available.  
 22 The policing style of the UK is by consent. The way  
 23 that policing is delivered is about the most appropriate  
 24 style of policing to meet the threat that is present  
 25 when people are planning a policing operation.

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1 Q. We were dealing with risk and the assessment of risk and  
 2 I'll just ask you a small number of final questions on  
 3 this topic and then we'll move on to something else.

4 In your witness statement at paragraph 44 you state:  
 5 "The BTP officer in charge at Manchester considered  
 6 the risks associated with the concert on 22 May 2017  
 7 were low."  
 8 Do you agree that that was not the correct  
 9 assessment?

10 A. In relation to the information available, I understand  
 11 why that assessment was made. Do I disagree that it was  
 12 wrong? I think the officer making a decision at the  
 13 time based on the information that she had, that was the  
 14 correct outcome.

15 Q. I'm just going to suggest to you that that wasn't  
 16 correct, the risk wasn't low, in a situation in which  
 17 the terrorism risk was severe, but let's move on and see  
 18 what that assessment actually looked like on the ground.

19 What you say at paragraph 45 is:  
 20 "The BTP deployment for the event was therefore  
 21 based on security and safety risks related to crowd  
 22 control and the possibility that young persons might be  
 23 separated from their accompanying adults"; yes?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So it would seem to follow from that that the deployment

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1 was not based, subject to Sergeant Wilson, to any extent  
 2 upon the risk that there might be a terrorist attack.

3 A. I can't say, sir, whether he took that into account.  
 4 What I have taken from my enquiries and informing my  
 5 statement is what was the threat, what was the issue  
 6 that we were trying to police on the night.

7 Q. You identify four officers, a police constable and three  
 8 community support officers, were put on patrol at  
 9 Manchester Victoria Station to provide reassurance and  
 10 visibility as concertgoers arrived and left the arena.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Let's move on. I'm going to ask you a blunt question,  
 13 which is: is it fair to say that on 22 May 2017, before  
 14 the attack, BTP let the public down in their policing of  
 15 the City Room?

16 A. The attack that happened on that night certainly  
 17 happened on our watch, yes. And there isn't a day that  
 18 goes past with BTP when we don't consider that. Did we  
 19 let the people down? It was our responsibility to  
 20 police that arena and that attack happened when we were  
 21 policing it and there were police officers deployed or  
 22 planned to be deployed to the site of the attack and  
 23 they were not there. So in that term, yes.

24 Q. Can I see if you agree about some of the things that it  
 25 might be concluded went wrong? First, of the four

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1 officers who were on duty, only one on duty at the time  
 2 was a constable and she had just 8 months' service.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. (2), that colleague and a PCSO colleague took a break  
 5 that lasted for more than 2 hours.

6 A. I am aware of that, sir.

7 Q. And that's something that went wrong that night?

8 A. It certainly did, yes.

9 Q. Thirdly, that meant there was a period during which no  
 10 officer at all was patrolling that station and during  
 11 that period Abedi made his final trip to the City Room;  
 12 is that something that went wrong?

13 A. Not having an officer on the station per se for a set  
 14 period of time, no. Not having an officer at that point  
 15 because they were told to be and they weren't, that did  
 16 go wrong, yes.

17 Q. Fourth, you may have just answered this. Do you agree  
 18 that a fourth thing that went wrong was that no officer  
 19 from BTP was in the City Room during egress?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Fifth, PC Corke had failed to return in time for egress?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And do you agree that that is or may be significant  
 24 because he has explained that it was his practice during  
 25 egress to be on the mezzanine?

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1 A. I could not comment on that, sir. That was his view and  
 2 perception.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it's fair to say a different  
 4 part of the mezzanine where he would view the City Room  
 5 generally, on the left hand side as you're looking at  
 6 it.  
 7 A. Yes, sir.  
 8 MR GREANEY: And sixth, we've discussed the instructions of  
 9 Sergeant Wilson. Let's just in fact have the email on  
 10 the screen to remind ourselves. {INQ025538/1}. I'm not  
 11 going to read it through, we all know what it says.  
 12 The top half of the screen, please.  
 13 Is a sixth thing that went wrong that in a number of  
 14 respects, the officers on duty failed to comply with the  
 15 instructions they had been given by Sergeant Wilson?  
 16 A. They did, sir.  
 17 Q. Would it be reasonable to say that, notwithstanding that  
 18 instructions were not followed, it would be wrong just  
 19 to blame the individuals?  
 20 A. Yes, sir, absolutely.  
 21 Q. Would it be reasonable to say that to the extent that  
 22 things went wrong because officers didn't follow their  
 23 instructions, that's the kind of thing that does occur  
 24 where there is a lack of supervision?  
 25 A. I wouldn't agree with that, no.

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1 Q. Would you explain your answer, please?  
 2 A. Yes, sir. The very nature of policing, not just in BTP  
 3 but in policing from my own experience of previous  
 4 forces and knowledge across the country, is it is not  
 5 one-to-one supervision. That does not occur. Police  
 6 officers hold great responsibility and the expectation  
 7 and the correct expectation of the force is that when  
 8 instructions or tasks are given, they are followed.  
 9 I do not see this as a lack of supervision issue; it is  
 10 lack of application of task.  
 11 Q. You had a constable with 8 months of service, still in  
 12 her probationary period, certainly as I understood her  
 13 evidence, and three PCSOs. If someone were to suggest  
 14 that that's the type of situation in which you can't  
 15 necessarily expect instructions to be followed to the  
 16 letter, what would your response be?  
 17 A. I would disagree with that totally. The office of  
 18 constable and office of -- the role of a PCSO --  
 19 understands the working environment, command and  
 20 control, organisation, function. A task was set and  
 21 they was not completed.  
 22 In terms of not just, as you refer to, sir,  
 23 PC Bullough's experience, BTP follows the exact same  
 24 process for all police officers in the UK, College of  
 25 Policing, 20 weeks' training, tutorship, independent

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1 patrol.  
 2 The 8 months piece -- again, from my own experience,  
 3 that could bring a wealth of experience in a busy area,  
 4 not as much experience in a quieter area. So the  
 5 8-month element could be seen as a distraction from my  
 6 position.  
 7 Q. Would it be reasonable for someone to say that  
 8 instructions are more likely to be followed if the  
 9 person given the instruction has a clear understanding  
 10 of why it is being given?  
 11 A. Yes, sir.  
 12 MR GREANEY: I'm about to move on, sir. May I take some  
 13 instructions on a particular issue?  
 14 (Pause)  
 15 Sir, as you're aware and all core participants are  
 16 aware, the inquiry has received two anonymous letters  
 17 dealing with issues relating to BTP and which are  
 18 critical of BTP. My proposal is that there should be  
 19 some further investigation of some of the issues raised  
 20 in those, particularly since one of them was received  
 21 only on Thursday of last week, and therefore the  
 22 appropriate course is for ACC O'Callaghan not to be  
 23 asked questions about those letters today but instead to  
 24 be asked about them if there are relevant matters  
 25 emerging when he returns during the course of

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1 chapter 10.  
 2 I believe within this room, there is agreement that  
 3 that is an appropriate course. Mr Weatherby has  
 4 indicated that he proposes to touch upon the first  
 5 letter but only very briefly, which of course he is  
 6 entitled to, but that does not provoke CTI to adopt  
 7 a different approach from that that I've indicated.  
 8 There is one remaining issue to --  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's clearly desirable, whether or not  
 10 further investigations need to be made, that the whole  
 11 position is clear before questions are asked. So it's  
 12 better that that is done.  
 13 MR WEATHERBY: May I speak at this point?  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's not stopping you, Mr Weatherby,  
 15 from you asking the question you wish to ask. All  
 16 right?  
 17 MR WEATHERBY: I hadn't realised that Mr Greaney was  
 18 proposing to put these matters off. I'm entirely  
 19 content with that. As I said, there may be one question  
 20 that I might ask on that, but I'm in no way in  
 21 disagreement with Mr Greaney's proposal.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you. You must ask the  
 23 question you want to.  
 24 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No one's stopping you from doing that,

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1 but thank you for mentioning it, Mr Weatherby. That's  
2 helpful.

3 MR GREANEY: The final topic to be dealt with is lessons  
4 learned and it would be rather better if we took an  
5 earlier lunch and I deal with that topic when we return,  
6 please.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 1.25. Thank you very much.  
8 (12.23 pm)  
9 (The lunch adjournment)  
10 (1.28 pm)

11 MR GREANEY: We are turning, assistant chief constable, to  
12 the final topic that I'm going to be dealing with, and  
13 this is the changes that have been made by British  
14 Transport Police since the arena attack and I will be  
15 asking you why those changes have been made as well.  
16 You address this issue in a statement, which is  
17 dated 5 June of this year and is at divider 4 of the  
18 bundle.  
19 The first heading is "Manchester Arena liaison". As  
20 you've explained to us, before May 2017, SMG arranged  
21 monthly meetings between BTP, GMP, ShowSec, ETUK,  
22 Network Rail, GMRS, the Ambulance Service and others.  
23 A. Apologies if I misheard you, sir, but six—monthly  
24 meetings.  
25 Q. Every 6 months those meetings would be held?

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1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. What was the purpose of those meetings?  
3 A. They were the original planning meetings and they had  
4 two purposes. The first purpose was a backwards look to  
5 see — at the events that had occurred for the previous  
6 6 months, to see if there were any issues with policing  
7 them or the events taking place. And then it was  
8 a forward look for the following 6 months for the events  
9 to come, so the discussions could be had.  
10 Q. Would it be at those meetings that events thought to  
11 carry with them a particularly high risk were  
12 identified?  
13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
14 Q. How has that changed since 22 May?  
15 A. Now, sir, those meetings have moved to two groups. The  
16 first group is a meeting every 3 months, which is  
17 a multi—agency meeting with the same partners as before.  
18 Q. Pause there for one moment. Does that mean that the  
19 six—monthly meetings with all of those organisations  
20 I listed present is now every 3 months?  
21 A. Yes, that's my understanding, yes.  
22 Q. And you were going to tell us about a second group  
23 meeting.  
24 A. The specific meetings with SMG and BTP now occur  
25 monthly.

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1 Q. What is the difference between those two types of  
2 meeting?  
3 A. The wider piece is the specifics for BTP, understanding  
4 in the monthly meeting, discussing resources, any  
5 changes in intelligence for immediate action to take  
6 place, and the wider meeting is in relation to, again,  
7 any lessons learned from the previous events or any new  
8 information sharing with those other stakeholders.  
9 Q. Are ShowSec invited to the monthly meetings?  
10 A. I can't answer that, sir. I don't know the answer to  
11 that.  
12 Q. Perhaps, unless anyone else knows and is in a position  
13 to deal with it, perhaps you could find out that for  
14 your return.  
15 A. Certainly, sir.  
16 Q. Why was it decided to change the existing regime, both  
17 to double the number of meetings in the first category  
18 and introduce the meetings in the second category?  
19 A. Simply put, it was realised that the frequency of the  
20 meetings that were every 6 months was not enough  
21 opportunity to understand any changes in information,  
22 was too far apart for partners to share views or for BTP  
23 in a formal setting to understand any concerns that  
24 anyone else had. And of course, in addition to these  
25 meetings will be the daily interactions and contact

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1 between BTP and the arena management.  
2 Q. So do you mean that under the old regime, meeting every  
3 6 months, you might be considering an event which was  
4 going to take place in 5 months and 29 days' time?  
5 A. Absolutely.  
6 Q. And in that period, the level of risk or the matters  
7 that were relevant to risk might change?  
8 A. Yes, absolutely.  
9 Q. In terms of the monthly meetings, have they led to an  
10 actual improvement?  
11 A. Yes, because a change in the assessment process  
12 undertaken by the planning team is now able to obtain  
13 the latest information and inform the risk assessments  
14 that are now in place for the events that are yet to  
15 come.  
16 Q. We'll come on to changes in risk assessment in a moment.  
17 One of the things you say about the monthly meetings and  
18 the improvements that they have created is that they  
19 have — you say in your witness statement that they have  
20 made it easy to audit or cross—check the effectiveness  
21 of the policing response.  
22 A. Yes, sir.  
23 Q. What do you mean by that?  
24 A. That's in real time situations, being able to understand  
25 if, as in the here and now, the policing was in the

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1 right position, if there was any conflict in the way  
 2 police responded to an incident or if there was any  
 3 concerns that information became known that could have  
 4 been shared at a meeting that wasn't.  
 5 Q. The second change that has been made -- I'm now at  
 6 paragraph 6 of your statement where you observe at the  
 7 time of the attack, the team responsible for policing  
 8 Victoria Station -- so this heading is "Assessing police  
 9 provision for arena events":  
 10 "At the time of the attack the team responsible for  
 11 policing Victoria Station was also responsible for  
 12 providing officers to patrol arena events."  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Risk assessments were undocumented?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. And you have told us about that of course.  
 17 Where there was a risk of crime or public disorder,  
 18 such as at boxing matches, an operational order was put  
 19 in place?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. What issues would an operational order have addressed  
 22 prior to May 2017?  
 23 A. So an operational order would have considered --  
 24 it would follow a set format, which is known as  
 25 II Marsh(?) so that would have followed a -- those

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1 letters mean, sir, information and intelligence -- the  
 2 method of policing.  
 3 Then in relation to risk assessment, communications,  
 4 and then any health and safety matters attributed to the  
 5 event. That document would set all of those elements  
 6 out and, under the section of information intelligence,  
 7 would specifically cover prior events, information from  
 8 previous locations that that tour or event had been  
 9 elsewhere in the country, and then that was used to  
 10 inform the risk assessment in terms of how many police  
 11 officers were required to police that event and that  
 12 would feature within the method section, sir.  
 13 Q. Was the existence of an operational order important? No  
 14 doubt for a number of reasons, but one of those reasons  
 15 being that there would be no dedicated event commander  
 16 or supervisor for the event unless an operational order  
 17 was in place?  
 18 A. Yes, that is where that would get to, yes.  
 19 Q. Have changes been made to that state of affairs since  
 20 the arena attack?  
 21 A. In relation to the planning, sir, yes, absolutely. The  
 22 planning for events at the arena are now owned and  
 23 delivered through the C Division planning team. Two  
 24 benefits for that, sir, is consistency of the people  
 25 that are actually delivering the package in terms of the

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1 briefing material and the deployments, and also whilst  
 2 there was no suggestion of this originally, it equally  
 3 is an independent assessment of resources that are  
 4 required, so there's no conflict with local policing of  
 5 the station versus policing the event.  
 6 Q. Are the risk assessments now conducted in what might be  
 7 described as a formal way?  
 8 A. Yes. They're certainly formal in terms of the  
 9 information and intelligence available is documented on  
 10 to an actual document as said. Then continuing review  
 11 is shown against that risk assessment and then it's  
 12 fully recorded in relation to officers' thinking and the  
 13 new RAG status, in terms of risk, BTP will apply to  
 14 those events.  
 15 Q. So risk assessments are now formal. They are  
 16 documented. Are the documents now kept in a file  
 17 dedicated to the event and held in the operations  
 18 department at C Division?  
 19 A. Yes, they are, sir.  
 20 Q. Does the terrorism risk form part of the risk assessment  
 21 process for events now?  
 22 A. Yes, it does, sir.  
 23 Q. Always?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. How does it form part of the risk assessment process

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1 now?  
 2 A. So, again, as previously, the consideration of the  
 3 threat assessment, what that actually is, again  
 4 reverting to information and intelligence, that that is  
 5 available, and of course tragically now with this arena,  
 6 we now know from the information, the events of  
 7 22 May 2017, and the impact that that can have. So  
 8 clearly, that is taken into consideration as well.  
 9 Q. The risk assessments we've just been talking about,  
 10 I believe, are risk assessments specific to each event;  
 11 is that correct?  
 12 A. Yes, sir, correct.  
 13 Q. Before the arena attack, was there any BTP risk  
 14 assessment that -- I'm talking about a general risk  
 15 assessment -- that considered the risk of a terrorist  
 16 attack in the City Room or any public part of  
 17 Manchester Victoria Railway Station?  
 18 A. Not to my knowledge, no.  
 19 Q. Is there now any such risk assessment that deals with  
 20 the general risk of an attack in the City Room or in any  
 21 public part of the railway station?  
 22 A. Not a generic risk assessment, no, sir.  
 23 Q. Is the allocation of officers to arena events now  
 24 governed by a different system from that which applied  
 25 before?

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1 A. Yes, it is.  
 2 Q. And obviously, I'm not going to delve, at least in open  
 3 session, into how it is numbered, but in general terms  
 4 is the allocation now governed by a four-tier system of  
 5 risk evaluation?  
 6 A. That is correct, yes.  
 7 Q. Denoted by the colours green, amber, red and red plus?  
 8 A. Yes, sir.  
 9 Q. Do E Division, so the division for which you are  
 10 responsible, also provide support?  
 11 A. If required, yes, sir.  
 12 Q. Are an event commander and/or a Gold, Silver and  
 13 Bronze Command structure put in place for any events  
 14 now?  
 15 A. Yes, they are, sir. What is traditionally known as  
 16 a GSB, gold, silver, bronze, which is a command term in  
 17 public order and public safety policing, is put in place  
 18 for all red plus events.  
 19 Q. Again, as you'll appreciate, for reasons of operational  
 20 sensitivity, we won't in open go into how those colours  
 21 are allocated.  
 22 Is each deployment of BTP officers during an event  
 23 now supported by a full operational order?  
 24 A. Yes, sir. So in terms of -- for clarity, a full  
 25 documented assessment, a full section regarding

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1 briefings, and method of deployment. The actual generic  
 2 term of an operational order is not used in every single  
 3 event per se. The term "operational order" will  
 4 definitely be used in terms of a full public order  
 5 deployment where Gold, Silver, Bronze Command is in  
 6 place.  
 7 Q. Does that mean that a full operational order will be  
 8 place for all red and red plus events?  
 9 A. Correct.  
 10 Q. But not or not necessarily so for green and amber  
 11 events?  
 12 A. Correct.  
 13 Q. But there will be documents relating to such events  
 14 including, for example, the risk assessment?  
 15 A. Absolutely.  
 16 Q. What does the grading system incorporate? And I'm now  
 17 at page 8 of your witness statement.  
 18 A. Apologies, sir, my changes made statement goes to  
 19 page 4.  
 20 Q. Sorry, did I say -- I meant --  
 21 A. Apologies.  
 22 Q. -- paragraph 8.  
 23 A. The grading system now covers increased levels of  
 24 command control that reflects the risk, and again they  
 25 are formally documented, those decisions, and also

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1 intelligence considered is recorded on those documents.  
 2 Q. Third change, the heading "Deployment of officers to  
 3 arena events". At paragraph 9 of your statement you  
 4 identify that:  
 5 "Sergeants responsible for policing an arena event  
 6 were not necessarily on the same shift as the officers  
 7 policing it."  
 8 A. Correct.  
 9 Q. Does the arena attack provide an example of that in the  
 10 sense that Sergeant Wilson's shift had come to an end by  
 11 the time that the arena event started?  
 12 A. Yes, absolutely.  
 13 Q. You add:  
 14 "Consequently, more than one sergeant could be  
 15 involved in the briefing, deployment and supervision for  
 16 a single event."  
 17 A. Correct, yes.  
 18 Q. Did that give rise, as was identified afterwards, to  
 19 a risk of inconsistency between how different constables  
 20 and PCs were briefed?  
 21 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 22 Q. You add:  
 23 "Furthermore, the officers deployed to an event  
 24 might come on duty after the sergeant had provided  
 25 a verbal briefing."

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Again, we know from some of the officers who were on  
 3 duty that night that that was a factor:  
 4 "The briefings were generally followed up by an  
 5 email to the officers which attached an event  
 6 information rider provided by SMG."  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Was there therefore a risk before 22 May not only of  
 9 inconsistent briefing but also that one officer might  
 10 miss the briefing altogether?  
 11 A. That is correct, yes.  
 12 Q. Indeed we know from the PCSO who was to accompany  
 13 Constable Bullough that he says that he had no briefing.  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. There was, you say, no specific patrol plan, although  
 16 instructions were usually given regarding policing the  
 17 ingress and egress to the stadium.  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. You say:  
 20 "Instructions were usually given."  
 21 Does that allow for the possibility that they would  
 22 not always be given?  
 23 A. Yes, correct.  
 24 Q. You go on to say what the changes are. Could you  
 25 summarise those for us, please?

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1 A. Certainly. Now, the process for events at the arena is  
 2 the sergeants responsible for the shifts that are on  
 3 duty and assigned to arena events now share the same  
 4 duty times so that the problems that have occurred  
 5 before can no longer happen. So the sergeant that comes  
 6 on duty is able to give the face-to-face delivery and  
 7 briefing of the officers or to the officers .  
 8 Q. Does the briefing to officers provide a detailed review  
 9 of the risk level along with any key information or  
 10 intelligence ?  
 11 A. Yes, it does, sir .  
 12 Q. What is or may be the consequence of that in terms of  
 13 policing on the ground?  
 14 A. So now if there is any information or intelligence  
 15 that's available that's come to light, sir , the officers  
 16 are able to receive that in real time and also  
 17 in relation to understanding the threat level and the  
 18 application of policing against that threat level , it  
 19 allows the sergeant an opportunity to have that dialogue  
 20 with the officers and it also now, through the briefing,  
 21 is a point in time reminder of a number of the  
 22 principles that I explained earlier that were covered  
 23 during officers ' initial training , such as reminders of  
 24 things such as the HOT principle and the principle of  
 25 approaching anybody who may be seen to be suspicious.

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1 Q. I'm going to come on when we look at the fourth change  
 2 to consider the extent to which the counter-terrorism  
 3 briefing has been increased.  
 4 Do officers who have attended the briefing to be  
 5 briefed now sign a document to acknowledge that the  
 6 briefing has been delivered?  
 7 A. Yes, they do.  
 8 Q. Is that document, in common with others, then stored in  
 9 the event file ?  
 10 A. Yes, they are, and I have personally checked those files  
 11 to see that that is occurring.  
 12 Q. For events graded amber or above, what's the position  
 13 in relation to the event commander?  
 14 A. An event commander is now in place for events that are  
 15 red. That means a trained officer within BTP with  
 16 knowledge of undertaking such events is physically  
 17 assigned to the team. Generically that will still be  
 18 a sergeant, but trained to a specific level. And that  
 19 officer in policing terms we'd refer to as being ground  
 20 assigned, so they will physically be out on the patch,  
 21 so to speak, for the duration of the operation.  
 22 Q. So your statement, paragraph 9, reads:  
 23 "For events graded amber or above, the event  
 24 commander is on the ground."  
 25 Should we read there:

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1 "For events graded red and above, the event  
 2 commander is on the ground?"  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. He will generally , but not always, be of the rank of  
 5 sergeant, is that so?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct .  
 7 Q. Is that person, the event commander, required to send  
 8 a text to the arena security lead?  
 9 A. Yes, they are.  
 10 Q. What is the purpose of that occurring?  
 11 A. So that the event manager for that specific event, be it  
 12 afternoon or evening, has clear and undisputed contact  
 13 with the policing commander for the event, so incidents  
 14 such as -- I know the inquiry has heard before of  
 15 seeking officers through CCTV or suchlike no longer is  
 16 the method; it's direct contact via the telephone.  
 17 Q. Is the purpose of these changes, (1), to ensure  
 18 consistency of briefing across all of those who will  
 19 work an event?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And (2), to ensure, moreover, that all of those who will  
 22 police an event have actually received that briefing ?  
 23 A. Yes, sir .  
 24 Q. And I suppose, (3), to ensure that on the ground there  
 25 is actual supervision?

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1 A. Yes, sir .  
 2 Q. Certainly for events which are red and above?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Fourth change. The heading is "Counter-terrorism  
 5 awareness at events".  
 6 Is it the position that prior to May 2017, no  
 7 reference was made to counter-terrorism when officers  
 8 were briefed or not always?  
 9 A. Not always, sir .  
 10 Q. So on the occasions that that did not occur, were  
 11 officers expected to fall back upon their initial  
 12 training together with any subsequent training and  
 13 events they'd attended?  
 14 A. Yes, that is correct .  
 15 Q. How has that changed since 22 May 2017?  
 16 A. So every officer who now attends a policing event at the  
 17 arena, irrespective of the risk assessment grading,  
 18 receives a specific briefing in relation to  
 19 counter-terrorism awareness before being deployed to the  
 20 event.  
 21 Q. Has any refresher training been provided to officers ?  
 22 A. Yes, sir , it has.  
 23 Q. Just to some or to all officers ?  
 24 A. To a programme across the force, but priority was given  
 25 to officers for C Division. That's not just

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1 Pennine Division, that is taking into account  
 2 opportunities or instances where officers from outside  
 3 of the subdivision may have been policing the arena.  
 4 All of those officers within C Division received  
 5 additional training, which was entitled  
 6 "Operation Flashpoint".  
 7 Q. The fifth change is one which isn't in fact detailed in  
 8 your statement and I don't say that in any way  
 9 critically, but we'll deal with it nonetheless. Does  
 10 BTP now have a CT security coordinator?  
 11 A. Yes, it does, sir, but it equally did beforehand.  
 12 Q. I see. Perhaps the change is that since the arena  
 13 attack, has the CT security coordinator prepared  
 14 a security plan relating to events at the  
 15 Manchester Arena?  
 16 A. Yes, they have, sir, what I would refer to as a generic  
 17 plan, yes.  
 18 Q. I'm going to ask that we have just the front page on the  
 19 screen. This was received by the inquiry yesterday and  
 20 a redacted version has been made available to core  
 21 participants only very recently indeed today, so all I'm  
 22 going to do is ask you some very basic questions about  
 23 this. Many of the questions we have will in any event  
 24 need to be posed in a restricted session, and sir, what  
 25 we're proposing therefore is that we have a single

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1 restricted session in relation to this officer when he  
 2 returns in chapter 10 because there will be other  
 3 operationally sensitive material to deal with arising  
 4 out of the emergency response in any event.  
 5 It may well be that -- I think Mr Cooper would like  
 6 to say something.  
 7 MR COOPER: I'm grateful. No criticism, of course. I have  
 8 not had chance to see the document, so obviously if  
 9 we can have a moment some time during the inquiry's  
 10 process just to peruse it.  
 11 MR GREANEY: Of course, that's entirely reasonable. It may  
 12 well be that some core participants haven't even  
 13 registered that this exists.  
 14 We'll just put on the screen the front page,  
 15 {INQ038806/1}.  
 16 So we can see the title "Manchester Arena events".  
 17 Whilst it is generic, this security plan is specific to  
 18 the arena and events that take place there?  
 19 A. That's correct, yes.  
 20 Q. It has been prepared by Sergeant Brian Dickinson. Is he  
 21 the CT security coordinator for BTP?  
 22 A. He's one of 11, sir, yes.  
 23 Q. It is dated 3 May 2019?  
 24 A. Yes, it is.  
 25 Q. As I've said, we'll deal with the detail of it when you

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1 return. But can you confirm that there was no CT  
 2 security plan for the arena events in place in May of  
 3 2017?  
 4 A. That is correct, sir. I wonder if some context  
 5 that isn't operationally sensitive may assist the  
 6 inquiry on that point at this time?  
 7 Q. Of course, assistant chief constable.  
 8 A. Thank you. So the role of the counter-terrorism  
 9 security coordinator has existed for many years. The  
 10 application of such an officer, who is usually an  
 11 officer who is experienced in public order policing or  
 12 other skills, such as a police search adviser, is  
 13 selected and receives an intensive two-week training  
 14 course into the role.  
 15 The role of a counter-terrorism security adviser is  
 16 appointed at the discretion of a public order and public  
 17 safety Gold Commander. The application of such a skill  
 18 is governed by the College of Policing approved  
 19 professional practice, which is a manual against  
 20 a number of individual disciplines in policing. That  
 21 manual goes on to say, sir, that a counter-terrorism  
 22 security coordinator must be considered by  
 23 Gold Commander for events such as public military  
 24 events, royal visits, iconic locations, for key sporting  
 25 events, and it then goes on to say at the last bullet

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1 point that:  
 2 "A report may be of use for multi-use venue sites."  
 3 And it specifically references the O2 or  
 4 Old Trafford.  
 5 So the relevance to that, sir -- and I thank the  
 6 chair for the time to explain that -- is not all events  
 7 will have a Gold Commander, therefore not all events  
 8 will have a consideration for a counter-terrorism  
 9 security coordinator.  
 10 We know in relation to your question, sir, we  
 11 definitely know of a CT SECO report for the arena in  
 12 2012 or a pre-Olympic event where a Gold Silver Bronze  
 13 approach was in place.  
 14 Q. Just to make sure that I've understood you: in 2012, for  
 15 an Olympic event in Manchester, there was a plan which  
 16 was specific to that particular event?  
 17 A. Yes, sir, and specific to the Manchester Arena.  
 18 Q. What there was not was the generic plan that now exists  
 19 in place at the time of the arena attack?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.  
 21 Q. Is the first such generic plan that was prepared is the  
 22 one we have on the screen, namely that dated 3 May 2019?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. In your changes document, you've identified other  
 25 changes that have been made since the arena attack;

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1 am I correct?  
 2 A. Yes, sir.  
 3 Q. But those more readily fit into chapter 10, I'm sure  
 4 you'll agree.  
 5 A. Yes, sir. Equally, they play into the deployments that  
 6 we have now put in place.  
 7 Q. What I don't propose to do is ask you about the other  
 8 changes at this stage. I'll leave that until you return  
 9 in chapter 10.  
 10 Those, assistant chief constable --  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you finish, let's just deal  
 12 for a moment with the reality of what this means. You  
 13 told me before lunch that if you had been faced with  
 14 a decision about an event like this particular event,  
 15 which took place, you might well have thought it was not  
 16 a suitable event actually to deploy any officers to at  
 17 all. It may well not be necessary?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You pointed out the fact that there had  
 20 been no previous incidents at any other Ariana Grande  
 21 concerts. You had no intelligence about it. The people  
 22 who were going would be considered fairly low risk.  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So let's forget about this event having  
 25 happened for a moment on 22 May 2017. Even with all

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1 your changes, what from your position would be  
 2 different, if anything, as to whether you would actually  
 3 think it necessary to deploy any police officers to this  
 4 event at all?  
 5 A. Specifically to the arena, sir, we obviously know it is  
 6 now a --  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, sorry, let's leave aside for  
 8 a moment, if we can, the fact of the 22 May event, the  
 9 fact of who the concert was with and the factors of the  
 10 arena, where of course everyone is now more sensitive  
 11 after the event. Try and put that -- an entirely  
 12 similar place. Would you now, with your changes,  
 13 consider it necessary to deploy any police officers --  
 14 MR GREANEY: Sir, just before the witness answers the  
 15 question, I just want to make sure that he has fixed  
 16 in -- this was very much an issue we were going to  
 17 explore in the restricted session. It may well be that  
 18 it can be dealt with openly and we were being cautious,  
 19 but I want to make sure that the assistant  
 20 chief constable has fixed within his mind, as I know he  
 21 will do, in answering your question the need not to  
 22 delve into operationally sensitive material.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you can't answer that question  
 24 without going into things that might be sensitive,  
 25 please don't, and we'll deal with it later. Would you

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1 be prefer to deal with it in a restricted session?  
 2 A. I am happy in the context now, sir.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 4 A. In direct answer to your question, there would still be  
 5 circumstances where such events would not attract  
 6 a police presence or a policing operation and, equally,  
 7 from my own -- as an acid test, we've equally spoken to  
 8 colleagues around the country to see the approaches  
 9 taken and that is of a similar position. The only  
 10 reason I say that is not in a defensive way, but just to  
 11 check that where my thinking was actually wasn't out of  
 12 kilter with other policing operations around the  
 13 country.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if everyone else is doing the same  
 15 thing, but of course, as you probably appreciate, that  
 16 may not be a complete answer --  
 17 A. Accepting that, sir, yes.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. If we need to go into more  
 19 detail, we'll do so in a restricted session.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Those are my questions at this stage at any  
 21 rate. I'm now going to invite the core participants to  
 22 ask any questions they have in this order: Mr Butt for  
 23 Counter-terrorism Policing headquarters indicated that  
 24 he might have questions. I'd ask him whether he does.  
 25 (Pause)

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1 It would seem he doesn't. Mr Butt, I'll pause  
 2 again.  
 3 MR BUTT: I came just as I was being told I didn't and I was  
 4 simply going to say the matter raised in my Rule 10 need  
 5 not be dealt with with this witness.  
 6 MR GREANEY: Mr O'Connor next on behalf of SMG.  
 7 Questions from MR O'CONNOR  
 8 MR O'CONNOR: I have just a few questions, assistant  
 9 chief constable.  
 10 First of all, just a couple of preliminary points,  
 11 if I may. You were asked right at the start service  
 12 your evidence this morning about the question of  
 13 jurisdiction, which then became a question of primacy.  
 14 I don't want to go back into all of those complexities,  
 15 just a simple point really.  
 16 The questions you were asked focused on the subject  
 17 of the arena and, remember, the evidence about it being  
 18 Network Rail land. Of course, it's not just the arena,  
 19 is it, it's the entire Victoria Exchange Complex, which  
 20 is built on Network Rail land and therefore attracts  
 21 this jurisdiction issue; is that right?  
 22 A. That's correct, yes.  
 23 Q. Thank you.  
 24 Secondly, I'm going to ask you a few more questions  
 25 in a moment about two different types of policing, both

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1 of which I'm going to suggest BTP undertook in the  
 2 complex. But let me just introduce them and see if you  
 3 agree with me.  
 4 First of all, one has what one might describe as  
 5 BTP's general policing duties in relation to the station  
 6 and the public areas of the complex. I think you  
 7 described it as day-to-day policing, public safety,  
 8 prevention of crime and so on.  
 9 A. Yes. I recognise that, yes, sir.  
 10 Q. And then on the other hand, is this right, we have rare  
 11 incidents when BTP provide special support, special  
 12 policing support, to the arena for particular events  
 13 which have a -- which are, for example, likely to give  
 14 rise to exceptional degrees of public order risk? We've  
 15 heard the examples given of boxing, darts and so on.  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. And that second category, is this right, is known  
 18 technically as special policing services?  
 19 A. Yes, correct.  
 20 Q. And ones of its hallmarks is that it is those services  
 21 that the venue operator pays for?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. I'm going to take you back to both of those categories  
 24 of work. First of all, let me just focus on that first  
 25 category, the day-to-day policing. You've accepted that

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1 BTP have the responsibility for day-to-day policing  
 2 in the exchange complex; yes?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that that general function  
 5 includes Counter-terrorism Policing, preventative  
 6 measures to prevent counter-terrorism?  
 7 A. Yes, sir.  
 8 Q. The inquiry has heard plenty of evidence that SMG also  
 9 had a responsibility along similar lines in the public  
 10 areas of the exchange complex. I'm sure you are aware  
 11 of that.  
 12 A. Yes, I am.  
 13 Q. And you described the relationship, if you like, between  
 14 BTP and SMG in that regard as having a shared  
 15 responsibility.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. I just want to press you a little bit on that and in  
 18 particular ask you about some evidence that the security  
 19 experts gave in the course of their oral evidence right  
 20 at the start of this chapter of the inquiry.  
 21 They expressed the view that at least when an event  
 22 was taking place, BTP provided their policing in, for  
 23 example, the City Room in support of SMG. That term "in  
 24 support of" is obviously a rather general one and we may  
 25 need to explore with the experts precisely what they

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1 meant when they come back to given evidence. But if for  
 2 example what was meant by that term was BTP were  
 3 providing their policing under the direction of SMG on  
 4 those occasions, that would not be an accurate way of  
 5 describing the policing you were providing, would it?  
 6 A. No, it wouldn't.  
 7 Q. There's no evidence, for example, is there, of BTP  
 8 either receiving or seeking any express direction from  
 9 SMG about how it should police those events?  
 10 A. That's correct, sir.  
 11 Q. And just to take it on a stage further, assistant  
 12 chief constable, it wouldn't be appropriate, I would  
 13 suggest, for SMG to direct BTP in the policing it  
 14 provides. Do you agree, for example, that SMG didn't  
 15 have access to the intelligence that BTP would have had  
 16 in counter-terrorism matters?  
 17 A. Yes, I would agree with that, yes.  
 18 Q. And nor, for example, would SMG have any knowledge of  
 19 the resourcing issues that BTP would wish to feed into  
 20 decisions around policing?  
 21 A. The discussion around resources would be discussed  
 22 in the planning meetings with SMG, but in terms of  
 23 direction, no, sir.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you moving on from that,  
 25 Mr O'Connor?

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1 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, I think I am, sir.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's leave aside direction. I readily  
 3 understand that BTP would not be told what to do by SMG.  
 4 But in the planning meetings, would you expect, if SMG,  
 5 say, have a particular issue with actually controlling  
 6 a particular place at a particular time, they might say  
 7 at the meeting, "Would it be possible to have one of  
 8 your policemen patrolling round there around this time"?  
 9 A. Yes, absolutely, sir. In reference to your first  
 10 comment, we would certainly listen to direction from SMG  
 11 and I think a relevant example would be taking back to  
 12 some of the either the boxing or darts matches. There  
 13 may be a request due to some concerns that additional  
 14 policing services would be purchased. However, SMG may  
 15 direct us that we would not be physically within the  
 16 bowl for the duration of the event, we'd be on standby  
 17 at a location and that would be at the request and  
 18 specific direction of the event manager, which we would  
 19 agree to.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's because they're paying you?  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But when you're not being paid, you  
 23 would expect to have some sort of discussion with SMG,  
 24 who have their own security staff there as well, and the  
 25 police as to how you can best relate together?

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1 A. I think one of the potential gaps we're at is that is  
2 the default position is a generic understanding. I do  
3 not believe that as individuals --

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's defeated me a bit. The default  
5 position is a generic understanding?

6 A. As in this is how things are done rather than: there's  
7 an event on 16 November, how will we police that one and  
8 how will we police Friday's one and Saturday's one?

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they should be policed individually  
10 rather than: we do this every time?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 MR O'CONNOR: I'm going to move to on ask you a few more  
13 questions about that second level of service, the  
14 special police services.

15 We have mentioned already a couple of times the  
16 examples of the boxing. This area of special police  
17 services can get quite complicated, can't it?

18 A. Very much so, yes.

19 Q. And I'm going to ask you to look at a small part of  
20 a rather long document in a moment which demonstrates  
21 at the very least the complexities that can arise. Very  
22 generally speaking, is it right that special police  
23 services tend to take place at the request of any  
24 operator?

25 A. I would say that would be at the discussion of both

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1 parties, if there was intelligence that we was aware of,  
2 we may well lead that discussion, starting off that our  
3 view is that additional resources should be required.

4 Q. They tend also to take place on the venue operator's  
5 property?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And as I've already said, they are -- one of the  
8 hallmarks of those services is that they are paid for by  
9 the operator?

10 A. Yes, indeed.

11 Q. Just to go back to the example you gave. There might be  
12 a situation, we've seen it in the notes, where the venue  
13 itself is aware that there is, for example, a boxing  
14 match coming up and they may know that the fans of one  
15 or other of the boxers have a particular profile or  
16 caused trouble at the last fight, so they may approach  
17 you and ask for those services to be provided.

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. There may equally be another situation where in fact  
20 it is the police who have access to particular  
21 intelligence about an upcoming event and you share that  
22 with the operator, but that discussion leads,  
23 nonetheless, to a request from the operator for you to  
24 undertake those services for payment?

25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In that second instance, if it doesn't,  
2 do you say, "We're going to expect trouble within the  
3 arena because of these particular people mixing, there  
4 should be extra resources in there, we should have  
5 policemen in there", and they say, "We're very sorry, we  
6 don't believe that's going to happen, we're not prepared  
7 to pay", what can you or do you then do?

8 A. I'm not aware of any such instance, sir. In my own  
9 meetings with SMG in undertaking the post and  
10 cross-checking that within my own department, a suitable  
11 solution is reached in most of those cases.

12 If it was a hypothetical situation, then I know that  
13 additional resources would be considered for the outer  
14 section if required, if that risk was shown.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you wouldn't go into premises which  
16 are not public, into private premises such as the arena,  
17 unless invited in and paid for?

18 A. Absolutely, and that is due to the fact of our powers  
19 and jurisdiction and that specific bit of -- a private  
20 part of the property. We need to be invited in.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

22 MR O'CONNOR: I want to take you briefly, assistant  
23 chief constable, back to the rather aged document from  
24 Inspector Lewis, if you remember.

25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. {INQ036812/1}. You weren't taken through this document  
2 in great detail, assistant chief constable, and I'm not  
3 going to do that either. We can all read it. Can I,  
4 first of all, take you to {INQ036812/5} and zoom in on  
5 the bottom half. I think we looked with you earlier at  
6 paragraph 4.4, but if we could then look at the next  
7 paragraph, 4.5, we see that Inspector Lewis is arguing  
8 that Railtrack ought to be enforcing the terms of the  
9 lease and ensuring that the entity he describes at any  
10 rate as the MEN Arena leaseholders actually pay -- the  
11 MEN stands for Manchester Evening News, doesn't it?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 Q. The Manchester Evening News was the sponsor of the arena  
14 at that time, I think.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Just picking it up:  
17 "... that they actually pay for officers whenever  
18 they police their premises as defined in the lease and  
19 not just inside the stadium."

20 Is it right that in fact that's a theme of this  
21 entire document, that Inspector Lewis has picked up this  
22 point about the requirement for payment being -- for  
23 policing services not just within the arena but within  
24 the complex and that is what is described as being  
25 within the lease?

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1 A. Yes, sir .  
 2 Q. We can see that if we go back to {INQ036812/3} and we  
 3 zoom in on the bottom half again. We see that  
 4 Inspector Lewis has defined again what he describes as  
 5 MEN's premises, and he's defined it in these four  
 6 sub-paragraphs as including the arena itself, but then  
 7 also, essentially, the Hunts Bank area and the NCP car  
 8 park and the Trinity Way link tunnel, one assumes he  
 9 means.  
 10 A. Yes, sir, that's my understanding, yes.  
 11 Q. You may or may not be able to help us with this, but  
 12 without going into all the archeology of the leases and  
 13 so on, let me suggest to you and see if you agree that  
 14 in fact, so far as SMG is concerned, it has never had  
 15 within its lease any of those areas either at  
 16 sub-paragraphs (ii), (iii) or (iv), and its lease has  
 17 always been confined to the arena itself?  
 18 A. I haven't seen the physical lease myself, but that is my  
 19 understanding, yes.  
 20 Q. So however we read this document, it does appear that  
 21 when Inspector Lewis is referring to this body as "the  
 22 MEN", he's referring to something other than SMG?  
 23 A. Yes, sir .  
 24 Q. Thank you. That's all I wanted to ask you about that  
 25 document.

1 Going back to that distinction I started with, the  
 2 distinction between special police services and what you  
 3 described as everyday policing, it's another hallmark,  
 4 isn't it, of the divide between the two that where  
 5 a police force is simply providing the public safety or  
 6 counter-terrorism everyday service that it would  
 7 normally provide and that it considers appropriate to  
 8 provide, that is not a service that it can levy a charge  
 9 for? Do you agree with that?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. I said I'd take you to a long document. Perhaps we  
 12 could look very briefly at {INQ020192/1} ---  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you don't mind me saying so,  
 14 Mr O'Connor, that may not be legally correct. There are  
 15 some quite difficult cases relating to football clubs  
 16 and I think a distinction is drawn between football  
 17 clubs who invite the police to provide police officers  
 18 to police areas outside the physical football ground but  
 19 just outside as compared with those where the police  
 20 have simply come themselves to do it. I may be wrong.  
 21 I don't claim to have researched it as much as you have.  
 22 MR O'CONNOR: Sir, if you did want to research it, the  
 23 document I have just got on screen would be a good way  
 24 to start. I mentioned there was a lengthy document.  
 25 This is the National Police Chiefs' Council guidelines

1 on charging for police services. Sir, for your note, it  
 2 does in fact summarise the football club case law,  
 3 indeed it annexes what was then a recent decision of the  
 4 Court of Appeal.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I made the mistake of reading the cases,  
 6 which was obviously a mistake if there's a summary here.  
 7 MR O'CONNOR: Well, it may be that no doubt both assist; one  
 8 of the cases is exhibited to this document.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 10 MR O'CONNOR: I just wanted, assistant chief constable, to  
 11 go to {INQ020192/7} within that.  
 12 Sir, before I go on, you're absolutely right, with  
 13 respect, that this issue about private land or public  
 14 land is very much part of the analysis. But if one  
 15 looks at the second paragraph there, assistant  
 16 chief constable, and the first sentence or two:  
 17 "The central principle is that the police cannot  
 18 charge for services which fall within their ordinary  
 19 public duty, ie the services the police are duty-bound  
 20 to provide."  
 21 The duty is described as being:  
 22 "A duty owed to the public at large for the  
 23 prevention of violence and disorder."  
 24 Do you recognise that summary and do you accept what  
 25 it says?

1 A. Yes, sir. Certainly in principle. Matters do get  
 2 complicated with British Transport Police because of the  
 3 different funding arrangements, and in all terms all of  
 4 out funding comes from the user so it does complicate  
 5 things slightly in terms of British Transport Police  
 6 opposed to a Home Office force, but in principle, yes.  
 7 Q. Again, one can get lost in the detail, and as the  
 8 chairman has observed and as we know, some of these  
 9 matters have been very hard fought but in particular  
 10 between football clubs and their local police forces,  
 11 have they not?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. So I don't want to drift off into issues that may be  
 14 academic. Let's focus on the arena.  
 15 A. Certainly, sir .  
 16 Q. Just focusing on that sentence for a moment, it's right,  
 17 isn't it, that where a police force considers it  
 18 necessary to provide policing for counter-terrorism  
 19 matters, those are going to be services which they are  
 20 required to provide in order to protect the public?  
 21 A. Yes, sir .  
 22 Q. So to take an example, which we've heard evidence about,  
 23 there was the episode in 2015 where there was  
 24 a suspicious incident at a Jehovah's Witness event, was  
 25 there not?

1 A. Yes, sir .  
 2 Q. And one of the consequences of that was an involvement  
 3 by BTP?  
 4 A. Yes, sir .  
 5 Q. I think it 's right to say that the Special Branch  
 6 element of BTP investigated the matter?  
 7 A. They did, yes.  
 8 Q. And as a result of that concern and the ongoing  
 9 investigation , there was an enhanced BTP presence at at  
 10 least two following concerts?  
 11 A. That is correct .  
 12 Q. And we have heard Superintendent, I think he was then,  
 13 Wylie went into the control room for those concerts.  
 14 A. Yes, sir .  
 15 Q. One assumes that there was no charge made for that  
 16 policing .  
 17 A. Absolutely, that's correct , yes.  
 18 Q. And that of course is in contrast to the special police  
 19 services for the boxing and so on?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. So just switching our gaze from the control room, from  
 22 the arena, to the City Room, and for that matter the  
 23 other public spaces of the arena complex, does it come  
 24 to this: that once BTP has assessed what level of  
 25 counter—terrorism policing is required in those areas,

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1 there is no question that it could charge SMG for the  
 2 performance of that policing?  
 3 A. That's correct, yes.  
 4 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down.  
 5 I have just one further short point for you,  
 6 assistant chief constable, and it 's simply relating to  
 7 the point you were asked about SMG's risk assessment and  
 8 whether BTP had seen a copy of that document.  
 9 Could we have up on screen, please, {INQ037018/1}.  
 10 You may not have seen this document. What we see  
 11 here is an email from Miriam Stone, with whom we are  
 12 familiar , with Graham Fair. He was the resilience  
 13 planning officer for BTP in Manchester, I think.  
 14 A. Correct, yes.  
 15 Q. I may not have his exact title right . Do we see here  
 16 Miriam Stone sending him a copy of the emergency  
 17 contingency plan, which is a lengthy document which  
 18 contains SMG's risk assessments?  
 19 A. I have not seen that document, but I can accept the  
 20 content of that, yes.  
 21 MR O'CONNOR: Thank you very much. I'm grateful. Those are  
 22 my questions.  
 23 MR GREANEY: I'm going to ask Mr Laidlaw next if he has  
 24 questions on behalf of his client .  
 25 MR LAIDLAW: No, thank you.

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1 MR GREANEY: Next then, the families, and I understand that  
 2 Mr Weatherby is taking the lead on this issue.  
 3 Questions from MR WEATHERBY  
 4 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. Can you see me, officer?  
 5 A. Yes, I can, sir .  
 6 Q. And you can hear me clearly?  
 7 A. Loud and clear, yes.  
 8 Q. Thank you.  
 9 I represent a number of the families, and no doubt  
 10 others may follow on when I've finished my questions.  
 11 You've been asked about the provision of officers on the  
 12 night. There was one very inexperienced police  
 13 constable and three PCSOs.  
 14 We've already been through that, quite clearly, they  
 15 didn't follow the tasking by their sergeant and, in  
 16 particular , none of them were in the City Room on  
 17 egress, and in particular for long periods of time there  
 18 was no patrolling at all because of the long breaks that  
 19 they took. That's right, isn't it ?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And I think you've accepted already that that was wholly  
 22 unacceptable, that they didn't follow specifically those  
 23 two points of the sergeant's directions or orders?  
 24 A. Yes, I have.  
 25 Q. Can I ask, and it may be that I've misunderstood this,

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1 and if I have, then I apologise in advance. You've gone  
 2 on to deal with deployment more generally, and as I've  
 3 understood what you were saying to the chair towards the  
 4 end of the evidence that you gave through Mr Greaney,  
 5 you were saying that in this circumstance you might not  
 6 have deployed any BTP officers. Have I understood you  
 7 correctly ?  
 8 A. That is correct. Yes, sir , that's correct .  
 9 Q. The general threat level was severe.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And you had a crowd of 14,500, predominantly young  
 12 people?  
 13 A. Yes, sir .  
 14 Q. Can you explain to us how it could possibly be right  
 15 that you could discharge your policing duty without  
 16 deploying any officers in those circumstances?  
 17 A. Yes, sir . That would be in my professional opinion  
 18 based on the — as I've said before — information and  
 19 intelligence available to us, looking at the crowd  
 20 demographics in terms of age groups, taking into  
 21 consideration such things as alcohol consumption at an  
 22 event and risk to others from alcohol consumption, and  
 23 also potentially in this case the consideration would  
 24 have been the actual fact it was early in the week as  
 25 opposed to a weekend event. Those sorts of

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1 considerations would have come into play.  
 2 Q. I can well understand, Mr O'Callaghan, the assessment  
 3 that this was a low risk in terms of public order or  
 4 drunkenness, for example. But one more go from me: the  
 5 general threat level was severe and you had a large  
 6 crowd and it was on your patch, and you're suggesting  
 7 that no deployment at all was necessary?  
 8 A. From what I know of the event, absolutely, that may well  
 9 have been a consideration or an option to deploy or not  
 10 to deploy. If I can expand slightly regarding that,  
 11 because of a low risk, as I see it there are two other  
 12 places to go to, either high, at the extreme -- and the  
 13 only way to mitigate a high risk event would be for it  
 14 not to occur at all -- and that takes us to a medium  
 15 risk.  
 16 In terms of considerations, if I had believed it to  
 17 be a medium risk of mitigation, control measures within  
 18 protective policing services to be deployed, and in real  
 19 terms that would be firearms officers, as an example, or  
 20 a low risk event that you either consider to deploy  
 21 officers to assist with public safety in terms of  
 22 disorder, crush, vulnerabilities such as lost children,  
 23 or the option not to deploy at all.  
 24 Q. I'm specifically asking about the CT aspect here. I'm  
 25 going to come back to this, both in terms of the general

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1 risk that was known beyond the general threat level and  
 2 I'll also come back and put some more questions to you  
 3 in a few moments about what effect the policing might  
 4 have had to mitigate the risks.  
 5 Before I do that, a few more general questions.  
 6 You've been asked about supervision and the lack of  
 7 supervision. First of all, would you accept that there  
 8 was in fact no supervision of the four officers that  
 9 were on the station and the arena complex on that  
 10 evening?  
 11 A. No direct supervision, sir, in relation to that event;  
 12 there was supervision on duty at that time throughout.  
 13 Q. Would you also agree with me that none of those four  
 14 officers was in charge of the others?  
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 16 Q. So how were they expected, first of all, to determine  
 17 who went where on Sergeant Wilson's directions?  
 18 A. So I accept as the senior officer responsible at BTP  
 19 that that was a gap. The only way those officers could  
 20 have been clear was if an instruction had been given to  
 21 individual officers what was expected.  
 22 Q. Yes. Now, in terms of supervision, the point of  
 23 supervision is to make sure that directions and orders  
 24 that are being given as necessary are carried out.  
 25 That's the point of it, isn't it?

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1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. And we know that the orders and directions that were  
 3 given weren't carried out.  
 4 A. In relation to those four officers, yes, sir.  
 5 Q. Therefore there was a deficit in supervision, which made  
 6 a difference? Is that a fair way of putting it?  
 7 A. I do not believe so in that case, sir, and the reason  
 8 I say so is, or have that view, is that there was  
 9 a number of officers in addition to the four on the  
 10 email that Sergeant Wilson set out, and all of the other  
 11 officers carried out and conducted those duties in  
 12 accordance with those instructions.  
 13 Q. With respect to the four officers asked to deal with the  
 14 arena complex and the event, they didn't carry out the  
 15 duties as directed and there was a failure of  
 16 supervision; that's the truth of it, isn't it?  
 17 A. Again, not wishing to, of course, argue the point, sir,  
 18 but my view is that the direction was given and it  
 19 wasn't followed, and that is the fault of the force,  
 20 yes.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You take the view they shouldn't need  
 22 supervision; that's what you've said before.  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And I think Mr Weatherby's making the  
 25 point that, well, yes, you do because that's when people

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1 don't actually do what they're told.  
 2 A. Yes, I accept that, sir, yes.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, Mr Weatherby.  
 4 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you, that's very helpful.  
 5 Moreover, in hindsight, and lessons learned, you've  
 6 now put in place supervision?  
 7 A. Yes, in relation to that specific point of the arena,  
 8 but that is in relation to being able to dynamically  
 9 respond to situations and having a sergeant present with  
 10 those teams, as I say, not ground assigned but that can  
 11 make those decisions.  
 12 Q. Okay, but the lesson learned here is the lack of  
 13 supervision didn't rectify the failure of the officers  
 14 in doing what they were directed to do and you've now  
 15 filled that gap?  
 16 A. To prevent similar issues happening at the arena, yes.  
 17 Q. In your witness statement -- you've been taken to this  
 18 passage so I don't think it's necessary for us to go to  
 19 it, but just for the note, it's paragraph 46 -- you set  
 20 out the provision, what the provision was, as we've been  
 21 through, and the orders that Sergeant Wilson gave. But  
 22 you don't mention there, and I think you don't mention  
 23 anywhere else in that statement, the fact that those  
 24 orders were simply not carried out. Is there a reason  
 25 you didn't do that?

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1 A. No, sir.  
 2 Q. Is the reason that you weren't aware of that when you  
 3 wrote the statement? No one had made you aware of the  
 4 fact that those orders hadn't been carried out?  
 5 A. I believe to the best of my knowledge I was aware of  
 6 that at the time the statement was made.  
 7 Q. So you didn't include that in the statement?  
 8 A. No, sir.  
 9 Q. Any reason?  
 10 A. Not that I can answer today, no.  
 11 Q. PC Bullough, the one PC in the deployment, when she gave  
 12 her evidence -- I think you followed her evidence, would  
 13 that be correct?  
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 15 Q. Okay. In her evidence, she expressed the view that more  
 16 senior officers were aware that long breaks were being  
 17 taken but effectively turned a blind eye because the  
 18 period between ingress and egress was considered  
 19 a downtime. Did you hear that evidence, first of all?  
 20 A. I did, yes.  
 21 Q. Is that right, that effectively a blind eye was turned  
 22 to (overspeaking) --  
 23 A. No, it's not correct, sir.  
 24 Q. That's not correct?  
 25 A. No.

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1 Q. Because of course if it was correct, that would be again  
 2 a failure of supervision and it would be unacceptable,  
 3 wouldn't it?  
 4 A. Yes, it would, sir.  
 5 Q. You've dealt with the absence of counter-terrorism  
 6 briefings or absence of a briefing of counter-terrorism  
 7 in every briefing. Again, that was unacceptable at the  
 8 time, wasn't it, that there was a failure to have  
 9 a counter-terrorism briefing when deploying officers to  
 10 a scene like this?  
 11 A. This is a matter which I have given much thought and  
 12 much deliberation about -- not what Sergeant Wilson  
 13 didn't deliver but what did BTP as an organisation fail  
 14 to provide to Sergeant Wilson to deliver. I am still  
 15 uncertain in my own mind of what that information could  
 16 have been that we didn't deliver.  
 17 In terms of a counter-terrorism briefing of my own  
 18 opinion, professional opinion, would be the balance of  
 19 what would be in such a briefing if it was given so the  
 20 whole of the force was operating in the same threat  
 21 level. Other than repeating on a daily basis, "The  
 22 threat level is severe" -- and as I mentioned earlier  
 23 had been for 2 years and 9 months of the proportionality  
 24 of what could have been delivered in such a briefing.  
 25 Q. So is the answer yes or no, Mr O'Callaghan?

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1 A. In those circumstances, my answer at that time would be  
 2 no. In my view there would be, specifically in relation  
 3 to a briefing, there was nothing to tell the officers at  
 4 that time.  
 5 Q. Do you think it was acceptable for there to have been no  
 6 counter-terrorism briefing to those four officers?  
 7 A. In terms of acceptable, to me it's an omission of what  
 8 BTP or the officers or any of the staff didn't do.  
 9 Should we have reminded officers on a daily basis the  
 10 threat level? That will of course be for the chairman  
 11 to comment on in his findings. That is something that  
 12 we do now, yes, specific to these events.  
 13 Q. Okay, so lessons learned, you do it now. A lesson must  
 14 have been learned to change, to make it so?  
 15 A. Yes. In terms of the general deployment of our officers  
 16 on a daily basis, they do not have a specific  
 17 counter-terrorism briefing on a daily basis to go about  
 18 their business. As an organisation, we of course  
 19 refresh through a number of channels and a number of  
 20 mediums the current threat level, but in terms of  
 21 physically sitting officers down on a daily basis  
 22 force-wide and saying, "To remind you, today the threat  
 23 level is severe", that does not happen, sir.  
 24 Q. Okay. I'm going to move on, but let me just put it to  
 25 you once more again: I'm suggesting to you that it was

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1 a significant failure not to give a counter-terrorism  
 2 briefing to four officers, a very inexperienced officer  
 3 and three PCSOs, who were going to be deployed to an  
 4 event involving 14,500 people, mainly young people, in  
 5 the context of where the threat level was severe. I'm  
 6 suggesting to you directly that it was a failure not to  
 7 give a counter-terrorism briefing to remind those  
 8 officers of the counter-terrorism aspect of that  
 9 deployment. What do you say to that?  
 10 A. I don't believe it was, no.  
 11 Q. We know that the orders included that at least one of  
 12 the four was to be in the City Room on egress and the  
 13 others were to cover other specific areas, and we don't  
 14 need to go into where those were, and we know that all  
 15 four at egress were together or close together by the  
 16 war memorial in the station. Again, that was wholly  
 17 unacceptable, wasn't it?  
 18 A. It was definitely unacceptable in relation to  
 19 a deployment for covering the event and it was  
 20 definitely unacceptable not to deploy as per the task  
 21 set by the sergeant, yes.  
 22 Q. Let me move on. I said I would come back to what the  
 23 known threat was and let me just get through this with  
 24 you and I'll do it quickly because I think a lot of this  
 25 has been covered.

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1 On 22 May, everybody in British Transport Police  
 2 knew that the threat level was severe and what that  
 3 meant?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. There was highly likely to be a terrorist outrage, yes?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. I want to just go through a list of events that also  
 8 should have been certainly in managers' but probably  
 9 officers' minds as well.  
 10 In January of 2015, there were the horrific attacks  
 11 on Charlie Hebdo in Paris; yes?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 Q. And in fact, I think you will know that SMG,  
 14 Miriam Stone, contacted both the Greater Manchester  
 15 Police CTSA and the then British Transport Police CTSA,  
 16 Chris Smith, asking for assistance within the days after  
 17 that.  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. So British Transport Police were alerted to general  
 20 concerns about the raised problem of terrorism by the  
 21 operators themselves.  
 22 Then, as has just been touched on, later in 2015 SMG  
 23 again reported to British Transport Police that two men  
 24 had been acting suspiciously at the Jehovah's Witness  
 25 conference on 26 July of 2015; yes?

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1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. And that led to concern properly within British  
 3 Transport Police about two forthcoming events, including  
 4 Jewish American artists?  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 Q. And extra deployment, as you've just been taken to, was  
 7 provided in respect of that. That's right, isn't it?  
 8 A. It is correct, yes.  
 9 Q. You've recently been asked to look at that and you gave  
 10 your sixth statement relating to that.  
 11 In November 2015, there were the attacks at the  
 12 Bataclan and the Stade de France?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And that would have been something that would have been  
 15 noticed and would have caused great concern in British  
 16 Transport Police and elsewhere; yes?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And the key takeaway, if you like, from that is the  
 19 Bataclan was a music venue and the attack was conducted  
 20 with an American artist, yes --  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. -- when an American artist was performing.  
 23 Then, as Mr Greaney has said, there was the  
 24 July 2016 attacks in Germany, and also in July 2016  
 25 there was the joint exercise which you've touched upon,

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1 Exercise Sherman.  
 2 A. Yes, sir.  
 3 Q. The scenario or scenarios plural that were considered,  
 4 two of them, scenario 2 in Sherman was a gun attack in  
 5 Victoria Station in the early evening; yes?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And then scenario 3 was a follow-on attack, possibly by  
 8 the same fictitious, happily, gunman, possibly by  
 9 others, but a follow-on within a few minutes, which was  
 10 a gun attack through the doors of the City Room near the  
 11 McDonald's; yes?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. The context of that was a Disney on Ice event; yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. So we have there something which would have no doubt  
 16 made people responsible for the policing of that area,  
 17 ie BTP, very mindful in this context of a highly likely  
 18 terrorist outrage position and the resilience officers  
 19 who picked that context, the station and the City Room,  
 20 had most unfortunately done so with a degree of  
 21 accuracy, as we now know. It would have concentrated  
 22 the minds of British Transport Police, or one might have  
 23 thought, as to the particular risks in that area; would  
 24 you agree with that?  
 25 A. Certainly into the wider risks, yes, sir.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Of all the things you mentioned in that  
 2 quite long question, I think, acted to heighten the  
 3 risk, all the events which had happened to --  
 4 MR WEATHERBY: Yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the cumulative effect of all those  
 6 things.  
 7 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. I've taken a rather long run up to the  
 8 wicket there.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wanted the witness to understand  
 10 it was the cumulative effect, rather than the last  
 11 thing, Sherman, that you were talking about.  
 12 MR WEATHERBY: That was my aim, so thank you for that.  
 13 Bearing those matters in mind, real life attacks  
 14 elsewhere, which presumably raised concerns or should  
 15 have done, exercises involving terror attacks on the  
 16 station and the City Room itself at a not dissimilar  
 17 type of event, certainly in terms of the attendee  
 18 demographics, and perceived threats to actual concerts  
 19 at the arena or events at the arena, the  
 20 Jehovah's Witness event and the concerts following it,  
 21 you then have the failure to provide any kind of  
 22 documented risk assessment. Were these matters actually  
 23 noted within BTP? I know you weren't there, so I'm not  
 24 being critical of you, but we've got this long train of  
 25 events and then, at the end of it, we have an event

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1 where this outrage occurs and there isn't even  
 2 a documented risk assessment. Were the --  
 3 A. So what I would say to that is definitely the  
 4 organisation or the force took cognisance of every  
 5 single one of those attacks in terms of the information.  
 6 That is what fed the style of initial training our  
 7 officers had. That is what fed into our own  
 8 Operation Largo events, which were simulation exercises  
 9 we put our own officers through, and all of those events  
 10 influenced the College of Policing NCALT products and  
 11 all of those events influenced all the ACT Awareness  
 12 products that all of our officers were put through.  
 13 I believe it's really important, and I say this is  
 14 as a strategic Gold Commander, that focus is given to  
 15 officers you're deploying into the actual event to which  
 16 you are deploying them in, that real risk potential  
 17 that is available. Otherwise, what you risk is -- and  
 18 I have no intention of impacting on what actually  
 19 happened -- but you're almost into the arena of, like  
 20 with aviation and a safety briefing, when people get on  
 21 to an aircraft. Is there any new information? It's the  
 22 same information you're giving people time in, time out.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. But no one suggests you shouldn't  
 24 give it, do they?  
 25 A. No, sir, I accept that. However, I would say,

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1 acknowledging that a lot of people do not listen to it.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You have to make it somehow relevant so  
 3 each time you do it people pay attention and take notice  
 4 and it affects the way they do their jobs.  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And that's your job to make them do  
 7 that, isn't it?  
 8 A. That is extremely difficult if there is no information  
 9 to base that new alive briefing to your officers,  
 10 especially 2.5 years on from the level of that risk  
 11 assessment -- or threat level.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry to take over, Mr Weatherby,  
 13 forgive me for asking these questions.  
 14 The sort of terrorist attack which we are facing  
 15 more and more now is an individual on their own, not on  
 16 their own but with a few others, going out and  
 17 committing an attack, whether it be a stabbing with  
 18 a knife or something like that, of which there may well  
 19 be and can be no prior intelligence. I'm not saying in  
 20 this particular case or anything like that, but that is  
 21 the situation you face with lone terrorists, isn't it?  
 22 A. Yes, absolutely.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So actually saying, it only makes sense  
 24 if you have actual intelligence to tell them, doesn't  
 25 meet that occasion, does it?

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1 A. I believe, sir, though that the additional work that is  
 2 in the DNA of policing up and down this country, not  
 3 just with BTP, in relation to refreshing -- refreshed  
 4 intranet articles, media within the police station,  
 5 posters, the Stay Alert posters. All of those prompts  
 6 are within policing on a daily basis up and down the  
 7 country. Again, as I said before, fully accepting this  
 8 event happened on our watch, I have constantly  
 9 considered and reviewed, even in my own position, what  
 10 additional information could have been available or what  
 11 additional information would have impacted on our  
 12 policing of that night.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 14 MR WEATHERBY: I have just been in my long run up to the  
 15 wicket through all of the matters that just might have  
 16 prompted British Transport Police to take a more  
 17 proactive approach to particularly the City Room, but  
 18 other places, because that's where we're talking about,  
 19 but other places. Your answer appears to be that  
 20 without specific intelligence, there's nothing much you  
 21 can do. And that seems to underpin your suggestion that  
 22 you might justify not deploying any officers at all.  
 23 Is that right?  
 24 A. If there is no intelligence or no actual threat to  
 25 a venue or a location, then, yes, that would be the

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1 decision taken, and it's a decision taken every day in  
 2 the week within some of the crowded spaces that we will  
 3 operate in especially -- and they are truly crowded  
 4 spaces.  
 5 Again, as another further example of an operating  
 6 space, in somewhere like London Waterloo, some 380,000  
 7 people will travel through that, 185,000 per rush.  
 8 Again, of course that consideration is given to our  
 9 policing deployment into those locations and our  
 10 posture.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the less we identify potential  
 12 targets, the better.  
 13 A. It is in open source, sir, not operationally sensitive.  
 14 But that is the reality, that is the difficult reality  
 15 that every policing commander, every briefing sergeant,  
 16 every intelligence officer building a briefing faces on  
 17 a daily basis. That element of, yes, keeping things  
 18 fresh.  
 19 MR WEATHERBY: You're not suggesting -- I'm not going to go  
 20 into any specific locations, please don't, but you're  
 21 not suggesting that just because the problem is a big  
 22 one that you don't take measures so far as you're able  
 23 to mitigate the risks that there are, and some of those  
 24 risks are risks from intelligence and some of them are  
 25 the general high risks that we know about?

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1 A. Absolutely not, sir. BTP, ourselves, my previous  
2 organisations, my knowledge from colleagues up and down  
3 the country, absolutely the risk will be assessed and  
4 policed accordingly.

5 Q. But the distinction I'm making, Mr O'Callaghan, is that  
6 you seem to be saying that absent some kind of warning  
7 like happened at the Jehovah's Witness meeting on  
8 26 July 2015, absent that, then it would be justifiable  
9 to ignore the high level background threat because  
10 there's in essence not much you can do about it?

11 A. No, I (overspeaking), I do not accept that, sir. It is  
12 not ignored. The deployment of officers is based on how  
13 you can form that assessment.

14 Q. I'm going to move on.  
15 The risk assessment. Let me just deal with this.  
16 Your evidence is the officer in charge, who I think is  
17 Inspector Wedderburn on your evidence, did do a risk  
18 assessment, although it's undocumented; yes?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. And that risk assessment was for the Ariana Grande  
21 concert on 22 May 2017?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. You know that because you have orally spoken with her,  
24 not because you've seen any document at all which  
25 evidences a risk assessment having been done?

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1 A. I can confirm, sir, there was no documentation, and in  
2 fact Inspector Wedderburn has told me that herself, that  
3 there was no written record of that assessment that was  
4 made.

5 Q. I don't wish to cast any aspersions on  
6 Inspector Wedderburn at all, she may or may not come to  
7 give evidence, but the fact of the risk assessment is  
8 simply word of mouth from her to you?

9 A. Yes, sir, yes.

10 Q. Are you able to say — and let me stress, I'm not in any  
11 way being critical of it, this is not your, what I'm  
12 going to call, a failure. But are you able to assist us  
13 with what exactly was considered and what exactly was  
14 not considered in terms of that risk assessment? If you  
15 can't, then of course just say so.

16 A. Sir, from my conversations and from my research into  
17 that, it was purely against the history of previous  
18 events, the age demographic at the time, the fact that  
19 there was no issues at the concert in Birmingham 2 weeks  
20 prior, at the later date, but purely on those  
21 discussions. And that is something regarding changes  
22 made and still work to be done in relation not  
23 specifically to the failure of Inspector Wedderburn but  
24 the failure of BTP to put the processes in place to  
25 assist Inspector Wedderburn.

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1 Q. So are you accepting it was a failure of  
2 Inspector Wedderburn, or whoever, to have failed to do  
3 a proper risk assessment?

4 A. Yes, absolutely a failure of the organisation not to  
5 have that process in place and for that process to be  
6 then for Inspector Wedderburn to have been able to  
7 access that process, yes.

8 Q. And of course the consequence is that — we don't have  
9 an audit trail for it, do we? We don't have any  
10 documents to look at what was and wasn't considered?

11 A. No, sir, that's correct.

12 Q. Do you know how the risk assessment was communicated or,  
13 perhaps I should say, if the risk assessment was to  
14 Sergeant Wilson?

15 A. I can't answer that, sir, I don't know.

16 Q. And again, no documents, no email, no documents?

17 A. Not that I'm aware of. I have certainly not seen any,  
18 no.

19 Q. Okay. I want to show you an email now and because it's  
20 only come up in the course of your evidence, I'm not  
21 sure you've seen it before, but I don't think it'll be  
22 a difficulty for you. You must say if it is. I just  
23 want you to —

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You take your time to read it and tell  
25 us if there are any problems with it.

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1 MR GREANEY: We're at an hour and a half now, so it may be  
2 a good idea to have a break and the assistant  
3 chief constable can look at the email in the meantime if  
4 it suits Mr Weatherby.

5 MR WEATHERBY: Yes, indeed.

6 MR GREANEY: Perhaps Mr Weatherby could give the INQ  
7 reference.

8 MR WEATHERBY: {INQ001933/1}.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, okay, thank you. If we come back  
10 at 10 past. Thank you.  
11 (2.53 pm)

12 (A short break)

13 (3.10 pm)

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.

15 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you very much.  
16 Mr O'Callaghan, have you had a chance to have  
17 a quick look at the email?

18 A. Yes, I have, sir.

19 Q. Thank you very much. I'm using you for assistance to  
20 put the context of what you said about the undocumented  
21 risk assessment.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you want to have it up on the screen?  
23 Because we haven't at the moment.

24 MR WEATHERBY: Yes, please. {INQ001933/1}.

25 It's a chain of emails. The one I'm really

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1 interested in is at {INQ001933/3}, please.  
 2 Before we deal with the 6 October 2017, 18.01 email  
 3 from Michelle Wedderburn, Mr O'Callaghan, can you agree  
 4 with me that this appears to be an email chain about the  
 5 Kerslake Report and that Michelle Wedderburn is  
 6 reporting to Chief Inspector Allan Gregory about various  
 7 matters relating to the terms of reference of the  
 8 Kerslake Report?  
 9 A. Indeed so. Just for a point of clarity and for the  
 10 record, it will be Chief Superintendent Allan Gregory.  
 11 Q. I'm so sorry, I thought that's what I'd said -- I said  
 12 Chief Inspector, I'm sorry. Chief superintendent is  
 13 what I meant to say. So Michelle Wedderburn,  
 14 Inspector Wedderburn, is assisting  
 15 Chief Superintendent Gregory in replying to or assisting  
 16 the Kerslake Inquiry by answering a series of questions.  
 17 Let's start with the first question, "Preparedness".  
 18 Here Inspector Wedderburn sets out Sherman. So:  
 19 "The last exercise carried out prior to 22 May 2017  
 20 was Operation Sherman, a tabletop exercise on  
 21 26 July 2016..."  
 22 And then she puts who was involved:  
 23 "... involving a terrorist shooting incident at  
 24 Manchester Victoria on a Disney on Ice event."  
 25 A point to note there, as in fact we've already

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1 discussed, it was a shooting incident firstly at  
 2 Victoria and, secondly, specifically, on the City Room  
 3 on the third of the scenarios. That's right, isn't it?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.  
 5 Q. So two risk assessments, and this is the part that I'm  
 6 particularly interested in, under "Risk assessment",  
 7 Inspector Wedderburn says:  
 8 "Please see attached documents."  
 9 And then refers to the generic risk assessment for  
 10 the arena. And then:  
 11 "Contingency plans carried out for each high risk  
 12 event..."  
 13 And I'll come back to that in a minute:  
 14 "... where a dedicated police response is required  
 15 and planned."  
 16 And then:  
 17 "A historic tactical plan carried out at the  
 18 Phones4U Arena."  
 19 Yes?  
 20 A. Yes, sir.  
 21 Q. Now the red text, which I am not reading out, is  
 22 Superintendent Gregory's notes or questions that are  
 23 added to the text which comes from Inspector Wedderburn.  
 24 That's right, isn't it?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. Thank you.  
 2 So if we then move on to the next page, please,  
 3 {INQ001933/4}, and on to paragraph 6. The first  
 4 paragraph we'll move over swiftly. The second  
 5 paragraph:  
 6 "Policing in response to events is managed as part  
 7 of a six-monthly multi-agency meeting where events are  
 8 risk assessed."  
 9 Chief Superintendent Gregory adds in red:  
 10 "Who attends for BTP? Is there a minuted record in  
 11 email format of the specific meeting which covered the  
 12 Ariana Grande concert? Does this process continue?"  
 13 Yes?  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. Then Inspector Wedderburn continues with the risk  
 16 definition of (a) low, (b) medium and (c) high. And in  
 17 the final paragraph:  
 18 "Please see attached events schedule dated  
 19 6 January 2017."  
 20 Which includes the Ariana Grande concert, which  
 21 grades the concert as "(a) low-risk audience" and deals  
 22 with the ratio.  
 23 Yes?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. Over the page to {INQ001933/5} --

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1 A. Apologies for interrupting, if I may, I'm sure you'll  
 2 cite it, but further in this email is some distressing  
 3 material. Just to draw to your attention in pages still  
 4 to come.  
 5 Q. I'm only going to refer to the next page, the top of  
 6 {INQ001933/5}.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for pointing that out,  
 8 Mr O'Callaghan.  
 9 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you indeed for pointing that out, but  
 10 I'm only going to refer to the next page and the top of  
 11 it, {INQ001933/5}. After the resources  
 12 Inspector Wedderburn continues:  
 13 "All events graded as (a) or policed from business  
 14 as usual staff from Manchester Police Station with  
 15 uniformed officers", et cetera.  
 16 I'll read it:  
 17 "... uniformed officers and PCSOs providing  
 18 reassurance, deterrent and to prevent crime and disorder  
 19 during the ingress and egress due to the increased  
 20 football (sic)."  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It should be "foot fall".  
 22 MR WEATHERBY: "The safety of persons attending the arena is  
 23 the responsibility of the arena as detailed in the  
 24 premises licence attached which provides specific detail  
 25 concerning stewarding, their role and training."

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1 Yes?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. I don't need to go any further. But having read out  
 4 what I think are the important points -- and others will  
 5 go to others if I've missed anything -- but  
 6 Inspector Wedderburn doesn't in fact refer to any kind  
 7 of undocumented risk assessment, does she?  
 8 A. No, she doesn't, sir, no.  
 9 Q. One inference to be drawn is from the passage that  
 10 I read out about the six-monthly multi-agency meetings  
 11 where events are risk assessed, an inference from that  
 12 would be that the only risk assessment carried out about  
 13 the Ariana Grande concert specifically would have been  
 14 on 30 November; would that be fair?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. I'm sure this is a very unfair question, but it might be  
 17 one that you might look at after you've given your  
 18 evidence today: are you aware of any further emails or  
 19 documents which answered Chief Superintendent Gregory's  
 20 note about, "Who attended and is there a minuted  
 21 record"?  
 22 A. No, I'm not. It's the first time I've seen this in any  
 23 of my preparation bundle, so of course I'll assist in  
 24 finding further documentation.  
 25 Q. It may be I've missed it and somebody else will pick it

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1 up today, but if they don't, I wonder if you'd be so  
 2 good as to have a look and see if there's a further  
 3 document. That would be very helpful.  
 4 A. Of course.  
 5 Q. On the face of it, a few months after the -- we can take  
 6 that down from the screen if it's still there.  
 7 A few months after the event, Inspector Wedderburn  
 8 was involved in assisting the Kerslake Inquiry and  
 9 apparently didn't refer to the process that you have  
 10 been recounting from your conversation with her; is that  
 11 right?  
 12 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 13 Q. Again, that highlights the problem of the fact that risk  
 14 assessments aren't done in documentary form, doesn't it?  
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 16 Q. Yes, okay. I'm not going to take that point any  
 17 further.  
 18 Just returning briefly to the Sherman exercise,  
 19 I have already referred to it a couple of times and so  
 20 has Mr Greaney. It had this multiple scenario aspect to  
 21 it and it was a terrorist attack on the station and then  
 22 a terrorist attack following it on the City Room at an  
 23 event which, on the process that we've just been looking  
 24 at, would probably have been cast as low risk, do you  
 25 agree with that, Disney on Ice?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. So what was being highlighted through that exercise  
 3 is that the real risks were the high-density crowd in  
 4 a vulnerable place; yes?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. This had been picked up as an example by the resilience  
 7 officers from Greater Manchester Police and picked up to  
 8 use as a good example of a potential problem area within  
 9 the borough; yes?  
 10 A. Yes, sir, exactly as the railway station at the start of  
 11 the exercise was, yes.  
 12 Q. Yes, indeed. We know from other evidence, you may or  
 13 may not know this, but we know that the resilience staff  
 14 or resilience officers rolling out Exercise Sherman  
 15 picked different scenarios or different places within  
 16 the boroughs where they were delivering Sherman. So  
 17 they had specifically picked the station and the  
 18 City Room within the central area where they were  
 19 delivering Sherman. So they had picked this up as  
 20 a potentially vulnerable place, hadn't they?  
 21 A. I wasn't aware of that fact, sir, until you just said  
 22 it. I thought it was a generic exercise across all  
 23 boroughs.  
 24 Q. Okay. There is evidence, particularly from an officer  
 25 called Grimshaw, I think, that spells that out, but no

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1 doubt we can have that at a later point.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: For an exercise you're very likely to  
 3 pick out something which causes the maximum number of  
 4 problems so people can actually look at them?  
 5 A. Yes, absolutely, sir.  
 6 MR WEATHERBY: The simple point I am making is it was  
 7 tailored to this particular borough, so in this borough  
 8 they picked the station and the City Room.  
 9 The point I'm moving to finally on Sherman is that  
 10 in fact one of the two BTP officers who attended the  
 11 Sherman exercise was in fact Inspector Wedderburn.  
 12 A. That's correct, yes.  
 13 Q. Yes. You've been asked by Mr Greaney about whether the  
 14 reason that there was no report -- and I think your  
 15 answer was that the person delivering the exercise had  
 16 been unwell and therefore no report had been produced;  
 17 is that right?  
 18 A. That's my understanding, yes.  
 19 Q. But from the BTP side, it is right, isn't it, that there  
 20 was no report back from the Sherman exercise, or none  
 21 that I've been able to find, from Inspector Wedderburn  
 22 or the other officer that attended of anything arising  
 23 from the Sherman exercise?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. No report of any description from the attending

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1 officers , in fact the other management of BTP or anybody  
 2 that was considering risk?  
 3 A. That's correct, yes.  
 4 Q. And in fact there were simply no learning points from  
 5 Sherman?  
 6 A. That's correct, again, sir .  
 7 Q. No realisation of the particular vulnerability of the  
 8 City Room?  
 9 A. No, sir .  
 10 Q. No realisation coming from Exercise Sherman of what has  
 11 turned out to be the unfortunate reality , that GMP  
 12 resilience officers had recognised a particularly  
 13 vulnerable place on your patch?  
 14 A. Correct, sir .  
 15 Q. Can I just move on to what might have been? We know  
 16 from the CCTV and other evidence that Salman Abedi did  
 17 a reconnaissance early on the evening of 22 May and we  
 18 know that at 18.34, just after 6.30, he entered the  
 19 City Room very briefly and left . We know that the  
 20 experts in their final report have asserted that on  
 21 their view of the evidence it's likely that he entered  
 22 the City Room at this time and left soon thereafter  
 23 because he saw BTP officers who were in there at that  
 24 point. The inference is that he was deterred by their  
 25 presence. Would you agree with that?

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1 A. I agree that's the findings of the experts, sir .  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Quite. Do you agree with their findings  
 3 or is it something you prefer not to give an opinion  
 4 about?  
 5 A. I would give an opinion, sir , if I may, that we have  
 6 subsequent evidence beyond that that isn't a deterrent.  
 7 So I don't believe or I have no -- my view is I don't  
 8 know in relation to obviously if Abedi was deterred  
 9 because of that. The evidence that we do have, again  
 10 even in Manchester Victoria some 2 years later,  
 11 officers ' presence did not deter a terrorist attack, nor  
 12 did our own officers ' presence in the subsequent  
 13 London Bridge attack, where they was injured in fact in  
 14 both terrorist attacks. So drawing the view of officer  
 15 presence will always deter a terrorist attack, I do not  
 16 subscribe to that point, sir .  
 17 MR WEATHERBY: It may not matter too much, but my  
 18 understanding from the BTP opening was that it seemed to  
 19 be accepted that he was deliberately trying to avoid the  
 20 officers at that point. It maybe a slightly different  
 21 point. I ' ll move on.  
 22 We've established that the BTP officers had not been  
 23 there for long periods of time during the evening and  
 24 therefore their availability to patrol had been greatly  
 25 reduced. Would you agree that if they had patrolled as

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1 they were required to do or tasked to do, it's entirely  
 2 likely that Salman Abedi would have been spotted and  
 3 perceived by one or more of the officers to have been  
 4 suspicious?  
 5 A. Obviously, I cannot speak for the officers . The comment  
 6 I would make on that is some of our officers, as the  
 7 inquiry knows in terms of PCSO Morrey and Brown, asked  
 8 Abedi at a key point and, no, suspicions were not  
 9 raised, so I couldn't answer that question, sir .  
 10 Q. Again, looking at the evidence of PC Bullough, she was  
 11 asked to watch the footage and she very candidly said  
 12 that if she'd seen him, bearing in mind the way he was  
 13 walking under the strain of a backpack, she would  
 14 probably have stopped him and asked him what was in it.  
 15 Did you hear that evidence?  
 16 A. I did, sir .  
 17 Q. It was a missed opportunity that officers were not  
 18 patrolling when they should have been, wasn't it?  
 19 A. Potentially, yes, sir .  
 20 Q. And likewise, if they had patrolled generally in the  
 21 City Room -- I know they were in there for a short  
 22 period, I ' ll come to that in a minute -- but if they'd  
 23 been patrolling generally in the City Room during the  
 24 period when Salman Abedi arrived with his backpack  
 25 twice, they may well have seen him and they may well

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1 have seen him trying to hide and they may well have  
 2 viewed him as suspicious. Is that right?  
 3 A. They may well have done, sir, yes.  
 4 Q. Again, another missed or series of missed opportunities?  
 5 A. Potentially, yes.  
 6 Q. Just for completeness, I accept that officers were in --  
 7 during the period of nearly 1 hour and 20 minutes in two  
 8 tranches, they were in the City Room for about 12 of  
 9 those minutes.  
 10 If the BTP officers had been in the City Room as  
 11 directed to be during egress, it's likely, again, that  
 12 either Salman Abedi would have been deterred or perhaps  
 13 more likely spotted by the officers and challenged. Do  
 14 you agree with that?  
 15 A. I certainly agree, sir, there is potential for that, but  
 16 of course, as the inquiry has heard, lots of ifs and  
 17 lots of -- depending on where they would have patrolled,  
 18 depending if they was contacted, but certainly  
 19 potential, yes.  
 20 Q. And we know that at 22.15, quarter past 10, a member of  
 21 the public reported to the steward, Mr Agha, where  
 22 Salman Abedi was and that he was suspicious of him. Do  
 23 you agree that if BTP officers had been in the City Room  
 24 at that time as directed, it's likely that the member of  
 25 the public or indeed Mr Agha would have reported the

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1 suspicions to them and he could have been challenged  
 2 again away from the main floor where he detonated his  
 3 bomb?  
 4 A. I fully accept that that is a probable outcome, yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the member of the public who  
 6 reported it actually said he would have spoken to  
 7 a police officer had there been one there.  
 8 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. Another failure and another very  
 9 significant missed opportunity?  
 10 A. A missed opportunity, sir, yes.  
 11 Q. I was going to ask you about CTSA's but I think I can  
 12 probably deal with that with another witness. Maybe if  
 13 I can just deal with it at a high level with you.  
 14 We know that the main CTSA input to the arena was by  
 15 Greater Manchester Police rather than British Transport  
 16 Police, but the CTSA input into the station was British  
 17 Transport Police. Should there have been a joining-up  
 18 of those two processes? Should there have been  
 19 coordination between the CTSA work on the station and  
 20 the CTSA work in relation to the City Room and the  
 21 arena?  
 22 A. Yes, absolutely, and in my professional opinion, from  
 23 what I know of the role, sir, my preferred outcome would  
 24 be a single CTSA doing both locations to have cognisance  
 25 of those issues.

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1 Q. And again, there was a failure to coordinate those two  
 2 processes and whether that can be solved by more  
 3 coordination or by a single CTSA doing it, nevertheless  
 4 there was a failure of coordination; is that right?  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 MR WEATHERBY: Those are my questions. Thank you very much,  
 7 Mr O'Callaghan.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 9 MR GREANEY: Sir, Mr Cooper has some further questions to  
 10 ask on behalf of the families.  
 11 Questions from MR COOPER  
 12 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.  
 13 Following on a little bit from Mr Weatherby's  
 14 questions, which obviously I'm not repeating, officer,  
 15 you've been asked about the actual threats that you  
 16 perceived so far as the arena is concerned and you have  
 17 dealt with that. But you and your colleagues were  
 18 perfectly aware of the generic threat that the sort of  
 19 person like Salman Abedi posed to the arena, weren't  
 20 you, generically?  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. Let me take you on that point, please, to {INQ015929/1}.  
 23 This is a British Transport Police national threat  
 24 assessment for 2017/2018, undated. I want to take you,  
 25 please, to page 8 of 30 {INQ015929/8}. If we look

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1 a little further down underneath the photograph. Just  
 2 familiarise yourself with it. It's:  
 3 "The dissemination of online materials from  
 4 terrorist groups remains highly prevalent with ISIL and  
 5 Al Qaeda being the main authors of distributed media  
 6 content. This extremist rhetoric plays a key role in  
 7 what motivates many spontaneous volatile extremists and  
 8 lone actors to conduct no-notice attacks. The mass  
 9 transit rail environment provides a plausible target  
 10 location for instigation of such attacks."  
 11 And then just the next paragraph:  
 12 "The rail network offers a target-rich environment  
 13 for terror-related activity. High footfall and heavy  
 14 utilisation of the network creates crowded places.  
 15 Coupled with the relatively low levels of security which  
 16 can be practically emplaced, the mass transit rail  
 17 environment is an attractive target for terrorists. The  
 18 terrorism threat similarly applies to police and other  
 19 uniformed staff, as well as to members of the public."  
 20 Then just this as well, on that same page in the  
 21 middle of the page, in the middle of the photograph  
 22 there's this:  
 23 "The majority of UK-based terrorist attack plots  
 24 have been planned by British residents. MI5 indicate  
 25 that there are several thousand individuals in the UK

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1 who support violent extremism or are engaged in Islamist  
 2 extremist activity. There is a continuing threat posed  
 3 by the return of British nationals who have engaged in  
 4 fighting for extremist groups overseas. Motivated  
 5 persons who have acquired skills whilst overseas may  
 6 organise attacks under direction from foreign-based  
 7 orchestrators under their own initiative or radicalise  
 8 others to conduct attacks. It is accepted that the  
 9 majority of returnees are not motivated to conduct  
 10 attacks in the UK, however the volume of returnees  
 11 implies that there is the potential for some to attempt  
 12 to conduct such activity."  
 13 Putting all those paragraphs together, whatever your  
 14 level of concern about whether the arena and an  
 15 Ariana Grande concert was at risk, what we've just read  
 16 from a British Transport Police document is exactly what  
 17 happened at the arena, isn't it?  
 18 A. Yes, it is.  
 19 Q. We have the profile, effectively, in this document of  
 20 Salman Abedi. It fits in perfectly, doesn't it, really?  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. We have the recognition of how vulnerable a crowded area  
 23 is and that it is "a target-rich environment for  
 24 terror-related activity"; correct?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. So what I'm putting to you, officer, is wasn't this on  
2 its own enough? Forget about specific references to  
3 whether Ariana Grande or the arena had been targeted  
4 before. My simple question on this topic is this:  
5 wasn't that enough of its own self for you to be  
6 concerned about the arena and concerned about an  
7 Ariana Grande concert given what British Transport  
8 Police knew when they drafted this document?  
9 A. I would see that very much as a generic document for the  
10 entire force area.  
11 Q. It's a national document, of course, but that doesn't  
12 detract, I suggest to you, from the importance of what  
13 it is saying and, more particularly, to how directly it  
14 impacts upon the arena and an Ariana Grande concert.  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. You take the point?  
17 A. Yes, sir.  
18 Q. Because up until now, you've been saying, in answer to  
19 Mr Weatherby's questions and those from Mr Greaney, that  
20 because little was done as far as the arena was  
21 concerned on 22 May 2017, it was because it wasn't  
22 considered to be particularly at risk for the reason the  
23 arena hadn't been hit before and Ariana Grande's concert  
24 hadn't been hit before. That's what you've been saying,  
25 correct?

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1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. What this document shows, doesn't it, is that there was  
3 far more there upon which you should have bitten, for  
4 want of a better expression, to protect the arena and  
5 Ariana Grande's concert; would you agree?  
6 A. Again, I'd refer back to the overall assessment and the  
7 information available. It is very generic, that  
8 document, in terms of the wider risk.  
9 Q. I'm going to suggest to you that it may well have been  
10 written generically, but it tends to, as I think you've  
11 accepted, fit in very neatly and tightly indeed to the  
12 circumstances of the arena and an Ariana Grande concert  
13 on 22 May 2017; would you agree?  
14 A. Yes, sir.  
15 Q. Just on that point about — you were, as it were, not  
16 focusing on the arena and an Ariana Grande concert  
17 because, (1), the arena hadn't fortunately been the  
18 subject of attack before and Ariana Grande, equally  
19 fortunately, her concerts had not been subject to an  
20 attack before. But would you agree that the Bataclan  
21 facility had never been targeted before?  
22 A. To my knowledge, yes.  
23 Q. And that indeed, the band playing there, who hailed  
24 under the title Eagles of Death Metal, had never  
25 themselves been targeted before?

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1 A. I accept what you're saying, sir.  
2 Q. So in actual fact, on your thesis, upon your analysis,  
3 and try and put yourself in this hypothetical position,  
4 in 2015 you wouldn't have particularly considered the  
5 Bataclan a risk?  
6 A. Correct, sir.  
7 Q. Do you accept that that attitude towards the arena and  
8 to an Ariana Grande concert at the arena was complacent?  
9 A. No, sir. Based on the fact that for policing any event,  
10 there must be a proportionate response in relation to  
11 the intelligence and information and the threat.  
12 Otherwise, the only option is for every public event  
13 crowded space to be policed by armed police officers,  
14 and that is not the posture of England, Scotland and  
15 Wales.  
16 Q. I heard your evidence of policing by consent and  
17 I recall that evidence from this morning. But let's put  
18 to one side — I'm not conceding the point on behalf of  
19 those I represent, but let's put it to one side, that,  
20 all right, not armed police officers. But there were  
21 other steps to mitigate the harm to people going to the  
22 arena on 22 May that could have been put into place,  
23 would you agree, had you — and I'll be blunt, as we all  
24 have been today, that might have made British Transport  
25 Police take the threat more seriously? Other steps to

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1 mitigate, is the question, apart from armed police  
2 officers.  
3 A. There are some tactics available.  
4 Q. I'm not going to ask you what they are. We're all very  
5 conscious, and if it has to in due course be dealt with  
6 in a closed session, then so be it. But I'll put the  
7 question generally to you. There are many, many other  
8 mitigating steps that can be put into place over and  
9 above armed police officers, aren't there? It's  
10 a simple yes or no for operational reasons, if you can.  
11 A. For operational reasons, I am satisfied to expand. Many  
12 options, no. Limited options, yes. And one of those  
13 options, which is included in my evidence, sir, so  
14 I have no issues regarding operational sensitivities, is  
15 Project Servator, which was a new document in  
16 behavioural detection and that was being deployed in  
17 London at the time but had not been rolled out  
18 nationally.  
19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: A simple thing, presumably: the greater  
20 the threat, the more people you'd have there? That may  
21 be putting it in simplistic terms.  
22 A. With respect, I'd disagree with that.  
23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Fair enough. You know more about it  
24 than I do.  
25 A. It would be down to tactics and deployable tactics.

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1 MR COOPER: The document that was on the screen is enough in  
 2 itself, isn't it, officer, for some mitigating steps to  
 3 be put into place -- I'm not putting it too highly,  
 4 I hope -- some mitigating steps to be put in place?  
 5 A. I do not seek to be disrespectful to what happened,  
 6 of course, but yes there will always be options  
 7 available, but those deployments of those sorts of  
 8 tactics must be based on evidence and must be based on  
 9 information.  
 10 Q. Mr Weatherby's ably presented to you a list of matters  
 11 which could fit into that category and the chair will be  
 12 aware of them.  
 13 I want to ask you about kebabs. You know that the  
 14 two officers, and I'm not going to go over it again,  
 15 Officer Bullough and Mark Renshaw, went off for 2 hours  
 16 for a kebab. That is a serious dereliction of duty,  
 17 wasn't it?  
 18 A. It's unacceptable, yes, sir.  
 19 Q. Are they being disciplined for it?  
 20 A. Not at this time, sir, no.  
 21 Q. Is consideration being seriously given to disciplinary  
 22 procedures as far as those two officers are concerned?  
 23 A. It is something, sir, that I haven't given thought to at  
 24 great length regarding that matter. I think at this  
 25 stage, from when it came to my attention, it'd be right

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1 and proper, or the decision I have taken regarding that  
 2 matter be right and proper to wait for the inquiry to be  
 3 concluded, should there be any comment or findings made  
 4 regarding that by yourself. But then equally, regarding  
 5 the proportionality of what I would expect to have  
 6 happened in the circumstances if that matter had been  
 7 established in relation to the level of interaction as  
 8 a result by supervising officers, in truth if that had  
 9 been found out, I would have expected words of advice to  
 10 be given at the time, for want of a better phrase, an  
 11 old-fashioned telling-off. But equally, in relation to  
 12 a discipline matter, BTP's position, the College of  
 13 Policing's position is learn, not blame. And part of  
 14 that process is very much acceptance, which I understand  
 15 that the officers have made in this inquiry regarding it  
 16 being unacceptable, and then a reflective practice. And  
 17 for me as a senior officer, knowing and having watched  
 18 that evidence, I don't think there's any greater  
 19 reflective practice than admitting your wrongdoings in  
 20 a public inquiry.  
 21 Q. That all may or may not be so, but you'll understand the  
 22 families' concerns when at least one of them has  
 23 photographs of them receiving commendations.  
 24 A. Yes, sir. If I may in relation to that matter,  
 25 of course, to date, we have heard up to a certain point

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1 in the events on 22 May 2017.  
 2 Q. I understand what you say.  
 3 A. And the officers, my officers, who we had full faith in  
 4 before that evening, and still do, went on to do  
 5 extremely brave actions with many others and I think  
 6 it would be unfair, from my point of view as their  
 7 senior officer, to link the actions of a refreshment  
 8 break to the brave and courageous actions that followed  
 9 that evening.  
 10 Q. That may have been a very fair retort, officer, and the  
 11 inquiry will obviously take that into account.  
 12 But I simply put this to you: dealing with the fact  
 13 that these two officers were away from their duties for  
 14 2 hours, simply getting a kebab, so they tell us, this  
 15 is above and beyond a telling-off, this is a serious  
 16 matter which potentially had serious consequences.  
 17 I ask you again: are disciplinary procedures being  
 18 seriously considered? The evidence is there. You don't  
 19 need, with respect to the chair, his ruling on this.  
 20 We've heard the evidence, we've heard what they've  
 21 admitted to. The evidence is already in, as it were.  
 22 On that basis, why are you waiting?  
 23 A. Again, with respect, sir, if we'd acted earlier, the  
 24 challenge may well have been that we had acted before  
 25 the findings of the inquiry. So at this moment in time

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1 I think it is right and proper that the actual  
 2 misdemeanour is considered in the circumstances as it  
 3 was, the passage of time in relation to that as well,  
 4 absolutely not taking anything away from what then  
 5 followed, but I think it is important in this moment in  
 6 time that we wait and then that decision is being taken,  
 7 but it is firmly -- we are firmly aware of that position  
 8 within British Transport Police and the view that -- as  
 9 you've just articulated it, sir.  
 10 Q. I want to ask you a little bit about pushing back the  
 11 perimeter. You have not been asked about that yet.  
 12 You're aware of the discussion and the debate about  
 13 pushing back the perimeter, as far as the City Room is  
 14 concerned, to enhance security. Are you aware of the  
 15 issue?  
 16 A. Yes, sir.  
 17 Q. And you're also no doubt aware that after this atrocity  
 18 the perimeter has been pushed back?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. I think it was Miriam Stone, when she was giving her  
 21 evidence, she indicated to the chair during the course  
 22 of this inquiry that she got the impression there was  
 23 still a very uneasy understanding between stakeholders  
 24 and others as to how long that perimeter pushback would  
 25 last. Are you aware of any friction being caused still

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1 to this day as a result of the perimeter being pushed  
2 back?  
3 A. I can say to the inquiry, sir, that I was not aware of  
4 the perimeter being pushed back until this week. In  
5 terms of friction, I haven't had any conversation  
6 regarding that matter with any stakeholders, but I can  
7 state from an operational point of view I'm satisfied,  
8 not at the risk of operational sensitivity, but  
9 I personally am not happy with the position of that  
10 pushback.  
11 Q. Perhaps you would explain then to the chair why you are  
12 not.  
13 A. Because in simplest terms, sir, it is moving one crowded  
14 space into another crowded space, that same threat.  
15 Q. So your view is that any pushing back of the perimeter  
16 is not the answer to the security problem in the  
17 City Room?  
18 A. I am not clearly an expert in security matters, but from  
19 an operational point of view, I have concerns from that,  
20 it's one crowded place from the arena into a crowded  
21 place of a busy train station and I will be seeking  
22 further tactical advice regarding that.  
23 Q. Would you accept, and I understand what you're saying,  
24 and I'm not going to press you on it in this  
25 environment, but would you accept that the consequences

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1 of the pushing back of the perimeter have at the least  
2 made the City Room safer?  
3 A. Absolutely, sir, yes. I do, but I do think the whole  
4 consequences of the perimeter issue is the consequences  
5 of building a mass entertainment venue in a city centre.  
6 Q. Or over a railway station?  
7 A. Indeed, sir.  
8 Q. The thought had occurred to a number of us, but that's  
9 probably beyond what this inquiry can achieve. It is  
10 what it is, I'm afraid.  
11 A. Yes.  
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I'm not sure that that's right  
13 in relation to future buildings of arenas --  
14 MR COOPER: Of course, sir --  
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- (overspeaking) consideration should  
16 could be given at that stage.  
17 MR COOPER: Sir, forgive me. I was thinking more of any  
18 suggestion of demolition of the place which is beyond  
19 the inquiry's ambit (overspeaking). That's what I was  
20 thinking of. I totally accept from you that the future  
21 is another matter.  
22 Have you watched the evidence of Mr Lavery?  
23 (Overspeaking). Mr Lavery reported potential hostile  
24 surveillance on 18 May.  
25 A. No, sir, I'm not familiar with that evidence.

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1 Q. Well, very shortly indeed, Mr Lavery called in on the  
2 radio, describing a black or Asian male acting  
3 suspiciously, wearing all black with a large bag on the  
4 mezzanine bridge on 18 May 2017.  
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is not the mezzanine that we've  
6 been talking about where Salman Abedi was, just so you  
7 understand, and he was not Salman Abedi, just so you  
8 know.  
9 MR COOPER: Absolutely, it's accepted he was not  
10 Salman Abedi but it was the reporting of a hostile  
11 surveillance incident.  
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just remind us exactly where that bridge  
13 is and how you get to it, if you can. If you can't,  
14 don't worry.  
15 MR COOPER: I'd have to check on that, but I can in due  
16 course assist.  
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's just I would like to go and see  
18 where it is at some stage.  
19 MR COOPER: I can certainly do that for you.  
20 My question is simply this: Mr Lavery spoke to  
21 a British Transport Police officer in the station and  
22 told that British Transport Police officer about what  
23 he'd seen.  
24 A. Sir, apologies, is this the evidence of  
25 Constable Johnson?

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1 Q. I think it may be Johnson, yes.  
2 A. I am aware of the circumstances.  
3 Q. And that Mr Lavery reported the matter then to that  
4 British Transport Police officer as to what he'd seen.  
5 As far as he was concerned, that is Lavery, he wasn't  
6 aware of any action that was taken, he never heard any  
7 more of it, and it seems to be a little bit of a mystery  
8 as to what happened. Do you know what happened with  
9 Mr Lavery's report?  
10 A. Yes, I do.  
11 Q. Can you help us?  
12 A. Yes, certainly, sir. Enquiries were put in place by the  
13 officer regarding initially attending the platform to  
14 see if the said suspect could be seen. In terms of  
15 railway speak, in terms of trains, trains are identified  
16 by what is known as a header code to identify that  
17 actual train itself. The officer obtained a header code  
18 for that train and then made enquiries with the train  
19 operating company to secure CCTV. Information was  
20 forwarded on to stations ahead of the line and, to the  
21 best of my recollection, sir, no trace was made of the  
22 said gentleman. But a number of efforts to the level  
23 that I would expect were followed through in relation to  
24 that report of suspicious activity.  
25 Q. Was all that put in writing and logged and properly

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1 recorded?  
 2 A. To the best of my knowledge, sir, yes, and I have seen  
 3 the officer's notebook in relation to that.  
 4 Q. I see. It may be of interest to the inquiry, it's  
 5 a matter for the chair, for us to see that notebook if  
 6 you can obtain it.  
 7 A. It's certainly in existence. It's part of my bundle, so  
 8 I can make that available.  
 9 Q. Was the result of that reported back to SMG or ShowSec?  
 10 A. I cannot answer that question.  
 11 Q. If we've already got it, sir, I apologise, I just can't  
 12 remember.  
 13 MR GREANEY: We're just checking. I think Mr Gibbs is  
 14 confident that we do have it.  
 15 MR COOPER: Thank you.  
 16 Primacy, please, and I would like you to look at --  
 17 and I'm aware that you're aware of this document,  
 18 although it was before your time -- {INQ001867/1}. This  
 19 is the only other document I'm referring you to. It's  
 20 a series of emails. We can start right at the beginning  
 21 so you can familiarise yourself.  
 22 We see the date there of 21 September 2018. It is  
 23 from a Mr Fitzpatrick at British Transport Police. Do  
 24 you know by any chance who that is?  
 25 A. First of all, sir, I'm familiar with the document and my

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1 understanding, sir, is that DCI Fitzpatrick was an  
 2 officer assigned to build evidence to assist the  
 3 Kerslake Inquiry and, to the best of my knowledge, that  
 4 officer is no longer with BTP.  
 5 Q. Thank you. It's to Mariel Irvine; do you know who she  
 6 is?  
 7 A. That is our solicitor instructing this inquiry, sir.  
 8 Q. Thank you. Let's get some orientation. This is:  
 9 "Please see below commentary around who has primacy  
 10 from a CTSA perspective."  
 11 We read from the bottom:  
 12 "From Allan Gregory."  
 13 And this is a little earlier which begins it:  
 14 "Thanks for the chance to see and comment. Eddie  
 15 has the longest memory. Frankly, I think the  
 16 arrangements pre-incident are a sign of collaborative  
 17 strength and not confusion. The ends are the same. The  
 18 two agencies knew what was happening and the advice  
 19 stands regardless. GMP have a wider responsibility  
 20 in the city centre, of which the arena is part. Efforts  
 21 to wrestle any responsibility back now would be  
 22 reputationally risky. How would that look?"  
 23 Can I ask you a little bit about that, please?  
 24 I know you didn't write it, but it's the expression:  
 25 "GMP have a wider responsibility for the city centre

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1 of which the arena is part. Efforts to wrestle [and I  
 2 emphasise 'wrestle'] any responsibility back now would  
 3 be reputationally risky. How would that look?"  
 4 Can you explain there why such terminology is being  
 5 used?  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we get the context of this so we  
 7 understand? This is the fact that the arena had a GMP  
 8 CTSA rather than a BTP CTSA, is it?  
 9 A. Yes, sir. That's my understanding.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So within that context, would you like  
 11 to see if you can explain that language?  
 12 A. Yes. This -- in high level summary, sir, I would refer  
 13 back to my comments this morning to Mr Greaney, and  
 14 a similar set of circumstances regarding the letters  
 15 between the two deputy chief constables. It would not  
 16 be right and appropriate post-event at this time,  
 17 especially in relation to the Kerslake Review, to start  
 18 deciding who was best placed to deliver the service.  
 19 That is my understanding.  
 20 MR COOPER: Yes, officer, and you say it eloquently and  
 21 neutrally and professionally today. I'm asking about  
 22 the language used by colleagues then, which I suggest to  
 23 you is quite different:  
 24 "GMP have a wider responsibility in the city area of  
 25 which the arena is part. Efforts to wrestle ..."

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1 Would GMP have to be wrestled with, for instance, by  
 2 British Transport Police to get any powers off them?  
 3 A. I would extremely doubt it, sir. That would be  
 4 a professional conversation.  
 5 Q. Well, wrestle seems to imply there's some sort of  
 6 friction or there was some sort of friction between GMP  
 7 and British Transport Police.  
 8 A. Again, I don't know the context of that document. What  
 9 I would say from my learning of a lack of existing  
 10 relationship between the two -- I do not perceive that  
 11 that was because of an issue between the two CTSA's.  
 12 I think my assumption -- because of course I'm not the  
 13 author of this document -- is it is just a phrase being  
 14 used by the chief superintendent.  
 15 Q. Well, people in your position and his position are  
 16 intelligent people who use words carefully, but that is  
 17 as it may. How is the superintendent -- can you explain  
 18 his language "reputationally risky"? whose reputation  
 19 might be at risk?  
 20 A. I can only assume, sir. It's either the force -- from  
 21 that, I cannot comment, I was not the author.  
 22 Q. Why would their reputation, from your own general  
 23 knowledge of relationships between Greater Manchester  
 24 Police and British Transport Police, be a matter of  
 25 reputation if there's a difference of opinion? Why does

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1 reputation come into it?  
 2 A. From my point of view, sir, I do not see it as that way.  
 3 Obviously, I would not wish to comment on why another  
 4 person had written the words that they had done.  
 5 Q. Can I suggest to you this reveals perhaps a soft  
 6 underbelly of the relationship between Greater  
 7 Manchester Police and British Transport Police and that  
 8 of more friction than you're prepared at the moment to  
 9 accept?  
 10 A. No, sir, I disagree with that. I respect your view of  
 11 the document, but I have no evidence to suggest that.  
 12 Certainly even at my level, sir, I have a good working  
 13 relationship with ACC Bailey, ACC Jackson, I have been  
 14 to GMP Headquarters regarding intraoperability in the  
 15 past in my role. That is not a position I recognise.  
 16 Q. That may well be or may not be a matter for this inquiry  
 17 as to whether now that is the case.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, it is. Can I just ask a question  
 19 to follow up on that?  
 20 If I may say so, you've had a perfectly reasonable  
 21 and professional way in which you have discussed the  
 22 question of primacy. Looking back over early  
 23 documentation in this inquiry, which you may or may not  
 24 have seen, the response by BTP to suggestions by the  
 25 experts that it may be that GMP were the more suitable

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1 people to deal with policing the arena was not met with  
 2 joy exactly. In fact, it was fairly strenuously  
 3 objected to, I think it would be fair to say from my  
 4 recollection of what the wording was, and suggested  
 5 perhaps more that, so far as BTP were concerned, they  
 6 were the right people to be doing it and any suggestion  
 7 to the contrary was entirely wrong.  
 8 Now, what you have said today is that there will be  
 9 a professional discussion which will take place between  
 10 BTP and GMP and whatever is in the best interests of the  
 11 public will be what will transpire?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I hope it's the second one rather than  
 14 the one that was perhaps indicated earlier on. I don't  
 15 know whether you will you've seen the responses to  
 16 what was said by the experts.  
 17 A. No, I haven't, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be the way the experts expressed  
 19 it which generated that, I have no idea. There does  
 20 seem to have been somewhat of a change of tone,  
 21 a welcome change of tone.  
 22 MR COOPER: What I'm asking you on behalf of the families is  
 23 what the tone was in 2017. Do you understand? Which  
 24 was round about the time when critical decisions were  
 25 being made about the safety of people at the arena and,

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1 without going into what the tone is now, would you  
 2 accept that -- we are going to go through some other  
 3 emails in a moment. Would you accept that the tone  
 4 being shown here is one of bruised egos between police  
 5 forces?  
 6 A. I honestly don't recognise that. I respect your  
 7 position on that. I know what I can say. I know in  
 8 depth the chief superintendent and what I can say is he  
 9 is nothing more than a gentleman in terms of how he  
 10 deals with me and his officers, so that tone is not  
 11 something that I recognise or even would perceive to be  
 12 in the negative way that it appears off the page, sir.  
 13 Q. And as a result of that battle of the egos, the safety  
 14 of people on 22 May 2017 may have been put in jeopardy?  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We'll obviously have to look at  
 16 that. Have you actually got emails dating back to May  
 17 or pre-dating May 2017 when there were conversations  
 18 about who should have primacy?  
 19 MR COOPER: I have looked for them, I can't find them. This  
 20 is probably one of the earliest I've seen, about a year  
 21 later, when it is potentially going on. We'll carry on  
 22 the search, of course, sir.  
 23 Can I ask you to scroll down, please, Mr Lopez?  
 24 Take us to the bottom of the page. Could you take me to  
 25 the first page, please? I've lost my orientation on

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1 this. And the next page {INQ001867/2}, please.  
 2 Thank you.  
 3 This is a document which has a date of 20 September  
 4 at 13.05. For context, it is from Edward Wylie, who we  
 5 know is British Transport Police and who is very closely  
 6 associated with the arena.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. He says this:  
 9 "This has been the position for a number of years  
 10 along with out CTSA when required. BTP CTSA's have been  
 11 involved, it hasn't been neglected, and have worked  
 12 together. The reason why is relatively simple and it is  
 13 due to the location of the arena. The arena sitting  
 14 firmly within the city centre attracts various checks by  
 15 many agencies, none of which are BTP resources, such as  
 16 licensing and Trading Standards officers. I think from  
 17 memory there are legislative requirements within the  
 18 city centre that require individual functions, such as  
 19 CTSU, to be GMP requirements. The relationship was and,  
 20 as far as I know, still is a very good one and shares  
 21 information when necessary."  
 22 Next page {INQ001867/3}, please:  
 23 "So in summary it is the city centre that is  
 24 important in all this, not the jurisdiction /primacy of  
 25 the owning force or otherwise. Personally, it never has

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1 been an issue and works well. Hope this helps."  
 2 And that's Edward Wylie. Do you agree with  
 3 Mr Wylie's assessment?  
 4 A. Yes, I do.  
 5 Q. Thank you. Then looking further down, just to get,  
 6 again -- in fairness to you, I'll read the final few  
 7 emails. A little earlier, 20 September, 12.14:  
 8 "You may wish to weigh in" --  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think you've read the response to  
 10 that. It's the response (overspeaking).  
 11 MR COOPER: I'm reading it backwards, yes, I'm sorry.  
 12 The next page {INQ001867/4}, please. Starting it  
 13 off, really, it seems James Fitzpatrick:  
 14 "Morning, Jo. It appears that the GMP CTSA has  
 15 a good working relationship with the arena and I would  
 16 imagine that has increased post attack. If it is  
 17 exactly the same advice and the GMP CTSA has the local  
 18 knowledge, it is my view why should we change something  
 19 that isn't broken. I suppose the only caveat is that  
 20 the BTP CTSA just touches base with the GMP counterpart  
 21 to ensure that there are no issues for BTP to consider  
 22 in the round with Victoria Station."  
 23 Would you agree with that, officer?  
 24 A. Absolutely, sir.  
 25 Q. Thank you.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, do you? I thought you went rather  
 2 further than that --  
 3 A. Yes (overspeaking) personal professional preference is  
 4 it would be one CTSA for both locations (overspeaking).  
 5 MR COOPER: Because the expression here is it's just  
 6 "touching base". Would that satisfy you? Do you think  
 7 that is the answer or do you want a little more  
 8 involvement than touching base?  
 9 A. No, absolutely. My view, having had the opportunity to  
 10 review the process, is it has to be either full exchange  
 11 of information, sharing of documents, discussion, or my  
 12 preference as I said earlier, a single CTSA for both  
 13 locations under, as the description as DAC D'Orsi  
 14 described to the court, it's a national function,  
 15 singular training, all managed through NaCTSO. That  
 16 would make perfect sense for me for either/or but one  
 17 single CTSA.  
 18 Q. Last page, please, Mr Lopez {INQ001867/4}. It's  
 19 background. By all means peruse it, officer, but  
 20 I think I've taken you to what I need to.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we're going back in time.  
 22 MR COOPER: It is, sir. Thank you.  
 23 You indicated in your evidence this morning --  
 24 I think you used a quantification of about 5,000  
 25 people -- it was a hypothetical number -- in the

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1 City Room in the arena would not attract the need for  
 2 any police presence; is that right?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That was mine based on roughly 15,000  
 5 split between three main exits.  
 6 MR COOPER: I'm going to ask you a question which I'm going  
 7 to ask you to not answer straightaway in case it's  
 8 sensitive. So we can get some form of comparison, you  
 9 indicated that per day there are 26,000 people going  
 10 through Victoria Station.  
 11 A. Yes, sir.  
 12 Q. My question, which you won't answer, please, until we're  
 13 sure it's safe to do so is: how many police officers are  
 14 deployed to protect those 26,000?  
 15 MR GREANEY: I think that, sir, certainly is operationally  
 16 sensitive. It's an understandable question, but one  
 17 that we should explore in the restricted session in due  
 18 course.  
 19 MR COOPER: I suspected as such.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be that just the answer will be  
 21 sufficient for you without it being made public.  
 22 MR COOPER: The answer would be more than sufficient.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you be good enough to find it for  
 24 us?  
 25 A. I already know the answer so I am more than happy to

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1 share it.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we are thinking at any one time  
 3 rather than cumulatively?  
 4 A. I'm more than happy to help assist the inquiry with that  
 5 information. I have it ready.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 7 MR COOPER: I've nearly come to the conclusion of my  
 8 questions of you. I simply just want to double-check  
 9 what you said this afternoon. You are of the clear  
 10 view, are you, that the presence of a police officer,  
 11 even a single police officer, in his or her uniform acts  
 12 as no deterrent whatsoever or would have acted as no  
 13 whatsoever in the context of the arena?  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I haven't interpreted his answer that  
 15 way. We need to find out. I interpreted it as being:  
 16 it may do, it may not do, it depends.  
 17 A. Correct, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Someone may be put off by the presence  
 19 of one police officer, others may simply not mind at  
 20 all. That's the way I interpreted it.  
 21 MR COOPER: I only ask the question because I'm aware of it  
 22 and we've referred to it already in this inquiry,  
 23 a number of pieces of documentation where it  
 24 specifically said the presence of officers in uniform  
 25 was a significant deterrent effect and I was simply

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1 going to ask this officer, and it's my last question.  
 2 Would you agree that the presence of an officer in  
 3 uniform is of itself a deterrent effect?  
 4 A. Maybe to some, sir. The reason -- I'd quantify that  
 5 with something that's happened in this city that I'd  
 6 referred to earlier -- many will know in the exact same  
 7 location in Manchester Victoria Station, on  
 8 31 December 2018, a further terrorism attack occurred,  
 9 and from that inquiry we know that that terrorist walked  
 10 straight past four BTP officers in full uniform, high  
 11 visibility jackets, on to the tram tracks of the  
 12 Metrolink and attacked two people from this city. The  
 13 BTP officers intervened and that officer was attacked as  
 14 well. So we know from real experience, pure visibility  
 15 policing on its own does not deter a terrorist in some  
 16 cases.  
 17 Q. I'm sure we can all think of tragic instances where an  
 18 officer's been killed, for instance, in London, and  
 19 clearly that didn't deter that appalling individual.  
 20 I won't do percentages with you, we'll work that in  
 21 later.  
 22 I just have one point of clarification. PC Corke we  
 23 know, was not present -- I am still trying to work out --  
 24 where was he?  
 25 A. He had been in the custody suite, dealing with a

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1 prisoner. He then went to his posting in Piccadilly  
 2 en route to the arena. Through his decision-making, he  
 3 went to check a vulnerable premises that was subject to  
 4 burglary or to theft and was then making his way to the  
 5 arena and my understanding was that his vehicle was then  
 6 in Trinity Way at the point that PC Bullough put up the  
 7 information regarding the bomb being detonated.  
 8 Q. And his places of duty during the time that you've  
 9 described, are they logged and recorded in accordance  
 10 with normal practice or are there gaps?  
 11 A. I haven't seen his pocket notebook, sir. It may be  
 12 probable that those visits were there. My understanding  
 13 is those movements were confirmed with another colleague  
 14 that was with him and personally I have no reason to  
 15 doubt those movements.  
 16 MR COOPER: I'm in the inquiry's hands as to whether that  
 17 should be just verified, but I have no further  
 18 questions.  
 19 MR GREANEY: Sir, in a moment I'm going to call on Mr Gibbs  
 20 to ask his questions. Could I first of all answer or  
 21 seek to answer a question that you posed about where the  
 22 mezzanine bridge is that was described by  
 23 Constable Lavery? That bridge is accessed in a number  
 24 of ways, I believe in three ways. First of all, when  
 25 one enters the station and goes through the ticket

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1 barriers, in front of you would be steps that lead up to  
 2 a bridge which gives access to other platforms. That is  
 3 what BTP describe as the mezzanine bridge or did so  
 4 at the time.  
 5 That can also be accessed in two other ways. First  
 6 of all, the grey doors upon which Mr Agha was positioned  
 7 give access to the mezzanine bridge and, secondly, the  
 8 red doors, so the Fifty Pence doors, also give access to  
 9 the mezzanine bridge and I'm grateful to Mr O'Connor for  
 10 confirming that my understanding is correct.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 12 MR GREANEY: I will now call on Mr Gibbs.  
 13 MR GIBBS: So for instance, when the BTP officers ran in  
 14 response to the bomb, they ran through the ticket  
 15 barriers, up those steps on to what we call the  
 16 mezzanine bridge, along and through the red doors into  
 17 the Fifty Pence area, and then back left and into the  
 18 City Room.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. That's very helpful,  
 20 thank you.  
 21 Questions from MR GIBBS  
 22 MR GIBBS: You've just been asked about the deterrent effect  
 23 potentially of armed officers -- I beg your pardon, of  
 24 uniformed officers and that sometimes that may be  
 25 a deterrent to a particular person who's bent on mayhem.

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1 A. Yes, it may well be.  
 2 Q. Sometimes it won't be?  
 3 A. Indeed, sir.  
 4 Q. Sometimes the uniformed officer may be exactly the  
 5 person whom the person has in mind to harm?  
 6 A. Absolutely, sir, and history has shown that, yes.  
 7 Q. Primacy and jurisdiction. May I just go back to that to  
 8 clear it up a bit? Section 31(f):  
 9 "BTP officers have policing powers not just in the  
 10 station but on the adjoining Network Rail land."  
 11 A. Yes, sir.  
 12 Q. And that includes the arena surrounds?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. Including the entrances and exits that we know about?  
 15 A. Indeed.  
 16 Q. And we have seen CCTV stills of the patrolling officers  
 17 patrolling that full perimeter and up and around?  
 18 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 19 Q. Do GMP officers also have the powers of a constable in  
 20 all of those areas?  
 21 A. Yes, they do indeed, both forces.  
 22 Q. And so in terms of jurisdiction, by which I mean  
 23 policing power, there is an overlap of jurisdiction?  
 24 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 25 Q. So what's required when we then turn to primacy is

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1 a practical policing arrangement for who will take the  
 2 lead in providing those policing services?  
 3 A. That's correct, yes.  
 4 Q. Is that right?  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 Q. In the overlapping areas?  
 7 A. Absolutely.  
 8 Q. You've told us that in the arena, and the arena  
 9 surrounds, that practical policing arrangement wasn't  
 10 written down anywhere.  
 11 A. That's right, yes.  
 12 Q. But was it long established?  
 13 A. Over 25 years, sir.  
 14 Q. Had it been a problem?  
 15 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.  
 16 Q. Is it a problem today?  
 17 A. Not to my knowledge and I can confirm that from my  
 18 visits and discussions when I took over I asked that  
 19 very question of Miriam Stone.  
 20 Q. As for what the arrangement should be, who should take  
 21 the lead for providing the policing services in the  
 22 overlapped jurisdiction, on one side of the arena  
 23 there's the city centre?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. On the other side of the arena there's a railway

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1 station?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. GMP police the city centre, BTP police the railway  
 4 station?  
 5 A. Correct, yes.  
 6 Q. The arena sits in a city centre, it also sits alongside  
 7 a railway station.  
 8 A. Yes, sir.  
 9 Q. So who should take the lead?  
 10 A. In terms of responding, it should be both, is the  
 11 response. Calls for assistance and the actual lead as  
 12 a result of this inquiry to be found should therefore be  
 13 subject to discussion between both forces for the right  
 14 outcome.  
 15 Q. If that begs the question: well, by policing services  
 16 what policing services do you have in mind? Can I just  
 17 pull apart four different ...  
 18 Day-to-day policing. Policing an event or policing  
 19 while there's an event on. CTSA advice for the premises  
 20 and, quite differently, a response by lots of people  
 21 including police officers to a terrorist incident.  
 22 Day-to-day policing; could either force do that?  
 23 A. Absolutely, sir.  
 24 Q. Policing events or policing during events; could either  
 25 force do that?

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1 A. Absolutely, sir.  
 2 Q. CTSA advice; could either force provide that?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. Is there any difference between the training that BTP  
 5 CTSA's receive and the training which GMP CTSA's receive?  
 6 A. In simplest terms, same course, same room.  
 7 Q. Responding to a terrorist incident. Can either force  
 8 take the lead in that?  
 9 A. In purest terms, yes, sir.  
 10 Q. In fact, does the local force always take the lead?  
 11 A. History would show, yes, and I think that would be the  
 12 right response, yes, sir.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, armed policemen are obviously  
 14 very important for responding to a terrorist attack.  
 15 Yours are rather a long way away.  
 16 A. Not now, sir. We have armed officers in Manchester.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But then they were?  
 18 A. No then, sir, correct.  
 19 MR GIBBS: Dealing with the chairman's question, there were  
 20 no BTP armed officers outside London?  
 21 A. Correct, sir.  
 22 Q. But now there are?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. Including in Manchester?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. If I could ask that a document be put on screen.  
 2 {INQ010583/1}. I think it may be a neat encapsulation  
 3 of the position. We recognise it immediately. It's the  
 4 multi-agency generic response plan.  
 5 If we could go to paragraph 37, I think Mr Greaney  
 6 dealt with this in his opening a long time ago now --  
 7 page 37 {INQ010583/37}, sorry.  
 8 This is the page that deals with British Transport  
 9 Police and it's down the bottom there:  
 10 "British Transport Police plays a role akin to  
 11 Greater Manchester Police, albeit in a more specialist  
 12 environment. The force takes responsibility for the  
 13 investigation/management of all crime or incidents  
 14 (except terrorism) occurring upon the rail  
 15 infrastructure nationally."  
 16 And it goes on to say --  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. So in cases of terrorism, what normally happens in terms  
 19 of the policing lead?  
 20 A. That would be either the main local geographical force  
 21 or, in truth, as happened here, would be the  
 22 Counter-terrorism Network local unit would have the  
 23 overall responsibility. But in terms of, in truth, the  
 24 emergency response to such an event, that would  
 25 generally be the local Home Office force.

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1 Q. Okay.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you tell me the date of this  
 3 document?  
 4 MR GIBBS: It's 2016. It's the one in force at the time,  
 5 I think. Can we go back to the first page  
 6 {INQ010583/1}? Do you see it down the bottom there,  
 7 sir?  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, thank you very much.  
 9 MR GIBBS: Thank you.  
 10 So back to those four things, so day-to-day  
 11 policing, policing during events, CTSA advice, and  
 12 responding to a terrorist incident. Leave on one side  
 13 what the chairman may have to say about who he thinks  
 14 should best do each of those things. At the moment, so  
 15 far as you can see, is there any confusion about who  
 16 provides day-to-day policing?  
 17 A. No, sir.  
 18 Q. Is there any confusion at the moment about who provides  
 19 the police resources during an event at the arena?  
 20 A. No, sir.  
 21 Q. Is there any confusion about who provides the CTSA  
 22 advice?  
 23 A. No, sir.  
 24 Q. And is there any confusion about who will take the lead  
 25 in responding, heaven forbid, to any terrorist incident?

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1 A. No, sir.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for that. But the problem  
 3 I may be faced with is that on the night of this attack,  
 4 a terrorist attack, it was not sorted out until quite  
 5 late in the day, late in the event, who was taking  
 6 primacy. That may be because people were not  
 7 following — I don't know what the status of this  
 8 particular document is or whether it binds anybody or  
 9 not, but that seems to me, would you agree, something  
 10 which needs to be sorted out in relation to a terrorist  
 11 attack, who takes primacy and when it is arranged and  
 12 when it is — so it's agreed as soon as possible?  
 13 A. I'm trying, sir, with respect, not to stray into the  
 14 future chapters.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, right.  
 16 A. Yes, I think I would save my comment for then, if I may.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The other thing is the CTSA. There's no  
 18 doubt about who does it, but you don't think it's very  
 19 satisfactory as it is?  
 20 A. Correct, sir.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll come back to what I was saying.  
 22 MR GIBBS: The witness has set me a very good example  
 23 because I was about to respond at length to your  
 24 question to me.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I was only responding to you, Mr Gibbs.

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1 You take all responsibility for straying into different  
 2 areas.  
 3 MR GIBBS: Certainly.  
 4 The policing experts' views on primacy, which, as my  
 5 learned friend Mr Greaney has taken you to, are quite  
 6 neatly set out just on this topic in Deputy Chief  
 7 Constable Pilling's letter, so let's have a look at them  
 8 there, please. It's {INQ036998/2}. The top of the page  
 9 is what I wanted to go to. This is just to really cover  
 10 it. It's the phrase "Mass public entertainment" in  
 11 line 3. You said something about it. I'm going to ask  
 12 you to expand:  
 13 "For BTP to have operational primacy and  
 14 responsibility for planning and command response to the  
 15 Manchester Arena is not in our view [that's these  
 16 experts] appropriate. BTP are the specialists in  
 17 policing the high risks of a railway network..."  
 18 Do you agree with that?  
 19 A. We are certainly specialists in policing the railway  
 20 network.  
 21 Q. Let's carry on:  
 22 "... and not places of mass public entertainment."  
 23 Stripping that out:  
 24 "BTP are not specialists in policing places of mass  
 25 public entertainment."

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1 Are you?  
 2 A. We're not experts per se, and as I mentioned this  
 3 morning, sir, I do not recognise what that would look  
 4 like in terms of an expert force anywhere in the country  
 5 regarding any entertainment location.  
 6 Q. Entertainment locations or mass entertainment locations  
 7 are likely to be or to include crowded spaces?  
 8 A. Yes. And in that context, what I would counter with  
 9 that is BTP are absolutely experts in dealing with mass  
 10 crowds and significant crowded spaces from a number of  
 11 environments, not just on the network, sir, and  
 12 day-to-day railway policing, but our experience  
 13 throughout the calendar year with other events up and  
 14 down the country, in London, such as the Notting Hill  
 15 Carnival, we have a significant role with the  
 16 Metropolitan Police in that area, we have extensive  
 17 knowledge in other sporting events, and I would point  
 18 the inquiry to things such as the Principality Stadium  
 19 and the Six Nations events in Cardiff — our  
 20 jurisdiction as such to the stadium doors. We police  
 21 some 45,000 people on ingress and egress through the  
 22 station.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sometimes.  
 24 A. Yes, sir. In other events such as Pride in Brighton,  
 25 mass, mass public events that BTP are expert, in my

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1 view, of dealing with those and seeing — again, for the  
 2 arena side, I see that ingress and egress as a rush hour  
 3 in and out of what we would deal with on a daily basis.  
 4 MR GIBBS: Can we then also just think about entertainment  
 5 as well? Some railway stations are very simple, almost  
 6 single rooms in the middle of the countryside —  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. — without even a café.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Some are large footprint premises which have quite a lot  
 11 of retail and leisure on them.  
 12 A. Yes, absolutely. Certainly in the last decade, the move  
 13 has been nationally, through a lot of predominantly  
 14 Network Rail locations, to massively expand and some of  
 15 those venues we now consider effectively to be shopping  
 16 centres with a train station attached, so a significant  
 17 change in the look and feel of railway stations  
 18 nationally.  
 19 Q. So I don't know whether you're experts or what you'd  
 20 call yourself more modestly, but are you at least  
 21 experienced in policing those sorts of large stations?  
 22 A. Absolutely, for decades, yes, sir.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just raise one issue about this,  
 24 which may have some relevance? I get in a lot of  
 25 trouble for raising licensing issues, but actually

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1 a branch of the ordinary police force, GMP for example,  
 2 would have their own licensing officer or officers who  
 3 actually police premises with licences. Part of that is  
 4 to make sure the conditions of the licence are fulfilled  
 5 such as the stewarding and things like that. So they  
 6 are doing that in relation to large entertainment  
 7 venues. Is that an argument for saying that all the  
 8 policing should be done by them or not?  
 9 A. I don't believe so, sir. We have many examples  
 10 specifically regarding the licensing side where we don't  
 11 have our own licensing officer, but many examples of  
 12 where we have worked with the Home Office force  
 13 regarding licensing conditions in both pub and  
 14 restaurant environments, but equally across a number of  
 15 licences, yes, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 17 MR GIBBS: Just to pick up on that and follow it: BTP  
 18 doesn't have a licensing unit?  
 19 A. No, sir.  
 20 Q. It doesn't have licensing officers, but if there were,  
 21 say, a problem with a pub on the concourse of a station,  
 22 which perennially had rowdy football supporters outside  
 23 it and they were traumatising the rest of the population  
 24 and the local force took that to the licensing  
 25 authorities, might BTP be asked to contribute to the

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1 objection or to contribute information to the  
 2 application?  
 3 A. Absolutely, sir, and again, sir, there is evidence of us  
 4 instructing solicitors to act on our behalf for that  
 5 purpose, even to assist other forces yes, sir.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 7 MR GIBBS: You gave an illustration of a train crash in  
 8 Wales this morning. Obviously, that wasn't a terrorist  
 9 incident.  
 10 A. No, sir.  
 11 Q. That's just a straight train crash. You used it as an  
 12 example of, I think in response to the chairman's  
 13 enquiry, about how easy it was to sort out who's going  
 14 to take the lead. Can you just say a bit more about  
 15 that? In the context of that incident what made it  
 16 relatively simple to sort out by contrast with what the  
 17 chairman isn't, we agree, going to get into now in the  
 18 confusion of the aftermath of this bomb?  
 19 A. Yes. So that incident, in very brief context, was  
 20 a fuel train that crashed and lost significant volumes  
 21 of fuel. The train caught fire and there was a  
 22 significant environmental threat that still continues to  
 23 the coast of South Wales.  
 24 Following, again without stepping into future  
 25 chapters, but all agencies got together under the JESIP

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1 principles, although removed, so effectively the way  
 2 that we approached that as senior strategic commanders  
 3 was — the co-location was through telephony at this  
 4 point. Communicating and talking to each other and then  
 5 understanding the coordination of who would be best  
 6 suited to coordinate that incident.  
 7 Discussion — that was multiple partners,  
 8 Home Office police force, a fire and rescue service,  
 9 environmental services, including Welsh Government as  
 10 well, that coordination was — it was agreed that would  
 11 be best placed with British Transport Police very much  
 12 in a coordination role. We are not experts in  
 13 environmental, that involved things such as fishing  
 14 industry, cockle beds, impact to local communities, the  
 15 whole evacuation of a Welsh village, and then a rapid  
 16 joint understanding of what the risks were to the  
 17 community, fire to other houses, and then understanding,  
 18 as JESIP says at the end, and understanding the shared  
 19 situational awareness of what issues faced us and what  
 20 we was all working to together.  
 21 That matter was dealt with at that time, sir, and  
 22 then in line with major incident response and civil  
 23 contingencies a strategic coordination group was set up  
 24 and again throughout the subsequent 7 days that that  
 25 incident ran, at a strategic response level, at each

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1 point it was agreed, following the JESIP principles  
 2 again, that I myself as the Gold Commander was best  
 3 placed to continue to lead that multi-agency response to  
 4 a complex matter that was beyond just a simple train  
 5 crash.  
 6 Q. Okay. Did BTP in that case have a written arrangement  
 7 about primacy with the local force?  
 8 A. No, sir. That was discussed and established on the  
 9 night.  
 10 Q. Does BTP have written arrangements about primacy with  
 11 any Home Office forces?  
 12 A. Not to my knowledge. Nothing that I've come across in  
 13 my 2.5 years, no.  
 14 Q. A point that was being made, in potential criticism, was  
 15 that this question of primacy, which has been ventilated  
 16 in the correspondence between the senior GMP officer and  
 17 the senior BTP officer was being ventilated 3 years  
 18 after the event. And the question is asked: well,  
 19 shouldn't this have been done sooner? But the question  
 20 of primacy for policing the arena passing from BTP to  
 21 GMP, was that a recommendation that first appeared in  
 22 the expert policing report?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. For instance, had Lord Kerslake's review said anything  
 25 about that?

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1 A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.  
 2 Q. If we go to an exercise example, and you've been asked  
 3 about Sherman, do you remember the scenarios in Sherman?  
 4 Have you looked at the Sherman documents?  
 5 A. Yes, I have.  
 6 Q. In Sherman, which was being delivered by GMP to a number  
 7 of audiences, including the one in the city centre where  
 8 Mrs Wedderburn and Mr Cooper went for BTP, was there any  
 9 question in that documentation about who had primacy?  
 10 A. No, sir.  
 11 Q. Would you just clarify one very small historical detail  
 12 about the PSIA system? You said that it hadn't been  
 13 taken up or hadn't been required of BTP when it was  
 14 first brought in in 2014.  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. And you said, you said it all quite quickly, although  
 17 the transcriber caught it, that that was -- BTP weren't  
 18 required to do that until 2015?  
 19 A. That's correct, sir.  
 20 Q. And you mentioned the National Rail Security Programme.  
 21 Can you say what that is and why that explained the  
 22 delay?  
 23 A. Yes, sir. If I can summarise, sir, because the  
 24 programme is operationally sensitive to the railway, but  
 25 effectively it's about the security and protection of

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1 the infrastructure and railway buildings up and down the  
 2 country.  
 3 Q. So is that quite an onerous regime?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. With its own regulator?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. Who is subject to it?  
 8 A. From my working knowledge of that, that is Network Rail  
 9 and the train operating companies with strict scrutiny  
 10 through the Department of Transport's Land and Transport  
 11 Securities Department.  
 12 Q. Is there an overlap or was there perceived certainly  
 13 initially to be an overlap between that and the PSIA  
 14 scoring system?  
 15 A. Absolutely, that is my understanding. We would not be  
 16 allowed to ignore a national process for no good reason.  
 17 Q. Thank you.  
 18 Inspector Lewis' report. This was his idea?  
 19 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.  
 20 Q. This was back in 2003?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Has much changed since then?  
 23 A. Not in relation to charging, sir, no.  
 24 Q. In relation to the entire licensing regime, there have  
 25 been a few changes?

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1 A. Yes, absolutely.  
 2 Q. Since 2003, and you have said that it ended up with  
 3 advice being sought from a solicitor and apparently no  
 4 changes being made, since then has the relationship  
 5 between the arena and BTP appeared to work all right?  
 6 A. Yes, absolutely, sir.  
 7 Q. Might one go further than that?  
 8 A. I think it is a real positive partnership working  
 9 arrangement and I say that from being an officer  
 10 involved in community partnerships across the county  
 11 force in my previous force in Essex. I would go as far  
 12 as to say the working relationship between GMP and BTP  
 13 is exemplary and real good, not just from a corporate  
 14 side of view, but from those individuals who are  
 15 operating on a daily basis on the ground, event  
 16 managers, duty managers, and my team.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's fair to say it's improved a lot  
 18 since May 2017 then?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the idea of not being able to  
 21 contact a police officer on the station, and not being  
 22 able to get through and having to send someone to go out  
 23 and find them was not very satisfactory, was it?  
 24 A. It wasn't, sir, but I wouldn't put that down to  
 25 relationship, that was down to process. The

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1 relationship from my assessment of having read documents  
 2 and speaking to people such as Ms Stone in my visit, the  
 3 relationship was good then but it has certainly only  
 4 grown over that time.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it's fair to say if good  
 6 relationships don't lead to good processes the good  
 7 relationship may not be of use except to say you get on  
 8 well together.  
 9 A. Yes, sir. But I have seen no evidence to the contrary  
 10 of that. I have not seen any process not put in place  
 11 through that period of time.  
 12 MR GIBBS: Your attention was drawn to two paragraphs in  
 13 particular in Mr Lewis' report and I just wanted to  
 14 complete the second of the references, so if we could go  
 15 to {INQ036812/5}.  
 16 If we could expand the bottom part of the page,  
 17 please. You were taken to 4.4 and 4.7. Can we just  
 18 look at 4.7:  
 19 "There have been occasions, however, when there have  
 20 been insufficient resources to police events  
 21 satisfactorily."  
 22 That's the sentence we focused on this morning. Can  
 23 we see what was being said more specifically in 2003?  
 24 These occasions when there were insufficient resources  
 25 to police the event satisfactorily, these usually

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1 involve the presence of illegal merchandisers impeding  
 2 the safe egress of patrons from the Manchester Evening  
 3 News Arena, and an example is given of a particular  
 4 group in September 2002 at the same time that another  
 5 group played at Old Trafford, which caused a lot of  
 6 merchandisers to visit Manchester and -- if we go over  
 7 the page {INQ036812/6} -- descend on the arena, swamping  
 8 the police resources.  
 9 That's the example given of the under-resourcing  
 10 at the arena on a particular night. Did you read this  
 11 to be a general criticism on the part of Inspector Lewis  
 12 or drawing attention to some specific occasions when  
 13 there had been a problem?  
 14 A. A specific occasion, sir, as outlined in the report.  
 15 Q. Could we go to Sergeant Wilson's deployment on the night  
 16 of 25 May? There were going to be large numbers of  
 17 people coming out of each exit of the arena.  
 18 Sergeant Wilson wanted them all to be covered, his email  
 19 says. Do you understand that to have been because  
 20 he had a concern that there might be a terrorist outrage  
 21 or because of ordinary policing considerations?  
 22 A. Ordinary policing duties, sir, yes.  
 23 Q. And what risks, as you understand it, was that  
 24 deployment to each of the three exits in his email  
 25 designed to address?

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1 A. That was designed in my view to address bottlenecks of  
 2 crowds, if there was an occasion to occur, such as the  
 3 merchandisers to intervene and deal with that crowd  
 4 safety, specifically because of the demographics of the  
 5 concert, if there was young people who hadn't found  
 6 people who were collecting them, people being split up  
 7 or in general terms directing people who may not be  
 8 familiar with the location and were seeking direction to  
 9 car parks, taxis or train stations, et cetera.  
 10 Q. Any police officer who had done what he or she was told  
 11 by Sergeant Wilson and gone to those three exits would  
 12 have received counter-terror training --  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. -- of the sort you've described in general?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And in particular on the days which their training  
 17 records show as disclosed to the inquiry?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. And would have been trained to be vigilant?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Vigilant not just for spotting crime but for spotting  
 22 suspicious behaviour?  
 23 A. Absolutely.  
 24 Q. For spotting suspicious objects?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. You have told us HOT and you have told us WHAT?  
 2 A. Yes, sir.  
 3 Q. And vigilant generally?  
 4 A. Absolutely.  
 5 Q. Can we just focus on that? There has been quite proper  
 6 questioning about whether police officers need to be  
 7 told every time they go on duty: you're going to be  
 8 doing this today and don't forget counter-terrorism;  
 9 yes?  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. Or should they always know that they should be thinking  
 12 about counter-terrorism? That, I think, in a nutshell  
 13 is the question. What do you say about that?  
 14 A. The latter, sir: should always be thinking about  
 15 counter-terrorism amongst many other things that they're  
 16 deployed to do.  
 17 Q. It can't do any harm, can it, to give everyone  
 18 a reminder every day?  
 19 A. No, sir, but my professional judgement would be in  
 20 understanding how successful that message was.  
 21 Q. So every rush hour in every train station you'd expect  
 22 your officers to be vigilant?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. Including vigilant to the risk of terrorism?  
 25 A. Absolutely, sir.

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1 Q. And do you think they are?  
 2 A. Yes, I do, sir.  
 3 Q. If there is, on the other hand, a particular reason in  
 4 a particular place at a particular time to fear, to  
 5 think that there might be a terrorist outrage here,  
 6 there, do you need to do more?  
 7 A. Absolutely.  
 8 Q. What do you need to do?  
 9 A. Consider what that specific threat is and what the best  
 10 approach is to mitigate that threat or, in extremis,  
 11 neutralise that threat.  
 12 Q. You spoke about armed officers --  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're going on to another topic --  
 14 MR GIBBS: I wasn't going to, but I'm happy to be  
 15 interrupted.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I just want to dig down a bit  
 17 into what you've been saying. I well understand you  
 18 expect, with their training, that every police officer  
 19 will be thinking about terrorism all the time.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're right, it makes no difference  
 22 at all if they are warned every time about terrorism,  
 23 does it?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Doesn't do any harm, because they'll be

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1 thinking about it anyway because the time when it may  
 2 have gone out of their immediate consciousness, it's  
 3 just -- occasionally if you are reminding them every day  
 4 it stops avoids people being described as complacent --  
 5 that's probably the wrong word -- but just not thinking  
 6 about it. Where's the downside from doing it from your  
 7 point of view?  
 8 A. I fully accept it is not a downside in terms of briefing  
 9 officers. There is a model -- as in many organisations,  
 10 these things are looked at many, many times. There's  
 11 often a phrase, the Rule of Seven: don't brief more than  
 12 seven incidents at a briefing, seven issues. That will  
 13 include --  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, if I may say so, that's entirely  
 15 different. It's the way they teach advocates to never  
 16 give them more than one point at a time. You must limit  
 17 the amount of information. But that doesn't actually  
 18 prevent you giving that terrorist advice, does it, every  
 19 time?  
 20 A. It doesn't, sir. The argument would be how do you  
 21 balance that message with messages about other issues,  
 22 accepting totally it's not the loss of life, but serious  
 23 sexual assaults that occur on the network and don't  
 24 forget to look out for this issue. Issues -- a whole  
 25 raft of issues potentially you could argue we should

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1 share that message every day. I think the important bit  
 2 to remember outside of training is that message is still  
 3 constant and I know, and I'm not sure if it's part of  
 4 the bundle, my own research, I know, the person in my  
 5 seat at the time, even on 2 and 9 March circulated  
 6 intranet articles reminding officers of the importance  
 7 of staying alert, being vigilant, and those were shared  
 8 force wide. So those are what I would describe as pulse  
 9 messaging and were continued throughout that period.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Now, the other thing you said  
 11 was, which I can well accept and understand, that the  
 12 reason for putting officers where they were going was  
 13 because in order to keep people flowing, people getting  
 14 lost, particularly when you have youngish people there,  
 15 trying to re-unite them with their parents, they don't  
 16 where to go, keeping the people flowing.  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It follows from your answer that  
 19 actually locating officers where they were really didn't  
 20 have anything to do with a terrorist threat at all.  
 21 A. No, absolutely, sir, yes, yes. And if I can expand, if  
 22 I may, slightly on that point. For those specific  
 23 roles, was, where I referenced earlier in your question  
 24 about 5,000 people, would we police it, my view would be  
 25 that would be the role of a steward or the premises

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1 owner, not a policing function. And that is equally --  
 2 that is what we was there to do and, of course, the  
 3 general policing duties.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're stewarding, of course, you have  
 5 quite a lot of young girls there, who can be vulnerable  
 6 in those situations.  
 7 A. Yes, sir, absolutely.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But nothing to do with terrorism as far  
 9 as you are concerned, putting them there?  
 10 A. Not specifically and certainly not on that night, I'm  
 11 not trying to suggest it was.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in fact BTP did nothing to counter  
 13 any potential CT attack?  
 14 A. I can't answer that, sir, because obviously that was the  
 15 deployment decisions in relation to Sergeant Wilson.  
 16 I am just sharing my thinking regarding such an event.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Perhaps Mr Gibbs shouldn't have  
 18 asked you to explain the decision of Sergeant Wilson  
 19 then, really.  
 20 MR GIBBS: Oh, well, I thought it was important to do so.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Just before Mr Gibbs resume, we've been going  
 23 for 1 hour and 40 minutes. I was simply going to  
 24 enquire how much longer Mr Gibbs anticipated being so  
 25 that we could decide whether to take a short break.

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1 MR GIBBS: I'll be 10 minutes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And I will promise not to interrupt  
 3 Mr Gibbs any longer.  
 4 MR GREANEY: And I will have 5 minutes, so I believe it's  
 5 fine to continue.  
 6 MR GIBBS: May I say I find the interruptions very helpful  
 7 because it tells us what you're thinking and then the  
 8 witness can answer what you are asking --  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's the reason: it gives him the  
 10 responsibility to give his answer.  
 11 MR GIBBS: Quite.  
 12 Can I just pick you up on this? You've gone into  
 13 this several times. It arose with the chairman asking  
 14 the question about 5,000 people. He took the number,  
 15 explained the arithmetic, roughly 15,000 inside, three  
 16 exits, 5,000 people coming out.  
 17 I'm going to refine the hypothetical. I know all of  
 18 this is hypothetical, but imagine a situation where  
 19 there was no terror threat, the UK terror threat was  
 20 zero, and a concert is taking place at the arena where  
 21 15,000 young people are going to see an uncontroversial  
 22 performer with their parents and there are going to be  
 23 the risks of crush, of being preyed upon in some way, of  
 24 being voyeured, those sorts of risks, the policing  
 25 risks. Would you police that?

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1 A. No, sir.  
 2 Q. Just explain why not.  
 3 A. Again, because what it comes down to in simplest terms,  
 4 the role of a constable, and what is needed for  
 5 warranted powers. The management of the crowd, sir, as  
 6 described by Mr Gibbs would not, in my view, describe  
 7 the powers of a constable. That requires the expertise  
 8 and training and knowledge of stewards. It is not  
 9 a policing function per se in those circumstances.  
 10 Q. That assumes that the event is going to be well-managed,  
 11 well-stewarded, as we know the arena was -- well, if  
 12 that's up for grabs, I shouldn't say that.  
 13 But imagine a situation where the stewarding and the  
 14 management was extremely good. If 5,000, say, of those  
 15 people are going to be pouring down into a train station  
 16 and getting into trains and trams, would you expect BTP  
 17 to be there?  
 18 A. Yes, in those circumstances, again based on different  
 19 risk. Often people attending an event like that would  
 20 not be familiar with the railway environment, the  
 21 railway carries significant risk. That would be part of  
 22 the decision-making to police the railway in those  
 23 circumstances in that case.  
 24 Q. Now add to that that there is a terror risk, it's  
 25 a severe threat and it's highly likely that there is

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1 going to be a terrorist attack, not in one place or  
 2 another place, but somewhere there's going to be  
 3 a terrorist attack. That obviously is in every  
 4 policeman's mind.  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 Q. What difference potentially does that make to how you  
 7 would police the event?  
 8 A. That would be in line with potential protective policing  
 9 measures we may or may not put in place. Those measures  
 10 may be permanent for the duration of the event or it  
 11 could be pulse policing of those assets, sharing across  
 12 a wide area. So yes, it'd be a consideration, again  
 13 apologies for going back to it, but based on the  
 14 information and the intelligence.  
 15 Q. SECO. You were asked some questions about the SECO.  
 16 Can I try and simplify it in this way? What's the long  
 17 form of SECO?  
 18 A. Counter-terrorism security coordinator, sir.  
 19 Q. Is the security coordinator a bit like a tactical  
 20 adviser to a Gold Commander on CT subjects?  
 21 A. Yes, and deliberately outside of the command structure.  
 22 Q. Do you need a BTP SECO where the event overall  
 23 Gold Commander is from BTP?  
 24 A. Not every time, sir. It would be down to the  
 25 decision-making of the Gold Commander.

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1 Q. So where there is such an overall Gold Commander from  
 2 BTP, and the event justifies it, and the Gold Commander  
 3 asks for it, a SECO will be appointed?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. And you gave some for instances, but the royal visit or  
 6 military events?  
 7 A. Exactly, yes.  
 8 Q. And also at the arena we know an Olympic-related event  
 9 in 2012?  
 10 A. Yes, pre-attack, yes.  
 11 Q. Now I just have some very small points, please, I think  
 12 you can answer these quite quickly. BTP doesn't use the  
 13 999 number; shortly, why not?  
 14 A. Because the 999 system is based on geographical  
 15 location, so it routes the emergency call to the most  
 16 suitable location. Because of the -- so if someone made  
 17 a 999 call here, it would automatically go through to  
 18 Greater Manchester Police. If that occurred on the  
 19 platform at Victoria, the system wouldn't identify it  
 20 was on BTP location, so it automatically would go to  
 21 GMP.  
 22 It's the same around the country. That is why --  
 23 and again for moving trains BTP does not have a 999  
 24 system.  
 25 Q. Instead there's an emergency BTP number we've heard of

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1 and a non-emergency BTP number, and there have been  
 2 concerns expressed by an earlier witness, and the  
 3 chairman's just referred to them, about difficulties  
 4 getting through or a number being engaged. Can you  
 5 explain that? Can you say more about that?  
 6 A. Yes, sir. My understanding is that at no time would  
 7 a BTP incident number be engaged. For a non-emergency  
 8 number, a caller may and quite often may enter a queue,  
 9 just like any call centre for any company or any other  
 10 police force under the 101 system. But in relation to  
 11 the emergency number, that is not possible for that  
 12 number to be engaged, that will continuously loop just  
 13 like a 999 operator system until that call is answered.  
 14 Q. Explosive search dogs. The question was where was the  
 15 explosive search dog on 22 May. Are you familiar with  
 16 a dog called Mojo? Have you read the BTP --  
 17 A. I know the dog, sir, and yes, I do know the dog  
 18 personally.  
 19 Q. His handler is an officer called Healey. I'm going to  
 20 give you, sir, the reference. I don't bring it up on  
 21 screen. There's a statement from Mr Healey at  
 22 {INQ016391/1}, and as for his deployment and how quickly  
 23 he was on scene, you'll find it there.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 25 MR GIBBS: CT training by BTP to rail staff. Have you said

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1 all you need to say or want to say about that?  
 2 A. Yes, sir.  
 3 Q. CT training by BTP to the arena staff. Have you said  
 4 all you need to say about that?  
 5 A. Yes, sir.  
 6 Q. SONET. What is SONET?  
 7 A. SONET is the Specialist Operations National Exercise and  
 8 Testing team. That is a department under my command  
 9 that delivers. As the title says, exercise and testing  
 10 specifically is responsible for Operation Largo, which  
 11 is the simulation exercise for partners and police staff  
 12 to engage in.  
 13 Q. And the inquiry has the Largo documents?  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. Finally this: single patrolling and double patrolling.  
 16 No one's asked you about it yet. If you could clear  
 17 this up: was there a force policy about it back in 2017?  
 18 A. No, there wasn't, no.  
 19 Q. Was there an expectation about it?  
 20 A. Absolutely, sir. It's often referred to as the force  
 21 strategy or the force patrol policy. No such policy  
 22 exists. It is the expectation of senior leaders, and  
 23 myself included, that wherever possible, officers will  
 24 solo patrol, and that is to ensure the most effective  
 25 police force and delivery of services to the public.

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1 Q. How does an officer in a particular deployment on  
 2 a particular day decide whether that expectation applies  
 3 or whether there may be a personal safety reason for  
 4 doing something different? How does an officer make  
 5 that decision?  
 6 A. The starting point is that the default position is solo  
 7 patrol. Officers have the discretion if they can make  
 8 their own dynamic risk assessment, if they feel there  
 9 are circumstances before them that would justify being  
 10 with more than one officer, they are allowed to do so.  
 11 But the expectation is routine deployment, in most  
 12 circumstances, is solo patrol.  
 13 MR GIBBS: Those are my questions.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 15 MR GREANEY: Thank you, Mr Gibbs.  
 16 Sir, I think, on reflection, I've probably got  
 17 10 minutes of questions. But it would seem sensible  
 18 that I ask those now.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Unless anyone doesn't want that to  
 20 happen, and indeed if the transcribers are ...  
 21 Further questions from MR GREANEY  
 22 MR GREANEY: At 10 minutes we'll be at the limits of what's  
 23 acceptable, but not quite beyond them, I believe.  
 24 I'm going to seek your assistance in relation to two  
 25 topics. The first is a point of clarification, the

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1 second is to see whether there is any inconsistency, no  
 2 doubt if there is, inadvertent, in the evidence you've  
 3 given on one particular issue.  
 4 Let's deal with the clarification first of all. It  
 5 relates to the email of Inspector Wedderburn of  
 6 7 October 2017. Mr Lopez, I'm going to give you the  
 7 reference, but would you ensure, please, that we don't  
 8 put it on the screen until you have found the page and  
 9 the precise part of the page? Thank you.  
 10 {INQ001933/5}. The very top of that page.  
 11 (Pause)  
 12 This is an email, as we know, sent to Allan Gregory,  
 13 who was the chief superintendent for C Division.  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. Also to Peter Cooper. Was he the BTP inspector for  
 16 operations in the Pennine subdivision of C Division?  
 17 A. Yes, I believe so. If he wasn't an inspector, he may  
 18 well have been promoted to chief inspector at the time.  
 19 Q. I think you're quite right: at the time of the email  
 20 he was a chief inspector, but at the time of the arena  
 21 attack he was the inspector that I've described.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And finally, David Oram. Was he, at the time at any  
 24 rate, a superintendent?  
 25 A. Yes, sir, and still is.

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1 Q. It's a simple point. If we need to ask  
 2 Inspector Wedderburn about it, when, as we now  
 3 anticipate, she gives evidence, we'll do so. You can  
 4 see that:  
 5 "Resources are assigned from BAU..."  
 6 Being?  
 7 A. Business as usual.  
 8 Q. "... for 22 May 2017."  
 9 And then a list is given, one of whom was PC Corke,  
 10 who, as we know, didn't actually get there in time for  
 11 egress. But the top listed person is a duty sergeant.  
 12 Do you see that?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Are you able to help us with in what way a duty sergeant  
 15 was assigned to the Ariana Grande concert?  
 16 A. Yes, sir. So my understanding from looking at that  
 17 email was the reference to duty sergeant was not  
 18 a specific officer, it would be the sergeant on duty  
 19 at the time, and that would have been between Wilson  
 20 and, I believe, Wilcox, if I have the right name, for  
 21 the later turn. The duty reference will be the sergeant  
 22 who is looking after general duties for the officers  
 23 at the time so, that would have been overseeing the  
 24 three locations, the response team, the neighbourhood  
 25 team, those on duty at the time.

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1 Q. That may be an answer to my question, which is: would  
 2 there be an expectation that on being assigned as part  
 3 of the resource, the duty sergeant would attend the  
 4 arena at some stage during the course of the event?  
 5 A. No routine expectation, sir, no. That would be -- if  
 6 they was able to, that would be an advantage but not an  
 7 expectation.  
 8 Q. So would it be dependent upon the weight of their other  
 9 responsibilities --  
 10 A. Absolutely.  
 11 Q. -- during the course of their shifts?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There is one name missing from there.  
 14 MR GREANEY: PCSO Brown. He was a probationary PCSO.  
 15 That's issue 1. Issue 2, a question of whether  
 16 there is any inadvertent inconsistency.  
 17 Mr Lopez, I'm going to attempt, with your  
 18 assistance, for the first time, I think, to put on the  
 19 screen a part of the real time [draft] transcript. Are  
 20 you able to do that if I give you the reference? I'm  
 21 going to ask you to put on the screen, please, page 77.  
 22 So this is during the evidence that you gave this  
 23 morning, Assistant Chief Constable. [Draft] page 77,  
 24 line 25 {Day36/78:20}.  
 25 Thank you very much. We're just missing the line.

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1 Can you put line 25 at the top of the page, please, so  
 2 that we can read [draft] page 78.  
 3 These were my questions and you'll recall that I'm  
 4 sure:  
 5 "Whilst accepting that ingress would be more  
 6 attractive to a suicide bomber than the event, can we  
 7 agree that a particularly acute risk of an attack in the  
 8 City Room does arise during egress?"  
 9 And you agreed with that.  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. "Bearing in mind that BTP did have a responsibility,  
 12 even if not sole responsibility, for security in the  
 13 City Room, would you therefore, bearing in mind the  
 14 analysis we've been through, have expected a BTP  
 15 presence within the City Room during egress?"  
 16 You agreed with that and made clear that you would  
 17 have expected it in line with the policing plan.  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. And the chairman then clarified that policing plan was  
 20 a reference to what Sergeant Wilson had instructed his  
 21 team to do that evening.  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. Then at the very bottom of [draft] page 78  
 24 {Day36/79:19}, I asked:  
 25 "So you're agreeing with what Sergeant Wilson

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1 directed, although as we know it didn't eventuate. But  
 2 I think you're agreeing in general terms that, bearing  
 3 in mind the risk that existed on egress, bearing in mind  
 4 the responsibility of British Transport Police, you  
 5 would have expected, whatever Sergeant Wilson said,  
 6 there to have been a BTP policing presence in the  
 7 City Room during egress?"  
 8 And you agreed with that too.  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. So you appeared to be agreeing that your own  
 11 expectation, irrespective of what Sergeant Wilson had  
 12 in the result said, would have been that there should be  
 13 a BTP presence in the City Room during egress. Do you  
 14 agree?  
 15 A. Yes. My understanding of what I was trying to portray  
 16 there --  
 17 Q. I'm going to interrupt you for one moment because  
 18 I perhaps ought to have identified the following  
 19 question and answer. I asked you:  
 20 "One of the purposes of the police officer being  
 21 there would have been to guard against the risk of  
 22 terrorist attack?"  
 23 And you said yes. So the issue that I would like  
 24 you to address -- I am sorry I cut you off, but it was  
 25 necessary -- the issue I'd like you to address is: if

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1 what you were saying there was that you would have had  
 2 an independent expectation of a policing presence in the  
 3 City Room during egress, and one of the purposes of that  
 4 officer being there would have been to guard against the  
 5 risk of a terrorist attack, does that fit with your  
 6 evidence that it was or may have been appropriate to  
 7 have no policing presence in the City Room during such  
 8 a situation?  
 9 A. So for clarity, on my point there, if the officers were  
 10 being deployed against a plan and the plan was for the  
 11 City Room, then I would have expected them to have full  
 12 consideration of being mindful of a terrorist attack.  
 13 Q. Just taking a step back, what you agreed earlier was  
 14 that there was a risk of a terrorist attack which was  
 15 most acute in the City Room.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. So bearing that fact in mind, and I appreciate you've  
 18 been over this a number of times, would you not,  
 19 irrespective of what Sergeant Wilson had said, have  
 20 expected a BTP presence in that room during egress?  
 21 A. Specifically, sir, if we're talking outside of this  
 22 operation, no. If the question, if I'm understanding it  
 23 wrong — and apologies if I'm confusing matters. But if  
 24 you're asking me, from what I've said should, there have  
 25 been an officer in the City Room because of the

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1 terrorism threat full stop, then my answer would be no.  
 2 But accepting the risk that was there and the officers  
 3 were deployed, or expected to be deployed, terrorism  
 4 would have been an issue that they would have been  
 5 looking at.  
 6 Q. I just want to be very clear about this because we need  
 7 to understand your resting position. Point 1 is there  
 8 was a terrorist risk which was particularly acute in the  
 9 City Room, and I'll simply ask you: bearing in mind that  
 10 fact, would you not have expected a BTP presence in that  
 11 room during egress, no doubt to deal with a number of  
 12 issues, but one of them being a terrorist threat?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Irrelevant of whether there was a plan  
 15 by Sergeant Wilson?  
 16 A. No, sir. Apologies if I'm confusing matters. It might  
 17 be the hour of the day. In relation to  
 18 Sergeant Wilson's plan and the directed plan for what  
 19 he was seeking to achieve, yes. In the cold light of  
 20 day concert, do I believe there should be an officer in  
 21 the City Room for every concert because of the threat as  
 22 it is now? Then no. It would have to be built on  
 23 information and intelligence.  
 24 MR GREANEY: So the requirement that an officer be present  
 25 in the City Room and having regard to the terrorist

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1 risk, in the circumstances of 22 May that was wholly  
 2 dependent upon Inspector Wilson deciding to deploy an  
 3 officer there?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 MR GREANEY: Those are my questions.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 7 Thank you very much. It has been a long day and  
 8 thank you for your help.  
 9 MR GREANEY: We will, of course, see the Assistant  
 10 Chief Constable again next year.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll look forward to having your help  
 12 in the future as well.  
 13 A. Thank you.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Sir, could we rise until 9.30 tomorrow morning,  
 15 please?  
 16 (5.12 pm)

(The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on  
 Tuesday, 17 November 2020)

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