

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 39

November 19, 2020

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Thursday, 19 November 2020

(9.30 am)

MR DE LA POER: Sir, good morning. We have one witness, possibly two, today, the first of whom is Mark Logan, who will be joining us from a remote location. I wonder if we could seek to open that link now. Mr Logan, can you see and hear me?

THE WITNESS: I can see and hear you, yes.

MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed. I understand that Mr Suter, solicitor to the inquiry, is with you. Mr Suter, would you please identify for us who's in the room with you?

MR SUTER: Hello, Mr de la Poer. There is myself and there's also someone from the Resilience Hub. There's three of us in the room in total.

MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed. Mr Logan, I'm going to ask now that you are sworn, please.

MR MARK LOGAN (sworn)

Questions from MR DE LA POER

MR DE LA POER: Mr Logan, we're going to begin by identifying the statements that you have provided to the inquiry. Firstly, is it correct that you made a statement on 8 November 2019?

A. That's correct.

1

Q. That's our {INQ025753/1}. And relatively recently, did you also give a second statement on 24 September of this year?

A. That's correct.

Q. Was that statement in part a response to the observations and criticisms contained within the security expert report?

A. That's correct.

Q. That is our {INQ035984/1}.

Mr Logan, just so that you understand what we're going to do today, I'm going to begin just by introducing you and your background so far as it's relevant. Then we're going to together look at what I hope will be just six documents, which I'll take in chronological order and seek your comments on. All right?

A. Okay.

Q. So we'll begin with introducing you. Did you start working for ShowSec in 1991?

A. That's correct.

Q. Was that whilst you were still at university?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Was that work initially as a steward at Leicester City Football Club?

A. That's correct.

2

Q. Is your current position within ShowSec that you are a director?

A. That's correct.

Q. When did you become a director?

A. 2007.

Q. Is one of your roles as a director that you are the line manager for the health and safety department?

A. Yes, that's correct.

(Pause)

Q. Mr Logan, we just experienced a technical difficulty there. I don't know whether you could perceive that at your end.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you just confirm that you can see and hear us?

A. Yes, I can see and hear you now.

Q. I'm going to go back a question. I'm not exactly sure when the feed cut out.

You told us that you are the line manager of the health and safety department. My next question is: when did that responsibility start?

A. (Inaudible: distorted).

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We lost you. Maybe because you turned your head away. Could you start your answer again, Mr Logan? No.

MR DE LA POER: Mr Suter, I don't know if you can hear us.

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I'm afraid that we've have no audio at this end. I'm quite certain that's not Mr Logan's fault, it will be a technical issue.

Could he, if it's comfortable for Mr Logan to do so, move slightly closer to the machine because we know that some microphones are sensitive to that sort of distance.

Mr Logan, would you mind telling me if you can hear me now?

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We've obviously lost sound. I will rise while we sort it out.

(9.36 am)

(A short break)

(9.42 am)

MR COOPER: Sir, I'm grateful for that opportunity. I spoke with counsel and very sensibly we've come to a form of approach whereby you and the families can be kept up to speed with matters.

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm very grateful. Thank you very much.

Can I just say that I'm being rather unkindly blamed for the fact of the breakdown because I said how well they've been working. I think it's an unkind suggestion which I reject entirely!

MR DE LA POER: I agree, sir.

Mr Logan, can you see and hear me?

A. I can see and hear you.

4

1 Q. I'm sorry about that disruption.
 2 You had confirmed for us that you were the line
 3 manager of the health and safety department. When did
 4 that responsibility start?
 5 A. I can't remember exactly. It was somewhere between 2010
 6 and 2013.
 7 Q. Thank you. In terms of particular qualifications of
 8 relevance, is it correct that you have a foundation
 9 degree in crowd management?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. Finally, by way of introduction, is this right, that you
 12 on behalf of your company ShowSec have been responsible
 13 for assisting the inquiry in terms of providing material
 14 on behalf of ShowSec?
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
 16 Q. And as part of that role, have you been able to follow
 17 the inquiry closely?
 18 A. I have.
 19 Q. Thank you. Mr Logan, we're going to move now to the
 20 first of the documents that I'm going to seek your
 21 assistance on and that is an email chain in 2013.
 22 Mr Lopez, {INQ035987/45}.
 23 Mr Logan, I know, but could you please confirm, that
 24 you have had an adequate opportunity prior to today to
 25 consider in detail the content of this email chain?

5

1 A. Yes, I have seen this email chain.
 2 Q. We don't need to look at the particular terms of it
 3 because we've done that with other witnesses, but do you
 4 agree that it comes to this: that Mr Wise, the head of
 5 your training, was saying in 2013, in unequivocal terms,
 6 that bag checks required an SIA licence?
 7 A. Yes, I agree with that.
 8 Q. And this was an email chain that you were a party to,
 9 wasn't it?
 10 A. Yes, I was copied into it.
 11 Q. So the assistance that I seek, Mr Logan, is simply this:
 12 what explanation can you offer, if any, about why, given
 13 this advice was in 2013, that in 2017 that wasn't the
 14 practice on the ground at Manchester Arena?
 15 A. I can't give an explanation beyond what Mark Harding has
 16 already conceded on behalf of the company, that there
 17 has been a management system failure in the delivery of
 18 the information and cascading it down to the operation.
 19 Q. I'm going to move on from this document, we are going to
 20 move forward in time from 2013 to 2015, {INQ034698/1}.
 21 Mr Logan, again, you've had an opportunity to
 22 consider this, but in addition to that, this is your
 23 email, isn't it?
 24 A. That's correct.
 25 Q. Is the context for this email, which we can see is dated

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1 16 November 2015, that 3 days earlier, there had been
 2 the terrorist outrage in Paris?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.
 4 Q. Was this email written in direct response to those
 5 terrible events?
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.
 7 Q. We're going to have a look at some parts of this,
 8 please. Can we please zoom in, because the text is
 9 small, and crop in to the third paragraph down?
 10 I'm going to invite you to focus on a particular
 11 paragraph, Mr Logan, but if there are other parts of
 12 this email that you consider we need to look at when you
 13 answer, please do say so. I'll just read out what the
 14 paragraph says:
 15 "The company aims to deliver best practice through
 16 third party engagement on a local and national level and
 17 we seek to use the guidance being offered by the
 18 security services, which I have copied into the
 19 narrative of this email. These practices should be
 20 embedded into operating plans, risk assessments,
 21 counter-terrorism advice, briefing, training (please see
 22 the e-learning module for refreshment) and standard
 23 operating procedures."
 24 So those are your words, Mr Logan. Do you agree
 25 that the meaning of this paragraph includes that ShowSec

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1 offers counter-terrorism advice?
 2 A. I don't. I believe what I was trying to get across to
 3 our management staff was reflecting the guidance that
 4 was at hand publicly at the time from NaCTSO, to deliver
 5 that to our management staff so they could anchor
 6 themselves to that information to give themselves the
 7 confidence to use that in order to plan the way ahead in
 8 terms of delivering operations.
 9 Q. What do you mean by the phrase:
 10 "These practices should be embedded into...
 11 counter-terrorism advice"?
 12 A. I mean by that that we were taking the advice from
 13 NaCTSO and the guidance and using it and distilling it
 14 into our documents in order to best prepare ourselves
 15 for the delivery of our product. Maybe the word
 16 "advice" is misplaced and the word "awareness" would
 17 have been better, but that's maybe a naivety of
 18 language. The reality was we were trying to draw down
 19 the best information that was publicly held that we
 20 could at that time and reflect that into our operations.
 21 Q. I'm going to move forward in the email to the next page
 22 {INQ034698/2}, please. We can crop into the middle
 23 section, which includes that list. Again, I'm going to
 24 read out a part of it and seek your assistance. You
 25 say:

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1 "When reviewing the operating procedures in place,
 2 please take the above into account and interrogate the
 3 plans based on the following: (1) How does the
 4 venue/event physical and personal search plan work? Who
 5 is responsible for it? How would it be audited and
 6 recorded? Examine the control procedures, search
 7 templates, search queueing times, moving a queue to
 8 a place of safety, external operating environment, terms
 9 and conditions of entry."

10 The particular phrase that I'm seeking your help on,
 11 so you have it in mind, is "moving a queue to a place of
 12 safety". Is what you are saying here that your staff
 13 should review the operating procedures, including giving
 14 consideration to moving where the queueing takes place?

15 A. I think that's intrinsic to crowd management that
 16 we would review the locality of any queueing space to
 17 ensure that there could be a contingency should there be
 18 any emergency factors, whether it be counter-terrorism,
 19 overcrowding, or a breakup of the terrain, that we would
 20 reallocate that queue to another entry position. I was
 21 coming from that angle rather than any other specific
 22 angle.

23 Q. Do you agree that this email is very much focused upon
 24 counter-terrorism?

25 A. I agree that the email was reflective of what had

1 happened at Bataclan and it was a means by which
 2 I wanted to give our staff the confidence to engage with
 3 their staff and their clients in order to bring this
 4 into discussion so that we could take any measures with
 5 our clients that were appropriate to help keep people
 6 safe.

7 Q. Did you expect that an outcome from this email would
 8 include a review by ShowSec of the safety of queueing
 9 in the City Room from a counter-terrorism perspective?

10 A. I wrote that from a generic point of view and sent it
 11 across to the management resource so that everybody
 12 would consider their own positions with their own
 13 clients. I didn't specifically consider the City Room
 14 or the Manchester Arena.

15 Q. And I'm sorry if my question implied that that was the
 16 only consideration; I meant to convey that that was
 17 included. I appreciate it's of generic application, but
 18 is that one of the things that you were expecting would
 19 happen, along with many, many others, by reason of this
 20 email?

21 A. I think it would be fair to say that I expected that
 22 there would be a consideration and review for any
 23 techniques used in queueing for each event.

24 Q. Have you seen any evidence that as a result of your
 25 email there was any review by ShowSec of the safety of

1 queueing in the City Room from a counter-terrorism
 2 perspective?

3 A. I believe that one of the results of this email trail
 4 was the genesis of the counter-terrorism awareness
 5 document that I believe looks at the different parts of
 6 the counter-terrorism awareness for all the different
 7 component parts for the Manchester Arena. So by the
 8 nature of that, I think it was reviewed in light of
 9 this.

10 Q. So are we to understand by that answer that the extent
 11 of any review of the safety of queueing in the City Room
 12 is to be found in that document?

13 A. I believe that that's where it would lie if it did lie.

14 Q. You weren't the author of that document, were you?
 15 I think that was a combined effort between Mr Rigby and
 16 Mr Bailey, so I shan't ask you about that; the inquiry
 17 has looked at that very extensively.

18 We're going to move forward in time from
 19 November 2015 now to April 2016. Thank you very much
 20 indeed, Mr Lopez, you can take that down. Please
 21 replace it with {INQ025638/1}.

22 This is the slides for a presentation given by you
 23 and your fellow director, Mr Battersby; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Can you please give us a summary of the event that you

1 were speaking at?

2 A. I believe the event was a National Arenas Association
 3 event, which I believe also was doubled up with
 4 a European Arenas Association meeting or conference, of
 5 which Simon Battersby had been engaged or invited to
 6 present on the basis of ShowSec being a crowd management
 7 supplier to the arena market on the basis that he would
 8 look at the effects of crowd management and the current
 9 terrorism environment which we were operating in at that
 10 time.

11 Q. How many people, approximately, was this presentation
 12 delivered to?

13 A. I can't remember specific numbers, but it wasn't -- it
 14 didn't feel -- from my memory, it doesn't feel that it
 15 was any more than maybe 40 or 50 people in that room at
 16 maximum.

17 Q. Do you recall whether there was any representative from
 18 SMG present?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you recall who from SMG?

21 A. I remember James Allen being there. I remember
 22 Miriam Stone being there. I do remember others, but
 23 I can't remember exactly who. So I definitely remember
 24 those two being there.

25 Q. Did any other organisation providing the same services

1 as ShowSec also speak?
 2 A. Not to my knowledge.
 3 Q. So was ShowSec giving the perspective from the crowd
 4 management/event security to this conference?
 5 A. Yes, I believe so.
 6 Q. We're going to look at some of the slides, please.
 7 {INQ025638/3}.
 8 These appear to be the notes rather than what will
 9 necessarily have been shown to the participants; is that
 10 right?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. We can see your colleague was speaking at 5.1 the
 13 initials "SB" are next to it:
 14 "Whether in-house or as a contracted company, the
 15 aim should be to create as coordinated approach as is
 16 possible and deliver the strategic aims of the venue."
 17 Presumably, you were aware of what Mr Battersby was
 18 going to say?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And you heard what he had to say about it?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Is that single sentence a fair summary of the message
 23 that he was trying to convey in this part of the
 24 conference?
 25 A. Sorry, can I just see the sentence again?

13

1 Q. Yes, of course:
 2 "Whether in-house or as a contracted company, the
 3 aim should be to create as coordinated approach as is
 4 possible and deliver the strategic aims of the venue."
 5 A. Yes, I think so. Obviously I can't speak on his behalf
 6 and I know he's given a written statement which deals
 7 with the matter of this presentation, but that sounds
 8 sensible, that the crowd management company would be
 9 there to deliver the strategic aims of the venue, yes.
 10 Q. And the phrase to focus on:
 11 "... to create as coordinated approach as is
 12 possible" ?
 13 A. I think so.
 14 Q. So the inquiry has examined in great detail the
 15 relationship between SMG and ShowSec. In the context
 16 that that was the stated aim in 2016, do you think that
 17 there were areas in which coordination between SMG and
 18 ShowSec could have been better?
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we understand? Are you asking the
 20 witness to say at the time or with the benefit of
 21 hindsight?
 22 MR DE LA POER: Sorry, with the benefit of hindsight to
 23 assist the inquiry. I should have made that clear. I'm
 24 not suggesting necessarily there was an awareness at the
 25 time.

14

1 Looking from your position now, with the insight
 2 that you can give us of the inner workings of ShowSec
 3 and the work you've done to assist the inquiry, do you
 4 think there were areas in which coordination between SMG
 5 and ShowSec could have been better?
 6 A. I think in hindsight, I agree with that. Our
 7 understanding of the full depth of SMG's
 8 responsibilities could have been better published and
 9 I think in hindsight, yes.
 10 Q. And if you were to identify what the solution to those
 11 issues is, what would you say to the chair as to how
 12 in the future that lack of coordination in those areas
 13 could be guarded against?
 14 A. I think there needs to be, or there could be, a drawdown
 15 of the documentation that each company is relying upon
 16 and publish that to each other in a manner of developing
 17 one plan for both companies rather than the siloing of
 18 plans, which seems to have happened from hindsight.
 19 Q. So from your presentation, which took place I think in
 20 April 2016, we're going to move forward to the next
 21 document, which is September 2016. {INQ034692/1}.
 22 This is an email from you to senior management,
 23 is that correct?
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.
 25 Q. Is this right, that the thrust of the email is: a year

15

1 has passed since Paris, we must not be complacent?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. What prompted you to send that email?
 4 A. I think general housekeeping. I was or am continually
 5 aware that our delivery environment changes and ebbs and
 6 flows and that the pressures of the workload in front of
 7 people can maybe get in the way of the bigger picture.
 8 I see it as part of my role to continually frame that
 9 strategy. What I was aiming to do with that was to
 10 remind people as much as the normal day-to-day work
 11 should continue, that that bigger picture should be
 12 referred to.
 13 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, I stress, do you identify
 14 whether any complacency had set in to ShowSec's
 15 operation by May of 2017 or do you think that is not the
 16 case?
 17 A. I don't believe that's the case.
 18 Q. The penultimate document I'm going to take you to is the
 19 email that you sent in the early hours of 23 May of
 20 2017. It's {INQ015838/1}.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Logan, just before we look at that,
 22 in regard to the last email that you sent out to all the
 23 staff, guarding against, as it's been described,
 24 complacency, some people, I know, put reminders on their
 25 diaries to remind to send out reminders at a certain

16

1 stage. Can you remember, is that what happened there or
 2 did it suddenly occur to you in September to do it?
 3 A. I don't think so. I don't think it was a reminder, sir.
 4 What I feel is that when we get to September each
 5 year — we're a seasonal business, so whenever we get
 6 through the ebb and flow of the festival season, we're
 7 now moving back into the venue marketplace again. The
 8 venues are starting to crank up and open their doors,
 9 the students are starting to come back into the city
 10 centres, so the venue industry is then starting to
 11 unshackle itself for the winter running.

12 What I feel I was doing there was it was almost
 13 a re-centring of the focus. We'd now come out of the
 14 fields and were now moving back under the roofs of the
 15 venues again and, just remember, that this is a part of
 16 our function in terms of — in our mindset, it should be
 17 in our mindset.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.

19 MR DE LA POER: Mr Logan, I'm just going to review that
 20 evening's chronology for you in very summary form. All
 21 right? Were you first notified of the attack at about
 22 10.50?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. By 11.20, had you opened the Manchester office?

25 A. Yes.

17

1 Q. And by 11.45, had you spoken to James Allen?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Mr Logan, I can detect that you're becoming slightly
 4 distressed; is that correct?

5 I wonder if we could take a short break, please,
 6 sir.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Absolutely.

8 MR DE LA POER: Would 10 minutes be sufficient for you,
 9 Mr Logan? Thank you.

10 (10.07 am)

(A short break)

12 (10.19 am)

13 MR DE LA POER: Sir, thank you. I have been informed by
 14 Mr Suter that he believes that Mr Logan is able to
 15 continue. Is that your feeling too, Mr Logan?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. Thank you very much indeed. Can I just re-emphasise
 18 that if at any time you consider that you need a break,
 19 please do speak up.

20 A. Yes, of course.

21 Q. I'm sorry that I've had to go to this level of detail,
 22 but I was just reviewing at a very summary level your
 23 actions, which provide us with the context of this
 24 email, and there are just three more to identify.

25 Firstly, and I'm not going to ask you about the

18

1 content of the conversation, did you speak to James
 2 Allen at 11.45?

3 A. Yes, I believe that happened, but I can't remember the
 4 detail of it.

5 Q. Then did you collect some staff from the arena at about
 6 2.45 in the morning?

7 A. Yes, that sounds right, yes.

8 Q. Did you have a short conversation with Mr Rigby shortly
 9 after that?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. So is that the context for the email that we see at the
 12 bottom of this page sent at 3 am on 23 May?

13 A. Yes, that email was sent as a relay of what I believe
 14 was the information I was going from not just Tom Rigby
 15 but also from the other staff members who had been
 16 brought back to the Manchester office so that we could
 17 then look after their forward travel to their homes.

18 Q. We can see what you say. What I would like is just for
 19 your help about what it means insofar as it may not be
 20 clear and why you included it. So that's the focus of
 21 my questions.

22 Firstly:

23 "Bag search on all public entry doors, main focus
 24 F&B [food and beverage]/prohibited items."

25 Why did you consider that that was something worth

19

1 telling Mr Harding about in this email?

2 A. I can't remember exactly, but I believed that

3 Mark Harding as managing director of the company would
 4 no doubt receive numerous enquiries on what information
 5 he had to hand the next morning and I wanted to give him
 6 an understanding of the words that were being used to me
 7 at the source of extracting those staff members out.

8 Q. "Access control staff on doors — targeted profiling."

9 What did you mean by the phrase "targeted
 10 profiling"?

11 A. That's simply the words that were used to me and I was
 12 relaying them on. The access control staff were there
 13 to profile ticket holders coming into the venue.

14 Q. "Incident search protocol areas during egress — show
 15 down — house lights up."

16 Again, can you help us with what you were intending
 17 to communicate with the phrase "incident search protocol
 18 areas during egress"?

19 A. I believe that that was a search of the venue that was
 20 carried out with GMP and ShowSec staff after the actual
 21 incident had happened in order to clear down the venue
 22 to ensure that there was no other perpetrators in the
 23 area. That's where my memory leads me to.

24 Q. Can I just ask you to reflect upon that answer bearing
 25 in mind the phrase "during egress"?

20

1 A. I don't... I really can't offer anything more.
 2 I understand what you're saying, it seems that it's
 3 unbalanced. But again, I just have to refer back to the
 4 time of the night that it was sent and the trauma that
 5 I was witnessing around me at that time. It probably
 6 isn't a particularly clear email.
 7 Q. Finally, the last sentence, I'm not going to read it
 8 out, but the last phrase:
 9 "No particular line of sight on assumed instigator."
 10 What was that intending -- I appreciate literally
 11 it's easy to understand, but what were you seeking to
 12 convey there?
 13 A. I was seeking to convey that at that time nobody had
 14 been able to identify where this had come from or how
 15 this had happened, or nobody believed that they'd
 16 actually seen the person who detonated the device.
 17 Again, this was talking to a minute sample of staff in
 18 the course of a quick 5-minute conversation, bearing in
 19 mind they were almost stunned into silence. It was
 20 palpable, their position.
 21 Q. Can I just ask you whether you know if amongst those
 22 staff you spoke to was included Kyle Lawler?
 23 A. No. Kyle Lawler was not there.
 24 Q. Or Mohammed Agha?
 25 A. No.

21

1 Q. Thank you. Finally before we leave this document, and
 2 it has been read out already so I don't need to read it
 3 again, you sent another email in this thread, 6 days
 4 later, 29 May, again to Mr Harding. What were you
 5 intending to convey in that top email? What was its
 6 purpose?
 7 A. The purpose of that email was in the in-between time,
 8 we'd become consumed with the welfare of the staff and
 9 trying to get welfare statements from them to
 10 understand, almost triage, which staff had been most
 11 traumatically affected, also triage which staff would
 12 maybe have evidential importance. And it was becoming
 13 clear, just rhetorically, from people speaking to me,
 14 words of random search, pat-downs, were being used and
 15 I remember reflecting back across the email and
 16 thinking, whenever I saw it again, thinking that
 17 I needed to qualify it because I felt that the initial
 18 transaction of the words used probably weren't accurate
 19 and that over the course of time, with the constant
 20 welfare statements and police statements, which we
 21 believed that we would have to give in the fullness of
 22 time, the accurate position would then be uncovered
 23 rather than me trying to pursue it.
 24 Q. Was that email written only for Mark Harding's benefit
 25 or when you wrote it, did you have in mind that the

22

1 email of 23 May may be read by others?
 2 A. My only mindset was to ensure that whatever information
 3 I felt was appropriate was going to Mark so that if
 4 he was asked questions, as the corporate head, he would
 5 understand the information.
 6 Q. The final document I'm going to ask you to have a look
 7 at is {INQ012135/1}. This is a presentation or the
 8 slides for a presentation with your name on the first
 9 slide; is that correct?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. It's dated 25 July 2017?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. To whom were you giving this presentation?
 14 A. I was giving that to our general managers, general
 15 management forum in head office in Leicester.
 16 Q. So approximately how many people were attending to hear
 17 this?
 18 A. I think around 20.
 19 Q. All of them ShowSec employees?
 20 A. That's correct.
 21 Q. I'm just going to ask us to have a look at
 22 {INQ012135/5}, please, and this phrase:
 23 "Key learning. You are only as strong after
 24 a disaster as your pre-disaster planning and
 25 documentation can evidence."

23

1 Mr Logan, it's been recognised on behalf of ShowSec,
 2 through more than one employee, that there were some
 3 deficiencies in some of the documentation. You have
 4 seen that evidence, haven't you?
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
 6 Q. I'm not proposing to review all of that with you, but
 7 difficulties, if I can use that word, with some parts of
 8 the counter-terrorism document and with the risk
 9 assessment documentation have been identified and spoken
 10 to frankly, haven't they?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. Were those deficiencies known -- (video link frozen).
 13 (Pause)
 14 MR DE LA POER: Mr Logan, can you see and hear me?
 15 A. I can hear you.
 16 Q. Right. We're shortly to resume. I'm sorry about that
 17 disruption.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I apologise to everyone for the fact
 19 this has happened. Obviously we'll try and ensure it
 20 doesn't happen any more.
 21 MR DE LA POER: Yes.
 22 Mr Logan, I'm going to consider this slide with you,
 23 as we began doing, and then just ask you some general
 24 questions particularly by reference to the presentation
 25 that we've already touched upon. So that's all that

24

1 there is left to go for you and I at this stage.
 2 What this slide says is:
 3 "You are only as strong after a disaster as your
 4 pre-disaster planning and documentation can evidence."
 5 You and I had reached a stage where you agreed that
 6 deficiencies within documentation had been identified
 7 and accepted in the course of the inquiry. The question
 8 I was asking you when we got cut off was whether or not
 9 at the time of this presentation those deficiencies had
 10 been identified and understood by you.
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. Given that this is your perspective as encapsulated in
 13 this slide, is there any assistance that you can give
 14 the inquiry about what might be done in the future to
 15 avoid the sort of difficulties in the planning and
 16 documentation that have been identified in the course of
 17 this inquiry so far as ShowSec is concerned?
 18 A. I think, without being drilled into the detail of
 19 Martyn's Law, as I understand it, and the impression
 20 I have of it, the drive-out of the risk assessment in
 21 a public document, in terms of made public to the
 22 stakeholders involved, and those stakeholders have an
 23 input into it will then deliver a stronger outcome than
 24 what I believe or have seen as the weaknesses, which are
 25 the compartmentalised risk assessment process.

25

1 Q. I'm going to conclude by taking us back to the
 2 presentation that you gave in April 2016 and we're just
 3 going to look at some more of those slides. Just so you
 4 know where I'm going with this, you know, don't you,
 5 that it is a matter of some controversy in this inquiry
 6 whether or not ShowSec held itself out as having
 7 expertise in counter-terrorism? You understand that
 8 that is an issue that the inquiry is considering?
 9 A. I understand that that question has been raised, yes.
 10 Q. And you have a particular view on that and I think
 11 you've expressed that view in your statement. It's to
 12 the effect that you don't think that ShowSec held
 13 themselves out as being experts in counter-terrorism;
 14 is that a fair summary of your position?
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
 16 Q. Let's have a look at this presentation, and we've
 17 already looked at the context of it. I'm going to pick
 18 out some slides and then ask you about that.
 19 {INQ025638/3}, please.
 20 We've looked at this one. We've already spoken
 21 about 5.1 in particular.
 22 Can we move to {INQ025638/6}?
 23 Is it right that in 2016, you were presenting to
 24 those organisations that attended that there was a need
 25 for a proactive approach on the behalf of the industry?

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1 A. I believe what we were presenting was our understanding
 2 of where crowd management — the crowd management
 3 industry sat in this terrorism environment and we were
 4 (inaudible: distorted) what publicly facing information
 5 we had at that time to be able to consider it. I think
 6 if you look at — I'm trying to give an example rather
 7 than talk theoretically.
 8 In some of our deliveries, police forces have
 9 engaged with heavy vehicle mitigation barrier systems in
 10 order to put a protective position in place for that
 11 event. We would be engaged from the crowd management
 12 element to understand how we would deliver the safe flow
 13 of the pedestrians through that HVM process but would
 14 have no mind or understanding of the integrity of that
 15 HVM process or any aspect of understanding how that
 16 would deliver protection against different weighted
 17 vehicles, et cetera, et cetera. Our mindset was simply
 18 about the flow of the crowd through it rather than the
 19 integrity it brought.
 20 I understand that was our position then and that was
 21 our position whenever this delivery of this presentation
 22 from Simon Battersby occurred.
 23 Q. Can I ask in relation to this slide, when it says, "The
 24 proactive approach", who is that suggesting needs to be
 25 proactive? Is that ShowSec needs to be proactive,

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1 venues need to be proactive, everyone needs to be
 2 proactive?
 3 A. I think everybody needs to be proactive, but again what
 4 I don't want to do is assume words — from my
 5 perspective everybody should be proactive. Again,
 6 I think Simon in his statement has alluded that in
 7 giving this presentation, it was a conversational piece
 8 in order to raise the awareness and to seek an
 9 understanding of where the limitations between state and
 10 private entities lay. Again, that in itself was
 11 a conundrum, probably, bearing in mind that there were
 12 different countries being represented in that room at
 13 that time, not just the UK. It was pan-European, which
 14 has, I think, been disclosed in the invite list or
 15 whatever it was to that conference.
 16 Q. If we move to {INQ025638/7}, please.
 17 This slide is headed "Security operations". Is that
 18 a reference to the sort of services that ShowSec
 19 provides?
 20 A. No. That was from my understanding, again, a generic
 21 understanding of what venues may or may not engage in.
 22 Again, in trying to bring context to this, this
 23 wasn't a case of ShowSec trying to propel some sort of
 24 sales piece, this was merely a conversational
 25 presentation to raise awareness, bearing in mind that

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1 there was people being drawn into that conference from
 2 countries that we didn't operate in. So it wasn't
 3 a case of us trying to construct a menu for people to
 4 buy from. No, it was not. It wasn't about ShowSec.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Logan, if I can just interrupt for a
 6 moment, help me with this if you will. It looks to me
 7 that they are stewarding staff or whatever at a football
 8 ground, in the picture?
 9 A. Yes, sorry, sir, I can't see the picture. Yes, I can
 10 now. Yes, I can see that picture and I don't believe
 11 those are actually ShowSec staff. That does look as if
 12 it's what I understand to be either a pre-event seat
 13 check or a post-event seat check.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may or may not be a football ground.
 15 But you do provide security at football grounds, don't
 16 you?
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So is that the sort of thing we see
 19 there that your staff do do as part of their duties at
 20 a football ground?
 21 A. Yes, it can be in terms of -- there's different,
 22 obviously, different duties, but that duty from that
 23 picture looks to me like that's a checking of seats to
 24 make sure that no seats have been broken either during
 25 the game or before the game.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. And that is the sort of thing
 2 that your staff might well do at a football ground?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 5 MR DE LA POER: If you could just crop out again, Mr Lopez,
 6 so we can see the whole slide.
 7 As I have understood what you're saying, Mr Logan,
 8 this isn't ShowSec describing necessarily what ShowSec
 9 does, but this is directed at the venues?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. This is you telling venues what they need to do from
 12 a counter-terrorism perspective?
 13 A. I'm sort of struggling with the language in terms of
 14 "telling". I think what we're doing is offering what we
 15 believe the industry in some parts can provide. It's
 16 really up to them whether or not that's applicable to
 17 their venues.
 18 Q. I used the word "telling" because I was trying to avoid
 19 what I know is a more controversial word, but I'll use
 20 it. Is that ShowSec advising venues what they need to
 21 do from a counter-terrorism perspective?
 22 A. No, it's ShowSec offering up some considerations for
 23 discussion.
 24 Q. Sitting there now, with the benefit of hindsight, do you
 25 think it might have been a reasonable interpretation of

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1 what you were doing at that venue to have construed it
 2 as advice by ShowSec about counter-terrorism to venues?
 3 Do you think that's a reasonable interpretation? It may
 4 not have been what you were intending.
 5 A. I don't, based on the fact that also presenting that day
 6 were CTSA officers from West Midlands Police, who were
 7 there to focus on, as I understood, an advisement piece
 8 around counter-terrorism and how that's worked for
 9 venues.
 10 I also believe that there was a person there who was
 11 presenting on a product range on the basis of facial
 12 recognition and how that could be used in terms of
 13 deployment at venues. I don't believe he was giving CT
 14 advice, and nor were we. We were merely looking at our
 15 world and the limitations of our world, which was crowd
 16 management.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking at that slide, and
 18 obviously we don't have the person speaking about it, it
 19 might look like the services which ShowSec offer. So
 20 going through that list, would you offer CCTV awareness?
 21 A. I don't think so. I don't... I don't think so --
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: (Overspeaking) monitor CCTV, don't they?
 23 A. Yes, of course, we have CCTV operators who can -- and
 24 they're only a very minute number inside our company in
 25 terms of us deploying staff to do that. It isn't

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1 something that we would actively sell. I can understand
 2 what you're saying, but that really wasn't the drive
 3 behind this. This wasn't a sort of sales menu, it
 4 really wasn't.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: "Observing people by predictive
 6 behaviour not ethnicity."
 7 That's something you do, isn't it?
 8 A. I think within that profiling in terms of crowd
 9 management, yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And without going through the list, you
 11 do all of those things, don't you?
 12 A. Sorry, sir, I can't...
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you can't read them you must tell me.
 14 I don't want you to agree with something or disagree
 15 with something if you can't read it.
 16 MR DE LA POER: Perhaps Mr Lopez could zoom in.
 17 I appreciate your screen is much smaller than ours.
 18 Tell us when we need to stop zooming so you can read the
 19 list properly.
 20 A. I think it'd be fair to say that we offer these in terms
 21 of component parts or parts of our service. I do think
 22 that's a fair observation.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 24 MR DE LA POER: The final bullet point:
 25 "External and internal patrols."

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1 Mr Logan, would it be fair to say that somebody
 2 listening to this presentation would understand that it
 3 was ShowSec's view that external and internal patrols
 4 were an important part of counter-terrorism?
 5 A. I think patrolling in itself is an element of it, yes.
 6 Q. So, for example, SMG, who were present, that would be
 7 a message that you would have been conveying to them?
 8 A. Amongst many in the room.
 9 Q. Yes. {INQ025638/8}, please.
 10 The heading here makes it clear, does it, Mr Logan,
 11 that you are speaking about what a venue needs to do
 12 from a counter-terrorism perspective?
 13 A. I think what the presentation does here is makes it
 14 clear that there is a ... It was an aim to set out an
 15 expectation of where the venue sat in terms of where it
 16 lay with them in terms of any venue, not just the
 17 Manchester Arena.
 18 Q. Do you think somebody sitting and listening to this part
 19 of the presentation might consider that ShowSec was
 20 offering counter-terrorism advice generally to venues
 21 in the terms that appear on that slide?
 22 A. I don't think -- again, I struggle with "advice".
 23 I think what we were trying to do was raise awareness
 24 and to give elements that really could be discussed or
 25 considered in the room.

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1 Q. Finally in terms of this document, {INQ025638/10},
 2 please.
 3 The heading of this slide is:
 4 "Joint aims for success."
 5 Mr Logan, the word "joint" implies that more than
 6 one organisation is in contemplation. Can you help us
 7 with which organisations were in contemplation as
 8 indicated by the word "joint"?
 9 A. I think that the contemplation was the venue, whoever
 10 their security operators are, who their other vendors
 11 are inside the building, and the emergency services.
 12 Q. The third bullet point:
 13 "Rigidly assess each event."
 14 Firstly, and we have been over this at great length
 15 with other witnesses but I just want to ask you a simple
 16 question, given this is your slide: have you identified
 17 in your review of the ShowSec material any single
 18 document or multiple documents that demonstrate that
 19 ShowSec rigidly assessed the Ariana Grande concert?
 20 A. I believe that that assessment was drawn down
 21 dynamically from the information from SMG's assessment
 22 of the event and delivered through the briefing in the
 23 briefing materials.
 24 I cannot -- I'm not of a mind to pinpoint any single
 25 document, other than the briefing material document,

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1 that could have captured us carrying out that process.
 2 Q. What was meant by the word "rigidly"?
 3 A. I don't know. I didn't write that slide. I didn't
 4 present on that slide.
 5 Q. All right. I shan't ask you any more about that.
 6 I'm going to take a step back now, having been
 7 through some of the detail, and just ask that question
 8 one final time that I've already indicated that this
 9 topic area is going to.
 10 Do you think that before May 2017 that a reasonable
 11 interpretation of ShowSec's behaviour included that it
 12 was suggesting that it has counter-terrorism expertise?
 13 A. No. We were simply using publicly held information and
 14 NaCTSO guidance to try and deliver awareness and raise
 15 awareness within our staff and in the hope that they
 16 would then carry on and engage with clients and cascade
 17 down to our staff in order to deliver a safe
 18 environment.
 19 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Logan. Those
 20 are all the questions that I have. I know that it would
 21 be convenient for a break to be taken at around
 22 11 o'clock, as has been communicated to us, and I just
 23 wonder whether, given we've got to where we are, whether
 24 we do that now, sir?
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That sounds a good idea. 11.10.

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1 Thank you.
 2 (10.55 am)
 3 (A short break)
 4 (11.10 am)
 5 MR DE LA POER: Mr Logan, can I begin by checking that you
 6 can see and hear me?
 7 A. Yes, I can.
 8 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I'm going to turn now to the core
 9 participants. Before I do, can I indicate that a break
 10 in about an hour's time will be helpful. I will try and
 11 draw people's attention to that.
 12 I have had indications that there are no questions
 13 from SMG, on behalf of Kyle Lawler or on behalf of
 14 Greater Manchester Police, so I turn to the bereaved
 15 families and first invite Mr Atkinson to ask his
 16 questions.
 17 Questions from MR ATKINSON
 18 MR ATKINSON: Mr Logan, can you hear me and see me?
 19 A. I can, Mr Atkinson.
 20 Q. Bad luck in particular in relation to the second. If
 21 you do not understand any of my questions, that's my
 22 fault, not yours, so please just let me know, all right?
 23 A. Okay.
 24 Q. I want to start just by understanding a little better
 25 what it was that ShowSec did offer at the arena in terms

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1 of services. To that end, I wonder if we could have
 2 {INQ012054/1}.

3 This is the 2015 iteration of a service delivery
 4 management plan for the arena provided by Mr Bailey.
 5 Would you have seen that document before he submitted
 6 it?

7 A. I don't think so, no.

8 Q. Because under the service contract between SMG and
 9 ShowSec, you were the designated representative of
 10 ShowSec, weren't you?

11 A. Yes, that's what's in the contract. I think in my
 12 primary statement I underline that that fell away quite
 13 quickly, I believe, into that contract phase because my
 14 counterpart was no longer engaged inside SMG, so that
 15 ability to talk to somebody wasn't there and that then
 16 was manifested through Mark Harding and John Sharkey
 17 at the higher levels of the corporate structure in both
 18 companies.

19 Q. Under the contract there was provision for you
 20 delegating your liaison responsibility with SMG to
 21 others. Did that manifest itself in Mr Bailey having
 22 more regular contact with SMG at the arena than you did?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If we go to page 3 of this document, {INQ012054/3}.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you seen this document before?

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1 A. I may have come across it in disclosure, but I don't
 2 have it in my — I don't believe it's in my bundle.

3 MR LAIDLAW: It's my fault, sir. I have two lists, the list
 4 which is in the formal list, I have an informal list,
 5 and this document doesn't appear on either list. It's
 6 a document that Mr Logan was asked to look at before he
 7 gave evidence. If I'm wrong, then of course I'll
 8 apologise, but as far as I can tell, it's not there.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.

10 You are going to be shown a section of this document
 11 to look at. Take your time to read whatever you are
 12 referred to. If you don't feel in a position to comment
 13 on it, Mr Logan, because you haven't had a chance to see
 14 it before, you must say so. If you are able to help us
 15 about it, please do.

16 A. Of course.

17 MR ATKINSON: This was unquestionably on the Rule 10 list.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, it's gone wrong in some way.

19 MR ATKINSON: It's one paragraph and I hope it won't be
 20 a problem.

21 Mr Logan, I just want to ask you about the second
 22 paragraph of the introduction, the one beginning "the
 23 venue has been operating".

24 A. Okay, yes.

25 Q. If you read that to yourself.

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1 A. I can't read the last two lines, it's gone out of focus.

2 MR SUTER: Is it possible to make it bigger, the document?
 3 It's rather small at our end.

4 MR ATKINSON: Mr Lopez, it is the top two paragraphs on the
 5 page that Mr Logan needs to see.
 6 Is that better, Mr Logan?

7 A. Yes, that's a bit better.

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Take your time to read it now you can
 9 see it.

10 MR ATKINSON: Perhaps read from the top of the screen, if
 11 your screen's the same as mine, those two paragraphs in
 12 context, all right?

13 (Pause)

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. So from the top, do you agree with the description in
 16 this document of ShowSec as "a leading crowd management
 17 and security company"?

18 A. I think there's a word missing from that and that would
 19 be event security.

20 Q. Just so we understand it, you have in your answers thus
 21 far today drawn attention to ShowSec's role in relation
 22 to crowd management, and that clearly is an important
 23 part of what, at a range of venues, ShowSec does. Do
 24 you agree?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

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1 Q. But also an important part of what ShowSec does is the
 2 provision of security or, with your qualification, event
 3 security?

4 A. I think event security is fair, yes.

5 Q. And presumably, which of those is the more prominent
 6 will depend on the venue and on what your client at that
 7 venue wants ShowSec to do?

8 A. Yes, that's fair.

9 Q. At Manchester Arena, ShowSec were required to do both;
 10 do you agree?

11 A. I think that's fair.

12 Q. In relation to the second paragraph, you'd agree that by
 13 the time of this document ShowSec had been working with
 14 the arena for a significant period of time?

15 A. Yes, I agree with that.

16 Q. It's the last line and a bit after the reference to the
 17 stringent tender process:
 18 "... which displayed the benefits that ShowSec could
 19 offer to the Manchester Arena in providing professional
 20 service management and consultancy."
 21 It's that last word I need your help with, please,
 22 Mr Logan. Did that envisage or, to put it more broadly,
 23 did your understanding of ShowSec's role of security
 24 at the arena envisage an interaction with the venue's
 25 operators in relation to both crowd management and event

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1 security?
 2 A. I wasn't part of the 1995 tender process, but I don't
 3 know what was envisaged at that time. I believe, as the
 4 relationship matured, ShowSec could offer consultancy
 5 and be framed inside the crowd management and parts of
 6 the event security field where ShowSec were delivering
 7 services. Those services, as in schedule 2 of the
 8 contract, are pretty well—expressed and there is room
 9 for other people to be involved in consultancy and
 10 provisions inside that contract where SMG found the need
 11 to do so.
 12 Q. But does it follow that ShowSec itself had a role
 13 in relation to advising, in discussion with the venue,
 14 on the approach to crowd management and event security?
 15 A. I think so, I think so.
 16 Q. They would come to you and tell you what they were
 17 planning to do and you would discuss it with them?
 18 A. They wouldn't come to me.
 19 Q. You as a company.
 20 A. Okay, yes, they would come to the operational staff and
 21 if there was, for example, a front of stage barrier that
 22 was a unique design, I'm sure they would discuss that
 23 with the ShowSec management staff on the best way to
 24 either staff it or manage it in terms of delivering that
 25 for their client, who would have been the promoter

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1 inside the venue. But ultimately, those decisions would
 2 have sat with SMG.
 3 Q. Ultimately, it would be SMG's decision what to do in
 4 a particular respect, but it would be entirely
 5 consistent with the relationship between SMG and ShowSec
 6 that they might ask what you thought first, what you as
 7 a company thought first?
 8 A. I think — again, this is taking me into the realms of
 9 guessing here and I don't want to do that. I'm not
 10 saying that that's inconsistent, but I would imagine
 11 that SMG would, if there was a unique position that
 12 affected their crowd management or event security, they
 13 would look at what that situation was, they would equate
 14 it to how it had worked at other venues and maybe speak
 15 to their colleagues inside the National Arenas
 16 Association, speak to the promoters on what and how that
 17 had been delivered as a concept inside other operating
 18 environments, and they'd have a conversation with
 19 ShowSec on either the impact or anything ShowSec
 20 believed they could bring to the table.
 21 Q. Such a conversation could, and I suggest would, happen
 22 in the light of the changing threat from terrorism as it
 23 might in relation to other issues?
 24 A. It could, but I believe that with different threats or
 25 different instances — this probably just isn't SMG, but

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1 an organiser of the event would go to the person they
 2 felt was best equipped to deal in terms of understanding
 3 that threat and giving them any sort of mitigating
 4 advice. For example, if it was noise, they would go to
 5 noise engineers, they wouldn't come to ShowSec, but they
 6 may ask ShowSec in terms of their resource to ensure
 7 that, for example, I don't know, the concourse doors
 8 were shut so the noise didn't leak out via the inside
 9 doors on to the concourse.

10 So I'm not saying that they wouldn't speak to us,
 11 but I think they would definitely go to the person they
 12 thought was the — had the field skills and the field
 13 intelligence to deliver the best advice.

14 Q. Can we go to a second document on this theme?
 15 {INQ035986/8}.

16 You've been taken by Mr de la Poer to this
 17 presentation that you and Mr Battersby delivered in
 18 2016. Just to explain to you, Mr Logan, what we're
 19 looking at here though. As you have said, Mr Battersby
 20 has made a witness statement which you have seen. In
 21 his witness statement he produced the presentation, both
 22 the slides and also the notes in relation to the
 23 delivery of that presentation. It's that version that
 24 we're going to have a brief look at. All right?

25 A. Okay.

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1 Q. Because, as you've already said, you knew in advance
 2 what Mr Battersby was going to say and you were with him
 3 when this presentation was delivered.

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. And he wasn't saying anything that you disagreed with,
 6 was he?

7 A. Nothing jumped out.

8 Q. So if we go over the page to {INQ035986/9}, please. If
 9 we can enlarge that. It's more the lower half of the
 10 page that Mr Logan will need to be able to see,
 11 Mr Lopez.

12 Are you able to see that, Mr Logan?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. If at any point you can't see anything I'm reading, just
 15 shout, all right?

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. So what Mr Battersby and/or you were saying at this
 18 point was that your presentation was to explore the part
 19 private security has to play in the deterrent and
 20 disruption of terrorism. Does it follow from that that
 21 you did see firms like ShowSec as having a role in the
 22 deterrent and disruption of terrorism?

23 A. I think where we set ourselves is our position of
 24 vigilance and reporting. There are, I believe, on the
 25 market now — I can't consider when these companies came

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1 into life , companies that particularly focus on
 2 delivering a counter—terrorism aspect as a product.
 3 We've never been one of those companies and I've never
 4 aspired to be one of those companies. As I said
 5 earlier , our motivation was to capture public—facing
 6 guidance and to heighten awareness.
 7 Q. So obviously, you as a company would draw on, for
 8 example, the NaCTSO guidance for the type of venues that
 9 you were working in and that would inform your thinking
 10 as a company as to the best way of dealing with issues
 11 where they formed a part of what you did that had
 12 a counter—terrorism element?
 13 A. Yes, I think that's fair . I think that's fair .
 14 Q. And you would share that in your discussion with your
 15 client when you and they — you as a company and they
 16 were talking about arrangements for their events?
 17 A. Or we would direct them to the NaCTSO guidance in terms
 18 of — the NaCTSO guidance — you should consider the
 19 NaCTSO guidance if you've got a question or you need an
 20 understanding.
 21 Q. So they may raise a question about something, and would
 22 this be a position, that sometimes you'd say, there is
 23 a NaCTSO document on this, or, the NaCTSO document on
 24 this says you should do X?
 25 A. I think we would — and I'm speaking personally, I can't

1 understand what every conversation any manager's ever
 2 had with every client . But my understanding would be
 3 that we were pointing towards the NaCTSO guidance and,
 4 if there wasn't enough in that, then I would expect that
 5 they would speak to the police or the emergency services
 6 to see if they could — or if there was a specific
 7 threat that they believed that they needed to act upon.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Logan, terrorist threats don't just
 9 affect members of the public, they affect your employees
 10 and they affect SMG's employees.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Isn't it inevitable therefore that this
 13 is something that you would mutually discuss together to
 14 decide what each of you thought was appropriate for all,
 15 namely including your employees? Isn't that the reality
 16 of life ?
 17 A. The reality of life was that we would have engaged the
 18 counter—terrorism guidance in order to look after our
 19 staff across all the different operating environments,
 20 whether they were working at a football ground, whether
 21 they were working inside an arena, et cetera . I don't
 22 believe that there was a direct engagement with SMG on
 23 that matter about the staff specifically . I don't
 24 believe that that conversation happened.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm just talking about day to day. It's

1 in the interests of both of you that you have the
 2 protection you can against counter—terrorism.
 3 A. Yes, and that makes a hell of a lot of sense. I'm not
 4 in a position to understand what the conversations were
 5 because that wasn't — I wasn't engaging with SMG at
 6 that level . I'm pretty sure that Tom Bailey and
 7 Miriam Stone and people like that level, they will have
 8 been having those conversations as daily conversations,
 9 but I am not aware of those conversations.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 11 MR ATKINSON: On that same theme, before we move on to
 12 a different topic, {INQ035986/11}, please.
 13 It's the bottom bit of the page, so if that can be
 14 made slightly larger to help Mr Logan.
 15 There's a reference to Bataclan in the second line
 16 of the bottom paragraph.
 17 A. Yes, I see it .
 18 Q. In the third line of that same paragraph:
 19 "As an industry there is a burden of responsibility
 20 on us to be proactive to help ourselves ensure that
 21 venues are not perceived by terrorists to be easy
 22 targets, nor by our clients , so that venues are still
 23 appealing havens to enjoy live music, comedy and sport."
 24 Did you as a company see it as part of your
 25 responsibility to work with others to achieve that aim?

1 A. I think we work in an industry, the crowd management
 2 industry, where achieving safety at events is one of the
 3 focal points. That was directed — and again, I'm
 4 trying not to second—guess the words or the thoughts
 5 behind it, but — at almost the wider understanding of
 6 the live entertainment industry that were attracting
 7 crowds in this world of terrorist activity .
 8 Q. {INQ035986/14}, please.
 9 The slide for this page, you were taken to a little
 10 earlier . If we could have the slide for a moment,
 11 Mr Lopez? The proactive approach and reference there to
 12 risk assessments. Do you see that?
 13 A. I do see that, yes.
 14 Q. If you see the second bullet point down in the notes
 15 underneath —
 16 A. That's correct.
 17 Q. — beginning "Risk assessment".
 18 It's the paragraph under the slide that begins "Risk
 19 assessment":
 20 "Risk assessment has to be..."
 21 Do you see a paragraph beginning "Risk assessment
 22 has to be"?
 23 "Risk assessment has to be the starting point to
 24 examine each of the venue's operating activities and
 25 where any vulnerabilities lie and what risks they pose.

1 By forensically examining these, a series of risks will
 2 present themselves whereby mitigating actions can be
 3 identified."

4 And this is under the banner headline of a proactive
 5 approach.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you have said to us this morning that with
 8 hindsight, a greater sharing of, for example, risk
 9 assessments between venues and ShowSec would have been
 10 helpful?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Was the position at the time, as we've understood it
 13 from others, that SMG was not, to your knowledge,
 14 sharing its risk assessments with ShowSec?

15 A. I wasn't aware that there wasn't a coming together of
 the documentation. I wasn't aware of that at that time.

17 Q. In relation to ShowSec's risk assessments -- and this is
 18 just to help you deal with it, Mr Logan, I wonder if we
 19 could go to {INQ001477/1}.

20 This is a risk assessment document completed by
 21 Mr Rigby in relation to the arena at the beginning of
 22 2017, which we understand to be a new format of risk
 23 assessment that had been brought in at that time.

24 If we could go to the very bottom of the page,
 25 please. Literally the bottom of the page before you

1 started enlarging it, Mr Lopez.

2 It's, on my copy, the bottom left-hand corner:
 3 "Version 1. Authorised by Mark Logan and
 4 Sharon Pates."

5 Sharon Pates we understand to be your HR or health
 6 and safety --

7 A. Health and safety manager.

8 Q. You had line management responsibility for health and
 9 safety?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Can you help us as to how this format of document came
 12 to be introduced?

13 A. We felt that the actual risk assessment format should be
 14 refreshed in that the one prior to it was very narrative
 15 form and almost linear in that it kept going down the
 16 page in that it was engaging the actual areas of
 17 assessment and primacy rather than the actual threat
 18 subject matter or risk subject matter. We believed that
 19 there was a better way and a more simplistic and
 20 standardised format that could be driven out by
 21 reviewing it and Sharon brought this template into
 22 fruition by considering other templates, and this was
 23 felt as the best way, the most simple way forward in
 24 a standard format.

25 Q. One of the things that this document considers is the

1 risk of terrorism. What, if any, expert assistance did
 2 you as a company get in relation to how this document
 3 assessed the risk from terrorism?

4 A. I don't believe we got any, other than using again the
 5 NaCTSO guidance in order to consider it.

6 Q. We can see the document was completed by Mr Rigby, we've
 7 spoken to him about that, and I won't ask you any more
 8 about it.

9 Can we move on to a different document, please?
 10 {INQ034658/1}.

11 Can we go down to -- just before we move off,
 12 do you see, right at the top of this page, this is an
 13 email from someone called Sam Hodkin to a variety of
 14 people and copied amongst others to you?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. If we go down to the second page, please, {INQ034658/2}.

17 The email in black, which I hope you can see,
 18 Mr Logan --

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you see it all right, Mr Logan?
 20 We can blow it up, I expect.

21 A. That would be helpful.

22 MR ATKINSON: This is from Alan Wallace, it is October 2016,
 23 to a list of people, copied amongst others to you:
 24 "Subject: CT review meeting -- Paris one year on."
 25 Were you a part of that meeting or was this you,

1 amongst others, being informed of what had happened at
 2 this meeting?

3 A. I wasn't at that meeting and I have no recollection of
 4 the email at the time. I feel that this process has
 5 been engaged out of my email that we spoke about earlier
 6 in terms of complacency and that we needed to ensure
 7 that we didn't fall into any complacent position, and
 8 I believe this was the management staff then acting upon
 9 that to drive out more awareness.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it follows your email of September?

11 A. That's what I believe in reading the emails as a fuller
 12 contextual piece.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

14 MR ATKINSON: We can see that amongst the bullet points --
 15 at least I hope you can see, Mr Logan -- that amongst
 16 the bullet points, in the lower half of the page, the
 17 second bullet point down refers to the need to update
 18 risk assessments, which is the topic we were just
 19 discussing. Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. The third bullet:

22 "Briefings are considered as inadequate as to the CT
 23 element if not delivered frequently enough to new
 24 starters. Counter-terrorism focus needs inserting into
 25 briefings."

1 At the bottom of that list :
 2 "Our debriefing process is not formulaic or
 3 practised enough at each venue."
 4 Was there an issue in relation to having enough time
 5 to brief people as you understood it?
 6 A. Not as I understood it, no. It was never raised to me
 7 that that was an issue.
 8 Q. We'll come to another document on that topic, but to
 9 save flitting too much between documents, can we go up
 10 to the first page of this, please? {INQ034658/1}.
 11 We see that Mr Hodkin --- and who was he or she?
 12 A. He was a manager or is a manager in our Leeds area.
 13 Q. He was referring, three lines down in his email, to
 14 exercises that were being undertaken, talking about live
 15 event exercises and non-live event exercises and
 16 scenarios that were being talked about. Did that
 17 process of training actually happen to your knowledge,
 18 Mr Logan?
 19 A. I believe those... I believe that they're referring to
 20 desktop exercises, and from my understanding, they did
 21 happen. I have no reason to believe that they didn't
 22 happen.
 23 Q. We see below that:
 24 "We practised a non-live event in February 2016.
 25 We have one planned for November 2016. We bring staff

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1 in at no cost to ShowSec or SMG."
 2 Was that at no cost to ShowSec because the staff
 3 were not paid to do it?
 4 A. As I understand it, the staff were invited to come in
 5 for it and it was up to them whether or not they did or
 6 did not attend those sessions. If they did attend and
 7 they weren't paid, then they would have been told that
 8 they weren't being paid.
 9 Q. Thank you. If we go to a further document in relation
 10 to that topic, {INQ032652/18}.
 11 This is really going to test your eyesight, I'm
 12 afraid, Mr Logan. It's row 16 of the document if you're
 13 looking at the left-hand column, and we will need to
 14 enlarge that, I'm sure, to help Mr Logan.
 15 To explain what this is, this is a record that
 16 Ms Stone would keep of your meetings with and in
 17 preparation for her meetings with ShowSec. We can see
 18 that this is a row, the topic of which is:
 19 "HMRC [Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs] audit:
 20 ShowSec audited and mostly okay but have to pay staff to
 21 be on site as required, including training, briefing and
 22 debriefing."
 23 Was that an issue that had come up, the paying of
 24 staff in relation to their training and briefing?
 25 A. I can't remember the detail of it as I wasn't directly

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1 engaged in it, but from my understanding at the
 2 Manchester Arena, staff are paid for all their briefing
 3 and debriefing time and at a cost to ShowSec we supply,
 4 I think, two to three staff in order to ensure that
 5 staff aren't waiting around at check-in period so that
 6 they can maximise the amount of time that we have to
 7 brief the staff prior to them taking up their roles.
 8 Q. Was there a similar issue, though, in relation to paying
 9 staff for the time they took to do their training?
 10 A. I believe that once a staff member is engaged by
 11 ShowSec, so actually on the books working for us,
 12 they've begun to work for us, then we would pay staff to
 13 carry out any training.
 14 Q. But not the training that they had to undertake in order
 15 to start working for you?
 16 A. That's correct, the mandatory training before they began
 17 working for us.
 18 Q. Thank you. Moving on again, a different topic.
 19 {INQ015801/1}.
 20 If we could enlarge the top part of the page,
 21 please. We have heard from others that there were
 22 a number of reviews and audits in which staffing levels
 23 were considered during the course of 2016. This is, as
 24 we understand it, an SMG document, but it is a document
 25 that your company provided to the inquiry and therefore

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1 you personally would have had a role in because you have
 2 been helping to provide that documentation. Is this
 3 a document you are familiar with?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. In terms of the purpose of this review in May of 2016,
 6 its overall aim was to investigate cost-effectiveness in
 7 security operations delivery, and number 1 on the list:
 8 "Evaluate the ops delivery per functional area by
 9 reducing headcount/shift time by reflecting the
 10 operation of the functional area/staffing against four
 11 predominant criteria..."
 12 The first of which is counter-terrorism. Did you
 13 understand that SMG was seeking to reduce staffing
 14 levels and that that was a process in which they were
 15 engaging with ShowSec?
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I just need to understand. I'm
 17 aware you've seen this document because you've been
 18 helping deliver documents to the inquiry. Were you
 19 aware of this document at the time? I want to know
 20 whether you're just construing it now reading it because
 21 of what you found for the inquiry or whether it's
 22 a process that you were aware of at the time. I hope
 23 you understand, Mr Atkinson, why I ---
 24 MR ATKINSON: Absolutely.
 25 A. Sir, these are my notes of a meeting with John Sharkey,

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1 James Allen and I believe Miriam Stone.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, I wasn't aware of that.
 3 MR ATKINSON: So as your note says, Mr Logan, were SMG
 4 looking to cut costs by reducing staffing levels?
 5 A. I am not sure it was quite as harsh as that, or it never
 6 felt as harsh as that to me. The conversation, as
 7 I understood it, was driven out of good housekeeping.
 8 There was no pressure from SMG to reduce staffing
 9 numbers. That's not how it came across to me. There
 10 was no pressure, there was no targets set, there was no
 11 moment in time of someone saying, "If we don't get the
 12 staffing numbers below X then this is a problem". That
 13 wasn't the environment of it. I think it was -- the
 14 environment was a -- it felt like a housekeeping sort of
 15 update to ensure that the staffing numbers that ShowSec
 16 were providing were needed for the provision of what SMG
 17 wanted.
 18 Q. One of the criteria in that process was the role that
 19 those staff had in counter-terrorism?
 20 A. I would say so, yes.
 21 Q. You had to look at what was commercial on the one hand,
 22 but safe, including safe from the risk of terrorism, on
 23 the other?
 24 A. I think the conversation was -- again, this is going
 25 back in time and I'm trying to keep this as factual as

1 possible, but my feeling is that the conversation was
 2 one born out of: if SMG want to reduce staffing numbers,
 3 it may have an impact on one of these. I can't see the
 4 document now, but I believe there was almost four or
 5 five items that may be affected by reducing staff, if
 6 that's what they felt. The rhetoric from SMG,
 7 particularly James Allen, was, one, that he didn't feel
 8 there was any need for any further or any development of
 9 this in terms of cutting staff.
 10 Q. We have seen -- and by all means we'll put it up if it
 11 helps you, Mr Logan -- there was an audit undertaken
 12 in relation to a Justin Bieber concert later in 2016,
 13 which again was looking at staffing levels and staffing
 14 roles. Again identifying, amongst other things, the
 15 counter-terrorism role of your staff.
 16 A. I think from that audit, the Bieber audit, it was on
 17 staffing numbers, and I believe that as a by-product of
 18 that some of the staffing positions were alluded to, to
 19 having a by-product of a counter-terrorism position or
 20 elements, for want of a better word, but I don't believe
 21 that it was done in terms of: these people are here for
 22 counter-terrorism, therefore we should consider it in
 23 that fashion. That's my belief.
 24 Q. As a facet of any assessment of staffing levels, account
 25 had to be taken of particular roles that could only be

1 done by those who were SIA licensed.
 2 A. Could you say that again?
 3 Q. Of course.
 4 As part of any assessment of staffing levels,
 5 account had to be taken of roles that had been to be
 6 done by people who held SIA licences.
 7 A. I think from what I believe, it didn't actually delve
 8 into the operation. What I understood was it was
 9 a numbers audit. That's my memory of it.
 10 Q. But in relation to -- for example, as part of that
 11 process we understand Mr Bailey undertook a positional
 12 analysis looking at all the different roles that ShowSec
 13 staff did and amongst other things what
 14 counter-terrorism aspect that role had.
 15 A. Okay, I'm taking your word for it.
 16 Q. In terms of the cost to SMG of staff provided by
 17 ShowSec, SIA-licensed staff would cost them more,
 18 wouldn't they?
 19 A. That's correct, yes.
 20 Q. Therefore, on the one hand, it would be of a financial
 21 benefit to them to have fewer SIA staff as opposed to
 22 non-SIA staff?
 23 A. I think that obviously follows logically.
 24 Q. And just to illustrate that, {INQ012053/2}.
 25 If we could enlarge the section just below the first

1 hole punch on this page, please, Mr Lopez.
 2 To explain what this is, Mr Logan, this is a meeting
 3 with Guidepost that both SMG and ShowSec had, and you
 4 were one of those who attended on behalf of ShowSec so
 5 that Guidepost could advise SMG in relation to security.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. This is after the attack.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Do you see just below where there's a little box with
 10 "OS written" in it, the cursor is --
 11 "If James Allen wasn't..."
 12 Do you see that?
 13 A. Yes. It's quite distorted in terms of the view from my
 14 end.
 15 Q. Let me read it to you.
 16 (Pause)
 17 This is Guidepost saying to the meeting:
 18 "If James Allen wasn't in the room [and of course
 19 he is] what would you do differently?"
 20 And Alan Wallace said:
 21 "More SIA search -- also focused on budgets/impact
 22 on ingress."
 23 Was there a limit to how many SIA staff could be
 24 involved in searching at the arena because of cost?
 25 A. I don't remember that ever being a -- I don't remember

1 that being any part of any conversation that came my
2 way.
3 Q. Because we know that there were staff at the arena who
4 were undertaking bag checks who should not have been.
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. And that it should have been the SIA staff doing that.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Were costs being kept down at the arena by allowing that
9 to carry on?
10 A. I don't think that was -- it never... I never
11 understood that to be the consideration.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to ask something about that.
13 It has now been discovered and well-known to ShowSec
14 and to SMG that people doing bag checks who were not SIA
15 qualified should have been SIA qualified, and you know
16 that. Was that still going on at the time of the
17 meeting with Guidepost, ie that bag checks were being
18 done by people who were not SIA qualified?
19 A. No, the building had been shut for a considerable amount
20 of time whenever that Guidepost meeting occurred.
21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had that mistake/error been realised by
22 then?
23 A. Not to my knowledge.
24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking completely from the
25 outside, you will understand, won't you, that someone

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1 looking at this, just looking at the objective facts,
2 that ShowSec were aware in 2013 that a requirement of
3 the law was that anyone doing a bag check should have
4 an SIA qualification -- you knew that in 2013, right?
5 A. That's correct.
6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Nevertheless, it continued until 2017
7 and we're aware that at least, inevitably, cost was
8 going to be a consideration for SMG of the whole
9 venture. It might look like, to an objective observer
10 just looking at those facts, that the situation was not
11 altered after your knowledge of what happened in 2013,
12 when you knew that SMG -- you had to have SIA-qualified
13 staff on bag checks. So that was done deliberately with
14 the full knowledge that you were acting unlawfully in
15 order to keep down costs. All right? You can
16 understand how that may look to an objective outsider.
17 What's your response to that?
18 A. My response is that I was unaware that the process
19 hadn't been engaged properly and that cost burden was
20 never discussed in terms of that.
21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I diverted you off.
22 MR ATKINSON: Not at all. Staying with SIA, and this is the
23 last document I'll be looking at with you,
24 {INQ038748/1}, please.
25 This is the annual report and financial statements

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1 for ShowSec for the year ending 31 December 2017. It is
2 signed off by Mr Harding as managing director, but makes
3 clear at various points that it had been considered by
4 and approved by the board. So would you have seen this,
5 Mr Logan?
6 A. I don't think I would have seen it before it was served,
7 but I'd have seen it after it had been served.
8 Q. It's only to ask you about one observation within this
9 document, which is {INQ038748/4}, last paragraph.
10 Under the heading of "Principal risks and
11 uncertainties", do you see that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. The last paragraph of this page under that heading:
14 "Of these [presumably the principal risks and
15 uncertainties], the largest risk facing ShowSec is the
16 potential impact of the shortage of SIA workers in the
17 UK. ShowSec is working to help develop possible
18 solutions to this problem, in the interests of itself,
19 the SIA and the government. A reduction in supply of
20 licence-holders could lead to a significant increase in
21 wages and a more measured approach by ShowSec regarding
22 which contracts it can maintain, especially at times of
23 peak demand."
24 Just so we can understand that, Mr Logan, do you
25 agree with that as a concern that ShowSec was having to

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1 deal with?
2 A. I agree that it was a pressure on the marketplace,
3 particularly evident in the last quarter of 2017,
4 in that -- do you want me to expand or are you happy
5 with that answer?
6 Q. If you feel it helpful to do so, I don't want to stop
7 you.
8 A. The market -- it was evident that the market was
9 pressurised due to the gig economy and also people's
10 attractiveness to work in security and I think that was
11 right the way across the industry towards the back-end
12 of 2017.
13 Q. So would it be right to say that if clients were asking
14 ShowSec for very large numbers of SIA staff then that
15 was all well and good from ShowSec's point of view
16 because they would be paid more for those staff, but
17 there was a limit on how many SIA-licensed staff there
18 were to go around?
19 A. I think that's probably fair.
20 Q. And so, again, in relation to maintaining its contracts,
21 including that at the arena, the possible limit to the
22 number of available SIA staff was always a factor?
23 A. I wouldn't say that in terms of always a factor. I've
24 asked my staff to do some research into where we were in
25 May of 2017 and we in Manchester had a staffing pool of

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1 744 staff, of which 400 stewards and the remaining 344
 2 were SIA, plus supervisors, plus management. I believe
 3 that would have delivered a strong pool of staff to
 4 deliver the needs of SMG, and contextually, it put us in
 5 a very strong market position within the local
 6 Manchester area.
 7 Q. So does it follow from that that whatever other
 8 explanation there was for non-SIA staff at the arena
 9 doing SIA jobs, it wasn't because there was a shortage
 10 of SIA staff available?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 MR ATKINSON: Thank you very much, Mr Logan. Thank you,
 13 sir.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. We should have a break. Is
 15 10 minutes enough break for you, Mr Logan, or would you
 16 like longer?
 17 A. Ten minutes is fine, thank you, sir.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, quarter past.
 19 (12.05 pm)
 20 (A short break)
 21 (12.15 pm)
 22 MR DE LA POER: Mr Logan, can you hear and see me?
 23 A. Yes, I can.
 24 MR DE LA POER: Next I'm going to ask Mr Cooper on behalf of
 25 a bereaved family group to ask some questions.

1 Questions from MR COOPER
 2 MR COOPER: Thank you. Let me reassure you, I am not going
 3 to repeat any questions that you've already been asked.
 4 These are questions that follow on and hopefully assist.
 5 Can I take you, please, to {INQ015804/1}. I know
 6 you've had notification of this document. Have you
 7 looked at it recently?
 8 A. I have looked at it over the last few days, yes.
 9 Q. When you first saw it, did you recognise it?
 10 A. I recognised it as a document that one of our Dutch
 11 colleagues wrote.
 12 Q. Do you know when it was written?
 13 A. I can't be sure. I believe it was obviously after the
 14 attack, but I can't be sure of the time or day.
 15 Q. Do you know for what purpose it was written?
 16 A. Again, it's a document that I have never given
 17 consideration to until a couple of days ago, so I really
 18 don't know and I don't want to make assumptions of
 19 what was going through the person's mind when they
 20 were...
 21 Q. You accept, don't you, that firstly it's a ShowSec
 22 document?
 23 A. I accept that one of our Dutch colleagues in the Dutch
 24 company wrote it, yes.
 25 Q. Is there any reason, and it may be absolutely nothing,

1 but there's the constant repetition, it seems, of "It's
 2 a Dutch document". It's a ShowSec document, isn't it?
 3 A. Yes, but the reason I say it is Dutch is having read
 4 it — I'm trying to put this in as best a contextual
 5 fashion...
 6 Q. Take your time.
 7 A. Somebody who speaks Dutch every day and a translation of
 8 Dutch into English may come across in a different manner
 9 to the intention of the words that's actually been
 10 written. I think that's why I refer to it as a Dutch
 11 document. I apologise if that's been...
 12 Q. There's absolutely no need to apologise. There's been
 13 regular references made, not just by you, that it's
 14 a Dutch document. I'm just trying to work out whether
 15 Dutch ShowSec is any different to ShowSec. But the
 16 point being made is it may be a document written in bad
 17 English; is that the point of us and the chair being
 18 told it's a Dutch document?
 19 A. Yes, that's where I'm coming from in terms of that, yes.
 20 Q. It's not to suggest that Dutch ShowSec is any different
 21 to UK ShowSec, for instance?
 22 A. There is no Dutch ShowSec, it's called The Security
 23 Company Utrecht. It's not called ShowSec in Holland,
 24 it's a separate thing.
 25 Q. I don't want to get too bogged down for your and my

1 purposes with this, but it's a document which is marked
 2 ShowSec, so we can take it as a ShowSec document, can't
 3 we?
 4 A. For the purposes of this conversation, yes.
 5 Q. For the purposes of any conversation, it's a ShowSec
 6 document, isn't it?
 7 All right, Mr Laidlaw says it's not.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have heard the evidence about where it
 9 comes from and I can conclude myself.
 10 It's an associated company with ShowSec which
 11 operates in Holland; is that right?
 12 MR LAIDLAW: Yes.
 13 MR COOPER: And the document is marked ShowSec; correct? Is
 14 that right, Mr Logan?
 15 A. Okay, yes.
 16 Q. So therefore, the individual who wrote this document is
 17 speaking on behalf of ShowSec or holding — Mr Laidlaw
 18 will be giving evidence soon, perhaps he could give
 19 disclosure to Opus —
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, let's all calm down about this,
 21 please.
 22 It talks about ShowSec in the penultimate bullet
 23 point: "That's exactly what we do at ShowSec", it says.
 24 So clearly it is talking to that extent on behalf of
 25 ShowSec in one way or another. I can read it for myself

1 and I can decide what it is. So let's deal with the
 2 point.
 3 MR COOPER: Do you agree with what he says?
 4 A. Sorry, are you speaking to me?
 5 Q. Indeed. Do you agree with what this document, marked
 6 ShowSec, says?
 7 A. I've never considered it. It's not been ever published
 8 by ShowSec, so I can't agree with the sentiment that's
 9 inside it. I don't believe that this has been
 10 representative or is being pursued to be representative
 11 of a ShowSec position.
 12 Q. Well, with the inquiry's patience, I'm going to press
 13 you on this, if I may, in the nicest possible way, that
 14 this is a document marked ShowSec and am I to understand
 15 that it says things that you don't agree with? And to
 16 be fair to you, let's drill down on that. Do you say
 17 that this document says things that you don't agree
 18 with?
 19 A. I think that there is, from what I've seen of it,
 20 I wouldn't have used the phraseology or the terminology
 21 or set a document out like this. I can't explain other
 22 people's thoughts if that's how they've done this. I go
 23 back to the point that it wasn't published by ShowSec
 24 outwardly to anyone else and I have never taken it into
 25 consideration.

1 Q. Mr Logan, I'm absolutely sure it wasn't published to
 2 anyone else. That in many respects is the point I'm
 3 dealing with here. Perhaps, I suggest to you, it shows
 4 a mindset in ShowSec or certain parts of ShowSec, not
 5 shown to the public, which is put to paper on a ShowSec
 6 document, doesn't it? A mindset of certainly some
 7 people in ShowSec.
 8 A. Say again? I'm not sure (overspeaking).
 9 Q. It shows a mindset for certainly some people in ShowSec,
 10 unpublished, kept within ShowSec, as to the attitude of
 11 ShowSec to the Ariana Grande tragedy.
 12 A. Having watched Mr Harding's evidence and this topic
 13 being raised, I don't believe that it is representative
 14 of how people inside ShowSec feel or displayed
 15 themselves at the time. I think what is representative
 16 is elements such as or people such as Ricardo Costa, who
 17 went to help people in the City Room that night.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I really don't want to -- I understand
 19 what happened. I don't think that particular answer,
 20 which I well understand why you're giving it, is a very
 21 good idea to give at this time. I will of course take
 22 all those things into account.
 23 Just help me: I know it comes from the Dutch, but
 24 how is it -- where did it come from? Who got it and
 25 where does it come from? It looks like it's part of

1 a bigger bundle to me. Do you know?
 2 A. I can only assume that it was -- in terms of disclosure,
 3 anything that dealt with the issue on the night was
 4 disclosed and I believe that's how this has come to
 5 surface.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does this disclosure come from ShowSec?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which you've been, as I understand, the
 9 person who's been having to carry most of it out?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you tell me what document it comes
 12 from?
 13 A. I only think... I know very little about it, but what
 14 I do think of this document is that the person from the
 15 Dutch company or the Dutch ShowSec, as Mr Cooper's
 16 referred to, has written down some thoughts and those
 17 thoughts have been sat on a PowerPoint platform. But it
 18 hasn't been cascaded outwards and it was never
 19 considered at the time, sir.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So whoever drafted it, it never
 21 went out, you told us, but it was drafted in order,
 22 presumably, to go out to customers to reassure customers
 23 of that company in Holland?
 24 A. No, I don't even believe it was for that. I think it
 25 was just somebody writing down their thoughts in terms

1 of -- maybe at face value, the thoughts... I don't
 2 believe it was ever considered that it would go to
 3 either clients or staff or anything like that.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If it's a PowerPoint, they are normally
 5 done to show to people on a presentation.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who was -- pardon? Do you know who the
 8 presentation was intended for?
 9 A. I don't. I just think they used that platform, not
 10 because of a presentation, but maybe just for ease of
 11 writing. Again, I'm second-guessing somebody else's
 12 position here, which I'm not comfortable with.
 13 MR COOPER: In the nicest possible way, Mr Logan, this
 14 document is an embarrassment, isn't it, to ShowSec,
 15 which is why you're trying to distance yourself from it.
 16 A. I just (overspeaking).
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's put it his way: sitting there as
 18 you are now, answering questions, would you wish it
 19 hadn't been written?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 MR COOPER: I'll leave it there.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 MR COOPER: Can I go on to another document, please, that
 24 you've already been referred to. In fact, it's
 25 a different reference, but it's the same document. Can

1 I ask you to please look at {INQ015826/1}, which is the
 2 exact document — {INQ012135/1}, but it's the document
 3 I've been working from.
 4 {INQ015826/1}. This document, and again I'm not
 5 going to repeat the questions that have been ably put to
 6 you by CTI on the matter, but I just want to check a few
 7 things.
 8 Firstly, a preliminary question. You're presently
 9 still employed by ShowSec; that's correct, isn't it?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. In what role?
 12 A. As a director.
 13 Q. And when did you go back to work after this atrocity?
 14 A. I never left work.
 15 Q. When did you take up your duties again? Was it in
 16 September when the arena opened or was it before then?
 17 You carried on?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Sorry, it's my mistake, you carried on.
 20 So far as this document is concerned, you've already
 21 been to it. It's about crowd safety, I presume, isn't
 22 it? "Manchester Arena terror attack overview." It's
 23 about crowd safety, isn't it, and lessons learned?
 24 A. It's about the recovery of the company and the steps
 25 that we had tried to take and the steps that we should

1 consider going into the future.
 2 Q. Thank you.
 3 A. It's almost — it's not particularly considered with
 4 crowd management or crowd safety.
 5 Q. In fact, that's the question I was going to put to you.
 6 There's absolutely nothing in here — and this will
 7 short circuit it — there is nothing in this document
 8 about improving the procedure and approach to crowd
 9 safety or security at all, is there, in this document?
 10 A. That's correct and that's not what it was designed for.
 11 Q. And it was designed for corporate positioning, was it,
 12 post-Manchester Arena?
 13 A. It was really designed for giving the managers an
 14 understanding of what had happened, the pressures upon
 15 the working environment, and the steps we had to take
 16 moving forward in terms of a business environment.
 17 Q. Thank you.
 18 There's a similar presentation, I presume, to
 19 management in terms of keeping people safe and attitudes
 20 being taken to security of the public? Was a similar
 21 presentation given to management?
 22 A. I think those — any improvements to either crowd
 23 management or any elements that you're talking about
 24 would have been driven out on a local basis from the
 25 direction of the multiple changes inside the environment

1 and would have been peculiar to each of those specific,
 2 either venue or operational, deliveries. It's very
 3 difficult to send out standardised techniques that then
 4 need to be almost paralleled against what that client
 5 wants and what's needed.
 6 Q. I think I understood that. You're saying that as far as
 7 a parallel presentation is concerned, telling management
 8 about things that went wrong on the night, that wasn't
 9 considered to be in this sort of format an appropriate
 10 presentation?
 11 A. I think at that time, that was in — did you say June or
 12 July, that presentation?
 13 Q. July, 2 months after the tragedy.
 14 A. Yes. I think we weren't in a position at that time to
 15 look in depth to any effect of the operation. That's
 16 really been born out of not just this process but other
 17 understandings at that time. But again, what I'm trying
 18 to say is it's very hard to lift one operation and then
 19 drop it on top of multiple other organisations where
 20 there's no synergy.
 21 Q. Do you understand, Mr Logan, my questions are designed,
 22 just as my questions on the so-called Dutch document are
 23 designed, to work out what ShowSec's priorities were.
 24 Do you understand? This is the line of questioning
 25 (overspeaking) with you.

1 A. I understand that, I understand.
 2 Q. (Overspeaking).
 3 A. And following the attack in Manchester, the management
 4 staff did go to their clients and did re-engage in order
 5 to deliver any guidance that was applicable. I think
 6 the guidance changed not long after, if I'm... Sorry,
 7 I'm trying to catch up on my thought pattern here. I do
 8 think the NaCTSO guidance did change in June or July
 9 that year and that would have been carried through to
 10 the operational practices.
 11 Q. Would there be documentation indicating that local level
 12 of engagement of management with clients? Would
 13 you have examples of that for us to see or was it not
 14 committed to paper?
 15 A. I don't have it to hand.
 16 Q. It's a matter for the chair and for you, but if there
 17 are such similar documents, but on a local level,
 18 indicating management explaining the changes on a crowd
 19 safety level for us to see, I'm sure you'll help us with
 20 that.
 21 A. Okay.
 22 Q. It is right to say that although this document is
 23 2 months after the event, as time went on, you became
 24 aware — I'm not going to take you through it all — but
 25 as time went on you became aware of the potential

1 failings that occurred at the arena, such as risk
 2 assessment issues, pre-egress check problems, online
 3 training, and that sort of thing, without going through
 4 the whole list of things we've heard over the last few
 5 weeks? You became aware, didn't you, of all that before
 6 this inquiry?
 7 A. I think the risk assessment element we became aware of
 8 within the process of the security experts' report. As
 9 I understand it, the issue with the online training was
 10 dealt with without knowledge of the actual issue itself
 11 that has been highlighted. And the actual pre-egress
 12 check that sits against the mezzanine has only really
 13 been -- come to the table throughout this process.
 14 That's my understanding.
 15 Q. It's your evidence, I'm simply asking the question: so
 16 are you saying -- you've explained you're still in
 17 position and you have remained in position since this
 18 tragedy -- that that the vast extent of what the chair
 19 has heard over the last few months here concerning the
 20 potential problems at the arena that may or may not be
 21 the fault of ShowSec, you weren't aware of until it
 22 became clear in this inquiry? You weren't aware of much
 23 of that until it became clear in this inquiry?
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you don't mind me saying so,
 25 Mr Cooper, you've slightly enlarged the second question

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1 from the first so they don't quite --
 2 MR COOPER: It wasn't intentional.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The first question, I think, was
 4 relating to ShowSec's possible failures coming to light
 5 and now you are talking about the general failures --
 6 MR COOPER: My second question is the faulty one then. Let
 7 me correct that second question.
 8 In terms of the ShowSec-specific potential failures,
 9 are you saying that the majority of those have not
 10 become apparent to you until you heard the evidence or,
 11 to be fair to you, read the experts' reports?
 12 A. A bit of both. I do think that we have become aware in
 13 learnings in the run-up and have executed those
 14 learnings in the run-up and prior to the experts'
 15 report. But I do think that the experts' report has
 16 highlighted elements that we hadn't picked up on to that
 17 time.
 18 Q. Can I ask you this: obviously we know that the arena
 19 came back into action again -- was it 9 September?
 20 Certainly September of 2017. At that stage, had any
 21 internal inquiries been undertaken by ShowSec as to
 22 their operation to see exactly what might have gone
 23 wrong? Had anything been done to try and isolate the
 24 failures or potential failures yourselves without
 25 waiting for the experts and without waiting for this

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1 inquiry?
 2 A. Yes, there was a local debrief within the management
 3 staff and, I believe, in terms of understanding the next
 4 stage of where the arena wanted to go to, looked at the
 5 then and the now and the changeover and the changes
 6 in the delivery.
 7 Q. I didn't quite understand, but I'll move on.
 8 Was there not, and it's a simple question, an
 9 attitude taken by ShowSec that they would take
 10 responsibility immediately and have an internal inquiry
 11 as to what might have happened at the arena as far as
 12 they are concerned? Was any decision or discussion
 13 taken --
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, let him answer the question if you
 15 don't mind.
 16 MR COOPER: I was trying to clarify it, sorry.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you understand the question,
 18 Mr Logan?
 19 A. Yes, of course I do.
 20 We moved through the stages of the welfare
 21 statements, but then we moved on to the stage of helping
 22 the police with garnering statements. Then we carried
 23 out a question and answer session with the management
 24 team once we felt that they were in the right frame of
 25 mind to do so, and then that then moved on to the

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1 refocus of what the operation was on the ground for the
 2 Manchester Arena, working with SMG on the basis of the
 3 Guidepost plan to re-open the building.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: One of the things which may have become
 5 apparent during the course of this inquiry is that lots
 6 of people, not just ShowSec, but lots of people had
 7 perhaps not paid sufficient attention to the risks of an
 8 attack at the time of egress when lots of people are
 9 coming out. Do you understand?
 10 A. Yes, I do.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it's been focused on quite a lot
 12 in the inquiry. This is a risk that presumably doesn't
 13 just arise, as far as your firm are concerned, at the
 14 arena, so have you looked to see whether this may be
 15 a weakness in your operation -- not just you, but the
 16 people who are running the place as well -- that this
 17 may be a weakness elsewhere which needs to be looked at?
 18 I'm trying to get the specific lessons now.
 19 A. Okay. Is it okay for me to speak of examples? Is that
 20 appropriate? I don't want to...
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're going to say there are
 22 problems in other arenas, then probably it wouldn't be
 23 a good idea. Just talk in general terms in the first
 24 instance.
 25 A. Yes. I do believe that egress and the monitoring of

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1 egress beyond the access flow out of a venue or a space
 2 being used for entertainment has now become a part of
 3 what the staff will do and they will engage with their
 4 clients to do so.
 5 I can cite an example straight afterwards, but I'm
 6 also focused on the fact that you may be reluctant for
 7 me to do so.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 9 MR COOPER: On the chair's question, can I take you, please,
 10 to {INQ015826/3} of the document that's presently before
 11 you and just examine with you for a moment the
 12 expression you used:
 13 "Incident. Post show — not in full egress."
 14 What do you mean by that? What do you mean by that
 15 qualification "not in full egress" and what's the
 16 relevance of that?
 17 A. The relevance is that, as I understood it at the time,
 18 the actual egress wasn't at a point of its peak. It had
 19 just begun, people had just started to not trickle out,
 20 but it was maybe slightly building, and the egress
 21 wasn't at full peak flow.
 22 Q. Just on this general point that I was examining with you
 23 a moment ago about steps taken by ShowSec post—tragedy,
 24 it is a matter put to a number of witnesses that ShowSec
 25 were being reactive rather than proactive in the sense

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1 of they're waiting for this inquiry, they're waiting for
 2 a number of matters, but they're not being proactive in
 3 examining themselves what went wrong with their
 4 operation. I put it to you simply: you're being
 5 reactive, aren't you?
 6 A. I don't think so. I'm really not trying to be
 7 argumentative. I believe that every operation stands on
 8 its own merits. I think the factors of the egress
 9 position most definitely have been taken in and I've
 10 witnessed and seen them being taken into the operational
 11 context on large scale events. So I believe that in
 12 terms of that element that you're speaking of,
 13 Mr Cooper, I'm sorry, I don't agree with that.
 14 Q. I see. {INQ015826/7}, please. I just want to examine
 15 one expression on that page, "Reputational posture".
 16 What do you mean? This is headed "Post—event —
 17 24 hours to 72 hours". So this is very close to the
 18 tragedy. You're indicating from your presentation that
 19 very close to the tragedy, within 3 days of it, one of
 20 the concerns of ShowSec is reputational posture. What
 21 sort of reputational posture is ShowSec interested in 3
 22 or so days after this tragedy?
 23 A. I think we were looking at business continuity, being
 24 able to continue to deliver services in the business as
 25 usual format, in that clients still expected us to

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1 deliver and what I was trying to get across was that we
 2 needed to maintain our services to those clients who may
 3 want to continue operating in the events space at that
 4 time even though this had happened.
 5 Q. Well, forgive me, Mr Logan. I'll be as delicate as
 6 I can with you on this. Business as usual? Three days
 7 or so — and I won't go into the detail —
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think this is becoming a comment.
 9 I get the point that you're making. I think it's
 10 possibly a comment rather than question —
 11 MR COOPER: So be it, sir. I'll address the potential
 12 question to you, sir: simply that there were people
 13 continuing then perhaps to go into concerts and arenas
 14 and perhaps business as usual should have been to stop
 15 them and close them down if necessary. That's the point
 16 I was going to put.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So do you think the right reaction
 18 should have been to close down what was going on in
 19 arenas around the country until you had sorted out what
 20 the problems had been at the arena?
 21 A. I don't think that decision would have... It didn't lie
 22 with us. That lay with the operators of different
 23 venues. I can't speak on their behalf. I understand
 24 what you're saying. I really do understand what you're
 25 saying. But I don't... I also think that those other

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1 operators wanted to continue and honour the tickets.
 2 I do think in the first day or so, there was some shows
 3 cancelled, if I'm correct, and I think there was some
 4 shows put on, almost as an act of solidarity with what
 5 had happened in that they wanted to maintain business.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The other factor, forgive me, is that
 7 I think the threat rating went up to whatever the top
 8 level is.
 9 MR COOPER: Critical, I think.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Critical. So the police were actually
 11 warning of further attacks. Perhaps that adds — were
 12 you considering advising people not to have shows or
 13 is that something which you wouldn't be yourself
 14 concerned with?
 15 A. It wouldn't be ShowSec's position to advise a client not
 16 to have a show. The client would need to talk to their
 17 local police force in understanding what that heightened
 18 threat level meant to them and whether or not they
 19 should go ahead with the show.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 21 MR COOPER: I was going to put a question, sir, about the
 22 priority being money making, but I think you have the
 23 point.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do have the point and we understand
 25 the general thrust and it's obviously something —

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1 whether the reaction was appropriate or not is clearly
 2 something that I will have to look at.
 3 MR COOPER: And the motivation for it.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think I've probably heard quite a lot
 5 about that.
 6 MR COOPER: Then I shall move on, sir.
 7 {INQ015826/8}, please. I just want some
 8 clarification on this:
 9 "Ongoing legal positioning — potential 5 years."
 10 It goes into criminal inquiries, coronial inquiries,
 11 insurance claims and such. What does, "Ongoing legal
 12 positioning — potential 5 years", mean? I'm being told
 13 by Mr Laidlaw it's privileged.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be.
 15 MR COOPER: If he says it is, it is.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think inevitably any company is going
 17 to face an inquiry, going to face being sued, insurance
 18 claim, HSE inquiry...
 19 MR COOPER: I will move on.
 20 Lastly on this document, you've already been taken
 21 to this, but I want to drill in closer. "Key learning",
 22 the last page, {INQ015826/9}:
 23 "You are only as strong after a disaster as your
 24 pre-disaster planning."
 25 I want to understand what you mean by pre-disaster

1 planning. What precisely do you mean by that?
 2 A. I mean by that the whole planning phase of an operation.
 3 If you plan an operation strongly and well, then if
 4 a disaster happens, then you're in a position to be able
 5 to provide an audit of your decision-making and the
 6 incremental parts of your planning.
 7 Q. I see. As you've already indicated, this is
 8 a presentation for management, so you're pitching it,
 9 effectively, to management in that respect?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. I'll move off this document now, but before I move on,
 12 just a few disparate questions on a number of matters.
 13 I asked you a little earlier whether you were still
 14 in position and you are. What sort of lessons then are
 15 you putting in place now as the man still in position
 16 for ShowSec in protection of the arena? What sort of
 17 things have you learned from this tragedy as far as
 18 security is concerned? I wouldn't ask you this if you
 19 were no longer working for ShowSec or indeed no longer
 20 in this business, but you are, you're there, you're
 21 still at the arena. So what, as a result of this
 22 tragedy, practically in terms of protecting people, have
 23 you learned?
 24 A. I think the biggest learning has been where
 25 counter-terrorism sits in the mindset of risk, and where

1 I'm coming from is maybe up to this tragedy, terrorism
 2 was, rightly or wrongly, construed as a hazard in terms
 3 of the whole risk assessment element. What I've learned
 4 from it in terms of engagement with experts in the field
 5 is that the terrorism element is omnipresent and it's
 6 difficult to assess the risk of that terrorism on
 7 a local nature. It never goes away and it needs to be
 8 viewed from that — I'm not trying to cloud the water
 9 here, but it's almost like the predicament we're in with
 10 COVID-19 at this minute in time, in that it's an
 11 omnipresent risk that no one item or element can really
 12 construct what the hazard is or how it can be mitigated
 13 against, and I think the importance of the new
 14 educational courses that have come through from —
 15 I think it's Cumbria University — it really then brings
 16 that understanding of risk from terrorism into our
 17 industry, whereby it was viewed as a singular hazard
 18 entity in the past. I hope that answers your question.
 19 That's definitely a learning point for me.
 20 Q. Some may think, it's a matter for them, that it didn't
 21 need this tragedy at Manchester Arena for that to be
 22 learned. Bataclan, Stade de France, the incidents in
 23 Germany that were thankfully foiled: some might think,
 24 and I'll give you an opportunity of responding to this,
 25 that those lessons were there to be learned before

1 Manchester Arena. What do you say to that?
 2 A. I think lessons can always be learned from disasters
 3 around the world. I think we can't stop learning. I'm
 4 interested that you do pick up on Bataclan in such
 5 a detailed fashion, because it does equate to the
 6 industry that I work in, but I'm also aware that
 7 Bataclan as a theatre had several threats because of its
 8 ownership, because of activities that had happened
 9 inside it, because it was on the radar, it seemed to be
 10 on the radar for extremists, and it was also part of
 11 a three-pronged attack that night. So it wasn't singled
 12 out.
 13 I do understand the comparisons and why you draw
 14 those comparisons, but I also think it was operating
 15 under a different element of threat in that it was
 16 a localised pointed threat against it as a venue because
 17 of its activity, which wouldn't parallel against where
 18 the Manchester Arena sat at that time. Notwithstanding
 19 that, there's obviously lessons from any terrorist
 20 activity that can be acted upon.
 21 Q. That's very helpful. I'll put this last question on
 22 this point succinctly, I hope.
 23 Taking all that into account, the UK was under
 24 a severe threat level. What happened at the arena, I'll
 25 suggest to you, tragic and appalling though it was, was

1 an attack of a lone bomber who, and we know the details
 2 of it, was not that new. Should you not have been
 3 a little more alert to the risks that the arena faced
 4 before this atrocity? Regardless of the nuances of
 5 Bataclan, should you not have been more alert, and I'll
 6 put it as neutrally as that, to the risks that the arena
 7 faced during the severe threat level? And we know that
 8 during 2017 there were other terrorist atrocities before
 9 the arena.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's the question. What's the answer?
 11 What do you say to that?

12 A. I say that we've been proactive after Bataclan. You've
 13 seen the emails. We have spoken of two of the emails
 14 today. The documents then of 20 November, which are
 15 also captured in an email, which I sent out, which had
 16 been forwarded on by the SGSA. We went back to it as
 17 a point in 2016. So of course I understand the
 18 sentiment, but I believe that we were —

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, you've just told me that you are
 20 now looking, since 22 May 2017, at the risk of terrorism
 21 in a different way.

22 A. Yes.

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the question boiled down to:
 24 shouldn't you have been looking at it in that way before
 25 22 May?

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1 A. I think it's an education piece. Those courses have
 2 only become available and it's only maybe broadened the
 3 horizon or the thought plane of what we should or
 4 shouldn't be looking at. We thought we were doing as
 5 much as we possibly could in terms of delivering that
 6 guidance that was publicly available.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'll obviously assess that, Mr Cooper.

8 MR COOPER: I'll top and tail it simply this way, if I may.
 9 It shouldn't take a course, should it, Mr Logan, to
 10 bring these matters to your attention? Someone in your
 11 business with your experience should have known about it
 12 without having to go on a course. And then I'll leave
 13 it there. What to you say to that?

14 A. I still go back to the fact that I think we were
 15 proactively pursuing it.

16 Q. All right. There are a few matters, and you heard the
 17 evidence that Mr Harding gave and there are a few
 18 matters that he referred to, and on one particular
 19 matter he referred back to you, so you can thank
 20 Mr Harding for this rather than me. I just want to
 21 clarify it with you.

22 As far as counter—terrorism advice is concerned and
 23 whether ShowSec were giving it, Mr Harding in his
 24 evidence said it was "base—level counter—terrorism
 25 advice". Base—level counter—terrorism advice. Do you

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1 agree with that?

2 A. I think, as I've said several times, we were taking our
 3 position from the publicly held guidance and making
 4 people aware of it.

5 Q. Indeed, but Mr Harding — and it's your prerogative to
 6 disagree with him — didn't say there was no
 7 counter—terrorism advice given by ShowSec but that it
 8 was base level, and I want to know whether you agree
 9 with him or disagree with him. Either course is
 10 perfectly appropriate.

11 A. He uses advice where I use awareness; that's maybe the
 12 crux of that.

13 Q. All right. It's the base level that I'm trying to focus
 14 on here. So it's not that ShowSec weren't giving
 15 counter—terrorism awareness/advice, what you will, but
 16 it was the level of that advice that's the issue.

17 A. And the threshold of that position would have been the
 18 government guidance on the matter.

19 Q. I'll move on.

20 Mr Harding directed this question back to you, so
 21 I do so on his behalf. It was a question concerning
 22 collaborative risk assessment, about the collaboration
 23 between SMG and ShowSec on the risk assessments.
 24 Mr Harding said:
 25 "Mr Logan is the best person to speak to this."

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1 So was there collaboration, and I know it's been
 2 touched upon, but Mr Harding directly puts it in your
 3 court. Was there collaborative risk assessment between
 4 SMG and ShowSec?

5 A. Not that I know of. If it was, it would have been done
 6 at the operational level and I'm unsure why Mr Harding
 7 would have directed that back to me, because I wouldn't
 8 have been involved in it.

9 Q. That just leaves me with some final two questions and
 10 they're disparate again.

11 I put to Mr Harding the position in relation to
 12 Mr Lavery's report and Mr Harding said that he would
 13 have sent it to you, and that's where it was left. So
 14 I'm asking you: do you remember a report being given to
 15 you by Mr Harding concerning a sighting that Mr Lavery
 16 had about potential hostile surveillance on 18 May?

17 A. As I understand it, Mr Harding wasn't made aware of it
 18 until the night of the bomb, afterwards, and he —

19 Q. I understand. The incident was 18 May, is what I meant.
 20 I'll put the question very simply: do you recall
 21 Mr Harding giving you a report from Mr Lavery about what
 22 he saw?

23 A. He forwarded me an email.

24 Q. (Overspeaking) — pardon?

25 A. He forwarded me an email (overspeaking) on the night —

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1 sorry, I can't --
 2 Q. It's my fault. I'm not trying to talk across you, it's
 3 difficult on the screen. You speak now.
 4 A. He forwarded me an email which was sent on the night
 5 after the bomb had gone off, as John Lavery had raised
 6 it to his attention. He sent it to me, and I believe
 7 I sent that on, or engaged with James Allen on it, so he
 8 would be fully aware. This was all after the bomb. And
 9 I believe that those have been disclosed.
 10 Q. Yes, there's no criticism of the disclosure process at
 11 the moment. I'm not sure whether we had those emails,
 12 we can check. I'm not criticising you for that. We'll
 13 check whether we've had those emails. If we haven't,
 14 perhaps we could call upon them.
 15 But what you are saying is that, to be clear about
 16 this, it was left with Mr Harding to you, Mr Harding
 17 gives you this information from Lavery, did you say on
 18 the night of this tragedy?
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He said after the bomb.
 20 A. Yes, it happened after the bomb.
 21 MR COOPER: And then you sent it to James Allen?
 22 A. Yes, I think I sent it to James Allen or spoke to him
 23 about it. I can't remember.
 24 Q. That just deals with the trail.
 25 You've been asked questions about a document

1 concerning -- I'm not going to take you to it, you've
 2 been referred to it by CTI -- concerning the bag
 3 searches and a series of emails from 23 May, you to
 4 Harding, concerning bag searches on all public entry
 5 doors, with a main focus on food and beverages and
 6 prohibited items. I'm not going to go over that again.
 7 Really, my final question to you concerns that
 8 photograph you were shown on {INQ025638/1}. It concerns
 9 again whether ShowSec are holding themselves out as
 10 counter-terrorism advisers. Perhaps we can look at that
 11 photograph again. It's the one where you say they're
 12 checking broken seats. I have a few brief questions on
 13 this.
 14 {INQ025638/7}.
 15 I'm not going to ask the same questions, it's just
 16 defined on this. Looking at that photograph, they're
 17 not just checking for broken seats, are they?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Look at the two men at the top. What are those two men
 20 checking at the top of the photograph?
 21 A. I don't have a clue. They could be shouting down to
 22 somebody. I really have no knowledge. I have no
 23 knowledge where that photograph came from.
 24 Q. They could be checking for bags or packages left,
 25 couldn't they, for all you know?

1 A. I think you would need to look --
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we can deal with it this way:
 3 they may be checking for broken seats, they certainly do
 4 do that at football grounds, and they miss quite a lot
 5 of broken seats when they do it. But if they had found
 6 some sort of package when they'd been checking for
 7 broken seats, you'd expect them to take that in to some
 8 sort of security person at the football ground, wouldn't
 9 you? So whatever their purpose, they are in fact doing
 10 both things?
 11 A. Yes, of course, I understand.
 12 MR COOPER: No further questions, sir.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 14 MR DE LA POER: Sir, it may be a good idea to break for
 15 lunch now. I thought I ought to check with Mr Laidlaw.
 16 MR LAIDLAW: Could we not? I just have two short topics.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are two short topics. Are you
 18 happy to continue and finish the evidence, Mr Logan?
 19 A. Yes, please. Yes, please.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, we will then.
 21 Questions from MR LAIDLAW
 22 MR LAIDLAW: Mr Logan, it's in respect of two documents you
 23 were shown by my learned friend Mr de la Poer. I think
 24 there's some other information that you can provide to
 25 the chairman, which may be of assistance.

1 The first one, please, Mr Lopez, is {INQ034698/1}.
 2 Mr Logan, this is the email you sent, including the
 3 NaCTSO advice, on 16 November. Do you remember?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And just to fill in the chronology, the attack was on
 6 13 November, was it not?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. So you're sending this on the 16th. It is sent
 9 internally within ShowSec, is it not?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. Can you assist the chair with whether any of the trade
 12 associations made similar or gave similar advice drawing
 13 upon the NaCTSO material in the days which followed the
 14 16th?
 15 A. Yes. On 20 November, I forwarded on an email that I had
 16 received from the SGSA, who had attached -- I'm doing
 17 this from memory, so please forgive me -- hostile
 18 reconnaissance, lockdown, and there was one other piece
 19 of NaCTSO guidance, as attachments, and were sending
 20 them out on the basis that the SGSA had had a conference
 21 call from someone at NaCTSO and NaCTSO had asked the
 22 SGSA to disseminate that information and relevant NaCTSO
 23 guidance out to any members or interested parties or
 24 stakeholders.
 25 Q. So again, you, as it were, sent on or distributed that

1 further information coming from NaCTSO?
 2 A. Yes. That's correct.
 3 Q. Thank you. The next document is this: this is the
 4 presentation document, but the version that Mr Atkinson
 5 showed you. Could we have up, please, {INQ035986/9}.
 6 You'll remember that Mr Battersby, who speaks to
 7 this presentation primarily, has included not just the
 8 slides but also the speaking note; is that right?
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.
 10 Q. There are two questions. Firstly, you've read
 11 Mr Battersby's statement, have you?
 12 A. I have, yes.
 13 Q. And do you agree with its content?
 14 A. I do, yes.
 15 Q. The second question, really, is: if we look at the
 16 narrative below the first slide, and I won't read it
 17 out, does this really describe the nature of the piece
 18 that you and Mr Battersby presented?
 19 A. Yes, I think so. It's all about the limitation of what
 20 a crowd management company can do versus the
 21 expectations of the state, and obviously where the
 22 client sits in all of that.
 23 Q. Yes. It will obviously be for the chair to reach his
 24 own conclusions, but it appears to have the appearance
 25 of exploring and raising questions and promoting

1 discussion?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Is that a fair summary of the atmosphere of the piece
 4 that you were presenting?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 MR LAIDLAW: That's all from me. So unless the chair has
 7 questions.
 8 Questions from THE CHAIRMAN
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have two short ones and please feel
 10 free to come back if you wish to.
 11 I don't know whether you saw yesterday afternoon's
 12 session at all. I'm not suggesting you should have
 13 done, I just wonder whether you did.
 14 A. I didn't see it, sir, sorry.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no need to apologise. You have made
 16 it clear to us that you were aware of and made sure you
 17 were aware of the NaCTSO training, which is the extent
 18 of your knowledge on counter-terrorism.
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We were told in the course of
 21 a question, and of course we'll check up whether this is
 22 right, that prior to the May 2017 attack NaCTSO guidance
 23 was delivered relating to the risks of person-borne IEDs
 24 at egress. So the particular sensitivity of egress and
 25 the risks then. Were you aware of that advice before

1 May 2017?
 2 A. No.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We will check up whether it was actually
 4 out there at the time and that can be done no doubt.
 5 The question is really: if not, why not? Because
 6 you told us that that's what you took into account, the
 7 NaCTSO advice.
 8 A. Yes. Are you asking me why the NaCTSO advice didn't
 9 have (overspeaking)?
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, why you were not aware of it.
 11 Apparently there was NaCTSO advice before May 2017 --
 12 A. Okay.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- making it clear that egress was
 14 a time of risk, particularly in relation to person-borne
 15 IEDs. Have I put the question clearly enough?
 16 A. Sorry, my misunderstanding. I have not seen any
 17 guidance that details that ingress or egress would
 18 attract specifically that type of attack methodology,
 19 and I'm racking my brain now while I sit here, and in
 20 terms of bars and clubs, there's talk of suicide
 21 attacks. It doesn't talk about person-borne IEDs. I'm
 22 thinking about the arena and stadia guidance.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Person-borne IEDs tend to be suicide
 24 attacks because people blow themselves up at the same
 25 time, so they're the same thing.

1 A. Yes, I appreciate that. But from my memory of the
 2 guidance, the guidance talked almost in a dual format at
 3 that time about suicide attacks being vehicle borne and,
 4 as you've quite rightly described, person borne. I'm
 5 not saying it didn't extract it out in that way, but it
 6 wasn't clear, and I don't remember particular parts of
 7 it addressing ingress and egress for that. I'm not
 8 dismissing that it may have done, but I just don't
 9 remember.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We will check on it and certainly try to
 11 get it.
 12 A. Okay.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Bearing in mind the risk to your staff
 14 and to your clients of terrorism, which you described as
 15 an ever-present threat, and you said you're not experts,
 16 do you think you should have bought in expert advice?
 17 Was it sufficient to just rely on the NaCTSO advice or
 18 should you have done what SMG have now done, which is to
 19 get their own in-house terrorist adviser?
 20 A. I'm struggling to know where we would have gone to at
 21 that time. I'm not saying there may not have been
 22 places to go to. We believed that we were being
 23 proactive in engaging with the NaCTSO guidance as the
 24 industry norm and I believe now that we've moved on,
 25 we have engaged in terms of reflecting our operating

1 positions against more specialised entities , but I don't
 2 know if they were alive at that time. I feel that the
 3 new educational pieces that are now on the market will
 4 help us to help other companies move forward with this
 5 hazard, this element being in the predominance of our
 6 understanding.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Logan. I'm
 8 grateful for your help.
 9 Mr Laidlaw, by all means come back.
 10 MR LAIDLAW: I wasn't going to come back through the
 11 witness, but can I suggest we wait to see what Mr Butt
 12 had in mind and perhaps we can show that to the witness
 13 and he can then respond in writing back to you --
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That'd be very helpful.
 15 MR LAIDLAW: -- and therefore address the question you have
 16 raised with him.
 17 That's all from me, thank you.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Logan, again, for your
 19 help.
 20 2.15, everybody. Thank you very much.
 21 (1.11 pm)
 22 (The lunch adjournment)
 23 (2.15 pm)
 24 MS LIZ FORSTER (continued)
 25 MR DE LA POER: Sir, this afternoon we will resume the

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1 evidence of Ms Forster and we do so by inviting
 2 Mr Weatherby to join us over the link.
 3 Questions from MR WEATHERBY
 4 MR WEATHERBY: Good afternoon.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Good afternoon.
 6 MR WEATHERBY: Can you see and hear me, Ms Forster?
 7 A. Yes, I can.
 8 Q. Good. I want to start with -- well, first of all , I'm
 9 going to ask you some questions on behalf of some of the
 10 bereaved families. I want to start with a few questions
 11 about the role and the extent of the CTSA system and the
 12 fact that it's a complementary service and not
 13 a substitution for responsibilities of those running
 14 venues. Do you understand?
 15 A. Yes, I do, yes.
 16 Q. So your position, first of all , is that you were
 17 Mr Upham's line manager and I think you were responsible
 18 for five CTSAs at the time; is that right?
 19 A. Correct, yes.
 20 Q. Those five CTSAs, just with a bit of context here, they
 21 were covering the whole of the GMP area?
 22 A. Correct, yes.
 23 Q. I think we have already heard that nationally, there
 24 were 200.
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Mr Upham was the CTSA, as we've heard, who dealt with
 2 the arena for some period of time. But of course, that
 3 wasn't his only site , was it?
 4 A. No, not at all .
 5 Q. So just in terms of round figures, just to get some
 6 idea, how many sites would Mr Upham have been providing
 7 advice and guidance and doing PSIA scoring to at that
 8 time? I'm not asking you for any kind of accurate
 9 figure , but was it 10, 100 or what?
 10 A. With a little bit of context, the PSIA isn't necessarily
 11 just used by the tier 1 and 2 sites, it could be tier 3.
 12 So in context of the tier 1 and 2, that could be
 13 a handful, maybe five or six.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 A. However, there are numerous others that we would be
 16 working with.
 17 Q. So numerous others being, what, 100 for Mr Upham,
 18 something like that?
 19 A. It's an open-ended number. It's how long is a piece of
 20 string . There will be other sites as well that won't be
 21 taking on the PSIA but that we will be working with
 22 regularly .
 23 Q. It was my fault in the question. I'm not focused on the
 24 PSIA at the moment. In terms of the number of sites
 25 he was providing a greater or lesser extent of advice

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1 and guidance to, it was a substantial number?
 2 A. Yes, and more than crowded places as well, far more.
 3 Q. Indeed. And also, it wasn't just sites , venues of this
 4 type that he was dealing with, he was also responsible
 5 for a number of national infrastructure sites as well?
 6 A. Yes, correct.
 7 Q. And he also had a number of different strings to his
 8 bow, he dealt with hazardous material sites?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. He dealt with military and private sites which dealt
 11 with sensitive information?
 12 A. Correct, yes.
 13 Q. He dealt with advising public figures , including
 14 politicians --
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. -- about threats and threat mitigation?
 17 A. Correct.
 18 Q. And he dealt with briefings to local businesses?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. CT input into the local authority planning processes?
 21 A. Correct, yes.
 22 Q. And he dealt with CT training, Griffin and things like
 23 that?
 24 A. Correct, yes.
 25 Q. Have I missed anything significant out?

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1 A. No, I think they're the main workstreams.
 2 Q. So it would be fair to say that he had a difficult and
 3 onerous job, frankly he was spread pretty thin? No
 4 criticism, it was just a reality.
 5 A. He certainly had enough work to keep him occupied, yes.
 6 Q. Okay, yes, I won't quibble with words.
 7 The CTSA system, as we've heard, it's
 8 a NaCTSO-accredited service; is that the right
 9 phraseology?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And it's free and it's complementary? I will come back
 12 to that word, complementary, in a bit, but it's advice
 13 and guidance to both public and private site owners and
 14 operators and public authorities on CT protective
 15 security; yes?
 16 A. Yes, correct.
 17 Q. The distinction that I'm seeking here to tease out
 18 is that it is not designed in any way to adopt or take
 19 over responsibility from owners or operators for
 20 security arrangements, is it?
 21 A. No, you're correct on that, yes.
 22 Q. So it's absolutely clear to you that you're providing —
 23 my word — a complementary service, but it's something
 24 that may well assist venues with their responsibilities,
 25 but that's not your interest? Your interest is simply

1 public security and public safety and assisting to the
 2 best that you can; is that right?
 3 A. Correct, yes.
 4 Q. And, of course, I've been through, perhaps in a little
 5 too much detail, the workload. But would you agree that
 6 that would lead to the fact that the advice and guidance
 7 that your service provides couldn't in fact be
 8 sufficient for large and complicated complex sites with
 9 major crowd densities in terms of CT protective advice?
 10 A. I don't think it's the only source that they should rely
 11 on. So in that respect, yes.
 12 Q. Yes, I'm not criticising you for it, I'm just trying to
 13 navigate your positioning here.
 14 Again, talking about a complex venue like the arena,
 15 but not just the arena, that requires, because of the
 16 risks involved and the footfall, it requires
 17 comprehensive and ongoing security assessment, doesn't
 18 it?
 19 A. Yes, it does, yes.
 20 Q. Over and above what your service could possibly provide?
 21 A. Yes, I believe that, yes.
 22 Q. So doing the best you can with the resources that you
 23 can, the provision to the arena was two formal visits
 24 with the PSIA tool and action plan, it involved emails
 25 and calls, no doubt a few drop-in visits as well?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And the provision of written guidance material, yes?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. So your service did its best, but it's far from
 5 a comprehensive service that the risks involved would
 6 require; is that fair?
 7 A. Yes, I'd say that was fair.
 8 Q. So going back to responsibilities, and the
 9 responsibilities remaining on the owner and operator,
 10 did you by any chance listen to the evidence of
 11 Mr Scally of the Football Museum near to the arena?
 12 A. Yes, I did.
 13 Q. In particular, he made quite clear that, so far as
 14 he was concerned with his dealings with Mr Upham, there
 15 was absolutely no ambiguity, that Mr Upham had
 16 repeatedly and correctly made clear to him that the
 17 responsibility for what the museum did remained on the
 18 museum and that he provided advice and guidance but was
 19 in no way adopting responsibility or providing any kind
 20 of indemnity; yes?
 21 A. I got that from what he said, yes.
 22 Q. Assuming Mr Scally is correct in his evidence, and
 23 nobody's suggesting, I think, that he isn't, that was an
 24 entirely appropriate thing for Mr Upham to have made
 25 clear to him?

1 A. Yes, I think so, yes.
 2 Q. In fact, essential that he made it clear to him so that
 3 there could be no misunderstanding that the
 4 responsibility was being offloaded on to Mr Upham or the
 5 CTSA system; yes?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. You were asked questions by Mr O'Connor on behalf of SMG
 8 yesterday regarding conversations between Miriam Stone
 9 and Ken Upham. I just want to refer to one passage from
 10 that. It may be convenient to put it up on the screen.
 11 Can I reassure you that I'm well aware that you weren't
 12 there, but there is just a question around this I want
 13 to ask you.
 14 Could we have up on the screen {INQ034423/8},
 15 please, Mr Lopez. Could you highlight paragraph 30,
 16 please, in the middle of the page?
 17 About four lines down, I'm just going to pick out
 18 the bit that I want to talk around, it's the end of the
 19 third line:
 20 "However, I am confident I never advised the arena
 21 that SMG were doing all that it was being advised to do
 22 or that I was happy with the security procedures in
 23 place at the arena on both event days and dark days."
 24 Okay?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So obviously you weren't there, so you don't know
2 what was and what wasn't said, but that would be
3 consistent with the questions that I've been asking you
4 so far, wouldn't it?
5 A. Yes, it would.
6 Q. It would be consistent that Mr Upham wouldn't say he was
7 happy with what they were doing because, although the
8 CTSA system does its best, it wasn't the comprehensive
9 overview that is required for responsibility; is that
10 fair?
11 A. It makes sense to me that that -- what you've said is
12 correct, yes.
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, I would just like to take
14 this one step further, if you don't mind.
15 MR WEATHERBY: Yes.
16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: "I am confident I never advised the
17 arena that SMG were doing all that it was being advised
18 to do."
19 The system was that the form would be filled in and
20 then there would be an action plan?
21 A. Yes.
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then Mr Upham would then either be
23 satisfied or not satisfied that the action plan had been
24 carried out when he came again?
25 A. Yes.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if they had done everything on the
2 action plan, why shouldn't be he saying, "I'm satisfied
3 you're doing everything I've advised you to do"?
4 A. I don't take that necessarily ... Well, the action plan,
5 actually not everything is closed and completed, so to
6 me it would make sense that they're not doing everything
7 that he's advised them to do. They may be progressing
8 and doing a good job, and as I think I intimated
9 yesterday, I do believe they had good security measures
10 in place, but obviously there were still things they
11 could do that would improve that security.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But in that sentence, the advice he must
13 be referring to is the advice that he was giving them?
14 "I never advised the arena that SMG were doing all
15 that it was advised to do."
16 He must be talking about the advice that he was
17 giving, mustn't he, in that context?
18 A. Yes. Which would be reflected in the action plan as
19 well.
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So from your point of view, it's
21 the fact that the action plan -- the contents of the
22 action plan had not been completed means that's why he
23 could never tell them, "You've done everything you were
24 advised to do"?
25 A. That's how I would take it, yes.

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1 MR WEATHERBY: The second part:
2 "I was happy with the security procedures."
3 That's what I'm driving at. It's not the CTSA's
4 position to tell a venue that their security procedures
5 have complied with their responsibilities, is it?
6 A. No.
7 Q. That's the point I was driving at earlier with you. So
8 it's not the CTSA's job to tick a box so a private
9 company can say they've discharged their
10 responsibilities; that's the real point, isn't it?
11 A. Yes, correct.
12 Q. The CTSA does a survey, advises how to mitigate
13 vulnerabilities that come to his or her attention, but
14 in no way are you setting out as a service to suggest
15 that you do a full assessment or a full audit in the
16 sense of signing off a premises as CT safe, are you?
17 You're coming in twice a year, you are doing a survey,
18 you're asking the site for their comments on things, but
19 you're not pretending in any way that you're doing
20 a comprehensive assessment or an audit that would comply
21 with --
22 A. Yes, we --
23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think you were thinking about the
24 answer. Have you thought about the answer?
25 A. Yes. It was a process. We are not continually

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1 reassessing, and that's is a good practice, that is what
2 we have put out lots of information suggesting or
3 advising companies and public bodies that they should
4 continue to reassess and review their security. When we
5 do our assessment, that is a snapshot in time that at
6 that time when that was undertaken these are the
7 vulnerabilities we found.
8 Things can change over time and so, yes, what you're
9 saying is correct in that respect.
10 MR WEATHERBY: And it's based on what you're told by the
11 site itself?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And it isn't generally based on what you observe or
14 assess in terms of what the venue does operationally?
15 A. Correct, yes.
16 Q. So just to take that one step further, a CTSA would be
17 unlikely, given the workload and the role, unlikely to
18 attend events to see how any mitigations worked or see
19 the extra, perhaps, holes in the mitigations or perhaps
20 vulnerabilities which aren't apparent on days when the
21 operation isn't in fact occurring?
22 A. Correct. It's not unheard of that we would go to an
23 event, but obviously every event is different and there
24 may be a different security posture at each event.
25 Q. So it'd be perfectly reasonable for a CTSA to view

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1 a venue operationally, but it doesn't generally fall
 2 within what you do?
 3 A. No, not in general.
 4 Q. Not least for resourcing reasons, okay.
 5 Just on that, are you aware of Mr Upham or indeed
 6 any other CTSA actually having been present observing
 7 operational measures during events at the arena?
 8 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
 9 Q. Okay. We've heard at the time that the O2 site in
 10 London -- it employed its own security expert to manage
 11 security, including CT matters, and it's now apparently
 12 the case that SMG do likewise, they have a security
 13 director covering all of their venues. I think you're
 14 aware of that, yes?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Do you agree that for many venues such as the arena, run
 17 by very large companies, multinational companies in this
 18 case, who have many venues, significant resources,
 19 in addition to any advice that you can give them it's
 20 clear that they need, and in fact needed at the time,
 21 dedicated expertise, either in-house or contracted, to
 22 make sure that their security was CT safe?
 23 A. I think it would be good practice to do so.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So were you telling them that? Was the
 25 arena told: it would be a good idea for you to go and

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1 get external advice?
 2 A. They may have been told to get external advice on
 3 particular issues, but not generally.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So CTSA's wouldn't normally tell
 5 someone: you need to get some outside advice? Or would
 6 they? You can say: you can have this particular type of
 7 equipment but go to a supplier to tell what you to do.
 8 I understand that. But generally having an in-house
 9 security adviser looking at their operation and telling
 10 them what they think may be wrong with it, which is what
 11 Mr Weatherby is talking about, is that something that
 12 you do advise companies to do?
 13 A. No, not really. It would -- no. We wouldn't tell them
 14 who they should employ.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no.
 16 A. There should be obviously someone who has that
 17 responsibility, but whether we would advise... No,
 18 probably not.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you really as a CTSA can't cover it,
 20 because it's too big, too complicated an organisation,
 21 I just wonder whether you feel with the benefit of
 22 hindsight somebody should be saying, "You really need
 23 someone who's got the time to come and look at your
 24 operational thoroughly and give you proper advice"?
 25 A. We do look at the site thoroughly. We don't look at

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1 individual events thoroughly. So that, I would suggest,
 2 yes, they need someone who is specialist to deal with
 3 the events. We look at the site as a whole and those
 4 other things and if the actions and advice that is
 5 available and given through the PSIA, to increase your
 6 security you should do this, this and this, then I don't
 7 necessarily ... They would be undertaking activities
 8 that would improve their security. It's then ... It's
 9 then really what sort of risk appetite that site has, if
 10 it's fed back up to the management, et cetera, that we
 11 can't do this or this, it's for them to decide whether
 12 they need to pursue and explore other avenues in how
 13 they could take something on board.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Sorry, Mr Weatherby.
 15 MR WEATHERBY: I'll come back, if I may, to something
 16 a little later on.
 17 In terms of -- well, let me change the subject.
 18 I want to talk about the post-Bataclan,
 19 post-Stade de France period. I want to pick up the
 20 point that Mr Butt from NaCTSO was making to you
 21 yesterday. I'll move quicker than I would have done
 22 because he's dealt with quite a bit of it.
 23 First of all, in your statement, as we've heard, you
 24 referred to there having been no NaCTSO guidance on
 25 egress risks prior to the Manchester attack, and I think

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1 you've accepted that that wasn't in fact quite accurate;
 2 is that right?
 3 A. I still maintain there was no guidance issued, but there
 4 were two presentations that had reference to it, yes.
 5 Q. Okay, I get the distinction. It perhaps wasn't very
 6 clear from your statement.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Thank you.
 9 Mr Butt put the document to you and I may be able to
 10 deal with this without having to trouble you with the
 11 document. You attended the course in May 2016 at
 12 Old Trafford and to the extent that you were actually
 13 involved in it by sending out the invites; is that
 14 right?
 15 A. Yes. I sent out the invites, yes.
 16 Q. And your office was there. Is this fair: you weren't
 17 entirely sure that Mr Upham was there but you thought
 18 he was?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And he certainly would have been aware of the content
 21 even if he hadn't been there, yes?
 22 A. He may have been aware of the content if he had
 23 delivered an Argus arena event or had attended that one.
 24 Q. Yes.
 25 A. To be honest on that day, we didn't deliver the Argus

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1 arena and stadia, we were hosting and so we were
 2 coordinating, and a lot of the time we weren't
 3 necessarily sat watching it.
 4 Q. Yes, okay. You would have had the material -- this is
 5 the roll-out, wasn't it, by NaCTSO?
 6 A. Yes, it was.
 7 Q. And have I understood it correctly that the roll-out
 8 would mean that in this area the purpose of the roll-out
 9 was, firstly, for those people who attended -- and I'll
 10 come on to one of those in particular in a moment -- but
 11 it was also for you to take over and deal with this
 12 Argus training with others?
 13 A. To deliver in the future, yes, to stadia and arenas,
 14 yes.
 15 Q. So it obviously would have been something that you'd
 16 have had to pay some close attention to, you meaning you
 17 and your office.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And Mr Upham would be included in that, okay. I don't
 20 want to dwell too much on the content, partly because
 21 some of it has been put to you, but it's right, the
 22 scenario that was dealt with was a stadium?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. It involved a football match?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And the scenario was at the end of the football match,
 2 with the supporters streaming out, as they do in stadia
 3 or arenas generally, at the end of the event, and a man
 4 walks up with a suitcase against the crowd and just
 5 outside the perimeter he detonated a bomb, causing
 6 multiple casualties; yes?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. That was the first part of the --
 9 A. That's one of the scenarios, yes.
 10 Q. I'll deal with it, hopefully, fully. A very shocking
 11 scenario and one which would have made an impression on
 12 you at the time; yes?
 13 A. If I'm honest, at that particular event, no, it didn't,
 14 because I was doing other things. However, I have been
 15 at other stadiums where they have delivered their own
 16 exercises and I couldn't say what year, if I'm honest,
 17 at this moment in time, where they have used similar
 18 scenarios outside of their footprint.
 19 Q. I see. At this time -- training delivered or exercises
 20 delivered around this same time, would that be?
 21 A. I think it would have been possibly around that time.
 22 Q. Okay. Just to complete the picture, although I don't
 23 think it takes us very far, the scenario went on and
 24 there was a second suicide bomber who detonated a second
 25 device, causing further casualties to those fleeing the

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1 scene; is that right?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Okay. So fast-forwarding now a year, to the outrage
 4 that this inquiry is looking at, at the arena, when you
 5 heard of that you must have immediately thought, "Oh my
 6 goodness, that's just like the Argus exercise I went on
 7 a year ago"?
 8 A. No, I didn't immediately think that.
 9 Q. We've been through the fact that you and your team were
 10 there and probably Mr Upham. But you also mentioned
 11 yesterday that SMG were there. Are you able to recall
 12 who from SMG was there?
 13 A. I've provided that information somewhere to my team, but
 14 I ...
 15 Q. Let me help you. Can we just put up Miriam Stone's
 16 statement? It's INQ025576 --
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: She says she was there.
 18 MR WEATHERBY: Well, more or less. Can I just put it up on
 19 the screen? {INQ025576/23}, please.
 20 Page 23, paragraphs 84 and 85. She says that she
 21 was at an event at the Old Trafford stadium organised by
 22 NaCTSO on 27 May 2016 and:
 23 "The aim was to help CEOs [et cetera] identify
 24 measures to help their organisations prevent, manage and
 25 recover from a terrorist incident."

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1 Would you agree with me that that's highly likely to
 2 have been the same event?
 3 A. Yes. That is the same event, yes.
 4 Q. And it jogs your memory that it was Miriam Stone, yes?
 5 And just while we're on that page, if we could scroll
 6 down, please, Mr Lopez, to paragraph 86.
 7 In fact, Miriam Stone was also at the Sherman
 8 exercise on 26 July, a couple of months later. We're
 9 going to come on to deal with that, but as it's on
 10 screen, I just wanted to put that up too.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. I think you were there as well, weren't you --
 13 A. Yes, I was.
 14 Q. -- at the Manchester fire station? Again, Miriam Stone
 15 from SMG was there.
 16 Can you help us with this NaCTSO Argus training
 17 scenario? Did you or your CTSA's actually go on to
 18 deliver it yourselves given that it was being rolled
 19 out?
 20 A. We delivered a version of it to a stadium. It didn't
 21 really fit what they required. Feedback from it had
 22 been mixed, so it had been adapted, I know, for one of
 23 the stadiums.
 24 Q. This is something you had obviously taken on board, as
 25 is your job, to follow on and provide training, either

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1 on this basis or similar to it; yes?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Can I just put it in a bit of context here now? You
 4 were asked by Mr de la Poer about the Stade de France
 5 and the Bataclan ---
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. --- and whether risks on egress might have been thought
 8 of then. You drew a distinction that in fact at the
 9 Stade de France the attackers didn't gain access.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And it was access that your concentration as a CTSA
 12 service was on at the time; yes?
 13 A. Yes. Generally, yes.
 14 Q. Okay. That was your answer to Mr de la Poer yesterday.
 15 So the attacks at the Stade de France and Bataclan,
 16 of course, were a stadium and a music venue
 17 respectively.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And 130 people died in those attacks and the attacks
 20 associated on the same evening in Paris.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. It was front and central to most of us, but I was going
 23 to say to people involved in counter-terrorism, yes?
 24 A. Yes, definitely.
 25 Q. It would have led anyone, particularly involved in

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1 counter-terrorism, realising that attacks were now being
 2 directed at stadiums, arenas, music venues; yes?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And that in turn would have triggered people involved in
 5 counter-terrorism looking at the vulnerabilities of such
 6 places generally, wouldn't it? Not just access points
 7 but actually what general vulnerabilities were involved
 8 in stadiums and arenas and music venues?
 9 A. Well, we would have already been doing that through the
 10 PSIA and action plans for a lot of them, yes.
 11 Q. What I'm getting at is --- I'm trying to return to your
 12 answer to Mr de la Poer about egress. The issues of
 13 stadiums and arenas and music venues very obviously
 14 involve ingress and egress, don't they?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. It's not simply that terrorists would, as they did
 17 at the Stade de France, try and fail to gain access, but
 18 the vulnerabilities would be around times where there
 19 would be high crowd densities outside the stadium or the
 20 arena or the event; yes?
 21 A. Yes, correct.
 22 Q. Is it apparent then that the NaCTSO Argus training
 23 scenarios that we've just looked at really had picked
 24 that up? I suppose it could be a coincidence, but would
 25 you agree it's likely that that Argus training was

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1 a reaction to the Paris attacks a few months earlier?
 2 A. I couldn't comment, but yes, it could be.
 3 Q. It probably doesn't matter, but it would be logical,
 4 wouldn't it?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And of course in terms of large venues like stadiums and
 7 arenas, safety generally, taking it away from CT, safety
 8 issues sometimes relate to egress in particular because
 9 of a large crowd density in movement; yes?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And therefore anybody involved in security and safety
 12 would have egress in mind or should have? Would that be
 13 a fair way of putting it?
 14 A. Yes. And it is something that we advise --- I think
 15 I mentioned it yesterday about the housekeeping and
 16 checking for items that are left, et cetera, and using
 17 CCTV for that purpose.
 18 Q. Then moving on to Sherman --- I'll do this quickly
 19 because again we've looked at this before --- in Sherman,
 20 there were three scenarios. Scenario 2 was a gun attack
 21 at Victoria and scenario 3 was a follow-on gun attack
 22 from the Victoria walkway through the City Room doors;
 23 yes?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And in the context of a Disney on Ice event. And you

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1 were aware of that because you were there?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And in fact it was put on by your force, by resilience
 4 officers from your force?
 5 A. Correct, yes.
 6 Q. Both you and Mr Upham were there. In fact, Mr Upham did
 7 part of the presentation, didn't he?
 8 A. Correct, yes.
 9 Q. So again, moving on in the chronology, if you like, so
 10 a couple of months after the Argus scenario with egress
 11 risk being looked at, the scenario at the station and
 12 the City Room was in the context of ingress to an event
 13 at the arena; yes?
 14 A. I can't recall whether it was ingress or egress, but it
 15 was when it was certainly busy, yes.
 16 Q. Okay. It's there for anyone to look at. I can take you
 17 to it, but in fact it was ingress on that occasion.
 18 A. Okay.
 19 Q. You take the point? The GMP officers involved had
 20 designed a scenario round a vulnerable point outside of
 21 the perimeter of the actual arena itself, yes?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. So with that chronology of events in mind, and the arena
 24 bombing then happening about 10 months later, do you
 25 think there should have been a greater concentration

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1 with the arena and elsewhere on the vulnerabilities of
 2 crowds entering and leaving events than in fact there
 3 was by CTSA's?

4 A. It would have been concentrated on in a similar way
 5 anyway because --- I keep going back to the fact that
 6 hostile reconnaissance, suspicious behaviour, suspicious
 7 activity, checking for unusual items, et cetera --- so
 8 that should have been being done ---

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. --- in that area anyway, constantly. We were told that
 11 CCTV was monitored, that they had stewards in that area,
 12 et cetera.

13 Q. We'll come to it in a minute, but in fact in your
 14 statement you say that the CTSA system was very much
 15 based on the site, the inside of the site itself, and
 16 looking at the outside of the site was, with respect,
 17 a mitigation of the safety of those in the site itself.

18 A. Yes, which I do still stand by that, but in order to
 19 protect the internal part of the site you would still
 20 have to look beyond your perimeter to check that nothing
 21 is going on outside that may then threaten it. And
 22 I know there was a little bit of a disagreement, but
 23 traditionally it was to look after the crowds within,
 24 because that is when the site is crowded, but it does
 25 still encompass being aware of your surroundings to try

1 and stop that coming in. So although it wasn't the
 2 primacy to stop something happening outside, it would
 3 still have the same ---

4 Q. As I've understood your evidence, the relevance of what
 5 happened outside, in terms of the PSIA scoring, was as
 6 a mitigation of the risk inside the site; is that right?

7 A. A risk to the crowds within the site, yes.

8 Q. Yes. Therefore you're not doing any kind of scoring
 9 exercise and therefore any assessment of the risks
 10 outside, to the crowd outside of the site itself?

11 A. It's not a specific area that's covered separately, no.

12 Q. Okay. I think I've got that tolerably clear. Just
 13 moving on from that, just one point about training.
 14 You've told us, and I'm not going to go through it in
 15 any kind of detail at all, about the foundation course,
 16 the modules, the CPD. Can you just help me? At any
 17 point were CTSA's trained about layers of security
 18 outside of perimeters?

19 A. Yes, the onion peel. That's really part of the onion
 20 peel, so you're looking beyond your perimeter for that
 21 suspicious activity and stuff that's going on, and then
 22 you work your way in, or in some scenarios with
 23 different sites, you may work from the inside out,
 24 depending on what ---

25 Q. Are you able to point us to the training material, not

1 necessarily now, but are you able to point us to the
 2 training material about layering that CTSA's would have
 3 had prior to the Manchester bombing?

4 A. It would have been on the initial course, definitely,
 5 and throughout some of the CPNI courses as well.

6 Q. Would that have included ---

7 A. Yes, it will have been some part of it, yes.

8 Q. Would that have included things like X-ray machines
 9 outside of the perimeter?

10 A. The training itself wouldn't necessarily cover every
 11 item that could be used for security purposes.

12 Q. What about soft cordons? What about security staff ---

13 A. Soft measures?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Yes, it's another thing --- it's part of... They're all
 16 things that could be introduced to increase those
 17 layers, so yes ---

18 Q. Was there specific training about soft cordons, for
 19 example, people checking tickets and why people were
 20 wanting to go into places like the City Room even though
 21 they had no legal right to stop them? There would be
 22 training on things like that?

23 A. It would have been in some of the training, but whether
 24 that was a specific thing that would have been explored,
 25 it's just one of the tools that could be used to enforce

1 those layers.

2 Q. Okay. I'll move on.

3 In terms of the 2014 changes, again you've been
 4 asked questions about this, so I'll move as quickly as
 5 I can through it. You told us in 2014 there were two
 6 significant changes. First of all, the prioritisation
 7 of sites. I don't think I need to return to that. The
 8 change was to basically, very sensibly, prioritise your
 9 resources into those sites that needed it most, yes?
 10 And then concurrently, but distinctly, there was this
 11 change from gold standard to "something is better than
 12 nothing"?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. It's that I want to drill down into a little bit more.
 15 You have cast it, as I understood your evidence
 16 yesterday, as CTSA's identifying a vulnerability and then
 17 essentially giving a range of options, and your example
 18 was an expensive and a cheap barrier; yes?

19 A. Very, very simply put. It would be looking at the gold
 20 standard, which would be the expensive one, or
 21 alternatives which wouldn't necessarily be a cheap
 22 barrier, it may be layers of mitigation.

23 Q. Isn't the reality of this change that it came about
 24 because the take-up or the compliance or the engagement
 25 with the CTSA system was very low?

1 A. I don't think it was because it was the engagement was
 2 low. It was hard to measure what improvements had been
 3 made and then obviously you would have a limited or
 4 a smaller number of sites that could actually afford to
 5 have the more expensive security put into place because
 6 they did not have —
 7 Q. The CTSAs were giving gold standard advice and some
 8 sites, possibly for financial reasons, possibly for
 9 other reasons, were simply not taking up those
 10 recommendations, putting it as neutrally as I can;
 11 that's the reality, isn't it?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. It wasn't mandatory?
 14 A. No.
 15 Q. And therefore, in order — you were caught between
 16 a rock and a hard place, you were trying to give proper
 17 advice but it was a voluntary scheme and therefore the
 18 take-up was less than had been hoped, and therefore
 19 standards had to be reduced so that more businesses
 20 would at least do something; isn't that the reality?
 21 A. Rather than standards being reduced, I would suggest it
 22 was alternatives to those gold standards would be
 23 adopted.
 24 Q. Because of course, if you gave the most fantastic of
 25 advice but if it wasn't taken up there would be no

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1 real life impact, would there?
 2 A. Correct.
 3 Q. So in a voluntary scheme, if very good advice was being
 4 given and not taken up, the scheme was failing, not
 5 because of the advice but because it didn't lead to any
 6 real outcomes?
 7 A. Correct, yes.
 8 Q. The reality was that the newer ethos recognised
 9 commercial interests and imperatives were a driver of
 10 what was possible?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And there would be a significant difference, wouldn't
 13 there, between the gold standard service and the new
 14 ethos? I'm not being critical of you, please don't
 15 think I am, I'm just trying to explore the reality where
 16 the system was voluntary.
 17 A. There certainly could be, yes.
 18 Q. Well —
 19 A. When you say difference, do you mean in price or in
 20 quality?
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think in the way the system operated
 22 is what's being said. So when you changed over to doing
 23 "something is better than nothing" then there was
 24 a considerable difference in how the whole system
 25 operated, hopefully there was a greater take-up, but

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1 perhaps of less gold standard materials?
 2 A. Yes. Yes, that's correct.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was that the question you wanted
 4 answering?
 5 MR WEATHERBY: Essentially, yes. Can I just round it off
 6 and then I'll move on.
 7 In fact, the phrase that Ken Upham gave, it's
 8 paragraph 20 of his first statement, where he said that:
 9 "[The new system] differed greatly from the previous
 10 one."
 11 And that would be a fair comment, would it?
 12 A. Yes, yes it would.
 13 Q. And the implication of the new system is that CTSAs
 14 would have to tailor their recommendations so as not to
 15 put owners and operators off from taking action?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. The advice given, therefore, had to be tailored to the
 18 appetite of the owner?
 19 A. Yes. It doesn't mean that we wouldn't also mention what
 20 would be the best, but yes, we would look for
 21 alternatives, yes.
 22 Q. What I'm getting at here isn't a criticism of you, it's
 23 a criticism of the system —
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. — and its voluntary nature. But it's right, isn't it,

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1 that CTSAs had a discretion of what they advised on
 2 security mitigations and that discretion had to be
 3 exercised in a voluntary system, not simply on their
 4 knowledge of the site and the vulnerabilities but also
 5 on their knowledge of the appetite of the owners and the
 6 operators to take up any kind of financial spending,
 7 whether because they were, putting it bluntly, mean or
 8 whether they were under financial restraints; yes?
 9 A. Correct, yes.
 10 Q. Let me just ask you a few questions about perimeters.
 11 Again, it's paragraph 24 and 25 of your statement, where
 12 you describe the PSIA as:
 13 "Site focused and relating to a crowd within the
 14 site itself."
 15 Was that based on the fact that if the space outside
 16 a venue wasn't the responsibility of the venue then
 17 there was not much you could do in terms of giving
 18 advice?
 19 A. That has a lot to do with it, yes.
 20 Q. Would you agree that that would be a flawed approach,
 21 looking at what's happened?
 22 A. It was a flawed approach and it is hopefully being
 23 addressed, but it's still an issue.
 24 Q. Yes. So even where it's a purely public space outside,
 25 and I'm taking it away from the arena here, there was

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1 always something that CTSA's could do, for example
 2 advising on multi-agency meetings or advising on closer
 3 cooperation with the police over events? There were
 4 always mitigations that could have been advised upon,
 5 weren't there?
 6 A. No, not... What we would advise is that the site would
 7 look to engage with other people to see if anything had
 8 to be done. There's not always opportunities to do
 9 anything significant .
 10 Q. In the current case, the arena case, we're not dealing
 11 with the City Room being purely a space which wasn't
 12 under the responsibility of the owner or the operator,
 13 are we?
 14 A. No -- yes, yes, what you said is correct.
 15 Q. So here, in terms of the approach of the PSIA being
 16 focused on what happened within the arena bowl, that was
 17 flawed on the basis that there were measures that could
 18 be taken involving the City Room as well? Would that be
 19 a fair suggestion?
 20 A. Could you re-word that or repeat that, sorry?
 21 Q. Yes, I've not put it very elegantly, have I? Let me put
 22 it a different way.
 23 The space outside the actual footprint or perimeter,
 24 here there was a space that the public had access to and
 25 a thoroughfare through.

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And the operator of the arena also had a security
 3 responsibility . I won't put it any higher than that,
 4 that's a matter that the chair will have to look at
 5 later , but it would be fair to say that the operator had
 6 a security responsibility for it ; yes?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And therefore, really , the PSIA scoring and mitigation
 9 measures and action plan should have not focused on the
 10 bowl itself but the actual whole area including the
 11 City Room, shouldn't it?
 12 A. Having obviously read Mr Upham's statements, I'm aware
 13 that he had been informed that the arena only had
 14 queueing rights for the bowl, so he's obviously had --
 15 not the bowl, the City Room. So he's obviously had some
 16 discussion about the City Room. What that would be,
 17 because I wasn't there, I don't know. But he'd been
 18 continuously told that it was purely queueing rights.
 19 So something had been discussed and they had pushed
 20 out -- you mentioned about soft measures. On events,
 21 they would have stewards further out, so they were doing
 22 something, but how far --
 23 Q. (Overspeaking) and the chair made the point yesterday,
 24 I think also, about the fact that CCTV and patrols and
 25 what Mr Upham was told and what happened might not have

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1 been the same thing. That's a fair point.
 2 But you take the point I'm making as well, that
 3 where you say that the focus of the PSIA was on the site
 4 itself , here was a more complicated site --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. -- where you had the access points within an area to
 7 which the operator also had a responsibility , even
 8 though it was a complicated one?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And therefore, attention needed to be given to the wider
 11 area, including the City Room, and mitigation measures
 12 for the City Room itself; is that right?
 13 A. Yes. Again, I think Mr Upham's statement does actually
 14 state he did actually score the arena on the City Room
 15 and inside as well for events.
 16 Q. I think the point made was that the scoring of the
 17 City Room was mitigation for the safety of people within
 18 the bowl and that was wrong, wasn't it?
 19 A. It's not as extensive as it could have been, no.
 20 Q. Finally, can I explore this with you. I've concentrated
 21 my questions to a large degree on the voluntary nature
 22 of the CTSA system. Would you agree with me that the
 23 fact it's purely voluntary is a significant issue, it's
 24 a significant problem?
 25 A. It is for us because we have no teeth at all, so we can

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1 do an awful lot of work, we can make recommendations
 2 that would make places safer, and then if people
 3 don't -- not people, but if organisations choose not to
 4 take up any of that advice then, really , it's -- all our
 5 work has been for nothing.
 6 Q. Yes, and of course there are --
 7 A. It would have no impact whatsoever.
 8 Q. -- many large and prosperous businesses and many small
 9 businesses as well who are very keen to engage and will,
 10 so far as they can, do what you suggest. But it's
 11 entirely up to them, isn't it?
 12 A. Yes. Definitely .
 13 Q. And therefore a voluntary scheme is necessarily
 14 compromised by both commercial interests and commercial
 15 realities ?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Finally this: would a solution here -- I just want your
 18 view on it to try and assist the chair -- in terms of
 19 very big concerns where, of course you've got a large
 20 footfall and big problems, as we've seen at the arena
 21 and of course many other very large venues, would
 22 a helpful progression be for the CTSA system to
 23 acknowledge that it couldn't deal with the issues
 24 involved? So what I mean there is that the CTSA's would
 25 turn up at a very complicated large venue like this and

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1 would say that this is simply too big a CT problem to be
 2 dealt with by an organisation like the CTSA system,
 3 which is spread so thin, and therefore certify that it
 4 must be dealt with another way, thereby effectively
 5 requiring large concerns with large resources to have
 6 in-house or contracted expertise?
 7 A. When you say for a CTSA to deal with, what would...
 8 There would be no issue in a CTSA engaging in and
 9 undertaking a survey, making recommendations, but they
 10 would still only have a limited amount of visits,
 11 obviously, because there are other areas we have to
 12 concentrate on. So in that respect, we may be limited
 13 because we cannot — we can't enforce anything and we
 14 can go back and say, "Have you put this into place?" and
 15 nothing comes of it. That's the limitations. I don't
 16 think there's any limits as to whether we could
 17 undertake a survey, but there's limited time we could
 18 spend with them.
 19 Q. I'm not having a go at the expertise here, it's more to
 20 do with the resources and the voluntary nature of the
 21 scheme. One of the issues that the chair is likely to
 22 have to grapple with is the extent to which a large
 23 operator may be under the misapprehension, or indeed may
 24 choose to be under an apprehension, that by having CTSA's
 25 in a couple of times a year, they are complying with

1 their counter-terrorism responsibility, and the point
 2 I'm putting to you is that where you've got a very large
 3 concern, given the resourcing, not the expertise, but
 4 given the resourcing that you've got and given the
 5 continuous assessment process that really these large
 6 football venues require, wouldn't it be better for
 7 a CTSA to turn up at somewhere like this and, as they
 8 did the first survey, to realise that it's beyond such
 9 a voluntary and stretched service and to certify this is
 10 a venue that needs in-house or contracted expertise
 11 rather than the CTSA systems?
 12 A. The way I would interpret that is that it would be great
 13 if we could recommend that they have somebody employed
 14 to do that.
 15 Q. Yes, okay.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Why can't you?
 17 A. I suppose we could.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 19 MR WEATHERBY: I've taken it as far as I can. I have no
 20 further questions. Thank you very much, Ms Forster.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.
 22 MR DE LA POER: Sir, can I check whether Mr Atkinson has any
 23 questions? Then I understand Mr Cooper has questions.
 24 Questions from MR COOPER
 25 MR COOPER: Sir, I had two questions following Mr Weatherby.

1 I only have one now.
 2 It's a point of clarification, please, if I can. It
 3 deals with a question that Mr O'Connor put to you
 4 yesterday and for those that can follow the transcript,
 5 it's Day 35, page 154, lines 1 to 9 (sic)
 6 {Day38/189:18}. He said this and I want to clarify your
 7 answer. The question was this:
 8 "Question: We heard from DAC D'Orsi a description
 9 that the attack at the arena was what she described as
 10 a watershed moment in, amongst other things,
 11 counter-terrorism, security at entertainment venues, and
 12 so on."
 13 And then you dealt with that question. To be
 14 absolutely clear, if we can, on this, that watershed
 15 moment, that game changer or whatever expression one
 16 wants to use, wasn't the arena attack, it was the series
 17 of events in 2017; is that right?
 18 A. The... I can't remember word for word.
 19 Q. I said 2017. I think I got the right date.
 20 A. I can't remember, I did watch Lucy D'Orsi's questions
 21 and answers, et cetera, but I can't remember what she
 22 actually said. There's a few things I think I remember
 23 from that, and, yes, 2017 as a whole was certainly
 24 a watershed and also perhaps it's the culmination of
 25 those and the types of attacks that they were. They

1 weren't necessarily site based, they were in public or
 2 what we may call grey space areas as well.
 3 Q. Don't worry yourself so much, if I may say so, about
 4 what Officer D'Orsi said, it's just to be clear: you're
 5 not suggesting that the arena attack by itself was
 6 a watershed moment?
 7 A. No, it was the methodology throughout that year.
 8 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir, that's all I wanted to clarify.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 10 MR DE LA POER: In which case, finally, Mr Horwell, please,
 11 on behalf of Greater Manchester Police.
 12 Questions from MR HORWELL
 13 MR HORWELL: There's quite a lot of ground to cover, but
 14 I will do so as quickly as I can.
 15 At paragraph 24 of your witness statement — it's
 16 very short so I'll simply read it. At paragraph 24 you
 17 wrote that:
 18 "The PSIA process is site focused and scores
 19 protective measures for a crowd within a site. A site
 20 is not scored for areas outside the site perimeter in
 21 which a crowd may gather during ingress or egress."
 22 You were taken through the PSIA scoring mechanism
 23 and section 1 of that is headed "Non-penetrative vehicle
 24 attack".
 25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Does that relate in part to protecting a crowd outside
2 a site or not?
3 A. It would. However, from my training, we looked at
4 that — or the way I recall the training is we look at
5 the external perimeter, et cetera, and having a vehicle
6 stand off from a site so it does not damage that site
7 and protects the people in, and I suppose around as
8 well, because obviously if something goes off, there's
9 glass, et cetera, as well as the impact on the site
10 itself .
11 Q. You could injure the people inside?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I'm going to come back to your training in a very short
14 while. At the commencement of this process is the
15 tiering of a site, of course. Is a site tiered because
16 of the site itself or because of the site and its
17 surroundings?
18 A. Because of the site and the visitors to it .
19 Q. Right, thank you.
20 You were asked a number of questions yesterday as to
21 the source of the evidence that you have given, both at
22 this hearing and in your witness statement, namely that
23 the PSIA scoring process is designed to protect a crowd
24 within a site. You've been asked for the source of that
25 or the foundation for it. Are you able to give an

1 answer? Is it training, is it more than that?
2 A. It's training, and I have spoken again to colleagues,
3 and they are of the same opinion. We were protecting
4 people within. When a site is crowded we were asked to
5 look at how to stop people getting in, et cetera. So
6 certainly — and I am going back to 2011, so I am aware
7 that training has progressed, but that was certainly my
8 impression.
9 Q. And it was obviously from his witness statement
10 Mr Upham's attitude —
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry, if the training had changed
12 or how you were meant to do it after 2011, before 2017,
13 you would have been aware of it, presumably?
14 A. Not necessarily. I had new staff who had come back with
15 new templates for surveys and I'd never seen them
16 before.
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We don't know whether it happened, but
18 are we to assume that if some time between 2011 and 2017
19 someone decided it's actually quite important for you to
20 look at the egress and what happens at egress, not just
21 what's in the site but when people come out, that
22 significant change could have happened without you ever
23 knowing?
24 A. NaCTSO do issue guidance notes, et cetera, but I've
25 never seen one about egress.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you saying it did change between
2 2011 and 2017?
3 A. No, I'm not saying it did. I don't know.
4 MR HORWELL: NaCTSO is responsible for the training?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And NaCTSO, as we know, has issued a number of guidance
7 notes. I was going to come to this later, but let me
8 come to it now. Are you aware of any guidance note
9 before the attack placing emphasis on the vulnerability
10 of egress as an attack methodology?
11 A. No.
12 Q. This concentration of keeping the site safe, protecting
13 the people within it, and preventing penetration by
14 a terrorist, I just want to ask you to look at, please,
15 a document from CTPHQ. It's {INQ035489/3}. If you
16 could highlight paragraph 18:
17 "NaCTSO continually evaluates the threat [and this
18 is the opening statement, I should have made that clear,
19 from CTPHQ] from terrorist groups to ensure that the
20 most useful and up-to-date guidance and advice is
21 provided. At the time of the 2017 attacks, the
22 prevalent terrorist methodology suggested the most
23 likely form of person-borne improvised explosive device
24 attack to a crowded place would be by way of an attempt
25 to detonate a device within the crowded place itself .

1 This did not mean that the security outside the site was
2 ignored."
3 Were you aware that NaCTSO were approaching the
4 threat of terrorism based on that understanding of the
5 prevalent terrorist methodology, namely an attempt to
6 detonate a device within a crowded space rather than
7 outside? Were you aware of that before the attack?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Was that consistent with your understanding of the
10 purpose of the PSIA scoring mechanism?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It's obvious from what you have said —
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, are you going on with that
14 document still? The other part of it, which may be
15 relevant:
16 "This did not mean the security outside the site was
17 ignored. The PSIA score for the arena took into
18 consideration CCTV coverage and security patrols in the
19 City Rooms"; is that right?
20 A. When it was an event day, yes. That's what I referred
21 to earlier regarding — my belief is — and I wasn't
22 at the meetings, but Ken has stated that they only had
23 queueing rights in that area. However, he had — and
24 we have written down about the fact that they have CCTV
25 coverage and they were looking for hostile

1 reconnaissance because we look for the hostile
 2 reconnaissance and stuff like that and the fact that
 3 there were stewards in the area. So they are looking
 4 for -- they're --
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Security patrols is a rather different
 6 concept from hostile reconnaissance. I'm sure you can
 7 do it on security patrols, but it does not necessarily
 8 include that, does it?
 9 A. The hostile reconnaissance would have been the training
 10 to security staff. So it's that awareness, so it
 11 raises -- if the awareness is raised and they're doing
 12 security patrols then they are more likely to notice
 13 something that --
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand the context of that,
 15 thank you.
 16 MR HORWELL: It's obvious from what you have said and what
 17 Mr Upham has written in his statements that the PSIA
 18 scoring tool and the action plan, which of course flows
 19 from that, is an important part of the work that a CTSA
 20 does at a site. You may not be able to answer this
 21 clearly, but how important? How much does it dominate
 22 the work that a CTSA does at a site? There are
 23 obviously other aspects to his work, I'm not suggesting
 24 that, but how important is that scoring tool and the
 25 action plan which results from it to the work that

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1 a CTSA does?
 2 A. I'd say with the sites that engage it's very important.
 3 It is probably the driving force behind the advice --
 4 well, it is.
 5 Q. In terms of what the security experts themselves have
 6 said, if we could go, please, to {INQ035611/164}.
 7 Could you highlight paragraph 349?
 8 "While we acknowledge that the PSIA scores are
 9 designed to assist a site in adopting measures to
 10 protect a crowd once within the site and track the
 11 site's progress in this regard over time, and that
 12 a site is not scored for areas outside the site
 13 perimeter in which a crowd may gather during ingress or
 14 egress ..."
 15 And the authors then go on to deal with the score of
 16 PBIED mitigation. So that is an acknowledgement of the
 17 experts in terms of the evidence that you have given.
 18 If we could go to the next page, please,
 19 {INQ035611/165}, paragraph 350. If you could highlight
 20 that.
 21 "CTSA Upham rightly identified that for the purposes
 22 of the PSIA scoring tool, CCTV and staff in the
 23 City Room are mitigation measures to protect the crowd
 24 inside the arena (eg they can be used to identify
 25 suspicious individuals who may be trying to enter the

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1 site), although at the time of the Ariana Grande
 2 concert, there was no proactive use of the CCTV system
 3 to detect suspicious individuals or behaviour."
 4 My interest is in the first part of that paragraph,
 5 an acceptance that what Mr Upham had been saying was in
 6 accord with their views. Mr Butt yesterday asked you
 7 a number of questions on behalf of CTPHQ and at least it
 8 can be said we're not in each other's pockets.
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. Vulnerability of a crowd at the point of egress, which
 11 is at the very centre of the evidence that you are here
 12 to give. As a very basic principle, a crowd is
 13 attractive to a terrorist wherever it might be; would
 14 you agree with that?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Whether it's in the City Room, Hunts Bank, Trinity Way,
 17 the Victoria Station concourse or beyond?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Because a crowd of 14,000 people is going to go to
 20 a number of different immediate destinations, car parks
 21 we have heard of and no doubt many other places, to
 22 gather and reflect on the evening's entertainment.
 23 Was any part of the PSIA scoring tool focused on the
 24 vulnerability of a crowd at egress?
 25 A. I don't think so, no.

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1 Q. Well --
 2 A. No, because it was to protect within, so no.
 3 Q. The question that I have recently asked you, but let me
 4 ask you again because this is the context in which it
 5 was important: before this attack, was there any
 6 specific advice or guidance about the vulnerability of
 7 egress, so NaCTSO guidance? We're going to come to the
 8 May presentation in a moment, but NaCTSO guidance.
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. The presentation itself, Mr Weatherby has already asked
 11 you a number of questions about it, this is the May 2016
 12 Old Trafford presentation.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's an Argus presentation?
 15 A. It is, yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 17 MR HORWELL: I can obviously at a later stage, in a written
 18 statement, develop these points in more detail, but it's
 19 a document that we have all read. You have seen it
 20 recently?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. A word check of that document does not reveal the
 23 existence of the word "egress". A word check of the
 24 word "perimeter" shows that that word features twice.
 25 So what I'm going to do is take you to those two

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1 sections and then ask you some questions about the event
 2 itself .
 3 A. Okay.
 4 Q. This is {INQ035521/1}, please. Could we go to
 5 {INQ035521/16}? It's step 2:
 6 "Prepare a start (discuss PSIA). An individual to
 7 be responsible for owning the strategy and its delivery .
 8 Governance arrangements. Substantive risks and approach
 9 to managing these. Involvement of relevant business
 10 areas and stakeholders. Look beyond your perimeter.
 11 Good communications with neighbours. How capabilities
 12 will be delivered. Assessment of readiness. Monitoring
 13 and maintaining effectiveness of mitigations."
 14 Take your time, please, and look at that and read it
 15 as often as you wish to understand that particular part
 16 of this presentation, but the question I have for you
 17 is: what do you understand the purpose there of
 18 referring to "perimeter"?
 19 A. (Pause). I would say that's to do with managing who you
 20 communicate with and how you communicate. So rather
 21 than just ... There's a little bit of context missing,
 22 I think, that -- I don't know what went before this.
 23 Q. If it helps -- the trouble is, it's a long document.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. If we were to start at {INQ035521/14} -- and take your

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1 time, I'm not for one moment encouraging you to rush
 2 into an answer. At page 14 we have this part of the
 3 presentation:
 4 "Ask a colleague: do you have anything to add? What
 5 do we mean by hostile incursion and how should
 6 I respond?"
 7 You can look at that page yourself.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It looks like these are a series of
 9 questions with draft answers to them or recommended
 10 answers.
 11 MR HORWELL: Yes, sir.
 12 Do you want to look at the page in between at
 13 {INQ035521/15}?
 14 A. Yes, please.
 15 (Pause)
 16 A. Okay.
 17 Q. Turn over to {INQ035521/16} where we started. If you
 18 feel this is unfair and you need to look at the whole
 19 document to answer this later --
 20 A. I would prefer to.
 21 Q. -- I'm sure the chairman would agree.
 22 A. I have an idea.
 23 Q. The last thing I want to do is rush you into an answer.
 24 A. I have an idea, but I'd prefer to see exactly how it
 25 goes, because these are the facilitator 's notes to the

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1 whole of the exercise, and obviously what's gone on
 2 before would give an interpretation that might not be
 3 what I'm thinking of.
 4 Q. The second occasion on which the word "perimeter" occurs
 5 is on that same page, {INQ035521/16}. Let me then ask
 6 you this question: after that presentation -- now,
 7 you've said yourself you may not have been present for
 8 all of it .
 9 A. Because I was helping to host and certainly none of my
 10 staff were involved in the delivery, it was CTSA's from
 11 elsewhere. We were obviously ensuring that things were
 12 going to plan, that there was the required ... I'm not
 13 sure whether... It's things like refreshments, sorting
 14 out the tickets, making sure that there was paperwork,
 15 et cetera, for people to take away. So we weren't there
 16 necessarily just to go and watch, we were doing other
 17 things as well.
 18 Q. All right. I'm sorry if you've answered this question
 19 already, I've forgotten if you have. Did you read this
 20 document after the presentation? I mean close to the
 21 time, not now, obviously in preparation for giving
 22 evidence, but --
 23 A. I've probably not read it throughout because I've not
 24 delivered Argus to stadia as such.
 25 Q. Then for the limited value that this question has, let

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1 me ask it nonetheless: after that presentation, either
 2 from what you heard or from what you discussed with
 3 others, did you believe that you were being asked to
 4 consider a new type of attack methodology --
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. -- namely egress?
 7 A. No.
 8 Q. You told us yesterday that NaCTSO own the PSIA scoring
 9 system.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. After that presentation, did NaCTSO change the PSIA
 12 scoring system? I don't mean any recent changes, but...
 13 A. There have been three versions, but not with any
 14 different content that -- it's because of other issues.
 15 Q. My point is egress, obviously.
 16 A. No, no.
 17 Q. Let me then come to another aspect of a CTSA's work and
 18 of course all of the other information that is
 19 available. There is no doubt from the evidence that
 20 we have already reviewed that there is a significant
 21 amount of advice and guidance available as to the
 22 importance of vigilance.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And by that, I mean, of course, looking out for and
 25 reporting suspicious behaviour. Would that be both

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1 inside and outside the venue?
 2 A. Mm. Yes, it would.
 3 Q. And the importance of patrols, inside and outside?
 4 A. On the PSIA, yes, that would be considered.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think you're being asked whether
 6 there's a lot of advice about stressing the importance
 7 of patrols; is that right?
 8 MR HORWELL: Yes.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There is?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 MR HORWELL: That advice, and I'm using the word vigilance
 13 simply to summarise what lies underneath it, that advice
 14 as to the importance of vigilance, does that apply to
 15 all stages of an event, before, during and after, is the
 16 question I ask?
 17 A. Yes, it should be whenever that site is crowded, so yes.
 18 And actually even on — because we discussed about
 19 hostile reconnaissance. It wouldn't necessarily take
 20 place on an event night, it would precede an attack,
 21 therefore it's all the time.
 22 Q. I'm going to come to another very short paragraph in
 23 your statement. I'm sure there's no need to put it on
 24 the screen. It's paragraph 28 in which you wrote the
 25 following:

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1 "Following the arena attack, there was more of
 2 a focus on egress."
 3 You refer to a NaCTSO tasking, number 2 of 2017:
 4 "That was issued after the attack in July 2017. It
 5 required CTSA's, among other things, to review all tier 1
 6 and tier 2 crowded places within their region to ensure
 7 that there was a planned exit of people. The exit phase
 8 was considered and integrated within current emergency
 9 security planning."
 10 So that was the response after the attack?
 11 A. Correct.
 12 Q. A question that you were asked by Mr O'Connor yesterday.
 13 You were asked whether or not Mr Upham would or should
 14 have discussed metal detectors, X-ray machines and the
 15 searching recommendation or protocol PAS127. You
 16 obviously said, as we can all remember, that you weren't
 17 present and that it wasn't for you to comment on the
 18 conversation. But you referred yesterday to notes which
 19 appear on the PSIA scoring tool.
 20 A. Correct.
 21 Q. I just want to pause there for a moment. When a CTSA is
 22 at a site and he or she is using the scoring tool, what
 23 is in front of them, is it a laptop, a tablet or what?
 24 A. On the initial visits we take our own laptop because
 25 it's far easier to go through and ask the questions and

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1 it was brand new as well, a brand new thing, so it had
 2 notes and prompts within the Excel sheet. So I know,
 3 because Ken has written that he took his laptop, he,
 4 when he was asking those questions, would have had those
 5 prompts and notes to hover over.
 6 Q. It may be that unless you have seen this system in
 7 operation, it may be a little difficult to understand.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. But in respect of each topic raised within the PSIA
 10 scoring mechanism, you can't see it on the printed
 11 copies, sadly. But looking at a laptop with the
 12 appropriate software in it, for each topic is there
 13 a very, very small red triangle?
 14 A. Correct.
 15 Q. What, if you hover the cursor over the triangle —
 16 A. It then comes out with a pop-up screen which has notes
 17 in it and it actually details the options that can be
 18 scored and within that it has PAS127 and —
 19 Q. Does it also have metal detectors and X-ray machines?
 20 A. As far as I'm aware it does, and it certainly does on —
 21 there's a drop-down list as well when you're scoring,
 22 which is a guide of how to score it.
 23 Q. I don't believe for one moment that this is
 24 operationally sensitive, but we will disclose the
 25 relevant boxes that deal with this and I am sure it can

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1 be put on the inquiry website. I'm not going to mention
 2 it in case there is any issue of sensitivity, but as
 3 I've said, I don't believe that there would be.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 5 MR HORWELL: The arena itself, opened, as we know, in 1995.
 6 That meant it would have been designed and built during
 7 the IRA terrorist campaign. Obviously, a very different
 8 attack methodology.
 9 A. Correct.
 10 Q. But as a large entertainment venue, was it well designed
 11 and constructed to protect the crowd within the site?
 12 A. Correct.
 13 Q. And as a tier 2B site, that designation means that the
 14 site had a more developed current security stance?
 15 A. That was part of it, yes.
 16 Q. The City Room, about which we have heard, for obvious
 17 reasons, so much. The CCTV system that is monitored and
 18 stewards present during the course of an event. Other
 19 than the advice for vigilance, is there any additional
 20 specific advice that a CTSA should have given
 21 in relation to the City Room?
 22 A. No, I mean there could be other things, I suppose, that
 23 could be explored because things are developing all the
 24 time.
 25 Q. I'm talking pre-attack, obviously.

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1 A. No, not really .
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. CCTV. There are city centre type
 3 CCTVs which are monitored all the time, particularly at
 4 night, therefore when something develops or begins to
 5 develop or there's a suspicious person, that can be
 6 reported to police officers and they can go in and do
 7 something about it.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are other CCTVs which in general
 10 terms you could describe as reactive and they are used
 11 by the police to investigate crime --
 12 A. Yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- and people can see what has happened.
 14 Do you as CTSA's investigate which type there would be at
 15 a venue, so whether it's constantly monitored?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or whether -- okay. And on the scoring
 18 under which category did the arena come?
 19 A. There's only one score for CCTV and that is "monitored
 20 24/7", I think it actually says.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And that means?
 22 A. Somebody's watching it.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 24 MR HORWELL: Having been told that SMG only had queueing
 25 rights in the City Room and no other, should a CTSA have

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1 advised extending the perimeter to cover the entire
 2 City Room and prevent non-concertgoers entering the
 3 City Room?
 4 A. Difficult ...
 5 Q. Pre-attack, obviously.
 6 A. It's a difficult question because if you push
 7 a perimeter back, then you're just creating crowds
 8 elsewhere, because that has come up in Ken's statements
 9 and I believe there were discussions, but whether they
 10 covered that, I'm not sure, but the queueing rights --
 11 it's obvious that a discussion's gone or taken place
 12 about the area and perhaps that may have been that:
 13 well, could you search people further out -- could you
 14 repeat the question again? I think I wandered off then.
 15 Q. Having been told that SMG only had queueing rights
 16 in the City Room and no other, should a CTSA have
 17 advised effectively closing the City Room to anyone
 18 other than a concertgoer, so the perimeter at the moment
 19 then would have been at the City Room doors into the
 20 arena itself, push that back to the doors on the outside
 21 of the City Room by the bridge?
 22 A. Again, if I go back to where I was trying to go, I think
 23 that -- and it is only I think because I wasn't there --
 24 that that is a discussion that's possibly taken place
 25 and that's why Ken has been told time and time again,

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1 "We only have queueing rights".
 2 Q. The City Room is an unusual place legally, the ownership
 3 of it and the rights that flow from the ownership of the
 4 land --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. -- and the responsibilities that flow from it. Can we
 7 put that to one side for the moment and simply deal with
 8 the City Room as a space immediately outside that exit?
 9 There were two other exits: one of comparable use to the
 10 City Room and one that was used by lower numbers of
 11 people. As a CTSA before the attack, would one of those
 12 exits have been more prominent than another in terms of
 13 vulnerability to a crowd? I don't want you to go into
 14 details in case that is the type of evidence that we
 15 don't want to hear publicly. But a short answer,
 16 please.
 17 A. As an exit, no. Obviously that would need discussion
 18 with the site.
 19 Q. All right.
 20 MR DE LA POER: I'm sorry to interrupt Mr Horwell. We've
 21 been going on for a 1 hour and 40 minutes and I just
 22 wanted to check in with Mr Horwell in case a break would
 23 be required --
 24 MR HORWELL: I think for the benefit of the witness rather
 25 than anyone else, if we could have a short break then

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1 I think we would all benefit. I am coming to the end.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is 10 minutes enough?
 3 MR HORWELL: Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll have a 10-minute break.
 5 (3.56 pm)
 6 (A short break)
 7 (4.07 pm)
 8 MR HORWELL: Sir, I know judges and chairmen never believe
 9 counsel, but I was able to save time in the long run
 10 in the break. I've cut some out, so I'm able to be
 11 shorter.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Horwell. I believe you.
 13 MR HORWELL: Thank you.
 14 The scoring system. You were asked about
 15 a paragraph in your witness statement, it's
 16 paragraph 35. I'm going to read the first sentence:
 17 "The errors would not have had a significant impact
 18 on the PSIA process for the arena."
 19 You then go on to qualify that in one regard and you
 20 went into the detail of that yesterday. I'm just going
 21 to concentrate on the first sentence for the moment:
 22 "The errors would not have had a significant impact
 23 on the PSIA scoring process."
 24 What I'm going to do, hopefully, is to summarise
 25 what is very complicated evidence in two of Mr Upham's

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1 witness statements. I just want to put that into some
 2 sort of context.
 3 Sir, I fully --
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just make sure? You're not
 5 challenging for the longest question, are you?
 6 MR HORWELL: I might even have got there, sir. I'm going to
 7 take this very quickly. To do it otherwise might take
 8 a long time. I'm more than happy to justify what I'm
 9 about to say.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do carry on, Mr Horwell.
 11 MR HORWELL: Thank you.
 12 The scoring errors that have been identified for
 13 PBIED, the score recorded was 137, and it should have
 14 been 121. I'm going to come straightaway to the total
 15 because there were other errors in the document. But
 16 the total that Mr Upham recorded -- and I'm dealing with
 17 March 2017, the last PSIA scoring visit before the
 18 attack. The total that he recorded was 697 and it
 19 should have been 659.
 20 Putting those scores into evidence so that we can
 21 put some context around them, you still maintain that
 22 answer, do you, that those differences would not have
 23 had a significant impact?
 24 A. With the other sentences, yes.
 25 Q. Save for the qualification that is in your witness

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1 statement and that you were asked about yesterday.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Thank you. DAC D'Orsi's evidence -- I think we should
 4 have this on the screen. This is the transcript for
 5 12 November, please, starting at page 189. This is, to
 6 put a context to this, the number of times a CTSA should
 7 visit a site.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Page 189, it's line 13 {Day35/189:13}, and this is
 10 Mr Greaney:
 11 "Question: How often would you expect a CTSA to
 12 visit a site in respect of which he or she is giving
 13 advice?"
 14 "Answer: I would expect them to visit quarterly and
 15 obviously I would expect the PSIA to be scored twice in
 16 a year, so I think that would be about six times as
 17 a minimum. But I am aware, obviously, that CTSAs --
 18 it's mixed across the country and there's either minimum
 19 contact or there's much more frequent contact and that's
 20 really about the relationship and the collaboration
 21 between the two."
 22 And then the chairman asked:
 23 "Is that set down? You said you'd expect quarterly.
 24 Is that an instruction you sent out?"
 25 Next page {Day35/190:1}:

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1 "Answer: It's my understanding, sir, that this is
 2 an instruction that's there as part of the training
 3 programme."
 4 So Mr Greaney then summarised that evidence:
 5 "Question: So the bar is set at six, but depending
 6 on the site and the relationship, it might be more
 7 frequently?
 8 "Answer: Yes."
 9 You saw DAC D'Orsi's evidence and when she said that
 10 the instruction was for six visits to a site each year,
 11 did you agree with that?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. I make it very clear indeed, there is no suggestion that
 14 Mr Upham only visited the site twice a year and that was
 15 the only communication he had. The statements of
 16 Mr Upham and Miriam Stone make it clear that there were
 17 more visits and more communications, so I'm not
 18 suggesting for one moment that his visits to the site
 19 were only the two PSIA visits. But it's the obligation
 20 that I'm interested in, the instruction.
 21 You are a CTSA, a principal CTSA?
 22 A. Correct.
 23 Q. How often under the policy then in force should Mr Upham
 24 have visited the site?
 25 A. To conduct a PSIA and action plan review, twice a year.

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1 So quarter 2 and quarter 4 reporting.
 2 Q. Right. So his obligation under the system was to visit
 3 twice only?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Just so that we might have an idea of where DAC D'Orsi
 6 got the quarterly aspect of this from, could we go to
 7 {INQ032510/1}, please. If we start at page 1 so we can
 8 see what this document is. This is the NaCTSO "Crowded
 9 places 2014 delivery model: Protective Security
 10 Improvement Activity scoring guidance". If we could go
 11 to {INQ032510/8}, please. If we could highlight the
 12 entry at the very bottom of the page, the box by "Review
 13 and rescore":
 14 "High level quarterly reporting will be required
 15 through the management information returns (MIR).
 16 Rescore of the PSIA required at quarter 2 and quarter 4
 17 every year."
 18 Can you translate that for us, please?
 19 A. Yes. So every quarter we as CTSAs fill in a spreadsheet
 20 which outlines the activity that we've undertaken that
 21 quarter. So that would involve any visits, perhaps
 22 significant phone calls, contact with the site.
 23 However, it would only be quarter 2 and quarter 4 that
 24 the rescore of the PSIA and the number of actions
 25 outstanding or set would be expected to be undertaken

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1 and then filled in on that same record.
 2 Q. All right. Thank you.
 3 Moving to another topic, you've already been asked
 4 about this by Mr Weatherby, so I'm going to keep it
 5 brief. David Scally from the Football Museum: he gave
 6 evidence on Tuesday of this week and you saw it?
 7 A. Correct.
 8 Q. He gave evidence about how he trained and sought to
 9 motivate his staff. We're looking at this through the
 10 eyes of a CTSA, but looking at it through the
 11 obligations or the activity or the responsibility of
 12 a site owner or manager, what would you say about
 13 Mr Scally's response to the advice that he was given?
 14 A. He is an ideal person to engage with because he
 15 obviously really took it all on board, made the most of
 16 it, obviously didn't have a lot of money, but what he
 17 could do, he did do, and by the sounds of it, did it
 18 very well and conscientiously.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He did have a criticism, which I have
 20 now forgotten what it was, but he said he wished
 21 Mr Upham would have...
 22 MR HORWELL: He felt frustrated at the fact that he was
 23 a little guarded in the advice that he gave and made it
 24 clear that decisions were those of the site and he said
 25 that he was concerned that Mr Upham might himself have

1 been concerned about issues of liability .
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 3 Do you understand your ideal client's reservations?
 4 A. I do, because we have the same frustrations. We may
 5 seek advice on certain things and often we don't get
 6 a straight, yes, no, or, "This is what you should do",
 7 and it is possibly because of that liability .
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 9 MR HORWELL: A topic that I'm sure we can deal with very
 10 briefly indeed: CT SECOS. You were asked about this
 11 yesterday. You said that they were operational police
 12 officers. Not everyone may understand the importance of
 13 that. Why do you make that distinction between other
 14 officers and operational police officers?
 15 A. It was more — the operation side, actually, was more to
 16 do with the fact that they deal with operational issues,
 17 so it's how the police force engage during events,
 18 et cetera, or if I give an example, a CT SECO would look
 19 at maybe demonstrations, et cetera, and they would look
 20 at the operational requirements to police
 21 a demonstration, so an event. Whereas a CTSA wouldn't
 22 get involved with that because we don't have operational
 23 expertise. We will look at security for a longer
 24 period.
 25 So another example, when the Olympics were on, there

1 were celebrations that were being held in Bolton in the
 2 town square or you could look at the markets in
 3 Albert Square. Although those are events, it's an event
 4 space that's being used continuously. We may well work
 5 together on those, but they will concentrate on the
 6 operational policing whereas we would concentrate on the
 7 more permanent security.
 8 Q. Let's put whether it should have been a BTP CT SECO or
 9 a GMP CT SECO to one side. You described yesterday that
 10 you would expect a CT SECO, for example, at a royal
 11 visit or something of that magnitude.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Would you ever have expected a CT SECO to have been
 14 involved in these regular events at the arena — unless
 15 of course there was a royal person or a president
 16 present?
 17 A. Exactly. No, I wouldn't.
 18 Q. Thank you.
 19 Again, I think you dealt with this in part
 20 yesterday, but the chairman will have an obvious
 21 interest in what is happening now and what with
 22 Mr Upham's illness and COVID—19, obviously the site
 23 hasn't been used since March. But is there a new CTSA
 24 assigned to the arena?
 25 A. There is. Initially, when Ken was taken ill, I actually

1 covered, but I've made sure that there is now resilience
 2 with a new CTSA and somebody to support them, and we
 3 work together with the BTP CTSA as well.
 4 MR HORWELL: You do? Thank you. That's all I ask.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you finish, I'm going to ask
 6 a question and I'll allow you, obviously, the
 7 opportunity to come back.
 8 We've heard, and you may no doubt be aware, that one
 9 of things that what may appear to be a problem with the
 10 risk assessment plans which have been done by SMG and by
 11 ShowSec is that there seems to be a concentration on the
 12 risk presented by the people actually inside, so the
 13 people going into this particular concert would be low
 14 risk, and from the point of view of someone coming in to
 15 set off a bomb, provided you had good searching of
 16 people with rucksacks, so if you'd searched
 17 Salman Abedi, the chances of them actually getting in
 18 may be considered low. So it has been very much
 19 a concentration, it would appear, on those assessments
 20 on the people inside.
 21 I wonder if perhaps the way CTSA's did your
 22 assessments, with the concentration on everything inside
 23 and nothing really outside, may have contributed to what
 24 everyone now agrees are actually not a good risk
 25 assessment.

1 A. I would hope they wouldn't because the risk assessment
 2 isn't based on what security you've got in place
 3 necessarily. It should be based on the threat from a CT
 4 perspective, it should be that current threat. So the
 5 response to the threat levels should indicate
 6 commensurate security. And then things over and above
 7 that should also be taken into consideration, whether
 8 it's more attractive because of certain other aspects.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you. Thank you very much.
 10 Did you want to ask anything?
 11 MR HORWELL: Not on that at all, sir, thank you.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you thought of another question?
 13 MR HORWELL: I haven't. Just to make it clear, you have
 14 undertaken to the chairman to deal with that perimeter
 15 point that I have asked in that document?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And you'll do so, no doubt, as soon as you can.
 18 A. I will.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 20 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I have no further questions.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for coming back.
 22 We are now going to break off, we will not be
 23 sitting here in the hearing again until a week on Monday
 24 when we'll start again at 9.30.
 25 It is an appropriate time for me to express publicly

1 my gratitude, and I think probably everyone here, to the
 2 people who have been supporting everyone behind the
 3 scenes, the people at Spinningfields, the ushers, the
 4 members of the hub, and I'm bound to forget people, the
 5 technical operators dealing with the IT, who up until
 6 today have done really well, but they obviously need
 7 a rest as well, and all the people working behind the
 8 scenes, and that applies too to the legal teams who
 9 aren't here to have the glory, if that's the right word,
 10 of asking the questions but are providing the back-up.
 11 So thank you all very much to those who are behind the
 12 scenes and thank you to those who are here.
 13 Let me assure the public we will not all be doing
 14 nothing over this week. We're having this break because
 15 we had anticipated, optimistically and wrongly, that
 16 we would have finished this stage by this time, so it's
 17 an appropriate time to have a break. It was decided
 18 it would be better to keep it here now, but people will
 19 be planning for the next stages and taking stock of what
 20 has happened so far.
 21 Thank you all very much, and I will see you all
 22 a week on Monday -- and remember COVID is still there.
 23 (4.25 pm)
 24 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on
 25 Monday, 30 November 2020)

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