

bespoke advice and guidance. CTSAs will check to see that progress is being made but action by the site is voluntary.

14. NaCTSO do not have an audit role in the PSIA process. NaCTSO and CPNI provide guidance and support to CTSAs.
15. Whilst the PSIA process is designed to ensure consistency of advice delivery across the UK, it recognises that every site is unique. CTSAs are encouraged to provide bespoke advice, and CTSAs will seek to understand what a site does and how it functions to ensure this advice is appropriate. Attending a live event is not mandated in NaCTSO advice to CTSAs, this would be at the discretion of the CTSA.
16. It is also important to state that, acknowledging that every site and venue is different, the advice that is offered by CTSAs is dependent on the needs, vulnerabilities and risk appetite of each venue³. CTSA advice is predicated on CPNI guidance which provides a framework for protective security measures⁴. CTSAs do not mandate what protective security sites should use but instead highlight vulnerabilities and advise on what physical, cyber, people and procedural measures are available to mitigate those vulnerabilities. It is discretionary for the venue to put in place any of the advice provided by a CTSA. The flexibility to create bespoke plans allows CTSAs to cater to the needs of the venue. This autonomy cannot be overstated, as it could mean that similar sites which the lay person might assume would have similar protective security measures in fact have quite different measures in place.

CTSA advice and guidance: perimeters and metal detectors:

17. As explained above, CTSAs work in partnership with local stakeholders to provide protective security advice. However, security advice is generally directed at the site owner/operator rather than 'grey spaces' and areas surrounding a venue. The issue of extending security perimeters away from a venue is complicated. Whilst there may be a

³ CTSA training focuses on the principle of 'JASPAR', i.e. the advice given to venues should be 'Justifiable, Achievable, Sustainable, Practical, Affordable and Reasonable', and underlying this is that the advice is proportionate.

⁴ CPNI provide considerable material which feeds into the advice and guidance CTSAs provide but there are also security ratings and standards which ascribe a level to a physical security measure and venues can choose particular products based on those standards and their requirements.

security benefit in projecting perimeters as far from a site as possible, there are some obstacles to achieving this. A venue's security staff would not legally be able to search or screen members of the public outside the footprint of the venue (without agreement of the individual and/or the permission of the landowner), and there are restrictions on physical security mitigations extending into public spaces (for example venue CCTV).

18. Consideration should also be given to what impact extending security perimeters would have on security. For example security checkpoints or searches away from a venue could cause bottlenecks or hold ups, resulting in crowds of people queuing in areas where there is less security mitigation in place than if the crowds were within the footprint of a venue⁵.
19. Notwithstanding these restrictions, a CTSA can still offer advice on extending security outside a perimeter, as some sites may be able to do this due to their characteristics, and indeed if there are other venues located nearby with similar security priorities, it may be that security patrols, for example, are shared or overlap. It would not be uncommon for a CTSA to offer advice around extending a security perimeter; the site could then decide whether to adopt it, acknowledging the restrictions as detailed above.
20. Various security publications that pre-date 2017 reference protective security being projected beyond the perimeter of a venue, which could be used to inform CTSA's in providing their advice and venues in putting in place security measures. One example is Tasking 02/2015 (published after the November 2015 Paris Attacks), where advice is given under 'Search Planning' to 'Consider provisional search and screening on the approach or outside the venue, for example a visual check inside jackets and bags.'⁶ There are several other examples in documents which have been disclosed to the Inquiry.⁷
21. There is also a point to make about venues being aware of surrounding events or incidents and acting on this information, which is different to active security measures put in place outside a perimeter by a venue. So whilst a venue might not extend their security

⁵ As highlighted in INQ019234_0041: '... good practice in ensuring there is an efficient searching regime for spectators entering the site. Sufficient numbers of well trained searchers are present to reduce as far as possible any queuing outside access gates', p.40.

⁶ INQ001441_0002

⁷ INQ001552_0011, INQ018918_0008, INQ019234 (_0022,_0034,_0037,_0040), INQ001478_0001.