

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 42

December 2, 2020

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1 Wednesday, 2 December 2020  
 2 (9.30 am)  
 3 COLONEL RICHARD LATHAM (continued)  
 4 DR DAVID BAMAUNG (continued)  
 5 Questions from MR GREANEY (continued)  
 6 MR GREANEY: Good morning, sir. We'll return immediately to  
 7 the note containing the issues and to issue 11 and I'm  
 8 going to direct my questions to Dr BaMaung.  
 9 Issue 11, doctor, is in the following terms:  
 10 "Did the division of responsibility between BTP and  
 11 GMP for policing and providing CTSA advice to the arena  
 12 and the communication and information sharing between  
 13 the two forces and SMG and ShowSec work effectively? If  
 14 not why not?"  
 15 Before you answer, the context for this question,  
 16 of course, is that the Home Office force, GMP, and BTP  
 17 each had jurisdiction for the complex and the question  
 18 therefore arose of who had primacy in relation to  
 19 different issues. As a starting point, do you agree  
 20 that there should have been express agreement between  
 21 the two forces in relation to which force had primacy in  
 22 respect of general policing?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: I do, yes.  
 24 Q. And which force had primacy in relation to particular  
 25 incidents, in particular major incidents?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 2 Q. And which force had primacy for the provision of  
 3 counter-terrorism security advice?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 5 Q. You have listed your joint response to the question  
 6 posed in issue 11 in a series of short numbered  
 7 paragraphs and I just invite you to go through each of  
 8 them and I'll ask you to pause from time to time to  
 9 provide further information.  
 10 Point 1.  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I believe that the security operation at the  
 12 arena would have within greatly improved if there had  
 13 been closer liaison and planning between all the  
 14 organisations involved on event days and that includes  
 15 SMG, ShowSec and BTP as organisations, but I think GMP,  
 16 although they weren't directly involved in events,  
 17 should also have been made aware of the dynamics of the  
 18 particular events on the day so that they would be able  
 19 to provide an appropriate response if required to assist  
 20 with BTP.  
 21 Q. This is really a point that we have touched on already  
 22 and that has certainly been explored in the course of  
 23 the evidence, that each of SMG, ShowSec and BTP had  
 24 a responsibility for the security within the City Room,  
 25 and is the point that there should have been liaison

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1 between the three of them to establish who had  
 2 responsibility for doing exactly what?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. To give a proper integrity to the  
 4 operation, I think that would have been essential so  
 5 basically SMG and ShowSec knew what the police response  
 6 was going to be, what they were going to do, and the  
 7 police likewise knew what the security posture was  
 8 provided on the night by ShowSec and SMG.  
 9 Q. In your opinion, what was the importance, if it was  
 10 important, of GMP also being informed of the fact that  
 11 an event was on?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: Basically, the resources BTP had at the time  
 13 would probably be overwhelmed very quickly if there was  
 14 a major incident such as the Ariana Grande concert.  
 15 The other, I think, important issue is if there was  
 16 an incident involving a terrorist attack, if there was  
 17 a lack of clarity about where the command structure lay  
 18 the commander could potentially be BTP -- and I know I'm  
 19 straying into the next chapter, but at that time all  
 20 we've done is look at the actual position on the date of  
 21 the attack. At that time there was no BTP armed  
 22 policing response, so potentially you could have had  
 23 a BTP commander with an armed policing response provided  
 24 by Greater Manchester Police leading to huge amounts of  
 25 confusion, I think.

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1 Q. So this is really the point you made right at the  
 2 beginning of dealing with issue 11, that the two  
 3 organisations should have known who had primacy if there  
 4 were to be a terrorist incident at the arena?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 6 Q. So that the respective organisations should know which  
 7 organisation's command structure was in place?  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we take that further, we've  
 10 obviously heard what the doctor's views are on that.  
 11 But it may be better that we deal with that in any  
 12 detail when we're dealing with it in chapter 10.  
 13 MR GREANEY: I quite agree, sir.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If anyone disagrees fundamentally with  
 15 what's been said, they're perfectly entitled to ask  
 16 questions here, but we'll be returning to it in more  
 17 detail in chapter 10.  
 18 MR GREANEY: And of course we do have specialist policing  
 19 experts who will come back and give evidence on the  
 20 emergency response.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not restricting questions on it, I'm  
 22 indicating that the final decision will obviously come  
 23 on chapter 10.  
 24 MR GREANEY: Point 2 under issue 11 you have mentioned  
 25 already:

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1 "The responsibility for general policing of the  
 2 arena clearly lay with BTP, but BTP did not possess  
 3 specialist resources, such as a firearms response, to  
 4 deal with a terrorist attack."  
 5 It's important to stress, is it not, that in saying  
 6 that you're dealing with a historical situation and we  
 7 now know that that has changed?  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, and some of the evidence from  
 9 BTP is that the situation's totally changed now.  
 10 Q. Point 3:  
 11 "There was little coordination of security planning  
 12 between GMP and BTP other than at multi-agency  
 13 meetings."  
 14 What do you mean by that?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: In relation to the actual policing of the arena  
 16 and the management of the events, the main focus seems  
 17 to have been with BTP. GMP did attend at the  
 18 multi-agency meetings that were chaired by Miriam Stone,  
 19 but they never had any direct takeaway from these  
 20 meetings.  
 21 Q. Point 4. You observe:  
 22 "There was no clear reason why the GMP CTSA liaised  
 23 with SMG about the arena rather than the BTP CTSA,  
 24 although ultimately I think it would be fair to say [as  
 25 you've said already] the relationship between Ken Upham

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1 and Miriam Stone appeared to work well."  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 3 Q. Point 5. Would you explain to us the point that you're  
 4 making in point 5, please?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: In relation to the arena, Ken Upham obviously  
 6 had responsibility for the arena, whereas BTP had  
 7 responsibility for the station. There should have been  
 8 quite clear liaison between the two CTSA units because  
 9 if you're applying the principles of the PSIA or any  
 10 other protective security measures, it would make sense  
 11 to have an integrated approach. For example, if there  
 12 was a secure communications or some initiative being  
 13 performed by the arena in relation to their area,  
 14 it would only make sense to have the same situation  
 15 applying in the station as well, so you basically target  
 16 the whole complex rather than a disjointed approach.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And I think actually the evidence which  
 18 we've heard from both GMP and from BTP would tend to  
 19 support that position. I don't think I've heard anyone  
 20 say CTSA's shouldn't be combined together.  
 21 MR GREANEY: Yes. You have used the phrase "disjointed  
 22 approach" and you observe in the note that that  
 23 contributed to a number of problems. First:  
 24 "Criminal intelligence was obtained from BTP and  
 25 counter-terrorism intelligence was obtained from GMP."

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct, via the CTSA.  
 2 Q. "SMG would engage with GMP for counter-terrorism  
 3 security advice and BTP for general policing duties."  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 5 Q. "The contingency planning was insufficiently joined up  
 6 and there was a potential lack of information sharing  
 7 about risks or hostile reconnaissance at the arena  
 8 between BTP, GMP and SMG."  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. We have seen no evidence that when an SMG  
 10 or a ShowSec member of staff reported an incident of  
 11 hostile reconnaissance to British Transport Police, that  
 12 would get logged on their own system, but we've seen no  
 13 evidence in the documents we've read to say that they  
 14 would pass that information to GMP because potentially  
 15 the person committing hostile reconnaissance within the  
 16 site could be doing the same thing at other sites.  
 17 Q. One final point and we'll move on. As we heard from  
 18 Assistant Chief Constable O'Callaghan, and as we saw  
 19 from correspondence between GMP and BTP, there is  
 20 agreement between those two forces that they should  
 21 formalise the primacy arrangements, albeit there is not  
 22 agreement about the stage at which they should reach  
 23 that agreement. Would you endorse the idea that there  
 24 should be a formalisation of the primacy arrangements?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Most definitely, yes.

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1 MR GREANEY: Sir, I am about to ask Colonel Latham if he has  
 2 anything to add on issue 11, but do you have any  
 3 questions at this stage?  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No.  
 5 MR GREANEY: Colonel Latham, do you think do you have  
 6 anything to add on the issue of primacy?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: I agree with the importance of joint  
 8 operations between the police and venue operators and  
 9 that many places have a prearranged memorandum of  
 10 understanding where the venue, who are in charge, can  
 11 hand over responsibility formally and in writing to the  
 12 police should there be a requirement to do so.  
 13 Q. Issue 12. These questions are directed in the first  
 14 instance at you, Colonel Latham:  
 15 "Why was Salman Abedi's hostile reconnaissance on  
 16 the days prior to the attack not noticed by anyone? Was  
 17 it understandable or instead a failure, and if  
 18 a failure, was that the result of a systems or  
 19 individual failure?"  
 20 We'll begin, colonel, by spending 5 minutes  
 21 reminding ourselves of the images from that hostile  
 22 surveillance. First of all, we'll deal with the hostile  
 23 surveillance of Abedi on 18 May.  
 24 Sir, for your note, that surveillance occurred  
 25 between 18.18 and 18.39 hours.

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1           Could we have on the screen, please, but don't put  
 2           it on the screen until you have this precise page  
 3           available, {INQ031275/43-49}.

4           This is Abedi now well-established within the  
 5           City Room at 18.35.45, walking across the City Room  
 6           standing and observing the queues. This is 18 May and  
 7           I believe this is one of the Take That concerts.  
 8           {INQ031275/44}, please. This is a particularly  
 9           chilling image, as Abedi stands arms behind his back,  
 10          staring at the queues.  
 11          {INQ031275/45}, please. Starting to walk across the  
 12          room.

13       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that the total time that he's  
 14       standing there, 40 seconds? Are we able to say how long  
 15       he is actually in situ looking at the crowds?

16       MR GREANEY: We are certainly able to say. We'll give you  
 17       the precise period in due course.

18       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's helpful. We can see there's  
 19       40 seconds there.

20       MR GREANEY: Yes.  
 21       {INQ031275/46} next, please. So he's leaving the  
 22       City Room, walking across the overwalk.  
 23       {INQ031275/47}. Looking behind himself, as we  
 24       recall.  
 25       {INQ031275/48} -- just go back to {INQ031275/47} for

1           a second. I think you're going to explain to us in due  
 2           course, Colonel Latham, that this particular camera that  
 3           we see an image from at the top of {INQ031275/47} is one  
 4           that you think is particularly important?

5           COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, it is. It is a very high quality  
 6           camera on the bridge which captures high quality images  
 7           which would have been useful for the control room.

8           Q. If, and this is a point you are going to make, someone  
 9           had been monitoring the CCTV constantly?

10          COLONEL LATHAM: Only if someone was watching it.

11          Q. Because there are some features to Abedi, perhaps not  
 12          particularly on this occasion, that you consider would  
 13          have been apparent to someone monitoring the CCTV images  
 14          and would have warranted some form of intervention by  
 15          that person?

16          COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

17          Q. {INQ031275/48}, please. He is heading towards the tram  
 18          platform.  
 19          And {INQ031275/49}. Thank you very much.  
 20          So that's 18 May. We will identify the precise  
 21          period that he's within the City Room.

22       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can see the CCTV images, and I have  
 23       remarked on this before, seem to be extremely good --

24       MR GREANEY: Yes.

25       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- certainly better than any I've ever

1           seen in any court.

2           Have they been enhanced or is that what the person  
 3           would be seeing on the CCTV monitor?

4       MR GREANEY: I don't believe the footage has been enhanced  
 5       obviously whether this is precisely what is being seen  
 6       on the monitor may depend on the quality of the monitor.

7       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That may be important in view of what  
 8       Colonel Latham is going to say.

9       MR GREANEY: I quite take that point and we'll ensure that's  
 10       answered before the end of chapter 7.

11       So 21 May is the next occasion of hostile  
 12       reconnaissance -- sir, Abedi was within the station area  
 13       between 18.53 and 19.12 on that occasion.

14       On the screen, please, we'll have -- but again  
 15       please put the page on once you've identified the  
 16       particular page -- {INQ020163/51-62}.

17       Here is Abedi arriving at the station on the tram.  
 18       {INQ020163/52}. Walking through the station.  
 19       {INQ020163/53}. Again, at the top we can see one of  
 20       those images that you think, subject to the chairman's  
 21       points, is important.  
 22       {INQ020163/54}. This is the occasion, we'll all  
 23       remember, when he sits on the mezzanine.  
 24       {INQ020163/55}. Walking up the left-hand staircase  
 25       to the mezzanine.

1           {INQ020163/56}. The top of that staircase.  
 2           {INQ020163/57}. Back down again.  
 3           Next page and the following page, please  
 4           {INQ020163/58-59}.

5           And then {INQ020163/60}.

6       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No event on this day or?

7       MR GREANEY: I'll check.

8       SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I'm asking random questions,  
 9       I apologise for that.

10       MR GREANEY: This may be the Professor Brian Cox concert.  
 11       We'll check. That's my recollection, sir.

12       Then finally I'll ask you some questions.

13       COLONEL LATHAM: I think that's the day that  
 14       Brandon Couper-Phillips reported hostile reconnaissance  
 15       at the same time that Salman Abedi was conducting  
 16       hostile reconnaissance, but we cannot say that he saw  
 17       Salman Abedi.

18       MR GREANEY: And you have said hostile reconnaissance, you  
 19       may well have said this on 5 October, but you don't have  
 20       any doubt, do you, that what we have seen in those  
 21       images, if we were to watch the moving images on the  
 22       18th and 21st and indeed on the 22nd, as we'll next come  
 23       to, does represent hostile reconnaissance by  
 24       Salman Abedi?

25       COLONEL LATHAM: We are both certain of that.

1 Q. So 22 May, same routine, please, Mr Lopez. I'll give  
2 you the INQ reference and then the page.  
3 Sir, as you will well recall, the hostile  
4 reconnaissance on this occasion is between 18.31 and  
5 18.36.  
6 The reference is {INQ020160/48-54}.  
7 He has arrived at the station.  
8 {INQ020160/49}, please. Walking to and then up the  
9 staircase to the walkway.  
10 {INQ020160/50}. Walking across the walkway. At the  
11 top we see another one of those images you attach  
12 importance to, colonel, and we should note, shouldn't  
13 we, that he's wearing a hat?  
14 COLONEL LATHAM: Indeed.  
15 Q. {INQ020160/51}, please. Walking away from the arena  
16 back towards the staircase.  
17 {INQ020160/52}.  
18 COLONEL LATHAM: I might make a point that at that point my  
19 recollection is there were BTP in the City Room and it  
20 appears as though he's walked along the bridge, looked  
21 inside City Room, seen BTP — I am now speculating —  
22 and that's what's caused him to turn around, therefore  
23 he has been deterred by them and exhibited what is  
24 suspicious behaviour by turning around on seeing police.  
25 Q. You describe it as speculation. It may be a little more

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1 than that. There was certainly a coincidence between  
2 Abedi walking towards the City Room and then turning  
3 away and the presence of uniformed BTP officers within  
4 the City Room at that time?  
5 COLONEL LATHAM: And it's observable.  
6 Q. What is observable?  
7 COLONEL LATHAM: The fact that he walks in one direction  
8 with purpose and he turns around and decides to go in  
9 a different direction.  
10 Q. {INQ020160/52}, please. He interacts with a member of  
11 the security staff. Walks back down the staircase.  
12 {INQ020160/53}.  
13 {INQ020160/54}. There he has departed.  
14 So we can take that from the screen, thank you.  
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that's 5 minutes?  
16 MR GREANEY: 5 minutes, yes.  
17 You expressed the view that you have absolutely no  
18 doubt that this is Salman Abedi, at broadly similar  
19 times on each of these three occasions, conducting  
20 hostile surveillance.  
21 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
22 Q. As we know, that appears not to have been noticed or  
23 sufficiently noticed by anyone, so the question is: was  
24 it understandable in your view or instead a failure and,  
25 if a failure, was that the result of a systems or

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1 individual failure? So would you answer that question,  
2 those questions, please, bearing in mind that I need to  
3 finish my questioning by about 10.30?  
4 COLONEL LATHAM: I shall try to do so as succinctly as  
5 I can.  
6 It's a function of staffing and training, whether  
7 people are actually looking at the cameras, which we  
8 know that they were not doing all of the time, and how  
9 well they knew what they should look for, which is a bit  
10 of an art in itself. But if I pick out some things  
11 which I think made Salman Abedi look suspicious, the  
12 first one is simply having something on his head. There  
13 are many venues, or some, which will not let you into  
14 the venue if you're wearing a head covering, unless  
15 it is for religious reasons, because we want to get your  
16 face on camera. So simply by wearing a hat, a seasoned  
17 security professional or a well-trained one will —  
18 you are drawing your attention to him already.  
19 He's overdressed for the weather. In many of the  
20 slides that you have just shown us all, he was the only  
21 person doing the thing that he was doing. He was  
22 walking against the crowd. He was standing still,  
23 looking at the queue, not participating in the queueing,  
24 and I won't give more examples because we've just seen  
25 them. But again, a seasoned eye would spot that

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1 individual as being curious, turning around, looking  
2 behind him, not fitting the demographic. And therefore,  
3 if somebody had been looking at him at that time, and if  
4 they had effective patrol response at their call, they  
5 could have said, "Hey, Fiona, I've seen somebody down  
6 there on the bridge, he seems to have turned around when  
7 he saw the police, he's looking at the crowds, can you  
8 go and see what he's doing? We know the hostile recce  
9 is going to happen on the mezzanine, this guy has just  
10 gone up on the mezzanine, then he came straight back  
11 down, seems a bit odd. Can you ask him what he's  
12 looking for and see if we can help him?"  
13 Q. We saw on one occasion that Abedi appears to have two  
14 mobile telephones.  
15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. That is, in my view, suspicious of  
16 himself and would certainly require investigation because  
17 having two mobile phones might indicate someone who's  
18 involved in criminal activity.  
19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I would be quite interested to know how  
20 many people here fit into that criminal activity and  
21 have two mobile phones!  
22 COLONEL LATHAM: That would be interesting, sir. I only  
23 have one. But certainly outside a music venue, people  
24 with two mobile phones — it would make me think that  
25 they were involved in drug dealing, probably, and it was

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1 something that would attract my attention. Perhaps lots  
 2 of lawyers have lots of phones because they're very  
 3 busy.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, I think lots of people may do.  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Perhaps.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not deriding the point at all.  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Thank you.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Let's just unpick that slightly. The way in  
 9 which you put in the note is, first :  
 10 "Given the number of security staff in place at the  
 11 arena, and the lack of specific training about hostile  
 12 reconnaissance, there was almost no chance to recognise  
 13 Salman Abedi's hostile reconnaissance before 22 May."  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: Regrettably, that is the case.  
 15 Q. And of course we know that it wasn't spotted. You go on  
 16 to say:  
 17 "Had the staff had further training or had spotting  
 18 of hostile reconnaissance been given a higher priority ,  
 19 there would have been a better chance but it was by no  
 20 means certain."  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.  
 22 Q. So you are not saying that if there had been proper  
 23 training or good training and a high priority given to  
 24 spotting hostile reconnaissance that even in that  
 25 situation Abedi's reconnaissance would have been picked

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1 up?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: It would not certainly have been picked up,  
 3 but the possibility of picking it up would have been  
 4 improved.  
 5 Q. Let's assume for the moment that one of the things that  
 6 you've described had happened, and someone viewing the  
 7 CCTV had said, "There's a guy here that I think looks  
 8 a bit suspicious, he's gone on to the mezzanine, just go  
 9 and have a word with him". So this would be, for  
 10 example, 21 May. Of course, Salman Abedi did not have  
 11 his rucksack and did not have a bomb with him on that  
 12 occasion. To what extent do you consider, had he been  
 13 spoken to on that occasion or any of those occasions  
 14 that was capable of disrupting his plans, if you feel  
 15 able to address a view on that?  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: I certainly do feel able. The aim of that  
 17 conversation and that operation would be to deter him,  
 18 that is to persuade him that this is not a good target  
 19 to attack, he is less likely to be successful than  
 20 elsewhere, so to deselect this target as part of his  
 21 reconnaissance. Indeed, he is carrying out his  
 22 reconnaissance in order to work out is this a good  
 23 target and, if it is, where am I going to do my attack  
 24 from. So if he's interacted with by security staff who  
 25 say words to the effect of, "We have seen you on the

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1 camera, we saw you here yesterday, we have a lot of  
 2 security here and I'm one of the team, I just wanted to  
 3 know if I could help you, don't worry, thanks, great,  
 4 we'll look out for you in the future", I think that that  
 5 would have disrupted his attack and that's the training  
 6 that I have been given by CPNI and that's what I think  
 7 would have happened.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm going next to ask Dr BaMaung if he has  
 9 anything to add. Do you have any questions first?  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. If you are watching CCTV into  
 11 a public space, which is what's happening in the  
 12 City Room, I believe, although I'm not entirely clear ,  
 13 that you are required to have an SIA licence in order to  
 14 do that, because there are certain rules about viewing  
 15 people in a public space and what you're entitled to do  
 16 and what you're not entitled to do.  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you familiar with the training that  
 19 the SIA give in relation to that?  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: No, I am not expert on that particular  
 21 training, but I am expert on employing CCTV operators in  
 22 a variety of settings. Indeed, I have been one myself.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I'm just interested to know if  
 24 an SIA qualification had been obtained by the people  
 25 operating the CCTV, if they would have had that kind of

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1 training, but we'll find that out.  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: I think the training — detailed training  
 3 in how do you spot someone that looks curious is  
 4 something that has — that was in place before the  
 5 attack and has become better science after the attack.  
 6 But the fact that somebody's doing unusual things  
 7 was well-known before the attack and should draw the eye  
 8 of experienced security staff: if you see someone who's  
 9 doing something that's just a bit unusual, you know that  
 10 you should go and interact with them.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And presumably there's a lot of this  
 12 training around because local authorities have CCTV in  
 13 town centres when they are looking for the same sort of  
 14 thing?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Indeed, and it was covered at the  
 16 Project Argus Stadia event which we have heard about,  
 17 and at which SMG were attendees.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 2016?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Can I just confirm that the CCTV is not  
 21 enhanced.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So it depends on the quality of  
 23 the monitor you're looking through. We're looking  
 24 through pretty good equipment, it seems to me, and  
 25 I don't think we have — anyway, yes, okay.

20

1 MR GREANEY: We'll find out about the monitor, but for the  
 2 transcript, DCI Pickering gave that evidence on Day 13  
 3 page 68 line 5 {Day13/68:5}.

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I had forgotten, sorry.

5 MR GREANEY: Dr BaMaung, could you tell us whether you have  
 6 any contribution to make on the issue of hostile  
 7 reconnaissance, please?

8 DR BAMAUNG: I totally concur with what Colonel Latham said.  
 9 I think it would be really important if you had active  
 10 monitoring of a CCTV system that you then have the  
 11 ability to link in with security personnel on the ground  
 12 to follow up any leads. And unfortunately, I think that  
 13 was what was missing, the active monitoring constantly  
 14 of the activity by people who are licensed to do that.

15 Q. And we've --

16 COLONEL LATHAM: I wanted to add just one thing.  
 17 I threatened yesterday to repeat the three Ds: deny,  
 18 detect, deter. When an individual, a hostile actor, is  
 19 conducting hostile reconnaissance, we're trying to deny  
 20 information, we're trying to detect the fact that that's  
 21 going on, and we're trying to get those three things in  
 22 sum to deter the individual. Because if you can  
 23 persuade the individual this is a bad target, then the  
 24 rest of your problems go away. Information was not  
 25 denied and Salman Abedi was not detected and he was not

21

1 deterred by his physical recce.

2 Q. That term, deny, detect, deter, from where does that  
 3 derive?

4 COLONEL LATHAM: That's NaCTSO guidance. It was available  
 5 at the time before the attack and was included in the  
 6 Argus -- I'm slowing down now -- included in the  
 7 Argus Stadia documentation, which SMG attended.

8 Q. Issue 13 is also for you, Colonel Latham, and is in  
 9 these terms:

10 "Why did Mohammed Agha and Kyle Lawler not inform  
 11 the control room or anyone else between 22.14 hours and  
 12 22.31 hours about the report from Chris Wild of  
 13 a suspicious male with a backpack on the mezzanine level  
 14 of the City Room?"

15 Of course, it will be for the chairman to make  
 16 findings of fact in relation to why they did or did not  
 17 do particular things, but do you have any view of your  
 18 own that you'd like to express about this issue?

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's say what we're talking about is  
 20 possible reasons because it will depend on what I have  
 21 understood --

22 MR GREANEY: Exactly, sir, and that is what I was trying to  
 23 capture.

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- so you can explore them.

25 COLONEL LATHAM: Obviously, we've spent an awful lot of time

22

1 looking at this and trying to unpick the evidence. We  
 2 fully understand that it's the chairman that will make  
 3 findings of fact and not us. We are doing our best to  
 4 give our opinion on the evidence that we have seen and  
 5 heard.

6 It is our opinion that there was insufficient  
 7 supervision and direction to both Agha and Lawler. Agha  
 8 and Lawler should have been specifically and clearly  
 9 told in briefings about what to do if a member of the  
 10 public informed them about suspicious behaviour. It's  
 11 not clear that that happened.

12 Q. Whose responsibility was it to provide that supervision  
 13 and that information?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: So it's directly the responsibility of the  
 15 supervisor.

16 Q. Are you talking about a ShowSec supervisor?

17 COLONEL LATHAM: In this instance I'm talking about  
 18 Dave Middleton, who gave a briefing to Lawler and Agha  
 19 before they started their posts and we have the detail  
 20 of those briefings in evidence. Agha's briefing was  
 21 supplemented by somebody else who wasn't a supervisor  
 22 because Agha didn't know what he was supposed to do  
 23 after Dave Middleton's briefing. Indeed, he said he  
 24 didn't know where the grey doors were because he had  
 25 never staffed them before; it was his first day as

23

1 an SIA officer.

2 Q. Just pause for a moment. Obviously, Mohammed Agha has  
 3 given his own evidence about his state of mind  
 4 in relation to when he could and could not leave the  
 5 grey doors. What view do you have about the state of  
 6 mind and information that he should have been in  
 7 respect of those doors?

8 COLONEL LATHAM: He should have been given, and I believe  
 9 from memory the licence says that he should have been  
 10 given, written instructions of what he was to do and  
 11 he was not given written instructions.

12 Q. When you say what he should do, in what circumstances  
 13 are you referring to?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: For each post there should be post notes  
 15 and it should be entitled "Grey doors" and say that your  
 16 role is to do the following: stay at the doors; if  
 17 there's an emergency do what you're supposed to do in an  
 18 emergency; if there is an emergency that requires you to  
 19 leave your post, then go and speak to your supervisor  
 20 immediately and return to the grey doors once he sends  
 21 you back. Or words to that effect.

22 Sorry, that was too fast, I shall try to slow down  
 23 in future.

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Don't worry about that, we've got  
 25 a transcript going. If we hear from them they can't

24

1 keep up, that's serious, but I can keep up with the note  
 2 roughly, so I can check with the transcript if I miss  
 3 anything.  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: My point is that Agha should have had post  
 5 notes, as should Lawler and everybody else, and  
 6 I believe that's a requirement of the licence, but they  
 7 did not. But it goes further than beyond any particular  
 8 supervisor because what we have is a system that is  
 9 being run where there are not post notes and people who  
 10 could have -- may have had the opportunity to skip  
 11 through their training where the service provider cannot  
 12 guarantee the level of training of individuals who are  
 13 being provided who, at the last moment find, both Agha  
 14 and Lawler, they're doing a job they've never done  
 15 before and one which they are hardly briefed upon and  
 16 aren't given written notes. That is more than the  
 17 supervisor's fault: that is a managerial fault because  
 18 an operation is being run which seems to me to be in  
 19 breach of the licence and seems to accept the fact that  
 20 people can go on post without post notes and not be  
 21 properly briefed as a matter of routine.  
 22 MR GREANEY: So does the point come to this: we know that  
 23 Christopher Wild spoke to Mohammed Agha and informed  
 24 him, to put it neutrally, of his concerns. We know that  
 25 was not drawn to the attention of Dave Middleton, at any

1 rate not in a way that caused him to realise what was  
 2 going on, and was not drawn to anyone's attention until  
 3 Kyle Lawler was told at some time after 10.20.  
 4 Is the point that you are making that Mohammed Agha  
 5 should have clearly understood what to do in  
 6 circumstances in which he was on the grey doors and  
 7 a member of the public drew a concern to his attention?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm saying yes, he should have understood  
 9 that. But we have seen from his actions that he did not  
 10 do that, and the chair will decide what his motivations  
 11 were and, if I'm asked further about it, then I'll  
 12 answer those questions.  
 13 Q. Others may ask you further about it. In relation to  
 14 Mr Lawler, do you have any observations to make about  
 15 his conduct?  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we leave Agha, should he have had  
 17 a phone? If you're on a post which you're not meant to  
 18 leave, but you need to communicate or may need to  
 19 communicate, isn't the simplest way to give him a phone?  
 20 A radio, I mean.  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: Well, a phone or radio, both are relevant.  
 22 We have lived through this tricky time where people  
 23 didn't used to have phones and then everybody has phones  
 24 and then security guards look at their phones when they  
 25 should be doing something else, so then people like me

1 say no one is allowed to have phones --  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's talk about the radio.  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: So the radio. Radios are very cheap to  
 4 provide, they give you situational awareness, you can  
 5 put an earpiece in and you can hear what's happening in  
 6 the event and then it keeps you a bit more engaged  
 7 perhaps --  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Agha had the alternatives: leave the  
 9 grey doors, and I think everyone has accepted that  
 10 really he should have been given clearer instructions.  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Maybe people are saying, well, it's  
 13 obvious if it's an emergency you should leave the grey  
 14 doors. But he's saying, I was told to stay there.  
 15 So the alternatives are you say -- you make it clear  
 16 that he has to leave in certain circumstances. That can  
 17 depend on how serious he thinks the threat of an  
 18 emergency actually is. But actually, if he has a radio,  
 19 isn't that the --  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, if he has a radio, he can say, "Kyle,  
 21 can I have a quick word", Kyle comes over and he goes,  
 22 "What am I supposed to do?" --  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or he can directly contact control,  
 24 can't he?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: -- indeed -- because he is an inexperienced

1 security officer.  
 2 But it is not common practice to give everybody  
 3 radios. One of the -- just to give a balanced answer,  
 4 one disadvantage of giving out more radios, apart from  
 5 cost, which isn't expensive, is that you have more  
 6 people on the radio who aren't experienced using the  
 7 radios, so you get more chatter and clutter, and it  
 8 makes the rest of the operation more difficult.  
 9 So there is a sensible reason for not giving too  
 10 many people radios, but it is important to give people  
 11 on key points radios. Agha would have no need to  
 12 transmit on that radio unless something unusual was  
 13 happening so he wouldn't have been cluttering up the net  
 14 in my view. So certainly with hindsight he should have  
 15 had a radio, but that is said with hindsight.  
 16 MR GREANEY: Certainly we can understand that giving all of  
 17 the security operatives and management operatives radios  
 18 might have a downside because they might all try to use  
 19 them at the same time, but would it be fair to observe  
 20 that a way of addressing that situation is by ensuring  
 21 that those who have radios are properly trained in when  
 22 to use them?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, that is true. If you're giving  
 24 somebody a radio, they should be properly trained in  
 25 using them. My experience in the industry is a lot of

1 people are not well trained and when one is looking at  
 2 one's training burden, things like radio procedure  
 3 rather than using the radio, radio procedure tends to be  
 4 quite far down the priority chain. Physically how to  
 5 use the radio is very simple and doesn't take a long  
 6 time to train.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Kyle Lawler's given a radio, at least in  
 8 part because he is stuck on the bridge and is not meant  
 9 to be moving, so in order for him to get information to  
 10 people, he gets on the radio. It just seems to me the  
 11 same applies to Agha, but you're a bit resistant to that  
 12 idea?

13 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm not resistant to it, I am trying to be  
 14 fair and balanced, sir. I'm trying to be fair and  
 15 balanced.

16 I go back to the point about supervision as well.  
 17 A really good supervisor should be checking on their  
 18 staff -- the ratio is about 1 to 5. If you have five  
 19 staff and several hours you should be talking to those  
 20 staff every hour, I would say, and say, how's is going  
 21 on to the grey doors, boring as ever, or whatever.  
 22 There should be that interaction.

23 Agha found himself in a situation without a radio  
 24 and without a mobile phone and without a supervisor and  
 25 without post notes and, not knowing his evidence,

1 I think I am right in saying, feeling that he shouldn't  
 2 leave the doors. He's been put in a difficult position  
 3 by those circumstances.

4 I'm not saying that there is anything more than what  
 5 I've just said.

6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in those circumstances, the need to  
 7 report something in an emergency, should have been  
 8 something which was foreseen and is just not with the  
 9 benefit of hindsight?

10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

11 MR GREANEY: I'll move on. Mr Lawler: do you have any  
 12 observation to make about his conduct in relation to  
 13 this issue 13?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: Our note says:  
 15 "Problems with the radio do not appear to have been  
 16 the reason why Lawler not informing the control room.  
 17 There are also various other means by which either Agha  
 18 or Lawler could have contacted the supervisor or the  
 19 control room, so this does not appear to have been the  
 20 main reason either. The major factors appear to be that  
 21 Agha and Lawler did not think that Salman Abedi was  
 22 actually much of a threat."  
 23 I'll pause there before I continue reading because  
 24 there is an awful lot of evidence about that and some of  
 25 the statements have changed. There are statements that

1 say, "He looked really frightening and I was really  
 2 scared", and there are statements that say something  
 3 different. So there's an awful lot of conflicting  
 4 evidence which I know the chair will wisely balance.

5 Q. Let's assume for the moment that what you believe  
 6 occurred or may have occurred is the finding that is  
 7 made. What view do you have to express about that  
 8 situation? It concerns, I think, the level to which  
 9 they were directed.

10 COLONEL LATHAM: The statement continues, and I will say  
 11 some more about it:  
 12 "They had insufficient direction about how to  
 13 respond or report suspicious behaviour and encouragement  
 14 to act upon it and that Lawler was worried about being  
 15 criticised for escalating something which was not a real  
 16 problem and of being accused of racially profiling."  
 17 It is very difficult in a situation where you're  
 18 presented with a situation which might stop an  
 19 Ariana Grande concert. You don't want to make the wrong  
 20 call, but it's actually not your call to make if you're  
 21 a very junior member of staff. Your job is to tell  
 22 someone who's really experienced and they will go,  
 23 I have seen that before, I know how to deal with it, and  
 24 deal with it.  
 25 But these two individuals, both of them, have

1 something pointed out to them which in some of their  
 2 statements they say looked really scary and in others  
 3 they didn't conclude it gave them enough to act. But  
 4 the net effect was they didn't report it.

5 Agha did report it to Lawler and perhaps felt he  
 6 discharged his activities by so doing, and Lawler  
 7 appears to have tried to get through on his radio but  
 8 then desisted with trying to get through on his radio.  
 9 Is that enough?

10 Q. The point you're making, I think, is it's all well and  
 11 good to focus on the failures of the individuals,  
 12 Mr Agha and Mr Lawler, if that is what they were, but  
 13 you feel that that wouldn't be fair or entirely fair  
 14 because they lacked direction and supervision?

15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Somehow you need to get across to  
 17 everybody, whether you believe it to be right or a real  
 18 emergency or not, you report it and leave it up to  
 19 somebody else to make the decision? That's actually  
 20 quite difficult in practice. You can tell people that,  
 21 but it's probably quite difficult to get them to act on  
 22 it.

23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, but you can encourage it by, whenever  
 24 anybody reports anything, no matter how stupid, foolish  
 25 and irritating it is that they've done that, giving them

1 positive public praise and reinforcement, "This guy's  
2 always reporting stuff, he's my best reporter", that  
3 sort of attitude.

4 Whereas although we have seen evidence of positive  
5 things, really good reporting of hostile reconnaissance  
6 and potential hostile reconnaissance being reported and  
7 some people do it really well and the ex-police officers  
8 and the ex-military people will probably do it much  
9 better, not much better but sometimes better than others  
10 who don't have that background. But if you encourage  
11 your junior staff to really do that, their job is less  
12 boring and you can be a bit more of a team and it's  
13 better customer service.

14 But in this case, we have seen when these two  
15 individuals were pressed to test, the net result was  
16 that the control room didn't find out.

17 MR GREANEY: So you need to encourage your staff,  
18 particularly if they are junior, to report anything they  
19 have a concern about, and you have to ensure that they  
20 know how they report that and you have to give them the  
21 means to report it?

22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. And don't badger them if they have  
23 reported something that you think is insignificant.

24 MR GREANEY: Sir, do you have any further questions to ask  
25 on issue 13?

33

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No thank you.

2 MR GREANEY: Dr BaMaung, do you have anything to add?

3 DR BAMAUNG: No.

4 Q. Issue 14, this is for you, colonel:

5 "Were there any other missed opportunities at an  
6 earlier time [so earlier than 22.14 and 22.31] to  
7 identify Salman Abedi and take mitigating action, such  
8 as when he first entered the City Room between 20.51 and  
9 remained there until 21.10, or at 21.59 when a officer  
10 of British Transport Police was spoken to?"

11 And that officer, of course, was PC Bullough by  
12 Julie Merchant. What is your joint view, colonel?

13 COLONEL LATHAM: It is our view that Salman Abedi looked  
14 suspicious during the period of time that you've asked  
15 me about. I'm just going to list those things which  
16 made him look suspicious and as the list gets longer, it  
17 makes him sound more suspicious.

18 He was carrying an unusually large and heavy  
19 backpack, which affected his gait. There were times  
20 when he wasn't, but when he was carrying it, that made  
21 him look suspicious.

22 He was overdressed for the weather.

23 Q. Pausing there for a moment, we will put in evidence  
24 before the end of chapter 7, or shortly afterwards, what  
25 the actual weather was on this night, but it was in the

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1 high 60s.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

3 COLONEL LATHAM: We have in evidence other people have  
4 reported that they saw him to be overdressed for the  
5 weather.

6 MR GREANEY: We do indeed.

7 COLONEL LATHAM: (3), he remained in the City Rooms for an  
8 extended period. He looked nervous, did not fit the  
9 audience profile. He wore headwear and others in the  
10 City Room thought that he looked suspicious. The fact  
11 that no security noticed this may have been partly  
12 because no one was proactively monitoring the CCTV  
13 in the City Room and because the security operation was  
14 not sufficiently focused on recognising suspicious  
15 behaviour.

16 Q. Might we also add to the opinion you've expressed "and  
17 because no one seems to have visited the mezzanine area  
18 in the sense of physically going there during the  
19 pre-egress period"?

20 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. I would go back to those three Ds of  
21 deny, detect, deter. In evidence we have heard lots of  
22 people saying, we told people to look out for suspicious  
23 people, but we heard nobody using that deny, detect,  
24 deter language, which is all over the publications, all  
25 over the training, but it's not been commonly used by

35

1 SMG and ShowSec.

2 In our view there does not appear to have been  
3 a clear report of suspicious behaviour from  
4 Julie Merchant to PC Bullough.

5 Q. So this is 21.59?

6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is very much your decision on the  
8 facts as you have seen them? I'm not saying I disagree.

9 COLONEL LATHAM: Indeed, sir, but it's for you to decide  
10 of course.

11 If that is found to be correct, that interaction  
12 could not be considered as a missed opportunity. When  
13 Salman Abedi walked past two BTP officers on the station  
14 concourse, there was nothing particularly suspicious  
15 about him in that interaction we have observed.

16 However, when Salman Abedi walked past Lawler and  
17 Atkinson on the footbridge, this was an opportunity to  
18 notice him and interact or observe and report.

19 I note by the tone of that paragraph that — I have  
20 mentioned CCTV. So there's the opportunities on CCTV,  
21 there's the opportunities online, if he did anything  
22 online, and I won't speculate on that, and there's the  
23 opportunities when he's doing his physical  
24 reconnaissance and approach when he could have been  
25 interacted with.

36

1 Q. On the night, the 22nd, would it be fair to say the real  
2 opportunities to disrupt him are during those 20 minutes  
3 when he's in the City Room between 20.51 and 21.10 and  
4 during that hour that he's within the City Room between  
5 about 9.30 and 10.30, with the disruption either by the  
6 means of him being spotted by the CCTV or by being  
7 spotted by someone on the ground?  
8 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
9 Q. Whether that person on the ground is ShowSec or BTP?  
10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the occasion when you're saying that  
12 Lawler and Atkinson missed the opportunity is when  
13 he was carrying his rucksack?  
14 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Tell me the distinction, please, between  
16 walking past the BTP officers not being suspicious with  
17 his rucksack on and walking past Lawler and Atkinson  
18 wearing his rucksack. Why is it not suspicious one but  
19 suspicious the other?  
20 COLONEL LATHAM: When he's walking past the BTP experts  
21 he was on the station concourse and they would have been  
22 very used to people walking past with luggage. That's  
23 what they have said in evidence. Having considered all  
24 of the evidence, that's the conclusion that Dr BaMaung  
25 and I came to.

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1 But when they walked past Lawler and Atkinson, who  
2 are on the outer perimeter of a security operation, one  
3 of them with an SIA badge, which is protecting a crowd  
4 at a music venue, and somebody walks past with a clearly  
5 extremely heavy bag, they don't appear to have noticed  
6 that someone's coming past with a really big bag and, if  
7 you've done a risk assessment that says there's a risk  
8 of PBIED and that means keeping unsearched big bags away  
9 from crowds, and you've told your staff that that's part  
10 of your operation, that was a missed opportunity.  
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's look at the other side of that for  
12 a moment. We heard from Mr Edwards, who's the CCTV  
13 operator, and he said: we used to regularly see lots of  
14 people walking past with big bags because these were the  
15 counterfeiters selling stuff, so we actually ignored it  
16 because there was nothing suspicious about having a big  
17 bag.  
18 Equally, we have heard evidence of how people coming  
19 from the station would walk through there to the car  
20 park and they'd be carrying bags when they did it  
21 because they'd just been travelling. So do you think  
22 it's balanced and fair to say Lawler and Atkinson  
23 in that situation, in the City Room, should actually  
24 have been sufficiently suspicious about the big bag?  
25 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't think they were sufficiently

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1 well-trained to have known that that is -- to have  
2 joined the dots and thought... I don't think they would  
3 routinely have stopped people with bags. But the  
4 reality is that if you've got a PBIED, if it's going to  
5 be effective, it's got to be reasonably large, it  
6 therefore has to be either a big belt on your body or  
7 a big bag.  
8 If you have done your risk assessment that says:  
9 this is when there's going to be a crowd here what do  
10 I want to keep away from the crowd, I want to keep large  
11 threat items away, then your operation should take that  
12 into account and you should tell your CCTV operators  
13 that large items could be large threat items and  
14 therefore that should be part of your operation. That  
15 doesn't appear to have been the operation that was in  
16 place at the arena.  
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does mean you may be stopping a whole  
18 lot of people who are simply going from the station to  
19 the NCP car park.  
20 COLONEL LATHAM: It does. I have also looked at an awful  
21 lot of CCTV and I'm sure that there's people here who  
22 have watched much more than me, but I began to use the  
23 practice of playing spot the bag. I don't see many  
24 bags. I have seen no bags like Abedi's and I have seen  
25 very few other bags. Lots of people say it's very

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1 common and Dr BaMaung and I have discussed this as well  
2 and we have been looking for bags and I have not been  
3 seeing them.  
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Even over a travel hub, the station?  
5 COLONEL LATHAM: I have been looking for bags on CCTV that's  
6 been given to me in evidence for this inquiry.  
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I see what you mean, I'm sorry.  
8 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm talking about inquiry evidence. I'm  
9 sure a clever lawyer will show me a picture of someone  
10 carrying a bag, but it's not as common as some of the  
11 witnesses have made it sound from the evidence that  
12 I have seen.  
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
14 COLONEL LATHAM: And his bag was extraordinarily heavy, it's  
15 affecting his gait, he's not wearing it properly. All  
16 those other factors added together, I believe, we  
17 believe, he looks suspicious.  
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
19 MR GREANEY: Dr BaMaung, do you have anything to add on  
20 issue 14?  
21 DR BaMAUNG: Only to comment on what Colonel Latham said.  
22 The videos that we saw were in relation to round about  
23 the time of the events. There's nothing to say that  
24 during the day there were bags which weren't picked up  
25 or weren't presented on CCTV. But we're not saying

40

1 that. What we're saying is at the time of the event,  
 2 when we looked at the CCTV, the bags were not there  
 3 because you're talking about evening. You'd expect  
 4 a lot of journeys to be done during the day and that's  
 5 what we felt was that issue.  
 6 One other comment. In relation to the discussion  
 7 between Julie Merchant and PC Bullough, there are two  
 8 reasons why we discounted that as being a missed  
 9 opportunity. One was that Julie Merchant, in her  
 10 statements, said she didn't consider Salman Abedi to be  
 11 a threat -- I think she described him as a crankypants  
 12 or a nutter, so she never saw him as a deliberate  
 13 threat. We've looked at the video evidence and the  
 14 statements and we can see no meaningful conversation  
 15 taking place between the two of them.  
 16 Q. The chairman has heard the evidence from the two of them  
 17 about what passed between them.  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: That's the reasons why we felt that there  
 19 wasn't a missed opportunity.  
 20 Q. Yes. Colonel, issue 15.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I can't remember how many issues we've  
 22 got.  
 23 MR GREANEY: 17, sir. I won't quite finish by 10.30, but  
 24 it 'll be shortly afterwards.  
 25 15:

1 "Did the pre-egress checks for the concert involve  
 2 a specific element of a counter-terrorism sweep? If  
 3 not, should they have done? Should the pre-egress  
 4 checks have picked up Salman Abedi as appearing and/or  
 5 acting suspiciously?"  
 6 This takes us back to an issue we looked at  
 7 yesterday, namely the disagreement or confusion between  
 8 SMG and ShowSec about whether there should or should not  
 9 have been a visit to the mezzanine during the pre-egress  
 10 checks.  
 11 What view did the two of you hold in answer to  
 12 issue 15, please?  
 13 COLONEL LATHAM: We felt that the pre-egress checks did not  
 14 include a counter-terrorism sweep and should have done.  
 15 I will define that term, if you would like me to. In  
 16 particular, the pre-egress checks should have included  
 17 the City Room mezzanine because it was part of the SMG  
 18 patrols on non-event days and it was written on to the  
 19 checklist and it was an obvious place to look for any  
 20 suspicious behaviour.  
 21 Q. Why was it an obvious place to look for any suspicious  
 22 behaviour?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Because it was the best hiding place in the  
 24 City Room. It was in the CCTV blind spot and therefore  
 25 needed to be checked on foot because there was no other

1 way of checking it. Had the pre-egress checks included  
 2 the City Room mezzanine, it is likely that Salman Abedi  
 3 would have been seen and would have been thought to be  
 4 suspicious.  
 5 Q. Pausing there, is it your view that he would have been  
 6 thought to be suspicious because of the various factors  
 7 that you identified in dealing with issue 14?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, but in addition, there were people on  
 9 the mezzanine who also thought that Abedi was suspicious  
 10 and therefore it is very likely if a uniform had gone up  
 11 there to do their pre-egress check, including of the  
 12 blind spot, members of the public would have pointed  
 13 Salman Abedi out to them and said, "That guy looks  
 14 suspicious to me".  
 15 Q. So you say had the check included the mezzanine, it's  
 16 likely that Salman Abedi would have been seen and  
 17 thought to have been suspicious or?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: Or that he would have been reported to the  
 19 supervisor carrying out the check by a member of the  
 20 public who considered him to be suspicious.  
 21 There certainly should have been a CT sweep, which  
 22 is that you'll check the City Room pre-ingress, during  
 23 ingress, during the event, pre-egress and even  
 24 post-egress. They should all be looking for the  
 25 counter-terrorism threats which obviously were a threat

1 at the time, and which was written on the check sheet,  
 2 but did not do so on the mezzanine, where Abedi was  
 3 in the obvious hiding place.  
 4 Q. It comes to this: the threat level is severe at the  
 5 time, the City Room during egress is going to contain  
 6 very many people, and therefore be attractive to  
 7 a terrorist, the mezzanine is somewhere where such  
 8 a person might hide and is therefore someone that should  
 9 have been visited on a pre-egress CT sweep?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 11 MR GREANEY: But as we know, that did not happen.  
 12 Sir, I'm going to ask the doctor in a moment whether  
 13 he has a view to offer on issue 15. Do you have any  
 14 questions before I do that?  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, thank you.  
 16 MR GREANEY: Doctor, do you have any further view to express  
 17 or to add to the short view expressed by the colonel?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: No, I don't have.  
 19 MR GREANEY: Issue 16:  
 20 "What would have happened..."  
 21 I suppose the better way of phrasing it might be:  
 22 "What do you consider should have happened or would  
 23 be expected to happen had the control room been  
 24 informed, whether by Mr Lawler or anyone else, about the  
 25 presence of a suspicious male with a backpack in the

1 City Room at any point in the hour before the  
 2 explosion?"

3 Of course, the chairman has heard the evidence of  
 4 Miriam Stone about what she believes she would have done  
 5 and also, I believe, James Allen. But what would you  
 6 have expected if that thing that did not occur had  
 7 occurred?

8 COLONEL LATHAM: So in our opinion, what we wrote in the  
 9 final three paragraphs of our final report remains  
 10 essentially unchanged. In short, the control room would  
 11 have tried to get a CCTV camera on to the suspicious  
 12 individual that they have just been told about.

13 When it was realised that it wasn't possible to put  
 14 a CCTV camera on to that spot because it was a blind  
 15 spot, the fact that there was somebody suspicious in  
 16 a blind spot I would expect to have added to suspicion.

17 The ShowSec supervisor would have been asked to look  
 18 at Abedi and it's very likely that they would have  
 19 thought that Abedi merited further investigation and  
 20 that they should have approached him.

21 By approaching Abedi, that may have encouraged Abedi  
 22 to detonate his device immediately. Had he not done so,  
 23 the supervisor is likely to have seen him up close and  
 24 to have thought that he appeared nervous and to have  
 25 informed the control room of those facts.

1 The control room would then have either contacted  
 2 BTP via the emergency number or GMP via 999. In any  
 3 event, it's likely that the control room would have shut  
 4 the doors to the City Room, as they do for egress.

5 Q. Pausing for a moment, we have the evidence of  
 6 Miriam Stone and others about how quickly that can be  
 7 achieved during the pre-egress period.

8 COLONEL LATHAM: And it can be done very quickly, as they  
 9 explained to us. Whether the City Room would also have  
 10 been cleared of people and what other steps would have  
 11 been taken is more difficult to say and depends on how  
 12 much time there was between the report of suspicious  
 13 behaviour and egress.

14 MR GREANEY: Do you have any questions to ask about issue  
 15 16, sir?

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I am just concerned about realistically  
 17 looking at the timing of all this and the effect of what  
 18 you have said, bearing in mind that Salman Abedi as  
 19 a suicide bomber is looking at someone at 10.15 coming  
 20 towards him in a uniform which may disrupt what he's  
 21 going to do. At least one of his options would be to  
 22 detonate then.

23 COLONEL LATHAM: Certainly.

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So unhappily and tragically, people are  
 25 likely to die in that situation.

1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Although in lesser numbers than actually  
 3 happened and (inaudible: distorted) injuries .

4 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that really leads to saying, in the  
 6 situation we are in there — once he's in the City Room,  
 7 as I think one of the family members said, something is  
 8 going to happen or the chances are something is going to  
 9 happen.

10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. I would say it's very unlikely that  
 11 having done all that preparation, got to his attack  
 12 position and then been rumbled, it is unlikely he is  
 13 going to stand up and successfully walk home with his  
 14 IED.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there has to be an option which could  
 16 have occurred?

17 COLONEL LATHAM: But he would have been stopped by security.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's say it's Agha who should have made  
 19 the report earlier on and we're talking again about  
 20 10.15.

21 COLONEL LATHAM: A report could have been made when he first  
 22 appeared —

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The report is about 10.14 —

24 MR GREANEY: That's right.

25 COLONEL LATHAM: If Agha had spotted him when he spotted his

1 trainers much earlier in the evening with a backpack —

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do understand that, and he had been  
 3 hanging about upstairs and we need to check. But if  
 4 it's not until the report is made to him, then at 10.14,  
 5 he rings through to control to say, this report has been  
 6 made to me, which is what he should do. You say that  
 7 they would try and put a CCTV camera on the person?

8 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: One of the problems with the CCTV may be  
 10 that the camera which is actually the moving camera,  
 11 which actually covers the area or where you try to put  
 12 it is the one that the event control, Sierra, keep for  
 13 themselves, as it were, because they want to see it on  
 14 egress and access.

15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if they're going to get  
 17 Whiskey Control to do it, which is at least  
 18 a possibility, they will have to say to Whiskey Control,  
 19 you can have that camera back now, you try and find him;  
 20 yes?

21 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They can't find him because he's in  
 23 a blind spot, so you then have to tell event control  
 24 again, we can't see him. So then a decision has to be  
 25 made what to do now. So you send a supervisor to look

1 at him or try and find him.  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Where are we at the time now,  
 4 realistically ?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: I think it would happen really quickly.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's certainly what Miriam Stone said,  
 7 so I'm not in any way ignoring her evidence.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm sure there will be some discussion  
 9 about split control rooms later. In this area perhaps  
 10 it doesn't help having split control rooms. But  
 11 you have got a camera that you can very quickly put on  
 12 there, so a call comes through and they say, McDonald's  
 13 step, suspicious person. Very quickly, if you have good  
 14 operators, you'll have a camera on there, they'll say,  
 15 "It's a blind spot, get the supervisor", "Dave, go and  
 16 have a look at McDonald's steps".  
 17 That sort of time frame, very quick. Dave goes, or  
 18 a supervisor goes, I know that blind spot, I know  
 19 exactly where they mean, and when they say McDonald's  
 20 steps, I know exactly where they mean, I can just  
 21 picture where they are going to be, I'll stand back  
 22 a bit because... I did have a quick look, there is  
 23 somebody there.  
 24 So he could either go straight up and look him  
 25 in the face, "What are you doing here", or he could

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1 stand back and try not to escalate things, but he  
 2 wouldn't know quite what to do, whether he should try  
 3 and de-escalate, because he hasn't seen it. But when he  
 4 sees it or if he goes up there — "Who reported it to  
 5 you?" "That guy up there", "Why do you think he's  
 6 suspicious?" "Because of this".  
 7 Again, it is all pretty quick and whilst this is  
 8 going on, he's saying to Miriam, "There is somebody  
 9 sitting on the steps with a big bag".  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: At which stage does she shut off the  
 11 City Room doors coming from the arena?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: Not until the supervisor has said, "I'm  
 13 really concerned about that". Because the implication  
 14 of closing off the City Room is you're going to stop  
 15 these children getting to the people who have come to  
 16 meet them and that's —  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And not only that but whenever you're  
 18 doing that with a very large audience presumably there's  
 19 always a risk it will cause overcrowding elsewhere.  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Absolutely.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't want to do it unless you have  
 22 to?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: You don't want to do it unless you have to,  
 24 but you know, you haven't got that many things in your  
 25 armoury. One of the things is closing the door and if

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1 you're practised at it, and Miriam Stone —  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: She said she had done it —  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: She was good at doing it, experienced at  
 4 doing it.  
 5 So she has to decide, it's her that decides, she has  
 6 to decide: when am I going to close City Room doors?  
 7 She has a very experienced supervisor, he looks at  
 8 something and he says, do you know, I'm really not  
 9 comfortable with it, how long have we got, okay, we've  
 10 got a few minutes, let's get BTP to have a look. And  
 11 because we're so joined up with BTP, really quickly the  
 12 BTP officer that's already in the City Room says, yes,  
 13 I would agree, let's close those doors and not let  
 14 people through here, and we will go and interact with  
 15 him.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We don't actually need to go even that  
 17 far because the person who reported the matter to  
 18 Mr Agha also told us, had there been a police officer  
 19 there, he would have reported it to a police officer.  
 20 So that's another way it could have happened?  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm asking these questions because you  
 23 have experience of these things, I don't. I just wanted  
 24 to know whether in practical terms this could be  
 25 achieved and actually what you have said to me is, yes,

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1 it could be achieved.  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: Certainly. I have looked really closely at  
 3 all the evidence of course, and that of Miriam Stone,  
 4 and I am confident that she was good at doing that  
 5 operation and she knew what she was doing and she would  
 6 have — she did do it well.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry, just to balance this out,  
 8 I should not overemphasise the difficulties of doing  
 9 a divert and closing those doors because, actually, they  
 10 got everybody safely out of the arena when the bomb did  
 11 go off.  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: And that is commendable.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I've extended your time again.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Not at all, sir.  
 15 Just to ensure there's complete clarity in relation  
 16 to this, if Mohammed Agha had spoken to the control room  
 17 or at any rate got a message through to the control room  
 18 about a suspicious male with a backpack at about 22.15,  
 19 that of course provides 16 minutes before the bomb is  
 20 detonated. Would you, based upon your experience, have  
 21 expected, if the report had been made at that stage, the  
 22 doors to have been closed before 22.31?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 24 Q. If the report had been made by Kyle Lawler at about  
 25 22.23 or 22.24, so that there is 7 or 8 minutes prior to

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1 detonation, would you have expected the doors to have  
2 been closed before 22.31?  
3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and the reason that I say that with  
4 such confidence is I have stood in those control rooms  
5 with, for example, two crowds coming towards each other  
6 and people making second by second decisions about when  
7 is this going to become unsafe and when is it not. And  
8 those operations are mainly set up for crowd safety, to  
9 prevent crowd crush, but because they think about that  
10 every night, you become very expert at deciding when you  
11 need to do something quickly.  
12 As we got closer to egress, as Miriam Stone  
13 explained to us, the staff are already in place to do  
14 this. You just have to [clicks fingers].  
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's a different situation with Lawler.  
16 He's ringing in to the control room and he would be able  
17 to tell them, what he saw and this cuts out the  
18 supervisor having to go over or putting the CCTV on.  
19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it could actually be a quicker  
21 response?  
22 COLONEL LATHAM: Lawler would have lesser credibility.  
23 I don't know the individuals, but I imagine Lawler, as  
24 a junior SIA officer, would have less credibility than a  
25 supervisor. Miriam Stone would want to hear from

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1 a supervisor before she does that, I would say.  
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
3 MR GREANEY: Dr BaMaung, do you have anything to add on this  
4 issue?  
5 DR BaMAUNG: Very, very briefly. We thought through the  
6 scenario that the chair talked about and, irrespective  
7 of how quickly we could close the arena doors,  
8 realistically, if he was going to detonate, people would  
9 die that night. But the potential would be if the  
10 procedure had been quicker, the casualties and deaths  
11 would have been less.  
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I well understand that, yes.  
13 MR GREANEY: So issue 17. This is for you, doctor, and it  
14 picks up on a point the chairman has recently made:  
15 "Would it have made a difference if the BTP officers  
16 on duty had been joined by PC Corke before the explosion  
17 or if they had been given a more formal briefing as to  
18 where to patrol at such an event?"  
19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I believe that.  
20 Q. I'm going to take you to a document that I don't know  
21 whether you will have seen this document before. It was  
22 disclosed some time ago by British Transport Police, but  
23 its significance wasn't appreciated until the night  
24 before last when we received the statement of  
25 Inspector Wedderburn from whom we'll hear tomorrow. I'm

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1 going to draw your attention to some passages in this  
2 document.  
3 The document in, I hope, its unredacted form is  
4 {INQ001985/1}. Excellent, it is unredacted. Could you  
5 enlarge it, please, so we can read it?  
6 Our current understanding is that this is a tactical  
7 report prepared by PC Peter Wood and dated 13 June 2014,  
8 but we'll need to make sure that's right. It's  
9 a tactical report sent by PC Wood to Chief Inspector  
10 move at and Police Inspector Cooper and it relates to  
11 the Phones4U Arena, as the Manchester Arena was known at  
12 that time. I'll read through it. It's quite a long  
13 passage, and then ask you some questions:  
14 "This report will provide planners and operational  
15 commanders with an overview of policing an event at the  
16 Phones4U Arena and how to deal with the numbers of  
17 people attending the venue. It provides guidance and  
18 tactical options in relation to congestion and safety  
19 matters concerning the location and should be treated as  
20 advice. This report should be read in conjunction with  
21 the tactical report for Manchester Victoria Station and  
22 in consultation with a tactical adviser if possible."  
23 The location of the arena is then given.  
24 Have you seen this document so far as you recall,  
25 doctor?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: No.  
2 MR GREANEY: "BTP responses. To police the crowd traffic  
3 associated with an event at the Phones4U Arena, the  
4 policing numbers and style will depend upon the  
5 following criteria."  
6 So we can be clear, do you agree, doctor, that what  
7 this document is focused upon is how British Transport  
8 Police should police the arena during an event?  
9 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
10 Q. We're going to see the area around it. The criteria,  
11 are:  
12 "(1) The type of event, for example a children's  
13 concert, music event or sporting event, such as boxing  
14 or football. (2) Historical and intelligence led  
15 requirements. (3) Current threat level."  
16 So (3) would seem to include the terrorism threat  
17 level, do you agree?  
18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I do.  
19 Q. In fact, it's probably a direct reference to that.  
20 Can you agree that those would seem to be the  
21 relevant criteria in determining the policing that ought  
22 to be provided to an event at the arena?  
23 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
24 Q. So, so far good:  
25 "These factors will drive what level of response BTP

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1 implement to cover events at the arena. The Phones4U  
 2 management and security are very experienced and  
 3 professional in hosting all manner of events, operating  
 4 a strict condition of entry procedure and a compliance  
 5 with conduct once inside the venue. BTP therefore  
 6 provide a response in conjunction with arena staff on  
 7 the premise that the Phones4U will manage inside the  
 8 venue unless the event requires BTP assistance due to  
 9 threat or risk levels of crime and/or disorder.”  
 10 And we’ve heard some evidence earlier in the oral  
 11 evidence hearing about buying in BTP for inside the  
 12 arena bowl itself .  
 13 Then this particular passage upon which I seek your  
 14 views:  
 15 “The following levels of response by BTP are to  
 16 monitor the safe access and egress from the venue  
 17 through Victoria Railway Station, the City Rooms,  
 18 Trinity Way and Hunts Bank.”  
 19 Do you agree this document does appear to be  
 20 considering something that is important, namely the  
 21 response by BTP to monitor safe egress from, among other  
 22 places, the City Rooms?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would agree to that.  
 24 Q. So these are the proposed levels of response:  
 25 “(1) The minimum recommendation for a relatively

1 small event would be one PC and one PCSO. Minor events,  
 2 however, probably would not require officers dedicated  
 3 to arena duties.”  
 4 You’ll agree that would not seem to be an apt  
 5 description for the Ariana Grande concert —  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: No.  
 7 Q. — which 14,000+ people attended:  
 8 “For an event where ticket sales are high [so we’re  
 9 much nearer to Ariana Grande now] a recommendation of  
 10 one sergeant, four constables and two PCSOs. These  
 11 figures would enable officers to monitor the safe access  
 12 and egress from the venue through Victoria Railway  
 13 Station, the City Rooms, Trinity Way and Hunts Bank.”  
 14 Again, does that seem like a sensible proposal?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: They seem like sensible numbers, yes.  
 16 Q. So if that proposal had been in place on the evening of  
 17 22 May, would it have made a difference in your view?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, it would have.  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: What is the date of that document?  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We are still coming to that, I hope.  
 21 MR GREANEY: The date, I believe, is 13 June 2014, but the  
 22 document itself isn’t dated, but that’s the information  
 23 we have at the moment, but we are going to have to make  
 24 sure that’s so.  
 25 The document does contain photographs of the arena

1 before refurbishment, which is creating some confusion,  
 2 which is why we need to exercise a degree of caution  
 3 in relation to this document. It’s certainly a document  
 4 that pre—dates the arena attack, that much we can be  
 5 confident of:  
 6 “(3) Certain events where a sell —out crowd is  
 7 expected and/or the profile of the audience for the  
 8 event present a potential risk for disorder ,  
 9 a recommendation to include a PSU capability should be  
 10 considered to work inside the venue in conjunction with  
 11 arena staff . These currently include boxing events and  
 12 the football masters tournament. A dog handler would  
 13 also be of benefit for such events. It should be noted  
 14 that officers should be instructed in stadium tactics  
 15 prior to a deployment to determine where  
 16 persons/offenders may need to be removed from the arena,  
 17 which may include the auditorium, which has steep  
 18 stepped seating areas.”  
 19 Again, does that seem to be a sensible proposal?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 21 MR GREANEY: “(4) Certain events may require a search team  
 22 capability along with requisite explosives dogs and  
 23 handlers under the POLSA direction followed by BTP  
 24 maintaining security of the venue.”  
 25 And then there is a (5), which I think probably

1 needn’t be redacted, but in fact is irrelevant to the  
 2 circumstances we are considering.  
 3 So assuming I’m correct in my understanding that  
 4 that document post—dates the arena attack, it appears  
 5 that an officer of BTP police had given careful and  
 6 structured thought to the policing response at an event.  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would say so.  
 8 Q. But we can be clear that that was not the response on  
 9 the night of 22 May?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: No, the response was far less. The main issue,  
 11 I think, there, maybe it doesn’t reflect some of the  
 12 realities , and it says a sergeant there. There was no  
 13 sergeant dedicated full —time to that event.  
 14 Q. What we ended up with at that event was one PC, 8 months  
 15 into her probationary period, two PCSOs and one PCSO who  
 16 was being mentored.  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. Can I make one other comment as well?  
 18 From the statement of Constable Johnson for an event  
 19 that was just a few days before, she mentioned there was  
 20 only herself and one PCSO for a Take That concert, which  
 21 I would probably put into the category of being an event  
 22 where there should be a reasonable number of police  
 23 officers .  
 24 Q. Does PC Wood’s document, this tactical plan, represent  
 25 a reasonable assessment of how arena events should have

1 been policed?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, it does.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may also be something we need to  
 4 know — once we have found the date out, we may need to  
 5 know what the threat level was at that time.  
 6 MR GREANEY: Sir, you're quite right. This document came to  
 7 us again from BTP along with the statement of  
 8 Inspector Wedderburn and our expectation is that she  
 9 will be able to assist in relation to the document.  
 10 I felt in order to assist CPs I ought to introduce this  
 11 document at this stage.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Do you have anything, colonel, that you would  
 14 like to say in relation to this document?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm surprised that we've got it now and it  
 16 reflects broadly what we were doing at the O2.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think maybe we have had it for long.  
 18 MR GREANEY: We have. I wouldn't like it to be thought that  
 19 BTP have just produced this document. I do not believe  
 20 that to be the position.  
 21 Issue 17, I have read it out already, doctor.  
 22 Could you provide us with your views on that issue,  
 23 please?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. My view is that if PC Corke had attended  
 25 at the arena, as he'd been instructed, there is

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1 a significant chance he would have gone to the City Room  
 2 as was his normal procedure at the egress of an event,  
 3 possibly with other officers or even on his own. We  
 4 feel that when he realised he could not attend in time,  
 5 he should have contacted his supervisor to inform him  
 6 and potentially contacted other officers by radio to say  
 7 that he would not be there and that would help maybe  
 8 focus their attention in deploying to the City Room.  
 9 We believe that if PC Corke had been absent, and  
 10 this maybe refers back to a level of supervision, as  
 11 soon as it was realised he was absent there should have  
 12 been a more detailed guidance provided to the officers  
 13 who were on duty in the station, covering the arena at  
 14 that night. And also potentially clarification of what  
 15 they should be looking for, ie suspicious activity .  
 16 Q. Pausing for a moment, as we believe PC Corke accepted,  
 17 bearing in mind that he was the most experienced officer  
 18 and that it was his practice to be on the mezzanine,  
 19 albeit not in the precise position that Abedi was in  
 20 during egress, it was most unfortunate that he had not  
 21 arrived back in time for egress.  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we should just remind ourselves,  
 24 as I remember it, and you'll tell me if I've got this  
 25 wrong, the evidence of PC Corke. He used to stand to

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1 the left of the left —hand stairs as you were looking at  
 2 it, as we can all remember it. He also said, I believe,  
 3 that he would have no cause to go in the area where the  
 4 blind spot was, which is where Salman Abedi was and he  
 5 didn't think he'd have seen him.  
 6 MR GREANEY: I remember the first point, certainly, sir.  
 7 I don't immediately recall the — we'll check that.  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Could I maybe add a comment? Is that not the  
 9 area where Christopher Wild was, round about the area  
 10 where PC Corke was going to be, in which case,  
 11 potentially, Christopher Wild would have reported his  
 12 concerns.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do understand that Christopher Wild  
 14 may have said, if there had been a police officer there,  
 15 he said he would have reported his concerns, so I quite  
 16 agree it could have been drawn to Mr Corke's attention.  
 17 MR GREANEY: And that is the very point you are about to  
 18 make, I think, as you read from the note.  
 19 The question arises: let's imagine that PC Corke had  
 20 got back in time for egress and had been in his usual  
 21 position. What would you have expected, based upon your  
 22 experience, to have occurred?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: I believe that Christopher Wild would indeed  
 24 have spoken to PC Corke and potentially other  
 25 individuals like Neal Hatfield and Martin McGuffie. If

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1 they had seen a police officer they may also have  
 2 approached him to express their concerns and each report  
 3 would have reinforced the significance of the previous  
 4 one.  
 5 Q. As Christopher Wild explained, if there had been a BTP  
 6 officer there or a police officer, he would have  
 7 reported his concerns to that person. In the event that  
 8 Christopher Wild and/or anyone else who was concerned  
 9 had reported to PC Corke those concerns, what would  
 10 you have expected to have occurred?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I would have expected PC Corke to immediately  
 12 have gone across to clarify what the situation was and  
 13 potentially have spoken to Salman Abedi.  
 14 Q. Would you have expected that to have disrupted Abedi's  
 15 plans?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, in his plans to attack a large number of  
 17 people. If Salman Abedi had been of the mindset that  
 18 he was going to detonate, it would have probably led to  
 19 an earlier detonation involving — from that position  
 20 he was in, a lot of the blast would probably have been  
 21 incorporated by the surrounding area, so he would  
 22 probably have detonated but potentially the number of  
 23 deaths and injuries would have been less.  
 24 Q. The way you put it in the note is:  
 25 "He would not have been able to detonate in a crowd

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1 of the size that he in fact did.”  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 3 MR GREANEY: Sir, do you have any additional questions about  
 4 issue 17?  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, thank you.  
 6 MR GREANEY: Colonel Latham, do you have anything to add to  
 7 this issue?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: No, thank you.  
 9 Q. I’m very nearly at the end. I just want to draw some of  
 10 the strands together, to use a phrase that I use too  
 11 much. In terms of identifying particular criticisms  
 12 that you have, I’m going to list those that I have  
 13 picked up. If I have missed any, please tell me.  
 14 First, there was no proper risk assessment of the  
 15 terrorist threat by SMG, ShowSec or BTP.  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 17 Q. That is important because, as you’ve explained, a proper  
 18 assessment or a suitable and sufficient assessment of  
 19 risk drives the operational plan?  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 21 Q. 2. No system that you identified as being effective for  
 22 identifying hostile reconnaissance?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 24 Q. 3. A failure to understand the need to do a pre-egress  
 25 check on the mezzanine or, at any rate, to achieve that

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1 occurrence?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 3 Q. 4. Insufficient monitoring of the CCTV system?  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 5 Q. 5. An inadequate policing response by British Transport  
 6 Police, in particular no officer in the City Room during  
 7 egress?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 9 Q. 6. A failure to report to control by Mr Agha or  
 10 Mr Lawler the concerns that had been raised with them?  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 12 Q. You had, I think, wish to qualify that, as you have done  
 13 already, by indicating that you regard them as not  
 14 having been adequately trained or being adequately  
 15 supervised?  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. Is that the end of your list,  
 17 Mr Greaney? There’s one other that I might add at the  
 18 top of the list, which is maybe something that will be  
 19 discussed in a separate part of the inquiry.  
 20 There appears, on the evidence that I’m aware of, to  
 21 have not been a successful security-minded  
 22 communications operation. The reason I say that that  
 23 appears to have not been successful is because  
 24 Salman Abedi, for some reason, concluded that this was  
 25 a target worth doing hostile reconnaissance upon. But

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1 I have not seen that relevant evidence, but it is  
 2 relevant to the security —  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the bit you told us about that you  
 4 should put it out to the public, “We’re watching”, and  
 5 make sure they understand that it’s not a good place for  
 6 them to come and set up?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: That’s right, sir.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Sir, those are my questions at this stage.  
 9 This is a convenient moment to break for two reasons,  
 10 first of all to re-arrange the witnesses, and also we’ve  
 11 been going for an hour and a half.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is quarter of an hour sufficient?  
 13 MR GREANEY: It is, sir, yes.  
 14 MR COOPER: The only hesitation I have with the quarter of  
 15 an hour, I know because of documents supplied to us  
 16 yesterday, we informed the inquiry legal team there are  
 17 a number of documents, one in particular, the witness  
 18 needs to read in particular. I hope that 15 minutes  
 19 will be enough time.  
 20 MR GREANEY: I haven’t seen that correspondence. I was  
 21 going to call upon Mr Atkinson first in any event  
 22 followed by Mr Cooper and then Mr Weatherby. I’m sure  
 23 one way or another, we’ll ensure that document has been  
 24 seen.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, this is not directed at you,

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1 I’m just talking through you because you’re the one that  
 2 happens to be standing up. I think a timetable has been  
 3 issued. The timetable is important if we’re not going  
 4 to be sitting on Friday. This is an important part of  
 5 the evidence, as they’ve all been important, but it’s  
 6 a drawing together of threads, and certainly a detailed  
 7 analysis will be of assistance to me, but I’m sure  
 8 everybody will bear in mind the timetable that has  
 9 been —  
 10 MR COOPER: Of course, sir. We were only given the document  
 11 yesterday.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I’m not criticising about the document.  
 13 That’s not the matter I’m complaining about and I’m not  
 14 complaining about anything.  
 15 I’m just saying, in general terms, Mr Laidlaw’s  
 16 encouraged me to have my stopwatch there, so I will be  
 17 keeping some idea of the time, just so people know.  
 18 That’s not directed at you in particular, or the  
 19 document. You just happened to be there.  
 20 Quarter of an hour.  
 21 (11.02 am)  
 22 (A short break)  
 23 (11.17 am)  
 24 MR GREANEY: Sir, as I indicated, we’ve had to re-arrange  
 25 the courtroom. This is a satisfactory arrangement. I’m

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1 going to call upon Mr Atkinson to ask his questions on  
2 behalf of the bereaved families.

3 Questions from MR ATKINSON

4 MR ATKINSON: Colonel, doctor, if I at any point address  
5 a question to the wrong one of you, will please the  
6 right one answer it, or indeed both, as appropriate.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that's a recipe for disaster:  
8 they'll both answer at the same time!

9 MR ATKINSON: Starting, if I may with you, colonel, as  
10 a general proposition. The provision of security for  
11 any large venue cannot be the responsibility of one  
12 particular organisation, can it? It has to be  
13 a collaboration between a number of different  
14 components?

15 COLONEL LATHAM: I think your question included the word  
16 responsibility. I think it can be the responsibility of  
17 a single organisation, but it can't be delivered at  
18 a complex venue without collaboration.

19 Q. Taking a venue within a city centre, there will be  
20 a responsibility for security from the owners of that  
21 venue, clearly, but also a responsibility for the police  
22 force for that city because it is a part of that city,  
23 but I take your point. Certainly for a venue to be  
24 secured and those attending a venue to be safe, more  
25 than one organisation will have to play a part for that

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1 to work properly?

2 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.

3 Q. So there has to be, particularly in combating a threat  
4 such as terrorism, a very large amount of cooperation  
5 and collaboration between components if it is going to  
6 work as a security project?

7 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.

8 Q. If that breaks down or does not work properly, it is the  
9 protection of the public that is likely to suffer?

10 COLONEL LATHAM: That could be an effect, yes.

11 Q. So in this instance that there was a requirement on  
12 a number of different bodies to carry out their own  
13 assessment of the risk posed from terrorism to those  
14 attending the Manchester Arena, but also for them to  
15 collaborate with each other to mitigate that risk?

16 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree with that statement and it  
17 goes back to what I've previously said about  
18 responsibility, authority and accountability.

19 Q. Applying those here, at a headline level — and we'll  
20 look at these in more detail as we work through it  
21 together — there was a lack of such coordination  
22 between the two police forces that had a role to play  
23 in relation to the arena, the BTP and the GMP?

24 DR BaMAUNG: If I can comment. Yes, and I think the main  
25 issue is the complexity of that site because although

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1 the site was located within the area of Greater  
2 Manchester Police, because British Transport Police  
3 covered the complex due to Network Rail, there was an  
4 area of potential confusion.

5 Q. That made it all the more important, did it not, that  
6 those who had a role to play did collaborate with each  
7 other to remove that confusion?

8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Because where there can be confusion, that is the very  
10 thing that a would-be terrorist can take advantage of?

11 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

12 Q. In relation to those forces, that required an  
13 establishment of who did have primacy and for what?

14 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

15 Q. In terms of the day to day, in terms of providing  
16 counter-terrorism advice through a CTSA and also through  
17 emergency responses?

18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

19 Q. That there was a lack of coordination and cooperation  
20 between those forces and the venue in terms of there  
21 being joined-up thinking as to how the venue and the  
22 police forces that surrounded it were going to work  
23 together?

24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, in relation to the police service there  
25 was not a one point for all. I think a lot of the

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1 relationships were developed informally through the work  
2 of SMG and the example I gave was the fact that  
3 counter-terrorism intelligence was done through GMP  
4 CTAs whereas crime intelligence was through British  
5 Transport Police intelligence. So I think possibly  
6 because of the need to look at the best way forward, SMG  
7 did develop different links with the different forces,  
8 which from a coordination point of view is not great.

9 COLONEL LATHAM: I would reiterate — I have said it before,  
10 but it's relevant here — the event organiser, who is  
11 responsible in my opinion for the event, there are some  
12 things they cannot get hold of that the police have got,  
13 and therefore if they do not coordinate, those things  
14 will not be made available.

15 Q. If, as the doctor suggests, that to an extent things had  
16 developed just because you had a relationship with  
17 someone and you got used to going to that person or that  
18 organisation for something, and it wasn't all being  
19 written down, it wasn't all being coordinated between  
20 you all, there was the risk of things just not being  
21 covered because no one there was actually doing them or  
22 thinking about them or helping on them when they could?

23 COLONEL LATHAM: We're agreeing that coordination is  
24 important and my experience is that the police do write  
25 things down.

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1 Q. In terms of that theme of coordination, there was  
 2 clearly a lack of necessary coordination and cooperation  
 3 between the venue and its security provider, ShowSec,  
 4 for example in relation to a joined-up approach to risk  
 5 assessment, the sharing of intelligence that was  
 6 reaching or information that was reaching the venue from  
 7 its CTSA, and also in terms of areas of procedure like  
 8 pre-egress and what was or was not meant to happen at  
 9 that point.

10 COLONEL LATHAM: Your question is: was there enough  
 11 coordination between BTP and ShowSec? In those  
 12 respects, no, there wasn't.

13 Q. And was there enough coordination between ShowSec and  
 14 SMG in those respects?

15 DR BaMAUNG: I can maybe answer that one.  
 16 There were significant lost opportunities. The fact  
 17 that ShowSec were not involved in the PSIA process --  
 18 the process does not mandate that they are required to  
 19 be, the process involves linking in with the site owner  
 20 or operator, but the potential could have been there for  
 21 ShowSec to have been involved in the discussions which,  
 22 if they're seen as a security partner, is a lost  
 23 opportunity, I believe.

24 Q. And also a risk, looking at the relationship of SMG and  
 25 ShowSec, because they had worked at the arena together

1 for a long period of time, of each assuming that the  
 2 other one knew what they were doing and doing it the way  
 3 they thought they were doing it without actually  
 4 checking?

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we're talking about going on the  
 6 mezzanine and the --

7 MR ATKINSON: And a number of other things, bag checks being  
 8 an example.

9 COLONEL LATHAM: "We've always done it this way" means  
 10 you're probably doing it wrong, is my experience. What  
 11 we should be doing, whatever your venue is, is regularly  
 12 reviewing those plans with your key partners and looking  
 13 at how you can do it better. Because the threat is  
 14 changing, customer expectations are changing, the acts  
 15 are changing and refresh all the time.

16 Q. Filtering that through the steps in the chain that ought  
 17 to be there to provide security for those going to the  
 18 arena, the staff on the ground, there was clearly, on  
 19 the face of it, a lack of coordination with them as to  
 20 aspects of their jobs that left them insufficiently  
 21 either trained or briefed as to what they were meant to  
 22 be doing.

23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. Agha, as I said earlier today, is an  
 24 example.

25 Q. If it is a failure of training or instruction, that is

1 not the fault necessarily of the individual, it is the  
 2 fault of those who should have trained and/or briefed  
 3 them?

4 COLONEL LATHAM: If the individual has deliberately tried to  
 5 do something to subvert the training then it is their  
 6 risk for that -- but it is for the provider of that  
 7 security service to deliver assurance to their client,  
 8 "I can prove to you that they've done this training  
 9 properly, in the following way", and then the happy  
 10 client says, "Thank you, in that case I'm willing to pay  
 11 you for it". If you're not doing that, then you're  
 12 selling a product that is not of merchantable quality,  
 13 I would argue.

14 Q. Before I turn with you in a moment to those various  
 15 different relationships that needed to work for the  
 16 arena to be safe, just a brief moment on your approach  
 17 to your various reports, because, as you'll be aware,  
 18 there has been some criticism, not I hasten to add on  
 19 behalf of the families, of your evolution in certain  
 20 respects of your view in certain topics.

21 Before you started your work, you were provided with  
 22 a vast amount of material to sift your way through?

23 COLONEL LATHAM: We have had an extraordinary amount and  
 24 it's been ever increasing, yes.

25 DR BaMAUNG: It was really an iterative process. When we

1 wrote the first report, we based that on the evidence we  
 2 had at the time. A big factor for us in being able to  
 3 clarify certain issues was the responses from the CPs as  
 4 to what they deemed as correct or incorrect. I don't  
 5 know if we're allowed to mention, but we have had  
 6 virtually 2,000 documents given to us. Even in the  
 7 period to the time we did our final report to this,  
 8 we've had several hundred. So our reports were based on  
 9 the correct information at that time on our analysis and  
 10 what we tried to do is to reflect, to be fair to both  
 11 parties, if issues were identified which maybe altered  
 12 the view of what had been said previously and we tried  
 13 to incorporate that into the further reports.

14 Even since the final report, we've had so much  
 15 additional information and what we hope is that within  
 16 our evidence at the inquiry we can maybe give a final  
 17 version of what our views are.

18 Q. So at the various stages where the time came for you to  
 19 write a report, you were writing that report on the  
 20 basis of what the position appeared to be on the  
 21 information that you then had?

22 COLONEL LATHAM: That's right. As we wrote each report, we  
 23 did manage to read all of the evidence before we  
 24 submitted our report, so no report was written on the  
 25 basis of us not having read information that was given

1 to us. But if I had had 10 minutes in the first week  
 2 with Miriam Stone, it would have saved me months on risk  
 3 assessment because the documents didn't add up. Once we  
 4 had input from ShowSec and SMG it was completely  
 5 understandable and our final report correctly reflects,  
 6 for example, risk assessment, because the pieces then  
 7 fell into place.

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in the unlikely event we ever do  
 9 another inquiry, I'll make sure it's all done the other  
 10 way round!

11 MR ATKINSON: Can I turn then to those core relationships  
 12 and the first one I can deal with very quickly, not  
 13 least because insofar as Martyn's Law is engaged by it,  
 14 I defer on that entirely to Mr Cooper, who will follow  
 15 on from me.

16 One of the key relationships that needs to be  
 17 considered is the relationship between the venue and the  
 18 local authority that had granted it its premises  
 19 licence.

20 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

21 Q. And you have identified a number of apparent breaches of  
 22 the premises licence by SMG in the way that it was  
 23 operating, which had not been picked up, on the face of  
 24 it, with them by the local authority.

25 COLONEL LATHAM: My personal notes were handed in yesterday.

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1 They weren't written for other people, although I am  
 2 very happy for other people to have them. I'm not  
 3 a licensing expert and they are my personal notes. It  
 4 seems to me that there were breaches and that  
 5 relationship should have been close. Of course, the  
 6 relationship needs to be close because if you haven't  
 7 got a licence then you can't trade and your business  
 8 fails, so you would want to protect your licence.

9 Q. And in those areas where you have identified there to  
 10 have been breaches, for example in relation to training  
 11 and briefing of staff on the ground, which are areas  
 12 covered by that licence, which you spelt out yesterday,  
 13 it was SMG's responsibility to make sure it was  
 14 complying with its licence and therefore to make sure  
 15 those things were being done?

16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

17 Q. And if it was employing someone else to do that job, it  
 18 was still their responsibility to make sure it was being  
 19 done properly?

20 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, it's their responsibility, the  
 21 licence-holder's.

22 Q. Moving on swiftly from the local authority and matters  
 23 of licensing to the police.

24 Is it fair to say that the interaction between the  
 25 venue and the police was really at two levels? One of

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1 or getting the help of the police for planning in  
 2 advance to make the venue safe on the one hand and  
 3 actually policing the venue when it was operating on the  
 4 other?

5 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.

6 Q. In relation to the in advance level of things, you have  
 7 identified that GMP did have an emergency plan that  
 8 related to the arena, but it was out of date and dealt  
 9 with responses once something had happened rather than  
 10 taking steps to stop it happening?

11 DR BaMAUNG: I think there were quite a few issues  
 12 in relation to the contingency plan. In relation to  
 13 Greater Manchester Police, there was a restructuring and  
 14 two territorial divisions were combined into one and at  
 15 that point they lost the emergency planning liaison  
 16 officer or emergency planning officer. We noted in the  
 17 evidence PC Hughes took the position that it was  
 18 important to get a cohesive plan for the whole site and  
 19 that involved British Transport Police consultation as  
 20 well. So at that point in time, yes, the document was  
 21 due for renewal certainly at that time.

22 Q. So far as the BTP side of things was concerned, no  
 23 similar contingency plan from them dealing with how do  
 24 we stop things happening and what do we do when they  
 25 happen?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: I think the plans were more about after  
 2 something has happened, how --

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's what a contingency plan would  
 4 mean, as I understand it, what do you do if something  
 5 happens and how do you respond to an emergency, so not  
 6 really directly to do with your expertise and what you  
 7 were looking at in this report.

8 MR ATKINSON: The reason I'm exploring this, and I'm doing  
 9 it as quickly as I can, is an illustration of where  
 10 cooperation and coordination between the forces and the  
 11 venue should have been better. I think it's your view,  
 12 and I think this is something you can help with, doctor,  
 13 that BTP as the force that certainly on the whole was  
 14 treating itself as having primacy in relation to the  
 15 arena ought to have been ensuring that there was  
 16 a contingency plan that covered themselves, the venue,  
 17 GMP and any others who needed to be involved in it?

18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would have thought so.

19 Q. And that did not happen?

20 DR BaMAUNG: Not from the evidence that we've seen.

21 Q. From the venue's point of view, it was a requirement of  
 22 their premises licence, paragraph 13, that there should  
 23 be a contingency plan that involved those various  
 24 organisations and there was no evidence of them having  
 25 pushed that forward either beyond them having one of

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1 their own?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: No.  
 3 Q. In terms of assessing the risks in advance from the  
 4 police point of view and BTP's position, that's slightly  
 5 moved on this morning from where we all may have thought  
 6 we were when we got up this morning in terms of this new  
 7 document. I wonder if we could have it up again.  
 8 {INQ001985/1}, please, Mr Lopez.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You'll be well used to late disclosure,  
 10 won't you?  
 11 MR ATKINSON: Yes. I make no criticism at all.  
 12 If, as has been suggested, this is a document dated  
 13 June of 2014, and just so we understand what this is and  
 14 isn't, this is not a risk assessment of the sort that  
 15 you, I think, doctor, were saying there should have been  
 16 from BTP as a written risk assessment for events at the  
 17 arena?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: No, this is more, I think, a statement of  
 19 manning the deployment for an event and breaking down  
 20 the types of events that could be held.  
 21 Q. And so it is no substitute for there being a written  
 22 risk assessment from BTP in relation to events at the  
 23 arena?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: No.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: Not only is it not a substitute, this is

1 a document which is saying: for a big venue you'll have  
 2 a sergeant, four constables and two PCSOs, which weren't  
 3 being delivered.  
 4 MR ATKINSON: If this is a document that's June of 2014, the  
 5 terrorism risk level then was substantial, meaning that  
 6 it was thought that an attack was likely rather than  
 7 highly likely, which was the position by the time of the  
 8 attack in 2017. By reference to the wording of the  
 9 document itself, it makes reference to the fact that  
 10 work was ongoing, and we know there was a redevelopment  
 11 of the station, and so this is a document that came into  
 12 being before the redevelopment of the station, the  
 13 geography of the station and particularly the bridge  
 14 going into the City Room had come about.  
 15 Even taking this on its face, should this document  
 16 have been revisited given any of those changes?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think that with the rising threat level  
 18 it should definitely have been revisited. That might  
 19 have affected BTP's view on deployment numbers.  
 20 Q. And the fact that there were different means of access  
 21 to the City Room, between that and the station, was that  
 22 something at least to have been thought about?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think any substantial change in the  
 24 actual site and access to the site needs to be  
 25 considered in documents like that.

1 COLONEL LATHAM: In the over 2,000 documents that we've  
 2 reviewed, I haven't seen this document until today and  
 3 it's really significant and it surprises me that nobody  
 4 from SMG and ShowSec are talking about: we routinely get  
 5 a sergeant and four and two. That is an astonishing  
 6 thing to learn today.  
 7 Q. Dr BaMaung made the point earlier by reference to  
 8 Ms Johnson's evidence from the Take That concert and it  
 9 doesn't appear that anything like that level was being  
 10 provided then and the evidence in relation to the 22 May  
 11 is it wasn't being provided then either.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we've got the point or I have  
 13 certainly got the point in relation to this.  
 14 I repeat, I'm sorry you haven't had it before, but  
 15 actually it's not late disclosure as of today. Its true  
 16 significance had just not been appreciated.  
 17 MR ATKINSON: Final question on this topic. We've seen  
 18 Mr Wilson's email, which was the substitute for an  
 19 in-person briefing of the team who were going to be  
 20 policing on 22 May. Should there have been something  
 21 like this to inform Mr Wilson as to his deployment and  
 22 what the options should have been?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: I think in reality, Sergeant Wilson was given  
 24 the numbers rather than him deciding numbers. That  
 25 would be probably from the department that created the

1 memo. He was given the resources, be it PC or PCSO,  
 2 that he was going to be charge of for the deployment of  
 3 an event.  
 4 Q. But given that he had what he had, do we understand your  
 5 earlier evidence to be that more should have been done  
 6 to make sure that the resources he had were properly  
 7 deployed?  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 9 Q. They knew when they were meant to be there and where  
 10 they were meant to be?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I would agree.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is not a criticism of you but I was  
 13 slightly concerned of the criticism of Sergeant Wilson  
 14 yesterday. One thing which I think should be given in  
 15 an inquiry like this is the opportunity for people to  
 16 comment on the criticisms. This is not a comment on  
 17 anybody or any advocate. The reality is I have not  
 18 reviewed his evidence again. I don't really remember  
 19 any or any significant criticism of Sergeant Wilson  
 20 during his evidence. It's come in rather late in the  
 21 day. That's not a fault of yours either, but I want to  
 22 make it clear that he doesn't seem to have had the  
 23 chance to deal with the criticisms that were made  
 24 yesterday.  
 25 MR ATKINSON: I haven't reviewed his evidence recently

1 either, so I'm afraid I can't... other than by moving  
2 swiftly on.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There may have been criticism saying  
4 there should have been more put to him about the  
5 terrorism threat. I seem to remember his answer was:  
6 actually, everybody knew what the threat was and if you  
7 keep repeating it every day to every policeman who goes  
8 on duty it just becomes something which people regard as  
9 routine. Anyway, we can look at his evidence in due  
10 course.

11 MR ATKINSON: Moving on but staying with the police side of  
12 things, an opportunity for some of these disconnects  
13 between the BTP, the GMP and the venue to have been  
14 ironed out presumably would have been the multi-agency  
15 meetings that were prescribed and did happen between  
16 these organisations?

17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I'd agree.

18 COLONEL LATHAM: That was an opportunity, but they were  
19 biannual and that's nowhere near frequent enough.

20 Q. Did their appear to have been in the minutes you have  
21 seen of those meetings any real discussion about primacy  
22 and responsibility either on a day to day or --

23 DR BaMAUNG: No, I have not seen any evidence, but I don't  
24 know if that would be the best forum for that because  
25 the multi-agency meetings contained multiple attendees

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1 from local authority. If it was an issue about police  
2 primacy, I would probably have expected that to take  
3 place in a different forum entirely.

4 COLONEL LATHAM: It will also need to be a different forum  
5 for -- for example, if you arrest somebody at a music  
6 venue because of domestic violence, two police officers  
7 are required to process that person, so you lose two  
8 police officers off the ground and that has a great  
9 effect on your security operation. So there needs to be  
10 a conversation between the venue and the police about  
11 the circumstances, for example, of how they behave on  
12 the night. That doesn't require a multi-agency meeting,  
13 that requires a meeting between the police and the venue  
14 to talk about their own pressure points. I've not seen  
15 evidence that that was happening.

16 Q. Another contribution that the police and policing  
17 agencies could bring was in terms of advice to the venue  
18 about its security arrangements. And part of that,  
19 which I'll come to in just a moment, is through the  
20 CTSAs. Another route is through the various  
21 NaCTSO-provided sources of information, the various  
22 documents they've provided in relation to stadia, bars  
23 and so on, but also through things such as the Business  
24 Sentinel group and Bridge calls, which, as we understand  
25 it, were ways a venue like the arena could get

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1 up-to-date advice on things that would help them with  
2 their security planning relating to terrorism.

3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct. Probably you can't  
4 separate them too finely because all of the activities  
5 are based round about the CTSA and the importance of the  
6 CTSA. For example, with the NaCTSO documentation, very,  
7 very detailed, very good advice, it's available to all  
8 sites, but I think Miriam Stone said she read all of the  
9 NaCTSO documentation. The difficult part for her might  
10 have been taking out the critical parts to look at her  
11 particular site and that's where CTSAs can give general  
12 advice in relation to NaCTSO documentation.

13 The Sentinel group was run by the CTSAs at  
14 a strategic level and that had a really potentially  
15 powerful effect because it was based in the high levels  
16 within the organisations and if the members of that  
17 group felt that activity was justified then they had the  
18 power to do it.

19 Finally, the bit about the Bridge call, again that  
20 was CTSA run. The Bridge call was the third strand of  
21 the City of London Project Griffin, so there was  
22 communication between sites. That was also a very  
23 powerful tool. I believe that SMG didn't participate  
24 in that, but the good part of the Bridge call was that  
25 it allowed the sharing of information from sites as well

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1 as the police providing an update.

2 Q. Looking at those in reverse order. The Bridge call was  
3 an opportunity that would have been there for SMG to get  
4 advice if it had sought to take it up?

5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, SMG were actually listed on the  
6 documentation we got from Greater Manchester Police as  
7 members.

8 COLONEL LATHAM: And I participated in them and they were  
9 useful.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we just check the evidence at some  
11 stage as to whether Mr Allen was part?

12 DR BaMAUNG: Mr Allen was part of the Sentinel.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know he was part of Sentinel. I was  
14 just wondering whether he was part -- I just can't  
15 remember.

16 MR ATKINSON: Mr O'Connor will correct me if I am wrong, but  
17 it was accepted that SMG did not take part in the Bridge  
18 calls.

19 COLONEL LATHAM: But they were invited.

20 Q. But they were invited.

21 So far as Business Sentinel is concerned, that is  
22 something Mr Allen confirmed he was getting, but we have  
23 seen emails from him when he was receiving that  
24 indicating that they were not for wider circulation  
25 beyond quite a small group within SMG. Do you think

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1 information of that sort ought to have been more widely  
 2 circulated by him or were there problems in him doing  
 3 that?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: I think the issue he maybe had was the  
 5 documents were labelled as "official" under the new  
 6 security classification scheme. But there is no  
 7 reason -- I believe there was other evidence put forward  
 8 -- if he had sought permission of the owner of the  
 9 information, which would have been Greater Manchester  
 10 Police, then he could have shared with within his own  
 11 organisation and potentially with ShowSec as well.  
 12 He was certainly under the impression that the  
 13 information was extremely sensitive, some of the  
 14 information, and that was the reason he couldn't share  
 15 it. But effectively, if he had spoken to Greater  
 16 Manchester Police and sought permission to share it,  
 17 I don't see them having any issue with having that  
 18 shared because it's all about building a better security  
 19 regime within the facility.  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: And of course if you have up-to-date  
 21 security information you've just been given from  
 22 credible government sources, it is obvious you should  
 23 share it with senior members of your security team.  
 24 Q. And where you have a security company providing your  
 25 security, that surely means you need to share it with

1 them?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: Of course.  
 3 Q. You have already made the point the same would go for  
 4 the advice that SMG were getting from the CTSA. Again,  
 5 something that should be shared with the people who  
 6 would be providing their security?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: That would be essential because the CTSA's  
 8 told you that there's a PBIED threat, "I must remember  
 9 to tell ShowSec that". It is obvious.  
 10 Q. We'll come back to how much involvement ShowSec should  
 11 have had with that process in just a minute. But before  
 12 we do that, can we look at external training, so the  
 13 training opportunities that NaCTSO and the police were  
 14 providing. Doctor, I know you have a great familiarity  
 15 with both Argus and Griffin, having been involved in the  
 16 roll-out of both. Is the difference that Argus is more  
 17 aimed at managerial levels and Griffin at the people on  
 18 the ground?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, Project Griffin is aimed at the security  
 20 officers within organisations. The police tend to  
 21 encourage non-security professionals as well because  
 22 there is information that could be of value to anybody  
 23 such as understanding hostile reconnaissance. Argus is  
 24 principally aimed at senior management. There'd be no  
 25 harm potentially in supervisors attending as well

1 because the Argus product has a series of scenarios that  
 2 are run through and the tables are multi-agency or  
 3 multi-organisation and it's really used as a conduit to  
 4 share understanding of what the threat might be and what  
 5 potential best practice could be used in the future.  
 6 Q. You made the point in your report that participating in  
 7 Argus and Griffin is a good thing because through that  
 8 you'll gain a much better appreciation of a good  
 9 approach to deal with terror. But it's also important  
 10 that you disseminate what you have learned to others in  
 11 your organisation so the organisation improves and  
 12 adjusts rather than just you?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would agree. I think in one of the  
 14 earlier statements we saw, I'm not sure who it was from  
 15 SMG, but they mentioned all the key people were at the  
 16 exercises. But the dissemination of that learning is  
 17 critical and I think Miriam Stone had said that she took  
 18 the knowledge she gained from the exercises and applied  
 19 that in their internal exercises. And to give credit,  
 20 the internal exercises were very good, but the issue for  
 21 me was that the amount of learning that you could  
 22 potentially capture from a full day of doing Griffin or  
 23 doing an Argus event needs to be held somewhere and then  
 24 to give you time to reflect on it and then see how you  
 25 can apply that within your own organisation. I think

1 that was the weak point in the SMG approach in that they  
 2 participated in every exercise they could get, which was  
 3 commendable. Many organisations don't even bother  
 4 turning up and SMG sent a good proportion of their  
 5 senior management there. But the issue for me was the  
 6 dissemination, interpretation and application of that  
 7 really good information was missing.  
 8 Q. And again, not just missing within SMG filtering down  
 9 the organisation but also going from SMG to ShowSec as  
 10 the people who were providing their security on the  
 11 ground?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: I think ShowSec actually attended some Griffin.  
 13 I would need to check the statements. I'm sure they  
 14 did.  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Your point there is about a two-way flow of  
 16 information and that's very important. The provider  
 17 needs to be able to talk to the customer and tell them  
 18 what their issues are and so do the little people on the  
 19 ground who say that the radios don't work, that needs to  
 20 be able to be communicated up, or, you can't see from  
 21 here, or, I was put on post last night and I didn't know  
 22 what I was supposed to do because I wasn't given any  
 23 instructions. So you do need communication from the  
 24 shop floor up to management as well, not just  
 25 dissemination.

1 Q. You make clear in your report, doctor, to help you, that  
 2 ShowSec appeared to have participated in Griffin  
 3 training rather than Argus training, but you also made  
 4 the point in relation to the number of staff from  
 5 ShowSec who'd undertaken that training that of the 176  
 6 working in the arena on 22 May, 13 had undertaken  
 7 Griffin training. Would it be your view that that was  
 8 too low a number for the Griffin training really to have  
 9 benefited the security operation?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: I would agree, yes, with a caveat in that from  
 11 the actual demographics of the stewards, a lot of them  
 12 were part-time and they may have had had other jobs.  
 13 I think, so far as full-time staff are concerned  
 14 with ShowSec, I believe everybody should attend. I can  
 15 understand why the percentage may not have been higher  
 16 than on the night, but I've run events where people have  
 17 attended in their own time. Whether that was encouraged  
 18 enough, I can't comment, I haven't seen any evidence.  
 19 Q. Clearly, another area where the police had a role to  
 20 play was in relation to the CTSA scheme. Is the  
 21 position that you have reached over the review of this  
 22 mountain of material that's been thrown at you that you  
 23 can understand how it came about that it was the GMP  
 24 CTSA who was the primary CTSA working with the arena?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: I have seen the email chain within BTP where

1 the reasoning for GMP taking that role was discussed.  
 2 I think that the reality could potentially be that BTP  
 3 have a very small number of CTSA's who cover the whole of  
 4 the country and potentially, rather than waiting for  
 5 I don't know how long it would take for BTP to get round  
 6 to a Manchester station, and potentially the arena, that  
 7 GMP have stepped in to fill that gap. I don't have any  
 8 evidence to say that, but I think that because it was  
 9 a large venue within Greater Manchester, GMP probably  
 10 volunteered to take that responsibility.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, not to go over old ground a bit.  
 12 The position is there's no problem with GMP doing it,  
 13 but there needs to be some liaison with the CTSA from  
 14 BTP to make sure they're doing something, giving advice,  
 15 which covers the whole of the site rather than simply  
 16 taking the arena on its own?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry to cut through that.  
 19 MR ATKINSON: Not at all, very helpful.  
 20 Staying with the CTSA and how they operated at the  
 21 arena, does it come to this, that there are several  
 22 stages to the approach of a CTSA in terms of the job  
 23 that they do in terms of identifying the vulnerabilities  
 24 of a site, going through the PSIA scoring system with  
 25 a site and then producing an action plan at the end of

1 it? But it is the whole process that is the important  
 2 thing rather than looking at one particular aspect of  
 3 it, such as the PSIA scoring on its own?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. It was designed as an (inaudible:  
 5 distorted) process from initial survey, through PSIA  
 6 scoring, through to the action plan.  
 7 Q. The effectiveness of the programme first, of course,  
 8 depends on a site agreeing to engage in it at all  
 9 because it is, as things stand, a voluntary process?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 11 Q. And you agree with others that it should not be an  
 12 opt-in, it ought to be required of certainly large  
 13 venues?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I do.  
 15 Q. But it also depends on a proper understanding by the  
 16 site as to what the CTSA is there to do and what they  
 17 need from the site to do it?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. And also for the venue to understand what the CTSA is  
 20 not doing in the job that they're there for?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 22 Q. Would you agree that on the face of the evidence that  
 23 we've heard, and it is a matter of course for the chair,  
 24 there does not appear to have been a clear understanding  
 25 by the venue as to what the CTSA was there for and what

1 they were not there for?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would agree there was a lack of clarity  
 3 about the exact role.  
 4 Q. In terms of the end product, the action plan, did that  
 5 have to be limited in the way that the PSIA scoring was  
 6 limited to a focus on the venue itself?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: The action plan was designed to answer issues  
 8 within the PSIA scoring, to address the vulnerabilities  
 9 addressed in that. There could be the potential,  
 10 I suppose, if an issue was identified which didn't fall  
 11 within the PSIA, that that action could have been added  
 12 to the action plan, although it wasn't designed to go  
 13 that way. The action plan really was the driving force  
 14 within the organisation for CT improvement once the PSIA  
 15 process had been concluded.  
 16 Q. So although going through the spreadsheet of a PSIA  
 17 scoring would not have required, other than in specific  
 18 areas like CCTV examination outside the venue, the CTSA  
 19 in his dealings with the venue could look beyond its  
 20 doors, couldn't he or she?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: I wouldn't agree entirely with the fact it  
 22 doesn't look externally because things like hostile  
 23 vehicle mitigation would impact if a vehicle was placed  
 24 right next to a wall and that was subsequently detonated  
 25 causing death in the premises. So there was an aspect

1 of external environment as well, but the focus for the  
 2 PSIA was about the safety of people within an actual  
 3 venue.  
 4 Q. But the advice being given to a venue by a CTSA did not  
 5 have to stop at its doors, did it?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: No, I don't think so. Before PSIA came in, the  
 7 CTSAs could go and visit a venue and they'd give advice  
 8 if the venue asked. So there might have been too much  
 9 of a focus, I think, on PSIA at times because it gave  
 10 a structured and measured approach in relation to what  
 11 the mitigation measures could have been. But that's not  
 12 to stop a CTSA, if the venue identified another issue,  
 13 in looking at that.  
 14 Q. Is that a problem of communication, that for a venue to  
 15 not understand what the PSIA score did or did not mean?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: I think the guidance document that was  
 17 initially issued to the site should have been perfectly  
 18 clear in what the PSIA did and didn't do. Probably the  
 19 other bit around that is the interaction between the  
 20 CTSA and the site to clarify where the roles were and  
 21 what was involved.  
 22 Q. Again, the fact that in emails there were comments about  
 23 the score being high compared to other venues and  
 24 matters of that sort, suggests, it is a matter for the  
 25 chair, a misunderstanding of what the purpose of this

1 was and what its consequences were?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, a complete misunderstanding because no two  
 3 venues are the same and you cannot use a PSIA score as  
 4 a comparison against another venue.  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: But the PSIA scores have been come to  
 6 sitting in an office looking at a spreadsheet, whereas  
 7 any operator knows that the operation on the ground is  
 8 on the ground and if you don't go on the ground and look  
 9 at the operation on the ground, you can't understand  
 10 what 4,200 people looks like or whether or not they  
 11 carry bags or that you need all these staff and what are  
 12 they looking for.  
 13 So when you know that the person that you're talking  
 14 to and is giving you a score of whatever the score is,  
 15 when you know that they don't intimately understand your  
 16 operation, you would take less reassurance from a high  
 17 score because this person doesn't know what your  
 18 operation is.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to try and sum up so far  
 20 what I have got from the discussion about CTSAs. And  
 21 there may be problems with the system, at least how it  
 22 was operated at that time in that it needs to be made  
 23 clear to an operator that what a CTSA and the PSIA are  
 24 actually doing is measuring the measures for safety of  
 25 people within the venue. So you would look at the

1 City Room in order to make sure what the prevention is  
 2 of a suicide bomber actually getting into the arena.  
 3 And it needs to be made clear to them, the site, that  
 4 actually they're not covering the risk of a suicide  
 5 bomber being there in the City Room, as happened at the  
 6 arena. Is that right?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's right.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The alternative is that actually the  
 9 scheme is extended so it does cover what is obviously --  
 10 has been demonstrated to be a fairly obvious risk.  
 11 I hear what you say, that the CTSA could, if they felt  
 12 like it, deal with that issue as well, there's nothing  
 13 to stop them, it's actually not on the form, and  
 14 similarly with the action plan, that is covering the  
 15 safety of the people within the venue.  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: There is a section within the PSIA, sir,  
 17 in relation to communication and partnership with  
 18 neighbours. Potentially that could have been  
 19 interpreted for the --  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's not entirely clear, is it?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: For that application, no.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. Okay. So the limitations need to  
 23 be made clear of what it is or, alternatively, the  
 24 scheme needs to be extended to cover more?  
 25 MR ATKINSON: Another potential limitation to it, or

1 difficulty with it, which was perhaps illustrated by  
 2 your review of the scores in relation to searching that  
 3 you did with Mr Greaney yesterday. You were  
 4 identifying, this is what the score is that was given by  
 5 Mr Upham and this is what that score would mean. But we  
 6 know that actually in that particular respect searching  
 7 was not like that, so the score should have been lower.  
 8 Is that in part because the PSIA scoring system isn't  
 9 really looking at event days, it's looking at the venue?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: The PSIA was never designed to look at events  
 11 from its inception, it was designed to look at venues.  
 12 I would say the exercise we did yesterday was based on  
 13 the evidence that we had gained as to what was in place  
 14 that night. During the PSIA process, as we've mentioned  
 15 in our evidence, a lot of it relies on the information  
 16 that's shared between the parties such as SMG and GMP  
 17 and the score is obtained after an agreement between the  
 18 two parties.  
 19 Now, because every event is different, that's one of  
 20 the numerous reasons why you'd never use a PSIA for an  
 21 event. Every event would have a different profile, so  
 22 you might find that if it was a high-risk event there  
 23 could be X-ray. So what the CTSA is doing is he's in  
 24 conjunction with the management at the venue, asking  
 25 them for an opinion on what the correct score should be

1 because, as I say, every event has a different profile ,  
 2 some events may have the use of dogs, some might not  
 3 have, and so he needs to get an understanding from the  
 4 venue as to what their capabilities are.  
 5 Q. And that also requires the venue to be able to answer  
 6 those questions accurately?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 8 Q. Is that another reason why it is necessary for the  
 9 people who are actually doing the security to be a part  
 10 of that conversation if they are not the same people  
 11 as --  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: I would say so. If you're referring to  
 13 ShowSec, yes. I think if there's a close collaboration  
 14 and contract between two organisations that are jointly  
 15 involved in the safety of the people within the site ,  
 16 then my view might go against other people's, but my  
 17 personal view is that ShowSec should have been involved  
 18 in that whole PSIA process with the permission and  
 19 agreement of SMG.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Whose responsibility was it to get  
 21 ShowSec involved in this? Should the CTSA, who probably  
 22 knew or could at least ask whether they hired security  
 23 in, say, "It would be sensible for you to get your  
 24 security people in here with us", or is it simply the  
 25 responsibility of SMG?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: I think it's both, sir.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I can understand that.  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: I might just add that there might be  
 4 conversations the venue is going to want to have with  
 5 the CTSA which they won't want the provider to hear  
 6 because they might talk about the provider not being  
 7 very good or something. What the client should do is  
 8 introduce the CTSA to the security provider, so that  
 9 they can talk about things that are mutually of  
 10 interest .  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: To give an example, and I agree with  
 12 Colonel Latham, it might be deemed that SMG didn't want  
 13 ShowSec for the full PSIA process, which would be fine,  
 14 but if it's an area within the action plan that was  
 15 about a greater understanding of hostile reconnaissance  
 16 and application at the time then that is obviously very  
 17 relevant to ShowSec because it's their staff that are on  
 18 the ground at the events.  
 19 So you could very easily have ShowSec in for certain  
 20 parts of the PSIA and, if it was felt not relevant, not  
 21 have them for these parts.  
 22 Q. So in terms of looking at ways the scheme can be  
 23 improved, involvement to an appropriate extent of the  
 24 security practitioners as well as the venue, where they  
 25 are different , would be an improvement. Ensuring that

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1 there can be no ambiguity as to what the CTSA process is  
 2 there for would be an improvement?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 4 Q. And potentially looking beyond the confines of the venue  
 5 more could be an improvement?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Actually attending events, or some  
 8 events, just to see how it goes on the ground?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think that's highly relevant. I know  
 10 some forces do, some don't. There's no mandated part of  
 11 PSIA that says that you should do, but I think what it  
 12 does is give a greater appreciation of potential  
 13 vulnerabilities .  
 14 As an example, an extremely large site I engage  
 15 with, Glasgow, had very good physical security measures  
 16 in relation to a certain aspect of attack and these were  
 17 as good as you would get. A colleague and myself  
 18 attended there just to look at an operation. It was  
 19 a concert that was taking place at the venue. When we  
 20 looked at the egress that particular countermeasure was  
 21 not being used because of the whole issue of getting  
 22 a lot of people out of the venue very quickly, and after  
 23 a simple conversation with the security manager, the  
 24 problem was resolved in minutes.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: It would also allow the CTSA to build up

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1 a body of knowledge of how different venues run and  
 2 therefore allow that CTSA to advise and share on best  
 3 practice .  
 4 Q. Further potential improvement. You've identified at the  
 5 beginning of your answers to me, doctor, the  
 6 difficulties that this site posed in terms of  
 7 understanding who was responsible, but the difficulties  
 8 posed by grey areas, are they not an area where, in  
 9 particular , a venue ought to have as much help  
 10 unravelling that as it can?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I think if the grey areas were identified as  
 12 being grey areas. Another example could be if a site  
 13 was planning to put in hostile vehicle mitigation and  
 14 there was an area that had multi-ownership, it could be  
 15 the council for the pavements, that building may be  
 16 owned by somebody else, so I think as long as you  
 17 identify at the start that that -- we use the  
 18 terminology grey area here, but just an area of  
 19 conflicting areas that needs to get explored further .  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: There is a document produced called the  
 21 Green Guide by the Sports Ground Safety Association,  
 22 I think it's a 2018 issue, that includes quite a lot of  
 23 work on grey spaces which they call area X. So anybody  
 24 working with this work would want to look at what SGSA  
 25 has said about area X.

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1 Q. Finally, so far as the police aspects of this is  
 2 concerned, and this is something certainly that you,  
 3 colonel, have touched on when you were here back in  
 4 October. I wonder if we could have, Mr Lopez,  
 5 {INQ012033/14}.

6 This is part of ShowSec's operation plan and it's  
 7 a section that deals with police liaison and in part  
 8 this is as a way of dealing with the topic of the  
 9 importance of not just having your liaison with the  
 10 police at a general planning level but at an  
 11 on—the—ground on—the—day level.

12 Do you agree that there ought to be a memorandum of  
 13 understanding of some kind between venue security people  
 14 at the venue and the police so that everybody knows  
 15 who's doing what?

16 COLONEL LATHAM: I think that's very useful. It doesn't  
 17 need to be an MoU. I mentioned an MoU earlier and that  
 18 was for when you hand the venue over to the police:  
 19 right, you are now in charge, it is all out of our  
 20 hands, please sign here, you're in charge. What you do  
 21 need to have is a formalised understanding so you know  
 22 who's going to be responsible for what on a dark day and  
 23 on an event day, and you need to have regular contact  
 24 with each other. Simply the police coming to your  
 25 control room when they book on shift, pick up one of

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1 your radios, have a chat with your people in the control  
 2 room, what's happening today, and getting to know each  
 3 other over the course of many weeks is very helpful. If  
 4 they're on your radio net, you get to know what they're  
 5 interested in and how quickly they respond and all of  
 6 that. Does that answer your question?

7 Q. Presumably if that's working properly at a venue such as  
 8 this, where there was an allocation of BTP officers that  
 9 could have been in the City Room at egress, if there was  
 10 a problem with that happening because they'd been called  
 11 away, then the security company would have known that  
 12 they were not going to have a police presence and could  
 13 have done something about it?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

15 Q. And equally, have identified in advance where they would  
 16 like the police to be to help with their safety plan?

17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and indeed the mezzanine would be an  
 18 obvious place that I would expect SMG to say, it might  
 19 be handy if you could have someone on the mezzanine so  
 20 that they're visible to us and to the public during  
 21 ingress and egress.

22 Q. Have you seen evidence of that kind of common sense  
 23 discussion going on?

24 COLONEL LATHAM: I have not seen evidence of that.

25 Q. Moving on again, the relationship between SMG and

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1 ShowSec we have considered, as you'll have seen from the  
 2 evidence, at great length. I will try not to take it at  
 3 great length now. But in terms of the contract between  
 4 them, the ultimate say on security arrangements was with  
 5 SMG, was it not?

6 COLONEL LATHAM: That's clearly in evidence.

7 Q. And that involved a responsibility on their part to make  
 8 sure that the people they had given the job to were  
 9 doing it?

10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

11 Q. And so under the contract there are requirements that  
 12 ShowSec staff be trained. There was the opportunity for  
 13 SMG to see what their training was.

14 COLONEL LATHAM: I would expect a well-written contract to  
 15 include the level of training required and how the  
 16 client would know that that was being delivered.

17 DR BaMAUNG: I believe that James Allen actually undertook  
 18 the ShowSec CT course. That's part of the evidence: we  
 19 got screenshots of all the sections.

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Hang on a minute. Are you saying that  
 21 if you have a security contract which has a number of  
 22 requirements in it as to the sort of people that are  
 23 doing it and that are contracted to do it and the  
 24 training that they're doing it, you as SMG should be  
 25 actually checking up to make sure that all their people

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1 are actually doing that training?

2 COLONEL LATHAM: No, I'm not saying that, sir.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I thought that might be what was being  
 4 suggested.

5 COLONEL LATHAM: I think those things that you describe  
 6 should be in the contract as the guy who owns — as the  
 7 client, I'm expecting that to be done. I'm not going to  
 8 pay it any attention until I start to think things are  
 9 going wrong and then we're going to say hey —

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So if you have suspicions they  
 11 are not being trained sufficiently, then you go and  
 12 check up with your employees?

13 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, that's right. I trust my provider.

14 MR ATKINSON: Or ask to see what their training materials  
 15 are to see if they cover what you need them to have  
 16 covered?

17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

18 Q. So it wouldn't be right to suggest that you employ  
 19 a company to provide your security and you just leave  
 20 them to it?

21 COLONEL LATHAM: No, not at all. I would work with them  
 22 every day, you sit in the office with them and talk to  
 23 them constantly and bore them to death about everything  
 24 that's on my mind.

25 Q. Does that remain important when your relationship with

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1 that company at that venue is a long one to make sure  
 2 that things have not got stale or misunderstandings  
 3 haven't developed?  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, indeed.  
 5 Q. For example, in relation to pre-egress checks, we know  
 6 that on the face of the relevant checklist, I suggest it  
 7 couldn't have been plainer what it was that SMG had  
 8 envisaged was going to happen. It's equally clear from  
 9 the evidence you'll have heard from the ShowSec  
 10 witnesses that they didn't understand it that way and  
 11 that had built up over time that they just did what  
 12 others more senior had done and so on. Isn't that the  
 13 kind of thing that close cooperation is designed to  
 14 prevent?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and this is sometimes why fresh blood  
 16 is good and whenever someone new is built in, show  
 17 someone around your operation. If you have the right  
 18 culture, they say, wouldn't it be better if we went up  
 19 there because that's on obvious place to hide, and you  
 20 suddenly go [clicks fingers], what a good idea, I will  
 21 give you personal praise for that and you can take the  
 22 glory and everybody knows. But always doing it like  
 23 we have always done it always makes me worry.  
 24 Q. One of the areas, is this right, that ultimately SMG had  
 25 the final say on was staffing levels in terms of how

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1 many ShowSec stewards, SIA licence-holders and so on  
 2 there were going to be?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, that's for SMG to decide.  
 4 Q. We have seen, and you will have seen and heard that,  
 5 after the Charlie Hebdo attack in the first part of  
 6 2015, there was a short-lived increase in the number of  
 7 staff required at the arena. At the end of that year,  
 8 when there was the Bataclan and Stade de France attacks,  
 9 no such increase happened. But thereafter, starting in  
 10 March/April 2016, there were a series of reviews of  
 11 staffing levels at the arena on the face of it prompted  
 12 by the minimum wage change.  
 13 That process did involve at least a positional  
 14 analysis which I hope you have seen.  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 16 Q. It's a sensitive document, so I can't put it up on  
 17 screen, as to what the different roles ShowSec were  
 18 providing were and what their counter-terrorism role was  
 19 in relation to each of them, deterrence and so on.  
 20 You have concluded that levels of staffing as at 22 May  
 21 were sub-optimal.  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 23 Q. Is it your view that those earlier terror attacks and  
 24 the raising of the terrorist threat level ought to have  
 25 led to a review based on that rather than on cost?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Not your second point, but I agree with  
 2 your first point. Because it is necessary to look at  
 3 costs, of course, in a business, but when something  
 4 significant happens, it may be a new attack methodology  
 5 or it brings terrorism back up into — at the top of  
 6 one's thoughts, of course a review is appropriate and  
 7 I would expect that to be a multi-agency review where we  
 8 get together and rather than — it may be operationally  
 9 sensitive, so I won't talk about the numbers, but the  
 10 uplift that you talk about in access control was an  
 11 extremely small uplift, in my view, if it was in  
 12 response to terrorism. And even if it was to just  
 13 reassure the public, it was still very small and didn't  
 14 last very long.  
 15 Q. There was clearly a recognition post Charlie Hebdo that  
 16 the public would be reassured and potentially terrorists  
 17 deterred by there being a more obvious staff presence,  
 18 security presence, at the arena.  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: I agree that that's been said in evidence.  
 20 Q. And an obvious staff security presence is something that  
 21 can provide both reassurance and deterrence, is it not?  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 23 Q. And a heightening of the terror risk level is an  
 24 appropriate time to do something about that?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: To review, yes.

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1 Q. With a view to potentially increasing the reassurance  
 2 but also increasing the deterrence?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 4 Q. Clearly you have to assess whether it is going to do  
 5 that or not and where strategically people need to be  
 6 for that to work —  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: And it is definitely not all about people.  
 8 There's loads of thing you can do that don't involve  
 9 extra people.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The critical thing is, isn't it, you  
 11 assessed that they didn't have enough people there on  
 12 the night and you've explained why that is and I've  
 13 understood that?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if that's correct, that is a failing.  
 16 But that's really where we're looking at. Are there  
 17 enough security people on that job to provide a proper  
 18 security operation?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: In my opinion, no, sir.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Exactly, right.  
 21 MR ATKINSON: Whilst we have seen umpteen emails dealing  
 22 with reviewing the levels of staff that there should be  
 23 because of the change in the minimum wage, have you seen  
 24 comparable levels of discussion as to the need to change  
 25 the levels because of the change in the terror threat

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1 level?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: No, but I wish to be balanced and fair.  
 3 I recall from Miriam Stone's evidence that she took this  
 4 as an opportunity to review the security aspects of  
 5 those jobs and so although it may have been financially  
 6 driven, I think she saw it as an opportunity to try and,  
 7 if possible, bolster her operation. But my direct  
 8 answer to your question is, no, I have not seen those  
 9 other reviews.  
 10 Q. Or a sustained increase in staffing levels in light of  
 11 the terror threat level?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: I have not seen that because it didn't  
 13 happen.  
 14 Q. An aspect of staffing, clearly, is the number of SIA  
 15 licence holding staff who are more expensive, apart from  
 16 anything else.  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: They are.  
 18 Q. Is it your view, based on the number of SIA staff that  
 19 there were in the City Room at ingress, that a proper --  
 20 sorry, a bag search regime could not have functioned  
 21 with just those SIA staff doing it?  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct. It could not have  
 23 functioned. It couldn't have functioned to any  
 24 acceptable degree of assurance.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if there are two people doing it and

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1 nothing else and there is one supervisor who can help,  
 2 the two people who are actually doing it have to go off  
 3 and do other things from time to time, they don't seem  
 4 to be doing the sort of checks which they're setting out  
 5 to do, so there aren't enough.  
 6 MR ATKINSON: So the only way it did operate at all was by  
 7 using people who weren't meant to be doing it?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: And worse, it gave people reassurance that  
 9 something reasonable was being done when something  
 10 reasonable wasn't being done.  
 11 Q. And there may be a number of explanations for how that  
 12 has come about in terms of whether that was a  
 13 financially beneficial arrangement, whether it was  
 14 because there was a shortage of SIA staff around, which  
 15 was certainly a suggestion from ShowSec's accounts, but  
 16 whatever the reason for it was, it was an unsatisfactory  
 17 arrangement?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: My evidence is that it was an  
 19 unsatisfactory arrangement, the motivations for that is  
 20 not something which I have the expertise to comment  
 21 upon.  
 22 Q. I understand. And one that appeared to have been going  
 23 on for some time?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: It appears so, but I haven't seen much  
 25 evidence of that. It wouldn't be hard to find the

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1 evidence.  
 2 Q. Turning then, if I may, to the assessment of risk, and  
 3 I can do this, I think, quite shortly because you've  
 4 dealt with it and I know the chair has the points.  
 5 There needed to have been a comprehensive risk  
 6 assessment, both for the venue and for events at the  
 7 venue, that fully addressed potential methodologies by  
 8 which a terrorist attack could happen?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: And other bad things.  
 10 Q. So far as terrorism is concerned, the CTSA had  
 11 identified six methodologies to SMG --  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 13 Q. -- in his dealings with them? Their risk assessment did  
 14 not take account of all six?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 16 Q. It also was a document, as far as one can see from the  
 17 evidence, that had been prepared by SMG without  
 18 collaboration with their security company, ShowSec?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 20 Q. I think it's right to say that the document on its face  
 21 suggests that there had been collaboration but the  
 22 evidence from the witnesses we've heard would suggest  
 23 otherwise.  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, that's correct.  
 25 Q. I think the document on its face also suggests that

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1 there had been experts involved in the creation of the  
 2 risk assessment and contingency planning. Have you seen  
 3 any evidence of there having been such experts if they  
 4 weren't the CTSA and/or ShowSec?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: No, we've commented on this articulately in  
 6 our final report and the opening paragraph you're  
 7 talking about does not, to me, describe how that  
 8 document has been constructed.  
 9 Q. So you clearly agree with --  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: I agree with that point.  
 11 Q. It's not fit for purpose and it is on its face slightly  
 12 misleading how it came about?  
 13 COLONEL LATHAM: It is not fit for purpose.  
 14 Q. In relation to other risk assessment by SMG that dealt  
 15 with events, that didn't deal with the risk from  
 16 terrorism either?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: No, the event risk assessment didn't deal  
 18 with counter-terrorism, but in the other respects it's  
 19 a worthy document because you do need to do what that  
 20 document does; it just doesn't consider terrorism.  
 21 Q. Again, it doesn't appear to have been a document that  
 22 was the result of collaboration between the venue and  
 23 its security provider?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.  
 25 Q. So far as ShowSec's documents are concerned, we

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1 considered those with those who have been responsible  
 2 for them. The ShowSec event risk assessment we now  
 3 understand to be a document designed to identify who the  
 4 head of security for an event should be, which is the  
 5 document that lists a whole series of the events that  
 6 were due to be happening and in relation to  
 7 Ariana Grande it identifies that as a low-risk event.

8 Does it come to this, that that was not a risk  
 9 assessment dealing with terrorism because it was looking  
 10 at the risk from the crowd, not the risk to the crowd?

11 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

12 Q. It was that level of risk that was identified to  
 13 supervisors on their briefing sheets. At the top of the  
 14 briefing sheet there is a box which says "low risk". In  
 15 fact it was a typing error on that particular one but  
 16 the point remains. In fact was that assessment of risk  
 17 of any help to a supervisor in terms of properly  
 18 protecting the crowd at all?

19 COLONEL LATHAM: No. I think we've said in our final report  
 20 it risks being a hindrance because in fact the UK threat  
 21 level was severe, and on the piece of paper that said  
 22 low, without explaining what low meant, and I have  
 23 observed that that had the potential to cause confusion.

24 Q. The other document that assessed it as low, of course,  
 25 was the new ShowSec risk assessment document that

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1 assessed -- that did talk about terrorism but assessed  
 2 it as low. Again, staff focused, not safety of crowd  
 3 focused?

4 COLONEL LATHAM: That is what they've said, yes.

5 Q. So your assessment is overall that there had been no  
 6 real risk assessment for the safety of the crowd from an  
 7 external threat at all?

8 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct. So none at all. There had  
 9 been no effective risk assessment that appropriately  
 10 addressed the risks to the crowd.

11 Q. Does that create a very real difficulty, both for the  
 12 venue and for its security provider, in mitigating the  
 13 risk?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: Absolutely it does because it is the  
 15 starting point of your process, which leads you towards  
 16 risk mitigation and to developing an operational plan.  
 17 If you don't have or you have a flawed risk assessment,  
 18 what follows will be flawed.

19 Q. Again, nothing suggesting that this was new so far as  
 20 a problem on 22 May 2017, this appeared to have been the  
 21 situation for some time before that?

22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, it does. I couldn't say exactly how  
 23 long, although that will be available in evidence, but  
 24 it does appear to have been the case for a very long  
 25 period of time.

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1 Q. And another aspect of that problem is that risk  
 2 assessment really ought to have been being re-done much  
 3 more often than it appears it was being done?

4 COLONEL LATHAM: To keep up with the ever-evolving threat.

5 Q. Turning to mitigations for the risk from terrorism, one  
 6 of those that certainly had been raised with SMG was  
 7 moving its perimeter, extending the perimeter. This is  
 8 something that you talked to us about when you were with  
 9 us in October not least because of your experience  
 10 at the O2 and the idea of stand-off. Clearly, there  
 11 will be some venues that it is more easy to extend the  
 12 perimeter of than others. The conference that SMG were  
 13 present at in 2016 where there was the Accor Hotels  
 14 presentation appears to have led to some thought being  
 15 given to that and a decision being made at the time that  
 16 it was not going to work.

17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

18 Q. Effectively, it was put in the too difficult box from  
 19 their point of view.

20 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't agree with that sentiment about the  
 21 too difficult box. Just to note, I did not agree with  
 22 that.

23 Q. Can you --

24 COLONEL LATHAM: Because there was no evidence that that  
 25 phrase is appropriate to what they did.

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1 Q. Certainly --

2 COLONEL LATHAM: They did not persist with it having  
 3 discussed it.

4 Q. We know that there were difficulties which they did have  
 5 to overcome post the attack in terms of dealings with  
 6 their neighbours and what have you before it was  
 7 possible to make it happen. But is the reality that if  
 8 a decision was taken at that stage that it couldn't  
 9 work, that firstly they ought to have investigated with  
 10 expert help whether it could be made to work or not  
 11 rather than effectively assessing it in-house for  
 12 themselves?

13 COLONEL LATHAM: The thing with -- it comes from risk  
 14 assessment. When one looks at, what's the asset that  
 15 I'm trying to protect, there's lots of assets. One of  
 16 them is the crowd. Of all of the threats I am trying to  
 17 protect them against, two of those threats, a marauding  
 18 terrorist attack and PBIED. Therefore, how do  
 19 I mitigate that threat against the crowd? It means that  
 20 I have got to prevent mass casualty weapons interacting  
 21 with that crowd. How can I do that? Well, before they  
 22 become a crowd, do something that stops mass casualty  
 23 weapons getting to the crowd. That is what would lead  
 24 you to conclude before the crowd forms really densely,  
 25 I need to have put them through something which excludes

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1 really big threat items. And that would lead you to  
 2 conclude, is it possible to do that by pushing my  
 3 perimeter out? With lots of layers of security so at  
 4 some stage you come through a layer of security which  
 5 excludes really big threat items. Then the crowd inside  
 6 are slightly cleaner and then another layer perhaps  
 7 which still excludes big mass casualty weapons and then  
 8 it's cleaner still inside. That's the theory behind it  
 9 and that's what was not implemented and didn't flow from  
 10 their risk assessment.

11 Q. This having been raised with them as an approach and one  
 12 that they could see was going to be difficult at their  
 13 site, was that a stage where they really did need to get  
 14 help to work that through, whether it be engaging with  
 15 their CTSA or engaging with independent security  
 16 consultants to understand whether it was something that  
 17 could be made to work and, if not, what they had to do  
 18 instead?

19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. So had they spotted that on their  
 20 risk assessment, identified the asset, identified the  
 21 threat, looked for mitigation, realised they had to have  
 22 mitigation, then they would have gone to the CTSA and  
 23 perhaps he would have said, it's beyond my expertise,  
 24 and then I would expect they would have gone to external  
 25 professional advice through the Security Institute or

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1 whichever route they may have chosen.

2 Q. Because does it come to this? If right or wrong they  
 3 had concluded in 2016 that they couldn't extend their  
 4 perimeter, did that impose on them a responsibility to  
 5 do something else instead that would give the same level  
 6 of protection to the people that were coming to their  
 7 venue?

8 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, because they were responsible for the  
 9 safety and security of the people in the City Room.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's just be practical for a moment.  
 11 I understand going to an expert. This may be my  
 12 misunderstanding, but I actually thought on the last  
 13 occasion when you gave evidence you said that you  
 14 wouldn't criticise SMG for not putting back the  
 15 perimeter because it wasn't what was being done  
 16 generally in the trade at that time. I may have  
 17 misunderstood and I am afraid I didn't review it before  
 18 you gave evidence.

19 COLONEL LATHAM: No, sir, what I think I said — we received  
 20 criticism that we had said they should have pushed back  
 21 their perimeter by the concert and that is not what we  
 22 wrote in our report. What we wrote in our report was if  
 23 they wanted to deliver a high degree of assurance that  
 24 mass casualty weapons weren't getting into the crowd,  
 25 they would have needed a different security operation.

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1 I haven't designed that for them and can't design it  
 2 for them, I haven't done a survey of the arena and  
 3 I don't understand their operation.

4 So where they might put their perimeter is something  
 5 for SMG to discuss with whoever their advisers are. And  
 6 I was not saying that they should have pushed their  
 7 perimeter back because I am not qualified to say that  
 8 because I haven't done a survey of the arena. What  
 9 I have consistently said is they needed a different  
 10 security operation because the one they had in place did  
 11 not give assurance that mass casualty weapons couldn't  
 12 go into the crowd.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, I understand now.  
 14 Let's deal with the practical effect. If you can't  
 15 push the perimeter back, let's just assume that to be  
 16 the position, then, this is on a very simplistic level,  
 17 what is required, presumably, would be more regular  
 18 patrols?

19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, behavioural detection.

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, patrols to make sure there's  
 21 no one like Salman Abedi sitting around with a rucksack  
 22 on his back. More patrols to look out for people doing  
 23 hostile reconnaissance —

24 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: — or for people who don't fit in.

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Patrols who are SIA-qualified, more of  
 3 that, much better CCTV, which has no blind spots, with  
 4 somebody watching all the time.

5 COLONEL LATHAM: And better deterrent communication.

6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: One of your particular things. I'm not  
 7 criticising you for that, but okay, that as well.

8 It is conceivable, I don't know, because I'm not  
 9 a security expert, that that sort of thing might have  
 10 given the required amount of assurance. But what you're  
 11 actually saying is that, post-Bataclan for sure, when  
 12 they thought about it they needed to do one or the  
 13 other?

14 COLONEL LATHAM: They needed to review their risk assessment  
 15 and mitigate the risk.

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it wasn't enough just to think about  
 17 perimeters because if that didn't work, you needed to do  
 18 something else?

19 COLONEL LATHAM: It's much more than the perimeters, it's  
 20 layered security and all the other things I've talked  
 21 about. If it wasn't a concert venue, pushing back the  
 22 perimeter may be entirely irrelevant. It's: do your  
 23 risk assessment, understand your risks, mitigate them,  
 24 and only mitigate them as far as is reasonably  
 25 proportionate. And we will come on to that, I know,

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1 later on.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, we might do.  
 3 I have this real problem: proportionate to what?  
 4 The cost or the casualties? Or both?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't know whether we want to touch on  
 6 this now or whether we're going to do this later.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Perhaps it's a more fundamental problem  
 8 we need to look at. But someone will need to explain to  
 9 me when they say proportionate, proportionate to what and  
 10 in what degrees? Anyway, hopefully that's --  
 11 I understand the point you're making.  
 12 MR ATKINSON: Can I just check, because timings are perhaps  
 13 not entirely as they had been on paper, as to when  
 14 we are breaking for lunch?  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How much longer do you think you're  
 16 going to be? You mustn't eat into Mr Cooper's time.  
 17 MR ATKINSON: I have that very much to my heart, sir, as  
 18 you'd imagine.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Act on it as well as having it in your  
 20 heart, all right?  
 21 MR ATKINSON: No one else will believe me, but I've actually  
 22 made much more progress so far than I thought I was  
 23 going to.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I believe you.  
 25 MR GREANEY: To answer Mr Atkinson's question, the plan,

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1 subject of course to his views, is that we should break  
 2 at 1 o'clock for lunch but take a shorter than usual  
 3 lunch of 45 minutes.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Would that be satisfactory?  
 5 MR ATKINSON: Thank you very much.  
 6 Just looking at the various things you have  
 7 identified, if you weren't going to move your perimeter  
 8 you would need to at least revisit and think, is this  
 9 going to provide the high level of assurance that it  
 10 needs to in terms of protection, clearly one of those  
 11 would have to be your screening of people and their  
 12 belongings because one of the advantages of being able  
 13 to move your perimeter is that you can do that further  
 14 away from your venue, the stand-off point that you have  
 15 made.  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, before the crowd forms.  
 17 Q. If you can't do that, then you do have to make sure that  
 18 not only your screening of people going into the arena  
 19 is effective, but also that your awareness of where the  
 20 crowd is forming and the screening of people in that  
 21 area is also effective, which involves both the  
 22 searching of people and their belongings, but also the  
 23 profiling of the crowd, which is not just the people in  
 24 your queue but the people who are around in the area  
 25 where your queue is?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 2 Q. Because again, if you're moving your perimeter back  
 3 that is something that you'd be able to have more  
 4 control over --  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 6 Q. -- where people were around your queues?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 8 Q. There is, is there not, guidance, for example PAS127,  
 9 that helps venues with the kind of things they need to  
 10 think about in relation to the screening of people and  
 11 their belongings? There's the guidance from NaCTSO  
 12 in relation to hostile reconnaissance and hostile  
 13 behaviour. That again is designed to help venues with  
 14 that.  
 15 There were, were there not, significant failures in  
 16 both respects, both in relation to the searching  
 17 arrangements and the profiling arrangements in the  
 18 City Room as the front door, effectively, of the arena?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: There were on the night, yes.  
 20 Q. And insofar as performance on the night is indicative of  
 21 performance, there were failings that that was but an  
 22 example of?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: My summary of evidence is about what  
 24 happened on the night and I have not examined previous  
 25 nights in detail and I'll confine my comments on the

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1 night.  
 2 Q. Very good.  
 3 In terms of looking at people coming to your venue  
 4 and whether they're there to see Ariana Grande or for  
 5 a very different purpose, clearly the fact that people  
 6 have a legitimate right to be in that area makes that  
 7 more difficult. There's a grey space with people going  
 8 to the go-karts, people going to the car park, and  
 9 people coming and going to the station makes that more  
 10 difficult?  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: My examination of the licence, which has  
 12 been provided now to people, which may be wrong, seems  
 13 to -- my analysis seems to me that actually SMG did have  
 14 the ability to eject people from the City Room but no  
 15 lawyer's told me I'm right on that, so maybe we should  
 16 move on and someone will bring it up with me later.  
 17 But to go back to your point about, yes, there will  
 18 be members of the public in the City Room, but you can  
 19 still interact with them. I can walk up to any member  
 20 of the public outside of this courtroom and say, "Hello,  
 21 sir, you look like you need some help, are you okay?"  
 22 and if I don't like the answer I can call the police and  
 23 say, "I think I've seen somebody that I don't like the  
 24 look of". You can do that anywhere and security staff  
 25 do do it on land that they don't own all the time.

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1 Q. Going back to questions you were asked earlier, I think  
 2 by the chair, in relation to -- and this is just as an  
 3 example, so Messrs Lawler and Atkinson standing out on  
 4 the bridge when Abedi went past with his rucksack. He  
 5 could have been someone who had just got off a train on  
 6 his way home?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 8 Q. But he was walking across the bridge to their venue at  
 9 a time when the venue was having an event and when there  
 10 were people, that were their responsibility as part of  
 11 the security arrangement, there that they were meant to  
 12 be protecting. So shouldn't the presumption be that  
 13 you will speak to people with large bags to check what  
 14 they're doing rather than risk them doing something bad?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: I would like to think that you would  
 16 educate the public.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I think the answer could be yes  
 18 or no, before you go on to any further explanation.  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you would direct your staff, when you  
 21 were working the O2: if you see a person near the  
 22 station coming in our direction with a big bag on, go  
 23 and speak to them and ask what they're doing?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and I wouldn't accept it if they  
 25 didn't.

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1 MR ATKINSON: There is a difference between someone walking  
 2 across the concourse who may be going nowhere near your  
 3 venue, other than obviously the station is next door,  
 4 and someone who is up on the bridge that is leading to  
 5 your front door.  
 6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 7 Q. Once they're on the bridge, and they have a big bag, you  
 8 need to know what they are there for, don't you?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and it's good to educate the public so  
 10 they expect that that is going to happen to them and  
 11 then they find that out on hostile recce, et cetera.  
 12 Q. And there was nothing to stop that happening, was there?  
 13 COLONEL LATHAM: No. You might get some grumpy members of  
 14 the public, but that's all.  
 15 Q. None of these things can be 100% as a guarantee of  
 16 protection, but an awareness that that kind of thing  
 17 would happen, that people coming in across the bridge  
 18 with luggage were being questioned would be the kind of  
 19 thing that someone carrying out hostile reconnaissance  
 20 might notice?  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 22 Q. Clearly, people were entitled to sit down in the  
 23 City Room?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 25 Q. They didn't have to have tickets for a venue to do that?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: No.  
 2 Q. But people hanging around in the City Room may be there  
 3 for perfectly innocent purposes --  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: They would attract attention.  
 5 Q. And the various factors that you identified that made  
 6 Abedi suspicious were all things that a proper hostile  
 7 reconnaissance awareness of suspicious behaviour type  
 8 training course ought to identify?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 10 Q. And they identify not that someone is a terrorist but  
 11 they need looking at?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, they are curious, have a look at them,  
 13 have a talk to them.  
 14 Q. And there was nothing to stop that happening either?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: No.  
 16 Q. If people had been properly trained to do it?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 18 Q. But they hadn't been, had they?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: Not in my opinion.  
 20 Q. That needed to happen as a mitigation for the risk if  
 21 you couldn't control your perimeter further away from  
 22 your front door?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: That's one of the mitigations that you  
 24 should have used.  
 25 Q. Another is clearly the proper use of CCTV?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 2 Q. In relation to training for that, and to answer the  
 3 question from the chair, {INQ008043/1}, please.  
 4 This is the specification for the SIA course  
 5 relating to CCTV. If we could go to {INQ008043/9},  
 6 please.  
 7 This clearly deals with aims and objectives rather  
 8 than the detail of what is taught on the course by the  
 9 SIA. I'm not going to ask you to attempt to tell us the  
 10 details of the SIA training course, colonel. We can see  
 11 that amongst the things that it covers as its objectives  
 12 are:  
 13 "How to conduct surveillance planning. How to  
 14 interpret body language. Giving clear and accurate  
 15 descriptions."  
 16 That's so that if you see someone, you can  
 17 communicate to others who it is you're talking about,  
 18 presumably:  
 19 "Understanding the reasons for what you're doing and  
 20 the methods. How to detect and follow people."  
 21 So elements of what you were describing that the  
 22 CCTV surveillance needed to do were clearly things that  
 23 were being covered as objectives at least by the SIA  
 24 course that was training CCTV operators?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

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1 Q. Training that, as we understand it, those doing that job  
 2 at the arena did not have?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 4 Q. So as a mitigation, if you couldn't change your  
 5 perimeter, your CCTV really did need to allow you to  
 6 monitor who was coming near your venue?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Proactive monitoring by people who  
 8 understood hostile reconnaissance with a patrol  
 9 response, yes.  
 10 Q. And they needed to be doing that to the exclusion of  
 11 anything else if it was to work?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: 24/7, at least one individual should have  
 13 been doing that, and it's better if you've got two  
 14 because then you can react to an incident and still  
 15 surveil.  
 16 Q. And in a way, with facilities that allowed you to be  
 17 able to see things so that someone did come to your  
 18 attention on a screen rather than it being one of many,  
 19 many screens, quite small on a big screen but a series  
 20 of those in a bank in front of you?  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: The reality of the large complex venue is  
 22 they will have an awful lot of cameras and you have to  
 23 make a decision about which ones you wish to monitor,  
 24 which ones you wish to have -- when I say "monitor"  
 25 I mean look at -- and which ones you want to have and

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1 what size on the screen. There's a whole science behind  
 2 it. But certainly one of the areas that close attention  
 3 would be being paid to would be the City Room and the  
 4 approaches to it.  
 5 Q. That would be particularly important, would it not, at  
 6 times when you were in show mode at the venue and were  
 7 therefore going to have more people that needed  
 8 protecting at your venue?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, because you would be concerned about  
 10 crowd crush and you would be concerned about protecting  
 11 the crowd.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: One of the things which came up, one of  
 13 the reasons for actually looking at the corporate  
 14 ownership of SMG and who dealt with what is because  
 15 there was evidence very early on from SIA that there was  
 16 a complaint relating to the arena that someone who had  
 17 not got the necessary qualification was doing CCTV  
 18 operation. It was looked into by SIA, who came to the  
 19 conclusion that they came under an exemption, which is  
 20 that if you're actually doing CCTV of your own property,  
 21 then you don't need to do the training. We haven't  
 22 really got to the bottom of it, nor are we likely to,  
 23 but the reality may be because of the different  
 24 corporate identities and the fact that it was the  
 25 facilities training part who were actually doing this,

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1 they were not covered by the exemption. Can you see any  
 2 justification for that exemption, ie you don't need the  
 3 training if you're doing surveillance of your own  
 4 premises?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: No, I don't see any logical reason why  
 6 there should be that exemption. If there's a good CCTV  
 7 training package, it would seem sensible to standardise  
 8 that everybody should do it.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And make it compulsory, which is what  
 10 this does?  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and CCTV has proliferated and it  
 12 becoming much more capable and more intrusive because  
 13 you can put computers on it to look at crowd behaviour,  
 14 so as it becomes more technically able there would be  
 15 a stronger reason for that, it could be argued.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I am sorry to rather divert you off but  
 17 that has been the reason for looking at who actually in  
 18 SMG owns what and does what.  
 19 MR ATKINSON: Presumably, if such an exemption does apply,  
 20 it doesn't mean that if you're viewing the CCTV in your  
 21 own venue and there is no value in you having any  
 22 training in what you're doing? You would need to know  
 23 what you're doing on CCTV, whether it's covered by that  
 24 SIA requirement or not.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: Of course. And what's very important

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1 is that you should know what normal looks like, so that  
 2 you can spot abnormal, which is what hostile recce is.  
 3 Q. And a further difficulty at the arena in relation to  
 4 that on event days was this division of responsibility  
 5 between the two control rooms as to who was in fact  
 6 monitoring what?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, but I don't think I need to expand  
 8 given the time constraints.  
 9 Q. The crucial thing is that there needed to be someone  
 10 properly trained, doing it -- at least one person doing  
 11 it all the time, to properly mitigate the risk?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: And directed by a senior controller, yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you like, we'll break there. You are  
 14 getting on well?  
 15 MR ATKINSON: If I'm more than another half hour, I'll be  
 16 disappointed.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So will I. You talk to Mr Cooper.  
 18 You've been an hour and three-quarters so far or getting  
 19 towards that.  
 20 Thank you very much. If it's convenient for  
 21 everyone, we'll have three-quarters of an hour. Is that  
 22 impossible for the families to get over to  
 23 Spinningfields and be back? They were nodding that it  
 24 wasn't difficult. And that applies to you too,  
 25 Mr Cooper?

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1 MR COOPER: Certainly, yes, thank you, sir.  
 2 (1.00 pm)  
 3 (Lunch adjournment)  
 4 (1.45 pm)  
 5 MR ATKINSON: Colonel, I think this is a topic for you.  
 6 In relation to patrols, as you've already agreed with  
 7 the chair, patrols are an essential part of mitigation  
 8 for the risk from terrorism, particularly if you can't  
 9 move your perimeter.  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 11 Q. In terms of the counter—terrorism aspect of that,  
 12 I think there has been a suggestion that what you and  
 13 the doctor have in mind is some kind of patrol that  
 14 needed specialist equipment or specialist outfits or  
 15 something?  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: No.  
 17 Q. Nothing like that?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: People that you are already employing  
 19 walking along, looking out for suspicious people,  
 20 suspicious things, and telling somebody if they see  
 21 them.  
 22 Q. And that ought to be a part of any patrol, should it  
 23 not?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 25 Q. It also has other purposes?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: If they're SIA—qualified and that's their  
 2 primary role then, yes.  
 3 Q. In terms of the Deister patrols, whatever the position  
 4 in relation to those, there would be no logic to there  
 5 being fewer patrols on an event day than on a dark day,  
 6 would there?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: No, that would amount to reducing security  
 8 when you're busier.  
 9 Q. The related topic of egress. You identified when you  
 10 were with us in October that, on any view, egress is  
 11 a moment of considerable vulnerability.  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 13 Q. Because whilst the numbers going in may be doing so over  
 14 a period of time, they'll all be coming out at the same  
 15 time?  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. They will be more densely packed,  
 17 likely.  
 18 Q. That would be, sadly, obvious to someone who had  
 19 a hostile intent?  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 21 Q. And ought to be obvious to anyone who was there to stop  
 22 that happening?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 24 Q. Does it follow that before we come on to pre—egress  
 25 check lists, just as a matter of common sense, if you

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1 identify that a patrol of any kind has as an element of  
 2 it keeping an eye out for suspicious behaviour and  
 3 suspicious people, a pre—egress check inevitably must  
 4 have an element of doing that?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 6 Q. Otherwise whilst you may be checking the route, strictly  
 7 speaking the route that someone will walk from the venue  
 8 on their way home, you are not ensuring that they are  
 9 safe to walk it?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 11 Q. Again, that's obvious, isn't it?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: That's obvious.  
 13 Q. In terms of an understanding of the City Room, clearly  
 14 on the one hand there is the checklist that identifies,  
 15 on what I suggest is an obvious reading, that the  
 16 mezzanine is included in that?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 18 Q. Again, just applying common sense to it, if you look at  
 19 that room and where someone could be with hostile  
 20 intent, then the mezzanine is an obvious place, is it  
 21 not?  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: It's an obvious place, it's an obvious  
 23 place to hide, and you obviously get the best view from  
 24 there, so it's obvious that it should have been  
 25 included.

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1 Q. If you know about the CCTV blind spot, all the more  
 2 reason to check it?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 4 Q. Even if you don't?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Not all the more because you should be  
 6 checking it anyway.  
 7 Q. So if we just consider an example of a pre—egress check  
 8 so far as the City Room is concerned, we're going to see  
 9 a little bit of footage, Mr Lopez, this is INQ1  
 10 followed by an infeasible number of zeros  
 11 {INQ1000000/1}.  
 12 We're going to see Mr Beak, who did the last  
 13 pre—egress check. He's in the dark clothing walking  
 14 across, just about to reach the merchandise stall and  
 15 out of shot.  
 16 In fairness, at the beginning of his pre—egress  
 17 check, he had come out of the concourse into the  
 18 City Room and gone towards the lift that took him down  
 19 the stairs at the end of the room nearest the doors,  
 20 which would have taken him therefore near the other  
 21 staircase up on to the mezzanine. But is that the kind  
 22 of counter—terrorism aware patrol that you are talking  
 23 about, what we have just seen?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: No. I watched all of the evidence intently  
 25 as I was bound to be asked about this. That does not

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1 amount to a CT sweep of the mezzanine. It wasn't quite  
 2 the question you asked me, but that's the evidence  
 3 I would give.  
 4 Q. In terms of a sweep, at the very least you'd need to go  
 5 near to it?  
 6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 7 Q. But realistically, you'd have to go up on to it  
 8 (overspeaking)?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: There are parts of the mezzanine which you  
 10 cannot see unless you are on the mezzanine.  
 11 Q. And the added advantage of doing that is you would then  
 12 have the view from the mezzanine back down on to the  
 13 room, which, as we have heard from some of the witnesses  
 14 who had done it, gave them the best view of the room?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Dominating the high ground, yes.  
 16 Q. And if an approach to pre-egress checks had developed  
 17 where that was not being recognised, does that indicate  
 18 that there was a lack of review of what people were  
 19 doing and why they were doing it?  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Not only a lack of review, I would say  
 21 a lack of leadership and management. I would expect  
 22 junior and senior leaders to be participating at times  
 23 in those patrols, so they learn what they are and how  
 24 they do and what the difficulties are and so they can  
 25 inspire other people to do it properly and share best

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1 practice, but we didn't see that, I am afraid.  
 2 Q. And given that SMG had the responsibility, not least  
 3 under the premises licence, in relation to measures to  
 4 make the premises safe and that room safe, an obligation  
 5 on them, not every day, but on a regular basis to check  
 6 how it was being done to make sure it was doing the job  
 7 they expected it to do?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm not sure I can agree with the word  
 9 obligation, but I could say that there is  
 10 a responsibility to make sure that the work is being  
 11 done properly and that includes sufficient management  
 12 and supervision.  
 13 Q. In relation to supervision, we know, for example, that  
 14 it was the view of the supervisor for that room on that  
 15 day, Mr Middleton, that it was not necessary to involve  
 16 the mezzanine in a pre-egress check based on how he did  
 17 them and how he was told to do them. So it has to go  
 18 higher than that, doesn't it, in terms of an assurance  
 19 to make sure that the whole structure knows what it's  
 20 doing?  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: It certainly and very importantly must go  
 22 higher than that, but it also demonstrates that that  
 23 supervisor or maybe other supervisors doing that role  
 24 weren't living in that culture of: how with can we make  
 25 this better, obviously let's all talk about whether we

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1 should go up on the mezzanine. But your point about  
 2 higher than supervisor is one I agree with.  
 3 Q. Still on the subject of supervision, the point you were  
 4 making in relation to people understanding their roles.  
 5 We understand that people were -- it was indicated to  
 6 people when they arrived at work on a particular day  
 7 where they were going to be when they picked up their  
 8 sheet.  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 10 Q. Do we understand from what you're saying that really  
 11 what should have happened was that at that stage, with  
 12 their sheet, they should also have had a note telling  
 13 them not only where they were going to be but what that  
 14 meant?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. That's good because you can audit --  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we have been there, thank you.  
 17 MR ATKINSON: Moving on then again to training more  
 18 generally. I think, doctor, you can help us in relation  
 19 to the SMG position because I think this is something  
 20 you did deal with. Their participation in external  
 21 training events was extremely good, the provision of  
 22 internal training for those who were doing the job on  
 23 the ground, perhaps less so?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. That's correct.  
 25 Q. I'm not sure which of you can help us. SIA training in

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1 and of itself would equally not be enough, would it?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: No.  
 3 Q. Either because it wouldn't be venue-specific or because  
 4 you may have done your SIA training some time ago and  
 5 things move on?  
 6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. The former is the most important.  
 7 Q. Perhaps the pre-egress check is an illustration of that:  
 8 it's not enough to tell people what they need to do on  
 9 a patrol, they need to be shown: this is where you go  
 10 and so on?  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: And why.  
 12 Q. And why. In relation to the ShowSec counter-terrorism  
 13 training, I think this is you, doctor?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: That's right.  
 15 Q. It is right to say that much that was in the ShowSec  
 16 criticism module was rightly there?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 18 Q. That in terms of criticisms, there are parts of it that  
 19 they could probably have done without, for example  
 20 in relation to what happened on the Tokyo subway or  
 21 in relation to radiological weapons?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 23 Q. There were parts where some of that appeared to have  
 24 come from Wikipedia, I think?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, the Tokyo underground was a direct lift

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1 off Wikipedia.  
 2 Q. There were parts where there was too much text for it  
 3 really to sink in?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. Some of the pages had as much as  
 5 300 words of text. And as a learning medium that's not  
 6 the best way to deliver training. There's a lack of  
 7 interaction if there's continual text with no visual  
 8 back-up.  
 9 Q. Equally, there were parts where, although the text had  
 10 clearly come from the NaCTSO bars and clubs guidance,  
 11 they had taken the bullet points from that but not the  
 12 text that followed the bullets?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 14 Q. It may seem that we're therefore criticising them when  
 15 they put text in and when they don't put text in, but  
 16 isn't the underlying point that an online module on its  
 17 own isn't going to be enough to ensure that people don't  
 18 just read it but they understand it and use it?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: I took note of the evidence from ShowSec  
 20 in relation to the difficulty in numbers in doing other  
 21 than an online -- I think if the online is done  
 22 correctly, it would address a lot of issues. Certainly  
 23 it would need to be reinforced potentially by some sort  
 24 of classroom-based activity as well, or else properly  
 25 structured learning on the job.

1 Q. So interaction is important to make sure it goes in?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 3 Q. And is understood?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 5 Q. And then can be applied?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. To give maybe an example of interactive  
 7 learning, the ACT e-learning module that's distributed,  
 8 anybody can undertake, it's probably an example of what  
 9 I would say online training should be like. You  
 10 actually get the participant to take part in it, if you  
 11 like, from the very start. It's totally interactive,  
 12 a lot of video scenarios and also there's a text  
 13 overlay, so as well as having to read something, if  
 14 somebody doesn't have great reading skills, it's being  
 15 narrated -- well, there's very little text and it's  
 16 being narrated so all of the participants can understand  
 17 the context and what's being sought.  
 18 Q. The two areas of the online module that were videos are  
 19 perhaps also an example of that, that they were  
 20 providing a video which did have useful points in it  
 21 that someone could take away from it, but didn't tell  
 22 them what those points were to make sure they'd got  
 23 them?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. If I could use the example of  
 25 the Operation Fairway video, that was designed many

1 years ago and it was designed as a tool which could  
 2 assist classroom-based learning. As a CTSA, you'd go  
 3 out and either deliver Griffin or some other form of  
 4 training event and they'd use that as a video to give  
 5 examples of things. But being there and doing it in  
 6 a classroom, you can put things into context. For  
 7 example, the Fairway video does contain hostile  
 8 reconnaissance, but it also contains information about  
 9 insider threat and also about an analysis of  
 10 intelligence. So if you were a steward that was or an  
 11 SIA that was working at an event, how do you assimilate  
 12 what the learning is? Because it's based -- the  
 13 scenario is based around a shopping centre being bombed  
 14 and how that could have been prevented by people taking  
 15 the right action. But the main actors are police, it's  
 16 what information could a police constable or a PCSO have  
 17 done, what actions could they have done. The other part  
 18 in relation to insider threat is somebody providing  
 19 false documentation and getting a job where they could  
 20 use a large truck to get explosives to a site.  
 21 So you've got to be able to interpret the learning  
 22 points out of that video and the SIA training is you  
 23 simply click on to a video on the page and the other  
 24 aspect was there was no dedicated, at that time, module  
 25 on hostile reconnaissance. From that you would expect

1 to pick out the right elements of hostile reconnaissance  
 2 in that, and the other part was Eyes Wide Open, which  
 3 was very much about hostile reconnaissance.  
 4 Q. But again, important for the viewer to understand why  
 5 they were viewing it and that that was something that  
 6 they were going to be expected to be doing every day  
 7 whatever position they were in, they would be keeping an  
 8 eye out for hostile reconnaissance, they'd be keeping an  
 9 eye out for suspicious behaviour and, crucially, knowing  
 10 what to do when they saw it?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 12 Q. On that topic, we note that the counter-terrorism  
 13 awareness document that ShowSec produced identified  
 14 there that the appropriate thing to do if you saw  
 15 something was to tell someone else about it. We know  
 16 from a number of the members of staff who gave evidence,  
 17 Mr Couper-Phillips being an example, that his  
 18 understanding, if he saw something suspicious, was  
 19 firstly to go and talk to the person you were suspicious  
 20 of and/or to write it down on your sheet, which are the  
 21 things he thought about doing and the thing that he did.  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 23 Q. That is perhaps an example of slightly having missed the  
 24 point if the point of the training was to report what  
 25 you have seen.

1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. That's where the whole importance of  
 2 reinforcing the online training comes in, be it  
 3 informally through a more senior steward or through some  
 4 proper face-to-face training. That's where it's  
 5 absolutely crucial.  
 6 Q. And we've heard a lot of evidence about what was said at  
 7 briefings on the counter-terrorism theme and how much or  
 8 how little that might have been. But if you're using  
 9 a shorthand to keep an eye out for anything suspicious,  
 10 unless you have the background of what you should be  
 11 looking for and what you should do about it, that won't  
 12 really prepare you for the job?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that would be lost, yes.  
 14 Q. And also what may not prepare you for the job is if you  
 15 get to the end of the training without having really  
 16 understood it, if the test at the end of it, all  
 17 eight questions, doesn't really test your knowledge of  
 18 what you need to know?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. It's quite a difficult balancing act  
 20 because the level of information in the course is pretty  
 21 basic, so some of the questions would be quite basic,  
 22 but other ones -- for example, in the training course,  
 23 there was no question in relation to hostile  
 24 reconnaissance at all, which I would have classed as an  
 25 extremely important part of the CT module.

1 Q. Also important, if you are going to deliver your  
 2 training via the internet rather than a classroom, is  
 3 ensuring that people have done it?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 5 Q. And by that, really done it rather than clicked through  
 6 it?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 8 Q. We have now seen the evidence of a number of people who  
 9 had covered counter-terrorism in a matter of minutes.  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 11 Q. Or I think in one case, in a matter of seconds.  
 12 Clearly, for it to be of any value at all, you need  
 13 to make sure people do it, understand it, and learn from  
 14 it?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. That's important in the way the training  
 16 materials are designed, to encourage people to actually  
 17 undertake the whole training piece rather than simply  
 18 moving on from one slide to the next.  
 19 Q. We know that the premises licence in paragraph 96  
 20 required regular training of staff. Does that underline  
 21 a need for the training on a whole range of topics, but  
 22 counter-terrorism being an important one, to be regular  
 23 rather than a one-off or perhaps with a refresher once?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I think it definitely should be  
 25 regularly, or if not on a regular basis, at least once

1 a year.  
 2 Q. Again, do you see a reference to keeping an eye out for  
 3 things during the course of a briefing as a substitute  
 4 for that or do you think training needs to be more than  
 5 that?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: I think training is more than mentioning it in  
 7 one line of a briefing.  
 8 Q. This, I think, was something that you touched on,  
 9 colonel, that you may be able to help on, in terms of  
 10 the training that is provided and whether people are  
 11 paid to do it or not. My understanding was that you  
 12 weren't necessarily critical of staff not being paid for  
 13 training before they started, particularly if they were  
 14 casual workers, because otherwise you'd be potentially  
 15 paying money for training --  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: I didn't mean to be not critical of that.  
 17 It's my experience, and it's been explained in evidence,  
 18 that that is a business reality for some companies and  
 19 I can understand that they were in that position. But  
 20 I think that I said that it would be better if you could  
 21 train people in a more proper way.  
 22 Q. The important thing is that you -- particularly if they  
 23 are people who you have appointed, you've interviewed  
 24 them, they are going to start working for you and this  
 25 is something they need to do, between you giving them

1 a job and them starting to do the work for you, you need  
 2 to make sure they do the training, otherwise they are no  
 3 good to you and they might be possibly be a risk to  
 4 others?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and also you need to give assurance to  
 6 your client that you are delivering them what they have  
 7 paid you for.  
 8 Q. Isn't a way of doing that paying your staff who you have  
 9 appointed to do their training?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: No, that doesn't give you assurance that  
 11 they've done their training. You need assurance that  
 12 they've done their training and paying them doesn't give  
 13 you assurance that they've done their training.  
 14 Q. But presumably not paying them certainly doesn't give  
 15 you assurance that they have.  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: That's also true.  
 17 Q. Final topic to abate any disappointment at my timings.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We are not disappointed. Still one more  
 19 topic to go, though.  
 20 Q. It is not enough for you to train staff to identify  
 21 things that need reporting, they need to then report  
 22 them, and those that they are reporting to need to learn  
 23 from what they're being told and apply it themselves?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, there's an extra step, in fact. In  
 25 modern language we call it see, check and notify: they

1 have to see the thing, they've got to interact with it,  
 2 is that really suspicious, and if they think it is, they  
 3 must notify.  
 4 Q. And at a venue like the arena that is making it known  
 5 not only to their supervisor, or to whoever it is they  
 6 hand their note to at the end of the day, of the five  
 7 things they've done today, it's making sure the venue  
 8 knows as well so that everybody can consider whether  
 9 there's something they need to do in the light of it?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: That's if they think they've seen something  
 11 that should be escalated to their supervisor, they  
 12 shouldn't be writing it down on a note, they should be  
 13 immediately informing their supervisor and they should  
 14 be able to rely on their supervisor to escalate that to  
 15 event control if the supervisor deems it to be  
 16 necessary.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we have had one good example of that  
 18 with the former police officer which went right to the  
 19 top and, as we were told, was then conveyed to everybody  
 20 else. We have another example when it simply went on  
 21 one of the forms and didn't appear to get through to the  
 22 people who needed to know?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 24 MR ATKINSON: In relation to the first of those, Mr Lavery,  
 25 you made the point in your report that although he drew

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1 people's attention to it at the time, it was not  
 2 reflected in all the logs relating to that evening to  
 3 show that it had been taken on board by all those who  
 4 were listening to the radio and logging?  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 6 Q. I think it was not in the Whiskey Control log or the SMG  
 7 log for that night.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: No.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But the evidence is that it was actually  
 10 conveyed out to other people on the next night.  
 11 MR ATKINSON: I'm not sure that's altogether clear.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think Miriam Stone did say that,  
 13 actually.  
 14 MR ATKINSON: Certainly some of those who were on subsequent  
 15 nights did not recall that being a part of their  
 16 briefing.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be a matter of contention, but  
 18 I think Miriam Stone did say that it was recorded and  
 19 did get —  
 20 MR ATKINSON: I think you're right.  
 21 Clearly, whether or not, and we know not, that the  
 22 person on the 18th at Take That was Mr Abedi, it wasn't,  
 23 but it was someone of a quite similar description to  
 24 Mr Abedi. If someone had been identified carrying out  
 25 hostile reconnaissance, wouldn't be it good practice for

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1 that description to be given to people on the succeeding  
 2 nights as someone they might want to keep an eye out  
 3 for?  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: That's a good way of keeping your briefings  
 5 fresh: well done him, he's done a great job, we have all  
 6 given him praise, try and be like that, you lot.  
 7 Q. If that had been done, that as part of their looking for  
 8 someone suspicious, staff would have been looking for  
 9 someone dressed in black, perhaps overly dressed for the  
 10 time of year, carrying a backpack?  
 11 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 12 Q. Which might have helped them spot someone who fitted  
 13 that description?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: It might have drawn their attention to that  
 15 sort of person, yes.  
 16 Q. And I think you in your — I'm not going to go through  
 17 it all. You identify a series of occasions when similar  
 18 things happened, that something has been notified by  
 19 someone, but it didn't happen to have been recorded in  
 20 all the places you looked for it to show that it had  
 21 been notified to everyone who should have known about  
 22 it?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, and it didn't get into the subsequent  
 24 briefings.  
 25 MR ATKINSON: Gentlemen, I'm very grateful to you both,

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1 thank you very much.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Atkinson.  
 3 Mr Cooper.  
 4 Questions from MR COOPER  
 5 MR COOPER: I would like to ask you a little about  
 6 Martyn's Law. I don't mean to be disrespectful to  
 7 either one of you, I'll direct it there, but no  
 8 disrespect to either of you.  
 9 You are in short, Colonel Latham, and indeed both of  
 10 you, supporters of the concept of Martyn's Law, is that  
 11 right?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: We both are.  
 13 Q. And you had an opportunity of, no doubt on many  
 14 occasions, looking at the document which we'll call up  
 15 now, {INQ036722/1}. Both of you, I presume, have  
 16 carefully read this document and effectively, if I can  
 17 put it inelegantly, sign up to it?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 20 Q. In that case I'm going to take you to a limited number  
 21 of references that you may, with your experience  
 22 combined together, be able to assist.  
 23 Again, my document isn't paginated but it's in the  
 24 introduction, so let's go page by page, if we can,  
 25 Mr Lopez. Under the heading "introduction", the second

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1 paragraph says this — this is {INQ036722/4}:  
 2 "Martyn's Law should therefore be a key part of  
 3 delivering the UK's wider counter—terrorism strategy  
 4 2018, which is CONTEST."  
 5 I will address the question first to you,  
 6 Colonel Latham. Do you agree with that? Would you like  
 7 to develop any reasons as to why you think that's an  
 8 appropriate suggestion?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree with the statement from  
 10 a personal and security expert point of view. I am  
 11 a supporter of CONTEST, which has been developing over  
 12 the years, and it would be good if it wasn't voluntary  
 13 that people had to mitigate reasonably identifiable  
 14 threats.  
 15 Q. Thank you.  
 16 If you wanted to add anything, doctor?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: The fact that CONTEST Protect is in relation to  
 18 protective security and there's no mandatory element to  
 19 that just now I certainly think it would be an advantage  
 20 in putting more of an emphasis on the requirement for  
 21 organisations to actually meet the points that were laid  
 22 out.  
 23 Q. The only other part of the document I want to take you  
 24 to, just to elaborate on a few issues, is the details of  
 25 Martyn's Law. Could we scroll, please? The details of

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1 Martyn's Law. Scroll again, please.  
 2 There we go. {INQ036722/7}. Colonel Latham, I'll  
 3 go through a number of aspects of this section. Looking  
 4 under part 1:  
 5 "A requirement that spaces and places to which the  
 6 public have access engage with freely available  
 7 counter—terrorism advice and training."  
 8 And then if we look a few lines down, five lines  
 9 down:  
 10 "Our proposal is that every venue that hosts any  
 11 event to which the public have access on payment or  
 12 otherwise should have at least 25% of their staff  
 13 CT awareness trained."  
 14 Then there are other references to ACT, which  
 15 I asked Officer D'Orsi about. And can I ask you this:  
 16 do you agree with that proposal, Colonel Latham,  
 17 concerning the 25% element, or do you think it should be  
 18 more or less?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm not going to give you a straightforward  
 20 answer to that because this document covers a vast array  
 21 of venues, some of which I won't even know exist, and  
 22 for some 25% may be onerous and for some it may be far  
 23 below the number they should have. I have enormous  
 24 faith in Nick Aldworth, he will have done the work, but  
 25 I haven't seen the work so I'm not going to give you

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1 a simple yes on that.  
 2 I completely agree with the sentiment they're going  
 3 for. I can't agree with the percentage because  
 4 I haven't done the work.  
 5 Q. That's very fair of you.  
 6 Would you like to add or qualify anything?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I don't think personally 25% would be  
 8 onerous. As we mentioned quite a few times, the ACT  
 9 e—learning takes 45 minutes to complete which you can do  
 10 in your computer in your house. The benefit of  
 11 undertaking that is your knowledge then can be expanded  
 12 outwith the workplace. So if you see a suspicious  
 13 activity in a railway station or a bus station, you can  
 14 apply these concepts. I would hope that far more than  
 15 25% would undertake it.  
 16 Q. Thank you.  
 17 Can I move on then, please, to part 2:  
 18 "A requirement for those places to conduct  
 19 vulnerability assessments of their operating places and  
 20 spaces. Our proposal suggests that every such place  
 21 should undertake a vulnerability assessment of the area  
 22 in which the activity takes place and to which the  
 23 public will have access and/or transit through. Online  
 24 vulnerability assessments are available and some  
 25 insurance providers offer a discount for those

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1 businesses that undertake such assessments and then  
 2 manage any risks that are identified. However, we  
 3 propose also that this is not just the scope or  
 4 responsibility of the private sector and that local  
 5 authorities need to understand the impact of such  
 6 businesses have in the local environment. Local  
 7 authorities benefit from thriving communities and have  
 8 a responsibility to be part of the solution."  
 9 Again, turning to you, Colonel Latham, on that, on  
 10 the play, as it were, of local authorities. Do you have  
 11 any further observations that may be useful for the  
 12 progress of Martyn's Law on the impacts or otherwise  
 13 that local authorities can have?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: I have personal experience of local  
 15 authorities being obstructive in putting in place  
 16 obviously necessary counter—terrorism measures and  
 17 therefore I would support this.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you move away, I'm well  
 19 aware of the need to make this something which is  
 20 cost—effective for everybody to be able to go to and, as  
 21 has already been pointed out by Lucy D'Orsi, you have  
 22 charities who really don't have much money to get these  
 23 things done. But how much use do you think an online  
 24 vulnerability assessment would be, bearing in mind what  
 25 you have said about other vulnerability assessments?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: While Dr BaMaung is thinking about that,  
 2 I might make the point that I may be sitting here  
 3 appearing to be the guy from the O2, I'm the guy from  
 4 Parliament, I'm the guy from Shakespeare's Globe, that's  
 5 a charity, really low budget. I have lived that  
 6 experience in a prioritised target where we didn't have  
 7 any money. So please don't just see me as being the guy  
 8 from the O2. It's better to do things face-to-face as  
 9 we've said. It's probably easy to avoid online, but if  
 10 you have a duty to do it then hopefully we can force  
 11 people to do something.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That sounds like "Something is better  
 13 than nothing" coming back again.  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: No, I think the way Dr BaMaung put it, "Do  
 15 everything you can, do as much as you can", that's  
 16 a good mantra because most places cannot afford to put  
 17 in CPNI vehicle bollards. Shakespeare's Globe, for  
 18 example, is very well protected but some things they  
 19 simply cannot afford because they're a charity.  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: I think the vulnerability assessment will need  
 21 to cater for the vast differences in some sites from one  
 22 that maybe has a dozen people to something the size of  
 23 the arena. Obviously, the advantage the bigger sites  
 24 have is they have access to CTSA's and that advice. If  
 25 you're talking about smaller venues, advice on the

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1 vulnerability assessment would need to be simple, so it  
 2 could be easily understood, because it's difficult if  
 3 you don't have a counter-terrorism background with the  
 4 vast amount of information available to extract the  
 5 right bits to ensure that the vulnerability assessment  
 6 is done right.  
 7 So in answer to your question, I think it can be --  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: (Overspeaking). Do answer Mr Cooper, if  
 9 you prefer. In answer to my question?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Sorry, sir?  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is an online vulnerability assessment  
 12 going to be suitable?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Some sites I would say, yes, if it's really  
 14 small. For larger sites, the process could be a lot  
 15 more complicated.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you do it on size?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: I think size and potential throughput. You  
 18 might have a large site with very little crowd  
 19 throughput, in which case the same points might not  
 20 necessarily be as applicable as --  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, these are obviously all  
 22 things that need to be thought about.  
 23 MR COOPER: Sir, it's your inquiry and whatever obviously  
 24 concerns you is important.  
 25 Colonel Latham, you can't expect me to leave your

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1 other answer without the subsidiary: in what way have  
 2 local authorities obstructive?  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Again, I don't want any local  
 4 authority identified because I am not interested in  
 5 having -- sorry -- allegations being made against them  
 6 which they can't answer. But in general terms.  
 7 MR COOPER: Generic problems, of course.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: So one example, to give you an example to  
 9 illustrate, hostile vehicle mitigation measures,  
 10 particularly some years ago, required significant ground  
 11 works to be done, which can interfere with pipes and be  
 12 very expensive. Someone owns the pipes and someone owns  
 13 the land and the next bit of land and someone else wants  
 14 access across it and the emergency services and it all  
 15 gets terribly complicated. But when there is  
 16 a requirement to protect the crowd because you think  
 17 there's going to be a crowd in this place and you think  
 18 need some bollards to protect them, local authorities  
 19 have the opportunity to be unhelpful with that and  
 20 deprioritise it and not do anything about it or be  
 21 proactive and on the front foot. And I have had an  
 22 experience where they have not been proactive and on the  
 23 front foot.  
 24 Q. Might that be funding issues or policy issues?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: Actually, it's about their responsibility

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1 because if it's public highway, there are examples where  
 2 it's public highway, and they don't have the money, it's  
 3 all too difficult, they're not being forced to do it,  
 4 no one else has done it, so let's just not bother doing  
 5 that, when I can see it's blindingly obvious.  
 6 Q. So it goes to the point that you're both making of the  
 7 mandatory nature of these requirements?  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We just make it clear, this is the  
 10 result of your personal battles with some local  
 11 authorities?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: This is, and I've had a successful battle  
 13 and an as yet unresolved battle, sir.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I'm sure they're listening.  
 15 MR COOPER: Moving swiftly on, part 3:  
 16 "A requirement for those places to have a mitigation  
 17 plan for the risks created by the vulnerabilities."  
 18 I won't read the whole following paragraph, but a  
 19 précis: not every risk requires expensive infrastructure  
 20 to be built, good quality security is often good  
 21 counter-terrorism security.  
 22 And effectively then the paragraph goes into some  
 23 detail:  
 24 "The CT police information-sharing platform will  
 25 again provide a portal to this advice. We are not

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1 proposing an inspection regime to enforce this part of  
 2 Martyn's Law. It is our belief that the requirement to  
 3 have a vulnerability assessment and mitigation plan then  
 4 places the operator of the place or space as the holder  
 5 of any unresolved risks and liable for any consequences  
 6 which may arise."  
 7 Any observations or views, Colonel Latham, that may  
 8 well assist positively with that aspect of Martyn's Law?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: They make a really good point that a lot of  
 10 the things that one can do to deliver really effective  
 11 security do not cost any money at all. Some of it is  
 12 leadership, some of it is motivation. A little bit of  
 13 training, lots of practice and experience changes the  
 14 world, I would say.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, so no inspection regime. Does  
 16 enforcement work without an inspection regime or do we  
 17 wait for a tragedy and then say, you didn't do what you  
 18 were meant to do?  
 19 COLONEL LATHAM: I think we talked about this a bit  
 20 yesterday. There has to be — you can have a punitive  
 21 fining mechanism, but it's too late after the fact. So  
 22 although it might be such a scary finding that the  
 23 regime — that businesses that could afford it would  
 24 say, we probably ought to do that then, but some sort of  
 25 inspection regime would seem to me to be necessary at

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1 some scale because otherwise we just are simply going to  
 2 wait for a bang and then fine the person who's  
 3 responsible.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there's obviously a balance because  
 5 things need to be affordable and achievable, but equally  
 6 we want to make sure they actually work. So these are  
 7 things that need to be thought about.  
 8 MR COOPER: Can I ask this of you: supportive and grateful  
 9 my client is of this, you are, of Martyn's Law, on this  
 10 aspect, are you perhaps saying it should go further  
 11 in relation to inspection?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't feel that I am qualified to answer  
 13 that question with authority.  
 14 MR COOPER: Then I won't press you.  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: I agree with what Colonel Latham said. I don't  
 16 think that good security is necessarily expensive  
 17 security. I think that processes and procedures can be  
 18 just as effective as physical mitigation measures like  
 19 bollards. And I noted that in the very final sentence  
 20 you've said:  
 21 "... and liable for any consequences that might  
 22 arise."  
 23 So obviously that may put a bit of pressure on the  
 24 site if they realise that any failures to do some form  
 25 of activity could leave them liable for prosecution or

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1 civil fines.  
 2 Q. Much perhaps may turn on the level of fine and indeed  
 3 the chair's raised with me, perfectly correctly, fine  
 4 levels and other regimes such and health and safety and  
 5 that sort of thing.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let me take you to — this is probably  
 7 quite wrong to try and construe this like a legal  
 8 document, so forgive me if I appear to be doing it.  
 9 "Good quality security is often good CT security."  
 10 That would seem to imply that you don't need to have  
 11 CT training, you just need security training. Is that  
 12 actually something you'd agree with?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: I think what's maybe meant there is the  
 14 measures. The likes of understanding (overspeaking)  
 15 premises could lead to organised crime or criminals.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's not talking about training, it's  
 17 talking about what you do?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 19 MR COOPER: Part 4 is a requirement for those places to have  
 20 a counter-terrorism plan and the paragraph goes on to  
 21 refer to the principles of guide, shelter, communicate.  
 22 I know both of you will have read the guide, shelter,  
 23 communicate descriptions. In short, Colonel Latham, do  
 24 you agree with that analysis as far as part 4 is  
 25 concerned?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, I do. When we're talking about  
 2 communicate, the best way of communicating to people who  
 3 are panicking is using voice via a public address  
 4 system, I would comment.  
 5 Q. When you say voice, either an authoritative or a calming  
 6 voice, whatever is appropriate?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: A voice, yes.  
 8 Q. The tone of voice or what's being said?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: Calming using your voice over a speaker  
 10 system to tell the public what is happening first, most  
 11 importantly, and then, if you can work it out, what to  
 12 do. But if you tell people there's a bad thing over  
 13 there, they're able to work out, don't go over there, go  
 14 over there instead.  
 15 Q. I tread carefully here because I'm conscious I don't  
 16 want to go into any detail, and this question arises  
 17 from your answer. So let us all tread very carefully.  
 18 We have all heard the footage of this atrocity and  
 19 we have heard the complaint being made from some  
 20 quarters afterwards, post-detonation, of an announcing  
 21 system, a noise, effectively, a repeated voice and  
 22 rather a shrill tone that continually went on  
 23 post-detonation. I'm being terribly careful how  
 24 I describe this. I think you both know what I'm  
 25 referring to here. Some complaint was made in the

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1 statements about it, "Will someone turn that thing off?"  
 2 It is not a question I planned, but it does come  
 3 from the answer you've given. Do either of you have any  
 4 observation on that in terms of -- I know it's not  
 5 technically security, but nonetheless a consequence of  
 6 it?

7 COLONEL LATHAM: I'll give you an answer to that. I have  
 8 studied this area professionally, not so much the  
 9 evidence that you are talking about because some of it  
 10 was not provided to us, and quite properly. The best  
 11 way of communicating to people when a really bad thing  
 12 is happening is by using voice, calmly, from a control  
 13 room. And the most important thing to do is to tell  
 14 them what is happening because humans have evolved to  
 15 react to information like that.

16 The control room probably won't know what to do and  
 17 if they do know what to do, they can provide that  
 18 information as well. There's a whole science on this  
 19 and CPNI have done lots of exercises about it after the  
 20 attack, but having a repeated message looping away,  
 21 interrupting people talking to each other and being  
 22 annoying when it's already distressing enough is not  
 23 a helpful thing to have. If you have to use prerecorded  
 24 messages, it is better to have somebody calm and  
 25 experienced who's already thought about what they're

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1 going to say: something bad is going on, please run away  
 2 to safety.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So a calm tone of voice gets the best  
 4 and most helpful response?

5 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. There is a science behind what to  
 6 say, which I know we don't have time for now.

7 DR BaMAUNG: I may be incorrect, but the automated message,  
 8 was that not a fire alarm automated message when the  
 9 fire alarm was activated by the explosion?

10 MR COOPER: I'll be frank with you, this is not a question  
 11 I planned for, it is simply a recollection --

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's not bother with that. We have had  
 13 Colonel Latham's advice about that and that's what we  
 14 need rather than going back on whether it was right to  
 15 play whatever message it was.

16 MR COOPER: Thank you.

17 Part 5, finally, on the Martyn's Law document:  
 18 "A requirement for local authorities to plan for the  
 19 threat of terrorism."

20 That's a key word, a requirement. Colonel Latham on  
 21 that, a requirement.

22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. There should be a requirement.  
 23 I think they plan for pandemics and I think they should  
 24 be planning for terrorism as well and flooding in  
 25 London.

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1 Q. From your experience, what is the present level, without  
 2 going into detail of course, of authorities' planning  
 3 for counter-terrorism outcomes?

4 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't recall doing any planning with  
 5 local authorities on counter-terrorism.

6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There clearly is because we're going to  
 7 hear about it in later parts of the inquiry. The  
 8 question is, I suppose, at what level it needs to go  
 9 down to, whether we're doing it site by site or area by  
 10 area.

11 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm simply saying I have not participated  
 12 in it and --

13 DR BaMAUNG: I believe there would be multi-agency work at  
 14 Gold group level between the local authorities as  
 15 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act, although  
 16 they're not Cat 1 responders, but it will be strategic.  
 17 At what level or depth, I'm not sure.

18 MR COOPER: Thank you. I will move on from that. Putting  
 19 the document of Martyn's Law to one side, you have heard  
 20 nonetheless of certainly the attitude of Figen Murray  
 21 and those who support Martyn's Law that it is imperative  
 22 that Martyn's Law is brought in to law as soon as  
 23 possible. You have obviously heard the evidence  
 24 in relation to that. You may have heard the evidence of  
 25 Shaun Hipgrave as well.

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree that time is of the essence.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, time is of the essence, we all  
 3 agree with that, and it needs to be brought in quickly  
 4 and that's been the evidence. You can't say what  
 5 considerations government have about it. Clearly,  
 6 pressure should be put on them to get on with it and not  
 7 be put off. But I'm not sure that these two gentlemen  
 8 are actually the experts to say whether the constraints  
 9 on government at the moment are reasonable or not.

10 MR COOPER: I'll be guided by you, sir.

11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think they've heard your voice,  
 12 Mr Cooper, on that.

13 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir, then I will move on. It may  
 14 well be that I can do this quickly.

15 Nick Aldworth, you both clearly respect?

16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

17 Q. And you have had a chance of reading his statement,  
 18 I presume?

19 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

20 Q. Both of you, I presume, and for those that want to call  
 21 it up, and I may call it up now, just in case,  
 22 {INQ039232/1}. Without necessarily putting a number of  
 23 paragraphs to you from his report, Colonel Latham first,  
 24 can we deal with it globally and simply to say you agree  
 25 with everything he says?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: No, no.  
 2 Q. I tried.  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: I would need to go through it line by line.  
 4 I totally agree with the thrust of it. Some of the  
 5 things he talks about are personal things about himself  
 6 which I have no opinion on. That's where I'm coming  
 7 from.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But the general thrust you agree with?  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: I do.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you do as well?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that enough?  
 13 MR COOPER: We got there in the end, sir.  
 14 You heard the evidence as far as "Something is  
 15 better than nothing".  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 17 Q. That strand of evidence that we have heard in the  
 18 inquiry. I think it was you, Colonel Latham, that  
 19 referred to it perhaps being a poor choice of  
 20 terminology, to say the least.  
 21 COLONEL LATHAM: I think it was Dr BaMaung that brought that  
 22 up first.  
 23 Q. A poor choice of terminology?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: I think there's a misinterpretation of the term  
 25 "nothing" between the practitioners and what would be

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1 perceived from members of the public.  
 2 Q. The risk is, isn't it, and I'll try and again be  
 3 succinct with one or two questions, the risk of that  
 4 sort of terminology encourages people who want to  
 5 penny—pinch to feel more emboldened to do so?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: I don't think that was the original purpose.  
 7 Q. I'm sure it wasn't the purpose, I grant that.  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, there could be a potential for that  
 9 perception to be taken by —  
 10 Q. I'm certainly not suggesting for all listening to my  
 11 questions that that was the purpose of it, but it could  
 12 lead to an inclination for those that may be minded to  
 13 penny—pinch to be emboldened to do so in seeing  
 14 something like that?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 16 Q. Colonel Latham, anything you want to add?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: I think we have agreed it could be better  
 18 phrased to, "Do as much as you can", or something  
 19 similar, but the intention was good.  
 20 Q. I want to clarify something that Colonel Latham said  
 21 yesterday and it may be that I misunderstood it. It's  
 22 under the heading of security professionals. Did  
 23 I understand that you were assimilating the size of  
 24 a venue with the qualification of people necessarily  
 25 required to protect it? Did I completely misunderstand

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1 that?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: I think the sense of what I was trying to  
 3 get across was that with very big complicated venues,  
 4 like Wembley Stadium, for example, you would need  
 5 somebody who has a very high level of competence and  
 6 contacts and network to effectively manage that  
 7 operation, whereas if you are a bowling alley, you are  
 8 not going to attract somebody at that level. That's the  
 9 point I was trying to get across.  
 10 Q. I'm glad I have heard the clarification. You certainly  
 11 were not suggesting that people on the ground, who are  
 12 patrolling or otherwise, should be any less qualified at  
 13 a bowling alley?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: In relation to what Colonel Latham was talking  
 15 about potentially it could be for a large complex  
 16 environment that you need to get a blast engineer in, in  
 17 which case you would need to get a specialist in to make  
 18 sure the foundation and the actual building structure  
 19 was robust. I think that —  
 20 COLONEL LATHAM: Also to your point, Mr Cooper, no matter  
 21 the size of your venue, the quality of your security  
 22 staff needs to be good enough to be able to deliver  
 23 their job and whether you are big or small, they still  
 24 need to be good.  
 25 Q. That's the matter I wanted to clarify with you and I'm

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1 grateful for that.  
 2 We had a document given to us yesterday which  
 3 I gather you had a chance of looking at over the lunch  
 4 adjournment. It's {INQ039132/1}, a statement from  
 5 Eric Stuart, chair of the UK Crowd Management  
 6 Association. There's a small number of paragraphs  
 7 I want to put to you from that to see whether you agree  
 8 with what he says. Have you both had an opportunity of  
 9 looking at this document over the luncheon adjournment?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: We're not provided with it over the lunch  
 11 adjournment.  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: No, we have not seen this.  
 13 MR COOPER: Oh. I'd understood you had.  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: That's the document we've seen  
 15 (indicating).  
 16 MR COOPER: That's a statement. It doesn't matter as far as  
 17 I'm concerned because I'm going to put the paragraphs to  
 18 you. Some of the paragraphs are actually repeated  
 19 in the document that you have seen. This is not  
 20 insurmountable. I'd like to take you to paragraph 24,  
 21 please. Before we do so, let me establish, Eric Stuart  
 22 is the chair of the United Kingdom Crowd Management  
 23 Association. That's right, isn't it? He has  
 24 significant experience in the field of crowd security.  
 25 Take that from me to save you reading paragraphs 1 to 7.

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1 That's where it appears.  
 2 Let's go straightaway to paragraph 24 {INQ039312/5}.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's just all read it to ourselves  
 4 perhaps. Take your time.  
 5 MR COOPER: Of course. Just to help people navigate it, it  
 6 concerns grey spaces.  
 7 (Pause)  
 8 Effectively , Colonel Latham, again, you touched upon  
 9 zone X and we have "a last mile" as another  
 10 interpretation here, but we're talking here about what  
 11 the City Room was. The question I have based on this  
 12 paragraph is that would you accept, Colonel Latham, that  
 13 the complexities and the problems of grey spaces have  
 14 been well-known for some time?  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: It has.  
 16 Q. In fact, when we look at this paragraph, and I should  
 17 ask you, do you agree with what's said in paragraph 24?  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If they've just read it, I think it may  
 19 be better to break it down.  
 20 MR COOPER: I'll simply ask you specific questions. My  
 21 questions are really under the topic of how long was the  
 22 problem of grey spaces known and I think you have just  
 23 accepted that the problem of grey spaces is not a new  
 24 problem.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.

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1 Q. In fact, if we look at the tenor of what is written  
 2 here, and indeed if we look at paragraph 26, for  
 3 instance of this same document:  
 4 "The most significant point here is that for at  
 5 least 15 years these matters have remained unresolved  
 6 and, certainly in 2017..."  
 7 So the issue, problems and complexity of grey  
 8 spaces, all the problems we have heard about as far as  
 9 the City Room is concerned are not eureka moments, as it  
 10 were, for SMG and ShowSec, these are problems that have  
 11 existed, these are problems that have perhaps existed  
 12 for 15 years.  
 13 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree with what you have said and  
 14 I would make one observation: they haven't been  
 15 unresolved everywhere. I have examples of where the  
 16 complicated issues of grey space have been resolved. So  
 17 it has not been impossible to resolve them: some people  
 18 have identified them and resolved them.  
 19 Q. Thank you. But would you agree, and this is perfectly  
 20 in harmony with what you've just said, the fact that  
 21 they've been resolved, the problems, complexities and  
 22 the challenges of grey spaces, such as those presented  
 23 in the City Room, on this tragic night in 2017, it seems  
 24 to have been well-known for at least 15 years in the  
 25 community?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, clearly, each grey space is to do  
 3 with its own -- is a matter on its own facts, as it  
 4 were. Some may be difficult to work it all out, it  
 5 depends how many people you have there, what they're  
 6 doing. For other places it may be relatively easy.  
 7 Although of course it's helpful to have a generic term  
 8 for it, nevertheless we need to look at each individual  
 9 space.  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: I think that's correct, sir. I think probably  
 11 a more apt term is complex environments because the term  
 12 grey space might not have been thought of within  
 13 a complex environment, but it was a complex environment.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 15 MR COOPER: The issue, for instance, and I'm specifically  
 16 taking us back to the matter that concerns this inquiry,  
 17 the issue of the City Room as a grey space, it was  
 18 obviously closely connected to the railway station,  
 19 people coming in and going from it that may not all be  
 20 associated with attending at an event at the arena, and  
 21 obviously other interests and stakeholders that are  
 22 connected with that grey space. These are complexities  
 23 which aren't particularly novel, are they, when it comes  
 24 to grey spaces?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: No.

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1 Q. And I'll come to you, doctor -- it's easier to do it one  
 2 by one -- aren't particularly novel and therefore, quite  
 3 rightly, as the chair says, individual matters, but  
 4 generically the problems that the City Room faced as  
 5 a grey space were generic problems that had been known  
 6 in the industry and the community for at least 15 years?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree with that.  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: I would agree.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just to provoke a bit of disagreement,  
 10 what Lucy D'Orsi said, for example, is that what we have  
 11 seen, particularly in 2017 onwards, is a considerable  
 12 change in the nature of the terrorist threat which may  
 13 have made grey spaces more vulnerable than they were  
 14 before.  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: I would agree with that, sir. If you think  
 16 back to the IRA days, the method of attack was large  
 17 vehicle bombs and certainly with ISIS and some of the  
 18 literature that's coming from them online, it's about  
 19 causing any form of attack, be it a live attack or a --  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I think we should just say  
 21 it's changed, the attack methodology.  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: What I have had in mind -- everyone can  
 23 picture the approach to Wembley Stadium, full of 50,000  
 24 people. People have known that that's a grey space  
 25 issue for a long time, they've done lots of things about

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1 it for the varying threats that act upon that mass of  
 2 people.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I thought Wembley Stadium had changed.  
 4 MR COOPER: It's the same place.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's just a different building, yes.  
 6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. You've been going an hour. Give  
 8 me some idea.  
 9 MR COOPER: An hour, have I?  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may pass like a flash.  
 11 MR COOPER: I don't think I've been going an hour.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I thought we started at 1.45.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Mr Atkinson was about half an hour, sir.  
 14 MR COOPER: I am at tolerance level now, I understand that.  
 15 I hope the questions I'm asking aren't repetitive. I've  
 16 been very careful not to do that. I just want to top  
 17 and tail this.  
 18 The chair's perfectly properly put back to you what  
 19 Lucy D'Orsi said, but my question is different. Yes,  
 20 the terrorist threat has changed but the question of who  
 21 is responsible for what in grey spaces and people going  
 22 from one plot to another, putting the terrorist threat  
 23 to one side for a moment, that problem of  
 24 cross-fertilisation, for want of a better expression,  
 25 has been there for 15 years, hasn't it?

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, I apologise, I had forgotten  
 3 that there was someone questioning before you this  
 4 afternoon, so I apologise. But it has gone like  
 5 a flash.  
 6 MR COOPER: Your calm voice reassuring me is just what  
 7 I need to make me feel comfortable.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Pleased to hear it!  
 9 MR COOPER: Paragraph 27 {INQ039132/5}, please, if we can,  
 10 quickly.  
 11 The chair may know, but I don't know, and I just saw  
 12 it here, and I didn't have chance when I saw this to  
 13 research it, but reference to Lord Wheatley's  
 14 recommendations after the 1971 Ibrox disaster: from your  
 15 recollection, is that something that refers to grey  
 16 spaces? I'll move swiftly on if isn't. Do you know  
 17 about those recommendations?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: I had the great pleasure of reading every  
 19 word in the Green Guide about a week ago and I think it  
 20 is an excellent document. I don't know about  
 21 Lord Wheatley's recommendations, I do know about the  
 22 Green Guide. I do think the Green Guide would now apply  
 23 to Manchester Arena because they sometimes hold sporting  
 24 events, therefore they should be following the voluntary  
 25 guidance that's in the Green Guide which I think is

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1 excellent.  
 2 MR COOPER: I'll have a look at that (overspeaking) but I am  
 3 reliably, I know, informed by Mr Greaney that it  
 4 probably is not a relevant issue.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Deputy Assistant Commissioner D'Orsi  
 6 actually spoke about the Safety Advisory Group and  
 7 I think she said it'd be good if they had more teeth.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct, sir.  
 9 MR COOPER: I think I can be forgiven because this is  
 10 a question to assist the chair in a line of  
 11 questioning --  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I hope they're all here to assist me.  
 13 That's what we are here for.  
 14 MR COOPER: You were asking questions concerning public  
 15 places training for CCTV. Can I again very briefly just  
 16 refer to Tony Holyland's statement {INQ029576/16},  
 17 paragraphs 40 onwards.  
 18 Do we see there that:  
 19 "A qualification linked to public spatial  
 20 surveillance licensing. An individual needs to attend  
 21 and take two training modules and take and pass two  
 22 exams."  
 23 And it details the training that is required, I'll  
 24 put it succinctly, the training that is required of  
 25 people to monitor CCTV.

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 2 Q. If we can briefly scroll down to paragraphs 42 and 44  
 3 {INQ039132/8-9}, these are the criteria, for instance,  
 4 upon which people should be assessed to qualify as being  
 5 competent to monitor CCTV; is that right?  
 6 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 7 Q. You heard the evidence relating to blind spots and that  
 8 there was a particular blind spot so far as the arena  
 9 was concerned. Once detected, I'm sure you'll agree,  
 10 Colonel Latham, that blind spot should have been  
 11 immediately and 100% corrected, shouldn't it?  
 12 COLONEL LATHAM: It should have been... If the operations  
 13 were continuing, then it would need to have been  
 14 immediately addressed.  
 15 Q. Does it surprise you that it substantially wasn't  
 16 corrected until August 2020?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: If events were continuing and if there were  
 18 no other mitigating factors, then that would surprise  
 19 me, yes.  
 20 Q. I'm going to ask you one other -- I was about to say  
 21 tranche of questions, but that leave it very wide -- a  
 22 short series of questions and it's based upon cost and  
 23 money. The suggestions that you were taken to by  
 24 Mr Greaney, and indeed other aspects of your evidence  
 25 which I've listed here that may have mitigated against

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1 this tragedy, including better training, CCTV  
2 monitoring, bag checks, radios, we've even heard of  
3 explosive alert dogs and that sort of thing.

4 Would these things have cost a lot of money? Would  
5 they have been expensive? Or if there are expensive  
6 ones, which are the most expensive ones?

7 COLONEL LATHAM: People are expensive and dogs are  
8 expensive. The more of those that you have, the more  
9 they cost. But I think that needs to be put against  
10 what one's done in one's risk assessment. Without  
11 hindsight, a business that's making a hell of a lot of  
12 money wants to make sure it can continue making a hell  
13 of a lot of money. If it means it has to spend a lot of  
14 money that doesn't actually produce profit but prevents  
15 the loss of that profit can be quite a big motivating  
16 factor in my experience, and therefore those things that  
17 you describe, whilst being in real terms quite a lot of  
18 money, some tens or hundreds of thousands of pounds, if  
19 there's a licensing requirement for it or if they really  
20 perceive a risk that it needs to be done, then that  
21 money — it's easier to persuade them to spend that  
22 money.

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So good security is good for business?

24 COLONEL LATHAM: If you go to an event, "I felt really safe  
25 there" —

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, if you're able to agree with what  
2 I said, that will be our catchphrase for the afternoon.

3 MR COOPER: Here is another one: if you want to penny—pinch,  
4 it was an area where you can penny—pinch?

5 COLONEL LATHAM: When people find themselves in a position  
6 where they have to cut costs, security is one of the  
7 first places they look.

8 MR COOPER: That's a good phrase as well.

9 Would you like to add anything, doctor?

10 DR BaMAUNG: I completely agree.

11 MR COOPER: On that note, I'll sit down, sir.

12 MR GREANEY: Mr Weatherby indicated to me that he might have  
13 10 or 15 minutes of questions. If that remains the  
14 case, he could conveniently ask those before we break.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

16 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. Can you see me and hear me?

17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can hear you, we can't yet see you,  
18 but we'll tell you when we can.

19 MR WEATHERBY: That may be an advantage.

20 (Pause)

21 Questions from MR WEATHERBY

22 MR WEATHERBY: As Mr Greaney says, I don't think I will have  
23 more than 15 minutes of questions. I'll go as swiftly  
24 as I can.

25 I want to just ask you to clarify some matters, both

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1 Colonel Latham and Dr BaMaung, about some of the  
2 questions that Mr Greaney asked you at the start of his  
3 questioning yesterday.

4 My understanding of your evidence was that both of  
5 you would support a Protect duty, an actual Protect  
6 duty, and that should be cast as requiring a responsible  
7 person to take reasonably practicable steps to prevent  
8 or mitigate terrorist risks. Is that a fair way of  
9 characterising the evidence that —

10 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, it's a new phrase that a colleague has  
11 taught me: a suitably qualified and experienced person.

12 I believe it's called a SQEP. That's a phrase the  
13 Security Institute are looking at.

14 Q. I'm going to come on to the Security Institute in  
15 a moment; I just wanted to make sure I'd fairly  
16 characterised the duty that you're both in agreement  
17 should be made statutory or become part of the law.

18 Is it right that the words "reasonably practicable"  
19 are words that are used in other safety legislation  
20 particularly around health and safety law?

21 COLONEL LATHAM: To my knowledge, it is.

22 Q. Okay. Once a duty in such terms is set, and hopefully  
23 it will be, then of course the next questions are: how  
24 is it to be discharged and how is it to be enforced?

25 We've already had this discussion through questions and

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1 I think again it's the position of both of you that  
2 whereas in certain other areas, safety areas, it may be  
3 that the enforcement of a duty can be dealt with  
4 retrospectively, that's not really the case with  
5 counter—terrorism because the consequences of such  
6 attacks are so devastating; is that right?

7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.

8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

9 Q. So the approach to it should be to frontload protective  
10 security rather than to take an approach of  
11 retrospective enforcement? Would that be fair?

12 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, with the — I note what we've  
13 previously said about the potential for punitive fines  
14 is something that has to be borne in mind.

15 Q. Yes, indeed.

16 Dr BaMaung, you described in evidence yesterday that  
17 the lack of a senior CT security professional at the  
18 arena at the relevant time was, and I quote, "a key  
19 weakness".

20 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.

21 Q. That's right, isn't it? That's correct?

22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

23 Q. You noted, I think, that having a senior CT security  
24 professional in place is much more likely to provide  
25 a greater protective level of security than having

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1 a CTSA, and I'm not being disparaging at all to CTSA's in  
 2 general or in particular, but you are obviously going to  
 3 get a much better chance of having a higher level of  
 4 protective CT security with a senior CT security  
 5 professional, aren't you?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would agree, providing the right person  
 7 is in the job. If the organisation has a CT  
 8 professional, that person should be at an appropriate  
 9 level that they're able to meet the needs of the  
 10 environment. I would agree that if the person was  
 11 right, the advantage of there being in-house  
 12 counter-terrorism expertise is that person will know the  
 13 operation of site intimately. Unfortunately, a CTSA  
 14 will go in for a few hours, but he doesn't work in the  
 15 site day in, day out. And that's the big advantage of  
 16 having an internal counter-terrorism professional  
 17 in that they can understand the operation as well as the  
 18 physical security aspects of that environment.  
 19 Q. That's very helpful. That's where I was headed next.  
 20 Therefore, for venues which meet certain criteria,  
 21 and I'm not going to ask you to set or suggest criteria,  
 22 but criteria perhaps based on large capacity or  
 23 significant complexity, would you agree that it follows  
 24 that there should be a requirement to either employ or  
 25 contract in accredited senior CT security professionals?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think the option of either/or possibly.  
 2 If the organisation doesn't have the capability, if it's  
 3 a charity or something like that, to employ somebody  
 4 full-time, then, yes, they potentially contract in  
 5 somebody with counter-terrorism security expertise to  
 6 address particular problems that they can then progress  
 7 using their own organisation.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: I would also observe that when DAC D'Orsi  
 9 was giving her evidence she was talking as though she  
 10 was assuming that these large venues would have an  
 11 individual like that. That reinforces things.  
 12 Q. Yes, and regrettably that wasn't the case with the  
 13 arena, though, would you agree with the caveats that  
 14 Dr BaMaung has just referred to, that there ought, going  
 15 forward, to be a requirement for large venues with  
 16 certain criteria to have --  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, I would.  
 18 Q. Thank you.  
 19 And the accreditation, again I don't think I need to  
 20 spend much time on this. You were good enough yesterday  
 21 to refer to two institutes or professional bodies which  
 22 could provide accreditation. And that's the sort of  
 23 accreditation that should be applied here? I'm not  
 24 talking about the specific institutions but that sort of  
 25 approach is the approach that would be --

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Those two institutions that we mentioned  
 2 yesterday are high end, at the high end of things. The  
 3 Security Institute is trying to get their heads around  
 4 introducing with SIA, SIA counter-terrorism advisers,  
 5 which would be at a lower level, I understand. Because  
 6 of the scale of this proposal, there would need to be  
 7 a range of professionals who could help venues.  
 8 Q. I'm going to come to the next level down, if I may put  
 9 it that way, in a moment, but just sticking with high  
 10 capacity, high complexity venues that are likely to have  
 11 substantial resources, that's the sort of accreditation  
 12 which would make a scheme like this work; is that right?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I think the two organisations have  
 14 different skills that they can bring to the table. The  
 15 RSES is engineering focused and the Institute of Civil  
 16 Engineers worked alongside CPNI to establish that. So  
 17 if you're talking about CT protective security advice or  
 18 guidance in relation to structure, blast impact, I would  
 19 suggest probably the RSES is the best organisation to  
 20 select, although they are also moving into other areas,  
 21 which cover behavioural sides of the spectrum as well as  
 22 physical.  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Just to decomplexify it, you simply phone  
 24 the headquarters of either organisation --  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Perhaps simplify is a good word.

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: Simplify is a much better word, sir, given  
 2 that sentence.  
 3 If you just phone the headquarters, tell them what  
 4 your problem is, they'll find you the right expert.  
 5 MR WEATHERBY: So it would be quite easy to put that within  
 6 a regulatory scheme?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I think the one issue might be capacity.  
 8 If this was implemented nationwide there could be  
 9 potentially be a capacity issue if one of the clients is  
 10 a large client that involves a lot of work.  
 11 Q. But the advantage of this is that you'd have more than  
 12 a couple of visits a year and you would have a high  
 13 level of expertise and the amount of professional  
 14 expertise could be tailored to the requirements and  
 15 needs of the particular site; is that right?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I completely agree.  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 18 Q. And it would allow for the physical and human systems  
 19 deployed to be tested, supervised and, where necessary,  
 20 to be evolved; is that right?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: Are you talking about penetration testing or  
 22 simply testing the systems?  
 23 Q. Both. Professional expertise of that level could  
 24 conduct what testing was required to make sure the  
 25 protective security, whether it's physical or whether

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1 it's human, whether —

2 DR BaMAUNG: Looking at human system protective security,  
3 then it's probably a different type of test. It would  
4 be a company like Sorastes(?) that is used to do  
5 penetration test of a site rather than — which I don't  
6 think they're on that RSES. I might be mistaken, but  
7 they are specialised in actually testing the security.

8 COLONEL LATHAM: There are specialist companies like  
9 Sorastes and Red Vine who can do penetration testing for  
10 you at a very high level.

11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, that's extremely helpful.  
12 I don't want to go any deeper than that. Any minute now  
13 we're going to get a government document setting out  
14 their proposals for Martyn's Law. We'll look at it  
15 in that context. And one area that I would like people  
16 to think about, but I don't want them to talk to me  
17 about it today but to think about it, is an  
18 interrelationship between CTSA's and how they fit into  
19 this system and private security businesses which does  
20 seem to me to be an area to be worked on. Unless you  
21 want to take it further at this moment, I think we may  
22 have gone as far with that as we can.

23 MR WEATHERBY: I was about to say we're going into a little  
24 more detail than I'd intended with respect to the  
25 high-level side.

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1 If I may just then try to put what I'm putting to  
2 these witnesses in a perspective with other sites. I'll  
3 be very quick.

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In Mr Greaney's words, you may pull it  
5 all together, Mr Weatherby.

6 MR WEATHERBY: I'll certainly try.

7 Leaving those sites that are very high capacity or  
8 very complex like the arena, but going down to the next  
9 level, so medium or smaller but still tiered sites,  
10 still sites that would be perhaps tier 1 or tier 2,  
11 sites which would not even need or have the level of  
12 resources to afford the provision that we've just  
13 discussed, would it be your view that an amended version  
14 of the CTSA system would be appropriate with the caveats  
15 that you've already spoken to? Colonel Latham?

16 COLONEL LATHAM: So my view is that a tier 1 or tier 2 site,  
17 the CTSA — I haven't discussed this with Dr BaMaung so  
18 he may disagree with me for the first time. A CTSA  
19 would not have the training to do everything that would  
20 be required at a tier 1 or tier 2 site in my experience.  
21 So those sites would need to have more than what CTSA's  
22 currently deliver if they were to be properly looked  
23 after, not least because the CTSA can only turn up a few  
24 times a year, but there's other complexities that he or  
25 she could not be trained in, I think.

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1 Q. Perhaps I have approached this slightly the wrong way.  
2 Let's leave tiering on one side for a moment. But sites  
3 which have a lower footfall and a lower level of  
4 complexity but are still attractive to terrorists, there  
5 would still be a role for the CTSA system but perhaps  
6 amended to make some of its characteristics mandatory?  
7 Would that be —

8 DR BaMAUNG: I think possibly some form of revised system  
9 because the CTSA's role is to provide protective  
10 security advice to the sites that are most at risk,  
11 which would be tier 1s and 2s. There are also sites  
12 that are tier 3, which could still be significant sites  
13 but they don't have a regional impact. For example,  
14 shopping centres that aren't — I think the threshold...  
15 The role of CTSA's in relation to the smaller sites,  
16 again, is probably subject to capacity and priority.  
17 That's why I say maybe some sort of alternative system  
18 because I think with the existing CTSA resources, there  
19 is very, very little capacity left once you've finished  
20 with tier 1 and tier 2 sites. They're also engaging  
21 with some tier 3 sites as well just with basic advice,  
22 not advice for the specific site but providing more  
23 general advice.

24 Q. Right. In terms of the way I have put it to you, I was  
25 suggesting that the more complex and higher capacity

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1 sites would be taken out of the CTSA system by the  
2 provision of a requirement for specialised expertise.  
3 Would that not free up the CTSA system to deal with the  
4 lower level of risk or lower resource?

5 DR BaMAUNG: I don't think it would be advisable to take the  
6 CTSA's completely out of any higher tier system because  
7 there are a few issues that the CTSA's can address, such  
8 as access to intelligence and also specific guidance  
9 that comes from CPNI maybe, that sits at a higher level  
10 of restriction. To take the CTSA's from the higher level  
11 sites, I don't think would be a good idea necessarily,  
12 moving it completely to the private sector.

13 COLONEL LATHAM: I agree.

14 Q. That's very helpful, I shan't take that any further.  
15 So you would impose a requirement for specialist  
16 expertise, but you would keep the CTSA system to bring  
17 in the up-to-date NaCTSO advice and perhaps a layer of  
18 inspection?

19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think the CTSA's, I would suggest, should  
20 be continuing with the work they do. What we talked  
21 about was the potential needs of the higher level sites  
22 for more engagement and more advice. That's where  
23 I would see the specialists coming in. The CTSA's would  
24 still provide that basic element of protective security  
25 advice and guidance and this would be augmented, if the

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1 sites required it, by private security professionals,  
 2 who will provide the level of auditing that the CTSA's  
 3 currently do not provide.  
 4 Q. That's very helpful. Finally on this topic then, there  
 5 obviously comes a point where there aren't enough CTSA's  
 6 so there has to be a level at which the provision isn't  
 7 available. As I understand it at the moment, there  
 8 simply is the NaCTSO freely available material and no  
 9 doubt some other online open source material available  
 10 to them, but there's no other provision. Would you  
 11 support some level of online self-assessment tool being  
 12 a requirement for smaller venues which fall below the  
 13 CTSA system, so at least there's some provision perhaps  
 14 with a light touch involved with it?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, depending on its structure, I would have  
 16 no objections. What I would say as well is the  
 17 significant guidance that's available from the likes of  
 18 NaCTSO and CPNI is capable of interpretation. If the  
 19 CTSA's not able to provide sufficient engagement time  
 20 with the site then if they bring in a security  
 21 professional to augment advice given by the CTSA,  
 22 there's sufficient good material to help them on the  
 23 road to developing a robust process and response for the  
 24 site.  
 25 Q. Right. Thank you very much on that.

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1 Just a couple of final points, moving away from that  
 2 topic. You gave evidence earlier that beyond the site  
 3 itself, protective security has to take account of  
 4 different vulnerabilities arising at different times, so  
 5 for example, the egress point. Have I understood your  
 6 evidence correctly -- I think it was Colonel Latham --  
 7 that egress shouldn't be considered in isolation but  
 8 a risk assessment should consider the picture from  
 9 before ingress to after egress?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct.  
 11 Q. And if looked at in that way, the risk assessment picks  
 12 up the pinch points which will include egress; is that  
 13 right?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct and it should also include  
 15 consideration of dark days because someone could come in  
 16 on a dark day, leave something in the arena, go away and  
 17 it can manifest itself on the day. So the risk  
 18 assessment needs to consider not just the whole life  
 19 cycle of the event, but also dark days.  
 20 Q. Yes. Finally, on geography, equally the assessment must  
 21 consider the context of the site within its  
 22 surroundings; is that right?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. This is covered ably in the  
 24 Green Guide.  
 25 Q. With respect to the arena, we know that the access

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1 points to the arena bowl, ticketing access points, were  
 2 considered as the perimeter of the site. But given your  
 3 evidence that SMG were responsible for security in the  
 4 City Room, should they not have considered the perimeter  
 5 as being the doors to the City Room rather than the  
 6 doors to the arena bowl?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm not sure they used the word perimeter  
 8 in the way that you have used it, Mr Weatherby. They  
 9 used the term the "edge of their demise", which is the  
 10 legal term that you will understand. The perimeter of  
 11 their security operation extended to where Atkinson and  
 12 Lawler were at the top of steps. So I don't think  
 13 we can quite use perimeter in that way. I think that  
 14 we can say, and I have said, that it was -- SMG's  
 15 responsibility was for security and safety in the  
 16 City Room.  
 17 Q. Yes. Finally, you've been asked a lot of questions  
 18 about perimeters, I don't want to ask you any more about  
 19 that, but layering, just one point. You gave some very  
 20 helpful evidence about the O2 and you're not suggesting,  
 21 are you, that that's directly applicable to the arena?  
 22 You gave that evidence by way of example, I think.  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, that would only be one example. I am  
 24 in no way suggesting that anyone should replicate what  
 25 used to be done at the O2.

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1 Q. Indeed. There are of course measures such as X-ray  
 2 machines which may or may not be appropriate to the  
 3 arena. That's one thing. But there are much more  
 4 straightforward and cheaper options which are equally  
 5 worthy of consideration. I have been raising the issue  
 6 of soft cordons as an example of this. I don't know  
 7 whether this is the right term or not, but if you  
 8 imagine the area which Mr Lawler and Mr Atkinson were,  
 9 had there been a line of three or four SIA operatives as  
 10 a cordon across the City Room doors, asking people if  
 11 they could check bulky clothes or bags, of course they  
 12 wouldn't have had the legal right to do that, the legal  
 13 right to actually do the searching, but there's nothing  
 14 to actually stop them having a cordon like that and  
 15 asking whether they could look in a bag or check bulky  
 16 clothing, is there?  
 17 COLONEL LATHAM: Nothing to stop them doing that unless  
 18 other users of that space complained, I suppose, and  
 19 that would need to be negotiated out. But I haven't  
 20 taken legal advice on what I have written about the  
 21 licence. One interpretation that only I have made of  
 22 the licence in the document that's now been provided to  
 23 CPs, I think, is the fact that they did have ability to  
 24 exclude people from the City Room, and therefore, if  
 25 I've understood it correctly, which I may not have done,

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1 they did have the opportunity to insist that they  
 2 searched people.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: With respect, I think that's doubtful --  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: In that case I have misinterpreted it, sir,  
 5 and I retract that.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- even if it is a licence condition.  
 7 If they don't have the legal power to stop people and  
 8 make them go, then I'm afraid the licence can't give it  
 9 to them.  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: In that case, I accept that, sir.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be being said that they could but  
 12 it's difficult .  
 13 MR WEATHERBY: Obviously we can revisit that at a more  
 14 appropriate point.  
 15 The point I'm making is really one I picked up from  
 16 you, Colonel Latham, that you don't need a legal right  
 17 to go up to someone and say, "Do you mind if I look in  
 18 your bag?" or "Where are you going?" and therefore  
 19 the concept of a soft cordon, which I think has often  
 20 been used at football stadiums, for example, is one  
 21 cheap and easy solution to the sorts of problems that  
 22 were facing the arena.  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes. If it's implemented softly and gently  
 24 and with understanding, then you can, over a period of  
 25 time, educate the public to get used to it .

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just out of interest, are you aware of  
 2 any particular football ground which uses soft cordons?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: No, but I wouldn't be, sir. I haven't  
 4 studied -- I know about Wembley Stadium but I don't know  
 5 about other venues.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 7 MR WEATHERBY: I may address that later, sir, but probably  
 8 not appropriately here. Those are all my questions.  
 9 Thank you very much, Colonel Latham and Dr BaMaung.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much. We'll now break  
 11 off until 3.30.  
 12 MR GREANEY: Sir, I was simply going to indicate that the  
 13 advocates for the bereaved families have been within  
 14 their time allocation and so long as all other CPs do  
 15 the same, we will conclude the evidence of the experts  
 16 by the end of tomorrow.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Mr Greaney will be  
 18 distributing sweets to all those who have completed it  
 19 in the time.  
 20 (3.20 pm)  
 21 (A short break)  
 22 (3.30 pm)  
 23 MR GREANEY: Sir, Mr Butt will now ask his questions on  
 24 behalf of CTPHQ.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before we start, I am seriously

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1 grateful for people to keeping to the time limits .  
 2 You have a real challenge, Mr Butt.  
 3 Questions from MR BUTT  
 4 MR BUTT: I have five short topics and they're mostly  
 5 directed towards the deep end of the hot tub, but please  
 6 colonel, do interject if you can contribute as well .  
 7 The first concerns training. Would you agree with  
 8 DAC D'Orsi that CTSA's are very highly trained, highly  
 9 skilled police professionals?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would.  
 11 Q. And protective security improvement activity is only  
 12 part of the advice they provide and the work they do  
 13 with crowded places, isn't it?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: That's right. The PSIA only applies to the  
 15 higher level, but they give advice to all sorts of  
 16 organisations.  
 17 Q. And there's a wealth of material relating to, for  
 18 example, reporting suspicious activity and hostile  
 19 reconnaissance at a site that can be delivered by CTSA's,  
 20 yes?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. And that would apply as much outside the venue as  
 23 it would inside, wouldn't it?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 25 Q. The training and guidance was that each site was unique

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1 and had to be treated as such, wasn't it?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 3 Q. If we could look, please, at {INQ023064/4}.  
 4 This is the 2014 tasking that was sent out to CTSA's  
 5 and it says this:  
 6 "As explained at the launch, no single set of  
 7 measures can be expected to fit perfectly across a wide  
 8 range of site/venue types without becoming overly  
 9 complicated or unworkable. The scoring tool lays out  
 10 a broad set of protective security improvement  
 11 activities 'mapped' against a set of agreed attack  
 12 types. It is appreciated that appropriate measures are  
 13 dictated by the type of site being dealt with and that  
 14 each site has its own nuances and particular  
 15 requirements, hence the 'broad' nature of the measures."  
 16 That is certainly true of the arena and the  
 17 City Room, isn't it?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, it is.  
 19 Q. I think in your report you jointly describe the arena  
 20 with the presence of the City Room as presenting  
 21 potentially unique challenges, don't you?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, because of the type of environment the  
 23 City Room was with multiple access and in relation to  
 24 police force coverage as well, yes, it was.  
 25 Q. So the guidance from this tasking is clearly relevant

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1 in that regard, isn't it?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: I think the guidance in the document is general  
 3 enough that it could be applied, yes.  
 4 Q. In terms of the guidance for sites provided by NaCTSO,  
 5 if we could look briefly, please, at {INQ032510/10}.  
 6 Paragraph 1.3:  
 7 "This scoring guidance is written to assist those  
 8 concerned in the assessment of protective security  
 9 elements at crowded places sites and to provide an  
 10 informed view of how a site's security can be improved  
 11 through a range of measures. It is acknowledged that  
 12 the list of improvement measures are not exhaustive but  
 13 are deemed as the most applicable for use within the  
 14 crowded places environment."  
 15 Next page, please {INQ032510/11}. 3.2:  
 16 "Where there is no specific guidance to help,  
 17 explanations in annex 2 have been produced to help steer  
 18 you to an appropriate answer. These have been developed  
 19 based on good practice and experience and are solely  
 20 illustrative in nature and are meant to encourage wider  
 21 thinking and eventual engagement. Please note that some  
 22 of the headings are relevant across all attack methods  
 23 but need to be considered in the context of each attack  
 24 type. The examples are not prescriptive or exhaustive  
 25 and you should use your experience, training and local

1 good practice to determine criteria eligibility ."  
 2 So it encourages a creative approach and not being  
 3 too bound within the box of PSIA, would you agree with  
 4 that?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 6 Q. Second topic, please. The engagement of guarding,  
 7 security guards and CTSA's. Can we look, please, at the  
 8 PSIA tool for the arena, {INQ001541/4}.  
 9 Can we see here there is a specific heading for  
 10 guarding and a specific heading for training and  
 11 awareness?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. Within the notes, the drop-down menus within the tool,  
 14 it would define guarding as including both security  
 15 guards and also stewards who perform a security  
 16 function. Do you recall that from your CTSA days?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I believe it is.  
 18 Q. Specifically, a site would be scored as to whether the  
 19 guards and the stewards performing the security  
 20 functions had been Griffin trained within the last  
 21 12 months; yes?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 23 Q. That's in addition to and separate to, under training,  
 24 Project Griffin in relation to staff; yes?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. The tool was designed for both security

1 personnel and for general staff to increase general  
 2 awareness.  
 3 Q. So the tool itself specifically directs CTSA's and venues  
 4 to ask whether guards have received the Griffin training  
 5 and other matters and whether staff have been trained  
 6 in that way?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 8 Q. In terms of Project Argus can we briefly look at  
 9 {INQ036759/1}, please --  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just while we're looking for that, it's  
 11 great than 50%, is it, that's the test, who have Griffin  
 12 training?  
 13 MR BUTT: In order to get the full score on that section,  
 14 doctor, would you need to have greater than 50% of staff  
 15 trained in Griffin?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: It's not a score and there is no exam with  
 17 griffin .  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, it was the greater than 50% of  
 19 the number of the staff who had done it.  
 20 MR BUTT: Greater than 50% of security staff.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. On both of them for the guarding  
 22 and the training, they're all greater than 50%, aren't  
 23 they?  
 24 MR BUTT: The training specifically says:  
 25 "Project Griffin /Operation Fairway for staff."

1 DR BaMAUNG: I think the focus was on the security staff  
 2 in relation to the 50%, making sure more than half of  
 3 the guard force were trained in it .  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 5 MR BUTT: {INQ036759/1}. This was the invite that was sent  
 6 out to the launch of Argus Stadia and can you see this  
 7 event states that it is aimed to:  
 8 "... help chief executive officers , senior  
 9 executives and senior security managers from UK stadia"?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. So it was designed for managers, senior managers within  
 12 security firms --  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: That event was a launch event, so what you  
 14 found, it wasn't a full run-through of the Argus Stadia,  
 15 there was an element of explanation as well to what it's  
 16 about because these people that were attending that were  
 17 seen as the forefront to be able to drive the interests  
 18 in their own sector or on.  
 19 Q. {INQ001449/4}, please. This is a ShowSec document, and  
 20 in the second paragraph it states:  
 21 "ShowSec managers have attended the Project Argus  
 22 and Griffin courses."  
 23 Of course, we don't know which particular ones they  
 24 would have attended.  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.

1 Q. Thank you. Dissemination of information, please, the  
2 third topic. PSIA deals with six attack methodologies,  
3 but how and when those attacks might be delivered  
4 changes with the intelligence picture, doesn't it?  
5 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. An example could be from the  
6 use of vehicles as a weapon through to the use of single  
7 people who would attack with knives or other types of  
8 individual weapons.  
9 Q. And NaCTSO would update CTAs, industry and the public  
10 via a number of means, as you've said, wouldn't they?  
11 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. CPNI would give the  
12 information and intelligence to NaCTSO, who would then  
13 disseminate, usually through a NaCTSO guidance note or a  
14 bulletin to the CTSA network for further dissemination.  
15 MR BUTT: You also said, doctor, that Project Argus was  
16 a conduit for understanding what the threat might be;  
17 yes?  
18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
19 Q. That's precisely what the Argus Stadia that was launched  
20 in May 2016 sought in part to do, wasn't it?  
21 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, it was to design a product that was  
22 specifically aimed at arenas and stadia.  
23 Q. And I think you have seen the facilitator notes that  
24 relate to that event?  
25 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I have.

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1 Q. It specifically focuses around an attack scenario which  
2 is egress from a stadium and it's a suicide attack  
3 during egress?  
4 DR BaMAUNG: I would agree in that scenario the attack  
5 scenario was during egress. I think the main learning  
6 points from it were the fact that the public could be  
7 targeted by a PBIED and what actions to take thereafter,  
8 so I would agree that the attack scenario was on egress.  
9 I think the main learning points from that were how to  
10 respond if you had a suicide bomber within a crowd and  
11 what actions you'd take thereafter.  
12 Q. And the speaker notes specifically say:  
13 "Perhaps mention the attack could take place at any  
14 time, before, during or at the time of the event."  
15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
16 Q. Once that event had been launched, the intention, as  
17 with all of these training sessions, would be that CTAs  
18 would then deliver the training to venues nationally;  
19 yes?  
20 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
21 Q. And they would deliver that training consistently; yes?  
22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
23 Q. Can I briefly return to "Something is better than  
24 nothing". In 2014, there was a need for a change in  
25 focus, wasn't there, not least of all because only

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1 a minority of sites were showing an improvement in  
2 protective security?  
3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. At that time there was a serious problem  
4 in getting engagement from a lot of sites because, until  
5 then, the focus had been on more expensive protective  
6 security measures and the focus at that point was to try  
7 to get engagement with a wider variety of sites even to  
8 the extent of not doing heavy security measures but soft  
9 measures such as training, awareness and behavioural  
10 detection stuff.  
11 Q. Would it be fair to summarise it this way: everyone  
12 seems to agree, looking at it now, it's a poor choice of  
13 words, to say the least?  
14 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
15 Q. But the message certainly that you were delivering under  
16 that slogan was a positive one, wasn't it?  
17 DR BaMAUNG: Very much so. The negative aspect of the term  
18 only really came to light during the inquiry when you  
19 gained the perception of non-CTSA individuals and took  
20 it from a wider context in business. I would say within  
21 the CT community the concept was pretty sound and well  
22 understood.  
23 Q. The reality was that it in fact led to, to use the  
24 chairman's phrase, an increase in affordable, achievable  
25 protective security?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
2 Q. And there really is no evidence to support the idea that  
3 it was misunderstood by industry leading to  
4 penny-pinching?  
5 DR BaMAUNG: I can't speak for the whole industry. From my  
6 knowledge, no.  
7 Q. Finally, this, please. It concerns the ambit of the  
8 PSIA tool. The tool and the guidance use the phrase  
9 "protective security at your site", don't they?  
10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
11 Q. You don't find the phrase "protective security within  
12 your site" in the tool or in the guidance, do you?  
13 DR BaMAUNG: Not the phrase, but I think the measures were,  
14 I think, aimed within the actual confines of  
15 environment.  
16 Q. The focus without doubt is on the site, isn't it?  
17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
18 Q. As you've already said, some PSIA within the tool  
19 clearly relates to areas outside the site, doesn't it?  
20 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
21 Q. Non-penetrative vehicle activity obviously, in fact all  
22 vehicular attacks, are going to involve, for example,  
23 consideration of stand-off; yes?  
24 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
25 Q. Traffic exclusion zones; yes?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 2 Q. Obviously by definition outside the site?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 4 Q. One of the other attack methodologies is placed IEDs and  
 5 specific measures are going to include searches inside  
 6 and outside the site, aren't they?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 8 Q. And the guidance is very clear in that regard?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 10 Q. As a CTSA you'd be looking obviously at litter bins, for  
 11 example, outside the site and the perimeter?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: Whether you'd consider litter bins -- certainly  
 13 you'd consider hostile vehicle mitigation and obvious  
 14 threats to the site. External litter bins, if they were  
 15 deemed a great threat, possibly, but it's something that  
 16 maybe would not come to the front of your attention.  
 17 Q. We can find the document if need be. Have you not seen  
 18 specific references to litter bins outside the site in  
 19 the guidance?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: Within the documentation here, I may have done.  
 21 We've had so much documentation.  
 22 Q. In terms of egress attack, I think both of you have  
 23 agreed that whilst it would be wrong to have a specific  
 24 category, this is something that could be addressed  
 25 within the specific measure of planning; is that right?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, at the very end of the PSIA scoring tool,  
 2 there is an element about planning and also in relation  
 3 to neighbours and community engagement. There could be  
 4 a -- through a development of a better neighbourhood  
 5 scheme, if you like, there could be a raised awareness  
 6 of hostile reconnaissance and issues like that.  
 7 Q. We'll come to partnership in a moment, but specifically  
 8 it could be addressed under the generic measure of  
 9 security and planning, couldn't it?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think you'd probably need to have  
 11 a specific plan for egress, which would be part of the  
 12 planning documentation that you would have.  
 13 Q. If we could look then again, please, at {INQ001541/4}.  
 14 This is the scoring tool for the arena. Under the  
 15 generic measure for PBIED attack of security planning,  
 16 already in the tool is evacuation/invacuation plan. So  
 17 that's going to involve a degree of consideration of  
 18 egress, isn't it?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, it would.  
 20 Q. Also, the specific activity of capability to implement  
 21 increased security process at times of increased threat.  
 22 That is one of the specific measures CTSA's would advise  
 23 a site in relation to, isn't it?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, because as the threat level changes, the  
 25 posture of the security inside the site needs to change

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1 as well.  
 2 Q. An obvious consideration for a PBIED for an improved  
 3 security at a time of increased threat would be pushing  
 4 back the perimeter, wouldn't it?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 6 Q. And that's something that was specifically raised in the  
 7 guidance note 2 of 2015 that we've looked at, issued by  
 8 NaCTSO after the Stade de France attacks?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 10 Q. That was not a new proposal, was it, because  
 11 establishing the perimeter at a distance from the site  
 12 is also included in the 2014 revised stadia and arena  
 13 guidance, isn't it?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 15 Q. Could we look, please --  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we leave that, sorry:  
 17 "The incapability to implement increased security at  
 18 times of increased threat."  
 19 Is that meaning an increased threat level  
 20 nationally?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. If you move from critical then obviously  
 22 it's not sustainable for any length of time.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 24 MR BUTT: If we could look, please, at {INQ025707/3}.  
 25 This is a copy of the action plan relating to

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1 Victoria Station. Do we see this in action here where  
 2 it says:  
 3 "Further options available following an increase in  
 4 threat: extending the station checks to areas outside of  
 5 the station that may be at risk from VBIED or  
 6 restricting visitor access?"  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 8 Q. You mentioned partnership working. If the position was  
 9 that a site hadn't been given that advice that said: we  
 10 can't extend our perimeter because we'll be in an area  
 11 where our neighbours in fact are the legal owners or  
 12 they have control over access/egress, that is precisely  
 13 what partnership working is designed to resolve, isn't  
 14 it?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. It's going into discussion to  
 16 try to identify the best options to provide an effective  
 17 protective security.  
 18 Q. Partnership working is an integral part of each of the  
 19 six attack methodologies within PSIA; yes?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 21 Q. Finally this. You mentioned surveys in your report and  
 22 in your addenda. The survey is how the PSIA process  
 23 begins, isn't it?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. The survey system changed with the  
 25 introduction of PSIA. Before that you used to do

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1 recommendations at the very end of your survey, but when  
 2 you actually implemented surveys under PSIA, the  
 3 recommendations actually moved across to the action  
 4 plan. So your survey would be identifying the weak  
 5 points within the site and, once that was done, that  
 6 would influence the discussions within the actual PSIA  
 7 process and at the very end, the weaknesses would be  
 8 addressed through the action plan and stage 2 of the  
 9 PSIA process.

10 Q. And that's part of the training that all CTSA's would go  
 11 through, conducting a survey. Can we look, briefly,  
 12 please at {INQ035602/1}. These are the training notes  
 13 for module 3, relating to CT surveying. {INQ035602/7},  
 14 please. The third bullet point down:  
 15 "The recognition of the onion peel approach."  
 16 So you begin with the environment, the approach and  
 17 then the interior ; yes?

18 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. That's a basic concept that's  
 19 instilled from the initial training with CTSA.

20 Q. And that's something all CTSA's will be familiar with?

21 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

22 MR BUTT: Thank you very much. Those are my questions.

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

24 MR GREANEY: We're now going to be joined by Mr Horwell by  
 25 the link and he will ask questions on behalf of Greater

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1 Manchester Police.

2 Questions from MR HORWELL

3 MR HORWELL: I just want to start first, please, by  
 4 referring to a number of principles that have been set  
 5 out in your final report. I can give the references if  
 6 you wish, but they're going to be fairly obvious and  
 7 simple ones. You state that:  
 8 "CTSA's and others can and should provide appropriate  
 9 advice to venues. It was for the venue [SMG in this  
 10 case] to assess the risks, decide what appropriate  
 11 mitigations are, and to implement them."  
 12 And that of course remains your opinion.

13 COLONEL LATHAM: That's correct, yes.

14 Q. This has been said before, but I think this is the first  
 15 time this might have been put to you, that the CTSA is  
 16 not a substitute or a replacement for that  
 17 responsibility ?

18 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct. The CTSA is there to provide  
 19 advice and guidance to the site to allow them to make  
 20 informed decisions.

21 Q. You also go on to say in your report that:  
 22 "It would be reasonable to expect that SMG would  
 23 also undertake efforts to obtain further guidance and  
 24 advice themselves."  
 25 Can I just ask this? This may be best addressed to

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1 you, doctor. The larger and more profitable the  
 2 organisation, the more that principle should apply too,  
 3 for obvious reasons?

4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I'd agree.

5 Q. The limitations of a CTSA should be obvious to a large  
 6 organisation and I suggest those limitations are these:  
 7 first of all, the limitation of time, the amount of time  
 8 that a CTSA is enabled to spend at a site and the fact  
 9 that a CTSA does not conduct an audit of the security  
 10 operation in action. Would you agree with those  
 11 limitations?

12 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would completely concur with that.  
 13 I think the time that CTSA's can spend at sites is  
 14 limited. I would say that in the event of — the  
 15 engagement between CTSA and the arena was actually  
 16 probably in excess of what could have been expected.  
 17 I think that the sites' responsibilities are paramount.  
 18 As was mentioned before, the CTSA's do not provide an  
 19 audit function and that should be made clear to the  
 20 sites at the very start. They will provide advice but  
 21 will not audit any security and I think that's possibly  
 22 where there's been a misunderstanding of roles.

23 Q. Doctor, I'm not suggesting for one moment that the  
 24 system that this inquiry has been investigating over the  
 25 last weeks cannot be improved. So don't please for one

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1 moment think that I am suggesting that all was well.  
 2 But those limitations, those obvious limitations, must  
 3 have been very clear to any large organisation?

4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think as long as they were made clear to  
 5 them, yes, I would agree.

6 Q. Can I press you on that? It must have been obvious to  
 7 SMG that Mr Upham had never conducted an audit of the  
 8 security operation in action.

9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think in one of the statements it was  
 10 mentioned that Mr Upham went round the site with  
 11 Miriam Stone. I think the misunderstanding that I was  
 12 referring to about roles — I recollect in an email from  
 13 Miriam Stone to the other managers in SMG she mentioned  
 14 that she discussed various measures, or I think it was  
 15 after a couple of the attacks, with both the CTSA and  
 16 British Transport Police, and they seemed happy or  
 17 seemed fine with it, I think was the general impact of  
 18 the email. I think from that, I took that there was  
 19 a misunderstanding of what the police were there to  
 20 provide in that a tacit agreement that everything looked  
 21 okay was being taken to indicate that the police were  
 22 actually endorsing the measures in place, which they  
 23 weren't doing at all.

24 Q. Well, let me be even more direct, doctor. It must have  
 25 been obvious that Mr Upham could never have given any

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1 assurances at a briefing of staff at the venue because  
 2 he was never present when staff were briefed? Do you  
 3 agree?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I agree.  
 5 Q. And it must have been equally obvious that Mr Upham  
 6 could have given no assurance as to their egress checks  
 7 in the City Room because he was never present?  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 9 Q. If Mr Upham had asked anyone at SMG about the nature of  
 10 the egress checks, he would have been told they involve  
 11 the entire City Room, including the area where  
 12 Salman Abedi was hiding, because that was their  
 13 understanding?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that was certainly SMG's understanding,  
 15 although I think that differed from ShowSec's.  
 16 Q. Well, yes, but as we know, Mr Upham's association was  
 17 with SMG alone.  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. As for the other aspects to CT advice, we have heard  
 20 much about monthly Bridge calls and, Colonel Latham,  
 21 could I ask this question to you, please? Have  
 22 I understood this correctly? You have participated in  
 23 monthly Bridge calls?  
 24 COLONEL LATHAM: I'm not sure they were monthly, but  
 25 I frequently participated in them, yes.

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1 Q. Right. And you found them useful?  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, I did. So useful that I told my team  
 3 to keep quiet and I brought them in the room so they  
 4 could hear them too.  
 5 Q. Right. No one could force you to take part in those  
 6 Bridge calls, but you chose to?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 8 Q. And you can take a horse to water but you can't force it  
 9 to drink, can you?  
 10 COLONEL LATHAM: That's true.  
 11 Q. Bridge calls were made available to SMG and, as we can  
 12 see from the evidence produced, they didn't participate  
 13 in a single one?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: That's true.  
 15 Q. One of you referred to Business Sentinel quarterly  
 16 publications. I think it was you, doctor, said that  
 17 there was evidence that Business Sentinel could be  
 18 shared with others if GMP had been asked.  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 20 Q. Can I just for the sake of the record -- that is  
 21 paragraph 41 of Elizabeth Forster's witness statement,  
 22 where she said that of course GMP would have given  
 23 permission for those documents to be shared if asked.  
 24 That's what you would have expected, is that right?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, absolutely.

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1 Q. Doctor, still with you, if I may. In the note of the  
 2 meeting that you had with the inquiry legal team it is  
 3 said that there is no mention in NaCTSO guidance of PSIA  
 4 scoring about ingress or egress risk specifically.  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 6 Q. And the CTSA training at the time did not include  
 7 sufficient coverage of grey spaces, ingress and egress  
 8 risks?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I think the concept of grey space, the  
 10 actual terminology, wasn't used in the guidance, and  
 11 at the time certainly the focus was on the PSIA process.  
 12 Q. Still with you, doctor, if I may. It has been clearly  
 13 established that there is no requirement and indeed no  
 14 guidance that a CTSA should attend an event at night to  
 15 inspect the security operation in action?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. I know that you were a CTSA for many years. How many?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: Nine.  
 19 Q. Thank you. Can I ask this, please? During those  
 20 9 years, how many events did you attend at night to see  
 21 part of the security operation in action?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Less than five, probably about three events,  
 23 major events.  
 24 Q. Right. At three separate venues or three at the same  
 25 venue?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Different venues.  
 2 Q. Thank you.  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: And also at the weekend as well.  
 4 Q. We have heard evidence about the potential for false  
 5 impressions being given. I'm asking this simply to see  
 6 what your opinion would be. Is there a risk that by one  
 7 CTSA attending an event it might give the false  
 8 impression that that CTSA is agreeing with the security  
 9 operation that he or she has seen?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: No, not at all. The reason that -- well, I can  
 11 only speak for myself within my force at the time. But  
 12 the reason was to review the procedures at night  
 13 in relation to protective security measures and we  
 14 didn't agree with one aspect and, as I say, we had  
 15 a discussion with the security manager because the  
 16 guidance that we gave in relation to that particular  
 17 measure was being, not ignored, it wasn't being used to  
 18 allow the throughput of a crowd at egress.  
 19 So because we were there at the time, it was solved  
 20 in a matter of minutes, we had a chance to stand with  
 21 the security manager and agree what could be done.  
 22 Q. Had you gone to (overspeaking) --  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: -- I might add that plenty of people came  
 24 to look at my security operation and perhaps gave advice  
 25 or expressed their opinion and that was very kind of

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1 them. But it's my operation and we will do it the way  
2 that I'm doing it, not the way that somebody else tells  
3 me to do it.

4 Q. Right. But if I can just take this a stage further  
5 because for an inspection of a venue's security  
6 operation to be worthwhile, it should be without notice,  
7 would you agree?

8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would say on the occasions I went, it  
9 wasn't a security inspection and that was made clear to  
10 the management at the time. I was purely there to  
11 observe the procedures taking place. It was made  
12 perfectly clear that we were not performing any form of  
13 inspection function.

14 Q. For the reasons that I've mentioned, you did not want to  
15 given the false impression that you were agreeing to the  
16 entirety of the operation, you were just looking at one  
17 part of it?

18 DR BaMAUNG: Well, we weren't looking specifically at that  
19 one, we were observing the whole process, and during  
20 just watching that, we observed the one part that was  
21 failing in that particular operation.

22 Q. And would you agree that for a security audit and  
23 inspection to be effective, it would have to be  
24 conducted by quite a large number of people on the same  
25 night?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Not necessarily. Potentially two or three  
2 would be able to do that depending -- you would need to  
3 establish at the start what you were actually going to  
4 audit and inspect, what aspects of security. But  
5 I think it would be possible to do it without  
6 a significantly large number of people.

7 Q. Let me be more precise. I certainly didn't mean more  
8 than about 5 or 6 people, but if we take the arena as an  
9 example, there would be one person to inspect the  
10 operation at Hunts Bank, which was a major exit?

11 COLONEL LATHAM: I might just jump in here because I may be  
12 able to speak to this. I don't know what level of audit  
13 we're talking about because that hasn't been decided,  
14 but when people would come to my venue and I was showing  
15 them the operation or inviting them to have a look at  
16 it, one person, in my opinion, could cover the important  
17 things on an event night. I don't think that you'd need  
18 more than one person at a venue that looks after 21,000  
19 people unless the level of inspection you want to do  
20 goes into enormous detail.

21 Q. Colonel, that of course is the problem. If an audit is  
22 to pick up, for example, a CCTV blind spot, the number  
23 of people who are monitoring the CCTV system, the  
24 precise nature of ingress checks and egress checks,  
25 that is not the work of a few moments, obviously, is it?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: I think it depends, Mr Horwell, on what the  
2 role actually is. As I stated at the start, the times  
3 that a colleague and I -- and I would say that if the  
4 CTAs were going to do something it would be good to do  
5 it with two because you can bounce ideas off each other.  
6 But the purpose of our visit was to observe, not to  
7 audit, because, as you have fairly said, the CTSA role  
8 was not an audit role. So it didn't entail the detailed  
9 inspection of the site, it was simply to observe and  
10 pick up what was taking place.

11 COLONEL LATHAM: There's a question of scale about: do you  
12 want to check the training records, the first aid of  
13 every single person on site, every SIA badge, et cetera,  
14 or do you want to look at an overview? Are big  
15 important things being done? And of course we are now  
16 speculating because we don't know what would be in  
17 place. So if you want to get a good feel for how  
18 a venue is doing, even a large venue, and you're  
19 a security professional, I think that you can do that on  
20 your own.

21 Q. Well, colonel, I hope you understand I'm looking forward  
22 to the future to see what recommendations may be  
23 possible or practical and effective. But for an audit  
24 or an inspection to have discovered matters such as the  
25 blind spot and the efficiency of ingress and egress

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1 checks, you're the experts, not me, you believe that  
2 could have been found, those failures could have been  
3 found by an inspection of two or slightly more people on  
4 the same night?

5 DR BaMAUNG: For that level of detail to look for the blind  
6 spots, certainly it would take some amount of time  
7 because you're not simply looking at the CCTV for the  
8 City Room, you'd need to look at the camera or the  
9 monitors for every camera. So that in itself would be  
10 probably a significant piece of work to establish where  
11 the vulnerabilities actually are and if indeed there  
12 were any blind spots on the CCTV system.

13 Q. Right.

14 COLONEL LATHAM: That is going into a level of detail -- if  
15 one wants to go into that sort of level of detail of  
16 looking at the blind spots on every camera and  
17 everyone's SIA licence and training, et cetera, that is  
18 going to be a highly labour intensive, prohibitively  
19 labour intensive operation, and therefore when the  
20 legislation is drafted, that would need to be taken into  
21 account.

22 Q. Thank you. Colonel Latham, in relation to something you  
23 said today about pushing back perimeters, have  
24 I understood your evidence correctly that it is not  
25 necessary to consider pushing back perimeters if there

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1 are sufficient security measures in that particular  
 2 area? So if the crowd is safe or should be safe, there  
 3 is no need to consider pushing back perimeters?  
 4 COLONEL LATHAM: If the risks that you have identified have  
 5 been mitigated to an adequate level, then you don't need  
 6 to put in extra mitigations. So if you have a crowd who  
 7 are not threatened by, say, the six attack methodologies  
 8 because of the mitigations you've put in place, then you  
 9 wouldn't need to put in an extra perimeter, therefore  
 10 what you say is correct.  
 11 Q. And as others have commented, that in itself carries  
 12 with it risks because moving a crowd from one place to  
 13 another can itself create danger?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: Only if you haven't thought about it  
 15 properly.  
 16 Q. Right. Colonel Latham, again, still with you if I may.  
 17 Your evidence from yesterday highlighted two important  
 18 factors. The first, that the blind spot should have  
 19 been identified by SMG and SMG should have ensured that  
 20 all of their staff were aware of it and I'm sure you  
 21 meant to include in that SMG and ShowSec staff.  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: I'll qualify my statement to make sure that  
 23 it perfectly accurately reflects what I think about  
 24 that. I think that all those people whose operational  
 25 role required them to know where there were blind spots

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1 that were relevant to security, those people in ShowSec  
 2 and SMG should have been made aware of that blind spot  
 3 for obvious reasons.  
 4 Q. Yes. I'm sure it doesn't need further emphasis,  
 5 Colonel Latham, but you spelt it out earlier. It was  
 6 a good place to hide?  
 7 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes, it was.  
 8 Q. Secondly, you said that pre-egress checks should have  
 9 involved an eyes-open sweep of the City Room, looking  
 10 for, amongst other things, suspicious people. And you  
 11 said there should have been regular patrols of the  
 12 City Room, including patrols of the area in which  
 13 Salman Abedi hid?  
 14 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 15 Q. It's the same point again: it was a good place to hide.  
 16 And you added to that, that from your understanding of  
 17 the City Room, it was the best place to hide?  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: I did.  
 19 Q. You described how you would have expected an experienced  
 20 security officer to have identified Salman Abedi as  
 21 a suspicious person?  
 22 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 23 Q. Those responsibilities were plainly not the  
 24 responsibilities of the CTSA?  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: Those ones that you have just put to me

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1 were not the responsibility of the CTSA.  
 2 Q. For both of you, please, for your evidence. If the  
 3 security advisory system, and by that I include CTSA's,  
 4 NaCTSO, private seminars, Business Sentinel and similar  
 5 documents — if that system is working well, an operator  
 6 of a venue the size of this arena should be aware of the  
 7 following. There are five principles that I am going to  
 8 mention and I will mention all five first and ask you  
 9 for your comments.  
 10 First, visible security presence. Secondly,  
 11 (inaudible: distorted) suspicious activity before things  
 12 happen —  
 13 COLONEL LATHAM: Could you say that second one again,  
 14 please? Your microphone cut out momentarily.  
 15 Q. I'm sorry: secondly, catching suspicious activity before  
 16 things happen; third, visible and active searches and  
 17 patrols; fourth, keeping queueing crowds to a minimum;  
 18 and fifth, making the venue a less attractive target in  
 19 terms of impact and numbers being key.  
 20 Anyone who had understood those five principles, do  
 21 you agree, would have understood the fundamental  
 22 elements of CT mitigation?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: I agree with those elements that you've put  
 24 to us. But I don't think that you have listed the  
 25 fundamental elements of CT prevention, or however you

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1 put it, because I think it is a much wider subject than  
 2 those five things that you have just put to me.  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: I believe that all the points were covered  
 4 in the guidance that's issued by NaCTSO and CPNI. As we  
 5 raised the issue before, there is a significant amount  
 6 of information and the problem with an organisation not  
 7 having somebody that can interpret that is that they  
 8 might miss out on some of the key issues. That's why we  
 9 talked about the importance of a security professional  
 10 because there is a huge amount of information. If  
 11 you're a trained security professional, it's not  
 12 a problem to pick out what the key issues are and  
 13 unfortunately SMG never had a trained security  
 14 professional.  
 15 COLONEL LATHAM: The key issues will vary from site to site.  
 16 If you're a site that stores gas, you're less worried  
 17 about where the crowd is.  
 18 Q. That's why I asked you about a venue similar to the  
 19 Manchester Arena. Would you agree that those five  
 20 principles are a very good starting point for  
 21 understanding what a venue should be seeking to achieve  
 22 through its protective security?  
 23 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, absolutely.  
 25 Q. And it's for the venue to implement those principles,

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1 obviously?  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: Yes.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just stop this for a moment,  
 5 Mr Horwell? I'm sorry to interrupt you.  
 6 Everyone is saying how important it was for the  
 7 arena to have an independent security adviser operating  
 8 for them or employed by them; shouldn't someone have  
 9 told them that?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Either that, sir, or else it should have been  
 11 obvious to them if they didn't have the ability to  
 12 understand the material.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do most of the sites of a similar size  
 14 in the UK that you're aware of — do they have their own  
 15 in-house employed security adviser?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: Not all. Some of the organisation, if they've  
 17 got more than one site, they might have more than one  
 18 security manager that will cover all the sites, so it  
 19 might not be done to the individual site.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But within the arenas or music venues  
 21 generally, how typical was it to have either a shared  
 22 security manager or someone actually on site?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: I can't really comment on the arena.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know the O2 did.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: I know of other reasonable-sized music

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1 venues that did not have a security professional looking  
 2 after them. And in answer to your original point, it's  
 3 quite clear in the licence who's responsible. If that's  
 4 my — the licence-holder should read the licence, think,  
 5 crikey, that's a big responsibility, how  
 6 am I discharging that, maybe I should get some advice.  
 7 That's the stage I think that that realisation should  
 8 have happened, sir.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Horwell.  
 10 MR HORWELL: No, thank you, sir.  
 11 Can I just follow that up with this question? And  
 12 of course, I'm looking at this through the eyes of  
 13 a CTSA. There is certainly no NaCTSO guidance that  
 14 a CTSA should consider giving such advice or in which  
 15 circumstances such advice should be given; do you agree?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: The CTSA would give general advice, which isn't  
 17 digging down into the depth of the security principles  
 18 in the arena, so I would agree they wouldn't go into  
 19 that level of depth.  
 20 Q. The predominant policy behind the PSIA scoring system is  
 21 to protect the venue, to stop the terrorists getting  
 22 inside. I am sure that both of you would agree that  
 23 that is a very sound policy.  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 25 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't agree with your statement that it's

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1 to prevent terrorists getting inside. For example, if  
 2 you used a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device,  
 3 you could park it outside and kill the people outside  
 4 and some of the people inside. So your statement is not  
 5 one that I would —  
 6 Q. Colonel, let me amend it. It's to protect people inside  
 7 the building.  
 8 COLONEL LATHAM: I'll ask Dr BaMaung to answer that.  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I believe it's to protect — and as  
 10 Colonel Latham said, the attacks could actually occur  
 11 outside, the impact would be outside, so as the PSIA is  
 12 about protecting the crowd, and the crowd for this type  
 13 of venue will be inside the arena.  
 14 Q. There's one obvious example to the reason why  
 15 that approach is such a sound one: the Paris attacks  
 16 in November 2015. The suicide bombers could not enter  
 17 the stadium and although two detonated close to the  
 18 stadium, my understanding of that attack is that only  
 19 one person died. But the suicide terrorists who entered  
 20 the Bataclan Theatre and who held that audience captive,  
 21 my understanding is that 90 died inside the Bataclan.  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I'm not sure of the numbers. If you've  
 23 researched that, I would take that as being correct.  
 24 But yes, that demonstrated the effectiveness of  
 25 perimeter security and access control, whereas the

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1 Bataclan I think was a night — it was for an event and  
 2 I can't comment on the actual security, but obviously  
 3 whatever it was, it didn't succeed.  
 4 Q. No, but if ever an example is required to show the sense  
 5 behind that policy, that is obviously, sadly, a very  
 6 good one?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 8 Q. You have been asked, and this is my last topic, about  
 9 the element within the PSIA scoring system that relates  
 10 to partnership and communication sharing protocols and  
 11 the like that is contained in the PSIA scoring tool.  
 12 Doctor, we can provide this to the inquiry, but for  
 13 communication sharing protocols the drop-down box reads  
 14 as follows:  
 15 "Does the site have a communications agreement  
 16 policy process with its neighbours to share live time  
 17 information in relation to suspicious activity?"  
 18 Do you remember that from your days as a CTSA or  
 19 something similar?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: I'd need to probably see the document.  
 21 Q. I'm sure —  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: I take your word for it, yes.  
 23 Q. But my point is this?  
 24 DR BaMAUNG: (Overspeaking) — sorry, an example of that  
 25 could potentially be within a lot of the shopping

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1 centres. There is a protocol — somebody's in place  
 2 between the different shopping centres in the city,  
 3 although they're competitors, they also have an  
 4 information-sharing agreement, and that would be  
 5 usually — certain cities have a shared radio  
 6 communications network where, if they have intelligence  
 7 about shoplifters or whatever, they'll pass that  
 8 information on to the other sites as well.  
 9 Q. My point, doctor, is this: that this element of the PSIA  
 10 scoring system, looking beyond the venue to neighbours,  
 11 is all about information sharing, is it not?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. That's correct.  
 13 Q. If one venue sees suspicious activity then they pass it  
 14 on to neighbours?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 16 MR BUTT: There would have been much more to ask, but my  
 17 allocated time limit is up, there's no complaint about  
 18 that at all, but that is my half hour. Thank you,  
 19 gentlemen, for your assistance.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 21 MR GREANEY: Sir, next is Mr Gibbs on behalf of British  
 22 Transport Police. His allocation is 45 minutes. So  
 23 could I indicate to him that we cannot sit beyond 5.00  
 24 today or certainly not beyond 5.05 pm. If he is unable  
 25 to complete his questioning by then, he'll need to

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1 finish tomorrow morning. There's a challenge.  
 2 Questions from MR GIBBS  
 3 MR GIBBS: There's the challenge.  
 4 Sir, the topics on which I think there's consensus  
 5 I'm simply going to omit. Topics which I think I can  
 6 address in submissions to you next week, next fortnight,  
 7 I'm going to omit.  
 8 PC Wood's Phones4U document from this morning I am  
 9 going to omit save to say, because it might as well be  
 10 said on the same day as it's been described as to its  
 11 disclosure, was I think first provided to the inquiry by  
 12 BTP on 6 December 2018 and was disclosed to all core  
 13 participants in tranche 18, I think, on  
 14 16 December 2019. But none of that perhaps matters  
 15 because Inspector Wedderburn may well be able to  
 16 describe it and what it is and what it isn't tomorrow.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're acquitted of late disclosure.  
 18 MR GIBBS: Yes. I didn't feel indicted.  
 19 Gentlemen, I'm only going to ask you about topics as  
 20 they appear in that note of last Tuesday or in what  
 21 you have said over the last 2 days. I'm only going to  
 22 deal with parts of four of your 17 issues and they're  
 23 all about policing and therefore, if you'll forgive me,  
 24 colonel, I'm going to address my questions in the first  
 25 place mainly to Dr BaMaung.

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1 Doctor, you were a police officer for 30 years.  
 2 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 3 Q. You retired as an inspector, am I right?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 5 Q. Then you returned as a civilian to the same force —  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 7 Q. — for 9 years and you only stopped being a policeman  
 8 quite recently?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct.  
 10 Q. In Strathclyde in Scotland?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: Originally Strathclyde and thereafter  
 12 Police Scotland.  
 13 Q. In Strathclyde, where were you based?  
 14 DR BaMAUNG: I was based in a variety of places: Glasgow  
 15 city centre, the police office at Stewart Street was one  
 16 of them. That was the last one before I retired.  
 17 Q. Did you have experience of uniformed policing?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: The majority, virtually all my career was  
 19 uniformed policing.  
 20 Q. So neighbourhood policing and response policing but also  
 21 some CID?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: No, I was not in the CID. I was in community  
 23 policing and operational policing.  
 24 Q. Thank you. Any railway policing?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: None.

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1 Q. The first of the issues for me is issue 11. It's about  
 2 counter terror advice, counter-terror policing, and I'm  
 3 going to ask you a little bit about CTSA advice. In  
 4 2017, is this right, BTP had some CTSA's?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I believe they're based in London.  
 6 Q. And they provided counter-terrorism advice to  
 7 Network Rail and to the train-operating companies —  
 8 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, they did.  
 9 Q. — in the broader context, the regulatory context of the  
 10 national railways security programme?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I believe so, but I don't have any expertise  
 12 in that area.  
 13 Q. Okay. So they used the PSIA tool just like Home Office  
 14 forces but they used it to score railway stations?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 16 Q. Including Victoria?  
 17 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 18 Q. Which we have the PSIA documents for, about which no  
 19 complaint is made?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: No.  
 21 Q. They didn't provide the biannual CTSA advice to the  
 22 arena which is given by GMP, as Mr Horwell has just  
 23 dealt with. That was well understood by all, that GMP  
 24 were providing that advice?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. Both BTP and GMP seemed satisfied with

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1 that arrangement at the time.  
 2 Q. BTP did make, is this your understanding of the  
 3 evidence, some counter—terrorism advice and training  
 4 exercises available to SMG and its staff?  
 5 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct. I think there were  
 6 possibly one or two of the tabletop exercises were  
 7 arranged by BTP.  
 8 Q. They weren't present when the PSIA scoring process was  
 9 gone through with the arena?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: No, they weren't.  
 11 Q. And they weren't provided with the action plan that was  
 12 resulted from that?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: There was no communication between BTP and GMP  
 14 CTAs as far as I can establish to discuss the PSIA at  
 15 all.  
 16 Q. May I summarise it in this way: everyone now agrees that  
 17 it would be a good idea for the CTAs of the two forces  
 18 to, if not work jointly, at least share information as  
 19 fully as possible?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. That's a good point.  
 21 Q. Having said that, is it clear that Mr Upham of GMP knew  
 22 Superintendent Wylie?  
 23 DR BaMAUNG: I can't really comment on that. I don't know.  
 24 I certainly know that Miriam Stone dealt with the two of  
 25 them. I'm not sure whether they were together at any

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1 one place or time. They might have been at an exercise,  
 2 but I couldn't really comment on that.  
 3 Q. We can see from the correspondence, as you say, that  
 4 Miriam Stone was speaking to both of them and they both  
 5 made themselves available to the arena staff when the  
 6 staff had questions?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 8 Q. Can I move on then. Mr Wylie made a statement, it's  
 9 going to be read, so has an inspector called Smith, it's  
 10 going to be read.  
 11 Counter—terrorism policing. So responsibility for  
 12 general policing of the arena lay with BTP?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: That's correct, yes.  
 14 Q. And that was well understood by all?  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 16 Q. So GMP knew that perfectly well, they didn't think they  
 17 were in charge of general policing the arena?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: No, I believe that the arena and the complex  
 19 was left to BTP because it was a Network Rail  
 20 environment.  
 21 Q. And insofar as you can tell, BTP officers policed the  
 22 station and the platforms and the concourse and the  
 23 shops and the cafés as well as the exchange businesses,  
 24 the other businesses in the exchange, JD Williams, the  
 25 go—karting, the car park?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, every building within that complex,  
 2 including City Room and the environs around it was the  
 3 patrol area of BTP.  
 4 Q. So if a policing issue arose for those areas — and  
 5 I include the public places so the pavements, the  
 6 bridges, the tunnel, the taxi ranks — if a policing  
 7 issue arose in relation to those areas and those  
 8 businesses, it fell to BTP to respond to it?  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: I'm not sure of the full remit of BTP officers,  
 10 but I believe they've got the full power of a normal  
 11 police officer even in the environs outside the railway  
 12 station and other associated property, yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: At the risk of making you go over time,  
 14 can I check that? I think we've heard if you dial 999,  
 15 if you're a member of the public who sees something and  
 16 does what members of the public do, which is dial 999,  
 17 you go through GMP and not the BTP.  
 18 COLONEL LATHAM: Correct.  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Correct, sir. It would go to the GMP 999  
 20 centre.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who would respond to it?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: GMP. I wondered... I wonder whether the  
 23 reason for that is if you had two — if a 999 system  
 24 went both ways it would be confusing.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I was just pointing that out.

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1 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much. I think that  
 2 Mr O'Callaghan, he tried to explain that, I think if you  
 3 ring 999, as it were, the telephone software understands  
 4 where you're ringing from, so if you're ringing from  
 5 Glasgow it connects you to a Glasgow (overspeaking). If  
 6 you're ringing from Hastings, it connects you to an  
 7 East Sussex Police number. But if you're on a train you  
 8 could be anywhere — it doesn't know you're on a train  
 9 and so it doesn't know to connect you to the railway  
 10 police. That's why if you ring 999 it can't go to BTP,  
 11 it has to be transferred by the local force to BTP.  
 12 Have I understood that right?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. I believe that's correct. I couldn't be  
 14 100%, but it sounds like sense, yes.  
 15 Q. The situation might be different, and I'm not going to  
 16 go into it in any great detail, in the event of  
 17 a terrorist attack on BTP ground. I would ask you this  
 18 only: picture the situation in Glasgow and there's  
 19 a bomb or there's an MTFA. Wherever it is, BTP is not  
 20 going to take command of their response to that, is it?  
 21 It's going to be Police Scotland?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. If it was a 999 call, it would go to  
 23 Police Scotland. They would take responsibility if it  
 24 was a serious terrorist attack.  
 25 Q. Okay. The third subject under issue 11 is the police

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1 relationship with the arena — and I mean the BTP  
 2 relationship with the arena. Without naming any names,  
 3 would I be right in thinking that you must have come  
 4 across plenty of entertainment venues in Strathclyde  
 5 where the relationship between the venue and the local  
 6 police was nothing like as good as this?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would agree with that.  
 8 Q. Venues which were no end of trouble, non-compliant  
 9 venues, venues impervious to advice, venues which trod  
 10 the borderlines of legality even?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 12 Q. And the arena is a million miles, isn't it, from that?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. A lot of the emphasis there was at  
 14 operational level. I believe that the BTP officers on  
 15 the ground helped foster that relationship and possibly  
 16 nit has been more down to that than maybe even  
 17 approaches from senior management, although there were  
 18 liaison meetings between senior management and the  
 19 venue.  
 20 Q. Thank you, I was just going to ask you about the levels.  
 21 So we've heard, obviously, from Ms Stone and Mr Allen  
 22 and from others at SMG and can I summarise it this way  
 23 and tell me if I've got it wrong and judging it against  
 24 your experience of other police venue relationships: do  
 25 you agree that there appears to have been

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1 a well-developed and long-established working  
 2 relationship between the arena and BTP?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: At an operational level, I'd say yes.  
 4 Q. So it's not just Superintendent Wylie talking to  
 5 Ms Stone and the management but in terms of responding,  
 6 for instance, to the evidence that we've heard of  
 7 suspicious behaviour and the logging of that, you've  
 8 described a problem potentially with passing on the  
 9 consequences to GMP which perhaps another witness will  
 10 help with later. But in terms of BTP responding to  
 11 reports of suspicious behaviour, you're satisfied with  
 12 that process?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 14 Q. And in terms of the officers on the ground routinely, as  
 15 we have seen perhaps from the CCTV even, speaking as  
 16 they pass around the common parts to the SMG staff and  
 17 to the ShowSec staff, have you been satisfied with that  
 18 also?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: I don't think there's any dispute of the fact  
 20 that there was a good working relationship. One of the  
 21 witnesses mentioned the BTP officers would go in to the  
 22 control room, possibly once a day or more. I think the  
 23 arena was in a unique position was it was in an enclosed  
 24 environment, whereas a venue out in the territorial  
 25 division's area might not have the same amount of

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1 attention, but because the BTP officers were working  
 2 within the station complex every day, I think it was  
 3 natural that there would be a development of the  
 4 relationships.  
 5 Q. Yes. SMG are there every day and BTP are there every  
 6 day, next door to each other and around each other. In  
 7 practical terms, for events, would I be right in saying  
 8 that what this relationship meant was that BTP appear to  
 9 have been kept informed some months in advance of the  
 10 pipeline of events that was coming up?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: I think at the biannual multi-agency meetings  
 12 they were given the list of 6 months' forthcoming events  
 13 as were the other partners in the bi-monthly meetings.  
 14 And that was prior notification.  
 15 The other thing I believe they were given shortly  
 16 prior to the event was the event rider, which was used  
 17 as a briefing tool by the personnel on duty at the time.  
 18 Q. Yes. So there's the six-monthly briefing, and there's  
 19 the on-the-day briefing, the final "these are the  
 20 numbers, this is the demography", and so on, on the day.  
 21 And between that — it may be that we are going to have  
 22 to wait until tomorrow morning to hear this evidence,  
 23 I don't know whether you have seen  
 24 Inspector Wedderburn's statement, but were the  
 25 six-monthly details updated periodically, I don't know,

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1 by email, every 2 months, something like that, as events  
 2 approached?  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: I don't think that we've seen evidence of  
 4 that, although the running lists would change during the  
 5 course of the year as acts cancel and acts get added and  
 6 acts become unpopular.  
 7 Q. Thank you very much.  
 8 If there were particular concerns about an upcoming  
 9 event, we've seen reference to a Neil Diamond concert  
 10 and a Bette Midler concert, for instance, is it your  
 11 reading of the evidence that the police presence was  
 12 increased?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: I think in relation to that particular  
 14 incident, there had been a confirmed instance of hostile  
 15 reconnaissance which was sufficient enough to raise the  
 16 alarm bells within BTP, which then caused that enhanced  
 17 level of response. But in answer to your question, the  
 18 other times that I think there have been enhanced levels  
 19 of response have been at events which have had  
 20 a significant potential public disorder potential and  
 21 then you would possibly get a PSU or a serial of public  
 22 order officers available as well.  
 23 Q. And the special policing services bought in  
 24 (overspeaking) and we have seen the invoices for it.  
 25 Having said all of that, is it your evidence,

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1 looking at it from BTP's point of view, that even if  
 2 that represents a good relationship, the relationship  
 3 between BTP and SMG could have been even better?  
 4 DR BaMAUNG: I think so, and I think so especially  
 5 in relation to the policing of events because I think  
 6 that was where the communication fell down in the actual  
 7 operation on the night. Although the event riders were  
 8 given, it's an extremely complex issue as you're well  
 9 aware of.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: As I have understood the evidence so  
 11 far, and I'll be corrected by either of you, they all  
 12 got on perfectly well, but it would have helped if  
 13 they'd had a coordinated approach on the night of events  
 14 and everybody knew what each other was doing.  
 15 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.  
 16 COLONEL LATHAM: I would agree with that and I would change  
 17 the word that you used in your sentence: you said could  
 18 have been better and I would replace the word could with  
 19 the word should. The relationship should have been  
 20 better.  
 21 MR GIBBS: That's very helpful.  
 22 As that is plainly a matter of consensus now between  
 23 those who have spoken in the last 60 seconds, I'm going  
 24 to leave it there.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry, I was just trying to indicate

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1 what I thought the actual criticism was.  
 2 MR GIBBS: Yes. It's 16 minutes to and it's issue 8(b),  
 3 briefing.  
 4 Can I distinguish between two things and ask you,  
 5 doctor, to distinguish between two things? Can we  
 6 distinguish on the one hand, which I'm not going to deal  
 7 with, what the officers on the ground actually did, but  
 8 what I do want to deal with is what they were asked to  
 9 do. This really is Sergeant Wilson's briefing.  
 10 {INQ0255538/1}.  
 11 If we could expand it so that we're looking at the  
 12 top half first. Without just reciting it, which would  
 13 be idle on my part, doctor, can I just summarise what  
 14 may be common ground? Sergeant Wilson is the duty  
 15 sergeant for Manchester that afternoon. Based in the  
 16 police office at Piccadilly Station or just outside  
 17 Piccadilly Station, responsible for doing all of the  
 18 things that he, as duty sergeant, told us about.  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, that's correct.  
 20 Q. He briefs some of the officers on this document in  
 21 person, some of them by email, and some of them by both?  
 22 DR BaMAUNG: I think two officers got briefed both by email  
 23 and the rest didn't.  
 24 Q. I'm going to give you some propositions and tell me if  
 25 you think that they're accurate summaries from this

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1 document.  
 2 He told, and it wasn't just the officers at Victoria  
 3 he was briefing, was it, it was the officers at  
 4 Piccadilly and the officers who were on mobile patrol,  
 5 and my suggestion was that he told each of them what his  
 6 or her role was. He told each of them where to go and  
 7 when. And he asked the sergeants who were coming on  
 8 later, Banks and Wilcock, to ensure, down the bottom of  
 9 the page, that all of the officers at Peninsula were  
 10 advised of the details in the document. Are we okay  
 11 with that?  
 12 DR BaMAUNG: My personal view is the dynamics of that  
 13 briefing changed when he included the information about  
 14 Constable Corke going away to do another enquiry. If  
 15 the senior officer, the senior constable had been there,  
 16 then that briefing would — and it was guaranteed to be  
 17 at the site, that briefing may have sufficed. But  
 18 I think as soon as he realised that Constable Corke was  
 19 not going to be there, he should have been more specific  
 20 about what their roles were, namely which officers would  
 21 carry out which duties, and also which officers refresh,  
 22 because the problem that was faced on that night was  
 23 that you had a team of three PCSOs and one probationary  
 24 constable with 8 months' service that were given general  
 25 guidance, it was not stated who goes where, and I think

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1 from my 30 years of police service and experience, if  
 2 you have a probationer in charge of a detail you need to  
 3 be really specific, you can't treat it — if it was  
 4 Constable Corke, I think Constable Corke would have had  
 5 the knowledge and the ability to delegate because nobody  
 6 would challenge his 30 years' service. But I think for  
 7 that particular detail, once Sergeant Wilson had  
 8 realised Constable Corke was not going to be there,  
 9 initially he should have then advised the officers  
 10 specifically what their roles were.  
 11 Q. Yes, thank you. You cut across the detail, and I'm not  
 12 criticising you, to the end of it.  
 13 May I go back to the detail to this extent: did you  
 14 understand that Sergeant Wilson, when he went off duty  
 15 at the end of his rota, that he knew that Mr Corke  
 16 wasn't going to be able to get to the arena for the end  
 17 of the concert?  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: I believe in one of the statements he mentioned  
 19 he was leaving the police office when he came across  
 20 Constable Corke at 9 o'clock and he realised at that  
 21 point that Constable Corke wasn't going to be available.  
 22 (overspeaking).  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: (Overspeaking) Mr Corke was saying,  
 24 "I will (overspeaking) and I will be there".  
 25 As I said, I was concerned about the criticism of

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1 Sergeant Wilson yesterday. I am not saying that  
 2 criticism can't be made, all I am saying is that it was  
 3 never actually put to him when he gave evidence and  
 4 I thought he went away without any real criticism having  
 5 been made of him. If he is aware of what was said  
 6 yesterday and would wish to respond to it in  
 7 a statement, then I would be very happy to have it from  
 8 him because I don't think people should be criticised  
 9 without the opportunity to answer.

10 MR GIBBS: Thank you. And if you'll forgive me, sir,  
 11 I would like to pursue the question --

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Of course.

13 MR GIBBS: My suggestion is, Dr BaMaung, that one can always  
 14 improve upon anyone's work and analyse a document like  
 15 this years after the event and say. You could have said  
 16 this, or, you could have said that. But my suggestion  
 17 is that in fact this is something pretty close to  
 18 a model briefing.

19 COLONEL LATHAM: I wouldn't agree with that.

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You like to go high, don't you,  
 21 Mr Gibbs, really?

22 COLONEL LATHAM: I wouldn't agree with that.

23 MR GIBBS: I am going to ask the police officer to respond  
 24 first, colonel, before I turn to you, if I may.

25 DR BaMAUNG: No, I don't think -- if I was doing a briefing,

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1 I would assign a specific role to a specific officer.  
 2 I wouldn't leave it up to the officers to decide who  
 3 wants to go to what position and take their breaks at  
 4 what time. I would specify what the roles of the  
 5 individuals were. I was maybe being kind in saying if  
 6 Constable Corke, if he had been there, he would have  
 7 taken on the role of corporal or senior constable, but  
 8 I don't think that's a particularly great briefing, to  
 9 be perfectly honest.

10 Q. Okay. So he shouldn't have trusted the officers at  
 11 Victoria, is this the proposition, to work out between  
 12 themselves which of them went to the locations which he  
 13 did identify?

14 DR BaMAUNG: The issues that I was saying there is when he  
 15 realised there wasn't a senior constable going to be  
 16 there certainly for the start and the ingress, then yes,  
 17 I feel he should have been more specific in the guidance  
 18 he gave to the officers, especially considering one of  
 19 officers wasn't even through her probation and the other  
 20 three were PCSOs.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: My recollection again of the evidence is  
 22 originally when this was sent, he certainly did not know  
 23 that Mr Corke was not going to be there from 7.30, ie  
 24 the beginning of it, and therefore perhaps he was  
 25 relying on Mr Corke, or whatever his experience was,

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1 that they could then sort it out amongst themselves.  
 2 At some stage, and it may not have been until  
 3 9 o'clock and I will need to refresh my memory about  
 4 that, he realised that Mr Corke was not there and so  
 5 perhaps the argument is that at that stage he needed to  
 6 have done something to try and get someone more senior  
 7 there.

8 DR BaMAUNG: I believe, sir, that he should have found out  
 9 long before 9 o'clock that Constable Corke wasn't there  
 10 and I would have expected him to radio Constable Corke  
 11 halfway through the afternoon to find out, are you going  
 12 to be at the arena for ingress, and if he wasn't then  
 13 that would obviously impact on his view of how well that  
 14 was going to be policed. But there's no evidence that  
 15 any attempt was made to contact Constable Corke until  
 16 the sergeant left at 9 o'clock.

17 MR GIBBS: So there's an issue here between us perhaps about  
 18 to what extent a sergeant should micromanage his  
 19 constables; is that it?

20 DR BaMAUNG: I wouldn't call it micromanaging, I would call  
 21 it effectively manage his personnel. Because if  
 22 you have people working for you at an event which is  
 23 nearly 14,000 people, which is a significant concert,  
 24 and the person in charge at the time has got 8 months'  
 25 service and you've got three PCSOs helping, and you're

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1 not aware at the time that a senior constable who's got  
 2 a lot of experience in that field is going to there or  
 3 not going to be there, I don't think it's micromanaging,  
 4 I think it's effectively managing.

5 Q. Do you agree in terms of the arena that he identifies  
 6 the pinch point times, the peak flow times, the in and  
 7 the out, he identifies the right locations, namely the  
 8 places of maximum flow and he spells them out?

9 DR BaMAUNG: Yes.

10 Q. But he leaves it to the officers to decide which of them  
 11 goes to which?

12 COLONEL LATHAM: I would observe that he didn't point out  
 13 the mezzanine, which was known to be an important  
 14 observation point, to the four junior staff that he's  
 15 sending off to the City Room.

16 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I would concur with Colonel Latham on  
 17 that.

18 Q. And Hunts Bank, where he's sending one of them, what's  
 19 the equivalent of the mezzanine? Where should he tell  
 20 that officer to stand?

21 DR BaMAUNG: What he's done is he's given the areas where  
 22 the crowds are going to access into the arena. I think  
 23 another issue was that, as far as deploying the three  
 24 PCSOs and a constable, one of the PCSOs was being  
 25 mentored by another PCSO, and the third PCSO in his

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1 evidence, I believe, gave evidence to the effect that  
 2 the PCSOs would normally double up because they lacked  
 3 the PPE that constables had. Therefore the only person  
 4 he could double up with was the police constable, the  
 5 probationary police constable, which gave you in effect  
 6 two teams and there's several areas to be covered there.  
 7 Q. Yes, there are three areas. Do you agree with me it  
 8 plainly envisages solo patrols, save for the tutee who  
 9 will be with the tutor?  
 10 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, and I think he also made the caveat that  
 11 unless — there was an option for the personnel on duty  
 12 at the time to make a decision to double up or not, that  
 13 was left for them.  
 14 Q. But they couldn't, doubling up, have covered everything,  
 15 could they?  
 16 DR BaMAUNG: I think in evidence one of the officers or  
 17 PCSOs said that two of the actual points that were to be  
 18 observed were close to each other. I'm not sure but  
 19 potentially they might've been able to cover the two  
 20 points.  
 21 Q. All right. I think I've raised the issues that I wanted  
 22 to ventilate with you, you have given me your answer and  
 23 I'm not going to turn it to into an argument.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't know whether Colonel Latham  
 25 wanted to say something. He was quite keen to get in at

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1 an earlier stage but maybe you have said —  
 2 COLONEL LATHAM: I did disagree with your phrase about this  
 3 being close to a perfect brief. It's about what it  
 4 delivers and what it delivered was not very effective.  
 5 He didn't mention the mezzanine to these junior staff  
 6 although it was known to be something that was  
 7 important. We've got the quality of staff that are  
 8 being deployed, the numbers of staff that are being  
 9 deployed. Not telling people what lengths their  
 10 refreshment breaks should be and at least on this night  
 11 they took excessively long refreshment breaks and  
 12 there's an opportunity to display leadership to these  
 13 inexperienced people who are going to a crowded venue.  
 14 All of those things, when I read this, and when  
 15 I read it a year or so ago, made me think that this  
 16 doesn't look like a very good brief that isn't delivered  
 17 face to face.  
 18 DR BaMAUNG: I think in addition to the actual brief, in  
 19 Sergeant Wilson's statement he indicated that outwith  
 20 ingress and egress times all he required was one officer  
 21 on duty at the arena area when the rest could go to  
 22 potentially Piccadilly to report write or to have their  
 23 refreshment breaks (overspeaking).  
 24 MR GIBBS: Piccadilly or Peninsula, perhaps?  
 25 DR BaMAUNG: Peninsula.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we know where the battle lines  
 2 are drawn. I think it's also fair to say there was  
 3 a standing instruction about how long the refreshment  
 4 breaks could be.  
 5 COLONEL LATHAM: I accept that, sir.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 7 MR GIBBS: So he could have spelt out all of those things,  
 8 of course, but I don't know when you were a sergeant  
 9 whether you took a certain amount of nous on trust in  
 10 your constables?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: It depends what the event would be. If it was  
 12 an absolutely minor event that was of no significance  
 13 then yes, but I think I would actually class that as  
 14 a pretty large event and for something like that, if  
 15 I was a sergeant, I would brief individuals  
 16 specifically, I wouldn't just leave it up to a group to  
 17 work out amongst themselves what they wanted to do.  
 18 I would actually give them specific guidance in relation  
 19 to what duties they had, where they were, and also  
 20 I would assign refreshment breaks to individual officers  
 21 so they knew exactly what was expected of them.  
 22 Q. Thank you.  
 23 Could I just take you then to the first line in your  
 24 note of last Tuesday on this topic. It's number 8(b).  
 25 Was it certainly last week your opinion that there would

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1 have been an adequate number of BTP officers if PC Corke  
 2 had also been present?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I certainly hadn't seen the document that  
 4 came through recently to us about what was decided was  
 5 a minimum manning level for different events. I would  
 6 have said that if Constable Corke had been there, then  
 7 the two PCs and three PCSOs could potentially have  
 8 provided sufficient coverage.  
 9 COLONEL LATHAM: I think that our discussions at that stage  
 10 was around numbers and we've written the word "number"  
 11 there and I remember making a comment about quality. If  
 12 there had been four PCs, that is very different from one  
 13 inexperienced PC and three PCSOs, one of whom is under  
 14 instruction or whatever the phrase is. So therefore my  
 15 judgment is that one thing is about the number, another  
 16 thing is about the experience.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have read that as being that if  
 18 PC Corke had been there with the other ones that were  
 19 actually there on that night, that would suffice and  
 20 that would — that complies with the footnote with  
 21 PC Corke present there would have been two PCs with  
 22 powers of arrest rather than just the one. So it looked  
 23 like when this note was being prepared you were actually  
 24 saying those particular officers plus Corke would be  
 25 sufficient.

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1 COLONEL LATHAM: That was the sentiment that I expressed  
 2 at the time this note was being written, sir .  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you.  
 4 MR GIBBS: From a police point of view, as an experienced  
 5 officer — and Dr BaMaung, what did you mean by that  
 6 line and a bit?  
 7 DR BaMAUNG: Sorry, line?  
 8 Q. The first line of 8(b).  
 9 DR BaMAUNG: I felt if there were two police officers and  
 10 three PCSOs, that could have been an adequate number  
 11 because the problem as well is if there's an arrest,  
 12 that will take one of your police officers away  
 13 straightaway. So it might not have been an arrest  
 14 in relation to the arena, but with that detail, as well  
 15 as covering the arena, they were also covering the  
 16 station. If there'd been any incident that required  
 17 somebody to be arrested, that would be a sole police  
 18 constable away, potentially, with one of the PCSOs,  
 19 which would then leave the event covered by two PCSOs.  
 20 That's why I felt two police officers would be the  
 21 absolute minimum because, that way, at least if you lose  
 22 one police officer to an arrest, you've still got one  
 23 police officer that can remain.  
 24 Q. Yes, quite. Obviously, the need for arrest will differ  
 25 to some extent. Of course it's unpredictable, but will

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1 differ to some predictable extent by reference to the  
 2 crowd in the arena?  
 3 DR BaMAUNG: Yes. When I say "arrest", I wasn't talking  
 4 about the crowd in the arena, I was talking about the  
 5 railway station. If there was disorder or some incident  
 6 within the railway station or even the immediate  
 7 environs where BTP had responsibility, the taxi rank,  
 8 because the officers weren't dedicated solely to deal  
 9 with the arena event that night, it meant that they  
 10 would also have responsibility for dealing with any  
 11 other incidents round about the railway station, which  
 12 would deplete their numbers, or even the sole PC, very  
 13 quickly.  
 14 Q. And you agree, do you, doctor, with Colonel Latham's  
 15 suggestion that this email at 2.41 in the afternoon, at  
 16 a time when it wasn't known that Constable Corke  
 17 wouldn't be there at ingress and certainly wasn't known  
 18 that he wouldn't be there at egress, should specifically  
 19 have mentioned the mezzanine?  
 20 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I think that was a key area. If  
 21 Constable Corke had identified it now, if he had been  
 22 aware of it, I think that would have been knowledge for  
 23 other police officers within British Transport Police  
 24 that that is a key area.  
 25 Q. When did you first think that?

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1 DR BaMAUNG: City Room? As we were working along through  
 2 the evidence.  
 3 Q. No, when did you first think the email was to be  
 4 criticised by reference to its omission of the word  
 5 "mezzanine"?  
 6 DR BaMAUNG: Well, we thought after the full evidence was  
 7 heard. It was an omission at the time, but we never  
 8 realised the significance until we started seeing all  
 9 the evidence.  
 10 Q. For instance, have you ever said it before just now?  
 11 DR BaMAUNG: We've discussed it, yes.  
 12 Q. Have you ever said it to anybody else before just now?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: We've not discussed any of the evidence that  
 14 we've read other than with ourselves.  
 15 Q. Is there any risk, do you think — obviously we're all  
 16 looking directly at the mezzanine with laser sight now.  
 17 Is there any risk of hindsight bias, do you think,  
 18 there?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: I don't think even the mezzanine level is  
 20 a critical position for identifying suspicious activity,  
 21 but as an observation position, as Constable Corke had  
 22 identified, it's the ideal position for an officer to  
 23 cover. Now, Constable Corke knew that, I don't know if  
 24 PC Bullough knew that. Mind you, I believe she went up  
 25 on to the mezzanine level around about McDonald's at one

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1 point in time, when the other time she just went around  
 2 the actual floor.  
 3 COLONEL LATHAM: I'd say that when we began with our  
 4 evidence, we didn't realise what significance the  
 5 mezzanine would have and I think we had a moment of  
 6 realisation when we saw the footage of PC Corke on the  
 7 ITV or BBC documentary when he talked about how well  
 8 he was familiar with the mezzanine and he would always  
 9 go up there, and I remember that I had the thought,  
 10 "I don't think he told the others about that". That's  
 11 when it became a greater part of the conversations that  
 12 Dr BaMaung and I were having that that piece of  
 13 information, which seems to be known, did not seem to  
 14 have been passed on.  
 15 MR GIBBS: I know I've got 30 seconds left this evening.  
 16 Could I just ask one last thing on this? That is:  
 17 doctor, you say you think that Sergeant Wilson should  
 18 have gone to Victoria that night?  
 19 DR BaMAUNG: Yes, I do.  
 20 Q. When?  
 21 DR BaMAUNG: I would say during the evening, probably before  
 22 he finished duty. I'm aware that he got tied up with  
 23 something else. I seem to recollect a document recently  
 24 that mentioned that Sergeant Wilcock was on during some  
 25 of the evening as well. What I would have expected,

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1 just as an operational supervisor, was if  
 2 Sergeant Wilson became engaged with something else and  
 3 he couldn't get to the venue that (1) he would check to  
 4 see if Constable Corke was there and (2) if  
 5 Constable Corke wasn't there and he realised the junior  
 6 level of the officers there he would have contacted --  
 7 if Sergeant Wilcock was on -- I can't confirm whether he  
 8 was or wasn't -- would have contacted another supervisor  
 9 to cover for him and to go and just have a look at this  
 10 position in the arena.  
 11 Q. And that was to, what, to as it were, police his own  
 12 officers?  
 13 DR BaMAUNG: I don't think they were his -- well, I believe  
 14 they were officers from different police stations for  
 15 that event, but I think that may be symbolic of the way  
 16 the event was treated and that they were his officers  
 17 for the detail but they actually came from different  
 18 police offices.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the actual dividing line is  
 20 quite narrow. So the sergeant said, "I would have gone.  
 21 That's what I wanted to do and intended to do, but when  
 22 I went, I then had to deal with something else, an  
 23 emergency I came across". I think the difference is,  
 24 should he have got someone else in authority to go along  
 25 and check on them if he couldn't go.

1 MR GIBBS: I haven't done it in the 32 minutes or whatever  
 2 I had, and I am going to take 45 minutes. I know that  
 3 means I'll have to finish tomorrow. If everyone will  
 4 forgive me, that's what I'll do now.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I have to go, I have  
 6 arranged to go and see the arena tonight, so I can't  
 7 actually go on any longer, I'm afraid. You'll have  
 8 10 minutes tomorrow.  
 9 MR GREANEY: Can I indicate that we will also have to  
 10 interpose Inspector Wedderburn first thing tomorrow  
 11 morning, so we'll have to wait slightly longer for  
 12 Mr Gibbs to finish his questions.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm happy to sit earlier, but that may  
 14 be inconvenient for people and makes for quite a long  
 15 day tomorrow, but we do need to get through it.  
 16 MR GREANEY: We do, sir, but I can tell you that those  
 17 representing Mr Agha and Mr Lawler have no questions of  
 18 the experts and so we have clawed back 30 minutes, so  
 19 we are behind schedule only to a very limited extent.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you.  
 21 Thank you very much for everyone's hard work and  
 22 keeping to the time limits today.  
 23 (5.07 pm)  
 24 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on  
 25 Thursday, 3 December 2020)

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