

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 44

December 7, 2020

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Monday, 7 December 2020
 2 (9.30 am)
 3 (Delay in proceedings)
 4 (9.54 am)
 5 MR GREANEY: Sir, good morning. As will be obvious to
 6 everyone, we're starting almost 25 minutes late.
 7 There's no mystery in that. There has been a technical
 8 difficulty, wholly unrelated to the evidence of
 9 Mr Barraclough. Nonetheless, we apologise to you, sir,
 10 and to all the core participants.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have been made aware of the technical
 12 problems. They were very last minute. I'm very
 13 grateful to those who have worked very hard to overcome
 14 them and put alternatives in place, but equally the less
 15 time we lose before we start in the mornings, the
 16 better, particularly when people are ready to go.
 17 MR GREANEY: I should emphasise, everybody was ready to go.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry as well to everybody. There
 19 really were very serious technical problems, which have
 20 been overcome, I'm grateful to say.
 21 MR GREANEY: Sir, as I indicated on Thursday last week,
 22 we are turning to chapter 8. In this chapter the
 23 inquiry will focus upon the planning and preparation
 24 undertaken by Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi for the
 25 attack on 22 May. We will therefore be addressing

1

1 paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3 of the inquiry's terms of
 2 reference, which cover the following: 2.1, attack
 3 planning and reconnaissance; 2.2, bomb preparation and
 4 assembly, including, if applicable, relevant purchases,
 5 attempted purchases and storage; and 2.3, the movements
 6 of Salman Abedi and other relevant associates in the
 7 lead-up to the attack.
 8 As we explained when making our opening statement on
 9 behalf of CTI, the spine of the evidence for this
 10 chapter will be given by Mr Simon Barraclough, the
 11 senior investigating officer for Operation Manteline,
 12 the name given to the investigation into the arena
 13 attack.
 14 Before he is sworn, we should identify a number of
 15 ground rules. First, Mr Barraclough's witness
 16 statements run in total to 268 pages plus appendices.
 17 His evidence addresses issues of relevance not just to
 18 chapter 8 but also to chapters 13 and 14, which, as
 19 everybody knows, address radicalisation and
 20 preventability. He will be recalled in chapter 13 to
 21 deal with those issues. In our view, he should not be
 22 asked questions about chapter 13 or chapter 14 issues
 23 during this phase because to do so will be disruptive to
 24 the structure of the oral evidence hearings, would waste
 25 time and, moreover, Mr Barraclough has not been asked to

2

1 prepare for chapter 13 and 14 issues for the evidence he
 2 will give this week.
 3 Second, this inquiry, as we've just indicated, has
 4 set terms of reference and is not an investigation of
 5 the investigation, and, moreover, is not an
 6 investigation of whether different charging decisions
 7 could have been made in respect of some individuals.
 8 Third, at the trial of Hashem Abedi, a number of
 9 individuals were the subject of orders made under
 10 section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence
 11 Act 1999, orders which prevented their identities being
 12 publicised.
 13 A restriction order has been made to give effect to
 14 that order in these proceedings. That restriction order
 15 is, of course, available to all and, in particular,
 16 available to the press. I'll simply refer at this stage
 17 to paragraph 3, sir, of the order that you made, which
 18 is in the following terms. It prohibits reporting of
 19 the following:
 20 "Reference to information which is capable of
 21 leading to the identification of the identity of
 22 a person, including but not limited to the witness's
 23 name, the witness's address, the identity of the
 24 educational establishment attended by the witness, the
 25 identity of the witness's place of work, any still or

3

1 moving image of the witness, and information that may
 2 tend to identify family members."
 3 So, sir, we need to make clear that those witnesses
 4 must be referred to, given that we are broadcasting
 5 these proceedings on YouTube, by cipher, and if it truly
 6 proves necessary to ask them questions that would tend
 7 to identify them or family members by way of jigsaw
 8 identification, CTI should be informed of that fact
 9 because those questions would need to be asked in
 10 a restricted session and we hope that is clear to
 11 everyone.
 12 Fourthly, as will be perfectly obvious,
 13 Mr Barraclough is aware of much operationally sensitive
 14 and national security sensitive material. Disclosure of
 15 that material publicly would be harmful to the national
 16 interest because it would assist terrorists to launch
 17 attacks and/or to make their attacks more deadly. The
 18 risk of inadvertent disclosure inevitably arises no
 19 matter how careful everyone is. But everyone will need
 20 to exercise a high degree of care in asking the
 21 questions they wish to pose, including CTI, and that
 22 of course also includes Mr Barraclough.
 23 As a result, it may be the case that from time to
 24 time, Mr Barraclough, if we might put it this way, parks
 25 an answer in order to give consideration to get to

4

1 whether it can properly be answered openly.
 2 Fifth, the material underpinning the statements of
 3 Mr Barraclough is vast. As a result, from time to time,
 4 he may need to delay an answer in order to check the
 5 underlying material, and for that reason our breaks will
 6 be longer than usual at 30 minutes.
 7 Sixth and finally, the main statement of
 8 Mr Barraclough is dated 27 August of this year and is
 9 divided into seven parts and I'll indicate how those
 10 parts are to be dealt with.
 11 Part 1 deals with the initial investigation,
 12 including a high level summary of the whole
 13 investigation and I will deal with questions relating to
 14 that part. Part 2 relates to the device and its
 15 construction. Mr de la Poer will deal with that.
 16 There are two things to mention dealing with those
 17 first two parts. Witnesses will be interposed during
 18 parts 1 and 2. The instructional video will be referred
 19 to but will not be shown. In our view, no image from
 20 the video should be shown on screen at any stage and
 21 certainly the video should not be named.
 22 Part 3 relates to finances, and again Mr de la Poer
 23 will deal with that part of Mr Barraclough's evidence.
 24 Part 4 relates to the investigation of Salman Abedi
 25 and Hashem Abedi and I will deal with that, although

5

1 we will not reach that part until tomorrow.
 2 Part 5 relates to persons of interest. Again,
 3 I will deal with that.
 4 Part 6 of the witness statement relates to, as they
 5 are described in the statement, victims, but that part
 6 of the evidence will be addressed in chapter 12 and
 7 we will not be dealing with it during this phase.
 8 Finally, part 7 of the witness statement addresses
 9 other areas of investigation, together with certain
 10 miscellaneous matters, and Mr de la Poer will deal with
 11 that.
 12 Sir, that deals with all of the ground rules and
 13 introductory matters. Unless there is anything, sir,
 14 that you wish to say at this stage, I will call
 15 Mr Barraclough.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We will follow those ground rules
 17 subject to submissions being made to me. So I will
 18 obviously hear submissions if people wish to make them,
 19 if they want to go outside those ground rules. I think
 20 they should be aware that if that relates to identifying
 21 anyone who is subject to the order not to identify them,
 22 it may be necessary to go to Mr Justice Jeremy Baker for
 23 a ruling as well as they derive from his order, which
 24 remains in existence. But we'll deal with that
 25 if we need to. Obviously I will hear submissions if

6

1 people wish to contradict or go against any of the
 2 ground rules.
 3 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much, sir.
 4 At this stage, could Mr Barraclough please be sworn.
 5 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (sworn)
 6 Questions from MR GREANEY
 7 MR GREANEY: Would you begin, please, by telling us your
 8 full name?
 9 A. Simon Justin Barraclough.
 10 Q. In May 2017, and indeed until very recently indeed, were
 11 you an officer of Greater Manchester Police?
 12 A. Yes, I was. I was a detective chief superintendent.
 13 Q. And you no longer, I think, hold that role; is that
 14 because you recently retired?
 15 A. I did, yes. I retired on the day that we received the
 16 verdict for Hashem Abedi.
 17 Q. So I believe the position is that you could have retired
 18 earlier but you made a commitment to remain a police
 19 officer until that process and that trial had concluded?
 20 A. That's correct, Mr Greaney, yes.
 21 Q. But you have returned to work for Greater Manchester
 22 Police in the position of senior investigating officer?
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. And it ought to be recognised that you have done so in
 25 order to support the process of this public inquiry?

7

1 A. Yes, that's right.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We're all grateful and I'm sorry to
 3 interfere with your retirement.
 4 A. Thank you, sir.
 5 MR GREANEY: Your role, from very shortly after the arena
 6 attack and indeed to this day, was as senior
 7 investigating officer for Operation Manteline; is that
 8 correct?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. Is Operation Manteline the title of the operation which
 11 provided the investigative response to the arena bombing
 12 on 22 May 2017?
 13 A. It is.
 14 Q. How was that particular name for the operation selected?
 15 A. It's a randomly generated word. It has absolutely no
 16 meaning. It is just the title of the operation.
 17 Q. It's generated randomly by a computer?
 18 A. That's correct.
 19 Q. And as you say, means nothing. Is Operation Manteline
 20 a designated counter-terrorism investigation?
 21 A. Yes, it is.
 22 Q. Does it operate under the direction of Counter-terrorism
 23 Policing North-west and the National Counter-terrorism
 24 Network?
 25 A. Yes.

8

1 Q. Throughout the course of the investigation, have you had
 2 a line manager?
 3 A. Yes, that's right: it's Temporary Assistant
 4 Chief Constable Russ Jackson.
 5 Q. I believe, having led the police operation since the
 6 night of the attack, there is something that you would
 7 like to say before you get into the substance of your
 8 evidence on behalf of yourself and on behalf of your
 9 team more generally.
 10 A. I think that, put in the simplest terms, I would just
 11 like to say that from 22 May 2017 myself and my team --
 12 and my team have asked me specifically if I could say
 13 this -- we have been wholly committed to this
 14 enterprise. Our best wishes and our condolences go to
 15 the families who have been most affected by this
 16 terrible atrocity, but also those people who have been
 17 injured in the atrocity. We are currently at a stage
 18 where there are 1,017 people who have been injured
 19 in the actual bombing, and throughout the 3.5 years
 20 we have conducted this inquiry, they have always been in
 21 our thoughts and prayers.
 22 Q. I don't want to say too much about it, but Manchester,
 23 I know, is your home and the home for many of your
 24 officers?
 25 A. It is, yes.

1 Q. And the investigation has been a deeply affecting one
 2 for your team; is that correct?
 3 A. Yes, that's right.
 4 Q. Let's leave that and move on to ask some questions,
 5 please, about your own professional background.
 6 Did you join Greater Manchester Police as long ago
 7 now as 1988?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. What has much of your service been spent dealing with?
 10 A. Most of my police service has been investigating
 11 homicides and suspicious death. Latterly, I have been
 12 more involved in counter-terrorism investigations.
 13 Q. We'll come on to that. During the course of your
 14 career, you received training which later became the
 15 SIO, senior investigating officer, development
 16 programme?
 17 A. Yes, that's right.
 18 Q. In March 2003, having received that training, were you
 19 promoted to the rank of detective superintendent?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Leading major incident teams?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. With the job exclusively of investigating homicides?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. In your statement you deal with the definitions and

1 descriptions of the role of the SIO at paragraphs 6 and
 2 7. Those will be available for the chairman if that is
 3 necessary.
 4 You've also, I think, received training in issues
 5 such as disaster victim identification; is that correct?
 6 A. That's correct, yes.
 7 Q. Did there come a period when you left Greater Manchester
 8 Police to work elsewhere within the United Kingdom?
 9 A. Yes. I served with the police service of
 10 Northern Ireland in Belfast.
 11 Q. During what periods did you work there?
 12 A. That was from 2005 to 2007.
 13 Q. During your period in Northern Ireland, were you
 14 involved in counter-terrorism operations?
 15 A. Yes, I was.
 16 Q. I ought to say that within your first witness statement,
 17 that section of the statement is marked as operationally
 18 sensitive, but you've taken the view that it doesn't
 19 attract that description?
 20 A. No, I don't think so. I think it was quite well-known
 21 that I held that position.
 22 Q. In September 2010, were you appointed the head of the
 23 Greater Manchester Police major inquiry teams having
 24 returned to that force?
 25 A. Yes, I was.

1 Q. And thereafter, again did you devote your time almost
 2 exclusively to homicide investigation?
 3 A. I did.
 4 Q. Among other investigations that you were responsible
 5 for, were you responsible for the investigation into the
 6 murders and poisoning at the Stepping Hill Hospital in
 7 Stockport --
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. -- known as Operation Roxburgh? And moreover in 2012,
 10 did you undertake the duties of SIO for the dreadful
 11 murders of Constable Fiona Bone and Constable
 12 Nicola Hughes?
 13 A. Yes, I did.
 14 Q. Having much earlier in your career been trained as
 15 an SOI, in December 2012 were you accredited to level
 16 PIP4, namely accreditation as a strategic crime adviser?
 17 A. Yes, I was.
 18 Q. And in very simple terms, and in a few sentences, what
 19 does that accreditation involve?
 20 A. It effectively allows you to provide high-level advice
 21 to chief officers concerning complex major crime
 22 investigations, so you effectively can be the force
 23 adviser to a chief constable or his assistant with
 24 regard to the conduct of those enquiries.
 25 Q. In March 2014 were you appointed to the role of head of

1 investigations for the North–west Counter–terrorism
 2 Unit, now known as CTP North–west?
 3 A. Yes, that’s correct.
 4 Q. And what did that particular role require you to do?
 5 A. You effectively lead the investigations department,
 6 which consists of four other senior investigating
 7 officers , and each of those investigating officers
 8 carries a workload of investigations relating to
 9 counter–terrorism. So your role as the lead is to
 10 manage that department and ensure that those officers
 11 effectively have what they need to run those
 12 investigations .
 13 Q. So in short, therefore, your role as head of what is now
 14 CTP North–west required you to do two things. First of
 15 all , to coordinate and lead a team of other senior
 16 investigating officers ?
 17 A. That’s correct.
 18 Q. And secondly, also personally to lead a small number of
 19 operations which you considered carried the greatest
 20 risk ?
 21 A. That’s also correct.
 22 Q. And all of the operations in both categories would be
 23 counter–terrorism operations?
 24 A. Yes, they would.
 25 Q. Although it would not perhaps be appropriate to go into

13

1 the detail of them.
 2 A. No.
 3 Q. In July 2014 did you complete a course to train you as
 4 a counter–terrorism SIO?
 5 A. I did.
 6 Q. Again, in simple terms and a few sentences, what did
 7 that course involve training you in?
 8 A. It effectively uses your experience as a senior
 9 investigating officer with regard to major crime and
 10 homicide and it familiarises you with the
 11 counter–terrorism world. So that includes things like
 12 relevant legislation , the organisation and structure of
 13 counter–terrorism within the UK and how that fits within
 14 an investigation , and how counter–terrorism
 15 investigations actually impact particularly on the
 16 communities that we serve and nationally.
 17 Q. In June 2016, by which time you had been head of the
 18 counter–terrorism police in the north–west for a little
 19 over 2 years, did you attend the FBI post–blast
 20 investigation course in the United States?
 21 A. Yes, I did.
 22 Q. Did that follow attendance by you at several
 23 international bomb symposiums held in Germany to share
 24 experiences and learning around improvised explosive
 25 devices and explosives?

14

1 A. That’s correct.
 2 Q. So in short therefore, by May 2017, would it be
 3 reasonable to say that you were a highly experienced
 4 detective officer ?
 5 A. I think that would be reasonable, yes.
 6 Q. With many years of experience not only of investigating
 7 homicide offences but also investigating terrorism
 8 offences?
 9 A. Yes, I think that’s right .
 10 Q. Against that background, I’m going to turn to part 1 of
 11 your principal witness statement and so I’m not sure
 12 which divider in your bundle that will be at, I’m sure
 13 you’ll find it fairly readily . I’m going to begin at
 14 paragraph 5 of that statement. This is the main
 15 statement dated 27 August 2020.
 16 Everyone in this room and watching knows that
 17 Salman Abedi detonated his bomb at 22.31 hours on
 18 22 May 2017. When did the criminal investigation into
 19 his actions commence?
 20 A. It effectively commenced 2 minutes later, which was the
 21 first call to the police .
 22 Q. And as the initial response to the attack was taking
 23 place, were counter–terrorism resources being mobilised
 24 in order to begin a terrorism investigation ?
 25 A. Yes.

15

1 Q. When were you first made aware that there had been an
 2 attack at the arena?
 3 A. I received a telephone call from Mr Jackson — that was
 4 at 23.27 — and he told me that there had been a bombing
 5 at the arena and it was suspected that that was
 6 a suicide bombing.
 7 Q. Did he explain that, bearing in mind your particular
 8 experience, he intended to appoint you as the
 9 counter–terrorism SIO?
 10 A. Not in that telephone conversation, I think that was
 11 done a short time later .
 12 Q. At all events, did you decide to mobilise?
 13 A. Yes, I did.
 14 Q. And did you go to a particular location that I won’t
 15 identify ?
 16 A. Yes, I did.
 17 Q. Arriving there shortly after midnight on 23 May?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we stop for one moment? You’re
 20 quietly spoken, which is fine . I can hear you, but can
 21 I check everyone can hear all right ?
 22 A. I will try and speak up, sir .
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don’t want to make it uncomfortable
 24 for you, particularly if you’re going to be there for
 25 3 days, by having you speak very loudly. But just

16

1 occasionally, the sentences, at the end of them, the
 2 voice drops.
 3 A. I understand.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine. There is nothing more
 5 irritating than when a voice goes up at the end of
 6 phrases, so just keep it reasonably confident,
 7 thank you.
 8 MR GREANEY: I'm sure that those who are watching will raise
 9 a hand if they struggle to hear. Thank you very much.
 10 We had reached a point shortly after midnight on
 11 23 May, so about an hour and a half after the bombing.
 12 You have arrived at a location where the investigative
 13 response is being coordinated from, would that be fair?
 14 A. That's correct, yes.
 15 Q. And did you there meet with ACC Jackson?
 16 A. I did.
 17 Q. And what step did he take at that stage in relation to
 18 you?
 19 A. That was the conversation that we had when I was asked
 20 to be the senior investigating officer.
 21 Q. So within about 90 minutes of the attack, you had been
 22 appointed to that role?
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.
 24 Q. During the initial stage of the investigation, did you
 25 cover the night shift with Detective Chief Inspector

17

1 Pickering, from whom we've heard a number of times, as
 2 your deputy SIO?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct, and that was for approximately the
 4 first 10 nights.
 5 Q. Was the burden of the investigation such that
 6 effectively it had to run 24 hours a day?
 7 A. It was a 24-hour a day operation, yes, it was.
 8 Q. So during the day shift when you were not working, who
 9 was covering the work that needed to be done?
 10 A. That was Detective Superintendent William Chatterton and
 11 Detective Chief Inspector Andrew Meeks.
 12 Q. Who had appointed those officers to those roles?
 13 A. Again, that would have been Mr Jackson.
 14 Q. And no doubt you can confirm that in appointing those
 15 officers to those roles, regard was had to the fact that
 16 each of them was working in North-west CTU, as it was
 17 known?
 18 A. That's correct, yes.
 19 Q. And each was trained and experienced as
 20 a counter-terrorism SIO?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Having worked in such roles for a number of years?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So essentially, Mr Jackson was putting together his most
 25 highly trained and experienced team; would that be fair?

18

1 A. Yes, I think that's fair.
 2 Q. Initially, as you've explained, the investigation was
 3 managed within North-west CTU, but was it quickly
 4 recognised that assistance would be required from
 5 elsewhere in the country?
 6 A. Immediately, and this involved the marshalling of large
 7 numbers of officers from all over the Counter-terrorism
 8 Network.
 9 Q. Why was it thought necessary that assistance was
 10 required from elsewhere within the country?
 11 A. Because this was recognised from the very beginning to
 12 be an extremely large investigation.
 13 Q. So senior officers became assisted by a substantial
 14 number of other officers and staff from across the
 15 Counter-terrorism Policing Network; is that correct?
 16 A. That's correct, yes.
 17 Q. Including other SIOs who were given specific areas to
 18 oversee, for example in relation to CCTV?
 19 A. That's correct, yes.
 20 Q. Because, just to take that as an example, to harvest all
 21 of the CCTV relevant to this investigation was a mammoth
 22 task?
 23 A. It was enormous, yes.
 24 Q. And we've seen the product of it during the course of
 25 this inquiry and the jury at Hashem Abedi's trial

19

1 of course saw the product of it, but we must not
 2 underestimate the amount of work that's gone into
 3 producing the compilations that we have seen; is that
 4 correct?
 5 A. That is absolutely correct, yes.
 6 Q. In the course of any investigation, terrorism
 7 investigation, no less this one, is it necessary for the
 8 CTSIO to set objectives?
 9 A. Yes, it is.
 10 Q. And did you set objectives in relation to
 11 Operation Manteline at 2 am on 23 May?
 12 A. Yes, I did.
 13 Q. Were they agreed by ACC Jackson?
 14 A. Yes, they were.
 15 Q. And recorded in something that we'll look at a little
 16 more in a moment called the CLIO log?
 17 A. They were, yes.
 18 Q. I'll identify what those objectives are and then ask you
 19 a small number of questions about them.
 20 (1), identifying the continuing threat to public
 21 safety.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. (2), to identify any further offenders who present an
 24 immediate threat or who have assisted the commission of
 25 the attack by any means.

20

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. (3), identify the principal offender.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. (4), secure the bomb scene and gather all available
 5 evidence.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. (5), identify eyewitnesses and pursue relevant lines of
 8 enquiry.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. (6), identify all victims and deploy FLOs, so family
 11 liaison officers, where appropriate.
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. Would it be fair to say that the principal focus of the
 14 investigation at that stage was proactive, in other
 15 words to prevent a further attack as opposed to
 16 reactive, so to identify and investigate who had done
 17 what?
 18 A. I think both, in truth. So whilst there is an ongoing
 19 investigation that starts immediately, the slight
 20 difference with a counter-terrorism threat is that it is
 21 recognised that, for example, if you take the Paris
 22 attacks, it is highly possible that there will be
 23 further attacks, so having experienced the bomb going
 24 off, there was a very real concern that there may be
 25 other attacks and also there was a real concern that

21

1 there may be outstanding explosives. So you're right in
 2 saying the main concern is protection of life and
 3 preventing any further killings from that point.
 4 Q. You're quite right, it's both things at that stage.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. But what will inevitably be of particular importance
 7 will be to ensure, so far as possible, there is no
 8 further attack and also to secure any other explosives
 9 that may be in existence within the community?
 10 A. That's correct, yes.
 11 Q. I believe that at 03.21 hours on 23 May, the second and
 12 sixth of those objectives were updated?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. With objective 2 being updated to read as follows:
 15 "Identify any further offenders who present an
 16 immediate threat or have assisted the commission of this
 17 attack by any means and to arrest such individuals and
 18 secure evidence where available."
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. As we're going to see, there were a substantial number
 21 of individuals who were arrested; is that correct?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. Objective 6 was then updated to read:
 24 "Identify all victims and support GMP in the
 25 disaster victim identification or DVI process."

22

1 A. Correct.
 2 Q. And DVI is a recognised process which is brought into
 3 effect following an outrage of this type?
 4 A. Yes, that's right.
 5 Q. And in which you yourself, I think, had received some
 6 training?
 7 A. That's right, as a senior identification manager.
 8 Q. Did you personally set your investigative objective for
 9 the operation at an early stage as being to continue to
 10 search for the truth in order to bring to justice all
 11 those responsible for the atrocity and to answer all the
 12 questions that might be posed by the victims and/or
 13 others affected?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. I said that we would return to the CLIO logging system
 16 and, again in very simple terms and shortly, could you
 17 describe what that system is, please?
 18 A. It's a very simple process. It's effectively just
 19 a logging system, so it will work contemporaneously and
 20 record any information that you think is relevant with
 21 regard to an investigation or indeed an ongoing policing
 22 operation. So that would include things like
 23 decision-making, key actions, key policies. Everything
 24 goes into that log and is timed, dated and effectively
 25 contemporaneously recorded.

23

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does that replace what used to be the
 2 SIO's policy book?
 3 A. Not necessarily, sir. They can run simultaneously, but
 4 clearly in response to an incident such as this, it is,
 5 I would suggest, impossible to keep an SIO policy book.
 6 So you are literally throwing all those decisions on to
 7 the CLIO log with the loggist who records that.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 9 MR GREANEY: So is this a reasonable way of summarising it:
 10 that obviously in the immediate aftermath of an outrage
 11 such as this, events will be moving very quickly,
 12 decisions will need to be made on a minute-by-minute
 13 basis if not faster?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And CLIO is a simple and straightforward logging system
 16 which enables what is occurring to be captured?
 17 A. Yes, that's right, and of course it does allow you to
 18 then look back over that log and make sure that any work
 19 that should have been done has been done.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you have a dedicated loggist who
 21 records what you're saying, basically?
 22 A. You may have several, sir. There's so much happening
 23 that recording this information can be a full-time
 24 process for several loggists.
 25 MR GREANEY: I should say, during the course of ILT's work,

24

1 we have seen the CLIO log.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 3 MR GREANEY: Was the CLIO system, as is common, used only
 4 during the early stage of the investigation, namely
 5 between 0106 hours on the 23rd and the last entry being
 6 15.19 hours, and in your statement you say 19 June;
 7 is that the correct date?
 8 A. I think that's correct, yes.
 9 Q. Subsequently, were other computer systems, perhaps more
 10 sophisticated systems, used depending on the nature of
 11 the information?
 12 A. Yes, that's right. So at this stage, the system
 13 migrates into HOLMES, which is the Home Office Large
 14 Major Enquiries System. That is a standard piece of
 15 software that we would use in relation to managing any
 16 murder enquiry.
 17 Q. So this is now a long-established system, which has
 18 probably existed for 30 years, but in various
 19 iterations?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. The senior investigating officer or other senior
 22 officers can generate actions, as they are called, which
 23 are logged on the system?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Those are allocated to particular officers who then

25

1 produce reports or results?
 2 A. Yes, that's right. But the main thing with HOLMES
 3 is that it is a searchable database.
 4 Q. And it is really designed to ensure that opportunities
 5 are not missed and that what ought to be done is done?
 6 A. Yes, that's right.
 7 Q. In its early stages, it was learning the lessons of
 8 police investigations which were considered to have gone
 9 badly wrong, in particular the investigation into what
 10 were called the Yorkshire Ripper murders?
 11 A. Yes, that's why it's important that it's searchable.
 12 But just to refer back to the CLIO log, the CLIO log is
 13 effectively absorbed into HOLMES so again nothing
 14 within that should be missed.
 15 Q. So I believe it would be right to say that the HOLMES
 16 system is used for what might be described as overt
 17 material?
 18 A. Yes, on the whole, although it can be used for secret
 19 material as well.
 20 Q. And is designed so that if there is a prosecution, the
 21 material on HOLMES can rapidly be translated into the
 22 criminal justice system?
 23 A. Yes, it can.
 24 Q. Although I appreciate that some closed material or
 25 covert material may be on HOLMES, but would it be

26

1 reasonable to say that in relation to intelligence
 2 material, another system that we won't describe will
 3 also be utilised?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. In the early stages of your investigation were the SIO
 6 teams, because there were a number of them, based in
 7 a particular room known as the fusion cell?
 8 A. Yes, that's right.
 9 Q. What was the fusion cell?
 10 A. The fusion cell is basically an extremely large means of
 11 gathering information and intelligence in one place,
 12 assessing that information and intelligence, and then
 13 driving an investigation through actions from that base.
 14 So it forms the core of the investigation that's ongoing
 15 and it forms the core of any intelligence—gathering
 16 operation post-attack in this case.
 17 Q. I'm going to turn in a moment, as I promised I would, to
 18 seek from you a high level summary of what your
 19 investigation revealed, but still dealing with the
 20 structure of the investigation at the moment, in those
 21 initial phases of your investigation, as we will come on
 22 to describe in detail, were you concentrated, among no
 23 doubt other issues, on the identity of the bomber and
 24 the identification of anyone who may have assisted him
 25 or been in contact with him in the period before the

27

1 attack?
 2 A. Yes, that's right.
 3 Q. Did that lead to a total of 23 arrests under the
 4 Terrorism Act?
 5 A. Yes, it did.
 6 Q. And the searching of 42 sets of premises and
 7 18 vehicles?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. During that stage did you recover a total of 930 digital
 10 media devices?
 11 A. Yes, we did.
 12 Q. So phones, tablets and the like?
 13 A. That's correct, yes.
 14 Q. Under which provision or provisions did you arrest those
 15 23 people?
 16 A. That was under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000,
 17 which is being suspected of being concerned in the
 18 commission, preparation or instigation of an act of
 19 terrorism.
 20 Q. Does that legislation allow for an arrested individual
 21 to be detained for up to 14 days without charge, albeit
 22 with regular reviews in place to ensure that the ongoing
 23 detention is necessary and justified?
 24 A. That's correct, yes.
 25 Q. An important issue that we'll need to bear in mind as we

28

1 come on to look at parts 4 and 5 of your witness
 2 statement, which will be tomorrow, is that your role was
 3 to investigate, not to make the charging decision or
 4 prosecute; is that correct?
 5 A. Yes, that's right.
 6 Q. The decision as to who was to be prosecuted and what for
 7 and thereafter to conduct the prosecution rested with
 8 the Crown Prosecution Service; is that correct?
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.
 10 Q. And more specifically with the Crown Prosecution Service
 11 Counter—terrorism Division?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. In the course of your investigation, did you work
 14 closely with the Crown Prosecution Service?
 15 A. Yes, very closely, and unusually in this case a total of
 16 three lawyers from CPS were actually deployed to
 17 Manchester. They worked with our teams throughout this
 18 whole process of 22 of the 23 arrests in order to assess
 19 that evidence and whether or not there was any potential
 20 for a charging decision.
 21 Q. So when we look, as we will do, at others that were
 22 arrested and who have not been prosecuted, should we
 23 bear in mind that your team worked closely with the CPS
 24 from an early stage?
 25 A. Yes, that's right.

29

1 Q. How early on was their liaison with the Crown
 2 Prosecution Service?
 3 A. This was within — I think they were deployed within
 4 a couple of days up to Manchester. The liaison with
 5 the Crown Prosecution Service would have started the
 6 very next day, so that would have been the 23rd, but
 7 their deployment was a couple of days later.
 8 Q. So we should bear in mind liaison from within 24 hours?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. The liaison involved three lawyers, co—locating with
 11 your team in Manchester?
 12 A. Yes, that's right. So two lawyers who principally
 13 looked at the evidence and there was a dedicated lawyer
 14 to look at the warrants of further detention and
 15 obviously assess whether they should be applied for and
 16 whether that was being done in a lawful and
 17 proportionate manner and in order, really, to provide
 18 that first stage before judicial oversight with regard
 19 to the 14 days in custody, which is clearly a very
 20 important factor with counter—terrorism legislation.
 21 Q. Should we also bear in mind when we look at decisions
 22 that were made that these were experienced and
 23 specialist lawyers from the Crown Prosecution Service?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And, moreover, that in due course extremely experienced

30

1 leading counsel were instructed also to advise?
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.
 3 Q. In short whilst, of course, the content of the
 4 discussions that you and your team had with the Crown
 5 Prosecution Service and counsel about those who were
 6 arrested is privileged and must therefore remain
 7 confidential, would you wish to assure us, the bereaved
 8 families and indeed the public, that all of those
 9 decisions were made at meetings with senior lawyers of
 10 the CPS and extremely senior and experienced barristers?
 11 A. Absolutely, yes.
 12 Q. And were not made quickly but were made after the result
 13 of the most careful consideration?
 14 A. No, and indeed this process continued right through the
 15 trial of Hashem Abedi and there has been liaison after
 16 as well.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be we're going to deal with this
 18 later, but is it material to state that the terrorist
 19 legislation investigator or appointee, Max Hill at the
 20 time, also reviewed what went on at this stage in
 21 a report?
 22 MR GREANEY: I'm sure that is relevant for us to note and
 23 we will get on to that.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And there is a report that he has
 25 produced and it is in the public domain.

31

1 MR GREANEY: There is a report and we will, later on in the
 2 evidence of the SIO, be getting to that because Mr Hill
 3 has assisted us with the provision of certain
 4 information which was known to him but not necessarily
 5 to us at that stage.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 7 MR GREANEY: There came a time, as we'll see, at which the
 8 other suspects who had been arrested were released; is
 9 that correct?
 10 A. Yes, that's right.
 11 Q. Which was to come in early June. Did that mark in
 12 a sense the end of a phase of the investigation, or
 13 would that be putting it too high?
 14 A. In a sense, yes, it did in a sense. But I think it's
 15 almost a — it would suggest that the investigation
 16 comes to some sort of pause at that stage and that's
 17 just not the case.
 18 Q. No, my question wasn't designed to suggest that, but
 19 no one will have difficulty in understanding that
 20 a major investigation like this has a number of
 21 different phases.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Here we have a phase during which you're seeking to
 24 identify the bomber, which, as we'll see, happened at an
 25 early stage, and you were seeking to identify others who

32

1 may have supported the bomber.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Now you've reached a point in early June when others who
 4 have been arrested have been released without charge and
 5 it would seem that that marks the end of a phase of the
 6 investigation, albeit not one that results in a pause;
 7 is that a fair way of putting it?
 8 A. I think it is, but in a way I don't think it accurately
 9 reflects how I feel about that in that I think our
 10 investigation continued throughout the 3.5 years. It
 11 almost isn't a pause because, even on release, the
 12 investigation of all these subjects and their conduct,
 13 the part that was being played by everybody in the story
 14 of this offence, those enquiries have continued and
 15 still continue. So I understand what you're saying,
 16 Mr Greaney, and I do agree with that, but it has
 17 genuinely been an ongoing process for 3.5 years.
 18 Q. I believe I've understood and that what you're
 19 communicating is there doesn't come a day on, let's say,
 20 6 June when people are released from custody and that is
 21 an end of it; you continue to see where the evidence
 22 takes you and if the evidence reveals a further case for
 23 someone to address then they will have to address that
 24 case?
 25 A. Yes, absolutely.

33

1 Q. And indeed, as we're going to see --- I have said that
 2 a lot and I'll say it a lot more, no doubt --- there
 3 remain people that you wish to speak to?
 4 A. Indeed that's the case, yes.
 5 Q. At any rate, however, whilst understanding everything
 6 you've said, once the last suspect had been released,
 7 did that have an impact upon the size of the team?
 8 A. Yes, it did. It allowed us to reduce the management
 9 structure around this team and we were no longer needing
 10 to operate on a 24-hour basis.
 11 Q. The way in which you put it in your witness statement,
 12 paragraph 18, is that:
 13 "Once this early stage of the investigation was
 14 over, after the release of the last suspect, it was only
 15 necessary to have one SIO team, which consisted of me as
 16 SIO and DCI Pickering as deputy SIO. This was because
 17 the investigation was no longer a 24-hour, 7 days a week
 18 operation, and the focus had shifted from proactivity
 19 and public safety towards a reactive investigation."
 20 A. That's correct, yes.
 21 Q. So just so we're clear about this, this was nothing to
 22 do with a limit being placed upon resources, this was
 23 simply reacting to the changing needs of the
 24 investigation?
 25 A. Yes, and any investigation such as this will work much

34

1 better with a more focused leadership. So two teams
 2 with a reactive investigation would probably create far
 3 more complications than just the single team.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can someone remind me of the date we've
 5 got to? Is it June?
 6 MR GREANEY: We're going to come on to the date. It's about
 7 6 June, I think.
 8 You'll recall better than I do. Can you remember
 9 the date upon which the last of the 23 ---
 10 A. I think that would be about right, 6 June.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 MR GREANEY: In order to run the investigation efficiently
 13 and effectively, was it necessary for you, as SIO, and
 14 DCI Pickering, as deputy SIO, to delegate specific tasks
 15 to individuals and teams?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. But at the same time, did you take steps to ensure that
 18 relevant information flowed between each team?
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.
 20 Q. How did you achieve that in practice?
 21 A. We would have a very regular briefing regime, which
 22 would encompass the entire team and sometimes that would
 23 have to be split because of the size of the team.
 24 We would have briefings around specific areas of
 25 investigation as well with the team leaders and the

35

1 teams that would be engaged in that work.
 2 Q. Were all decisions either undertaken by you or taken by
 3 others ratified by you and logged either on the HOLMES
 4 system or in a document the chairman's referred to,
 5 namely your policy book?
 6 A. Yes, that's right.
 7 Q. In your witness statement, you deal with policy books in
 8 general terms in paragraph 20 and that information will
 9 be available for the chairman if it's relevant for the
 10 purposes of his report.
 11 Separately, did something called an identification
 12 commission come into existence as part of the
 13 investigation?
 14 A. Yes, it did.
 15 Q. Who was responsible for that?
 16 A. That was the responsibility of HM Coroner. The lead
 17 coroner for this was Mr Meadows.
 18 Q. Was that set up, in very simple terms, to manage the
 19 formal identification of each of those who had been
 20 murdered in the attack?
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.
 22 Q. As the work of the coroner's identification commission
 23 came to its end, what happened in terms of the
 24 investigation?
 25 A. In terms of the deployment of family liaison officers?

36

1 Q. Yes, that's what I had in mind.
 2 A. The family liaison officers, when they're initially
 3 deployed, particularly within a DVI process, are very
 4 much there with regard to the identification process, to
 5 support the families through the identification process.
 6 Q. So these are police officers?
 7 A. They are police officers, yes.
 8 Q. Appointed at an early stage --
 9 A. That's right.
 10 Q. -- as part of the identification commission initially to
 11 address matters of identification?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. But obviously, there comes a point and did come a point
 14 in this case where the process of identification is
 15 complete and so what becomes the role of the FLO at that
 16 stage?
 17 A. The FLO effectively is a conduit to bereaved families
 18 from the investigation. So where I need to communicate
 19 information to them or they need to communicate
 20 information back to the investigation, the FLOs act as
 21 the interface for that process.
 22 Q. Was there a particular officer who was in charge of the
 23 FLO team in this investigation?
 24 A. Yes, that's right, that was DCI Lamb.
 25 Q. DCI Theresa Lamb.

37

1 Still dealing with the structure of the
 2 investigation, is disclosure a particularly important
 3 process in circumstances in which it is expected to
 4 prosecute an individual or individuals?
 5 A. Yes, it's extremely important.
 6 Q. How was that handled by your investigation?
 7 A. This is indicative of the size or the scale of material
 8 that was being handled by the investigation, but the
 9 team that was appointed was substantial, it was eight
 10 disclosure officers and deputy disclosure officers who
 11 then catalogue all of the information within the enquiry
 12 on to particular schedules, which will be disclosed when
 13 a prosecution case is engaged.
 14 Q. Was the disclosure process, as set out and managed,
 15 agreed with the Crown Prosecution Service throughout?
 16 A. Yes, it was.
 17 Q. I don't believe it's necessary to go into that in any
 18 further detail.
 19 I'll turn to receive your high-level summary of the
 20 investigation. It is important that we should have an
 21 idea of the scale of it and I'm now at paragraph 25.
 22 During the initial stages of Operation Manteline,
 23 did an estimated 1,000 police officers, police staff and
 24 National Crime Agency officers from across the entire
 25 country work on the investigation?

38

1 A. They did, yes.
 2 Q. It may be that some viewing these proceedings don't have
 3 much of an idea of what that means in terms of scale,
 4 but how would that compare with other investigations?
 5 A. It's colossal. That is a colossal number of officers
 6 and staff coming into work with one enquiry. I would
 7 suggest that's certainly one of the biggest police
 8 responses to a major crime that certainly I've ever seen
 9 in my career.
 10 Q. Did those officers and other individuals assist in
 11 carrying out over 16,000 actions?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Recovering or seizing more than 17,000 exhibits?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And as at the date of your statement, there will be more
 16 now, taking more than 4,000 statements?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Furthermore, in total, have more than 20,000 documents
 19 been produced during the course of the investigation?
 20 A. Yes, far more.
 21 Q. Next, and we're still at part 1 of your witness
 22 statement, your high-level summary of the investigation,
 23 dealing with its scale and scope and the broad
 24 conclusions that it has reached.
 25 As I have indicated, this will be high level and

39

1 we'll delve into the detail of it in addressing further
 2 parts of your report.
 3 As we all know, at 22.31 hours on 22 May, whilst in
 4 the City Room, Abedi detonated his improvised explosive
 5 device, and as a result killed 22 people, about whose
 6 lives we heard at an earlier stage in these proceedings,
 7 and injured hundreds of others.
 8 A. Yes, that's right.
 9 Q. In the very early stages, was an assessment and search
 10 of the scene carried out?
 11 A. Yes, it was.
 12 Q. No doubt that had to be undertaken with great care so as
 13 to preserve evidence?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. At that very early stage, was the body of the suspected
 16 attacker identified near to the seat of the explosion?
 17 A. Yes, it was.
 18 Q. And therefore close to the arena box office?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Could I indicate through you to those who are watching,
 21 both in the room and who are watching remotely, that
 22 we are not going to be going into detail about those who
 23 were killed or injured, but we will be going into some
 24 detail in due course, at any rate, of how it was that
 25 you were able to identify Salman Abedi as the bomber; is

40

1 that correct?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Which will involve detailing certain medical
 4 interventions in relation to him. I simply mention that
 5 so if anyone feels they might get distressed about that
 6 detail, they do not need to watch this part of the
 7 proceedings.
 8 But found close to the body of that person, who
 9 turned out to be Salman Abedi, did you recover, or at
 10 any rate, a member of your team recover a bank card?
 11 A. Yes, that's right. A Halifax bank card in the name of
 12 Salman R Abedi.
 13 Q. Furthermore, and we'll come to the detail of this
 14 tomorrow, I expect, did facial recognition evidence
 15 support the fact that Abedi was the bomber?
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.
 17 Q. And thereafter did DNA and fingerprint profiling support
 18 that fact?
 19 A. Yes, it did.
 20 Q. I think, even to the extent of comparing teeth, that
 21 step was taken in order to check that he was indeed the
 22 bomber?
 23 A. Yes, it was.
 24 Q. As your investigation progressed, did it become apparent
 25 that there was evidence indicating that Hashem Abedi,

1 the brother of Salman Abedi, had assisted in the
 2 planning and preparation for the attack?
 3 A. That's correct, yes.
 4 Q. As a result, what step was taken at that early stage
 5 in relation to him?
 6 A. It's actually recorded as 11.30 hours on 23 May that
 7 Hashem Abedi is declared a suspect.
 8 Q. Very quickly afterwards, did reports start to appear
 9 in the British media about Hashem Abedi?
 10 A. Yes, they did.
 11 Q. Were those reports to the effect that he had been
 12 detained whilst in Libya?
 13 A. That's correct, yes.
 14 Q. And in due course, was that confirmed by the Foreign and
 15 Commonwealth Office?
 16 A. Yes, it was.
 17 Q. Did Hashem Abedi remain in custody in Libya before he
 18 returned to the United Kingdom on 17 July 2019?
 19 A. As far as I'm aware, yes.
 20 Q. Was his return the result of extradition proceedings
 21 between the United Kingdom and Libya?
 22 A. That's correct, yes.
 23 Q. In which both your team and the Crown Prosecution
 24 Service had been engaged?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Was Hashem Abedi charged with the murder of 22 people?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. The attempted murder of others who survived?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And with conspiring with Salman Abedi to cause, by an
 6 explosive substance, an explosion of a nature likely to
 7 cause serious injury or damage to property?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Once Hashem Abedi was back in the country, was there
 10 a desire on the part of your team to interview him?
 11 A. Yes, there was.
 12 Q. And did such an interview take place?
 13 A. It did, yes, under section 22 of the Terrorism Act.
 14 Q. Did he answer questions?
 15 A. He refused to answer questions. However, he prepared
 16 a pre-prepared statement.
 17 Q. We'll just look at two paragraphs of that prepared
 18 statement on the screen: CPS000043 --- forgive me, it's
 19 {CPS000207/1}. The earlier reference was the interview
 20 transcript.
 21 This is the typed version of his prepared statement
 22 and again, so that those who aren't familiar with the
 23 criminal process can understand, what happens is that
 24 a statement is prepared with the assistance of his
 25 solicitor setting out his position. It is then read

1 out, usually by the solicitor. Is that what happened in
 2 this case?
 3 A. I'm not sure, actually. I'm not sure whether it was
 4 read out. I'm not sure whether it was just handed over.
 5 Q. Sometimes it's just handed over. At all events, this
 6 was supplied to the investigation and then he refused to
 7 answer any questions, either generally or based upon the
 8 statement that he had provided?
 9 A. That's correct, yes.
 10 Q. Paragraph 2:
 11 "I deny any involvement in the terrorist attack at
 12 the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017. I was not involved
 13 in the instigation, preparation or commission of it.
 14 The first I heard of it was on 23 May, a few hours
 15 before I was arrested by the FTS in Libya. Had I had
 16 any idea of it, I would have reported it to my mother
 17 initially and then to other family members to prevent it
 18 from happening. I was shocked my brother had done this
 19 and felt bad for everybody. I could never have
 20 envisaged that my brother had it in him to do this to
 21 innocent people."
 22 And then I'll read out paragraph 3:
 23 "I am a practising Muslim. I do not hold [he
 24 claimed] extremist views. I do not delve too deep into
 25 anything other than pray and read the Koran. I have no

1 interest in Daesh and have no sympathy or support for
 2 their ideology and extremism. I did attend the mosque
 3 from time to time and wear traditional clothing at the
 4 time of visiting the mosque but this was not in support
 5 of ISIS but to practice my religion. I am not a member
 6 of ISIS nor do I subscribe to their way of thinking or
 7 ideology."
 8 So that was the statement that was either read on
 9 his behalf or, more probably, handed over.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And FTS stands for?
 11 A. This is effectively the militia that held him.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 13 MR GREANEY: We've understood that the militia that held him
 14 was the RADA Defence Force. This may be a different way
 15 of describing it?
 16 A. It may be. I can check for you, sir, if you wish.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 18 MR GREANEY: Effectively, he was denying being an extremist
 19 holding pro-ISIS views, he claimed that he had played no
 20 part in planning or preparation for the attack, and that
 21 it had been a shock when he discovered what his brother
 22 had done. And indeed, he was to conduct his trial on
 23 that basis?
 24 A. Certainly initially, yes, that's correct.
 25 Q. There came a time when it might be suggested he

1 disengaged and didn't give evidence and so on, but
 2 initially, I'm sure you'll be able to agree that from
 3 the base upon which his case was conducted, he was
 4 denying that he had played any part in the planning and
 5 preparation?
 6 A. Yes, I completely agree.
 7 Q. You, I think, are aware that on 22 October of this year,
 8 in prison, serving his sentence, Hashem Abedi was
 9 interviewed by member of the inquiry legal team?
 10 A. Yes, I am.
 11 Q. When I say members of the inquiry legal team, I mean
 12 Mr de la Poer and Mr Suter?
 13 A. That's right.
 14 Q. And you, I know, are aware and the core participants are
 15 aware, but this will be news to others, that on
 16 22 October during the course of that interview,
 17 Hashem Abedi admitted that he had played a full part and
 18 a knowing part in the planning and preparation for the
 19 arena attack?
 20 A. Yes, I think that's a fair summary.
 21 Q. So there is no doubt now that your team's prosecution of
 22 him and the Crown Prosecution Service prosecution of him
 23 was entirely well-founded?
 24 A. It was and there was no doubt in my mind.
 25 Q. So the point you're making is that it didn't need him to

1 tell you that you'd got it right?
 2 A. I think we'd got there with the trial, but these things
 3 help, I think.
 4 Q. Did the investigation establish that Salman Abedi and
 5 Hashem Abedi obtained the precursor chemicals for the
 6 construction of the IED between January and April 2017?
 7 A. Yes, that's right.
 8 Q. And furthermore, did the investigation, in particular by
 9 your financial investigators, reveal that the pair had
 10 taken steps to attempt at least to distance themselves
 11 from the purchase of chemicals, namely hydrogen peroxide
 12 and sulphuric acid?
 13 A. Yes, that's right.
 14 Q. And that the means by which they had sought to distance
 15 themselves was by using the bank accounts of associates
 16 in order to purchase materials required to construct the
 17 IED?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Again, we're going to come on to look at some of the
 20 detail of that in due course.
 21 Of those who were arrested, the 23 who were arrested
 22 in the aftermath of the attack, were any of those whose
 23 bank accounts had been used among them?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. In short, were all, or at any rate most, of the

1 associates and family members who had purchased such
 2 materials declared suspects?
 3 A. Yes, they were.
 4 Q. And subsequently arrested?
 5 A. Yes, they were. Not all were arrested, but attempts
 6 were made to arrest all of them.
 7 Q. That remark you have just made, which is entirely
 8 accurate, we will explain in due course.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. To deal with their accounts globally at this stage, did
 11 their accounts show that they claimed that they had been
 12 either told that the chemicals were required to top up
 13 a car battery?
 14 A. Yes, that was consistently the case with purchases of
 15 sulphuric acid.
 16 Q. Or were required for sending on to Libya in order to
 17 fill a large battery powering a generator at the Abedi
 18 family home?
 19 A. Yes, that's right.
 20 Q. Has very careful consideration been given by your team
 21 and the Crown Prosecution Service to whether their
 22 denials of knowing involvement are reliable?
 23 A. Yes, very careful consideration has been given.
 24 Q. Again, I'll emphasise that the content of your
 25 discussions with the Crown Prosecution Service, for very

1 good and long — on the basis of long-established
 2 principles must remain confidential, but everyone should
 3 understand that those denials have not simply been
 4 accepted but have been carefully scrutinised?
 5 A. And carefully investigated.
 6 Q. In all, was it revealed by your investigation that the
 7 brothers had purchased, through that route, at least
 8 16 litres of concentrated sulphuric acid?
 9 A. Yes, that's right.
 10 Q. And some 55 litres of hydrogen peroxide of a particular
 11 strength that we will not give?
 12 A. That's right, yes.
 13 Q. It is well-known that there is a third key ingredient,
 14 nothing sensitive about this, namely acetone, but has
 15 your investigation not identified the source of acetone
 16 for the killers?
 17 A. No, but of all three chemicals, the acetone is very easy
 18 to get hold of. You can literally buy it in any number of
 19 stores.
 20 Q. Yes. For example, and again I'm giving no secrets away,
 21 it's a key ingredient in nail polish remover?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. So as you say, not difficult to get hold of. So those
 24 three chemicals were obtained by the Abedi brothers.
 25 Did your investigation reveal that those chemicals were

49

1 used by the Abedis to manufacture
 2 triacetone triperoxide?
 3 A. Yes, that's right.
 4 Q. Which is commonly known as TATP?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And is a high explosive, sensitive to detonation by
 7 friction, impact, heat or spark?
 8 A. That's correct, yes.
 9 Q. And once manufactured, is TATP highly sensitive and
 10 unpredictable, such that it can easily detonate?
 11 A. Yes, very highly.
 12 Q. We've spoken so far on a number of occasions about
 13 others who were identified as suspects and arrested
 14 under section 41 of the Terrorism Act. Have any charges
 15 been brought against those individuals?
 16 A. Not under the Terrorism Act, no.
 17 Q. I think you've probably expressed yourself in those
 18 terms because there have been a small number of other
 19 prosecutions for offences which have been revealed by
 20 your investigation but are not terrorism offences?
 21 A. Yes. I took the view that any offences that were
 22 disclosed through the investigation, through this
 23 investigation, should be properly pursued. So where
 24 there is evidence in relation to any other offending,
 25 that has been referred to by the CPS.

50

1 Q. When we reach part 5 of your statement, we will identify
 2 where such points arise in relation to a particular
 3 individual.
 4 What we've understood is there has been an
 5 investigation of the size, scale and extent that you've
 6 just described. Evidence obviously has been generated.
 7 That evidence has been considered by your team and by
 8 the Crown Prosecution Service, and applying the code for
 9 Crown Prosecutors to which Mr Cooper referred earlier
 10 in the case, a decision has been made that there should
 11 be no prosecution of those individuals as matters stand?
 12 A. That's right.
 13 Q. We dealt with the acquisition of the chemicals and
 14 whether any of those who had been used to obtain them
 15 had been prosecuted. Did the investigation also reveal
 16 purchases made by both Hashem and Salman Abedi of other
 17 component parts of the device?
 18 A. Yes, it did.
 19 Q. Namely nuts, cross dowels, nails and screws?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And also the purchase of other equipment required for
 22 the manufacture of the device?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And indeed for the carrying of the device?
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

51

1 Q. Was a key part of your investigation not only
 2 identifying individuals who may have assisted but also
 3 identifying where, for example, the TATP had been
 4 manufactured and, moreover, where it had been stored if
 5 somewhere different?
 6 A. That's correct, yes.
 7 Q. Did the investigation identify a number of relevant
 8 addresses in the Manchester area?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. To deal with them in turn, was one such address a flat
 11 at 74 Somerton Court?
 12 A. Yes, it was.
 13 Q. Were both brothers to be linked to that address both by
 14 fingerprint evidence and DNA?
 15 A. Yes, they were.
 16 Q. Were traces of TATP identified at that flat?
 17 A. Yes, they were.
 18 Q. And in simple terms at this stage, bearing in mind we'll
 19 turn to it in further detail in due course, what did
 20 your team conclude 74 Somerton Court had been used for?
 21 A. 74 Somerton Court was effectively where the TATP was
 22 made, so the explosive material was made in that flat.
 23 Q. Was a second address that was proved to be of relevance
 24 44 Lindum Street in Rusholme?
 25 A. Yes, it was.

52

1 Q. In March of 2017 was the occupier of that address away
 2 from home and in Libya?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. What did the investigation reveal that address had been
 5 used for?
 6 A. So this address was used on a number of occasions as
 7 a delivery address, so when it came to chemicals they
 8 were delivered to 44 Lindum Street.
 9 Q. So the two addresses that we've mentioned so far,
 10 neither was the home address of the Abedi brothers?
 11 A. No, they were not. Again, I know this is high level,
 12 but 74 Somerton Court was effectively rented and
 13 44 Lindum Street was effectively loaned to the Abedi
 14 brothers.
 15 Q. So the point in relation to Lindum Street is that the
 16 attackers were not utilising their home address for the
 17 delivery of the substances, they were using another
 18 address?
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.
 20 Q. So distance was being placed between them and the
 21 acquisitions, not just by using family and friends but
 22 also by using an address that they were not immediately
 23 connected with?
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.
 25 Q. The third address that I would like to ask you about at

1 this stage is Devell House. Again, that's an address in
 2 Manchester in common with the other two. What was
 3 proved to be the relevance of that address?
 4 A. Devell House is effectively a small block of flats, and
 5 attached to that block of flats is a car parking area
 6 for exclusive use of the residents, and that's gated.
 7 Within that car park area we found a Nissan Micra, which
 8 was key in the investigation in that the Micra was used
 9 for storage of the TATP once it had been manufactured at
 10 Somerton Court. So it was transferred from
 11 Somerton Court to Devell House and stored within that
 12 Micra vehicle. This is particularly important when we
 13 move on to look at the travel of the Abedi brothers and
 14 Salman Abedi's subsequent return on 18 May.
 15 Q. I will ask you about that travel, again at a high level,
 16 in just one moment, but it's perhaps useful to get this
 17 issue out of the way at this early stage, although
 18 I dare say you'll need to return to it. When we get to
 19 part 5, we're going to see, aren't we, that there were
 20 occasions, captured on CCTV footage from Devell House,
 21 upon which particular individuals who are not either of
 22 the Abedi brothers appear to go to the Micra in which
 23 the TATP was being stored whilst it was at Devell House?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. I appreciate you'll need to take care in how far you go

1 in answering this question, but should we attach
 2 importance, or at least too much importance, to the fact
 3 that those people appear to visit that car? It's
 4 a rather clumsily expressed question, but do you know
 5 what I'm driving at?
 6 A. Yes, I do. I think without going into -- because this
 7 is high level -- any of the detail, I think it's
 8 important to understand that when we as an investigation
 9 came to seize the Micra, that set off a parallel
 10 investigation in regard to another vehicle that was
 11 parked in that car park concerning a conspiracy to
 12 supply class A drugs. That investigation itself
 13 involved a number of people who have also been of
 14 interest to us in our enquiry and some of those people
 15 were the same people who actually looked inside or
 16 appeared to look inside the Micra and were caught on
 17 CCTV when they did so.
 18 In other words, when we come on to talk about those
 19 TIEs, those TIEs, yes, looked inside the Micra. We
 20 needed to know why they'd done that, but actually there
 21 may be an explanation to that in that we know that there
 22 was drug dealing going on from those premises, and it
 23 was of a significant scale.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you say looked inside, do you mean
 25 opened the car and looked inside or looked through the

1 window?
 2 A. No, looked through the window, sir.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 4 A. And again, that seems to make sense because if you're
 5 dealing in drugs and you're using a vehicle to store
 6 those drugs, it is highly likely that you'd be
 7 interested in other vehicles that had been parked in
 8 a particular spot for some time.
 9 MR GREANEY: Just to make sure this is completely
 10 understood, and I'll express myself with care as well,
 11 TIE is "trace, interview, eliminate" or "trace,
 12 interview, evaluate", depending on your age?
 13 A. That's right.
 14 Q. These were particular individuals, as we'll see, the
 15 investigation looked at.
 16 On a number of occasions such a person had looked
 17 inside the Micra and the point that you're making
 18 is that it is not or not necessarily a safe inference
 19 that that person must have known what was in the Micra
 20 and that there is at least one other credible
 21 explanation for why they may have done so?
 22 A. Yes, yes, there is. Where there has been some crossover
 23 in this is some of that information, so the information
 24 that we have held as an investigation, has then been
 25 used in the prosecution of those drugs offences.

1 Q. Absolutely, and we'll see that there has been certainly
2 one prosecution.
3 We paused for a moment in looking at the
4 significance of the Micra. In simple terms, the Micra
5 was purchased on the evening of 13 April; is that
6 correct?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. From a man called Nathan Grice?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who, when the sale was made, was present with two
11 friends of his, James Keighron and John Keighron?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Am I right in my recollection that certainly
14 Nathan Grice was one of those arrested initially?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. But was entirely excluded?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The purchase was made on 13 April. You mentioned the
19 travel of the Abedi brothers and we'll just summarise
20 what the position was at this stage so we can understand
21 where the Micra comes into it.
22 In April, were Salman Abedi's parents and younger
23 siblings in Libya?
24 A. Yes, they were.
25 Q. On 1 April 2017, were flights booked for them to return

57

1 to the UK from Libya?
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 Q. Arriving in the UK on 6 April, but then departing again
4 for Libya on 15 April?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did the investigation reveal that a week later, so
7 a week after 1 April, the older brother of Salman and
8 Hashem, Ismail Abedi, about whom I'm going to ask you
9 a number of questions in due course, purchased two
10 single airline tickets?
11 A. That's correct, yes.
12 Q. Did he, Ismail, purchase airline tickets and
13 Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi to travel from Manchester
14 to Libya via Amsterdam and Istanbul on 15 April?
15 A. Yes, that's right. Effectively, that was the same
16 flight as the parents who were then returning to Libya
17 as well.
18 Q. I believe it's the position that those were one-way
19 tickets from Manchester?
20 A. They were, yes.
21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And we should understand that Ismail was
22 all this time in the UK, in England?
23 MR GREANEY: Ismail was in the UK throughout this time.
24 Just to summarise that, the position was parents and
25 younger siblings are returning to the UK on 6 April --

58

1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- and then, on 15 April, parents and siblings and
3 Hashem and Salman Abedi are all travelling to Libya
4 together?
5 A. Yes, that's right.
6 Q. So 13 April, the Micra is acquired. 15 April, the
7 brothers are going to Libya?
8 A. That's right, yes.
9 Q. By 15 April is it the investigation team's clear
10 understanding that the TATP had been manufactured?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. At 74 Somerton Court?
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. So where does the Micra come into this tale?
15 A. The Micra is driven to Somerton Court and the contents
16 of the flat effectively are cleared out, so they empty
17 the flat, and we would say that the Micra has then been
18 driven to Devell House in effectively -- and I know we
19 may come on, I think, to show the schematic that we've
20 got, which is very much about the trip of the Micra and
21 the trip of the taxi journey. So it's driven to
22 Devell House and it's parked in that car park and
23 we would say that within the Micra at that time are
24 a number of items which we subsequently recovered. That
25 included the vast majority of the sulphuric acid and

59

1 it would have also included a large drum which was
2 missing, a large blue drum, and within that large blue
3 drum we believe, and we proposed during our prosecution
4 case, that within that drum was all of the manufactured
5 TATP and that TATP was effectively held within a safe
6 environment in that drum. I'm not sure I can
7 necessarily go into that.
8 Q. No, I'm not going to ask you about how it was stored in
9 any more detail. We simply need to understand the
10 relevance of Devell House and its relevance is, within
11 the gated car park to those premises, the Micra was
12 parked during 15 April and 18 May when Salman Abedi was
13 in Libya and it was within the Micra that the TATP was
14 stored?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. Was a fourth relevant address apartment 39 at
17 Granby House?
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 Q. What did the investigation demonstrate the relevance of
20 that address to have been?
21 A. Granby House was specifically rented by Salman Abedi as
22 a premises to manufacture the improvised explosive
23 device. So this was effectively bringing the TATP from
24 the Micra, together with other component parts, to
25 actually build that improvised explosive device.

60

1 Q. And that was an address that Abedi rented on the day
2 that he returned to the United Kingdom, 18 May, as
3 I have said?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And that he moved into right away?
6 A. Yes, he did, yes, that morning.
7 Q. Let's move on in time. As I have said, Salman Abedi
8 returns to the UK on 18 May. We know about his hostile
9 surveillance on the 19th, 21st and 22 May, although
10 you'll tell us a little more about it in due course.
11 I want to take you to 19.55 hours on 22 May, which is
12 paragraph 43 of your statement. What did the
13 investigation reveal happened at that time?
14 A. At this time, Salman Abedi takes a taxi to the Shudehill
15 bus station via Granby Row. The taxi effectively waits
16 outside Granby House at 8 o'clock in the evening.
17 Salman Abedi is seen on the CCTV to emerge at 8.06, and
18 at this time he's carrying a large rucksack on his back.
19 The rucksack appears extremely heavy. Salman doesn't
20 remove the rucksack from his back whilst he's in the
21 taxi and he's then dropped off on the junction of
22 Thomas Street and Shudehill in Manchester city centre.
23 Q. You'll know and I know and many people will know, that's
24 a location which is very near to Victoria Station, but
25 obviously not at Victoria Station?

61

1 A. No, it's about 400 or 500 yards away from
2 Victoria Station and that's obviously where the tram
3 stop is actually situated.
4 Q. So obviously he could have asked the taxi driver to drop
5 him at Victoria Station but chose to be dropped off just
6 one stop away on the tramline?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did the investigation have a theory about why he did
9 that?
10 A. It's pure speculation, but it will help with his,
11 effectively, blending into the environment and his
12 anonymity.
13 Q. So the way put it in your statement is:
14 "It is believed he took the tram from Shudehill to
15 Victoria Station so as to avoid walking with a heavy
16 device that he was carrying in his rucksack and also to
17 enable him to blend in."
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Did your investigation also reveal that Abedi made,
20 between 20.18 hours and 20.23 hours, a number of calls
21 to a Libyan number?
22 A. Yes, that's right.
23 Q. Has an analysis led your team to conclude that that
24 number was one used by the Abedi family members who
25 remained in Libya?

62

1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. One of those calls was successful, lasting for 4 minutes
3 and 12 seconds?
4 A. Yes, yes, it was, and although in my statement I say
5 there's no further information available about the
6 contents of that call, within the criminal trial
7 process, at the conclusion of that trial process, I am
8 aware that the trial judge actually said that he was
9 quite certain that call was made from Salman Abedi to
10 Hashem Abedi.
11 Q. As part of their joint plot?
12 A. As part of that joint plot and enterprise, yes.
13 Q. As we know, your investigation revealed through the CCTV
14 work that was done that Abedi exits the tram at
15 20.30 hours at Victoria Railway Station with that
16 rucksack on his back, entered the lavatories at the
17 station, remaining there for 10 minutes, and then at
18 20.48 hours taking the lift to the City Room?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. We also know that the CCTV footage shows that he entered
21 the City Room at 20.51 hours, remaining for 20 minutes,
22 but then returning to the tram platform and sitting down
23 again for a period with the rucksack still on his back.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did the investigation develop any theory about why he

63

1 had not remained in the City Room at 20.51 but instead
2 gone to sit on the tram platform?
3 A. Again, it's difficult to put yourself in his mind, but
4 it would have been an extremely long time to stay
5 in that one place and we're moving into the area of just
6 how suspicious he would have looked in that position.
7 Q. I suppose there are a number of potential explanations
8 of which three are: he thought he had been spotted by
9 someone; secondly, he thought he might be spotted if he
10 continued to remain there; and I suppose the third might
11 be that for a period he had second thoughts. But your
12 own view is that the third is not likely and it's likely
13 to be 1 or 2?
14 A. I don't see any indication of that being the case.
15 Q. I'm sure that's a very fair observation to make.
16 So he remained there on the platform, as your
17 investigation revealed, until 20.30 hours, when he makes
18 his way back to the City Room. We've seen him in the
19 lift adjusting wiring under his clothing and then, as
20 chapter 7 revealed, he remains on that mezzanine area in
21 an area where he's not captured by CCTV between 21.33
22 and 22.30 hours, before walking into a crowd and
23 detonating his bomb.
24 Next, I'm going to ask you about the identity of the
25 bomber, an issue to which I said we would come back, and

64

1 which will involve dealing with some medical
 2 interventions relating to Abedi.
 3 Did the identification process of the bomber follow
 4 several different and distinct strands?
 5 A. Yes, it did.
 6 Q. Including photographic images?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Fingerprints?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Dental records and DNA?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And also, as you've told us, the bank card that was
 13 found near to his body?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. But because of those various strands, is it not possible
 16 for you in evidence to give a strict chronological
 17 breakdown of that work?
 18 A. Yes, of course. So the initial identification lead,
 19 effectively, came from the discovery, the recovery of
 20 that bank card.
 21 Q. I'm going to ask you to pause one there for one moment.
 22 I think my question was probably very poorly phrased.
 23 What I was driving at is something you refer to in your
 24 statement at paragraph 48. You have various different
 25 strands, some of which stand alone and you can identify

65

1 the time at which they occurred --
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. -- such as the finding of the bank card, as we'll hear
 4 from Mr Gallagher in just a moment. But other strands
 5 no doubt were running in parallel and it's not possible
 6 and probably not important to give a precise time in the
 7 chronology at which they proved fruitful?
 8 A. I think that's fair. Sorry, I misunderstood.
 9 Q. I'm sure it was my question. Let's deal with the one
 10 point in time that we can be clear about. Mr Gallagher
 11 will help us with it. Was it at 01.58 hours on 23 May
 12 that someone called Robert Gallagher discovered
 13 a partially damaged bank card issued by the Halifax
 14 Building Society to Salman Abedi?
 15 A. Yes, that's right.
 16 Q. Was Robert Gallagher the appointed bomb scene manager?
 17 A. Yes, he was.
 18 Q. Did he record what he had found or at any rate was
 19 a record made of what he had found on the CLIO log at
 20 02.20 hours?
 21 A. Yes. That was as a result of a call from the scene, so
 22 he rang me to say that that had happened.
 23 Q. And at that stage, therefore, were you given the first
 24 possible identification of the perpetrator of the
 25 attack?

66

1 A. Yes.
 2 MR GREANEY: The next stage will be for Mr de la Poer to
 3 call Mr Gallagher to explain what he found and where he
 4 found it. This, I think, would be a convenient moment
 5 for a break.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And we want a half hour break?
 7 MR GREANEY: I'm going to check with Mr Barraclough. Do
 8 you think it's necessary to have a half hour?
 9 A. No, I don't, sir.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We're a bit behind, so if we could do
 11 a quarter of an hour, I'd be grateful. Obviously when
 12 you need longer, just tell us.
 13 (11.32 am)
 14 (A short break)
 15 (11.47 am)
 16 MR DE LA POER: Sir, interposing into Mr Barraclough's
 17 evidence is Mr Gallagher. May he be sworn, please?
 18 MR ROBERT GALLAGHER (sworn)
 19 Questions from MR DE LA POER.
 20 MR DE LA POER: Please can you give your full name?
 21 A. It's Robert Samuel Gallagher.
 22 Q. In 2017, was your role described as the forensic and
 23 digital investigation manager?
 24 A. Yes, it was.
 25 Q. Were you employed by Counter-terrorism Policing

67

1 North-west?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Did your work involve you working out of Greater
 4 Manchester Police headquarters?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. I am going to briefly introduce your qualifications for
 7 that role. Do you hold an honours Bachelor of Science
 8 degree in forensic investigation?
 9 A. Yes, I do.
 10 Q. Was that accredited by the University of Teesside?
 11 A. Yes, it was.
 12 Q. Do you have a further qualification, namely a diploma in
 13 scientific support skills accredited by the University
 14 of Durham?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Has your work included a number of matters, not limited
 17 to being a member of the Chartered Society of Forensic
 18 Science?
 19 A. That's correct.
 20 Q. Have you also completed a counter-terrorism command
 21 forensic management course and police search team
 22 course?
 23 A. Yes, I have.
 24 Q. In 2017 was it your role to provide cover to the
 25 Counter-terrorism Policing north-west region?

68

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And what sort of assistance would you provide through
 3 that, please?
 4 A. I'd be on cover, providing 24/7 cover. The unit itself
 5 provides 365 days a year. So if anything does come in,
 6 personal cover can be contacted, but myself as a manager
 7 would usually be contacted as well to give any
 8 assistance regarding any forensic matters that we might
 9 have to turn out to any CT incidents.
 10 Q. So 365 days a year, for 24 hours of each of those days,
 11 cover is provided by your unit and they can be called
 12 upon to assist an investigation if required?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And you sit in a manager's role within that?
 15 A. Yes, I do.
 16 Q. So with that background dealt with, were you off duty on
 17 the evening of Monday, 22 May 2017?
 18 A. Yes, I was, I was on annual leave.
 19 Q. So it wasn't the case that you were on call even?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. But nonetheless, did you receive a telephone call
 22 informing you of an explosion at Manchester Arena?
 23 A. Yes, I did.
 24 Q. At that early stage, were you notified that there were
 25 a number of casualties?

69

1 A. Yes, I was.
 2 Q. Including fatalities?
 3 A. Yes, I was.
 4 Q. Were you instructed to travel to Greater Manchester
 5 Police's headquarters for a briefing?
 6 A. Yes, I did.
 7 Q. Did you arrive just after midnight?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And who was it that you principally liaised with when
 10 you arrived?
 11 A. I spoke with Mr Barraclough, Detective Chief
 12 Superintendent Barraclough, went up into the fusion
 13 cell, where I knew the management would be, so I paraded
 14 myself on there to speak with him.
 15 Q. And were you given a short briefing?
 16 A. Yes, it was a short briefing, yes.
 17 Q. And following that, were you instructed to go to
 18 a designated point near the arena?
 19 A. Yes, we were.
 20 Q. Were others accompanying you from other parts of
 21 CTP North-west?
 22 A. Yes, the on-call person came with me as well.
 23 Q. Did you arrive at about 1.35 in the morning of 23 May?
 24 A. Yes, it was around about then, yes.
 25 Q. At that stage, had you been given your designation

70

1 within the investigation?
 2 A. Yes. I was asked to attend to the scene, take on the
 3 role of bomb scene manager, forensic coordinator, and
 4 for that I would then have overall responsibility for
 5 managing that scene. Not only within the arena itself
 6 but the surrounding area, so I would have -- be managing
 7 the staff that I would need for there and also liaise
 8 with designated -- other agencies that I can call upon
 9 to assist.
 10 Q. As manager of the scene, did your responsibilities
 11 include controlling who went in and out of the scene
 12 from the point at which you took up that role?
 13 A. Yes. I reviewed the cordons to make sure the cordons
 14 were in place at the correct area and then, yes, it
 15 was -- access in and out was all recorded.
 16 Q. We are not going to go into any substantial detail here,
 17 Mr Gallagher, but dealing with it in summary form only,
 18 as you entered the railway concourse did you note that
 19 an area of the railway concourse itself had clearly been
 20 utilised for the purpose of medical triage and
 21 treatment?
 22 A. Yes, I did.
 23 Q. Did you travel through the railway up the stairs leading
 24 to the City Room?
 25 A. Yes, I did.

71

1 Q. And at the top of those stairs did you find a cordon?
 2 A. Yes, there was.
 3 Q. And we've heard reference to this in other evidence and
 4 we'll look at it in great detail, no doubt, in
 5 chapter 10, the terms inner cordon and outer cordon.
 6 Was that cordon at the top of the stairs the inner
 7 cordon or the outer cordon?
 8 A. That was to go into the -- that was the inner cordon, so
 9 down the stairs and round Victoria would be classed as
 10 the outer cordon, but anything past that line was the
 11 inner cordon.
 12 Q. Just because we will be looking at these in some detail
 13 in due course, what is the functional difference between
 14 the inner cordon and the outer cordon?
 15 A. The inner cordon is -- anybody going in there will be
 16 going in to recover forensic evidence. From my
 17 strategies what I will be doing is setting the
 18 strategies, setting the priorities of what we want to
 19 recover, how we're going to recover them, and then
 20 anyone within the inner cordon will be in full PPE, full
 21 protective clothing, for the recovery of any exhibits.
 22 Q. In terms of the outer cordon, does that mark the outer
 23 perimeter of where members of the public are allowed to
 24 access?
 25 A. Between the inner cordon -- and there's another area at

72

1 the end of the outer cordon, that's where the members of
 2 the public would be, but from the outer cordon itself
 3 that's where other staff may be coming in for rendezvous
 4 points, et cetera, where the search teams would come,
 5 where they could be briefed, but before they can come
 6 into the inner cordon, they have to have my say—so or
 7 one of my team who's there.
 8 Q. And had that — you told us when you got to the top of
 9 the stairs there was that cordon. Had you directed that
 10 cordon —
 11 A. It was already in situ.
 12 Q. Did you adopt it as your inner cordon?
 13 A. That was then for the inner cordon, yes.
 14 Q. Again, we are not going to go into any detail here at
 15 all, dealing with this in what I hope is a sensitive
 16 summary. When you arrived at the City Room, was it
 17 apparent to you that there had been a very substantial
 18 explosion?
 19 A. Yes, it was.
 20 Q. Did you notice that there was extensive damage to the
 21 fabric of the building?
 22 A. Yes, there was.
 23 Q. At that stage, was it known to you or to anyone else who
 24 the perpetrator was?
 25 A. No, not at this stage, no.

73

1 Q. So was it your priority to identify the suspect if they
 2 were present in the City Room?
 3 A. That was my priority, yes, along with identifying what
 4 type of explosives may have been used.
 5 Q. For that purpose, did you inform your team that you
 6 would make your own assessment of what had occurred?
 7 A. Yes, I did.
 8 Q. So from that, do we infer that you entered that
 9 City Room with an open mind about who the perpetrator
 10 was and what had happened?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. When dealing with a crime scene, is it important that
 13 evidence is left undisturbed until focus is given to it?
 14 A. Yes, it is.
 15 Q. Is there a technique that you have when managing a crime
 16 scene to ensure that happens?
 17 A. When we are entering a crime scene, we have what we call
 18 a common approach path, so it'd be a path that everyone
 19 will follow that comes into the scene itself and what we
 20 try and do there is to minimise any contamination of any
 21 evidence or possible evidence so that people aren't just
 22 walking willy-nilly round the crime scene and they will
 23 follow the path that I have set.
 24 Q. So given your last answer, did it take you to arrive
 25 in the City Room for that path to be set?

74

1 A. Since I had taken over as the crime scene manager, yes,
 2 it was me then that set that path.
 3 Q. Just so that we have it on the record, and again it may
 4 be something that we touch on in chapter 10 in relation
 5 to some officers' interaction with the area, did you
 6 identify the common path to be walking along the
 7 right-hand side, staying close to the upper level wall?
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
 9 Q. So it is that what we understand to be the area of the
 10 mezzanine?
 11 A. Yes, as we walked through the glass doors, there were
 12 some steps to my right, so I told the team to stay close
 13 to those steps and to then continue walking into the
 14 City Rooms past some doors that lead down into
 15 Victoria Station, and then there were some other steps
 16 that led up to the mezzanine. When we got to there,
 17 we would then turn left and walk in front of the box
 18 office.
 19 Q. In the course of that journey, and again we're not going
 20 to go into substantial detail, but did you identify the
 21 product of the explosion?
 22 A. As we were walking round you could see where the seat of
 23 the explosion was: it was to my left.
 24 Q. Again, dealing with it only insofar as it's necessary,
 25 certainly at this stage, was damage to reinforced glass

75

1 windows of the box office noted?
 2 A. Yes, you could notice that straightaway as you were
 3 walking in, you could see the damage caused to that.
 4 Q. Because it is an issue the inquiry is likely to explore
 5 in more detail in chapter 10, what you said of that
 6 damage was to your eye it bore the resemblance of
 7 gunshots?
 8 A. Experience in other crime scenes that I've attended over
 9 my career, it looked like gunshots had hit that window
 10 because of the fragmentation and the view of it, that
 11 you could see from it.
 12 Q. Of course that's just your initial impression at that
 13 stage?
 14 A. It was.
 15 Q. And we know now it was shrapnel that caused that?
 16 A. It was, yes.
 17 Q. As you were travelling along the common access path, did
 18 you identify an item that drew your particular attention
 19 near to the last box office window?
 20 A. Yes, we did.
 21 Q. What was that item, please?
 22 A. It was a bank card, a Halifax bank card, in the name of
 23 Salman R Abedi. It was lying on the floor, it was
 24 brought to my attention, we had a look at it, and from
 25 examining it you could tell it had been close to the

76

1 seat of the explosion due to the damage on the card
 2 itself .
 3 I formed the opinion it hadn't been dropped, it
 4 hadn't fallen out of a wallet, but it had been very
 5 close to the seat of the explosion.
 6 Q. As we've heard just moments ago from the senior
 7 investigating officer , Mr Barraclough, this was the
 8 first clue as to the identity of the perpetrator?
 9 A. It was something that stuck out in the scene, yes.
 10 Q. In the course of your continued journey through the
 11 City Room, did you also identify pieces of a rucksack?
 12 A. You could see straps from a rucksack, yes.
 13 Q. And also large pieces of metal that appeared to be from
 14 a metal container?
 15 A. Yes, there was.
 16 Q. Again, your witness statement deals in some detail with
 17 other matters that you identified . They are extremely
 18 distressing in their content and there is no need for us
 19 to adduce them from you now. So I'm going to move
 20 forward through that statement to the point at which you
 21 identify somebody who or a body who you suspected to be
 22 the perpetrator.
 23 A. Yes, I did.
 24 Q. Again without going into the detail of it , was that
 25 identification or preliminary identification made by you

1 on the basis of the injury to that body?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And we know from the evidence of Mr Barraclough that
 4 there was discussion between you and him whilst you were
 5 in the City Room; is that correct?
 6 A. That's correct .
 7 Q. And the timings taken from his statement are that there
 8 were photographs taken of the suspect at that time at
 9 02.29 for the purpose of facial recognition?
 10 A. That's correct .
 11 Q. Did you supervise that?
 12 A. I did supervise that, yes.
 13 Q. Again, taking the times from Mr Barraclough's statement
 14 as I have, was it at 04.43 that it was confirmed that
 15 the photograph of the face of the suspect matched that
 16 of Salman Abedi?
 17 A. From what I've been told, yes.
 18 Q. Obviously that was taking place off site , however?
 19 A. Yes, the photographs were sent out on an SD card from
 20 the camera.
 21 Q. In terms of fingerprints , was that also something that
 22 you supervised?
 23 A. Yes, it was.
 24 Q. Initially , were fingerprints taken from the right hand
 25 of the person suspected to be the perpetrator?

1 A. Yes, they were.
 2 Q. And were they sent to the Greater Manchester Police
 3 Fingerprint Bureau for comparison?
 4 A. Yes, we turned the staff out during the night and we got
 5 them over there, yes.
 6 Q. In simple terms, you got them out of bed in order to
 7 come and assist your investigation?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Was it, however, established that although Salman Abedi
 10 had a criminal record, there were no fingerprints on
 11 file for his right hand?
 12 A. Yes, correct . When he was arrested and fingerprinted,
 13 at the time of arrest his right hand was in a cast due
 14 to an injury , therefore they couldn't take fingerprints ,
 15 but I wasn't aware of that at the time.
 16 Q. Did information come back to you that it would be
 17 necessary to take fingerprints from the left hand?
 18 A. Yes, it did .
 19 Q. And was it that process that led to the positive
 20 identification via fingerprints ?
 21 A. Yes, I requested the fingerprint experts to attend the
 22 scene so they could carry out the fingerprinting at the
 23 scene and then they were able to give me the
 24 identification .
 25 Q. Again, taking this time from Mr Barraclough's statement,

1 that indicates that that positive identification
 2 occurred at 10.35 hours on 23 May.
 3 A. Yes, it would have been the full identification then,
 4 yes.
 5 Q. Two more matters to deal with, with you, Mr Gallagher.
 6 We're going to take them out of order for reasons which
 7 I think will become obvious.
 8 Plainly, your role continued for some considerable
 9 time as crime scene manager.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. You were also a participant in the DVI process?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. We are not going to go into that detail at all , as has
 14 already been indicated by Mr Greaney, but in summary
 15 form, you remained an integral part of the investigation
 16 in that role as crime scene manager; is that right?
 17 A. That's correct .
 18 Q. Culminating in, I think this is right, you gave evidence
 19 at the trial of Hashem Abedi?
 20 A. Yes, I did, yes.
 21 Q. During your time in the City Room, again we are here
 22 with you, Mr Gallagher, just prefiguring an issue that
 23 may take on some importance in chapter 10, was there
 24 concern about the ceiling?
 25 A. Yes, there was health and safety concerns, yes.

1 Q. Let's just investigate that to a small degree. Was the
 2 centre area of the ceiling of the City Room constructed
 3 of glass?
 4 A. Yes, there was large plate glass panels.
 5 Q. And approximately at what time in your stay in the
 6 City Room was that concern identified?
 7 A. We didn't quite notice them when we first went in
 8 because it was still dark outside, but as it got a bit
 9 lighter we could see that some of the panels had been
 10 completely smashed. There was one in particular that
 11 was broken and it looked like it was about to fall in at
 12 any time. And then a lot of the other panels were
 13 cracked and smashed as well.
 14 Q. So as the sun came up, those features were identified
 15 but no glass at that stage had come down?
 16 A. Not at that stage. It came down later, sorry.
 17 Q. Approximately when did glass from the ceiling come down?
 18 A. I think the first one came down around about 10 o'clock
 19 in the morning and then a second one came down. We had
 20 to vacate the City Room. We got extra PPE, hard hats,
 21 et cetera, to go back in. Then I think it was as
 22 we were about to do the DVI or the DVI had just started
 23 when the second panel came down as well.
 24 Q. So we get the sequence clear, did it take the first
 25 panel to come down before people retreated to put on

81

1 PPE?
 2 A. The hard hats, yes.
 3 Q. So the first panel came down, people retreated, it's
 4 quite plain that the area was unsafe and items could
 5 fall from the ceiling, put on PPE, went back in again
 6 and then a second pane came down?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. When that second pane came down, did that cause
 9 a retreat for a second time or at that stage was it safe
 10 in people's judgement to continue working there?
 11 A. No, we retreated out to just reassess the damage that
 12 was there. What we requested then was we had some fire
 13 officers attended to the glass doors and they then acted
 14 as checking the panels at all times and should they
 15 notice that one of the panels look like it's going to be
 16 dislodged, they had whistles to attract our attention so
 17 then we could vacate the City Room.
 18 Q. Thank you. That was my penultimate matter to ask you
 19 about.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have not managed to make a note of
 21 when you actually arrived.
 22 A. I got there, I think on my statement, sir...
 23 MR DE LA POER: 01.35, I think, sir.
 24 A. It was 01.35 I got to Victoria Station, sir, and then
 25 when I spoke to... It was 01.50 when I went into the

82

1 scene.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 3 MR DE LA POER: The final matter that I'm going to ask you
 4 about is an animation that has been created and upon
 5 which animation the key exhibits seized from the
 6 City Room are marked. This animation, do you agree,
 7 Mr Gallagher, is capable of being extremely distressing
 8 to some?
 9 A. Yes, it can be.
 10 Q. It is something that you have seen and in fact you saw
 11 during your evidence in the trial, so it has been played
 12 publicly previously?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 MR DE LA POER: I'm going to give a moment, sir, if I may,
 15 to people who may wish to leave or to turn away from
 16 their feed. The animation itself runs to about
 17 5 minutes, so if people are stepping away, I would
 18 encourage them to do so for that duration and I make
 19 clear that it does contain some photographs of items
 20 seized from the scene in the form that they were in, but
 21 it is not graphic in its content. But that said, it is
 22 possible that it could be extremely distressing.
 23 (Pause)
 24 Mr Lopez, please, {CPS000164/1}.
 25 Before we play it, and I have given Mr Lopez prior

83

1 warning of this, there are going to need to be places
 2 during which we stop at this. Sir, can I give the
 3 explanation for that? There are sections of this which
 4 reveal parts of the device, which the inquiry under no
 5 circumstances want to be made public given the concern
 6 about assisting future acts. So we will pass over those
 7 sections with Mr Lopez taking it down, moving on, and
 8 then putting it back up again.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 10 MR DE LA POER: We'll start, please, from the beginning.
 11 Mr Lopez, I remind you of the first time to stop: 02:45.
 12 (Video played to the inquiry)
 13 Pause it there, please, Mr Lopez.
 14 Is that the location of the bank card that you
 15 identified, Mr Gallagher?
 16 A. Yes, it is, yes.
 17 Q. Thank you.
 18 (Video playing continued)
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we stop there for a minute? We saw
 20 earlier on a microchip.
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that meant to have come from this
 23 card or is it unrelated?
 24 A. No, sir, it's come from the mobile phone.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are all the items that we are seeing

84

1 linked in some way to Salman Abedi?
 2 A. Yes, sir. They were my priority exhibits --
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just so I understand and we all
 4 understand what we're watching.
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 7 MR DE LA POER: Two more seconds, please, Mr Lopez, before
 8 taking it off the screen to move it forward.
 9 You can now take that off the screen for us and move
 10 it forward to 03:05.
 11 We're just going to play a very short section here,
 12 Mr Lopez, up until 03:12. So just a few seconds,
 13 please.
 14 (Video playing continued)
 15 Take that down again and resume at 03:24.
 16 (Video playing continued)
 17 I would like you to stop at 04:48. Thank you.
 18 (Video playing continued)
 19 Pause it there for a moment.
 20 We can see a piece of oil can indicated there,
 21 Mr Gallagher. Are you aware from your involvement
 22 in the investigation, and it's something that we'll hear
 23 from another witness in due course, that oil cans formed
 24 a key line of investigation in terms of establishing who
 25 was involved?

85

1 A. Yes, they did.
 2 MR DE LA POER: Sir, for your reference it is Mr Ryder, who
 3 will be joining us tomorrow, who will be able to give us
 4 some assistance with that.
 5 Thank you, Mr Lopez. On, please, to 04:48.
 6 (Video playing continued)
 7 Is that what you initially assessed as potentially
 8 being from gunshots?
 9 A. Yes, exactly.
 10 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez. You've stopped it
 11 at exactly the right point. Leave it on screen for one
 12 moment longer so everyone can see that layout finally
 13 indicated. Thank you very much indeed. If you can take
 14 that down.
 15 Mr Gallagher, as you told the chair in answer to his
 16 question, do those items there indicated in that
 17 animation sequence form the key items that you
 18 identified in your role as crime scene manager as being
 19 connected to the suspect, Salman Abedi?
 20 A. Yes, they were, yes.
 21 Q. Are they related in one way or another, or at least
 22 suspected at the time to have been so, to the device?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Gallagher.
 25 Those are my questions. We don't have any indication

86

1 that there are any questions from core participants, but
 2 we are operating a slightly less efficient platform
 3 today than we do on other days, so Mr Gallagher,
 4 I wonder if I can ask you just to wait for 20 minutes
 5 in the building, please.
 6 If we receive notification that there are any
 7 questions arising, that way we can manage them before
 8 Mr Gallagher goes away, but I see no reason why, once
 9 the holding slide has gone up and positions changed, we
 10 couldn't continue with Mr Barraclough's evidence.
 11 Can I ask those responsible for the technology to
 12 put up the holding slide?
 13 (The witness withdrew)
 14 (Pause)
 15 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued)
 16 Questions from MR GREANEY (continued)
 17 MR GREANEY: I'm next going to deal by way of summary with
 18 you with the other steps that were taken to confirm the
 19 identity of the bomber and, so far as it is apparent to
 20 me, I will deal with them in chronological order.
 21 The next step, as we have understood it, was the
 22 comparison between an image that was a photograph that
 23 was taken of Salman Abedi in situ in the City Room
 24 post-detonation with other images that existed of him,
 25 and an expert in image assessment carried out that

87

1 comparison and concluded that they were one and the same
 2 person, is that correct?
 3 A. Yes, that's right.
 4 Q. That, sir, was at 04.43 hours on 23 May?
 5 A. Yes, that's right.
 6 Q. Then at 10.35 am on 23 May, the fingerprint examination
 7 that Mr Gallagher referred to again proved a positive
 8 match between the fingerprints of the person believed to
 9 be the bomber and Salman Abedi?
 10 A. Yes, that's right, from the left hand.
 11 Q. Mr Gallagher explained that Abedi's fingerprints had
 12 been taken following an arrest for shoplifting in 2012.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. At 10.35 am, therefore, having been told of the bank
 15 card, the image assessment and the fingerprints, did you
 16 consider that the identity of the perpetrator of the
 17 attack was known?
 18 A. Yes, for investigative purposes, absolutely, yes.
 19 Q. Other steps that were thereafter taken -- I confess
 20 I don't know the exact date of all of these and it may
 21 not be important, but was the clothing worn by the
 22 bomber, I won't identify the brand, was the clothing
 23 compared with CCTV footage of Salman Abedi on 22 May?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And an expert in such analysis confirmed that the two

88

1 sets of clothing were consistent, the one with the
 2 other?
 3 A. Yes, they were.
 4 Q. Next, I think this is next anyway, there was
 5 a post-mortem examination of Abedi and DNA samples were
 6 obtained. Were they compared with a DNA sample obtained
 7 on the occasion of his arrest in 2012?
 8 A. Yes, they were.
 9 Q. And again, a match between Abedi's DNA and the bomber's
 10 DNA?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Then were the teeth of the bomber compared against
 13 evidence about the teeth of Abedi?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And again, there was a match?
 16 A. Yes, there was.
 17 Q. I think that was 1 June, so I have taken these slightly
 18 out of order for this reason: was it also identified
 19 during the post-mortem examination that the bomber had
 20 an implant in his right hand?
 21 A. Yes, that's right.
 22 Q. And on 31 May, was it confirmed by a medical expert that
 23 Salman Abedi had had precisely the same implant in his
 24 right hand?
 25 A. Yes, exactly.

1 Q. So in short therefore, an identification for
 2 investigative purposes occurred at 10.35 am on 23 May,
 3 and that identification was subsequently confirmed to
 4 have been correct using the various techniques that I've
 5 just described?
 6 A. That's right. That led to a conclusive identification.
 7 Q. Did Greater Manchester Police, I'm now at paragraph 72,
 8 officially release the identity of Salman Abedi as being
 9 responsible for the attack at a press conference given
 10 by the Chief Constable at 17.21 hours on 23 May?
 11 A. Yes, he did.
 12 Q. Based upon the identification material that was at that
 13 stage available?
 14 A. That's correct.
 15 Q. Bearing in mind that some steps remained to be completed
 16 by that time, for example the DNA and the odontology,
 17 why was that identification publicly released at that
 18 stage?
 19 A. The identification of the bomber and the release of that
 20 information would potentially provide real investigative
 21 opportunities and investigative leads, so it was
 22 important that we got that out into the public arena so
 23 that it would enable us to actually receive information
 24 directly about Salman Abedi.
 25 Q. Would it also tend to reduce the extent to which you

1 were receiving information about people who the public
 2 thought might have been the bomber but was not the
 3 bomber?
 4 A. Yes, to a much smaller extent, I think. The main thrust
 5 of this was actually to engage the public in an
 6 information appeal, so if you can tell us anything about
 7 this man, we would very much like to know.
 8 Q. As you put it in your statement at paragraph 72, it was
 9 done in order to allow more meaningful appeals for
 10 information from the public?
 11 A. Absolutely.
 12 Q. That was the principal purpose?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Mr Barraclough, you, I know, are aware that there has
 15 been some public concern, not to say political concern,
 16 about a leak or potential leak of Abedi's identity
 17 within the United States.
 18 A. I am aware of that, yes.
 19 Q. What are you able to contribute to our understanding
 20 in that regard, please?
 21 A. The actual details of that are not within my
 22 investigation. I've had absolutely no dealings with it.
 23 From an investigative perspective, I don't think it's
 24 caused any damage to us or didn't cause any damage to
 25 the investigation at the time. The trouble with the

1 lack of control of this information is that it does lead
 2 to completely unnecessary hurt for families and victims.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it could be serious in the
 4 investigation. In the event it wasn't, but presumably
 5 you could imagine circumstances in which it could be?
 6 A. If we'd had a particular live operation that that could
 7 have compromised, yes, it could have been. But the
 8 actual detail of what happened and what that leak
 9 amounted to, I really couldn't comment on because
 10 I don't know.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 MR GREANEY: The chairman's point no doubt is well made.
 13 What seems to be the position is before you had decided
 14 to release the identity of Abedi, it was revealed in the
 15 media in the United States.
 16 A. Yes, it would appear so, yes.
 17 Q. That was capable of causing damage to your
 18 investigation?
 19 A. It was capable, yes.
 20 Q. Albeit in the result it did not so far as you are
 21 concerned?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. But the point you would make is you can well understand
 24 that it may have caused distress to those affected by
 25 the attack?

1 A. Yes, in circumstances such as this we would always much
 2 prefer to communicate that information directly with
 3 families rather than someone else do it for us.
 4 Q. But I believe what ought to be said is that insofar as
 5 you're aware, there is nothing to indicate that the leak
 6 to the American media came from within your
 7 investigation?
 8 A. No, it did not.
 9 Q. That deals with the steps taken to identify the bomber.
 10 In terms of your immediate investigative objectives,
 11 did they include gathering information about Abedi?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Securing the scene of the bombing?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And gathering all available evidence?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And identifying any further offenders together with
 18 assessing and identifying the continuing threat to
 19 public safety?
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.
 21 Q. Along with identifying eyewitnesses and pursuing any and
 22 all relevant lines of enquiry?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. We'll just identify in summary some of the other
 25 investigative steps that were taken. Was the scene of

1 the attack preserved, photographed and video-recorded?
 2 A. Yes, it was.
 3 Q. And imaged using specialist software?
 4 A. Yes, that's right, with the 360-degree specialism.
 5 Q. Bearing in mind the bank card that had been found, were
 6 a number of financial enquiries undertaken in relation
 7 to Salman Abedi?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Did research of police systems identify Salman Abedi's
 10 last known address to be 21 Elsmore Road in Fallowfield?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Was a search warrant under the Terrorism Act obtained
 13 the same day, 23 May?
 14 A. It was.
 15 Q. That being the day upon which the address was
 16 identified, and were those premises then searched?
 17 A. They were.
 18 Q. Did the search of those premises in fact last between
 19 23 May and 10 June?
 20 A. Yes, it did.
 21 Q. That may sound like a long period, could you explain?
 22 A. Well, the early searches in relation to this
 23 investigation were painstakingly slow because we were
 24 looking for trace evidence, so trace evidence would
 25 include the presence of TATP, which could be in

1 microscopic form, so hence the detail undertaken for
 2 each search and the length of time it would take.
 3 Q. Were steps also taken to locate other addresses and
 4 individuals linked to Salman Abedi?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. We've dealt with that to some extent already. Was one
 7 of the persons identified Ismail Abedi, his older
 8 brother?
 9 A. Yes, that's right.
 10 Q. Was his identity recognised in the early hours of
 11 23 May?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. With a search warrant being obtained to search his home
 14 in Manchester on the same day, 23 May?
 15 A. Yes, that's right.
 16 Q. And that search, you'll be able to confirm, lasted for
 17 a similar period, namely 23 May to 11 June?
 18 A. Yes, that's right.
 19 Q. At that early stage were other steps taken to preserve
 20 CCTV footage?
 21 A. Yes, extensively.
 22 Q. We've seen from the imagery produced by Mr Gallagher
 23 that the remains of a mobile telephone were found at the
 24 scene.
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. In the proximity of the seat of the blast?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And as everyone will know, it is possible, sometimes at
 4 any rate, to obtain information from a mobile telephone.
 5 Were steps taken to see whether that was so here?
 6 A. Yes, that's right. We were able to get what they call
 7 a QR code off the phone.
 8 Q. Did the QR code provide the international mobile
 9 equipment identifier or IMEI number for the handset?
 10 A. Yes, it did.
 11 Q. Showing the make and model of the phone?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And what steps were then taken once you were armed with
 14 the IMEI number?
 15 A. That then allows us to interrogate what information is
 16 associated with that IMEI number. In other words
 17 numbers that would be associated to it and then —
 18 telephone numbers and then an interrogation of the
 19 contacts that those numbers have made with other
 20 numbers.
 21 Q. So the IMEI number also enabled you to obtain details of
 22 the top-up card?
 23 A. That's right.
 24 Q. I should have said: there's no doubt that this was
 25 Abedi's phone?

1 A. Yes, it was.
 2 Q. And the top—up history, I believe, provided further
 3 lines of enquiry to follow in the immediate aftermath?
 4 A. Yes, that's right.
 5 Q. What would, on the face of it, obviously have been of
 6 interest to the investigation would have been any text
 7 messages that might have been recovered?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. So were steps taken to see whether such data could be
 10 extracted from the device?
 11 A. Yes, they were, and I think I might lead on to that
 12 later in my statement, but it was very badly damaged
 13 in the explosion.
 14 Q. The way in which you put it, it's in fact a little
 15 earlier in the statement at paragraph 71, is that:
 16 "Such was the damage that no data could be extracted
 17 from the device."
 18 A. That's absolutely right.
 19 Q. So the question of whether hostile reconnaissance was
 20 done via the internet on that phone is one that you were
 21 unable to resolve and to this day have not been able to
 22 resolve?
 23 A. Yes, that is correct, but also bear in mind that the
 24 Alcatel phone is a very, very simple phone. It's not
 25 a smartphone.

1 Q. I see, I hadn't appreciated that but do now. And
 2 indeed, as we're going to see when we turn to deal with
 3 mobile telephones in further detail, one of the features
 4 of this investigation is that although you have
 5 identified the existence of a number of handsets,
 6 I think 14 ---
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. --- you have been able to recover only a very small
 9 number, I think two of them?
 10 A. That's right, and it's the two that are referred to in
 11 evidence, hence the absence of telephone information
 12 from actually within the telephone itself.
 13 Q. Yes. We were dealing, just before Mr de la Poer takes
 14 us to part 2, with other steps of the investigation that
 15 were taken. Did it become obvious at an early stage
 16 that TATP was the explosive that had been used in the
 17 IED?
 18 A. Yes, it did.
 19 Q. Did that lead to enquiries regarding the purchasing of
 20 precursor materials for TATP?
 21 A. Yes, that's right.
 22 Q. Was open source research conducted extensively
 23 in relation to various strands of the investigation?
 24 A. Yes, it was.
 25 Q. Did witnesses, so those who had survived the blast,

1 begin to be traced or to come forward?
 2 A. Yes, they were.
 3 Q. I believe that in the steps that we've just identified,
 4 we're speaking only of the initial and immediate lines
 5 of enquiry and that other enquiries in the course of
 6 your investigation were undertaken as time pressed on?
 7 A. Yes, absolutely, and of course these things expanded
 8 exponentially.
 9 Q. Then finally in relation to part 1, an issue of
 10 importance, although we'll be turning to it in more
 11 detail --- well, turning to it in chapter 13. Was there
 12 an immediate working assumption on the part of the
 13 investigation that the arena attack was ideologically
 14 motivated?
 15 A. Absolutely.
 16 Q. Was that so because of the type of attack?
 17 A. Yes, it was.
 18 Q. The early identification of the bomber?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Recent events?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. So for example, the March attack?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And the terrorism threat level, namely severe?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. As a line of enquiry, in addition to those that we've
 2 dealt with already, did you have to consider how it was
 3 that Salman Abedi had come to be radicalised?
 4 A. Yes, I did.
 5 Q. Although you will have heard me say at the very
 6 beginning of your evidence that that is an issue upon
 7 which you'll be asked questions when you return in
 8 chapter 13.
 9 A. Yes, of course.
 10 MR GREANEY: Mr Barraclough, that is all I'm going to ask
 11 you about part 1. As you appreciate, Mr de la Poer is
 12 going to deal with parts 2 and 3. There's time to start
 13 that before lunch, so I'm going to ask that the holding
 14 screen go up, please, and I will swap places with
 15 Mr de la Poer.
 16 (Pause)
 17 MR DE LA POER: Can I just check that the holding slide has
 18 been taken down now?
 19 May the witness please be sworn?
 20 MS LORNA PHILP (sworn)
 21 Questions from MR DE LA POER
 22 MR DE LA POER: What is your full name, please?
 23 A. Lorna Kirsten Philp.
 24 Q. We have moved on to part 2 of the senior investigating
 25 officer's statement, which is entitled "The device and

1 its construction” and we’re going to begin with you
 2 assisting us with that from a scientific perspective.
 3 So can we begin in this way? In 2017, were you the
 4 principal case officer at the forensic explosive
 5 laboratory based in Kent?
 6 A. So in 2017 I was a senior case officer ; I became
 7 a principal case officer at the start of 2018.
 8 Q. So was it the case that that was your position as at the
 9 trial of Hashem Abedi?
 10 A. That’s correct yes.
 11 Q. Is that the position today?
 12 A. Yes, I’m still a principal case officer .
 13 Q. How many years’ experience do you have as an analytical
 14 chemist?
 15 A. I now have over 19 years’ experience.
 16 Q. Do you have a particular interest in the forensic
 17 examination of items for features of explosive
 18 significance ?
 19 A. That is correct , yes.
 20 Q. Do you hold an honours Bachelor of Science degree in
 21 chemistry?
 22 A. I do.
 23 Q. And are you a Master of Science in forensic science?
 24 A. That is correct .
 25 Q. A chartered chemist?

101

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. A fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And a member of the Chartered Society of Forensic
 5 Science?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Have you been involved in the Operation Manteline
 8 investigation since the day after the attack?
 9 A. Yes, that is correct .
 10 Q. And as we shall come to shortly, did you visit the arena
 11 on 23 and 24 May?
 12 A. Yes, myself and two colleagues from the laboratory
 13 attended the scene to help with the examination.
 14 Q. We’ll come to that in a moment. But as an introduction
 15 to the subject matter that we are talking about, what is
 16 TATP?
 17 A. TATP, which stands for triacetone triperoxide, it is an
 18 extremely sensitive primary high explosive.
 19 Q. Just breaking down some of the terms that you’ve used
 20 there. The phrase primary high explosive, what does
 21 that mean?
 22 A. A high explosive is a material that will undergo
 23 a detonation, so it produces a shock wave when the
 24 explosive functions to give us a blast. You get
 25 different types of high explosives, primary high

102

1 explosives and secondary high explosives. A primary
 2 high explosive is extremely sensitive to initiation and
 3 can be detonated from stimuli such as friction , impact,
 4 heat or spark. These are commonly used in very small
 5 quantities within an initiation system.
 6 Q. So those initiators are used in small quantities?
 7 A. The primary high explosive would be used in very small
 8 quantities generally within an explosive device.
 9 Q. You’ve described it as extremely sensitive . Does that
 10 mean that during manufacture and handling, it is
 11 potentially extremely dangerous to the person engaged
 12 in that?
 13 A. Yes. TATP is an extremely sensitive and unstable
 14 primary high explosive such that it has no commercial
 15 use.
 16 Q. Simply put, is that because it is so dangerous to
 17 handle?
 18 A. Yes, because it is so dangerous.
 19 Q. What are the principal chemical constituents of TATP?
 20 A. There are three ingredients required to manufacture
 21 TATP: you need hydrogen peroxide, an acetone, and an
 22 acid.
 23 Q. Is an example of one such acid, sulphuric acid?
 24 A. Yes, sulphuric acid can be used to manufacture TATP.
 25 Q. We’ve heard from the senior investigating officer that

103

1 acetone is very readily available on the high street ; is
 2 that correct?
 3 A. That is correct , yes.
 4 Q. Is it commonly used as a solvent?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Because this might become important in due course to
 7 a limited degree, does it have a distinctive smell,
 8 which some people describe as fruity?
 9 A. That is correct , yes, acetone has a very distinctive
 10 smell.
 11 Q. Next, hydrogen peroxide. We’re not going to go into any
 12 substantial detail here, but is that commonly used as
 13 a bleaching agent?
 14 A. Yes, a bleaching agent and disinfectant.
 15 Q. It will be for others to deal with the availability of
 16 that, so we’ll turn to sulphuric acid. What can you
 17 tell us about that in terms of its potential legitimate
 18 use?
 19 A. Sulphuric acid can be found in car batteries . That is
 20 the acid within a lead–acid battery.
 21 Q. Does hydrogen peroxide have a smell?
 22 A. At the concentrations available to the general public,
 23 no, it does not have a distinctive smell.
 24 Q. Again, we’re not going to go into the levels here in any
 25 detail whatsoever, but in the levels that we know were

104

1 purchased in this case, would it have a smell?
 2 A. No, it would not have a smell.
 3 Q. Sulphuric acid, does that have an odour?
 4 A. Sulphuric acid at the higher concentrations has
 5 a pungent odour. By that I mean, when you smell it you
 6 can almost feel it inside your nose. It's very sharp.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's a very long time ago, but it
 8 certainly used to be used in schools in chemistry labs
 9 and things like that.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is it still?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's not just in car batteries, it
 14 can be found in educational establishments as well?
 15 A. Yes, it would be, usually in the lower concentrations.
 16 MR DE LA POER: Again, we're not going into the detail here,
 17 but in the concentration relevant to this case, would it
 18 have had a detectable odour?
 19 A. It may have had an odour if you were close to it, but
 20 it would not spread within a room.
 21 Q. That's all I want to say by way of introduction to TATP.
 22 Again, you are as concerned about this as I am, but
 23 we are not going to go into the sort of detail that
 24 might provide any sort of assistance to those who wish
 25 to misuse it, so we'll move, please, to your initial

105

1 scene examination. That's behind your tab 11 although
 2 we can deal with this in quite a brief form, I think.
 3 As you turn that up, perhaps you can confirm that on
 4 26 May 2017 you prepared a preliminary report which
 5 arose from your visit on 23 and 24th?
 6 A. That is correct, yes.
 7 Q. Within that document, I'm here looking at your third
 8 paragraph, perhaps you can confirm that your conclusion
 9 at that very early stage was this:
 10 "That based on examination of the scene, it would
 11 appear that an improvised explosive device had
 12 functioned within the box office area of
 13 Manchester Arena as accessed from Victoria Station";
 14 is that right?
 15 A. That is right, yes.
 16 Q. You go on to detail a number of your preliminary
 17 observations, some of which are distressing in their
 18 content, but fundamentally, having worked that out at
 19 a very early stage from your initial examination, did
 20 all of your subsequent extremely detailed analysis lead
 21 you back to that conclusion as being correct?
 22 A. It did, yes.
 23 Q. We'll just review some of that so far as it will be
 24 relevant or potentially relevant to the inquiry.
 25 Did you examine a very large number of items which

106

1 were seized as part of the investigation?
 2 A. I did, yes.
 3 Q. And in fact, were there so many items that you weren't
 4 the only person examining them, you had colleagues to
 5 help as well?
 6 A. Yes, so my role within the investigation was to deal
 7 with the arena scene and the items that arose from there
 8 as well as a number of smaller scenes. Other scenes
 9 within the investigation were dealt with by my
 10 colleagues, which I then at the end pulled a comparison
 11 statement across the whole investigation of items that
 12 had been submitted to the forensic explosives
 13 laboratory.
 14 Q. We're going to just review briefly some of those items
 15 now. Were you provided with what was termed a gilet or
 16 perhaps a body warmer as one of the items that you
 17 considered?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And a feature of that item was, is this right, that you
 20 identified that the pocket had been cut away?
 21 A. Yes. The inner lining on the front right-hand pocket
 22 appeared to be cut and there was a section missing.
 23 Q. So we're clear about it, your examination, obviously
 24 you are extremely experienced in examining items which
 25 have been damaged by explosion, was that alteration or

107

1 change to the garment caused by the explosion?
 2 A. No, that appeared to have been cut as opposed to damage
 3 caused by the explosion.
 4 Q. Based on your understanding of how these devices work,
 5 might that have been relevant to the device itself?
 6 A. It could have been, yes. However, it could also just
 7 have been damage to the jacket that had nothing to do
 8 with the device.
 9 Q. On that subject, the inquiry has received evidence from
 10 some witnesses who have indicated that they saw
 11 Salman Abedi with the rucksack off his back. Is it
 12 right that sometimes devices of this nature can
 13 effectively be attached to a person through their wiring
 14 so that it's very difficult to remove them?
 15 A. It would depend exactly on how the wiring of the device
 16 was constructed, but it would be possible that the
 17 device was wired in such a way that it would be
 18 difficult to remove from that person.
 19 Q. So that is some configurations of devices, but is it
 20 also possible to configure these devices in a different
 21 way such that an item like that rucksack can be removed,
 22 or is that highly unusual?
 23 A. Yes, it would be possible to configure it in such a way
 24 that it could be removed as well.
 25 Q. From all of the examination you did of the very many

108

1 items, were you able to reach a firm conclusion about
 2 whether or not the device that Salman Abedi had was of
 3 the type that he would have been attached to or one that
 4 he might have been able to remove with relative ease?
 5 A. I couldn't tell from my examination as all the items
 6 I received were very damaged. Therefore I could not
 7 determine exactly how the device was wired and
 8 constructed definitively .
 9 Q. Turning to some other items, again just because they
 10 have a relevance to connecting individuals to the
 11 investigation , there was involved amongst those items
 12 one identified as a money tin; is that right?
 13 A. There were lots of fragments that had come from a money
 14 tin .
 15 Q. Are you able to confirm, although it will have been
 16 others who seized it, that the investigation was able to
 17 establish that the lid to that money tin, or at least
 18 one that fitted a tin of that type, was found at
 19 Granby Row?
 20 A. Yes, there was a lid examined from Granby Row by my
 21 colleague that was the same as the control item
 22 purchased by the police.
 23 Q. So it's absolutely clear what the purpose of my question
 24 is, that provides a connection between Granby Row and
 25 the scene of the detonation?

109

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Or at least a potential one.
 3 By way of a further example, did you examine items
 4 of fibreboard from the arena scene?
 5 A. Yes, there were very small fragments of fibreboard found
 6 at the arena.
 7 Q. Again, it ' ll have been others who discovered this, but
 8 were there offcuts of a materially identical fibreboard
 9 recovered from Granby Row?
 10 A. That is correct , yes.
 11 Q. Did you also have cause to examine all, or at least
 12 parts of them, of the other components that you would
 13 expect to comprise an IED device?
 14 A. Yes, there were a number of components from the arena
 15 scene that I identified as being part of the IED.
 16 Q. I ' m not going to go into what they are for reasons
 17 I have previously stated, but each of those no doubt
 18 confirmed to you in your view of what device was being
 19 dealt with?
 20 A. Yes, it did.
 21 Q. Finally, in terms of items that you examined, did you
 22 establish -- and this is a distressing fact which I just
 23 pause to acknowledge so that people are prepared for
 24 it -- 29.26 kilograms of metal nuts?
 25 A. Yes, that was the quantity of metal nuts I examined,

110

1 recovered from the arena.
 2 Q. In addition, another 1.47 kilograms of screws or cross
 3 dowels?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And taking an average of 10 grams an item, did that lead
 6 you to the conclusion that there were approximately
 7 3,000 items of shrapnel recovered?
 8 A. Yes, that is correct .
 9 Q. I ' m going to turn away from the items that you examined
 10 to what has been termed instructional videos. Again,
 11 we are going to deal with these carefully , I hope. Were
 12 you invited by the investigation to consider two videos
 13 given the labels CAH/38 and CAH/39?
 14 A. Yes, I was.
 15 Q. Dealing with CAH/38 in particular, does that contain
 16 a method of how to construct TATP?
 17 A. Yes, it gave clear instructions for the manufacture of
 18 TATP.
 19 Q. You will have had cause to no doubt examine many such
 20 videos in the course of your substantial career; is that
 21 right?
 22 A. That is correct , yes.
 23 Q. The chairman has seen that video. Can you tell us of
 24 what sort of quality it is in terms of its clarity of
 25 explanation?

111

1 A. In my opinion, this is a very clear video that
 2 demonstrates how to manufacture TATP and is one of the
 3 better instructional videos in terms of clarity that
 4 I have viewed.
 5 Q. There are other data points outside your expertise
 6 about, for example, when this video was first published
 7 and by whom, but just dealing within the video's four
 8 corners, were you able to reach any conclusion about
 9 whether or not Salman and/or Hashem Abedi watched that
 10 particular video?
 11 A. I cannot give an opinion as to whether they watched that
 12 particular video or not.
 13 Q. Are you able to say, though, whether, had they followed
 14 that video or one which was materially identical, they
 15 would have produced a substance very like that used
 16 at the Manchester Arena?
 17 A. Yes, that video gave instructions to manufacture TATP,
 18 which was the explosive used at the Manchester Arena.
 19 Q. So its method is consistent, can we say, with that which
 20 was ultimately produced by Salman and Hashem?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. I ' ve already asked you questions about odour. Just to
 23 help us with one piece of evidence that the chairman
 24 will hear shortly from Mr Barraclough: a witness in this
 25 case, Mr Elwafi, attended the property that he was

112

1 associated with, Somerton Court, after it had been
 2 cleared out by the Abedi brothers, and he describes an
 3 odour like a mixture of petrol and diesel, which might
 4 be difficult to imagine for some, but not for others.
 5 Are you able to help us with whether or not that sort of
 6 odour might be expected to be in connection with
 7 somewhere where TATP had been created?
 8 A. I would not expect to have a smell similar to petrol or
 9 diesel from the manufacture of TATP.
 10 Q. But might you, bearing in mind what you've said about
 11 acetone, expect some sort of odour?
 12 A. Yes. However, I do not expect the odour to last very
 13 long after the material has been removed.
 14 Q. We know there's other evidence, that we'll turn to
 15 shortly, that TATP was manufactured or at least present
 16 at Somerton Court, but whatever caused that odour, it is
 17 likely to be something other than the TATP itself?
 18 A. Yes, I can't explain the odour of petrol or diesel.
 19 Q. We're going to turn to a list of areas which tested
 20 positive for TATP. Before we bring it up, can you just
 21 help us with whether or not TATP is the sort of
 22 substance that is likely to leave a trace if it comes in
 23 contact with another item?
 24 A. It will leave a trace if it comes in contact with
 25 another item. However, that trace may not last very

113

1 long on that surface because of the nature of TATP.
 2 Q. Is it possible to determine the level of contact or the
 3 length of contact by the amount of TATP that's detected?
 4 A. No, I cannot. There are a number of factors that will
 5 affect the length of time that TATP is retained on
 6 a surface.
 7 Q. So with those qualifications in mind, can we please
 8 turn, Mr Lopez, to {CPS000209/61}?
 9 Ms Philp, can you just confirm, because you were
 10 a participant as a witness at the trial of Hashem Abedi,
 11 what we're looking at here is an extract from the agreed
 12 facts presented at the trial?
 13 A. Yes, it appears to be that.
 14 Q. For those less familiar with that process, that means
 15 that these are matters which are agreed as being correct
 16 and true as between the prosecution and the defence.
 17 So we can see that at the Manchester Arena there
 18 were a number of occasions, which are listed under the
 19 heading DCM/1, 3, 4 or 17 as being relevant to locations
 20 where TATP was recovered.
 21 A. Yes. DCM/1 was a kit that was used to sample a number
 22 of different areas within the arena. It had five
 23 samples and you can see the five different samples
 24 listed there, of which four contained TATP.
 25 Q. So help us with the acronym TERK. What does that stand

114

1 for or mean?
 2 A. That stands for trace explosive recovery kit.
 3 Q. Is this a portable kit that can be taken to the scene to
 4 give you a reaction?
 5 A. This is a kit that we produce in the forensic explosives
 6 lab in a quality controlled environment. It contains
 7 a number of swabs and solvent that can be used to
 8 collect a sample from the surface at the scene. It
 9 then goes back into the kit. That gets returned to us
 10 at the laboratory, where we process and analyse it.
 11 Q. So do we see that the floor tested positive for TATP,
 12 the body warmer, the long-sleeved top and metal
 13 fragments?
 14 A. That is correct, yes.
 15 Q. If we move outside the Manchester Arena scene to
 16 74 Somerton Court, which we'll hear some more about
 17 after lunch, I expect, do we see there were a number of
 18 occasions on which areas of that flat tested positive?
 19 A. Yes, TATP was recovered in several areas.
 20 Q. We can see that the quantities vary. Firstly, help us
 21 with what ng stands for?
 22 A. Ng stands for nanogram.
 23 Q. What conclusion, if any, can be drawn from the number of
 24 nanograms that are detected?
 25 A. We would be looking at, from the levels detected at

115

1 Somerton Court, that an item that had been contaminated
 2 with TATP had been in contact with that surface or, for
 3 example, the sump end cap in the sink, it may be that
 4 the sink had been used to wash an item or a person
 5 contaminated with TATP down that sink.
 6 Q. So an explanation, no doubt one of a number, is that if
 7 somebody had handled TATP with their hands or gloves and
 8 then washed them under the tap in the sink, one might
 9 expect to see quantities of that level?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. So those are connections to 74 Somerton Court --
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you going to tell us what a nanogram
 13 is in terms of percentage of a gram?
 14 A. A nanogram is one times 10 to the minus 9 of a gram.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Not much?
 16 A. Not much at all: so zero point, then eight zeros, and
 17 then 1.
 18 MR DE LA POER: At the bottom of this page we can see the
 19 Nissan Micra is indicated if we go over the page. We
 20 see relatively low quantities in nanograms detected from
 21 the vacuum sampled from the driver's seat, the rear seat
 22 and the boot.
 23 A. Yes, these are extremely low levels.
 24 Q. And given that you were able to reach some conclusions
 25 about the level of contact that may have taken place,

116

1 what might we infer from those numbers?
 2 A. Again, these numbers could be caused by contact with an
 3 item contaminated with TATP as opposed to contact with
 4 the bulk material itself .
 5 Q. So might it be consistent with that Nissan being used to
 6 store TATP in a sealed container but the people sitting
 7 in those seats or making contact with the boot had
 8 themselves had some contact with TATP?
 9 A. Yes, so if somebody had contact with TATP and they'd
 10 contaminated their clothing, then if they sat in a seat,
 11 that contamination could be passed from their clothing
 12 to the seat.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is not to throw any doubt at all on
 14 any of the conclusions, it 's simply as a matter of
 15 interest : is there a limit as to when they are reliable?
 16 Can you get down to such a small amount that you can't
 17 rely on the conclusions of it ?
 18 A. Below about 15 nanograms we would not be able to confirm
 19 that, so we would not report that as being present. We
 20 need to confirm it on two separate techniques in order
 21 to say it 's definitely there.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 MR DE LA POER: Then finally, we see Granby House and
 24 basement, a very significant number of areas in which it
 25 was detected. Help us with why, and it may be visible

117

1 quantity is the clue, why we don't have any nanograms
 2 for approximately half of those?
 3 A. Because we have what we would call bulk explosive. So
 4 anything that we can see, a visible quantity, we
 5 determine as bulk, therefore we can analyse it in
 6 a different way and we don't have a quantity present
 7 because we have a visible bulk quantity.
 8 Q. So rather than perhaps a trace that's undetectable to
 9 the eye, you can see it ?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we leave that, mg? That's more?
 13 A. Yes. Mg is milligram, so 0.001.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Ug?
 15 A. That is microgram and that's between the two. So that's
 16 0.000001.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 18 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez.
 19 Two final short matters, please, Ms Philp. Firstly ,
 20 we see you said in your statement that it is not
 21 possible for you to accurately estimate the quantity of
 22 TATP used in this explosion; is that correct?
 23 A. That is correct , yes.
 24 Q. And that's because there are so many factors to be taken
 25 into account, many of which you just don't have any data

118

1 on?
 2 A. Yes, that is right .
 3 Q. But you estimate it, I think we can go as far as to say,
 4 in the low kilograms, but we are not going to go any
 5 further than that in terms of what that might mean;
 6 is that right?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. So having completed all of the work that you've
 9 described for us, did you, using your expert opinion,
 10 reach any conclusion about what the intention was behind
 11 what we saw take place at Manchester Arena?
 12 A. In my opinion, the design and construction of this
 13 device was a deliberate attempt to cause a large
 14 explosion that would injure and kill as many people as
 15 possible .
 16 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed. We have
 17 notification of one set of questions for you, Ms Philp,
 18 and that's from Mr Weatherby, who is joining us
 19 remotely.
 20 MR WEATHERBY: Can you hear me?
 21 MR DE LA POER: We can hear you, Mr Weatherby, but under the
 22 moniker Neil Sheldon.
 23 There you are, Mr Weatherby, you're now visible to
 24 us.
 25

119

1 Questions from MR WEATHERBY
 2 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you very much. I haven't got many
 3 questions and I don't think they're going to be very
 4 difficult ones. I'm not going to trespass into anything
 5 sensitive , I hope.
 6 Can I just deal with, first of all, the battery and
 7 the switch? Again, I just want to be careful here.
 8 I don't want to identify the battery and I don't want to
 9 identify the switch, but you have, haven't you?
 10 A. Yes, I was able, from markings on the battery and the
 11 switch, to identify their origin .
 12 Q. But in a device such as this, you don't need any
 13 anything battery that needs to be of a particular power
 14 to match the rest of the mechanism, can I put it that
 15 way? There's nothing strange or particular about the
 16 battery that is needed, is there?
 17 A. No, it would just need to have sufficient power or
 18 voltage to cause the initiator to function.
 19 Q. And likewise the switch? It doesn't need to be
 20 a particularly complicated or bespoke switch, does it?
 21 A. No, it doesn't need to be a complicated switch.
 22 Q. Moving swiftly on, the hydrogen peroxide. Just this:
 23 you have told us that it does have some domestic uses,
 24 but it 's right, isn't it, that those uses — there are
 25 plenty of other substances readily available which do

120

1 those jobs?
 2 A. Yes, I believe so.
 3 Q. There's no necessity, is there, to have hydrogen
 4 peroxide as a readily available domestic product?
 5 A. That would be slightly outside my area of expertise --
 6 Q. I'll ask somebody else.
 7 A. -- in non-explosive uses.
 8 Q. Both in giving evidence at the criminal trial and
 9 I think in your written material, you have tried to
 10 estimate the amount of explosives that were in the bomb,
 11 and I'm not going to -- and I'm going to ask you not to,
 12 as Mr de la Poer has said, actually put any figures on
 13 this. But it's incredibly difficult, isn't it, to look
 14 at the aftermath of a bomb scene such as this and to
 15 estimate the amount of explosives that would be needed?
 16 A. Yes, I cannot accurately give you a figure for the
 17 quantity of explosive that was in that device.
 18 Q. So when you previously have been asked about this,
 19 you have just done your best with your learning and
 20 experience and you've expressed a guesstimate; would
 21 that be fair?
 22 A. Yes, this is an opinion of the quantity of explosive
 23 based on my experience.
 24 Q. Yes. You've understood from other evidence the amount
 25 of precursor chemicals and catalyst chemicals that were

121

1 sourced. Am I right that your opinion is that the
 2 amount of explosives that were used in this device were
 3 capable of being manufactured from the known sourced
 4 chemicals?
 5 A. Yes, we have known sourced chemicals for the hydrogen
 6 peroxide and the acid, and based on the hydrogen
 7 peroxide figure there was sufficient hydrogen peroxide
 8 to make the TATP used within the device.
 9 Q. I want to turn to the video, but again I'm going to be
 10 very careful and ask you to be careful; I'm sure
 11 you will be. I only have a few questions about it.
 12 This is, first of all, an Islamic State video; is that
 13 right?
 14 A. I don't know who produced this video. I simply assessed
 15 it for its viability to manufacture explosives.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It looks a bit like it from the video
 18 itself, doesn't it?
 19 MR WEATHERBY: Yes, I think so, but I wasn't entirely sure,
 20 so I'll ask another witness, if I may.
 21 As you have said, there's no evidence that either of
 22 the Abedi brothers watched this particular video, but
 23 you've agreed already that the process that's shown
 24 in the video is consistent with making TATP. You can't
 25 go much further than that in terms of the process that

122

1 was actually used, can you?
 2 A. No, I can't, it's a very simple process, but the process
 3 shown in the video would make TATP.
 4 Q. You've described it as a simple process, but you've also
 5 agreed that it's an extremely dangerous process. It's
 6 not just a dangerous substance but it's an extremely
 7 dangerous process in the making, isn't it?
 8 A. Yes, there is potential to cause an explosion if it's
 9 not carefully controlled when you're making it.
 10 Q. I'm not going to go into the details and I'll ask you
 11 not to, but it's right, isn't it, that within the video
 12 there are two techniques referred to, which are meant to
 13 make the process less dangerous?
 14 A. Yes. It gives you a number of safety instructions
 15 within that video as well in order to make it a safer
 16 process.
 17 Q. From what we know of Somerton Court, and again I am not
 18 going to go into any detail, it's likely that whoever
 19 made the explosive, the Abedi brothers most likely, it
 20 is likely that they followed those two safety methods;
 21 is that right?
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you can't go that far, say so. They
 23 may just have been lucky, I suppose.
 24 A. I'm trying to... I think I understand what I'm being
 25 asked, but I'm wondering if I can answer it without

123

1 describing the safety measure that you're talking about.
 2 MR WEATHERBY: Yes, I've asked it in a not very elegant way
 3 because I'm trying not to raise that point. I'm not
 4 going to take this any further.
 5 Was there an indication from the scene of
 6 Somerton Court that the measures in the video had been
 7 followed?
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Apart from the fact that it didn't blow
 9 up.
 10 A. Yes. I think you're referring to the location that the
 11 traces were recovered from.
 12 MR WEATHERBY: Yes.
 13 A. There was an indication there...
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, are there indications that,
 15 whoever did it, the Abedi brothers no doubt, that they
 16 followed the instructions to avoid blowing themselves up
 17 in the process?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 MR WEATHERBY: I won't take it any further.
 20 Just in terms of the movement of the substance, not
 21 only is the manufacture of the explosive dangerous but
 22 the movement of it is unless precautions are taken;
 23 isn't that right?
 24 A. Yes. It's very sensitive to impact and friction, so
 25 therefore if it suffered either of those during the

124

1 movement then it has the potential to explode.
 2 Q. Yes. Again, I'm not going to ask you about any details
 3 here, but the video refers to how it should be stored to
 4 keep it safe, doesn't it?
 5 A. It does, yes.
 6 Q. I'm not going to ask you the detail of that, but the
 7 video does refer to that. But storing it in the way
 8 suggested, it's fairly straightforward, but it would
 9 mean it wouldn't be immediately usable; is that fair?
 10 A. That is correct, yes.
 11 Q. Therefore if the video was followed and they did store
 12 it in such a way, then a further process would have been
 13 necessary to make it ready for use?
 14 A. Yes, that is correct.
 15 Q. The investigation theory, as I understand it, is that
 16 the explosives were made in the Somerton Court flat and
 17 then they were transferred to the Micra on 14 April,
 18 where they stayed until 19 May, and then Salman Abedi
 19 turned up and picked them up; is that consistent with
 20 what you've either been told or what you've investigated
 21 yourself?
 22 A. Yes, I'm aware that that is the investigation theory and
 23 it's possible based on the trace evidence that we've
 24 recovered from my results.
 25 Q. So as you've told us, the traces found at Somerton Court

125

1 are consistent with the manufacture having taken place
 2 there?
 3 A. Some TATP would have been manufactured there based on --
 4 or would have been present within that property at some
 5 time.
 6 Q. Yes, so you're not in a position to say it was
 7 definitely all made at Somerton Court, but it's
 8 consistent with that having happened?
 9 A. Yes, that would fit.
 10 Q. Then as I understand it, the traces on the car were very
 11 minor traces?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. So that would be consistent, would it, with the TATP
 14 being transferred from the flat, assuming that it was
 15 all made there, but would it be consistent with
 16 transferring it from the flat to the car in a closed
 17 container?
 18 A. Yes. The levels there would suggest there was no open
 19 bulk or loose explosive within that vehicle.
 20 Q. So the traces -- the tiny traces that you have recovered
 21 from the Micra certainly show that TATP is present
 22 in the Micra, some of it could have come from the
 23 clothing of people getting into and out of the Micra,
 24 but it could also have come from the outside of
 25 a container which contained TATP or indeed containers

126

1 carrying other things?
 2 A. Yes, it could have come from contamination on the
 3 outside of a container. Whether that container had TATP
 4 nor something else within it, I can't say.
 5 Q. Therefore consistent with the investigation theory, the
 6 TATP was moved and, if it was moved to the Micra, it was
 7 most likely in a closed container?
 8 A. Yes, it would be in a closed container if it was in
 9 there.
 10 Q. Mr Barraclough, I think, has suggested that the TATP may
 11 have been in a drum and we know that some drums were
 12 found in the Micra itself, some blue drums. Am I right
 13 that you tested those drums and in fact there was no
 14 TATP on the drums, the inside of the drums, in the
 15 Micra?
 16 A. The Micra was dealt with by my colleague. However,
 17 I have in my comparison statement summarised the trace
 18 work that was done within the Micra.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine. You tell us what he found.
 20 A. So from their results, it doesn't seem that the drums
 21 themselves were tested. It may be that they were
 22 required for other forensic disciplines to examine and
 23 we did not look for them for trace. However, we did
 24 sample all the surfaces within the vehicle.
 25 MR WEATHERBY: Okay, that's fine.

127

1 Again, working with the investigation theory, we
 2 know that Salman Abedi turned up to the Micra and
 3 removed items on 19 May, and again if the TATP was in
 4 a drum in the Micra then it would be consistent with the
 5 investigation theory that he removed the drum with the
 6 TATP and took it to Granby Row?
 7 A. Possibly, yes. There was no drum of TATP within the
 8 Micra, so therefore --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you can't say either way?
 10 A. I can't say.
 11 MR WEATHERBY: Are you able to say from any receptacle
 12 recovered from Granby House or its environs that that
 13 was a drum or receptacle used for the transfer of the
 14 TATP to Granby House?
 15 A. The items that were recovered from Granby House again
 16 were dealt with by one of my colleagues. However,
 17 I don't believe there was any drum recovered from
 18 Granby House. There were a number of scoops and plastic
 19 containers that had bulk material visible on them, so
 20 therefore these may have been used to transfer the TATP.
 21 But whether that was from another container into the
 22 device I can't say any more than that.
 23 Q. Okay. So Salman Abedi turns up on the 19th, we know he
 24 turns up with a very large suitcase, but from the CCTV
 25 it is not only very large but appears to be very empty,

128

1 in that it's light, in the way he's moving it. He spent
 2 some time at the Micra, but the camera view is obscured
 3 by a tree so it can't be seen clearly what is taken from
 4 the Micra and put in the suitcase, but as he drags the
 5 suitcase away, it's plainly very heavy. Have you had an
 6 opportunity to see the CCTV or the photographs?
 7 A. I have seen a compilation of some of the CCTV.
 8 Q. Is that in broad -- I'm not interested in the detail,
 9 but is that description I have just given a fair
 10 description of what can be seen?
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure your expertise goes to --
 12 I think we'll have to make our own mind up,
 13 Mr Weatherby. But it may be perfectly clear from what
 14 we've seen already.
 15 MR WEATHERBY: Okay. And then at Granby House, at the other
 16 end, we can see that having taken the suitcase to
 17 a taxi, he is then dropped off at Granby House and he
 18 has some difficulty with the bag and he drags it up
 19 quite a few steps. Have you seen the CCTV or the stills
 20 of that?
 21 A. Yes, I have.
 22 Q. Would it be right if the TATP was not stored in the way
 23 that we've obliquely referred to, but if it was just
 24 simply a number of -- a quantity of TATP, that would be
 25 an extremely dangerous method of moving it?

129

1 A. The rough handling or the handling of a large quantity
 2 of TATP is extremely hazardous and dangerous, so yes,
 3 it would be a dangerous method of handling it.
 4 Q. Yes. So would you be able to say from what you've seen
 5 that it is at least consistent with the TATP having been
 6 transferred in the safer method of storage referred to
 7 on the video that we've obliquely referred to?
 8 A. I can't say either way based on that video. It's
 9 a heavy suitcase, so I can't even say there was
 10 definitely TATP within that suitcase.
 11 Q. That's why I put it the way I did. It would be
 12 consistent with it having been moved in the way that
 13 I have described?
 14 A. Yes, that would be a possibility.
 15 Q. If it was moved in that way, then I think you've agreed
 16 already that there would then need to be an additional
 17 process at Granby House to ready the TATP prior to the
 18 bomb being constructed there?
 19 A. Yes, that is correct.
 20 Q. And again, I don't want you to give any details here,
 21 but there was evidence within the flat, wasn't there,
 22 that that additional process had taken place there?
 23 A. Yes, there was.
 24 Q. So finally, this, really: you described it as a simple
 25 process, it's a simple chemical reaction involved to

130

1 make TATP. But as we've discussed, there are levels of
 2 complexity involved because of the danger; is that
 3 right?
 4 A. Yes, there are a number of safety issues with the
 5 process. However, the actual chemical reaction does not
 6 involve sophisticated laboratory techniques.
 7 Q. Yes. Again, you may not be able to answer this, but
 8 I just want to seek your view on it. Whereas the video
 9 is a clear methodology shown, would it be your view that
 10 it would actually take some degree of training to put
 11 this bomb together? You may not be able to answer, and
 12 if you can't, it may be an unfair question, so please
 13 say.
 14 A. It's difficult for me to know exactly what somebody
 15 could do without any training, given the fact that I do
 16 have that training and knowledge.
 17 MR WEATHERBY: Yes, okay. I'll leave it there. Thank you
 18 very much, that's very helpful.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.
 20 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I have an indication that Mr Jamieson
 21 has a question.
 22 Questions from MR JAMIESON
 23 MR JAMIESON: Three supplementary.
 24 May I ask, please, we have all seen some CCTV
 25 footage from 22 May, a little after 9.30 in a lift, with

131

1 Salman Abedi fiddling with some wiring. Is that
 2 something that you have seen?
 3 A. This is from the arena?
 4 Q. From the arena.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 MR JAMIESON: I wonder, sir, for ease if we could just play
 7 that again at this moment. It lasts, I think, no more
 8 than 10 seconds. The reference, please, Mr Lopez, is
 9 {INQ031759/1}.
 10 (Video played to the inquiry)
 11 Thank you.
 12 Given you said you have seen it before, I'm not
 13 going to ask that we watch it again, but the
 14 deliberately general question is this: are you able to
 15 offer an opinion from that footage as to whether at that
 16 point that device was likely to be ready to function or
 17 whether some further preparatory step would have been
 18 necessary?
 19 A. I can't give an opinion based on that footage.
 20 Q. Thank you. The final question is this: are you able to
 21 give an opinion as to whether or not the device would
 22 have been ready to function by the fact that subsequent
 23 to that, as you've been told already by Mr de la Poer,
 24 we understand that the backpack was removed and placed
 25 on the floor? Can you help us with whether it's likely

132

1 to be ready to function or not?
 2 A. I can't give an opinion as to whether it was fully wired
 3 up or not at that stage.
 4 MR JAMIESON: Thank you. Those are the only questions.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That was two not three, so I'll ask one
 6 to make up for the third one.
 7 The actual detonation procedure — and if anyone
 8 thinks this shouldn't be asked, please tell me — would
 9 that involve connecting up the sort of wire we saw there
 10 to something else?
 11 A. If the circuit contained a switch, it may already have
 12 been connected up and it would simply be a case of
 13 flicking the switch.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, thank you.
 15 MR DE LA POER: Thank you, sir. That then concludes this
 16 witness's evidence. I have been asked to put the
 17 holding slide up for a moment so Mr Greaney can address
 18 you for a very short period of time before inviting you
 19 to take lunch.
 20 (Pause)
 21 MR GREANEY: Sir, as you will recall, the bomb scene
 22 manager, Mr Gallagher, gave evidence a little earlier
 23 today about a glass panel falling from the ceiling on to
 24 the floor at 10 am on the 23rd. A concern has been
 25 expressed on behalf of some of the families to be

1 assured that that glass panel did not fall on to their
 2 loved ones. I have had a chance to speak to
 3 Mr Gallagher and also to Mr Barraclough and they can be
 4 so assured, the panel did not fall on to any of the
 5 deceased.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 7 MR GREANEY: Sir, could we now take lunch until 2.35?
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Shall we take it 2.30?
 9 MR GREANEY: Certainly, sir, yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 2.30. Has Ms Philp now finished?
 11 MR GREANEY: Yes, she has now finished.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I'm really grateful for you
 13 coming to give evidence.
 14 (1.39 pm)
 15 (The lunch adjournment)
 16 (2.30 pm)
 17 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued)
 18 Questions from MR DE LA POER
 19 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we are resuming this afternoon with
 20 part 2 of Mr Barraclough's statement, which is from
 21 page 21, under the heading "The device and its
 22 construction".
 23 Mr Barraclough, we've already heard from Lorna Philp
 24 about the device, so I don't need to take you into the
 25 finer points of that as they are contained in your

1 statement.
 2 What we're going to do now is just review what
 3 formed the substance of the trial evidence and that's
 4 contained in your paragraphs 94 and following. Is that
 5 correct?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So that everybody understands the scale of what we're
 8 about to do, the trial of Hashem Abedi began on
 9 27 January of this year with it being opened to the jury
 10 on 3 February and verdicts were delivered by the jury on
 11 17 March. Can you confirm that is correct?
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.
 13 Q. So as such, we are looking to condense all of the
 14 important parts of that evidence into what we're going
 15 to do this afternoon. So it will be an information-rich
 16 environment.
 17 We'll begin, please, with where Ms Philp left off in
 18 terms of the questions she was being asked by
 19 Mr Weatherby and 74 Somerton Court.
 20 Did the investigation conclude, taking into account
 21 her information, that is Ms Philp's information, and
 22 other factors that 74 Somerton Court was the place in
 23 which Salman and Hashem Abedi created TATP?
 24 A. Yes, it did, and that was by virtue of the fact that it
 25 must have been because that is the first premises in the

1 sequence of events where we find TATP.
 2 Q. When you say first, in fact you identified a number of
 3 premises, didn't you, that were connected with this?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And we're going to look at each of them in detail and
 6 you've already introduced them. To put what you just
 7 said another way, was the investigation able to identify
 8 any other premises in which TATP was created other than
 9 74 Somerton Court?
 10 A. No, we would say it must have been created there because
 11 that was the first premises where they spent time and
 12 then, subsequent to that, clearly they moved on to other
 13 premises where TATP was discovered.
 14 Q. And there was positive evidence of TATP, as we've seen,
 15 at 74 Somerton Court; is that correct?
 16 A. Yes, that's right.
 17 Q. And other locations, there was no evidence to suggest
 18 that TATP was had been created there, such as the
 19 Abedis' home address?
 20 A. That's correct, yes.
 21 Q. The sequence, as we have heard through Mr Weatherby's
 22 questioning, and I think that you would accept on behalf
 23 of the investigation, was that having been created at
 24 74 Somerton Court, it was transferred to a Nissan Micra;
 25 is that right?

1 A. That's right, yes.
 2 Q. Which was stored at Devell House?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And then, as we heard in the questioning of
 5 Mr Weatherby, subsequently put into its IED form, so the
 6 explosive was constructed with other parts of the bomb
 7 at Granby Row?
 8 A. That's correct, yes.
 9 Q. Did the investigation consider the capability, so far as
 10 it was able to establish, of Salman and Hashem Abedi to
 11 carry out that process?
 12 A. I think probably the best way of answering this is that
 13 I don't think it's a particularly complicated process.
 14 We had reference to a piece of footage that we believe
 15 may have been seen by the Abedi brothers, if not that
 16 piece of footage at least something that was very
 17 similar to it, and clearly the instruction within
 18 that is a relatively straightforward instruction.
 19 Q. So as part of the investigation, did Operation Manteline
 20 consider the training and qualifications within the
 21 educational establishment in this country of Salman and
 22 Hashem Abedi?
 23 A. Yes, we did, and to what relevance that actually points
 24 at I'm not sure.
 25 Q. Well, it was certainly something you looked at and

137

1 perhaps we can confirm that Hashem completed a level 2
 2 City & Guilds course in electrical installation at
 3 Manchester College?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. Which you describe in your statement as a basic level
 6 course?
 7 A. Yes, it was.
 8 Q. And so far as qualifications above secondary school in
 9 chemistry and/or maths or any other academic discipline
 10 that might be relevant to the manufacture of TATP or the
 11 construction of a bomb, was the investigation able to
 12 establish that they had any such qualifications?
 13 A. No, not to any degree.
 14 Q. But as you have adverted to, there were instructional
 15 videos identified by the investigation?
 16 A. Yes, that's right.
 17 Q. We've already identified them with Ms Philp, but let's
 18 just confirm them now with you. Were they given the
 19 exhibit references CAH/38 and CAH/39?
 20 A. Yes, they were.
 21 Q. And of those two, was the first, CAH/38, considered to
 22 be the more relevant by the investigation?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Why was that?
 25 A. The video itself is not just about the production of

138

1 TATP, it is the production of a potential device as
 2 well. When we look at the similarities between the
 3 building of the actual device and the device that's
 4 demonstrated, the similarities are remarkable, to such
 5 an extent that we were able to adduce this into evidence
 6 at the trial even though we could never prove that
 7 either Abedi brother had ever watched the actual video
 8 itself.
 9 Q. When you say "never proved", is that a reference to the
 10 fact that there was no direct evidence of them having
 11 watched it?
 12 A. That's precisely right. It goes back to this point of
 13 only two devices out of 14 used by the Abedi brothers
 14 were ever recovered.
 15 Q. We're just going to briefly summarise the content of
 16 that video and we're going to take extreme care as we do
 17 so. So let's just deal with it in that way, please.
 18 CAH/38. Is that a video lasting 13 minutes and
 19 51 seconds?
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.
 21 Q. Is it set in what appears to be a domestic kitchen?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Is it, as Mr Greaney opened this inquiry with in his
 24 opening statement, introduced by this:
 25 "Praise is due to Allah, who aided the obedient

139

1 mujahid. He is knowing, hearing, the one who defends
 2 the truth. May blessings and peace be upon our prophet
 3 Muhammad. My muwahhid brother, today, by Allah's
 4 permission, we will learn how to make simple explosive
 5 substances with common ingredients, and which you can
 6 make in your own home using simple tools. This
 7 substance is known as acetone peroxide, commonly known
 8 as white ice".
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Does the speaker then go on to instruct how TATP can be
 11 created?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Are further instructions given about how that TATP can
 14 be incorporated into an IED?
 15 A. Yes, they are.
 16 Q. As you have said, are those steps, as demonstrated in
 17 the video, not those, as we've already heard from our
 18 previous witness, requiring laboratory techniques?
 19 A. They require very simple laboratory techniques, but it's
 20 a very straightforward process.
 21 Q. There's another fact about CAH/38 that may support the
 22 proposition that it was watched by the Abedi brothers
 23 and that is the date on which it was released. When, so
 24 far as the investigation was able to establish, was that
 25 video released?

140

1 A. That was in November 2016, so it was literally 5 months
2 before the actual attack.
3 Q. Does that date coincide also with the first identified
4 positive steps by the Abedi brothers to begin to
5 construct their bomb?
6 A. Yes, it does, shortly after.
7 Q. So the chronology is that that video became available to
8 those who knew where to find it and, shortly after it
9 did, the first steps were taken by the Abedi brothers to
10 assemble the parts needed for the bomb?
11 A. Yes. I think the first step is the procurement of the
12 acid or attempted procurement of acid.
13 Q. We'll come to look at the acquisition of the precursor
14 materials in detail, but without naming them, was the
15 investigation able to establish that, some time around
16 December 2016 into January 2017, there were steps taken
17 by Hashem Abedi to acquire the oil cans that were used
18 in the device?
19 A. Yes, that's true, yes.
20 Q. And also around that time, an unsuccessful attempt to
21 acquire a precursor chemical?
22 A. Yes, that's right.
23 Q. Let's turn now and run through the chronology which the
24 trial looked at in very considerable detail of the
25 acquisition of precursor materials.

141

1 {INQ034340/1}, please. If we can crop into that,
2 please, Mr Lopez.
3 Is this a schedule, Mr Barraclough, created by your
4 team at the request of the inquiry, which brings
5 together a vast quantity of evidence which underlies the
6 chronology about the acquisition of precursor chemicals?
7 A. Yes, it does.
8 Q. We'll read it line by line, or rather row by row,
9 starting with the first row, which we see towards the
10 top left hand corner, 18 January 2017 to
11 24 January 2017. Did this relate to the purchase of
12 1 litre of sulphuric acid?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. We can see the price given there of £30.21, together
15 with the vendor, Restauro Online. Do we see that there
16 was an email address associated with this purchase?
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. Is Alharth Forjani a relative of the Abedi family?
19 A. Yes, he's a cousin.
20 Q. Was the investigation able to speak to Mr Forjani about
21 his understanding and involvement in this transaction?
22 A. Yes, that's right, we did.
23 Q. Did he provide a witness statement in support of the
24 investigation?
25 A. He did.

142

1 Q. In summary, did he tell the investigation that he was
2 approached by Hashem Abedi in relation to the purchase
3 of sulphuric acid?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And that it was principally because of his Amazon
6 account that he understood he was being approached?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And so it was that he came to use his Amazon account to
9 purchase that sulphuric acid?
10 A. That's right, yes.
11 Q. We can see that from the next column across that it was
12 Alharth Forjani's bank account that was used to purchase
13 that sulphuric acid; is that right?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. It was then delivered to an address, we can see that
16 in the next two columns, the address from which it was
17 ordered and that to which it was delivered?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Then we have the penultimate column, those involved in
20 the transaction, Alharth Forjani on his own admission;
21 is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And lest there be any doubt about it, did
24 Alharth Forjani tell the investigation that he did not
25 at any understand at any time that that sulphuric acid

143

1 would be used in connection with a bomb?
2 A. No, he stated that he believed the account of
3 Hashem Abedi, that it was for a car battery.
4 Q. And as we've already seen when Mr Greaney was asking you
5 questions, was that one of two explanations that was
6 advanced to a number of people about why that sulphuric
7 acid was necessary?
8 A. Yes, that's right. That is consistent with all of the
9 purchases of acid.
10 Q. Was the investigation able to examine Mr Forjani's
11 account in terms of his account with Hashem Abedi, both
12 before and after the purchase, and establish that it was
13 broadly consistent with the account that he had given to
14 the police?
15 A. Yes, it was consistent.
16 Q. In the final column, we can see a Y next to that, in
17 other words this was in fact a successful purchase of
18 a precursor material.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. It was delivered to the address that we can see; is that
21 right?
22 A. Yes, that's right.
23 Q. And ultimately collected by Hashem Abedi?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Next, we can see, just a couple of weeks later, if that,

144

1 the date range 2 March 2017 to 9 March 2017, 5 litres of
 2 sulphuric acid, more expensive, as might be expected,
 3 but not five times as expensive, from the same vendor;
 4 is that right?
 5 A. That's correct, yes.
 6 Q. The email associated with this is a person who's been
 7 ciphered as Relative C?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And that is because they are connected to a person who
 10 is subject to an order of the Crown Court; is that
 11 right?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And if their identity was known, then there is a risk
 14 that there would be an identification of the person that
 15 the Crown Court has prohibited from being identified?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. We can see that the bank account used was that of
 18 Relative C. We can see that it was delivered, although
 19 not where. Perhaps it doesn't matter for our purposes.
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. And there were two people involved in that transaction,
 22 Hashem Abedi and Relative C?
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.
 24 Q. And that that was successful?
 25 A. Yes.

145

1 Q. Was Relative C's account similar to that of
 2 Alharth Forjani in terms of being told that it was for
 3 a legitimate purpose?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. Next, we can see 15 March to 21 March, twice as much as
 6 the previous occasion, 10 litres of sulphuric acid. The
 7 price is given there, and can we see that it's the same
 8 vendor again?
 9 A. Yes, that's right.
 10 Q. There's an email address given there, but that wasn't in
 11 fact an indicator of the person who was involved in this
 12 transaction; is that right?
 13 A. No, I think you're right. That is right, yes.
 14 Q. Because if we look all the way along to the penultimate
 15 column, we can see this is a transaction involving
 16 Hashem Abedi and Mohammed Soliman.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. So we've not spoken about Mohammed Soliman yet. Was he
 19 an associate of Hashem and Salman Abedi?
 20 A. Yes, he was.
 21 Q. Can you help the inquiry with where, to the best of your
 22 knowledge, Mohammed Soliman is right now?
 23 A. We believe Soliman is in Libya at the moment.
 24 Q. Whether that exact location is right or not, is it fair
 25 to say that so far as the Operation Manteline team is

146

1 concerned, he is not in the jurisdiction?
 2 A. No, he's not.
 3 Q. This was also, as we can see from the final column on
 4 this third row, a successful transaction; is that right?
 5 A. It was, yes.
 6 Q. So as at 21 March, a total of 16 litres of sulphuric
 7 acid had been obtained by Hashem and Salman Abedi?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And on each occasion, different people were used in the
 10 purchase of it by them?
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.
 12 Q. Fourth, we can see that during this period that those
 13 10 litres of sulphuric acid were being delivered,
 14 Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi's intention turned towards
 15 hydrogen peroxide, didn't it?
 16 A. Yes, it did.
 17 Q. So on 19 March, we can see 15 litres of hydrogen
 18 peroxide, the price, and a different online vendor;
 19 is that right?
 20 A. Yes, that's right.
 21 Q. In our penultimate column we see a person by the name of
 22 Zuhir Nassrat, who is associated with this transaction;
 23 is that right?
 24 A. That is correct, yes.
 25 Q. Again with Mr Nassrat, so far as Operation Manteline

147

1 team has been able to establish, is he currently in the
 2 jurisdiction?
 3 A. He is not in the jurisdiction. Once again, I don't know
 4 whether you want me to be more specific about that.
 5 Q. If you have a location that you're aware of that you're
 6 able to disclose.
 7 A. We believe that Mr Nassrat is in Libya.
 8 Q. This is marked as an unsuccessful purchase, in other
 9 words that whilst an attempt was made using an email
 10 address and Mr Nassrat's bank account, that did not
 11 succeed. Can you assist us with why that failed?
 12 A. It failed due to lack of funds in the account and
 13 effectively a bank card that was not authorised to work.
 14 So from a financial perspective, the transaction did not
 15 go through, so it didn't get beyond the Amazon platform.
 16 Q. But not deterred, the next day, is this right, 20 March,
 17 a lesser quantity was sought, 10 litres of hydrogen
 18 peroxide?
 19 A. Yes, that's right.
 20 Q. It's in fact indicated to be more expensive than the
 21 15 litres, albeit from the same website. Same email
 22 address as used previously; is that right?
 23 A. Yes, that's right.
 24 Q. And Mr Nassrat's account also called upon for this
 25 transaction?

148

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. A different address from which it's ordered, but in
 3 common with the previous address, shall we just note at
 4 this stage, and we'll come to it in more detail, that
 5 the delivery address for this and the previous day is
 6 44 Lindum Street?
 7 A. Yes, that's right.
 8 Q. Was that an important address for the investigation?
 9 A. Yes, this was specifically a delivery address that was
 10 identified because of these purchases.
 11 Q. We'll come back, won't we, to that? And again we see it
 12 was unsuccessful?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. A third attempt on the same day in relation to hydrogen
 15 peroxide, this time from a different vendor; is that
 16 right?
 17 A. Yes, that's right.
 18 Q. But otherwise using the same email address and the same
 19 bank account, the same address it's ordered from, the
 20 same address it's ordered to be delivered to?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And similarly, unsuccessful?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Is the explanation for that the same, namely a lack of
 25 funds?

149

1 A. Yes, that's right.
 2 Q. So at this stage, if we just pause, 16 litres of
 3 sulphuric acid successfully obtained but, as yet, no
 4 hydrogen peroxide; is that right?
 5 A. That's correct, yes.
 6 Q. But that was to change at the back—end of March when
 7 there was an attempt, a successful attempt as it turned
 8 out to be, to obtain 25 litres of hydrogen peroxide from
 9 the same vendor as had been used on the 20th?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. We've got another name to introduce here, the bank
 12 account for that purchase is indicated to belong to
 13 Yahya Werfalli; is that right?
 14 A. Yes, that's right.
 15 Q. We can see, if we go down that same column, that all
 16 three of these transactions involved his bank account;
 17 is that right?
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.
 19 Q. Two of those three, as we see from the final column,
 20 were successful?
 21 A. Yes, that's right.
 22 Q. Did Operation Manteline look closely at Yahya Werfalli's
 23 involvement in those transactions?
 24 A. Yes, we did.
 25 Q. What was Operation Manteline able to determine from

150

1 that?
 2 A. The account that was provided by Werfalli indicated
 3 that — and this is similar, actually, to the attempted
 4 purchases of hydrogen peroxide, in that there was
 5 a request to use those banking details without an
 6 explanation or without explanation as to what was being
 7 purchased, except with Werfalli, where he would say and
 8 has said that he believed that a fraud was going to be
 9 perpetrated and that that fraud effectively would enable
 10 him to get some benefit as well as the Abedis.
 11 Q. We're not going to go into the mechanics of the fraud.
 12 A. No, sure.
 13 Q. But there was money to be made by him on his account?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Dishonestly?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Did he simultaneously deny any knowledge of the use to
 18 which this was going to be put?
 19 A. Yes, he did.
 20 Q. Has Yahya Werfalli in fact been prosecuted for that
 21 fraud?
 22 A. He has, yes.
 23 Q. That he pleaded guilty to it?
 24 A. He did.
 25 Q. And I think it was just last week that he was sentenced

151

1 for it?
 2 A. He was.
 3 Q. We do need to just consider some further details
 4 connected with these last three purchases, all of them
 5 for hydrogen peroxide, two successful, as we can see,
 6 the final one and the antepenultimate one. Can I just
 7 draw your attention to the email addresses that we see
 8 connected with these three purchases? The first,
 9 changyu7777, what was the investigation able to
 10 establish about those?
 11 A. Well, this was — well, both of these emails were
 12 specifically created for this process. In evidence we
 13 have said that these are emails that would effectively
 14 ascribe to Hashem Abedi. Changyu7777 has no real
 15 meaning, but bedap jeana has a very sinister meaning.
 16 Q. You tell us what it means, please.
 17 A. It translate as: we have come to slaughter.
 18 Q. And both those email addresses, as you say, connected
 19 back to Hashem Abedi?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. That's not because he was a subscriber to either of
 22 them, is it?
 23 A. No, this is through quite substantial work around
 24 provenance. If you need to know the detail of that —
 25 Q. I don't think we do, but I think there are a number of

152

1 investigative techniques that were used in order to
 2 establish that connection and those techniques were
 3 fully illuminated to the jury at Hashem Abedi's trial?
 4 A. Absolutely, yes.
 5 Q. So we can see by the end of this process that there has
 6 been successfully obtained 55 litres of hydrogen
 7 peroxide; is that correct?
 8 A. Yes, that's right.
 9 Q. And 16 litres of sulphuric acid?
 10 A. Yes, that's right.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we leave that, Mr Werfalli has
 12 pleaded guilty to what: fraud, conspiracy to defraud?
 13 A. It was fraud.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there was a fraud connected with
 15 these transactions as well as being to get hydrogen
 16 peroxide?
 17 A. I'd have to check, sir, to be honest. I can't quite
 18 remember whether it was an attempted fraud or it may
 19 well have been an attempted fraud.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or a conspiracy to defraud maybe?
 21 A. Yes, I think it might have been an attempt because it
 22 was a straight -- very straightforward plan,
 23 straightforward ...
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I can have it explained to me in due
 25 course, no doubt.

153

1 MR DE LA POER: We have obtained the sentencing remarks, and
 2 so the precise basis upon which he pleaded guilty, and
 3 the (overspeaking) will be put before you, sir.
 4 Before we leave Yahya Werfalli, is it also right to
 5 say that looking at the telephone traffic that was
 6 available to Operation Manteline, there was support for
 7 the notion that he thought he was engaged in a fraud?
 8 A. Yes. Really, everything within the investigation was
 9 consistent with that story, and indeed Werfalli was not
 10 present round delivery or ... We went to some lengths to
 11 investigate that.
 12 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you to keep your voice up,
 13 sorry?
 14 You have mentioned delivery, so we'll just put
 15 a marker down against 44 Lindum Street, which we're
 16 going to come to very shortly indeed.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Because that was, as you've told us, the delivery
 19 address. In terms of the storage of these materials --
 20 and I have moved forward now to paragraph 137 of your
 21 statement, Mr Barraclough -- did the investigation
 22 conclude, as we've perhaps heard already, that by the
 23 time Hashem and Salman Abedi went to Libya in
 24 April 2017, the TATP had already been manufactured?
 25 A. Yes.

154

1 Q. After the brothers had left for Libya, did a person
 2 connected with that property, a man called Elwafi,
 3 attend 74 Somerton Court to effectively take back
 4 possession of it?
 5 A. Yes, he did.
 6 Q. I've already asked questions about this and referred to
 7 Mr Elwafi and what he says he smelt, but did he tell the
 8 investigation that when he entered that property, it
 9 smelt like a mixture of petrol and diesel?
 10 A. He did.
 11 Q. Did he discover within the property a number of bottles
 12 of liquid that he did not recognise?
 13 A. Yes, that's right.
 14 Q. And because he was clearing the property up, did he
 15 inform the investigation that he had thrown them away?
 16 A. He did.
 17 Q. So those items were never recovered by the investigation
 18 and precisely what they were has not been able to be
 19 definitively established?
 20 A. No, we don't know.
 21 Q. What we're going to just watch now is something that you
 22 referred to this morning, Mr Barraclough, and that is
 23 the piece of work that was done establishing the
 24 transportation of materials from Somerton Court to where
 25 they were to be stored whilst the Abedi brothers were in

155

1 Libya.
 2 Mr Lopez, can I invite you, please, to bring up the
 3 animation {INQ033888/1}?
 4 This was obviously prepared for the jury, wasn't it,
 5 Mr Barraclough?
 6 A. Yes, it was.
 7 Q. We're going to see the journey on 13 and 14 April,
 8 principally because it illustrates, would you agree, the
 9 level of investigation that you and your team descended
 10 to in order to assess the evidential features in the
 11 case against Hashem Abedi?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. There are a number of such animations, we're not going
 14 to watch all of them, but this one, given that you
 15 mentioned it this morning, we'll consider now.
 16 Perhaps as it's playing, I'll ask you to pick out
 17 items of interest.
 18 Mr Lopez, unless I indicate otherwise, there will be
 19 no need to pause.
 20 (Video played to the inquiry)
 21 We can see here the date range we're concerned with
 22 is very shortly before the brothers are to depart on the
 23 15th to Libya; is that right?
 24 A. That's correct, yes.
 25 Q. 21 Elsmore Road is marked. That's the home address of

156

1 Salman and Hashem Abedi at that time?
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.
 3 Q. And Devell House is also marked. That is, as you've
 4 identified, and we'll look at in a little more detail in
 5 a moment, the place to which a number of the precursors
 6 were delivered?
 7 A. Yes -- no, sorry.
 8 Q. Sorry, that's Lindum Street, quite right. Devell House
 9 is where they are to be transported?
 10 A. Yes, that's right, yes. That's effectively where they
 11 will be stored within the parked Micra.
 12 Q. What we're going to see shortly is data points tracking
 13 the journey. That's the Micra; is that right?
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.
 15 Q. We'll come back to it shortly. Is that an image taken
 16 from an automatic number plate recognition system?
 17 A. Yes, it is.
 18 Q. Which permits the identification of that vehicle on the
 19 road at a particular time?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. We can see at this time, it'll become relevant shortly,
 22 there's contact from the telephone attributed to
 23 Salman Abedi to a taxi company?
 24 A. That's correct, yes.
 25 Q. When we see a green circle with that mast appearing, as

157

1 it has towards the top left-hand corner, is that an
 2 indicator of what's called cell site evidence?
 3 A. There are a number of things which prove these journeys.
 4 That is one of them, so that would indicate a cell site
 5 and it would allow us to provide a degree of positioning
 6 in relation to a phone held by an individual at
 7 a particular time when they're using that phone.
 8 Q. And although such masts identify only area, is it
 9 possible to draw inferences when people move between
 10 masts of a direction of travel?
 11 A. Yes, it is, and not just move, they can be static and
 12 we can still draw those inferences in relation to
 13 proximity, direction, et cetera.
 14 Q. We can see indicated now is Somerton Court and ringed in
 15 red, is that the flat that was used by the Abedi
 16 brothers to manufacture TATP?
 17 A. Yes, that's 74 Somerton Court.
 18 Q. So is the inference that is to be drawn that they've
 19 travelled, or Salman at least has travelled, north to
 20 Somerton Court in the Nissan?
 21 A. So --
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: From home? Is that what's being said?
 23 A. We would say they've both travelled from Elsmore Road
 24 in the same car to --
 25 MR DE LA POER: I think we're about to see some evidence on

158

1 the screen now in support of that. Because although
 2 it's unlikely that they would be standing next to each
 3 other, bearing in mind they're calling and texting each
 4 other, they're both using masts with their mobile
 5 telephones in close proximity?
 6 A. Yes. That's right.
 7 Q. That may be consistent with one of them outside and one
 8 of them up in the flat or an arrangement like that?
 9 A. Yes, that's right. That's one having gone in.
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 We see now indicated the taxi that we saw that
 12 Salman Abedi had been in contact with twice has now
 13 arrived at the Somerton Court area.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. We can see the text at the bottom there that a male has
 16 entered the taxi with two bags and two cardboard boxes,
 17 requesting to be taken to Rusholme, where he'll tell the
 18 taxi driver where to drop him off.
 19 Presumably that account derives from the taxi
 20 driver?
 21 A. Yes. Well, that's right, and clearly this is how we
 22 recognised that it's Salman Abedi who has gone into the
 23 taxi with these boxes. He also -- the account of the
 24 taxi driver would say that he's extremely careful with
 25 the boxes when he's handling them.

159

1 Q. We can see here that the investigation is indicating
 2 that Salman Abedi is present in that taxi travelling in
 3 the direction as indicated. Was it the investigation's
 4 theory, and therefore the prosecution's case, that
 5 having travelled to Somerton Court, the two brothers
 6 separate outside Somerton Court or in the vicinity with
 7 Salman Abedi alone making this journey?
 8 A. Yes, that's right. You'll see the difference between
 9 the two journeys in that this is a solid orange line
 10 because this is the recollection of the taxi driver.
 11 The taxi driver remembers the journey and he goes
 12 through that journey.
 13 Q. We'll see a blue line journey shortly, which will
 14 represent Hashem's journey?
 15 A. Yes, and some of that you'll see is broken, so the line,
 16 the blue line, is broken. That's because we are using
 17 reference points and we're assuming a particular journey
 18 between reference points, if that makes sense.
 19 Q. It certainly does.
 20 The cell site is consistent with Hashem Abedi still
 21 being in the Somerton Court area; is that right?
 22 A. That's correct, yes. We would say there's a clear
 23 reason why the two have separated in relation to these
 24 journeys. There's a reason why Salman Abedi has gotten
 25 his boxes and put them in the taxi and gone separately

160

1 from Hashem Abedi.
 2 Q. What is that reason?
 3 A. That reason is that he has the explosive, and then
 4 travelling separately, there is clearly less danger to
 5 the — well, particularly to his brother.
 6 Q. Here we see that dotted line that you indicated —
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. — and that by approximately 12.40, it appears that
 9 Hashem has set off on a separate journey?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. They travel there in the Nissan so presumably he would
 12 have that vehicle available to him.
 13 A. Yes, but there's also, and this is probably something to
 14 bear in mind for the future as well is that even at this
 15 each stage they have been considering operational
 16 security. There's something about, in transporting this
 17 material in a taxi, I suppose they've asked themselves
 18 the question: are they more or less likely to be stopped
 19 by the police or is Hashem more likely to be stopped in
 20 the Nissan Micra. So there is something about
 21 separating out here and something about, I would say,
 22 transporting that explosive in a relatively incongruous
 23 way in a taxi and limiting the danger to —
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's either, we'll blow up the taxi
 25 driver in his car rather than ours and Hashem?

161

1 A. Probably, sir, yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or it's done in order to make detection
 3 less likely?
 4 A. Yes, that's right.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or a combination of both.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 MR DE LA POER: But either way, thought has appeared to have
 8 gone into this?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And care is being taken?
 11 A. You see examples of that all the way through, that there
 12 is careful consideration and it is about the operational
 13 security of what they're attempting to do.
 14 Q. Of course, it's important to remind ourselves that at
 15 this point, the journey to Libya, the final journey for
 16 Salman at any rate, has yet to take place?
 17 A. Yes, that's right. Although it is the next day,
 18 literally. Well, it is this day, actually, it's later
 19 this day.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So by the time that the Micra sets off,
 21 has the taxi arrived?
 22 A. It's still travelling, sir.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 24 MR DE LA POER: There was a conversation at, I think, 12.35
 25 or thereabouts between the two brothers.

162

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And shortly after that, Hashem sets off?
 3 A. Yes. It goes back to the operational security. You see
 4 that Salman Abedi is not actually travelling towards
 5 Devell House, he goes beyond that and then does a great
 6 big loop round and then joins his brother very near to
 7 the final destination.
 8 Q. And that is a destination that, as we are seeing now,
 9 Hashem appears to be driving directly to?
 10 A. Yes, that's right.
 11 Q. So suggesting that this is part of a prearranged plan?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. This is perhaps the loop or doubling back that you
 14 referred to?
 15 A. That's correct.
 16 Q. Having travelled south of where the ultimate destination
 17 was, Salman Abedi is now travelling back in the
 18 direction, as we can see, clearly in the right-hand
 19 pane, of Devell House?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you identify the fact that Salman is
 22 in the taxi rather than Hashem by descriptions or
 23 identification by the taxi driver and phones?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you can identify whose phone is

163

1 whose?
 2 A. That's right. Again, a huge piece of work and quite
 3 complex, but when you look at the information that
 4 we have in relation to the phones that we've got, we've
 5 been able to provenance individual phones for Hashem and
 6 Salman.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: By saying where they were at
 8 a particular time that you knew and where phone calls
 9 were done from?
 10 A. Absolutely, and by the context of their calls, by the
 11 context of what's been sent to different people,
 12 et cetera.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: None of the phones were helpfully
 14 registered in their names or anything like that?
 15 A. I wouldn't have thought so. But there were also phones
 16 we've identified which have had joint use, so both
 17 brothers have used them at different times.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 19 MR DE LA POER: We're just at a point here, just after
 20 1 o'clock, when Salman is in close proximity to
 21 Devell House. There's contact between him and Hashem,
 22 and no doubt evidence from the taxi driver where he was
 23 told to stop by the person you've identified as Salman.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Again are we seeing another example of that, perhaps

164

1 what you might call anti—surveillance or awareness of
 2 police activity and tactics that the taxi isn't parked
 3 at Devell House but instead a short distance away?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. We can see there, and we'll come to this individual
 6 tomorrow, but Elyas Elmehdi was contacted by
 7 Salman Abedi. Was he a person connected to
 8 Devell House?
 9 A. Yes, he was, and I know we're going to come on to him,
 10 but he effectively gives permission for the vehicle to
 11 be parked there.
 12 Q. Because as we heard this morning, there is a private
 13 gated car park at Devell House; is that right?
 14 A. Yes, that's right, although it is probably important to
 15 say that from recollection I don't think the gating
 16 system actually worked, so it wasn't a secure closed—off
 17 area.
 18 Q. We can see from the text at the bottom now that there's
 19 a transfer from the taxi to the white car, the Micra no
 20 doubt the investigation concluded?
 21 A. Yes, that's right.
 22 Q. The taxi drives off, no doubt to collect another fare.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They do wait, do they, until the taxi
 24 has disappeared before they set off for their
 25 destination?

165

1 A. Yes, they do, sir.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they're far enough away from
 3 Devell House so that no one would have any idea where
 4 they are going?
 5 A. Absolutely.
 6 MR DE LA POER: We can see where Devell House is marked and
 7 we can see where the car is. Is there a short journey
 8 for them to travel between those two points?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. But there's no data to identify precisely by which route
 11 or at what time?
 12 A. No, because obviously they're together so they are not
 13 making phone calls, they're both in the same car, and
 14 we've no reference points on that short journey.
 15 Q. So we've watched that as illustrative of the work that
 16 Operation Manteline did, but is one of the things that
 17 it illustrates the two brothers working together as part
 18 of their plan?
 19 A. Yes, that's right.
 20 Q. Once at Devell House, did the investigation establish
 21 that the vehicle was left there for the duration that
 22 Salman was in Libya?
 23 A. Yes, it was. I'd have to check exactly how far the CCTV
 24 went back, but we know that it was parked on 15 April
 25 and we know that Salman Abedi returns to that on 18 May.

166

1 Q. So as to that latter date that you've given, he returns
 2 to, that is to say Salman Abedi returns to this country
 3 on 18 May; is that right?
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.
 5 Q. And does he visit the Micra that same day?
 6 A. Yes, he does.
 7 Q. Does he visit it for a second time the day after?
 8 A. Yes, he does.
 9 Q. At the time that he visits it on the second occasion,
 10 had he by then obtained that large blue Kangol suitcase
 11 that we have seen in the footage when this inquiry
 12 opened?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. We'll consider the movements of Salman Abedi during this
 15 period as captured on CCTV with your colleague,
 16 Detective Sergeant Hazelwood in due course.
 17 A. Of course.
 18 Q. But in summary form, as we have heard this morning, was
 19 that suitcase light before the visit and heavy after?
 20 A. Yes, it was.
 21 Q. Leading the investigation to infer that what had been
 22 stored in the Nissan had been transferred into the
 23 suitcase?
 24 A. Yes, I think that's entirely accurate.
 25 Q. So having dealt with that I'm just going to acknowledge

167

1 one part of your statement that we are not going to deal
 2 with together, Mr Barraclough, before we move on to
 3 further topics relating to the planning and preparation
 4 by, it was to become, Salman Abedi alone. That is you
 5 do provide a short section within your statement of
 6 compliance checks in relation to the acquisition of the
 7 precursor elements; is that right?
 8 A. Yes, that's right.
 9 Q. But we are not going to deal with that, you and I; it
 10 will be dealt with as a subject at chapters 13 and 14 of
 11 the inquiry oral evidence hearings and it may well be
 12 that there will be other witnesses who will be able to
 13 speak to it in greater detail than you can. I'm just
 14 acknowledging it to make clear that it is a deliberate
 15 omission at this stage.
 16 A. Thank you, Mr de la Poer.
 17 Q. I'm going to go on just to deal with the acquisition of
 18 other materials as established by the investigation.
 19 Again, we'll look at this in detail with DS Hazelwood,
 20 as revealed on the CCTV, and with you when we come to
 21 the finances, but were a number of tools and materials
 22 acquired by Salman and Hashem Abedi in pursuit of their
 23 plot?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And non—exhaustively, did they include the Karrimor

168

1 rucksack that was used on the 22nd? A very large number
 2 of items of shrapnel, as we heard from your colleague
 3 this morning?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Tools and other items associated with the construction
 6 of the bomb?
 7 A. Yes, that's right.
 8 Q. And were those items paid for in cash or by reference to
 9 debit cards associated either with Salman Abedi or his
 10 mother?
 11 A. Both, actually. I think they were routinely a mixture.
 12 Q. We'll have a look at the finances in part 3 of your
 13 statement. I would like to consider the items by
 14 reference to particular premises and in particular we'll
 15 start with 21 Elsmore Road.
 16 21 Elsmore Road was the home address of Salman and
 17 Hashem Abedi; is that correct?
 18 A. Yes, that's right.
 19 Q. It was identified by the investigation at an early stage
 20 as a property of interest to the investigation; is that
 21 right?
 22 A. Yes, that's right.
 23 Q. Were a number of important items of evidence recovered
 24 from there?
 25 A. Yes.

169

1 Q. First, were the parts of a number of oil cans, that is
 2 to say industrial or vegetable oil cans, recovered from
 3 there?
 4 A. Yes, they were.
 5 Q. Is your colleague, a forensic scientist, Mr Ryder,
 6 perhaps the best person for us to deal with that in
 7 detail with?
 8 A. I think he'll explain it very well, yes.
 9 Q. He is going to join us tomorrow morning, so we will come
 10 to his evidence then.
 11 Was a piece of paper with the email address
 12 bedap7jeana@gmail.com recovered from a bin at
 13 21 Elsmore Road?
 14 A. Yes, it was.
 15 Q. And that's the address with that, as you've described
 16 it, sinister translation?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Were attempts made to see if there was scientific
 19 evidence to connect anyone to that piece of paper?
 20 A. Yes, unfortunately, I think they were negative.
 21 Q. But did they include analysing it for fingerprints and
 22 DNA?
 23 A. Yes, that's right.
 24 Q. And was it also sent for handwriting analysis?
 25 A. Yes, it was.

170

1 Q. Was that handwriting analysis inconclusive?
 2 A. Yes, it was.
 3 Q. We're going to bring up for the chairman's reference
 4 a slide that was created for the trial in relation to
 5 important items recovered from 21 Elsmore Road. We
 6 won't need to look at it in any detail. {INQ033856/1}.
 7 Should the chairman in his report or any other core
 8 participant wish to refer to any part of this, does this
 9 provide us with a summary of key items seized from
 10 21 Elsmore Road?
 11 A. Yes, it does.
 12 Q. We can see that distinctive pale yellow and red of the
 13 oil cans --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- which appears a number of times.
 16 In the bottom right-hand corner of the pane in the
 17 bottom left-hand corner -- I have not described that
 18 very carefully, but if you go to the box in the bottom
 19 left-hand corner, that's nine sub-boxes -- the bottom
 20 right-hand one, is that the piece of paper with the
 21 email address on?
 22 A. It's difficult to read, but yes, it is.
 23 Q. So a number of important items and the oil cans we'll
 24 deal with with Mr Ryder.
 25 Before we come back to some other properties, let's

171

1 deal with some items that we've mentioned. The Kangol
 2 suitcase, which as you've established, was used on the
 3 19 May. Was that acquired the day before?
 4 A. Yes, it was.
 5 Q. So is the chronology that Salman Abedi arrives back
 6 in the UK, he visits the Micra, and then he purchases
 7 the Kangol suitcase?
 8 A. Yes, that's right.
 9 Q. Having collected the items as you have described from
 10 the Nissan on 19 May, does he go on later that day to
 11 purchase the Karrimor rucksack?
 12 A. Yes, he does.
 13 Q. So both important items in the chronology of planning,
 14 preparation, but only acquired very shortly before the
 15 attack itself?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Was the Kangol suitcase ever recovered?
 18 A. The Kangol suitcase, no, it wasn't.
 19 Q. But from the CCTV footage, was the investigation able to
 20 establish its dimensions?
 21 A. Yes, it was. We actually bought an exact copy, as
 22 we have done with many of the items that have been used
 23 in this process.
 24 Q. The same is also true of the Karrimor rucksack that --
 25 A. Yes, that's right.

172

1 Q. In relation to the Kangol suitcase was the investigation
 2 able to establish that a blue drum of the type, as we
 3 shall see, recovered from the Nissan Micra could fit
 4 within it?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. So that the public, core participants and the chairman
 7 can understand the steps taken, perhaps we'll illustrate
 8 one aspect of your investigation by reference to
 9 attempts made to find the Kangol suitcase. Perhaps you
 10 can tell us what your investigation did so far as
 11 that is concerned.
 12 A. I suppose the first phase of this is in relation to the
 13 CCTV recovery, so from 18 May to 22 May, we tried to
 14 capture every moment we possibly could in relation to
 15 Salman Abedi's movements and that left us with a very
 16 short window of time actually where there was no
 17 coverage that would help us. But in relation to the
 18 Kangol suitcase, we are conscious that once it had done
 19 its job, it was no longer required and Salman Abedi
 20 moves to dispose of that suitcase.
 21 We went through extensive enquiries to try and find
 22 that and that took us to the strong belief that it had
 23 actually been taken up to Pilsworth tip, rubbish tip,
 24 and for the next 12 months we searched for that bag,
 25 through some 10,000 tonnes of evidence -- sorry, not --

173

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You personally?
 2 A. I didn't, thankfully.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You delegated that?
 4 A. But some really amazing people did and they put their
 5 heart and soul into it and searched 10,000 tonnes of
 6 rubbish, but we never found it. I think as you say,
 7 Mr de la Poer, it does demonstrate the lengths to which
 8 the investigation has gone to.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: At the end of the day, it might have
 10 done, but it was unlikely to have added a huge amount to
 11 the inquiry.
 12 A. I'm not sure, actually.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 14 A. There could have been many things in that suitcase. We
 15 had some description of some things that might have been
 16 in there.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. They might have helped?
 18 A. I would never turn my nose up at evidence. I always
 19 welcome it from wherever.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 21 MR DE LA POER: So that's the Kangol suitcase.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was that meant to be a pun,
 23 Mr Barraclough?
 24 A. No!
 25 MR DE LA POER: Perhaps we can turn to another area from

174

1 which evidence was recovered and that was an area near
 2 the Macdonald hotel.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Firstly, what led the investigation to the Macdonald
 5 hotel area?
 6 A. So once again, this was CCTV recovery and a process of
 7 following Salman Abedi through his movements over those
 8 days.
 9 Q. Having identified that general area, was there an area
 10 of wasteland on Wyre Street?
 11 A. Yes, that's right.
 12 Q. What was recovered from there?
 13 A. This is the rucksack which, when we come on to talk
 14 about Salman Abedi's movements, when he arrives in the
 15 UK, it's the same rucksack that he is carrying when he
 16 comes through passport control.
 17 Q. Also in there was a passport, a Libyan passport in the
 18 name of Suleman Ramadan Al Abedi?
 19 A. Yes. That's right.
 20 Q. Was there also Salman Abedi's British passport?
 21 A. Yes, that's true.
 22 Q. A number of other items, including an airline stub?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. What conclusion did the investigation reach about why
 25 those materials, including those two passports, had been

175

1 left in that area?
 2 A. So I think if I remember rightly, the two passports were
 3 actually in a Timberland bag, but it was very near the
 4 actual rucksack. So this, for me, was a final disposal
 5 of items which were no longer needed by Salman Abedi.
 6 I think probably the telling thing is that the passports
 7 have been thrown away. I think part of that is
 8 in relation to perhaps concealing identity, but more for
 9 me that was a disposal of an item that he no longer
 10 needed.
 11 Q. When between the 18th and the 22nd was that disposed of?
 12 A. I'd have to refer back to the CCTV SoE.
 13 Q. We'll perhaps deal with that with your colleague
 14 Mr Hazelwood.
 15 Certainly when we see Salman Abedi goes into that
 16 general vicinity, the investigation concluded that's
 17 what he was doing there?
 18 A. Yes, absolutely.
 19 Q. So let's now, to conclude part 2 of your statement, look
 20 at some of the addresses in a little more detail,
 21 although we have touched on some of this on more than
 22 one occasion?
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are we going to deal with mobile phones
 24 at some stage? There's nodding from behind.
 25 MR DE LA POER: I wasn't proposing to go to the detail of

176

1 it , although we can fairly readily bring up an
 2 attribution .
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just ask you a couple of
 4 straightforward questions. When Salman Abedi arrived
 5 back into this country, did he have a mobile phone with
 6 him?
 7 A. Yes, he did. He had the Alcatel, which is the device
 8 that he took to the arena with him.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Did he get, acquire, another
 10 mobile phone when he was in this country, when he
 11 arrived back?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So he has two mobile phones?
 14 A. Yes, that's right .
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What happened to the other mobile phone?
 16 A. The other mobile phone is discarded again. It's
 17 actually recovered by a witness and then it's brought to
 18 the attention of the police and the police recover the
 19 mobile phone and we examine it. But unfortunately, that
 20 phone has been factory reset. Whether it was factory
 21 reset by Salman Abedi before he threw it away or whether
 22 someone else did it , we don't know.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we don't know, of the two phones
 24 he had on his return, any of the material which was on
 25 those phones?

177

1 A. There is a part of my statement --
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If we are coming to that later then we
 3 will leave it until later --
 4 MR DE LA POER: By all means, if it would be helpful to take
 5 us to that --
 6 A. You may have to remind us where it is.
 7 Q. I think it appears in part 4 from recollection , I think
 8 it was a matter that Mr Greaney was expecting --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll deal with it when counsel have
 10 intended to deal with it , but we'll bear in mind what
 11 you've told us, thank you.
 12 MR DE LA POER: Sir, if we may, then, we will turn to
 13 page 37 of Mr Barraclough's statement and just deal with
 14 the premises insofar as they've not been dealt with so
 15 far .
 16 A. Sir, could I just make a correction? I'm just conscious
 17 of your interest in this area. I said earlier with the
 18 Alcatel we got nothing back from it. That's not quite
 19 true. When there was an examination of that Alcatel at
 20 a forensic level with proper expertise, there was
 21 a fragment of a shopping list found on the device and
 22 that shopping list --
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I think we will deal with that
 24 at the proper place. That's my fault. I am interested
 25 in it and counsel will bear that in mind when we come to

178

1 deal with it .
 2 MR DE LA POER: Certainly, sir.
 3 So 74 Somerton Court. We saw this morning that that
 4 has trace elements of TATP recovered from it and it is
 5 the place where the investigation considers that the
 6 TATP was manufactured. Was the tenant of that property
 7 a man called Aimen Elwafi?
 8 A. Yes, he was.
 9 Q. Did the investigation establish that in late 2016 he
 10 placed an advertisement on Facebook looking for a sublet
 11 of that flat ?
 12 A. That's right .
 13 Q. Did he also post that same advertisement on what's
 14 described as a Libyan Facebook page?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Did the investigation establish through an analysis of
 17 the telecommunications evidence that Aimen Elwafi had
 18 contact with Hashem Abedi on 18 February?
 19 A. Yes, that's right .
 20 Q. Was that one part of the attribution process that was
 21 gone went through so far as Hashem Abedi was concerned?
 22 A. Yes, it was.
 23 Q. Has Mr Elwafi told the investigation that both
 24 Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi came to view the flat and
 25 he was paid cash for two months' rent?

179

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Have we seen the evidence in that comprehensive
 3 animation of the attendance at that property by both
 4 brothers on 14 April in order to clear it out?
 5 A. That's right, and that fits in with some of the timings.
 6 So when you think about the arrangements that were made
 7 because Mr Elwafi was not there, there were arrangements
 8 to hand the keys to the flat to this friend or
 9 intermediary who's mentioned in the statement as well.
 10 Q. We've covered that Mr Elwafi's attendance at the flat
 11 after the brothers had cleared it out to find out those
 12 items that he disposed of and described that smell that
 13 he has.
 14 Just to put it on the record, some of the items
 15 recovered from there by the investigation ,
 16 {INQ033857/1}.
 17 It is in a similar form to 21 Elsmore Road. Here
 18 perhaps to be considered at more leisure by any core
 19 participant who wishes to in due course, do we see
 20 a snapshot of various areas that were identified that
 21 were connected scientifically , such as through
 22 fingerprints , to the two brothers?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. As well as some of the areas that were swabbed for other
 25 reasons?

180

1 A. Yes, that's right.
 2 Q. Did the investigation conclude that there, together with
 3 Mr Elwafi's evidence, there was strong evidence that the
 4 brothers had used those premises?
 5 A. Yes, that's right.
 6 Q. Next, we've referred to it a number of times already,
 7 the delivery address, 44 Lindum Street. How were Hashem
 8 and Salman Abedi connected with that, please?
 9 A. They were connected through an individual they knew
 10 called Hamad and Mr Hamad believed that they had people
 11 staying with them and therefore was willing to lend them
 12 the actual premises by virtue of sort of extra space.
 13 Q. Was Hamad's account supported by a person by the name of
 14 Dughman?
 15 A. Yes, it was, and Dughman was effectively the person who
 16 acted as the -- he arranged keys to be given to the
 17 Abedi brothers.
 18 Q. We have seen on that schedule of precursor materials
 19 that it was named in the majority of the transactions as
 20 a delivery address?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Was the effect of using that to place a layer of
 23 distance between those who wanted these items and the
 24 items themselves?
 25 A. Yes. Yes, certainly.

181

1 Q. Perhaps we can bring up a similar diagram for
 2 Lindum Street. {INQ033858/1}. Again not to linger, but
 3 just to acknowledge the key identifications here.
 4 I think these are all references to scientific evidence
 5 that connected Hashem Abedi to the address, namely
 6 fingerprints?
 7 A. Yes, I believe so.
 8 Q. So we've got a visual depiction of the areas in which
 9 those were --
 10 A. And this was literally a delivery address. There was
 11 nothing really otherwise to recover from there.
 12 Q. The third and final property to consider is
 13 apartment 39, Granby House, Granby Row. That was used,
 14 as you've already said, Mr Barraclough, as the place at
 15 which Salman Abedi constructed the bomb. Was it an
 16 address that he had any connection to before 18 May?
 17 A. No, he did not.
 18 Q. But upon his return to the UK, did he make arrangements
 19 through a property company to let the premises?
 20 A. Yes, he did.
 21 Q. Has the owner of those premises been spoken to?
 22 A. Yes, she has.
 23 Q. Has she confirmed her contact with Salman Abedi?
 24 A. Yes, that's right.
 25 Q. Is in fact that contact captured partly on CCTV?

182

1 A. It is, yes.
 2 Q. Was the sequence in terms of -- and this may begin to
 3 assist the chairman in terms of his interest in the
 4 mobile phones. You deal with it at paragraph 179. When
 5 Salman Abedi returned to the UK to Manchester
 6 International Airport, was one of the very first things
 7 that he did to purchase a mobile telephone?
 8 A. That's right, yes.
 9 Q. In fact, I have said a mobile telephone. Was it in fact
 10 a SIM card?
 11 A. I'm sorry, yes. That was a SIM card, yes. The mobile
 12 telephone comes later.
 13 Q. He used that SIM card, you were able to establish,
 14 in the Alcatel mobile?
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
 16 Q. And it was through that means that the owner of the
 17 property was contacted?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. One of the things that that owner speaks about is that
 20 the agreement was to rent the flat and a car parking
 21 space; is that right?
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.
 23 Q. What, if any, conclusion did the investigation reach
 24 about why a car parking space might be required for
 25 Salman Abedi at this time?

183

1 A. So there are a number of different theories around this
 2 and I don't think the car park space cost very much
 3 more, so it may have been a "So what, I'll spend an
 4 extra £20 on a car parking space", but that doesn't seem
 5 very sensible to me because everything that Salman Abedi
 6 and Hashem Abedi have done would suggest that they are
 7 very careful about recovery of money. So for me, there
 8 was a very specific purpose for that car parking space,
 9 and I think the plan was to actually bring the Micra
 10 from Devell House to Granby House and put it in that car
 11 parking space. But there's clearly a reason why that
 12 didn't happen. So there's a reason why Salman Abedi
 13 went to check on the Micra on 18 May. There's a reason
 14 why he then went back on the 19th with a suitcase to
 15 collect things rather than drive the vehicle and we
 16 don't know what that reason is.
 17 Clearly, we recovered the car without car keys, so
 18 we don't know whether it would start or not. There may
 19 have been an issue with that. But it might have been as
 20 simple as, again, going back to operational security,
 21 which is: if I were to drive that Micra from
 22 Devell House to Granby, would that expose me to
 23 unnecessary risk if I've got TATP in the boot.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This does all seem to be perfectly
 25 sensible, but it's quite speculative.

184

1 A. We don't know.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I wonder whether for the little I have
 3 seen, compared with what you know, is it really fair to
 4 say that at the time he returned from Libya,
 5 Salman Abedi was being careful with money? My
 6 impression was that he actually got a reasonable amount
 7 of money out of cash machines and was spending it fairly
 8 liberally .
 9 A. Yes, he got refunds for things or he attempted to get
 10 refunds for things and he was very careful to send money
 11 back to Libya, even on the night he was going to kill
 12 himself. So I think it is -- I don't think that's
 13 speculative, I think that's probably true.
 14 MR DE LA POER: But so far as the car parking space,
 15 although there are a number of theories, no firm
 16 conclusion could be reached upon the evidence?
 17 A. No, but I think that there's a reason for that and if
 18 you've got a car with explosive in, it makes sense to me
 19 to get yourself a car parking space.
 20 Q. So on the subject of cars, we can conclude your part of
 21 the evidence before I invite the chairman to take
 22 a break when we've reached our 90 minutes. Three
 23 vehicles are connected with this plot; is that right?
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.
 25 Q. The first is a Toyota Aygo; is that right?

185

1 A. Yes, that's right .
 2 Q. Was that a vehicle that was acquired by Hashem Abedi in
 3 January?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. On 23 March, was it involved in a road traffic
 6 collision ?
 7 A. It was.
 8 Q. Did that lead to reports from witnesses of attempts by
 9 the occupants of that car to remove labels from a box or
 10 boxes?
 11 A. Yes, that's the account that's been given, yes.
 12 Q. Given the timing of that and where that vehicle was and
 13 where it was being driven, did the investigation
 14 consider that it was possible, if not likely , that
 15 within that vehicle was some of the sulphuric acid that
 16 had been obtained?
 17 A. Yes, possibly, or at least labels that might identify
 18 that sulphuric acid had been in the boxes.
 19 Q. The two people who were in the car, they fled from it;
 20 is that right?
 21 A. Yes, that's right .
 22 Q. And ultimately, was it recovered and scrapped?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So whatever was in the car has never been recovered by
 25 the investigation ?

186

1 A. No, that's right .
 2 Q. That meant that a new vehicle needed to be acquired; is
 3 that correct?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And on 24 March, so the next day, did Hashem Abedi
 6 acquire a Hyundai Sonata?
 7 A. Yes, that's right .
 8 Q. I think that a message from Zuhir Nassrat's mobile
 9 telephone supports that conclusion.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Did ANPR evidence connect that vehicle to the
 12 transportation of hydrogen peroxide?
 13 A. There is an activation of an ANP camera on Upper
 14 Chorlton Road in Trafford on 28 March. So it would make
 15 sense that it would, yes.
 16 Q. The location is consistent with the hydrogen peroxide?
 17 A. That's right .
 18 Q. Is that vehicle next identified by the investigation on
 19 18 May?
 20 A. That's correct, yes.
 21 Q. Being driven by somebody else?
 22 A. That's right .
 23 Q. When I say somebody else, I mean neither of the Abedi
 24 brothers and indeed nobody we've yet mentioned?
 25 A. No.

187

1 Q. But were items from within that vehicle recovered
 2 connecting it to the Abedi family?
 3 A. Yes, that's right . So just personal items.
 4 Q. We know that just before they depart for Libya, the
 5 Nissan Micra is obtained; is that right?
 6 A. Yes, that's right .
 7 Q. That was 13 April and Mr Greaney has already mentioned
 8 the individuals who were involved. I think one
 9 individual who perhaps wasn't mentioned is Ahmed Taghdi,
 10 who is an associate of the Abedi brothers; is that
 11 correct?
 12 A. Yes, that's correct .
 13 Q. Was the investigation able to identify any reason why,
 14 given that the brothers had the Hyundai, that there was
 15 a need to obtain the Nissan?
 16 A. I'm not sure. I don't think they had the Hyundai at the
 17 time, did they?
 18 Q. Well, certainly it had been acquired at the end of
 19 March. Is it just the case that the investigation
 20 hasn't managed to establish what happened to that
 21 vehicle?
 22 A. I think that's true, but I think the vehicle had passed
 23 on, to be honest. I can always check that.
 24 Q. We're going to -- we've said a lot about the Nissan, the
 25 fact that it was parked at Devell House, used for

188

1 storage. Is it right that, come 1 June 2017, so after
 2 the attack, the Nissan Micra was located?
 3 A. That's right, yes.
 4 Q. Was it examined for DNA and fingerprints?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And were the fingerprints and/or DNA of Ismail Abedi and
 7 Ramadan Abedi, brother and father respectively,
 8 discovered --
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. -- within the vehicle and also that of Ahmed Taghdi?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. The contents of the Micra were of very substantial
 13 interest to the investigation; is that right?
 14 A. That's right, yes.
 15 Q. I wonder whether we might just conclude this section of
 16 your evidence, and it will mean an overrun by a couple
 17 of minutes of our 90 minutes, if we may, of just
 18 considering the content of that. I'll ask you then
 19 a couple of questions about it and that should complete
 20 part 2 of your evidence.
 21 So can I ask, please, Mr Lopez, that you bring up
 22 {INQ031713/1}.
 23 (Video played to the inquiry)
 24 So indicated there, do we see two of the blue
 25 barrels that were recovered?

189

1 A. Yes, that's right.
 2 Q. I think what we're seeing here is a number of documents
 3 recovered from within the vehicle connecting it to
 4 Hashem Abedi.
 5 A. Yes. Again, this is by virtue of forensic evidence
 6 rather than documentary --
 7 Q. Yes. Of course when this animation was prepared and
 8 played at the trial, the focus was on looking at what
 9 evidence existed which connected Hashem Abedi in
 10 particular to this plot?
 11 A. Yes, that's right.
 12 Q. Is it right that this Nissan and its contents formed
 13 an important part of that evidence?
 14 A. Very important, yes.
 15 (Video playing continued)
 16 Q. Were the investigation able to establish what, if
 17 anything, the relevance was of this particular
 18 container?
 19 A. I'm not sure there was, to be honest.
 20 Q. Rather, is its significance the fact that it connects
 21 Hashem Abedi to the car through the fact that there is
 22 an object with his fingerprints on it?
 23 A. Yes, but there is -- I'd have to recheck, but there are
 24 obviously a number of containers with acid in and
 25 I think that will -- as we move through the animation,

190

1 the animation will actually assist you.
 2 Q. It perhaps speaks for itself, but inside the lid of that
 3 barrel are Hashem Abedi's fingerprints and that barrel
 4 contained seven packs of nails?
 5 A. That's right.
 6 Q. Is it right that there were a number of items of
 7 potential shrapnel acquired that were not used in the
 8 device?
 9 A. Yes, that's right. So once again, the purchases
 10 in relation to this material, which was all bought
 11 before 15 April, before the Abedis went to Libya, and
 12 there's extensive investigation around this, where it's
 13 been brought from, when, and how it's been paid for.
 14 Q. I think when we look at your next section, whether that
 15 be today or tomorrow, we'll see the schedule of
 16 transactions.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 (Video playing continued)
 19 Q. The indication there is a blue barrel. Is it that item
 20 that was purchased by the police with a view to seeing
 21 if it fitted into the Kangol suitcase?
 22 A. We have those blue barrels and we have obviously the
 23 suitcase, yes, but that's the blue barrel. So there are
 24 three blue barrels actually in the Micra and we
 25 recovered -- there was a further blue barrel at Elsmore.

191

1 Just as you move through the animation, you then see why
 2 that might be significant.
 3 Q. This may be material that you had referred to earlier --
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. -- namely some of the precursor chemicals of sulphuric
 6 acid recovered.
 7 (Video playing continued)
 8 I think we're about to see metal rings. Can you
 9 perhaps tell us what the significance of these are?
 10 A. Yes. If you look at those -- here we go. There's five
 11 sets of metal rings. These are seals that go on the
 12 blue barrels. Clearly, we've got the three seals that
 13 would fit the three blue barrels in the Micra. We've
 14 a further seal that would fit a blue barrel back at
 15 Elsmore and that would mean that we have one blue barrel
 16 that we haven't recovered.
 17 Q. So one blue barrel unaccounted for?
 18 A. That's right.
 19 Q. Which would be consistent with it having been removed
 20 in the Kangol suitcase, transporting the TATP to
 21 Granby Row?
 22 A. Yes, it would, and an obvious question that goes with
 23 that is: if you don't put the seal on, how could you be
 24 sure that the barrel would not leak, effectively? But
 25 again, we tested that and the actual seal with the --

192

1 Q. Can I just stop you there? I wonder if I might just
2 deal with this in a different way.
3 A. Okay.
4 Q. Just as we conclude this, and I'll just let this
5 animation complete, as I think it nearly has, and then
6 I'll come back to that if I may.
7 A. Of course.
8 Q. Do we see here then, indicated by the respective
9 colours, the connection via DNA and fingerprints to the
10 different items as between Salman and Hashem?
11 A. That's correct, yes. So as you can see, the
12 overwhelming forensic evidence relates to Hashem Abedi
13 in relation to the Micra.
14 Q. Just dealing with the barrel, if you don't mind,
15 Mr Barraclough, in this way: did the investigation test
16 the barrel as a means of transporting TATP?
17 A. Yes, we did.
18 Q. And did you conclude that was feasible?
19 A. It was, yes.
20 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed. We're slightly
21 over the 90 minutes, sir, it's probably felt like longer
22 than that for some, but we have completed part 2 and
23 therefore, I'm sure Mr Barraclough will agree, the
24 lion's share of evidence heard by the jury earlier this
25 year.

193

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you just help me with one thing,
2 because I am afraid I will forget it otherwise. When
3 Salman Abedi returned from Libya on 18 May and he then
4 rented Granby House, the apartment there, where did he
5 spend the nights? Where did he sleep during that
6 period? Did he go home or did he stay at Granby House?
7 A. No, sir, he deliberately didn't go home, he stayed at
8 Granby House.
9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was there anyone actually at the home
10 living there at the time?
11 A. I don't believe so, no, the house was empty. I will
12 double-check that. I think the whole purpose of Granby
13 was that he specifically --
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do understand that possibility.
15 Right.
16 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I'm entirely in your hands how we
17 proceed from here. I'm conscious that we started later
18 than we would have liked to today. If we were to take
19 a short break, we could resume before 4.30, I suspect it
20 will be tight to finish by 5.00 this next section, or
21 we can leave it until the morning or we can make a start
22 on it. I can say this, that insofar as Mr Greaney and
23 my plan is concerned, we are right now absolutely on
24 target.
25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If we sit for some more time this

194

1 afternoon or without sitting for some more time this
2 afternoon?
3 MR DE LA POER: As the evidence stands right now, so
4 reaching the end of section 2 with Mr Ryder to start
5 in the morning, which will be evidence pertaining to
6 section 2, we'll then have a period of time, I estimate
7 around 45 minutes, on section 3, and then we'll move to
8 the sections that Mr Greaney is going to be dealing
9 with.
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're on target, then we'll stop
11 now, but if it would be an advantage to carry on for
12 a bit, subject to how you feel about it.
13 A. I am in your hands, sir.
14 MR DE LA POER: I can say that we're on target, but whether
15 we remain so remains to be seen. But I am confident
16 that we are where we expected to be right now at the end
17 of the day.
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll have a break for 10 minutes and
19 then we'll do half an hour more. It may be worth
20 getting ahead given how we do fall behind occasionally.
21 (4.10 pm)
22 (A short break)
23 (4.24 pm)
24 MR DE LA POER: Sir, before we turn to section 3, which is
25 headed "Finances", I know that Mr Barraclough has, as he

195

1 told us he would, made enquiries of his team in relation
2 to the matter you raised, sir, about 21 Elsmore Road and
3 whether it was occupied.
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for doing that so rapidly.
5 A. My officers have checked, we did enquiries at the time
6 and we're quite happy it was empty.
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
8 MR DE LA POER: Finances, we are looking at paragraphs 195
9 of your statement and following, Mr Barraclough.
10 Did the investigation enquire into what bank
11 accounts Salman Abedi held?
12 A. Yes, we did.
13 Q. How many were identified during the course of 2017?
14 A. Two bank accounts were held in 2017, although there was
15 a period where he didn't actually have a bank account.
16 Q. We'll look at each of those in turn and consider what
17 other evidence there is. Firstly, he had, I believe,
18 a Royal Bank of Scotland account?
19 A. Yes, that's right.
20 Q. That was historical in the sense that it was opened many
21 years before, in May 2011; is that right?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. Was that account live throughout the period following
24 May 2011 up to 13 February 2017?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.

196

1 Q. Was it then closed by the Royal Bank of Scotland on that
2 date?
3 A. Yes, it was.
4 Q. Has the investigation enquired into the reasons behind
5 the bank's decision to close it?
6 A. Yes. Yes, we have, and the response has been suspected
7 fraudulent activity.
8 Q. We're not going to go into the method of fraud that was
9 used, but did the bank's internal procedures identify
10 activity that is consistent with a known fraud?
11 A. Yes, it did.
12 Q. And as a result, did they withdraw the banking facility
13 from Salman Abedi?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And reported it or not?
16 A. To the police, sir?
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.
18 A. No, I don't think so.
19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There may be a perfectly good
20 explanation for that so I'm not accusing anybody of
21 doing anything they shouldn't be doing, but I just
22 wished to know.
23 A. I'll double-check, but I'm pretty sure they didn't.
24 I think that's not unusual.
25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

197

1 MR DE LA POER: Dealing with activity on that account before
2 it was closed, once the plot had started in earnest, by
3 which I mean precursor elements were being obtained,
4 were there a number of substantial withdrawals from that
5 bank account in cash?
6 A. Yes, that's right.
7 Q. We'll just identify those. On 22 January, were two sums
8 totalling £1,600 withdrawn?
9 A. Yes, that's right.
10 Q. And on 24 January, was a further £1,500 withdrawn in two
11 tranches?
12 A. Yes, that's right.
13 Q. We are going to look in due course at where that money
14 came from, but bearing in mind that it was at that stage
15 cash, was the investigation able to identify precisely
16 what those sums were spent on?
17 A. I think, again, we're going to a fairly substantial
18 piece of work which is around the sequence of events and
19 the detail that sits within that.
20 Q. Perhaps we'll come to that then.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. We'll park that for the time being.
23 The bank account having been closed on
24 13 February 2017, a month later did Salman Abedi apply
25 to open another bank account?

198

1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. Was that with the Halifax Bank?
3 A. Yes, it was.
4 Q. Did that open on 21 March?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Was that bank account still live at the point of 22 May?
7 A. Yes, it was.
8 Q. You mention in your statement a refund and you have
9 adverted to this earlier in answer to questions from the
10 chair in relation to what care or otherwise Salman Abedi
11 took with money. Was he expecting a refund around the
12 time of the attack itself?
13 A. Yes, he was.
14 Q. We'll look at the transaction itself in due course, but
15 had he made an online order for items that were plainly
16 intended to be used as shrapnel in the bomb?
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. And had he reduced that order, meaning that effectively
19 he had overpaid for what he was getting?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Did you identify evidence to indicate that he had been
22 in contact with the bank trying to find out if that
23 refund had landed?
24 A. Yes, that's right, yes.
25 Q. This brings us on to something that you mentioned

199

1 earlier, namely a money transfer to Libya. Relevant to
2 that transaction, is there a person by the name of
3 Rabie Zreba?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. He's going to give evidence, we anticipate, next week
6 before the chairman, but is a part that he plays in the
7 chronology of events that he was involved in a money
8 transfer on 22 May?
9 A. Yes, that's right.
10 Q. Did the inquiry connect the desire by Salman Abedi to
11 have a refund with his intention to make a transfer on
12 the day of his attack?
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Shall we call it the investigation just
14 to avoid —
15 MR DE LA POER: I beg your pardon. Your investigation.
16 A. I'm not entirely sure the two are necessarily connected,
17 but that is the pattern of his banking behaviour.
18 Q. So seeking a refund?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And shortly thereafter seeking to make a transfer?
21 A. Yes. But I think this was disposing of the remainder of
22 his money, really, before the attack.
23 Q. Turning away from Salman Abedi to Hashem Abedi, did he
24 hold a bank account in 2017?
25 A. Yes, that's right.

200

1 Q. Was that a relatively short period that he had access to
2 that —

3 A. Yes, it was, it was between 17 January and 9 February.

4 Q. Was that bank account closed by the NatWest Bank?

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. Did the investigation establish from the bank that that
7 was because of their concern about what they describe as
8 unsatisfactory conduct?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Looking at the reason they give, does it appear to be of
11 a similar type to the concern that caused Salman Abedi's
12 bank account to be closed?

13 A. Yes, it's consistent with a sort of preparatory act
14 towards a similar sort of pattern of fraud.

15 Q. That's Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi. We need now to
16 deal with their mother, Samia Abedi. Did she hold
17 a bank account?

18 A. Yes, she did.

19 Q. Did the investigation establish that her account was
20 used by either Salman or Hashem?

21 A. Yes. There was an element of control over this bank
22 account with Ismail Abedi as the eldest brother, but
23 there was a period of time where the account appeared to
24 be controlled by Hashem and Salman.

25 Q. Let's just consider that briefly. Was their mother

201

1 living in Libya at the time that we're talking about?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. In other words in 2017?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So the investigation established that the principal
6 controller of that account, whilst his mother was
7 abroad, was the eldest son, Ismail?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. But I think you've told us the investigation established
10 that there were some transactions which appeared to have
11 been the responsibility of Salman and Hashem?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 Q. Did the investigation establish whether or not Ismail
14 appeared to know about those transactions?

15 A. No.

16 Q. No, he didn't know, or no, you didn't establish?

17 A. No, we didn't establish it. We've certainly asked the
18 question, but we didn't have the answer.

19 Q. Certainly is it right to say that Ismail Abedi
20 reported — forgive me. Ismail Abedi conducted an
21 internet search about lost or stolen cards?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And the investigation has established from the bank,
24 HSBC, that certainly there was a telephone call made to
25 their hotline?

202

1 A. Yes, which doesn't appear to have been connected.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What does that mean? It didn't get
3 through or not connected in substance?

4 A. So probably in the queue, sir, for a period of time.

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So actually connected by speaking to
6 someone or leaving a message or whatever?

7 A. Yes.

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

9 MR DE LA POER: So as a result of these investigations, did
10 the bank account of the mother of Hashem and Salman also
11 get taken into account in relation to the financing?

12 A. Yes, certainly.

13 Q. Was she the recipient of local authority benefits
14 through that bank account?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You've mentioned this already earlier, but is she wanted
17 in connection with enquiries into those benefit claims?

18 A. Yes, that's a matter being handled by the Department of
19 Work and Pensions, so not from a Manteline investigation
20 perspective.

21 Q. Let's just have a look at the sources of funding before
22 we come to look at the expenditure. {INQ033890/1}.

23 If we can crop into that so we can see it clearly,
24 Mr Lopez. Thank you very much indeed.

25 We start the review of the finances in October 2016;

203

1 is that right?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. We can see, on the right-hand side, three columns which
4 indicate which of those three individuals we've been
5 talking about is the recipient of external sources of
6 money; is that right?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 Q. So a number of those marked in that pinkish colour
9 appear to be payments, in fact all of them looking down
10 there, from the local authority to Hashem and Salman's
11 mother; is that right?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 Q. We can see that —

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Including housing benefit?

15 MR DE LA POER: Including housing benefit, yes, sir.

16 So far as Salman is concerned, we can see a very
17 substantial, on 6 October, in the form of £1,000 from
18 the Student Loan Company; is that right?

19 6 October 2016, four lines or so down, five lines.

20 A. Yes, you're absolutely right, yes.

21 Q. In due course, in chapter 13, there will be considerably
22 more investigation into Salman Abedi's education. But
23 for now, all we need to acknowledge is he was at an
24 educational establishment that qualified him to apply
25 for a student loan; is that right?

204

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. We can also see, towards the bottom, two more orange

3 rows indicating payment from an employment agency?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Over the page {INQ033890/2}, please, Mr Lopez. We're

6 coming towards the end of 2016. All of these will be

7 totalled at the end so we don't need to keep a running

8 track of how much it all adds up to; is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. We can see the majority of incomes to these three

11 accounts are to Hashem and Salman's mother. Again, in

12 the form of benefit payments?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We can see that on 2 January, Hashem Abedi appears to

15 receive €1,125. That seems to be by reference to an

16 exchange according to the information there.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you able to give us any more information or does

19 that speak for itself so far as you are concerned?

20 A. I actually don't think we have the answer to that, but

21 I will check for you.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It looks like he has dollars, he changes

23 them to pounds, and changes part of that to euros.

24 A. Yes, sir, but where the dollars have come from, I'm not

25 sure we have the answer to that, but I will check.

205

1 MR DE LA POER: We can see on 9 January 2017, another

2 student loan payment to Salman Abedi in a four-figure

3 sum, just over.

4 A. Yes.

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the evidence is that he wasn't

6 actually attending college by that time, is that right,

7 or shall I wait for the evidence?

8 MR DE LA POER: 13 January, so in answer to your question,

9 sir, and I'm sure Mr Greaney is right, he was as at that

10 date, but not as at 4 days later.

11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

12 MR DE LA POER: Then we can see a deposit of £1,700 into the

13 Royal Bank of Scotland account. Was the investigation

14 able to establish where that had come from?

15 A. So once again, I think I'd have to check that. I'm not

16 sure we know again.

17 Q. Further down in terms of the most substantial payments

18 in, another £1,500 deposited into that Royal Bank of

19 Scotland account for Salman Abedi.

20 A. Yes, that's right. The thing about this is it is cash,

21 and we've already talked about fraudulent behaviour

22 in relation to other accounts, so I think this is part

23 of the reason why we can't be exactly sure where this

24 has come from.

25 Q. Over the page, please {INQ033890/3}. We can see a very

206

1 substantial payment from the Student Loan Company, twice

2 as much as previously, on 20 January, after, subject to

3 confirmation in the evidence, Salman Abedi has stopped

4 attending his educational establishment. Do you see

5 that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Then some more local authority payments to their

8 mother's account and we can see -- I have moved over

9 one -- a deposit into Hashem Abedi's account, forgive

10 me, on 23 January. Is the answer similar to that you

11 gave earlier in terms of the origin of that money or

12 do you know?

13 A. No, I know that we don't know that. So we definitely

14 don't know where that's come from.

15 Q. We can see Hashem's account is closed on 9 February,

16 we can then see shortly thereafter the Royal Bank of

17 Scotland terminates their relationship with

18 Salman Abedi.

19 Some more benefits over the coming 2 months from --

20 month and a half, rather, and we can see Salman Abedi

21 opens his Halifax account, 13 March; is that right?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. And over the page {INQ033890/4}, we can see that there's

24 a deposit of £100 into that account, but after Salman

25 and Hashem Abedi leave the UK, as marked by that grey

207

1 row, there is a further deposit by the Student Loan

2 Company into Salman Abedi's Halifax account. That's on

3 24 April?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. A sum of £2,114.48. At the bottom of the page we see

6 his return and then, final page {INQ033890/5}, please,

7 Mr Lopez, of this, the remaining income items to the

8 three accounts are all by way of benefit figures. Do we

9 see at the bottom there that Salman Abedi has had paid

10 in, in the orange box, just over £10,000 into his bank

11 accounts?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The majority of which came from the Student Loan

14 Company?

15 A. Yes, that's right.

16 Q. We can see £18,000 worth of benefits to the mother's

17 account and then those two transactions making up the

18 lion's share of that £3,104 into Hashem's account?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. I wonder if overnight, and we've got one more document

21 to look at today, you could investigate for us,

22 Mr Barraclough, those cash inputs to see definitively

23 what, if anything, the investigation was able to

24 establish?

25 A. Yes, of course.

208

1 Q. So we'll turn away from the income that was available
2 and now consider the expenditure that was made, focusing
3 on the period of May 2017, we having reviewed the
4 purchase of the precursor chemicals before that.
5 Mr Lopez, {CPS000194/22}, please. We'll see, this
6 deals with the period starting on 18 January. We won't
7 need to look at all these but perhaps we can show each
8 in turn without needing to conduct a minute analysis.
9 Do we see the way this is laid out, that each of those
10 items that were purchased, as identified by the
11 investigation in pursuit of this plot are identified in
12 that fourth column down?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And so far as possible, a price has been attributed to
15 them where it is known or where it's discernible from
16 publicly available information. We're going to just
17 start our consideration by looking at the bottom of this
18 page, moving over the precursor chemicals to identify
19 the entry of 25 March 2017. Do we see there that
20 a number of screws and nails were purchased for a total
21 of £59.23 from a hardware store?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Were those items amongst those recovered from the
24 Nissan?
25 A. Yes, that's right.

209

1 Q. So items of shrapnel purchased before the departure for
2 Libya?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Over the page {CPS000194/23}, please. Do we see that
5 there are some further tools which are purchased and
6 I think the final purchase before departure is the
7 Nissan on 13 April?
8 A. Yes, that's correct.
9 Q. Upon Salman's return, do we see that there is a real
10 focus on purchasing items of shrapnel that are used to
11 construct the device itself?
12 A. Yes, absolutely.
13 Q. So by this stage, the TATP has been created, the focus
14 has moved on to items which are going to use that
15 explosive and turn it into a bomb?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. If we go over the page {CPS000194/24} -- we don't need
18 to look at every line -- do we see, for example, towards
19 the bottom, 20 May, a very large number of items, the
20 number of items in each one is listed by the letters PC,
21 items which were used as shrapnel?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. We'll look at this with Detective Sergeant Hazelwood,
24 but are we able to see Salman Abedi captured on CCTV
25 purchasing these items?

210

1 A. Yes, we are. I think with most of these purchases,
2 throughout this sequence of events, you actually have
3 a CCTV capture.
4 Q. Over the page, please, {CPS000194/25}. We can see from
5 the third column that five of the purchases made are
6 from Screwfix; is that right?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. Over the page again, {CPS000194/26}. I think we have
9 moved off the schedule, so if we can just go back that
10 one page. That's my mistake, Mr Lopez. {CPS000194/25}.
11 Do we see that the final purchase was on the 21st,
12 so the day before the attack, at 15.10?
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. So no doubt that can all be referred to by core
15 participants in due course, but is that the schedule
16 prepared by your investigation of all of the items that
17 you could identify that were relevant to the planning
18 and preparation of this attack?
19 A. Yes, that's right. It's just a neat summary of all of
20 them.
21 Q. Is this a fair conclusion, that although what many
22 people would regard as a lot of money was spent on this,
23 it was well within the means that they had available to
24 them, as we looked at on the income?
25 A. Yes. Yes, it was.

211

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the means of Salman Abedi principally
2 came from student loans? I think there was other
3 income, but it looks like the greatest share of it comes
4 from student loans.
5 A. Yes. From a personal perspective, student loans, but
6 then the access to their mother's benefit money as well.
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We don't know how much Salman or Hashem
8 actually had from that. This is not meant to be
9 a criticism of anybody, this is just simply stating what
10 appears to be a fact, a lot of those student loans were
11 obtained after a time when Salman Abedi was not being
12 a student in any real sense at all.
13 A. That's right, yes.
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Including turning up to an exam
15 in February when he didn't enter anything on the paper
16 and simply went home again?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
19 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I'm pleased to say that in fact I have
20 completed my review of section 3 faster than I thought
21 and unless you want us to proceed to section 4 --
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, thank you very much. I think
23 it's worth going that far, so thank you very much for
24 today, Mr Barraclough, we'll see you back tomorrow
25 morning.

212

1 Is there anything else I need to do?
 2 MR DE LA POER: No, sir.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you all.
 4 (4.50 pm)
 5 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on
 6 Tuesday, 8 December 2020)
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

213

I N D E X

1
 2
 3 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (sworn)7
 4 Questions from MR GREANEY7
 5
 6 MR ROBERT GALLAGHER (sworn)67
 7 Questions from MR DE LA POER.67
 8
 9 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued)87
 10 Questions from MR GREANEY (continued)87
 11
 12 MS LORNA PHILP (sworn)100
 13 Questions from MR DE LA POER100
 14 Questions from MR WEATHERBY120
 15 Questions from MR JAMIESON131
 16
 17 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued)134
 18 Questions from MR DE LA POER134
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

214

215

A							
	196:15,18,23	adjourned (1) 213:5	129:14 130:16 132:23	anyway (1) 89:4	arrives (2) 172:5 175:14	automatic (1) 157:16	
	198:1,5,23,25 199:6	adjournment (1) 134:15	133:11 134:23 136:6	apart (1) 124:8	arriving (2) 16:17 58:3	availability (1) 104:15	
	200:24	adjusting (1) 64:19	138:17 140:17 144:4	apartment (3) 60:16 182:13	ascribe (1) 152:14	available (19) 3:15,16 11:2	
abedi (189) 1:24,24 2:6 3:8	201:4,12,17,19,22,23	admission (1) 143:20	154:22,24 155:6 181:6	194:4	ask (30) 4:6 10:4 20:18	21:4 22:18 36:9 63:5 90:13	
5:24,25 7:16 15:17 31:15	202:6 203:10,11,14	admitted (1) 46:17	182:14 188:7 203:16	apologise (1) 1:9	53:25 54:15 58:8 60:8	93:15 104:1-22 120:25	
40:4,25 41:9,12,15,25	206:13,19	adopt (1) 73:12	206:21	apparent (3) 41:24 73:17	64:24 65:21 82:18 83:3	121:4 141:7 154:6 161:12	
42:1,7,9,17 43:1,5,9	207:8,9,15,21,24	advanced (1) 144:6	also (57) 2:18 4:22 9:16 11:4	87:19	87:4,11 100:10,13	209:1,16 211:23	
46:8,17 47:4,5 48:17 49:24	208:2,17,18	advantage (1) 195:11	13:18,21 15:7 21:25 22:8	appeal (1) 91:6	121:6,11 122:10,20 123:10	average (1) 111:5	
51:16 53:10,13 54:13,22	accounts (10) 47:15,23	adverted (2) 138:14 199:9	27:3 30:21 31:1,20	appeals (1) 91:9	125:2,6 131:24 132:13	avoid (3) 62:15 124:16	
57:19 58:8,13,13 59:3	48:10,11 196:11,14 205:11	advertisement (2) 179:10,13	51:15,21 52:2 53:22 55:13	appear (8) 42:8 54:22 55:3	133:5 154:12 156:16 177:3	200:14	
60:12,21 61:1,7,14,17	206:22 208:8,11	advise (1) 12:20	60:1 62:16,19 63:20 65:12	92:16 106:11 201:10 203:1	189:18,21	aware (16) 1:11 4:13 6:20	
62:19,24 63:9,10,14 65:2	accredited (2) 12:16,19	advice (1) 31:1	68:20 71:7 77:11,13 78:21	204:9	17:19 62:4 71:2 100:7	16:1 42:19 46:7,14,15 63:8	
66:14 76:23 78:16 79:9	accredited (3) 12:15	adviser (2) 12:16,23	80:11 89:18 90:25 95:3	appeared (8) 55:16 77:13	112:22 121:18 123:25	79:15 85:21 91:14,18 93:5	
80:19 85:1 86:19 87:23	68:10,13	affect (1) 114:5	96:21 97:23 108:6,20	107:22 108:2 162:7 201:23	124:2 133:8-16 135:18	125:22 148:5	
88:9,23 89:5,13,23 90:8,24	accurate (2) 48:8 167:24	affected (3) 9:15 23:13 92:24	110:11 123:4 126:24 134:3	202:10,14	155:6 161:17 202:17	awareness (1) 165:1	
92:14 93:11 94:1,5,9	accurately (3) 33:8 118:21	affecting (1) 10:1	141:3,20 147:3 148:24	appearing (1) 157:25	171:15 178:7 205:14	away (18) 49:20 53:1 61:5	
100:3 101:9 108:11 109:2	121:16	afraid (1) 194:2	154:4 157:3 159:23 161:13	appears (10) 61:19 114:13	212:10	62:1,6 83:15,17 87:8	
112:9 113:2 114:10 122:22	acusing (1) 197:20	after (27) 8:5 16:17 17:10,11	164:15 170:24 172:24	128:25 139:21 161:8 163:9	appendices (1) 2:16	107:20 111:9 129:5 155:15	
123:19 124:15 125:18	acetone (8) 49:14,15,17	31:12,15 34:14 58:7 70:7	175:17,20 179:13 189:10	171:15 178:7 205:14	applicable (1) 2:4	165:3 166:2 176:7 177:21	
128:2,23 132:1 135:8,23	103:21 140:1,9 113:11	102:8 113:1,13 115:17	203:10 205:2	212:10	applied (1) 30:15	200:23 209:1	
137:10,15,22 139:7,13	140:7	131:25 141:6,8 144:12	alteration (1) 107:25	appended (1) 185:25	applied (1) 30:15	aygo (1) 185:25	
140:22 141:4,9,17 142:18	achieve (1) 35:20	155:1 163:2 164:19	alternatives (1) 1:14	applicability (1) 2:4	applied (1) 30:15		
143:2 144:3,11,23 145:22	acid (33) 47:12 48:15 49:8	167:7,19 180:11 189:1	although (23) 5:25 13:25	applied (1) 30:15	applied (1) 30:15		
146:16,19 147:7,14	59:25 103:22,23,23,24	207:2,24 212:11	26:18,24 54:17 61:9 63:4	applied (2) 198:24 204:24	applied (2) 198:24 204:24		
152:14,19 154:23 155:25	104:16,19,20 105:3,4	aftermath (4) 24:10 47:22	79:9 98:4 99:10 100:5	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
156:11 157:1,23 158:15	122:6 141:12,12 142:12	97:3 121:14	106:1 109:15 145:18 158:8	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
159:12 160:2,7,20,24	143:3,9,13,25 144:7,9	afternoon (4) 134:19 135:15	159:1 162:17 165:14	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
161:1 163:4,7 165:7	145:2 146:6 147:7,13	195:1,2	176:21 177:1 185:15	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
166:25 167:2,14 168:4,22	150:3 153:9 186:15,18	afterwards (1) 42:8	196:14 211:21	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
169:9,17 172:5 173:19	190:24 192:6	again (71) 5:22 6:2 12:1 14:6	always (4) 9:20 93:1 174:18	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
175:7,18 176:5,15	acknowledge (4) 110:23	18:13 23:16 26:13 43:22	188:23	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
177:4,21 179:18,21,24,24	167:25 182:3 204:23	47:19 48:24 49:20 53:11	amazing (1) 174:4	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
181:8,17 182:5,15,23	acknowledging (1) 168:14	54:1,15 56:4 58:3 63:23	amazon (3) 143:5,8 148:15	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
183:5,25 184:5,6,12 185:5	acquire (4) 141:17,21 177:9	64:3 73:14 75:3,19,24	american (1) 93:6	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
186:2 187:5,23 188:2,10	187:6	77:16,24 78:13 79:25	among (3) 12:4 27:22 47:23	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
189:6,7 190:4,9,21 193:12	acquired (8) 59:6 168:22	80:21 82:5 84:8 85:15 88:7	amongst (2) 109:11 209:23	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
194:3 196:11 197:13	172:3,14 186:2 187:2	89:9,15 104:24 105:16,22	amount (9) 20:2 114:3	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
198:24 199:10	188:18 191:7	109:9 110:7 111:10 117:2	117:16 121:10,15,24 122:2	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
200:10,23,23	acquisition (6) 51:13	120:7 122:9 123:17 125:2	174:10 185:6	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
201:15,15,16,22 202:19,20	141:13,25 142:6 168:6,17	128:1,3,15 130:20 131:7	amounted (1) 92:9	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
205:14 206:2,19	acquisitions (1) 53:21	132:7,13 146:8 147:25	amsterdam (1) 58:14	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
207:3,18,20,25 208:9	acronym (1) 114:25	148:3 149:11 164:2,25	analyse (2) 115:10 118:5	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
210:24 212:1,11	across (4) 19:14 38:24	168:19 175:6 177:16 182:2	analysing (1) 170:21	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
abedis (22) 19:25 50:1 54:14	107:11 143:11	184:20 190:5 191:9 192:25	analysis (7) 62:23 88:25	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
57:22 88:11 89:9 91:16	acted (2) 82:13 181:16	198:17 205:11 206:15,16	117:16 121:10,15,24 122:2	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
94:9 96:25 136:19 147:14	actions (5) 15:19 23:23	211:8 212:16	174:10 185:6	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
151:10 153:3 173:15	25:22 27:13 39:11	against (6) 7:1 15:10 50:15	analysed (1) 92:9	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
175:14,20 191:3,11 201:11	activation (1) 187:13	89:12 154:15 156:11	analyse (2) 115:10 118:5	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
204:22 207:9 208:2	activity (4) 165:2 197:7,10	age (1) 56:12	analysis (7) 62:23 88:25	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
able (50) 40:25 46:2 79:23	198:1	agencies (1) 71:8	106:20 170:24 171:1	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
86:3 91:19 95:16 96:6	acts (1) 84:6	agency (2) 38:24 205:3	179:16 209:8	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
97:21 98:8 109:1,4,15,16	actual (11) 9:19 91:21 92:8	agent (2) 104:13,14	analytical (1) 101:13	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
112:8,13 113:5 116:24	131:5 133:7 139:3,7 141:2	ago (3) 10:6 77:6 105:7	and (5) 4:17 23:12 112:9	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
117:18 120:10 128:11	176:4 181:12 192:25	agree (6) 33:16 46:2,6 83:6	138:9 189:6	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
130:4 131:7,11 132:14,20	actually (39) 14:15 29:16	156:8 193:23	andrew (1) 18:11	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
136:7 137:10 138:11 139:5	42:6 44:3 55:15,20 60:25	agreed (7) 20:13 38:15	animation (12) 83:4,5,6,16	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
140:24 141:15 142:20	62:3 63:8 82:1 90:23 91:5	114:11,15 122:23 123:5	86:17 156:3 180:3	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
144:10 148:1,6 150:25	98:12 121:12 123:1 131:10	130:15	190:7,25 191:1 192:1	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
152:9 155:18 164:5 168:12	137:23 151:3 162:18 163:4	agreement (1) 183:20	193:5	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
172:19 173:2 183:13	165:16 169:11 172:21	ahead (1) 195:20	animations (1) 156:13	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
188:13 190:16 198:15	173:16,23 174:12 176:3	ahmed (2) 188:9 189:10	annual (1) 69:18	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
205:18 206:14 208:23	177:17 184:9 185:6	aided (1) 139:25	anonym (1) 62:12	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
210:24	191:1,24 194:9 196:15	aimen (2) 179:7,17	another (21) 27:2 53:17	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
above (1) 138:8	203:5 205:20 206:6 211:2	airline (3) 58:10,12 175:22	55:10 72:25 85:23 86:21	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
abroad (1) 202:7	212:8	airport (1) 183:6	111:2 113:23,25 122:10	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
absence (1) 98:11	added (1) 174:10	al (1) 175:18	128:21 136:7 140:21	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
absolutely (19) 8:15 20:5	addition (2) 100:1 111:2	albeit (4) 28:21 33:6 92:20	150:11 164:25 165:22	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
31:11 33:25 57:1 88:18	additional (2) 130:16,22	148:21	174:25 177:9 198:25	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
91:11,22 97:18 99:7,15	address (52) 2:19 3:23	alcatel (5) 97:24 177:7	206:1,18	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
109:23 153:4 164:10 166:5	33:23,23 37:11	178:18,19 183:14	anp (1) 187:13	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
176:18 194:23 204:20	52:10,13,23	alharth (5) 142:18	anpr (1) 187:11	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
210:12	53:1,4,6,7,10,16,18,22,25	143:12,20,24 146:2	answer (17) 4:25 5:4 23:11	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
absorbed (1) 26:13	54:1,3 60:16,20 61:1	allah (1) 139:25	43:14,15 44:7 74:24 86:15	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
academic (1) 138:9	94:10,15 133:17 136:19	allahs (1) 140:3	123:25 131:7,11 199:9	applied (1) 51:8	applied (1) 51:8		
acc (2) 17:15 20:13	142:16 143:15,1						

bear (8) 28:25 29:23 30:8,21
97:23 161:14 178:10,25
bearing (7) 16:7 52:18 90:15
94:5 113:10 159:3 198:14
became (4) 10:14 19:13
101:6 141:7
become (6) 41:24 80:7 98:15
104:6 157:21 168:4
becomes (1) 37:15
bed (1) 79:6
bedap (1) 152:15
bedap/jeanagmailcom (1)
170:12
before (49) 1:15 2:14 9:7
27:25 30:18 42:17 44:15
64:22 73:5 81:25 83:25
85:7 87:7 92:13 98:13
100:13 113:20 118:12
132:12 133:18 141:2
144:12 153:11 154:3,4
156:22 165:24 167:19
168:2 171:25 172:3,14
177:21 182:16 185:21
188:4 191:11,11 194:19
195:24 196:21 198:1
200:6 222 203:21 209:4
210:1,6 211:12
beg (1) 200:15
began (1) 135:8
begin (9) 7:7 15:13,24 99:1
101:1,3 135:17 141:4
183:2
beginning (3) 19:11 84:10
100:6
behalf (6) 2:9 9:8,8 45:9
133:25 136:22
behaviour (2) 200:17 206:21
behind (6) 67:10 106:1
119:10 176:24 195:20
197:4
being (53) 3:11 6:17 15:23
17:13 22:14 23:9 25:5
28:17,17 30:16 33:13
34:22 38:8 45:18 53:20
54:23 64:14 68:17 83:7
86:8,18 90:8 94:15 95:13
106:21 110:15,18
114:15,19 117:5,19 122:3
123:24 126:14 130:18
135:9,18 143:6 145:15
146:2 147:13 151:6 153:15
158:22 160:21 162:10
185:5 186:13 187:21
198:3,22 203:18 212:11
belfast (1) 11:10
belief (1) 173:22
believe (19) 7:17 9:5 22:11
26:15 33:18 38:17 58:18
60:3 93:4 97:2 99:3 121:2
128:17 137:14 146:23
148:7 182:7 194:11 196:17
believed (5) 62:14 88:8
144:2 151:8 181:10
belong (1) 150:12
below (1) 117:18
benefit (7) 151:10 203:17
204:14,15 205:12 208:8
212:6
benefits (3) 203:13 207:19
208:16
bereaved (2) 31:7 37:17
bespoke (1) 120:20
best (5) 9:14 121:19 137:12
146:21 170:6
better (4) 1:16 35:1,8 112:3
between (28) 25:5 35:18
42:21 47:6 53:20 62:20
64:21 72:13,25 78:4 87:22
88:8 89:9 94:18 109:24
114:16 118:15 139:2 158:9
160:8,18 162:25 164:21
166:8 176:11 181:23
193:10 201:3
beyond (2) 148:15 163:5
big (1) 163:6
biggest (1) 39:7

bin (1) 170:12
bit (4) 67:10 81:8 122:17
195:12
blast (3) 96:1 98:25 102:24
bleaching (2) 104:13,14
blend (1) 62:17
blending (1) 62:11
blessings (1) 140:2
block (2) 54:4,5
blow (2) 124:8 161:24
blowing (1) 124:16
blue (18) 60:2,2 127:12
160:13,16 167:10 173:2
189:24 191:19,22,23,24,25
192:12,13,14,15,17
body (7) 40:15 41:8 65:13
77:21 78:1 107:16 115:12
bomb (22) 2:3 14:23 15:17
21:4,23 64:23 66:16 71:3
121:10,14 130:18 131:11
133:21 137:6 138:11
141:5,10 144:1 169:6
182:15 199:16 210:15
bomber (18) 27:23 32:24
33:1 40:25 41:15,22 64:25
65:3 87:19 88:9,22
89:12,19 90:19 91:2,3 93:9
99:18
bombers (1) 89:9
bombing (6) 8:11 9:19
16:4,6 17:11 93:13
bone (1) 12:11
book (3) 24:2,5 36:5
boot (3) 116:22 117:7
184:23
bore (1) 76:6
both (21) 13:22 21:18 22:4
40:21 42:23 51:16
52:13,13 121:8 144:11
152:11,18 158:23 159:4
162:5 164:16 166:13
169:11 172:13 179:23
180:3
bottles (1) 155:11
bottom (12) 116:18 159:15
165:18 171:16,17,18,19
205:2 208:5,9 209:17
210:19
bought (2) 172:21 191:10
box (8) 40:18 75:17 76:1,19
106:12 171:18 186:9
208:10
boxes (6) 159:16,23,25
160:25 186:10,18
brand (1) 88:22
break (7) 67:5,6,14 185:22
194:19 195:18,22
breakdown (1) 65:17
breaking (1) 102:19
breaks (1) 5:5
brief (1) 106:2
briefed (1) 73:5
briefings (4) 35:21 70:5,15,16
briefings (1) 35:24
briefly (4) 68:6 107:14
139:15 201:25
bring (8) 23:10 113:20 156:2
171:3 177:1 182:1 184:9
189:21
bringing (1) 60:23
brings (2) 142:4 199:25
british (2) 42:9 175:20
broad (2) 39:23 129:8
broadcasting (1) 4:4
broadly (1) 144:13
broken (3) 81:11 160:15,16
brother (12) 42:1 44:18,20
45:21 58:7 95:8 139:7
140:3 161:5 163:6 189:7
201:22
brothers (34) 49:7,24 52:13
53:10,14 54:13,22 57:19
59:7 113:2 122:22 123:19
124:15 137:15 139:13

140:22 141:4,9 155:1,25
156:22 158:16 160:5
162:25 164:17 166:17
180:4,11,22 181:4,7
187:24 188:10,14
brought (5) 23:2 50:15 76:24
177:17 191:13
build (1) 60:25
building (4) 66:14 73:21 87:5
139:3
bulk (6) 117:4 118:3,5,7
126:19 128:19
bundle (1) 15:12
burden (1) 18:5
bureau (1) 79:3
bus (1) 61:15
buy (1) 49:18

C

c (3) 145:7,18,22
cah38 (6) 111:13,15
138:19,21 139:18 140:21
cah39 (2) 111:13 138:19
call (16) 6:14 15:21 16:3
63:6,9 66:21 67:3 69:19,21
71:8 74:17 96:6 118:3
165:1 200:13 202:24
called (12) 20:16 25:22
26:10 36:11 57:8 66:12
69:11 148:24 155:2 158:2
179:7 181:10
calling (1) 159:3
calls (5) 62:20 63:2 164:8,10
166:13
came (21) 32:7 36:23 45:25
53:7 55:9 65:19 70:22
81:14,16,18,19,23 82:3,6,8
93:6 143:8 179:24 198:14
208:13 212:2
camera (3) 78:20 129:2
187:13
cannot (3) 112:11 114:4
121:16
cans (6) 85:23 141:17
170:1,2 171:13,23
cant (17) 113:18 117:16
122:24 123:2,22 127:4
128:9,10,22 129:3 130:8,9
131:12 132:19 133:2
153:17 206:23
cap (1) 116:3
capability (1) 137:9
capable (5) 3:20 83:7
92:17,19 122:3
capture (2) 173:14 211:3
captured (6) 24:16 54:20
64:21 167:15 182:25
210:24
car (34) 48:13 54:5,7
55:3,11,25 59:22 60:11
104:19 105:13 126:10,16
144:3 158:24 161:25
165:13,19 166:7,13
183:20,24
184:2,4,8,10,17,17
185:14,18,19 186:9,19,24
190:21
card (19) 41:10,11 65:12,20
78:19 84:14,23 88:15 94:5
96:22 148:13 183:10,11,13
cardboard (1) 159:16
cards (2) 169:9 202:21
care (7) 4:20 40:12 54:25
56:10 139:16 162:10
199:10
career (5) 10:14 12:14 39:9
76:9 111:20
careful (12) 4:19 31:13
48:20,23 120:7 122:10,10
159:24 162:12 184:7
185:5,10
carefully (5) 49:4,5 111:11
123:9 171:18
carried (3) 13:19 40:10 87:25
carries (1) 13:8

carry (3) 79:22 137:11
195:11
carrying (6) 39:11 51:24
61:18 62:16 127:1 175:15
cars (1) 185:20
cash (7) 169:8 179:25 185:7
198:5,15 206:20 208:22
cast (1) 79:13
casualties (1) 69:25
catalogue (1) 38:11
catalyst (1) 121:25
categories (1) 13:22
caught (1) 55:16
cause (9) 43:5,7 82:8 91:24
110:11 111:19 119:13
120:18 123:8
caused (9) 76:3,15 91:24
92:24 108:1,3 113:16
117:2 201:11
causing (1) 92:17
cctv (25) 19:18,21 54:20
55:17 61:17 63:13,20
64:21 88:23 95:20 128:24
129:6,7,19 131:24 166:23
167:15 168:20 172:19
173:13 175:6 176:12
182:25 210:24 211:3
ceiling (5) 80:24 81:2,17
82:5 133:23
cell (7) 27:7,9,10 70:13
158:2,4 160:20
centre (2) 61:22 81:2
certain (4) 6:9 32:3 41:3
63:9
cetera (4) 73:4 81:21 158:13
164:12
chair (2) 86:15 199:10
chairman (9) 11:2 36:9
164:12
111:23 112:23 171:7 173:6
183:3 185:21 200:6
chairmans (3) 36:4 92:12
171:3
chance (1) 134:2
change (2) 108:1 150:6
changed (1) 87:9
changes (2) 205:22,23
changing (1) 34:23
changyu7777 (2) 152:9,14
chapter (17) 1:22,22
2:10,18,20,22,22 3:1 6:6
64:20 72:5 75:4 76:5 80:23
99:11 100:8 204:21
chapters (2) 2:18 168:10
charge (3) 28:21 33:4 37:22
charged (1) 43:1
charges (1) 50:14
charging (3) 3:6 29:3,20
chartered (3) 68:17 101:25
102:4
chatterton (1) 18:10
check (13) 5:4 16:21 41:21
45:16 67:7 100:17 153:17
166:23 184:13 188:23
205:21,25 206:15
checked (1) 196:5
checking (1) 82:14
checks (1) 168:6
chemical (4) 103:19 130:25
131:5 141:21
chemicals (16) 47:5,11 48:12
49:17,24,25 51:13 53:7
121:25,25 122:4,5 142:6
192:5 209:4,18
chemist (2) 101:14,25
chemistry (4) 101:21 102:2
105:8 138:9
chief (8) 7:12 9:4 12:21,23
17:25 18:11 70:11 90:10
chorlton (1) 187:14
chose (1) 62:5
chronological (2) 65:16
87:20
chronology (7) 66:7 141:7,23
142:6 172:5,13 200:7
cipher (1) 4:5
ciphered (1) 145:7

circle (1) 157:25
circuit (1) 133:11
circumstances (4) 38:3 84:5
92:5 93:1
city (22) 40:4 61:22 63:18,21
64:1,18 71:24 73:16
74:2,9,25 75:14 77:11 78:5
80:21 81:2,6,20 82:17 83:6
87:23 138:2
claimed (3) 44:24 45:19
48:11
claims (1) 203:17
clarity (2) 111:24 112:3
class (1) 55:12
classified (1) 72:9
clear (16) 4:3,10 34:21 59:9
66:10 81:24 83:19 107:23
109:23 111:17 112:1
129:13 131:9 160:22
168:14 180:4
cleared (3) 59:16 113:2
180:11
clearing (1) 155:14
clearly (13) 24:4 30:19 71:19
129:3 136:12 137:17
159:21 161:4 163:18
184:11,17 192:12 203:23
clio (9) 20:16 23:15 24:7,15
25:1,3 26:12,12 66:19
close (10) 40:18 41:8
75:7,12 76:25 77:5 105:19
159:5 164:20 197:5
closed (10) 26:24 126:16
127:7,8 197:1 198:2,23
201:4,12 207:15
closedoff (1) 165:16
closely (4) 29:14,15,23
150:22
clothing (9) 45:3 64:19
72:21 88:21,22 89:1
117:10,11 126:23
clue (2) 77:8 118:1
clumsily (1) 55:4
code (3) 51:8 96:7,8
coincide (1) 141:3
colleague (6) 109:21 127:16
167:15 169:2 170:5 176:13
colleagues (4) 102:12
107:4,10 128:16
collect (3) 115:8 165:22
184:15
collected (2) 144:23 172:9
college (2) 138:3 206:6
collision (1) 186:6
colocating (1) 30:10
colossal (2) 39:5,5
colour (1) 204:8
colours (1) 193:9
column (10) 143:11,19
144:16 146:15 147:3,21
150:15,19 209:12 211:5
columns (2) 143:16 204:3
166:23 184:13 188:23
205:21,25 206:15
checked (1) 196:5
checking (1) 82:14
checks (1) 168:6
chemical (4) 103:19 130:25
131:5 141:21
chemicals (16) 47:5,11 48:12
49:17,24,25 51:13 53:7
121:25,25 122:4,5 142:6
192:5 209:4,18
chemist (2) 101:14,25
chemistry (4) 101:21 102:2
105:8 138:9
chief (8) 7:12 9:4 12:21,23
17:25 18:11 70:11 90:10
chorlton (1) 187:14
chose (1) 62:5
chronological (2) 65:16
87:20
chronology (7) 66:7 141:7,23
142:6 172:5,13 200:7
cipher (1) 4:5
ciphered (1) 145:7

commercial (1) 103:14
commission (7) 20:24 22:16
28:18 36:12,22 37:10
44:13
commitment (1) 7:18
committed (1) 9:13
common (7) 25:3 54:2 74:18
75:6 76:17 140:5 149:3
commonly (5) 50:4 103:4
104:4,12 140:7
commonwealth (1) 42:15
communicate (3) 37:18,19
93:2
communicating (1) 33:19
communities (1) 14:16
community (1) 22:9
company (6) 157:23 182:19
204:18 207:1 208:2,14
compare (1) 39:4
compared (4) 88:23 89:6,12
185:3
comparing (1) 41:20
comparison (5) 79:3 87:22
88:1 107:10 127:17
compilation (1) 129:7
compilations (1) 20:3
complete (4) 14:3 37:15
189:19 193:5
completed (6) 68:20 90:15
119:8 138:1 193:22 212:20
completely (4) 46:6 56:9
81:10 92:2
complex (2) 12:21 164:3
complexity (1) 131:2
compliance (1) 168:6
complicated (3) 120:20,21
137:13
complications (1) 35:3
component (2) 51:17 60:24
components (2) 110:12,14
comprehensive (1) 180:2
comprise (1) 110:13
compromised (1) 92:7
computer (2) 8:17 25:9
concealing (1) 176:8
concentrated (2) 27:22 49:8
concentration (1) 105:17
concentrations (3) 104:22
105:4,15
concern (11) 21:24,25 22:2
80:24 81:6 84:5 91:15,15
133:24 201:7,11
concerned (10) 28:17 92:21
105:22 147:1 156:21
173:11 179:21 194:23
204:16 205:19
concerning (2) 12:21 55:11
concerns (1) 80:25
conclude (10) 52:20 62:23
135:20 154:22 176:19
181:2 185:20 189:15
193:4,18
concluded (4) 7:19 88:1
165:20 176:16
concludes (1) 133:15
conclusion (13) 63:7
106:8,21 109:1 111:6
112:8 115:23 119:10
175:24 183:23 185:16
187:9 211:21
conclusions (4) 39:24 116:24
117:14,17
conclusive (1) 90:6
concourse (2) 71:18,19
condense (1) 135:13
condolences (1) 9:14
conduct (6) 12:24 29:7
33:12 45:22 201:8 209:8
conducted (4) 9:20 46:3
98:22 202:20
conduit (1) 37:17
conference (1) 90:9
confess (1) 88:19
confident (2) 17:6 195:15
confidential (2) 31:7 49:2
configurations (1) 108:19

configure (2) 108:20,23
confirm (12) 18:14 87:18
95:16 106:3,8 109:15
114:9 117:18,20 135:11
138:1,18
confirmation (1) 207:3
confirmed (7) 42:14 78:14
88:25 89:22 90:3 110:18
182:23
connect (3) 170:19 187:11
200:10
connected (21) 53:23 86:19
133:12 136:3 145:9
152:4,8,18 153:14 155:2
165:7 180:21 181:8,9
182:5 185:23 190:9 200:16
203:1,3,5
connecting (4) 109:10 133:9
188:2 190:3
connection (7) 109:24 113:6
144:1 153:2 182:16 193:9
203:17
connections (1) 116:11
connects (1) 190:20
conscious (3) 173:18 178:16
194:17
consider (14) 88:16 100:2
111:12 137:9,20 152:3
156:15 167:14 169:13
182:12 186:14 196:16
201:25 209:2
considerable (2) 80:8 141:24
considerably (1) 204:21
consideration (6) 4:25 31:13
48:20,23 162:12 209:17
considered (6) 13:19 26:8
51:7 107:17 138:21 180:18
considering (2) 161:15
189:18
considers (1) 179:5
consisted (1) 34:15
consistent (23) 89:1 112:19
117:5 122:24 125:19
126:1,8,13,15 127:5 128:4
130:5,12 144:8,13,15
154:9 159:7 160:20 187:16
192:19 197:10 201:13
consistently (1) 48:14
consists (1) 13:6
conspiracy (3) 55:11
153:12,20
conspiring (1) 43:5
constable (5) 9:4
12:11,11,23 90:10
constituents (1) 103:19
constituted (4) 47:16 111:16
141:5 210:11
constructed (6) 81:2 108:16
109:8 130:18 137:6 182:15
151:5 47:6
101:1 119:12 134:22
138:11 169:5
contact (1) 27:25
113:23,24 114:2,3
116:2,25 117:2,3,7,8,9
157:22 159:12 164:21
179:18 182:23,25 199:22
contacted (4) 69:6,7 165:6
183:17
contacts (1) 96:19
contain (2) 83:19 111:15
contained (6) 114:24 126:25
133:11 134:25 135:4 191:4
containing (10) 17:14 117:6
126:17,25 127:3,3,7,8
128:21 190:18
containers (3) 126:25 128:19
190:24
contains (1) 115:6
contaminated (4) 116:1,5
117:3,10
contamination (3) 74:20
117:11 127:2
contemporaneously (2)
23:19,25
content (7) 31:3 48:24 77:18

83:21 106:18 139:15 189:18 contents (4) 59:15 63:6 189:12 190:12 context (2) 164:10,11 continue (6) 23:9 33:15,21 75:13 82:10 87:10 continued (20) 31:14 33:10,14 64:10 77:10 80:8 84:18 85:14,16,18 86:6 87:15,16 134:17 190:15 191:18 192:7 214:9,10,17 continuing (2) 20:20 93:18 contradict (1) 7:1 contribute (1) 91:19 control (4) 92:1 109:21 175:16 201:21 controlled (3) 115:6 123:9 201:24 controller (1) 202:6 controlling (1) 71:11 convenient (1) 67:4 conversation (3) 16:10 17:19 162:24 cooper (1) 51:9 coordinate (1) 13:15 coordinated (1) 17:13 coordinator (1) 71:3 copy (1) 172:21 cordon (22) 72:1,5,5,6,7,7,8,10,11,14,14,15, 173:1,2,6,9,10,12,13 cordons (2) 71:13,13 core (9) 1:10 27:14,15 46:14 87:1 171:7 173:6 180:18 211:14 corner (5) 142:10 158:1 171:16,17,19 corners (1) 112:8 coroner (2) 36:16,17 coroners (1) 36:22 correct (132) 7:20,23 8:8,9,18 10:2,8 11:5,6 12:8 13:3,17,21 15:1 17:14,23 18:3,18 19:15,16,19 20:4,5 21:12 22:10,21,22 23:1,14 25:7,8 27:4 28:13,24 29:4,8,9 31:2 32:9 34:20 35:19 36:21 40:14 41:1,16 42:3,13,22 44:9 45:24 50:8 51:25 52:6 53:19,24 57:6 58:2,11 65:14 68:2,19 71:14 75:8 78:5,6,10 79:12 80:17 88:2 90:4,14 93:20 95:25 97:23 101:10,19,24 102:9 104:2,3,9 106:6,21 110:10 111:8,22 114:15 115:14 118:22,23 125:10,14 130:19 135:5,11,12 136:15,20 137:8 138:4 139:20 145:5,23 146:4 147:11,24 150:5,18 153:7 156:24 157:2,14,24 160:22 163:15 167:4 169:17 183:15,22 185:24 187:3,20 188:11,12 193:11 196:25 197:14 199:20 205:1 208:19 210:8,22 correction (1) 178:16 cost (1) 184:2 couldnt (4) 79:14 87:10 92:9 109:5 counsel (4) 31:1,5 178:9,25 counterterrorism (24) 8:20,22,23 10:12 11:14 13:1,9,23 14:4,11,13,14,18 15:23 16:9 18:20 19:7,15 21:20 29:11 30:20 67:25 68:20,25 country (8) 19:5,10 38:25 43:9 137:21 167:2 177:5,10 couple (6) 30:4,7 144:25 177:3 189:16,19 course (52) 3:15 4:22 9:1	10:13 14:3,7,20 19:24 20:1,6 24:17,25 29:13 30:25 31:3 39:19 40:24 42:14 46:16 47:20 48:8 52:19 58:9 61:10 65:18 68:21,22 72:13 75:19 76:12 77:10 85:23 99:5,7 100:9 104:6 111:20 138:2,6 153:25 162:14 167:16,17 180:19 190:7 193:7 196:13 198:13 199:14 204:21 208:25 211:15 cousin (1) 142:19 cover (7) 2:2 17:25 68:24 69:4,4,6,11 coverage (1) 173:17 covered (1) 180:10 covering (1) 18:9 covert (1) 26:25 cps (4) 29:16,23 31:10 50:25 cps000043 (1) 43:18 cps0001641 (1) 83:24 cps00019422 (1) 209:5 cps00019423 (1) 210:4 cps00019424 (1) 210:17 cps00019425 (2) 211:4,10 cps00019426 (1) 211:8 cps0002071 (1) 43:19 cps00020961 (1) 114:8 czarek (1) 81:13 create (1) 35:2 created (12) 83:4 113:7 135:23 136:8,10,18,23 140:11 142:3 152:12 171:4 210:13 credible (1) 56:20 crime (14) 12:16,21 14:9 38:24 39:8 74:12,15,17,22 75:1 76:8 80:9,16 86:18 criminal (7) 3:10 15:18 26:22 43:23 63:6 79:10 121:8 criticism (1) 212:9 crop (2) 142:1 203:23 cross (2) 51:19 111:2 crossover (1) 56:22 crowd (1) 64:22 crowd (16) 29:8,10,14 30:1,5,23 31:4 38:15 42:23 46:22 48:21,25 51:8,9 145:10,15 cs (1) 146:1 ct (1) 69:9 cti (3) 2:9 4:8,21 ctp (3) 13:2,14 70:21 ctcio (1) 20:8 ctu (2) 18:16 19:3 culminating (1) 80:18 currently (2) 9:17 148:1 custody (3) 30:19 33:20 42:17 cut (3) 107:20,22 108:2	D d (1) 214:1 daesh (1) 45:1 damage (13) 43:7 73:20 75:25 76:3,6 77:1 82:11 91:24,24 92:17 97:16 108:2,7 damaged (4) 66:13 97:12 107:25 109:6 danger (3) 131:2 161:4,23 dangerous (11) 103:11,16,18 123:5,6,7,13 124:2,1 129:25 130:2,3 dare (1) 54:18 dark (1) 81:8 data (6) 97:9,16 112:5 118:25 157:12 166:10 database (1) 26:3 date (13) 25:7 35:4,6,9 39:15 88:20 140:23 141:3 145:1 156:21 167:1 197:2 206:10 dated (3) 5:8 15:15 23:24	day (28) 7:15 8:6 18:6,7,8 30:6 33:19 61:1 94:13,15 95:14 97:21 102:8 148:16 149:5,14 162:17,18,19 167:5,7 172:3,10 174:9 187:5 195:17 200:12 211:12 days (12) 16:25 28:21 30:4,7,19 34:17 69:5,10,10 87:3 175:8 206:10 dci (4) 34:16 35:14 37:24,25 dcm1 (2) 114:19,21 dcs (6) 7:5 87:15 134:17 214:3,9,17 de (66) 5:15,22 6:10 46:12 67:2,16,19,20 82:23 83:3,14 84:10 85:7 86:2,24 98:13 100:11,15,17,21,22 105:16 116:18 117:23 118:18 119:16,21 121:12 131:20 132:23 133:15 134:18,19 154:1 158:25 162:7,24 164:19 166:6 168:16 174:7,21,25 176:25 178:4,12 179:2 185:14 193:20 194:16 195:3,14,24 196:8 198:1 200:15 203:9 204:15 206:1,8,12 212:19 213:2 214:7,13,18 deadly (1) 4:17 deal (41) 2:21 5:13,15,23,25 6:3,10,24 10:25 31:17 36:7 48:10 52:10 66:9 80:5 87:17,20 98:2 100:12 104:15 106:2 107:6 111:11 120:6 139:17 168:1,9,17 170:6 171:24 172:1 176:13,23 178:9,10,13,23 179:1 183:4 193:2 201:16 dealing (19) 5:16 6:7 10:9 27:19 38:1 39:23 55:22 56:5 65:1 71:17 73:15 74:12 75:24 98:13 111:15 112:7 193:14 195:8 198:1 dealings (1) 91:22 deals (5) 5:11 6:12 77:16 93:9 209:6 dealt (12) 5:10 51:13 69:16 95:6 100:2 107:9 110:19 127:16 128:16 167:25 168:10 178:14 death (1) 10:11 debit (1) 169:9 deceased (1) 134:5 december (4) 1:1 12:15 141:16 213:6 decide (1) 16:12 decided (1) 92:13 decision (5) 29:3,6,20 51:10 197:5 decisionmaking (1) 23:23 decisions (6) 3:6 24:6,12 30:21 31:9 36:2 declared (2) 42:7 48:2 dedicated (2) 24:20 30:13 deep (1) 44:24 deeply (1) 10:1 defends (1) 140:1 definitely (4) 117:21 126:7 130:10 207:13 definitions (1) 10:25 definitively (3) 109:8 155:19 208:22 defraud (2) 153:12,20 degree (8) 4:20 68:8 81:1 101:20 104:7 131:10 138:13 158:5 delay (2) 1:3 5:4 delegate (1) 35:14 delegated (1) 174:3 deliberate (2) 119:13 168:14 deliberately (2) 132:14 194:7 delivered (9) 53:8 135:10 143:15,17 144:20 145:18 147:13 149:20 157:6 delivery (10) 53:7,17 149:5,9	154:10,14,18 181:7,20 182:10 delve (2) 40:1 44:24 demonstrate (2) 60:19 174:7 demonstrated (2) 139:4 140:16 demonstrates (1) 112:2 denials (2) 48:22 49:3 dental (1) 65:10 deny (2) 44:11 151:17 denying (2) 45:18 46:4 depart (2) 156:22 188:4 departing (1) 58:3 department (3) 13:5,10 203:18 departure (2) 210:1,6 depend (1) 108:15 depending (2) 25:10 56:12 depiction (1) 182:8 deploy (1) 21:10 deployed (3) 29:16 30:3 37:3 deployment (2) 30:7 36:25 deposit (4) 206:12 207:9,24 208:1 deposited (1) 206:18 deputy (4) 18:2 34:16 35:14 38:10 derive (1) 6:23 derives (1) 159:19 descended (1) 156:9 describe (6) 23:17 27:2,22 104:8 138:5 201:7 described (15) 6:5 26:16 51:6 67:22 90:5 103:9 119:9 123:4 130:13,24 170:15 171:17 172:9 179:14 180:12 describes (1) 113:2 describing (2) 45:15 124:1 description (4) 11:19 129:9,10 174:15 descriptions (2) 11:1 163:22 design (1) 119:12 designated (3) 8:20 70:18 71:8 designation (1) 70:25 designed (3) 26:4,20 32:18 desire (2) 43:10 200:10 destination (4) 163:7,8,16 165:25 detail (46) 14:1 27:22 38:18 40:1,22,24 41:6,13 47:20 52:19 55:7 60:9 71:16 72:4,12 73:14 75:20 76:5 77:16,24 80:13 92:8 95:1 98:3 99:11 104:12,25 105:16,23 106:16 123:18 125:6 129:8 136:5 141:14,24 149:4 152:24 157:4 168:13,19 170:7 171:6 176:20,25 198:19 detailed (1) 106:20 detailing (1) 41:3 details (7) 91:21 96:21 123:10 125:2 130:20 151:5 152:3 detained (2) 28:21 42:12 detectable (1) 105:18 detected (5) 114:3 115:24,25 116:20 117:25 detection (1) 162:2 detective (9) 7:12 10:19 15:4 17:25 18:10,11 70:11 167:16 210:23 detention (2) 28:23 30:14 determine (4) 109:7 114:2 118:5 150:25 deterred (1) 148:16 detonate (1) 50:10 detonated (3) 15:17 40:4 103:3 detonating (1) 64:23 detonation (4) 50:6 102:23 109:25 133:7 devell (23) 54:1,4,11,20,23 59:18,22 60:10 137:2	157:3,8 163:5,19 164:21 165:3,8,13 166:3,6,20 184:10,22 188:25 develop (1) 63:25 development (1) 10:15 device (41) 5:14 40:5 51:17,22,24 60:23,25 62:16 84:4 86:22 97:10,17 100:25 103:8 106:11 108:5,8,15,17 109:2,7 110:13,18 119:13 120:12 121:17 122:2,8 128:22 132:16,21 134:21,24 139:1,3,3 141:18 177:7 178:21 191:8 210:11 devices (7) 14:25 28:10 108:4,12,19,20 139:13 devote (1) 12:1 diagram (1) 182:1 didnt (19) 46:1,25 81:7 91:24 124:8 136:3 147:15 148:15 174:2 184:12 194:7 196:15 197:23 202:16,16,17,18 203:2 212:15 diesel (4) 113:3,9,18 155:9 difference (3) 21:20 72:13 160:8 differed (20) 3:6 32:21 45:14 52:5 65:4,24 102:25 108:20 114:22,23 118:6 147:9,18 149:2,15 164:11,17 184:1 193:2,10 difficult (9) 49:23 64:3 108:14,18 113:4 120:4 121:13 131:14 171:22 difficulty (3) 1:8 32:19 129:18 digital (2) 28:9 67:23 dimensions (1) 172:20 diploma (1) 68:12 direct (1) 139:10 directed (1) 73:9 direction (5) 8:22 158:10,13 160:3 163:18 directly (3) 90:24 93:2 163:9 disappeared (1) 165:24 disaster (2) 11:5 22:25 discarded (1) 177:16 discernible (1) 209:15 discipline (1) 138:9 disciplines (1) 127:22 disclose (1) 148:6 disclosed (2) 38:12 50:22 disclosure (6) 4:14,18 38:2,10,10,14 110:7 136:13 189:8 discovery (1) 65:19 discussed (1) 131:1 discussion (1) 78:4 discussions (2) 31:4 48:25 disengaged (1) 46:1 dishonestly (1) 151:15 disinfectant (1) 104:14 dislodged (1) 82:16 disposal (2) 176:4,9 dispose (1) 173:20 disposed (2) 176:11 180:12 disposing (1) 200:21 disruptive (1) 2:23 distance (5) 47:10,14 53:20 165:3 181:23 distinct (1) 65:22 distinctive (4) 104:7,9,23 171:12 distress (1) 92:24 distressed (1) 41:5 distressing (5) 77:18 83:7,22 106:17 110:22 divided (1) 5:9 divider (1) 15:12 division (1) 29:11 dna (12) 41:17 52:14 65:10 89:5,6,9,10 90:16 170:22	189:4,6 193:9 document (3) 36:4 106:7 208:20 documentary (1) 190:6 documents (2) 39:18 190:2 does (42) 8:22 12:19 24:1,17 28:20 59:14 69:5 72:22 83:19 92:1 102:20 103:9 104:7,21,23 105:3 111:15 114:25 120:20,23 125:5,7 131:5 140:10 141:3,6 142:7 160:19 163:5 167:5,6,7,8 171:8,11 172:10,12 174:7 184:24 201:10 203:2 205:18 doesnt (11) 11:18 33:19 61:19 120:19,21 122:18 125:4 127:20 145:19 184:4 203:1 doing (5) 72:17 176:17 196:4 197:21,21 dollars (2) 205:22,24 domain (1) 31:25 domestic (3) 120:23 121:4 139:21 done (25) 7:24 16:11 18:9 21:16 24:19,19 26:5,5 30:16 44:18 45:22 55:20 56:21 63:14 91:9 97:20 121:19 127:18 155:23 162:2 164:9 172:22 173:18 174:10 184:6 dont (17) 4:20 11:20 16:23 33:8 38:17 39:2 64:14 67:9 86:25 88:20 91:23 92:10 118:1,6,25 120:3,8,8,12 122:14 128:17 130:20 134:24 137:13 148:3 152:25 155:25 165:15 177:22,23 184:2,16,18 185:1,12 188:16 192:23 193:14 194:11 197:18 205:7,20 207:13,14 210:17 212:7 doors (3) 75:11,14 82:13 dotted (1) 161:6 doublecheck (2) 194:12 197:23 doubling (1) 163:13 doubt (21) 18:14 27:23 34:2 40:12 46:21,24 66:5 72:4 92:12 96:24 110:17 111:19 116:6 117:13 124:15 143:23 153:25 164:22 165:20,22 211:14 dowels (2) 51:19 111:3 down (26) 63:22 72:9 75:14 81:15,16,17,18,19,23,25 82:3,6,8 84:7 85:15 86:14 100:18 102:19 116:5 117:16 150:15 154:15 204:9,19 206:17 209:12 drags (2) 129:4,18 draw (3) 152:7 158:9,12 drawn (2) 115:23 158:18 dreadful (1) 12:10 drew (1) 76:18 drive (2) 184:15,21 driven (5) 59:15,18,21 186:13 187:21 driver (9) 62:4 159:18,20,24 160:10,11 161:25 163:23 164:22 drivers (1) 116:21 drives (1) 165:22 driving (4) 27:13 55:5 65:23 163:9 drop (2) 62:4 159:18 dropped (4) 61:21 62:5 77:3 129:17 drops (1) 17:2 drug (1) 55:22 drugs (4) 55:12 56:5,6,25 drum (12) 60:1,2,3,4,6 127:11 128:4,5,7,13,17 173:2	drums (6) 127:11,12,13,14,14,20 ds (1) 168:19 due (22) 30:25 40:24 42:14 47:20 48:8 52:19 58:9 61:10 72:13 77:1 79:13 85:23 104:6 139:25 148:12 153:24 167:16 180:19 198:13 199:14 204:21 211:15 dughman (2) 181:14,15 duration (2) 83:18 166:21 durham (1) 68:14 during (29) 2:23 5:17 6:7 10:13 11:11,13 17:24 18:8 19:24 24:25 25:4 28:9 32:23 38:22 39:19 46:16 60:3,12 79:4 80:21 83:11 84:2 89:19 103:10 124:25 147:12 167:14 194:5 196:13 duties (1) 12:10 duty (1) 169:20 dvi (6) 22:25 23:2 37:3 80:11 81:2,22,22 E e (1) 214:1 earlier (15) 7:18 12:14 40:6 43:19 51:9 84:20 97:15 133:22 178:17 192:3 193:24 199:9 200:1 203:16 207:11 early (24) 23:9 25:4 26:7 27:5 29:24 30:1 32:11,25 33:3 34:13 37:8 40:9,15 42:4 54:17 69:24 94:22 95:10,19 98:15 99:18 106:9,19 169:19 earnest (1) 198:2 ease (2) 109:4 132:6 easily (1) 50:10 easy (1) 49:17 education (1) 204:22 educational (5) 3:24 105:14 137:21 204:24 207:4 effect (4) 3:13 23:3 42:11 181:22 effectively (36) 12:20,22 13:5,11 14:8 15:20 18:6 23:18,24 26:13 35:13 37:17 45:11,18 52:21 53:12,13 54:4 58:15 59:16,18 60:5,23 61:15 62:11 65:19 108:13 148:13 151:9 152:13 155:3 157:10 165:10 181:15 192:24 199:18 efficient (1) 87:2 efficiently (1) 35:12 eight (2) 38:9 116:16 either (17) 36:2,3 44:7 45:8 48:12 54:21 122:21 124:25 125:20 128:9 130:8 139:7 152:21 161:24 162:7 169:9 201:20 eldest (2) 201:22 202:7 electrical (1) 138:2 element (1) 124:2 elegant (1) 201:21 elements (3) 168:7 179:4 198:3 eliminate (1) 56:11 elmehdi (1) 165:6 else (9) 73:23 93:3 121:6 127:4 133:10 177:22 187:21,23 213:1 elsewhere (3) 11:8 19:5,10 elsmore (12) 94:10 156:25 158:23 169:15,16 170:13 171:5,10 180:17 191:25 192:15 196:2 el
--	---	--	---	--	--	--	--

email (10) 142:16 145:6
146:10 148:9,21 149:18
152:7,18 170:11 171:21
emails (2) 152:11,13
emerge (1) 61:17
emphasise (2) 1:17 48:24
employed (1) 67:25
employment (1) 205:3
empty (4) 59:16 128:25
194:11 196:6
enable (3) 62:17 90:23 151:9
enabled (1) 96:21
enables (1) 24:16
encompass (1) 35:22
encourage (1) 83:18
end (17) 17:1.5 32:12
33:5.21 36:23 73:1 107:10
116:3 129:16 153:5 174:9
188:18 195:4,16 205:6,7
engage (1) 91:5
engaged (5) 36:1 38:13
42:24 103:11 154:7
england (1) 58:22
enormous (1) 19:23
enough (1) 166:2
enquire (1) 196:10
enquired (1) 197:4
enquiries (10) 12:24 25:14
33:14 94:8 98:19 99:5
173:21 196:1.5 203:17
enquiry (9) 21:8 25:16 38:11
39:6 55:14 93:22 97:3 99:5
100:1
ensure (6) 13:10 22:7 26:4
28:22 35:17 74:16
enter (1) 212:15
entered (6) 63:16,20 71:18
74:8 155:8 159:16
entering (1) 74:17
enterprise (2) 9:14 63:12
entire (2) 35:22 38:24
entirely (7) 46:23 48:7 57:16
122:19 167:24 194:16
200:16
entitled (1) 100:25
entry (2) 25:5 209:19
environment (4) 60:6 62:11
115:6 135:16
environs (1) 128:12
envisaged (1) 44:20
equally (1) 1:14
equipment (2) 51:21 96:9
essentially (1) 18:24
establish (26) 47:4 109:17
110:22 137:10 138:12
140:24 141:15 144:12
148:1 152:10 153:2 166:20
172:20 173:2 179:9,16
183:13 188:20 190:16
201:6,19 202:13,16,17
206:14 208:24
establishing (7) 79:9 155:19
168:18 172:2 202:5,9,23
establishing (2) 85:24 155:23
establishment (4) 3:24
137:21 204:24 207:4
establishments (1) 105:14
estimate (5) 118:21 119:3
121:10,15 195:6
estimated (1) 38:23
et (4) 73:4 81:21 158:13
164:12
euros (1) 205:23
evaluate (1) 56:12
even (7) 33:11 41:20 69:19
130:9 139:6 161:14 185:11
evening (3) 57:5 61:16 69:17
event (1) 92:4
events (8) 16:12 24:11 44:5
99:20 136:1 198:18 200:7
211:2
ever (4) 39:8 139:7,14
172:17
every (2) 173:14 210:18
everybody (6) 1:17,18 2:19
33:13 44:19 135:7

everyone (10) 1:6 4:11,19,19
15:16 16:21 49:2 74:18
86:12 96:3
everything (4) 23:23 34:5
154:8 184:5
evidence (93) 1:8 2:9,17,24
3:1,10 5:23 6:6 9:8 21:5
22:18 29:19 30:13 32:2
33:21,22 40:13 41:14,25
46:1 50:24 51:6,7 52:14
65:16 67:17 72:3,16
74:13,21,21 78:3 80:18
83:11 87:10 89:13 93:15
94:24,24 98:11 100:6
108:9 112:23 113:14
121:8,24 122:21 125:23
130:21 133:16,22 134:13
135:3,14 136:14,17
139:5,10 142:5 152:12
158:2,25 164:22 168:11
169:23 170:10,19 173:25
174:18 175:1 179:17 180:2
181:3,3 182:4 185:16,21
187:11 189:16,20
190:5,9,13 193:12,24
195:3,5 196:17 199:21
200:5 206:5,7 207:3
evidential (1) 156:10
exact (3) 88:20 146:24
172:21
exactly (8) 86:9,11 89:25
108:15 109:7 131:14
166:23 206:23
exam (1) 212:14
examination (12) 88:6
89:5,19 101:17 102:13
106:1,10,19 107:23 108:25
109:5 178:19
examine (7) 106:25 110:3,11
111:19 127:22 144:10
177:19
examined (5) 109:20
110:21,25 111:9 189:4
examining (3) 76:25
107:4,24
example (13) 19:18,20 21:21
49:20 52:3 90:16 99:22
103:23 110:3 112:6 116:3
164:25 210:18
examples (1) 162:11
except (1) 151:7
exchange (1) 205:16
excluded (1) 57:16
exclusive (1) 54:6
exclusively (2) 10:23 12:2
exercise (1) 4:20
exhibit (1) 138:19
exhibits (4) 39:13 72:21 83:5
85:2
existed (3) 25:18 87:24
190:9
existence (4) 6:24 22:9
36:12 98:5
exits (1) 63:14
expanded (1) 99:7
expect (7) 41:14 110:13
113:8,11,12 115:17 116:9
expected (4) 38:3 113:6
145:2 195:16
expecting (2) 178:8 199:11
expenditure (2) 203:22
209:2
expensive (3) 145:2,3 148:20
experience (8) 14:8 15:6
16:8 76:8 101:13,15
121:20,23
experienced (8) 15:3
18:19,25 21:23 30:22,25
31:10 107:24
experiences (1) 14:24
expert (4) 87:25 88:25 89:22
119:9
expertise (4) 112:5 121:5
129:11 178:20
experts (1) 79:21
explain (6) 16:7 48:8 67:3

94:21 113:18 170:8
explained (4) 2:8 19:2 88:11
153:24
explanation (9) 55:21 56:21
84:3 111:25 116:6 149:24
151:6,6 197:20
explanations (2) 64:7 144:5
explode (1) 125:1
explore (1) 76:4
explosion (15) 40:16 43:6
69:22 73:18 75:21,23
77:1.5 97:13 107:25
108:1.3 118:22 119:14
123:8
explosive (33) 14:24 40:4
43:6 50:6 52:22 60:22,25
98:16 101:4,17
102:18,20,22,24
103:2,7,8,14 106:11
112:18 115:2 118:3
121:17,22 123:19 124:21
126:19 137:6 140:4
161:3,22 185:18 210:15
explosives (14) 14:25 22:1.8
74:4 102:25 103:1,1
107:12 115:5 121:10,15
122:2,15 125:16
exponentially (1) 99:8
expose (1) 184:22
express (1) 56:10
expressed (4) 50:17 55:4
121:20 133:25
extensive (3) 73:20 173:21
191:12
extensively (2) 95:21 98:22
extent (6) 41:20 51:5 90:25
91:4 95:6 139:5
external (1) 204:5
extra (3) 81:20 181:12 184:4
extract (1) 114:11
extracted (2) 97:10,16
extradition (1) 42:20
extreme (1) 139:16
extremely (23) 19:12 27:10
30:25 31:10 38:5 61:19
64:4 77:17 83:7,22 102:18
103:2,9,11,13 106:20
107:24 116:23 123:5,6
129:25 130:2 159:24
extremism (1) 45:2
extremist (2) 44:24 45:18
eye (2) 76:6 118:9
eyewitnesses (2) 21:7 93:21

F

fabric (1) 73:21
face (2) 78:15 97:5
facebook (2) 179:10,14
facial (2) 41:14 78:9
facility (1) 197:12
factor (1) 30:20
factors (3) 114:4 118:24
135:22
factory (2) 177:20,20
failed (2) 148:11,12
fair (14) 17:13 18:25 19:1
21:13 33:7 46:20 64:15
66:8 121:21 125:9 129:9
146:24 185:3 211:21
fairly (5) 15:13 125:8 177:1
185:7 198:17
fall (5) 81:11 82:5 134:1,4
195:20
fallen (1) 77:4
falling (1) 133:23
fallowfield (1) 94:10
familiar (2) 43:22 114:14
familiarises (1) 14:10
families (7) 9:15 31:8
37:5,17 92:2 93:3 133:25
family (12) 4:2,7 21:10
36:25 37:2 44:17 48:1,18
53:21 62:24 142:18 188:2
far (27) 22:7 35:2 39:20
42:19 50:12 53:9 54:25
87:19 92:20 106:23 119:3

123:22 137:9 138:8 140:24
146:25 147:25 166:2,23
173:10 178:15 179:21
185:14 204:16 205:19
209:14 212:23
fare (1) 165:22
faster (2) 24:13 212:20
fatalities (1) 70:2
father (1) 189:7
fault (1) 178:24
fbi (1) 14:19
feasible (1) 193:18
feature (1) 107:19
features (4) 81:14 98:3
101:17 156:10
february (7) 135:10 179:18
196:24 198:24 201:3
207:15 212:15
feed (1) 83:16
feel (3) 33:9 105:6 195:12
feels (1) 41:5
fellow (1) 102:2
felt (2) 44:19 193:21
few (6) 12:18 14:6 44:14
85:12 122:11 129:19
fibreboard (3) 110:4,5,8
fiddling (1) 132:1
fifth (1) 5:2
figure (2) 121:16 122:7
figures (2) 121:12 208:8
fill (1) 79:11
fill (1) 48:17
final (14) 83:3 118:19 132:20
144:16 147:3 150:19 152:6
162:15 163:7 176:4 182:12
208:6 210:6 211:11
finally (7) 5:7 6:8 86:12 99:9
110:21 117:23 130:24
finances (6) 5:22 168:21
169:12 195:25 196:8
203:25
financial (3) 47:9 94:6
148:14
financing (1) 203:11
find (8) 15:13 72:1 136:1
141:8 173:9,21 180:11
199:22
finding (1) 66:3
fine (4) 16:20 17:4 127:19,25
finer (1) 134:25
fingerprint (5) 41:17 52:14
79:3,21 88:6
fingerprinted (1) 79:12
fingerprinting (1) 79:22
fingerprints (18) 65:8
78:21,24 79:10,14,17,20
88:8,11,15 170:21 180:22
182:6 189:4,6 190:22
191:3 193:9
finish (1) 194:20
finished (2) 134:10,11
fiona (1) 12:11
fire (1) 82:12
firm (2) 109:1 185:15
first (32) 2:15 5:17 11:16
13:14 15:21 16:1 18:4
30:18 44:14 66:23 77:8
81:7,18,24 82:3 84:11
112:6 120:6 122:12 135:25
136:2,11 138:21
141:3,9,11 142:9 152:8
170:1 173:12 183:6 185:25
firstly (4) 115:20 118:19
175:4 196:17
fit (4) 126:9 173:3 192:13,14
fits (2) 14:13 180:5
fitted (2) 109:18 191:21
five (6) 114:22,23 145:3
192:10 204:19 211:5
flat (17) 52:10,16,22
59:16,17 115:18 125:16
126:14,16 130:21 158:15
159:8 179:11,24 180:8,10
183:20
flats (2) 54:4,5
fled (1) 186:19

flicking (1) 133:13
flight (1) 58:16
flights (1) 57:25
flo (3) 37:15,17,23
floor (4) 76:23 115:11
132:25 133:24
flos (2) 21:10 37:20
flowed (1) 35:18
focus (7) 1:23 21:13 34:18
74:13 190:8 210:10,13
focused (1) 35:1
focusing (1) 209:2
follow (6) 6:16 14:22 65:3
74:19,23 97:3
followed (5) 112:13 123:20
124:7,16 125:11
following (10) 2:2 3:18,19
23:3 70:17 88:12 135:4
175:7 196:9,23
follows (1) 22:14
footage (11) 54:20 63:20
88:23 95:20 131:25
132:15,19 137:14,16
167:11 172:19
force (3) 11:24 12:22 45:14
foreign (1) 42:14
forensic (18) 67:22
68:8,17,21 69:8 71:3 72:16
101:4,16,23 102:4 107:12
115:5 127:22 170:5 178:20
190:5 193:12
forget (1) 194:2
forgive (3) 43:18 202:20
207:9
forjani (5) 142:18,20
143:20,24 146:2
forjanis (2) 143:12 144:10
form (11) 71:17 80:15 83:20
86:17 95:1 106:2 137:5
167:18 180:17 204:17
205:12
formed (1) 36:19
formed (4) 77:3 85:23 135:3
190:12
forms (2) 27:14,15
forward (5) 77:20 85:8,10
99:1 154:20
found (18) 41:8 54:7 65:13
66:18,19 67:3,4 94:5 95:23
104:19 105:14 109:18
110:5 125:25 127:12,19
174:6 178:21
four (4) 13:6 112:7 114:24
204:19
fourfigure (1) 206:2
fourth (3) 60:16 147:12
209:12
fourthly (1) 4:12
fragment (1) 178:21
fragmentation (1) 76:10
fragments (3) 109:13 110:5
115:13
fraud (13) 151:8,9,11,21
153:12,13,14,18,19 154:7
197:8,10 201:14
fraudulent (2) 197:7 206:21
friction (3) 50:7 103:3
124:24
friends (2) 53:21 57:11
front (2) 75:17 107:21
fruitful (1) 66:7
fruity (1) 104:8
fts (2) 44:15 45:10
full (7) 7:8 46:17 67:20
72:20,20 80:3 100:22
fulltime (1) 24:23
fully (2) 133:2 153:3
function (4) 120:18
132:16,22 133:1
functional (1) 72:13
functioned (1) 106:12
functions (1) 102:24
fundamentally (1) 106:18
funding (1) 203:21
funds (2) 148:12 149:25
further (32) 20:23 21:15,23

22:3,8,15 30:14 33:22
38:18 40:1 52:19 63:5
68:12 93:17 97:2 98:3
110:3 119:5 122:25
124:4,19 125:12 132:17
140:13 152:3 168:3 191:25
192:14 198:10 206:17
208:1 210:5
furthermore (3) 39:18 41:13
47:8
fusion (4) 27:7,9,10 70:12
future (2) 84:6 161:14

G

gallagher (24) 66:4,10,12,16
67:3,17,18,21 71:17
80:5,22 83:7 84:15 85:21
86:15,24 87:3,8 88:7,11
95:22 133:22 134:3 214:6
garment (1) 108:1
gated (3) 54:6 60:11 165:13
gather (1) 21:4
gathering (3) 27:11 93:11,15
gating (1) 165:15
gave (5) 80:18 111:17
112:17 133:22 207:11
general (5) 36:8 104:22
132:14 175:9 176:16
generally (3) 9:9 44:7 103:8
generate (1) 25:22
generated (3) 8:15,17 51:6
generator (1) 48:17
genuinely (1) 33:17
germany (1) 14:23
get (20) 4:25 9:7 31:23 41:5
49:18,23 54:16,18 81:24
96:6 102:24 117:16 148:15
151:10 153:15 177:9
185:9,19 203:2,11
gets (1) 115:9
getting (4) 32:2 126:23
195:20 199:19
gilet (1) 107:15
give (25) 3:2,13 4:25 46:1
49:11 65:16 66:6 67:20
69:7 79:23 83:14 84:2 86:3
102:24 112:11 115:4
121:16 130:20 132:19,21
133:2 134:13 200:5 201:10
205:18
given (32) 2:10,12 4:4 19:17
48:20,23 66:23 70:15,25
74:13,24 83:25 84:5 90:9
111:13 116:24 129:9
131:15 132:12 138:18
140:13 142:14 144:13
146:7,10 156:14 167:1
181:16 186:11,12 188:14
195:20
gives (2) 123:14 165:10
giving (2) 49:20 121:8
glass (9) 75:11,25
81:3,4,15,17 82:13 133:23
134:1
globally (1) 48:10
gloves (1) 116:7
gmp (1) 22:24
goes (11) 17:5 23:24 87:8
115:9 129:11 139:12
160:11 163:3,5 176:15
192:22
going (99) 15:10,13 16:24
21:23 22:20 27:17 31:17
34:1 35:6 40:22,22,23
47:19 54:19 55:6,22 58:8
59:7 60:8 64:24 65:21 67:7
68:6 71:16 72:15,16,19
73:14 75:19 77:19,24
80:6,13 82:15 83:3,14 84:1
85:11 87:17 98:2
100:10,12,13 101:1
104:11,24 105:16,23
107:14 110:16 111:9,11
113:19 116:12 119:4
120:3,4 121:11,11 122:9
123:10,18 124:4 125:2,6

132:13 135:2,14 136:5
139:15,16 151:8,11,18
154:16 155:21 156:7,13
157:12 165:9 166:4 167:25
168:19,17 170:9 171:3
176:23 184:20 185:11
188:24 195:8 197:8
198:13,17 200:5 209:16
210:14 212:23
gone (10) 20:2 26:8 64:2
87:9 159:9,22 160:25
162:8 174:8 179:21
good (3) 1:5 49:1 197:19
gotten (1) 160:24
gram (2) 116:13,14
grams (1) 111:5
granby (27) 60:17,21
61:15,16 109:19,20,24
110:9 117:23
128:6,12,14,15,18
129:15,17 130:17 137:7
182:13,13 184:10,22
192:21 194:4,6,8,12
graphic (1) 83:21
grateful (5) 1:13,20 8:2
67:11 134:12
greaney (43) 1:5,17,21
7:3,6,7,20 8:5 17:8 24:9,25
25:3 31:22 32:1,7 33:16
35:6,12 45:13,18 56:9
58:23 67:2,7 80:14
87:16,17 92:12 100:10
133:17,21 134:9,11
139:23 144:4 178:8 188:7
194:22 195:8 206:9
214:4,10
great (3) 40:12 72:4 163:5
greater (10) 7:11,21 10:6
11:7,23 68:3 70:4 79:2
90:7 168:13
greatest (2) 13:19 212:3
green (1) 157:25
grey (1) 207:25
grice (2) 57:8,14
ground (5) 2:15 6:12,16,19
7:2
guesstimate (1) 121:20
guiltless (1) 138:2
guilty (3) 151:23 153:12
154:2
gunshots (3) 76:7,9 86:8

H

hadnt (3) 77:3,4 98:1
half (6) 17:11 67:6,8 118:2
195:19 207:20
halifax (6) 41:11 66:13 76:22
199:2 207:21 208:2
hamad (2) 181:10,10
hamads (1) 181:13
hand (10) 17:9 78:24
79:11,13,17 88:10
89:20,24 142:10 180:8
handed (3) 44:4,5 45:9
handle (1) 103:17
handled (4) 38:6,8 116:7
203:18
handling (5) 103:10
130:1,1,3 159:25
hands (3) 116:7 194:16
195:13
handset (1) 96:9
handsets (1) 98:5
handwriting (2) 170:24
171:1
happen (1) 184:12
happened (10) 32:24 36:23
44:1 61:13 66:22 74:10
92:8 126:8 177:15 188:20
happening (2) 24:22 44:18
happens (2) 43:23 74:16
happy (1) 196:6
hard (3) 1:13 81:20 82:2
hardware (1) 209:21
harmful (1) 4:15
harvest (1) 19:20

hashem (84) 1:24 3:8 5:25
7:16 19:25 31:15 41:25
42:7,9,17 43:1,9 46:8,17
47:5 51:16 58:8,13 59:3
63:10 80:19 101:9
112:9,20 114:10 135:8,23
137:10,22 138:1 141:17
143:2 144:3,11,23 145:22
146:16,19 147:7,14
152:14,19 153:3 154:23
156:11 157:1 160:20
161:1,9,19,25 163:2,9,22
164:5,21 168:22 169:17
179:18,21,24 181:7 182:5
184:6 186:2 187:5
190:4,9,21 191:3
193:10,12 200:23
201:15,20,24 202:11
203:10 204:10 205:11,14
207:9,25 212:7

hashems (3) 160:14 207:15
208:18

hasnt (1) 188:20

hats (2) 81:20 82:2

havent (3) 120:2,9 192:16
having (26) 9:5 10:18 11:23
12:14 16:25 18:22 21:23
88:14 106:18 119:8
126:1,8 129:16 130:5,12
136:23 139:10 159:9 160:5
163:16 167:25 172:9 175:9
192:19 198:23 209:3

hazardous (1) 130:2

hazelwood (4) 167:16
168:19 176:14 210:23

head (4) 11:22 12:25 13:13
14:17

headed (1) 195:25

heading (2) 114:19 134:21

headquarters (2) 68:4 70:5

health (1) 80:25

hear (11) 6:18,25 16:20,21
17:9 66:3 85:22 112:24
115:16 119:20,21

heard (16) 18:1 40:6 44:14
72:3 77:6 100:5 103:25
134:23 136:21 137:4
140:17 154:22 165:12
167:18 169:2 193:24

hearing (1) 140:1

hearings (2) 2:24 168:11

heart (1) 174:5

heat (2) 50:7 103:4

heavy (5) 61:19 62:15 129:5
130:9 167:19

held (9) 11:21 14:23
45:11,13 56:24 60:5 158:6
196:11,14

hell (2) 159:17 170:8

help (15) 47:3 62:10 66:11
102:13 107:5 112:23
113:5,21 114:25 115:20
117:25 132:25 146:21
173:17 194:1

helped (1) 174:17

helpful (2) 131:18 178:4

helpfully (1) 164:13

hence (2) 95:1 98:11

here (26) 32:23 71:16 73:14
80:21 85:11 96:5
104:12,24 105:16 106:7
114:11 120:7 125:3 130:20
150:11 156:21 160:1
161:6,21 164:19 180:17
182:3 190:2 192:10 193:8
194:17

hes (10) 61:18,20,21 64:21
129:1 142:19 147:2
159:24,25 200:5

high (19) 4:20 5:12 27:18
32:13 39:25 50:6 53:11
54:15 55:7
102:18,20,22,25,25
103:1,7,2,14 104:1

higher (1) 105:4

highlevel (3) 12:20 38:19

39:22

highly (7) 15:3 18:25 21:22
50:9,11 56:6 108:22

hill (3) 12:6 31:19 32:2

himself (1) 185:12

historical (1) 196:20

history (1) 97:2

hit (1) 76:9

hm (1) 36:16

hold (8) 7:13 44:23 49:18,23
68:7 101:20 200:24 201:16

holding (6) 45:19 87:9,12
100:13,17 133:17

holmes (7) 25:13
26:2,13,15,21,25 36:3
home (17) 9:23,23 25:13
48:18 53:2,10,16 95:13
136:19 140:6 156:25
158:22 169:16 194:6,7,9
212:16

homicide (3) 12:2 14:10 15:7

homicides (2) 10:11,23

honest (3) 153:17 188:23
190:19

honours (2) 68:7 101:20

hope (4) 4:10 73:15 111:11
120:5

hospital (1) 12:6

hostile (2) 61:8 97:19

hotel (2) 175:2,5

hotline (1) 202:25

hour (5) 17:11 67:6,8,11
195:19

hours (24) 15:17 18:6 22:11
25:5,6 30:8 40:3 42:6
44:14 61:11 62:20,20
63:15,18,21 64:17,22
66:11,20 69:10 80:2 88:4
90:10 95:10

house (40) 5:4,1,4,11,20,23
59:18,22 60:10,17,21
61:16 117:23
128:12,14,15,18 129:15,17
130:17 137:2 157:3,8
163:5,19 164:21
165:3,8,13 166:3,6,20
182:13 184:10,10,22
188:25 194:4,6,8,11
housing (2) 204:14,15

however (11) 34:5 43:15
78:18 79:9 108:6
113:12,25 127:16,23
128:16 131:5
hsbc (1) 202:24

huge (2) 164:2 174:10

hughes (1) 12:12

hundreds (1) 40:7

hurt (1) 92:2

hydrogen (22) 47:11 49:10
103:21 104:11,21 120:22
121:3 122:5,6,7 147:15,17
148:17 149:14 150:4,8
151:4 152:5 153:6,15
187:12,16

hyundai (3) 187:6 188:14,16

95:7 98:5 99:3 107:20
109:12 110:15 136:2
138:15,17 141:3 145:15
149:10 157:4 164:16,23
169:19 175:9 180:20
187:18 196:13 209:10,11

identifier (1) 96:9

identify (45) 2:14 4:2,7 6:21
16:15 20:18,23
21:2,7,10,16 22:15,24
32:24,25 40:25 51:1 52:7
65:25 74:1 75:6,20 76:18
77:11,21 88:22 93:9,24
94:9 120:8,9,11 136:7
158:8 163:21,25 166:10
186:17 188:13 197:9
198:7,15 199:21 209:18
211:17

identifying (8) 6:20 20:20
52:2,3 74:3 93:17,18,21

identities (1) 3:11

identity (14) 3:21,23,25
27:23 64:24 77:8 87:19
88:16 90:8 91:16 92:14
95:10 145:13 176:8

ideologically (1) 99:13

ideology (2) 45:2,7

ied (7) 47:6,17 98:17
110:13,15 137:5 140:14

ill (19) 3:16 5:9 20:18 34:2
38:19 44:22 48:24 56:10
121:6 122:20 123:10
131:17 133:5 156:16 184:3
189:18 193:4,6 197:23

illuminated (1) 153:3

illustrate (1) 173:7

illustrates (2) 156:8 166:17

illustrative (1) 166:15

ilts (1) 24:25

im (75) 1:12,18,20 8:2
15:10,11,12,13 17:8 27:17
31:22 38:21 42:19 44:3,3,4
46:2 49:20 55:5 58:8
60:6,8 64:15,24 65:21 66:9
67:7 77:19 83:3,14 87:17
90:7 100:10,13 101:12
106:7 110:16 111:9 120:4
121:11,11 122:9,10
123:10,24,24,25 124:3,3
125:2,6,22 129:8,11
132:12 134:12 137:24
167:25 168:13,17 174:12
178:16 183:11 188:16
190:19 193:23 194:16,17
197:20,23 200:16 205:24
206:9,15 212:19

image (6) 4:1 5:19 87:22,25
88:15 157:15

imaged (1) 94:3

imagery (1) 95:22

images (2) 65:6 87:24

imagine (2) 92:5 113:4

imei (4) 96:9,14,16,21

immediate (7) 20:24 22:16
24:10 93:10 97:3 99:4,12

immediately (4) 19:6 21:19
53:22 125:9

impact (5) 14:15 34:7 50:7
103:3 124:24

implant (2) 89:20,23

importance (5) 22:6 55:2,2
80:23 99:10

important (23) 26:11 28:25
30:20 38:2,5,20 54:12 55:8
66:6 74:12 88:21 90:22
104:6 135:14 149:8 162:14
165:14 169:23 171:5,23
172:13 190:13,14

impossible (1) 24:5

impression (2) 76:12 185:6

improvised (5) 14:24 40:4
60:22,25 106:11

inadvertent (1) 4:18

incident (2) 10:21 24:4

incidents (1) 69:9

include (6) 23:22 71:11

93:11 94:25 168:25 170:21

included (3) 59:25 60:1
68:16

includes (2) 4:22 14:11
176:4 84:4,12 106:24 108:9

including (12) 2:4 3:22 4:21
5:12 19:17 65:6 70:2
175:22,25 204:14,15
212:14

income (4) 208:7 209:1
211:24 212:3

incomes (1) 205:10

inconclusive (1) 171:1

incongruous (1) 161:22

incorporated (1) 140:14

incredibly (1) 121:13

indicate (7) 5:9 40:20 93:5
156:18 158:4 199:21 204:4

indicated (18) 1:21 3:3
39:25 80:14 85:20
86:13,16 108:10 116:19
148:20 150:12 151:2
158:14 159:11 160:3 161:6
189:24 193:8

indicates (1) 80:1

indicating (3) 41:25 160:1
205:3

indication (6) 64:14 86:25
124:5,13 131:20 191:19

indications (1) 124:14

indicative (1) 38:7

indicator (2) 146:11 158:2

individual (8) 28:20 38:4
51:3 158:6 164:5 165:5
181:9 188:9

individuals (16) 3:7,9
22:17,21 35:15 38:4 39:10
50:15 51:11 52:2 54:21
56:14 95:4 109:10 188:8
204:4

industrial (1) 170:2

inevitably (2) 4:18 22:6

infer (3) 74:8 117:1 167:21

inference (2) 56:18 158:18

inferences (2) 158:9,12

inform (2) 74:5 155:15

information (34) 3:20 4:1
23:20 24:23 25:11
27:11,12 32:4 35:18 36:8
37:19,20 38:11 56:23,23
63:5 79:16 90:20,23
91:1,6,10 92:1 93:2,11
96:4,15 98:11 135:21,21
164:3 205:16,18 209:16

informationrich (1) 135:15

informed (1) 4:8

informing (1) 69:22

ingredient (2) 49:13,21

ingredients (2) 103:20 140:5

initial (10) 5:11 15:22 17:24
27:21 38:22 65:18 76:12
99:4 105:25 106:19

initially (9) 19:2 37:2,10
44:17 45:24 46:2 57:14
78:24 86:7

initiation (2) 103:2,5

initiator (1) 120:18

initiators (1) 103:6

injure (1) 119:14

injured (4) 9:17,18 40:7,23

injury (3) 43:7 78:1 79:14

inner (12)
72:5,6,8,11,14,15,20,25
73:6,12,13 107:21

innocent (1) 44:21

inputs (1) 208:22

inq0317131 (1) 189:22

inq0317591 (1) 132:9

inq0338561 (1) 171:6

inq0338571 (1) 180:16

inq0338581 (1) 182:2

inq0338881 (1) 156:3

inq0338901 (1) 203:22

inq0338902 (1) 205:5

inq0338903 (1) 206:25

inq0338904 (1) 207:23

inq0338905 (1) 208:6

inq0343401 (1) 142:1

inquiry (24) 1:23 3:3 7:25
9:20 11:23 19:25 46:9,11
76:4 84:4,12 106:24 108:9
132:10 139:23 142:4
146:21 156:20 167:11
168:11 174:11 189:23
200:10 213:5

inquiries (1) 2:1

inside (9) 55:15,16,19,24,25
34:13,17,19,24,25
56:17 105:6 127:14 191:2

insofar (4) 75:24 93:4 178:14
194:22

inspector (2) 17:25 18:11

installation (1) 138:2

instead (2) 64:1 165:3

instigation (2) 28:18 44:13

instruct (1) 140:10

instructed (3) 31:1 70:4,17
instructed (2) 137:17,18

instructional (4) 5:18 111:10
112:3 138:14

instructions (5) 111:17
112:17 123:14 124:16
140:13

integral (1) 80:15

intelligence (3) 27:11,11,12
144:10 149:8 152:9

intelligencegathering (1)
27:15

intended (3) 16:8 178:10
199:16

intention (3) 119:10 147:14
200:11

interaction (1) 75:5

interest (12) 4:16 6:2 45:1
55:14 97:6 101:16 117:15
156:17 169:20 178:17
183:3 189:13
200:13,15 201:6,19
202:5,9,13,23 203:19
204:22 206:13 208:23
209:11 211:16

interface (1) 37:21

interfere (1) 8:3

intermediary (1) 180:9

internal (1) 197:9

international (3) 14:23 96:8
183:6

internet (2) 97:20 202:21

interposed (1) 5:17

interposing (1) 67:16

interrogate (1) 96:15

interrogation (1) 96:18

interventions (2) 41:4 65:2

interview (6) 43:10,12,19
46:16 56:11,12

interviewed (1) 46:9

into (85) 2:12 5:9 9:7 12:5
13:25 15:18 20:2 23:2,24
25:13 26:9,13,21 36:12
38:17 39:6 40:1,22,23
44:24 55:6 57:21 59:14
60:7 61:5 62:11 64:5,22
67:16 70:12 71:16 72:8
73:6,14 74:19 75:13,14,20
77:24 80:13 82:25 90:22
104:11,24 105:16,23
110:16 115:9 118:25 120:4
123:10,18 126:23 128:21
134:24 135:14,20 137:5
139:5 140:14 141:16 142:1
151:11 159:22 162:8
167:22 174:5 176:15 177:5
191:21 196:10 197:4,8
203:11,17,23 204:22
206:12,18 207:9,24
208:2,10,18 210:15

introduce (2) 68:6 150:11

introduced (2) 136:6 139:24

introduction (2) 102:14
105:21

introductory (1) 6:13

investigate (5) 21:16 29:3
81:1 154:11 208:21

investigated (2) 49:5 125:20

investigating (17) 2:11 7:22
8:7 10:10,15,23 13:6,7,16
14:9 15:6,7 17:20 25:21

77:7 100:24 103:25

investigation (196) 2:12
3:4,5,6 5:11,13,24 6:9 8:20
9:1 10:1 12:2,5 14:14,20
15:18,24 17:24 182:4
19:2,12,21 20:6,7 21:14,19
23:21 25:4 26:9
27:5,13,14,19,20,21,29-13
32:12,15,20 33:6,10,12
34:13,17,19,24,25
35:2,12,20,34
37:18,20,23 38:2,6,8,20,25
39:19,22 41:24 44:6 47:4,8
49:6,15,25 50:20,22,23
51:5,15 52:1,7 53:4 54:8
55:8,10,12 56:15,24 58:6
59:9 60:19 61:13 62:8,19
63:13,25 64:17 67:23 68:8
69:12 71:1 79:7 80:15
85:22,24 91:22,25 92:4,18
93:7 94:23 97:6 98:4,14,23
99:6,13 102:8 107:1,6,9,11
109:11,16 111:12
125:15,22 127:5 128:1,5
135:20 136:7,23 137:9,19
138:11,15,22 140:24
141:15 142:20,24 143:1,24
144:10 149:8 152:9
154:8,21 155:8,15,17
156:9 160:1 165:20 166:20
167:21 168:18 169:19,20
172:19 173:1,8,10 174:8
175:4,24 176:16
179:5,9,16,23 180:15
181:2 183:23 186:13,25
187:18 188:19,19 189:13
190:16 191:12 193:15
196:10 197:4 198:15
200:13,15 201:6,19
202:5,9,13,23 203:19
204:22 206:13 208:23
209:11 211:16

investigations (12) 10:12
12:4,22 13:1,5,8,12 14:15
26:8 39:4 160:3 203:9

investigative (11) 8:11 17:12
23:8 88:18 90:2,20,21
91:23 93:10,25 153:1

investigator (1) 31:19

investigators (1) 47:9

invite (2) 156:2 185:21

invited (1) 111:12

inviting (1) 133:18

involve (7) 12:19 14:7 41:3
65:1 68:3 131:6 133:9

involved (18) 10:12 11:14
19:6 30:10 44:12 55:13
85:25 102:7 109:11 130:25
131:2 143:19 145:21
146:11 150:16 186:5 188:8
200:7

involvement (5) 44:11 48:22
85:21 142:21 150:23

involving (1) 146:15

ireland (2) 11:10,13

irritating (1) 17:5

isis (2) 45:5,6

islamic (1) 122:12

ismail (11) 58:8,12,21,23
95:7 189:6 201:22
202:7,13,19,20
isnt (7) 33:11 120:24 121:13
123:7,11 124:23 165:2

issued (1) 66:13

issues (7) 2:17,21,22 3:1
11:4 27:23 131:4

istanbul (1) 58:14

itd (1) 74:18

item (13) 76:18,21 107:19
108:21 109:21 111:5
113:23,25 116:1,4 117:3
176:9 191:19

items (60) 59:24 82:4 83:19
84:25 86:16,17 101:17
106:25
107:3,7,11,14,16,24

109:1,5,9,11 110:3,21
111:7,9 128:3,15 155:17
156:17 169:2,5,8,13,23
171:5,9,23 172:1,9,13,22
175:22 176:5 180:12,14
181:23,24 188:1,3 191:6
193:10 199:15 208:7
209:10,23
210:1,10,14,19,20,21,25
211:16

iterations (1) 25:19

itll (2) 110:7 157:21

its (111) 5:14 8:15,17 9:3
22:4 23:8,18 26:7,11,11
32:14 35:6 36:9,23 38:5,17
39:5,23 42:6 43:18 44:5
49:21 54:16 55:3,7 58:18
59:21,22 60:10 62:1,10
64:3,12 66:5 67:8,21 75:24
82:3,15 83:21 84:24 85:22
91:23 97:14,24 98:10
101:1 104:17 105:6,7,13
108:14 109:23 111:24
112:19 117:14,21 120:24
121:13 122:15
123:2,5,5,6,8,11,18 124:24
125:8,23 126:7 128:12
129:15 130:8,25 131:14
132:25 134:21 137:5,13
140:20 146:7 148:20
149:2,19,20 156:16
159:2,22 161:24
162:2,14,18,22 171:22
172:20 173:19 175:15
177:16,17 184:25
190:12,20 191:12,13
193:21 201:13 209:15
211:19 212:23

itself (22) 55:12 69:4 71:5,19
73:2 74:19 77:2 83:16
92:18 108:5 113:17 117:4
128:18 127:12 138:25
139:8 172:15 191:2
199:12,14 205:19 210:11

ive (10) 33:18 39:8 76:8
78:17 90:4 91:22 112:22
124:2 155:6 184:23

J

jacket (1) 108:7

jackson (6) 9:4 16:3 17:15
18:13,24 20:13

james (1) 57:11

jamieson (6) 131:20,22,23
132:6 133:4 214:15

january (15) 47:6 135:9
141:16 142:10,11 186:3
198:7,10 201:3 205:14
206:1,8 207:2,10 209:6

jeana (1) 152:15

jeremy (1) 6:22

jigsaw (1) 4:7

jobs (2) 10:23 173:19

job (1) 121:1

john (120) 1:11,18 6:16 8:2
16:19,23 17:4 24:1,8,20
25:2 31:17,24 32:6 35

205:22 206:5,11
212:1,7,14,18,22 213:3
join (2) 10:6 170:9
joining (2) 86:3 119:18
joins (1) 163:6
joint (3) 63:11,12 164:16
journey (16) 59:21 75:19
77:10 156:7 157:13
160:7,11,12,13,14,17
161:9 162:15,15 166:7,14
journeys (3) 158:3 160:9,24
judge (1) 63:8
judgement (1) 82:10
judicial (1) 30:18
july (2) 14:3 42:18
junction (1) 61:21
june (12) 14:17 25:6 32:11
33:3,20 35:5,7,10 89:17
94:19 95:17 189:1
jurisdiction (3) 147:1 148:2,3
jury (6) 19:25 135:9,10
153:3 156:4 193:24
justified (1) 8:23
justin (1) 7:9

K

kangol (11) 167:10
172:1,7,17,18 173:1,9,18
174:21 191:21 192:20
karrimor (3) 168:25
172:11,24
keep (5) 17:6 24:5 125:4
154:12 205:7
keighron (2) 57:11,11
kent (1) 101:5
key (11) 23:23,23 49:13,21
52:1 54:8 83:5 85:24 86:17
171:9 182:3
keys (3) 180:8 181:16 184:17
kill (2) 119:14 185:11
killed (2) 40:5,23
killers (1) 49:16
killings (1) 22:3
kilograms (3) 110:24 111:2
119:4
kingdom (4) 11:8 42:18,21
61:2
kirsten (1) 100:23
kit (5) 114:21 115:2,3,5,9
kitchen (1) 139:21
knew (4) 70:13 141:8 164:8
181:9
know (52) 9:23 40:3 46:14
53:11 55:4,20,21 59:18
61:8,23,23,23 63:13,20
76:15 78:3 88:20 91:7,14
92:10 96:3 104:25 113:14
122:14 123:17 127:11
128:2,23 131:14 148:3
152:24 155:20 165:9
166:24,25 177:22,23
184:16,18 185:1,3 188:4
195:25 197:22 202:14,16
206:16 207:12,13,13,14
212:7
knowing (3) 46:18 48:22
140:1
knowledge (3) 131:16
146:22 151:17
known (17) 12:9 13:2 18:17
27:7 32:4 50:4 56:19 73:23
88:17 94:10 122:3,5
140:7,7 145:13 197:10
209:15
knows (2) 2:19 15:16
koran (1) 44:25

L

la (66) 5:15,22 6:10 46:12
67:2,16,19,20 82:23
83:3,14 84:10 85:7 86:2,24
98:13 100:11,15,17,21,22
105:16 116:18 117:23
118:18 119:16,21 121:12
131:20 132:23 133:15

134:18,19 154:1 158:25
162:7,24 164:19 166:6
168:16 174:7,21,25 176:25
178:4,12 179:2 185:14
193:20 194:16 195:3,14,24
196:8 198:1 200:15 203:9
204:15 206:1,8,12 212:19
213:2 214:7,13,18
lab (1) 115:6
labels (3) 111:13 186:9,17
laboratory (7) 101:5 102:12
107:13 115:10 131:6
140:18,19
labs (1) 105:8
lack (3) 92:1 148:12 149:24
laid (1) 209:9
lamb (2) 37:24,25
landed (1) 199:23
large (19) 19:6,12 25:13
27:10 48:17 60:1,2,2 61:18
77:13 81:4 106:25 119:13
128:24,25 130:1 167:10
169:1 210:19
last (14) 1:12,21 25:5
34:6,14 35:9 74:24 76:19
94:10,18 113:12,25 151:25
152:4
lasted (1) 95:16
lasting (2) 63:2 139:18
lasts (1) 132:7
late (2) 1:6 179:9
later (18) 10:14 15:20 16:11
30:7 31:18 32:1 58:6 81:16
97:12 144:25 162:18
172:10 178:2,3 183:12
194:17 198:24 206:10
latter (1) 167:1
latterly (1) 10:11
launch (1) 4:16
lavatories (1) 63:16
lawful (1) 30:16
lawyer (1) 30:13
lawyers (5) 29:16
30:10,12,23 31:9
layer (1) 181:22
layout (1) 86:12
lead (14) 13:5,9,15,18 28:3
36:16 65:18 75:14 92:1
97:11 98:19 106:20 111:5
186:8
leadacid (1) 104:20
leaders (1) 35:25
leadership (1) 35:1
leading (5) 3:21 10:21 31:1
71:23 167:21
leads (1) 90:21
leadup (1) 2:7
leak (5) 91:16,16 92:8 93:5
192:24
learn (1) 140:4
learning (3) 14:24 26:7
121:19
least (13) 47:10 49:7 55:2
56:20 86:21 109:17
110:2,11 113:15 130:5
137:16 158:19 186:17
leave (13) 10:4 69:18 83:15
86:11 113:22,24 118:12
131:17 153:11 154:4 178:3
194:21 207:25
leaving (1) 203:6
led (6) 9:5 62:23 75:16 79:19
90:6 175:4
left (12) 11:7 74:13 75:17,23
79:17 88:10 135:17 142:10
155:1 166:21 173:15 176:1
lefthand (3) 158:1 171:17,19
legal (2) 46:9,11
legislation (4) 14:12 28:20
30:20 31:19
legitimate (2) 104:17 146:3
leisure (1) 180:18
lend (1) 181:11
length (3) 95:2 114:3,5
lengths (2) 154:10 174:7
less (8) 1:14 20:7 87:2

114:14 123:13 161:4,18
162:3
lesser (1) 148:17
lessons (1) 26:7
lest (1) 143:23
let (2) 182:19 193:4
lets (12) 10:4 33:19 61:7
66:9 81:1 138:17 139:17
141:23 171:25 176:19
201:25 203:21
letters (1) 210:20
level (16) 5:12 12:15 27:18
39:25 53:11 54:15 55:7
75:7 99:24 114:2 116:9,25
138:1,5 156:9 178:20
levels (6) 104:24,25 115:25
116:23 126:18 131:1
liaise (1) 71:7
liaised (1) 70:9
liaison (8) 21:11 30:1,4,8,10
31:15 36:25 37:2
liberally (1) 185:8
libya (31) 42:12,17,21 44:15
48:16 53:2 57:23
58:1,4,14,16 59:3,7 60:13
62:25 146:23 148:7 154:23
155:1 156:1,23 162:15
166:22 185:4,11 188:4
191:11 194:3 200:1 202:1
210:2
libyan (3) 62:21 175:17
179:14
lid (3) 109:17,20 191:2
life (1) 22:2
lift (3) 63:18 64:19 131:25
light (2) 129:1 167:19
lighter (1) 81:9
like (25) 9:7,11 14:11 115:25
28:12 32:20 53:25 76:9
81:11 82:15 85:17 91:7
94:21 105:9 108:21 112:15
113:3 122:17 155:9 159:8
164:14 169:13 193:21
205:22 212:3
liked (1) 194:18
likely (17) 43:6 56:6
64:12,12 76:4 113:17,22
123:18,19,20 127:7
132:16,25 161:18,19 162:3
186:14
limb (1) 120:19
limit (2) 34:22 117:15
limited (3) 3:22 68:16 104:7
limiting (1) 161:23
lindum (9) 52:24 53:8,13,15
149:6 154:15 157:8 181:7
182:2
line (12) 9:2 72:10 85:24
100:1 142:8,8
160:9,13,15,16 161:6
210:18
lines (6) 21:7 93:22 97:3
linger (1) 182:2
lining (1) 107:21
linked (3) 52:13 85:1 95:4
lions (2) 193:24 208:18
liquid (1) 155:12
list (3) 113:19 178:21,22
listed (3) 114:18,24 210:20
literally (5) 24:6 49:18 141:1
162:18 182:10
litre (1) 142:12
litres (13) 49:8,10 145:1
146:6 147:6,13,17
148:17,21 150:2,8 153:6,9
little (9) 14:18 20:15 61:10
97:14 131:25 133:22 157:4
176:20 185:2
live (3) 92:6 196:23 199:6
lives (1) 40:6
living (2) 194:10 202:1
loan (6) 204:18,25 206:2
207:1 208:1,13
loaned (1) 53:13
loans (4) 212:2,4,5,10

local (3) 203:13 204:10
207:7
locate (1) 95:3
located (1) 189:2
location (8) 16:14 17:12
61:24 84:14 124:10 146:24
148:5 187:16
locations (2) 114:19 136:17
log (8) 20:16 23:24 24:7,18
25:1 26:12,12 66:19
logged (2) 25:23 36:3
logging (3) 23:15,19 24:15
loggist (2) 24:7,20
loggers (1) 24:24
long (7) 10:6 49:1 64:4
94:21 105:7 113:13 114:1
longer (10) 5:6 7:13 34:9,17
67:12 86:12 173:19
176:5,9 193:21
longestablished (2) 25:17
49:1
longsleeved (1) 115:12
look (37) 20:15 24:18
29:1,21 30:14,21 43:17
47:19 54:13 55:16 72:4
76:24 82:15 121:13 127:23
136:5 139:2 141:13 146:14
150:22 157:4 164:3 168:19
169:12 171:6 176:19
191:14 192:10 196:16
198:13 199:14 203:21,22
208:21 209:7 210:18,23
looked (15) 30:13
55:15,19,24,25,25
56:2,15,16 64:6 76:9 81:11
137:25 141:24 211:24
looking (14) 57:3 72:12
94:24 106:7 114:11 115:25
135:13 154:5 179:10 190:8
196:8 201:10 204:9 209:17
looks (3) 122:17 205:22
212:3
loop (2) 163:6,13
loose (1) 126:19
lopez (22) 83:24,25
84:7,11,13 85:7,12 86:5,10
114:8 118:11,18 132:8
142:2 156:2,18 189:21
203:24 205:5 208:7 209:5
211:10
lorna (4) 100:20,23 134:23
214:12
lose (1) 1:15
lost (1) 202:21
lot (6) 34:2,2 81:12 188:24
211:22 212:10
lots (1) 109:13
loudly (1) 16:25
loved (1) 134:2
low (3) 116:20,23 119:4
lower (1) 105:15
lucky (1) 123:23
lunch (5) 100:13 115:17
133:19 134:7,15
lying (1) 76:23

M

macdonald (2) 175:2,4
machines (1) 185:7
main (5) 5:7 15:14 22:2 26:2
91:4
major (7) 10:21 11:23 12:21
14:9 25:14 32:20 39:8
majority (4) 59:25 181:19
205:10 208:13
makes (3) 64:17 160:18
185:18
making (10) 2:8 46:25 56:17
117:7 122:24 123:7,9
160:7 166:13 208:17
male (1) 159:15
mammoth (1) 19:21
man (4) 57:8 91:7 155:2
179:7
manage (3) 13:10 36:18 87:7

managed (4) 19:3 38:14
82:20 188:20
management (3) 34:8 68:21
70:13
manager (12) 9:2 23:7 66:16
67:23 69:6 71:3,10 75:1
80:9,16 86:18 133:22
managers (1) 69:14
managing (4) 25:15 71:5,6
74:15
manchester (29) 7:11,21
9:22 10:6 11:7,23 29:17
30:4,11 44:12 52:8 54:2
58:13,19 61:22 68:4 69:22
70:4 79:2 90:7 95:14
106:13 112:16,18 114:17
115:15 119:11 138:3 183:5
manner (1) 30:17
mantelina (15) 2:11
8:7,10,19 20:11 38:22
102:7 137:19 146:25
147:25 150:22,25 154:6
166:16 203:19
manufacture (15) 50:1 51:22
60:22 103:10,20,24 111:17
112:2,17 113:9 122:15
124:21 126:1 138:10
158:16
manufactured (10) 50:9 52:4
54:9 59:10 60:4 113:15
122:3 126:3 154:24 179:6
many (16) 9:23 15:6 61:23
101:13 107:3 108:25
111:19 118:24,25 119:14
120:2 172:22 174:14
196:13,20 211:21
march (20) 10:18 12:25 53:1
99:22 135:11 145:1,1
146:5,5 147:6,17 148:16
150:6 186:5 187:5,14
188:19 199:4 207:21
209:19
mark (2) 32:11 72:22
marked (8) 11:17 83:6 148:8
156:25 157:3 166:6 204:8
207:25
marker (1) 154:15
markings (1) 120:10
marks (1) 33:5
marshalling (1) 19:6
mars (1) 157:25
masts (3) 158:8,10 159:4
match (4) 88:8 89:9,15
120:14
matched (1) 78:15
material (24) 4:14,15 5:2,5
26:17,19,21,24,25 27:2
31:18 38:7 52:22 90:12
102:22 113:13 117:4 121:9
128:19 144:18 161:17
177:24 191:10 192:3
materially (2) 110:8 112:14
materials (11) 47:16 48:2
98:20 141:14,25 154:19
155:24 168:18,21 175:25
181:18
maths (1) 138:9
matter (9) 4:19 82:18 83:3
102:15 117:14 145:19
178:8 196:2 203:18
matters (10) 6:10,13 37:11
51:11 68:16 69:8 77:17
80:5 114:15 118:19
max (1) 31:19
maybe (1) 153:20
meadows (1) 36:17
mean (13) 46:11 55:24
102:21 103:10 105:5 115:1
119:5 125:9 187:23 189:16
192:15 198:3 203:2
meaning (4) 8:16 152:15,15
199:18
meaningful (1) 91:9
means (13) 8:19 20:25 22:17
27:10 39:3 47:14 114:14

152:16 178:4 183:16
193:16 211:23 212:1
meant (5) 84:22 123:12
174:22 187:2 212:8
measure (1) 124:1
measures (1) 124:6
mechanics (1) 151:11
mechanism (1) 120:14
media (4) 28:10 42:9 92:15
93:6
medical (4) 41:3 65:1 71:20
89:22
meeks (1) 18:11
meet (1) 17:15
meetings (1) 31:9
member (5) 41:10 45:5 46:9
68:17 102:4
members (8) 4:2,7 44:17
46:11 48:1 62:24 72:23
73:1
mention (3) 5:16 41:4 199:8
mentioned (11) 53:9 57:18
154:14 156:15 172:1 180:9
187:24 188:7,9 199:25
203:16
message (2) 187:8 203:6
messages (1) 97:7
metal (7) 77:13,14
110:24,25 115:12 192:8,11
method (6) 111:16 112:19
129:25 130:3,6 197:8
methodology (1) 131:9
methods (1) 123:20
mezzanine (3) 64:20
75:10,16
mg (2) 118:12,13
micra (54) 54:7,8,12,22
55:9,16,19 56:17,19
57:4,4,21
59:6,14,15,17,20,23
60:11,13,24 116:19 125:17
126:21,22,23
127:6,12,15,16,18
128:2,4,8 129:2,4 136:24
157:11,13 161:20 162:20
165:19 167:5 172:6 173:3
184:9,13,21 188:5
189:2,12 191:24 192:13
193:13
microchip (1) 84:20
microgram (1) 118:15
microscopic (1) 95:1
midnight (3) 16:17 17:10
70:7
might (35) 4:24 23:12 26:16
41:5 45:25 64:9,10 69:8
91:2 97:7,11 104:6 105:24
108:5 109:4 113:3,6,10
116:8 117:1,5 119:5
138:10 145:2 153:21 165:1
174:9,15,17 183:24 184:19
186:17 189:15 192:2 193:1
migrates (1) 25:13
militia (2) 45:11,13
milligram (1) 118:13
mind (22) 16:7 28:25 29:23
30:8,21 37:1 46:24 52:18
64:3 74:9 90:15 94:5 97:23
113:10 114:7 129:12 159:3
161:14 178:10,25 193:14
198:14
minimise (1) 74:20
minor (1) 126:11
minus (1) 116:14
minute (3) 1:12 84:19 209:8
minutebyminute (1) 24:12
minutes (16) 1:6 5:6 15:20
17:21 63:2,17,21 83:17
87:4 139:18 185:22
189:17,17 193:21 195:7,18
miscellaneous (1) 6:10
missed (2) 26:5,14
missing (2) 60:2 107:22
mistake (1) 211:10
misunderstood (1) 66:8
misuse (1) 105:25

mixture (3) 113:3 155:9
169:11
mobile (19) 84:24 95:23
96:4,8 98:3 159:4 176:23
177:5,10,13,15,16,19
183:4,7,9,11,14 187:8
mobilise (1) 16:12
mobilised (1) 15:23
model (1) 96:11
mohammed (3) 146:16,18,22
moment (18) 16:19 20:16
27:17,20 54:16 57:3 65:21
66:4 67:4 83:14 85:19
86:12 102:14 132:7 133:17
146:23 157:5 173:14
moments (1) 77:6
monday (2) 1:1 69:17
money (17) 109:12,13,17
151:13 184:7 185:5,7,10
198:13 199:11 200:1,7,22
204:6 207:11 211:22 212:6
moniker (1) 119:22
month (2) 198:24 207:20
months (4) 141:1 173:24
179:25 207:19
more (49) 4:17 9:9 10:12
17:4 20:16 25:9 29:10 34:2
35:1,3 39:13,15,16,18,20
45:9 60:9 61:10 76:5 80:5
85:7 91:9 99:10 115:16
118:12 128:22 132:7
138:22 145:2 148:4,20
149:4 157:4 161:18,19
176:8,20,21 180:18 184:3
194:25 195:1,19 204:22
205:2,18 207:7,19 208:20
moreover (5) 2:25 3:5 12:9
30:25 52:4
morning (14) 1:5 61:6 70:23
81:19 155:22 156:15
165:12 167:18 169:3 170:9
179:3 194:21 195:5 212:25
mornings (1) 1:15
mosque (2) 45:2,4
most (9) 9:15 10:10 18:24
31:13 47:25 123:19 127:7
206:17 211:1
mother (8) 44:16 169:10
201:16,25 202:6 203:10
204:11 205:11
mothers (3) 207:8 208:16
212:6
motivated (1) 99:14
move (14) 10:4 54:13 61:7
77:19 85:8,9 105:25
115:15 158:9,11 168:2
190:25 192:1 195:7
moved (11) 61:5 100:24
127:6,6 130:12,15 136:12
154:20 207:8 210:14 211:9
movement (3) 124:20,22
125:1
movements (5) 2:5 167:14
173:15 175:7,14
moves (1) 173:20
moving (8) 4:1 24:11 64:5
84:7 120:22 129:1,25
209:18
ms (9) 100:20 114:9 118:19
119:17 134:10 135:17,21
138:17 214:12
much (36) 4:13 7:3 9:22
10:9 12:14 17:9 24:22
34:25 37:4 39:3 55:2 59:20
83:2 86:10,13,24 91:4,7
93:1 116:15,16 118:11,18
119:16 120:2 122:25
131:18 146:5 184:2 193:20
203:24 205:8 207:2
212:7,22,23
muhammad (1) 140:3
mujahid (1) 140:1
murder (3) 25:16 43:1,3
murdered (1) 36:20
murders (3) 12:6,11 26:10
muslim (1) 44:23

must (7) 4:4 20:1 31:6 49:2
56:19 135:25 136:10
muwahhid (1) 140:3
myself (5) 9:11 56:10 69:6
70:14 102:12
mystery (1) 1:7

N

n (2) 105:14 214:1
nail (1) 49:21
nails (3) 51:19 191:4 209:20
name (12) 2:12 3:23 7:8
8:14 41:11 67:20 76:22
100:22 147:21 150:11
175:18 200:2
named (2) 5:21 181:19
namely (14) 12:16 25:4 36:5
47:11 49:14 51:19 68:12
95:17 99:24 149:24 181:13
182:5 192:5 200:1
names (1) 164:14
naming (1) 141:14
nanogram (3) 115:22
116:12,14
nanograms (4) 115:24
116:20 117:18 118:1
nassrat (3) 147:22,25 148:7
nassrats (3) 148:10,24 187:8
nathan (2) 57:8,14
national (4) 4:14,15 8:23
38:24
nationally (1) 14:16
nature (4) 25:10 43:6 108:12
114:1
natwest (1) 201:4
near (8) 40:16 61:24 65:13
70:18 76:19 163:6 175:1
176:3
nearly (1) 193:5
neat (1) 211:19
necessarily (5) 24:3 32:4
56:18 60:7 200:16
necessary (15) 4:6 6:22 11:3
19:9 20:7 28:23 34:15
35:13 38:17 67:8 75:24
79:17 125:13 132:18 144:7
necessity (1) 121:3
need (38) 4:3,9,19 5:4 6:25
13:11 24:12 28:25
37:18,19 41:6 46:25
54:18,25 60:9 67:12 71:7
77:18 84:1 103:21 117:20
120:12,17,19,21 130:16
134:24 152:3,24 156:19
171:6 188:15 201:15
204:23 205:7 209:7 210:17
213:1
needed (8) 18:9 55:20
120:16 121:15 141:10
176:5,10 187:2
needing (2) 34:9 209:8
needs (2) 34:23 120:13
negative (1) 170:20
neil (1) 119:22
neither (2) 53:10 187:23
network (3) 8:24 19:8,15
never (7) 44:19 139:6,9
155:17 174:6,18 186:24
news (1) 46:15
next (24) 30:6 39:21 64:24
67:2 87:17,21 89:4,4
104:11 143:11,16
144:16,25 146:5 148:16
159:2 162:17 173:24 181:6
187:5,18 191:14 194:20
200:5
ng (2) 115:21,22
nicola (1) 12:12
night (4) 9:6 17:25 79:4
185:11
nights (2) 18:4 194:5
nine (1) 171:19
nissan (17) 54:7 116:19
117:5 136:24 158:20
161:11,20 167:22 172:10

173:3 188:5,15,24 189:2
190:12 209:24 210:7
nobody (1) 187:24
nodding (1) 176:24
none (1) 164:13
nonetheless (2) 1:9 69:21
nonexhaustively (1) 168:25
nonexplosive (1) 121:7
nor (2) 45:6 127:4
north (1) 158:19
northern (2) 11:10,13
northwest (10) 8:23
13:1,2,14 14:18 18:16 19:3
68:1,25 70:21
nose (2) 105:6 174:18
note (4) 31:22 71:18 82:20
149:3
noted (1) 76:1
nothing (10) 8:19 17:4 26:13
34:21 49:14 93:5 108:7
120:15 178:18 182:11
notice (4) 73:20 76:2 81:7
82:15
notification (2) 87:6 119:17
notified (1) 69:24
notion (1) 154:7
november (1) 141:1
number (75) 2:14 3:8 13:18
18:1,22 19:14 20:19 22:20
27:6 32:20 39:5 49:18
50:12,18 52:7 53:6 55:13
56:16 58:9 59:24
62:20,21,24 64:7 68:16
69:25 94:6 96:9,14,16,21
98:5,9 106:16,25 107:8
110:14 114:4,18,21
115:7,17,23 116:6 117:24
123:14 128:18 129:24
131:4 136:2 144:6 152:25
155:11 156:13 157:5,16
158:3 168:21 169:1,23
170:1 171:15,23 175:22
181:6 184:1 185:15
190:2,24 191:6 198:4
204:8 209:20 210:19,20
numbers (7) 19:7
96:17,18,19,20 117:1,2
nuts (3) 51:19 110:24,25

O

obedient (1) 139:25
object (1) 190:22
objective (3) 22:14,23 23:8
objectives (5) 20:8,10,18
22:12 93:10
obliquely (2) 129:23 130:7
obscured (1) 129:2
observation (1) 64:15
observations (1) 106:17
obtain (5) 51:14 96:4,21
150:8 188:15
obtained (15) 47:5 49:24
89:6,6 94:12 95:13 147:7
150:3 153:6 154:1 167:10
186:16 188:5 198:3 212:11
obvious (5) 1:5 4:12 80:7
98:15 192:22
obviously (17) 6:18,25 24:10
30:15 37:13 51:6 61:25
62:2,4 67:11 78:18 97:5
107:23 156:4 166:12
190:24 191:22
occasion (5) 89:7 146:6
147:9 167:9 176:22
occasionally (2) 17:1 195:20
occasions (6) 50:12 53:6
54:20 56:16 114:18 115:18
occupants (1) 186:9
occupied (1) 196:3
occupier (1) 53:1
occurred (4) 66:1 74:6 80:2
90:2
occurring (1) 24:16
oclock (3) 61:16 81:18
164:20

october (5) 46:7,16 203:25
204:17,19
odontology (1) 90:16
odour (11) 105:3,5,18,19
112:22
113:3,6,11,12,16,18
offcuts (1) 110:8
offence (1) 33:14
offences (6) 15:7,8
50:19,20,21 56:25
offenders (1) 21:2
offenders (3) 20:23 22:15
93:17
offending (1) 50:24
offer (1) 132:15
office (7) 25:13 40:18 42:15
75:18 76:1,19 106:12
officer (17) 2:11 7:11,19,22
8:7 10:15 14:9 15:4 17:20
25:21 37:22 77:7
101:4,6,7,12 103:25
officers (28) 9:24 12:21
13:7,7,10,16 18:12,15
19:7,13,14 21:11 25:22,25
36:25 37:2,6,7
38:10,10,23,24 39:5,10
75:5 82:13 100:25 196:5
officially (1) 90:8
oil (7) 85:20,23 141:17
170:1,2 171:13,23
okay (12) 118:14 124:14
127:25 128:23 129:15
131:17 134:8 162:23
174:13,20 178:23 193:3
older (2) 58:7 95:7
omission (1) 168:15
oncall (1) 70:22
once (14) 34:6,13 43:9 50:9
54:9 87:8 96:13 148:3
166:20 173:18 175:6 191:9
198:2 206:15
ones (2) 120:4 134:2
oneway (1) 58:18
ongoing (5) 21:18 23:21
27:14 28:22 33:17
online (3) 142:15 147:18
199:15
open (5) 74:9 98:22 126:18
198:25 199:4
opened (5) 55:25 135:9
139:23 167:12 196:20
opening (2) 2:8 139:24
openly (1) 5:1
opens (1) 207:21
operate (2) 8:22 34:10
operating (1) 87:2
operation (25) 2:11
8:7,10,10,14,16,19 9:5
12:9 18:7 20:11 23:9,22
27:16 34:18 38:22 92:6
102:7 137:19 146:25
147:25 150:22,25 154:6
166:16
operational (4) 161:15
162:12 163:3 184:20
operationally (2) 4:13 11:17
operations (4) 11:14
13:19,22,23
opinion (11) 77:3 112:1,11
119:9,12 121:22 122:1
132:15,19,21 133:2
opportunities (2) 26:4 90:21
opportunity (1) 129:6
opposed (3) 21:15 108:2
117:3
oral (2) 2:24 168:11
orange (3) 160:9 205:2
208:10
order (31) 3:13,14,14,17
4:25 5:4 6:21,23 7:25
15:24 23:10 29:18 30:17
35:12 41:21 47:16 48:16
79:6 80:6 87:20 89:18 91:9
117:20 123:15 145:10
153:1 156:10 162:2 180:4
199:15,18

ordered (4) 143:17
149:2,19,20
orders (2) 3:9,11
organisation (1) 14:12
origin (2) 120:11 207:11
others (14) 23:13 29:21
32:25 33:3 36:3 40:7 43:3
46:15 50:13 70:20 104:15
109:16 110:7 113:4
otherwise (5) 149:18 156:18
182:11 194:2 199:10
ought (4) 7:24 11:16 26:5
93:4
ours (1) 161:25
ourselves (1) 162:14
outer (8) 72:5,7,10,14,22,22
73:1,2
outrage (2) 23:3 24:10
outside (10) 6:19 61:16 81:8
112:5 115:15 121:5 126:24
127:3 159:7 160:6
outstanding (1) 22:1
over (29) 14:19 19:7 24:18
34:14 39:11 44:4,5 45:9
75:1 76:8 79:5 84:6 101:15
116:19 175:7 193:21
201:21 205:5 206:3,25
207:8,19,23 208:10 209:18
210:4,17 211:4,8
overall (1) 71:4
overcome (2) 1:13,20
overnight (1) 208:20
overpaid (1) 199:19
overrun (1) 189:16
oversee (1) 19:18
oversight (1) 30:18
overspeaking (1) 154:3
overt (1) 26:16
overwhelming (1) 193:12
own (6) 10:5 64:12 74:6
129:12 140:6 143:20
owner (3) 182:21 183:16,19

P

packs (1) 191:4
pages (1) 2:16
paid (4) 169:8 179:25 191:13
208:9
painstakingly (1) 94:23
pair (1) 47:9
pale (1) 171:12
pane (4) 82:6,8 163:19
171:16
panel (6) 81:23,25 82:3
133:23 134:1,4
panels (5) 81:4,9,12 82:14,15
paper (4) 170:11,19 171:20
212:15
paraded (1) 70:13
paragraph (15) 3:17 15:14
34:12 36:8 38:21 44:10,22
61:12 65:24 90:7 91:8
97:15 106:8 154:20 183:4
paragraphs (5) 2:1 11:1
43:17 135:4 196:8
parallel (2) 55:9 66:5
pardon (1) 200:15
parents (4) 57:22 58:16,24
59:2
paris (1) 21:21
park (7) 54:7 55:11 59:22
60:11 165:13 184:2 198:22
parked (9) 55:11 56:7 59:22
60:12 157:11 165:2,11
166:24 188:25
parking (8) 54:5 183:20,24
184:4,8,11 185:14,19
parks (1) 4:24
part (54)
5:11,14,14,22,23,24
6:1,2,4,5,8 15:10 33:13
36:12 37:10 39:21 41:6
43:10 45:20 46:4,17,18
51:1 52:1 54:19 63:11,12
80:15 98:14 99:9,12
100:11,24 107:1 110:15

134:20 137:19 163:11
166:17 168:1 169:12 171:8
176:7,19 178:1,7 179:20
185:20 189:20 190:13
193:22 200:6 205:23
206:22
partially (1) 66:13
participant (4) 80:11 114:10
171:8 180:19
participants (5) 1:10 46:14
87:1 173:6 211:15
particular (35) 3:15 8:14
13:4 16:7,14 22:6 25:25
26:9 27:7 37:22 38:12 47:8
49:10 51:2 54:21 56:8,14
76:18 81:10 92:6 101:16
111:15 112:10,12
120:13,15 122:22 157:19
158:7 160:17 164:8
169:14,14 190:10,17
169:14,15 116:14 15:15
16:24 37:3 38:2 54:12
120:20 137:13 161:5
partly (1) 182:25
parts (16) 5:9,10,17,18 29:1
40:2 51:17 60:24 70:20
84:2 100:12 110:12 135:14
137:6 141:10 170:1
pass (1) 84:6
passed (2) 117:11 188:22
passport (4) 175:16,17,17,20
passports (3) 175:25 176:2,6
past (2) 72:10 75:14
path (7) 74:18,18,23,25
75:2,6 76:17
pattern (2) 200:17 201:14
pause (13) 32:16 33:6,11
65:21 83:23 84:13 85:19
87:14 100:16 110:23
133:20 150:2 156:19
paused (1) 57:3
payment (3) 205:3 206:2
207:1
payments (4) 204:9 205:12
206:17 207:7
pc (1) 210:20
peace (1) 140:2
pensions (1) 203:19
penultimate (4) 82:18
143:19 146:14 147:21
people (36) 1:16 6:18 7:1
9:16,18 28:15 33:20 34:3
40:5 43:1 44:21
55:3,13,14,15 61:23 74:21
81:25 82:3 83:15,17 91:1
104:8 110:23 117:6 119:14
126:23 144:6 145:21 147:9
158:9 164:11 174:4 181:10
186:19 211:22
peoples (1) 82:10
percentage (1) 116:13
perfectly (4) 4:12 129:13
184:24 197:19
perhaps (26) 13:25 25:9
54:16 106:3,8 107:16
118:8 138:1 145:19 154:22
156:16 163:13 164:25
170:6 173:7,9 174:25
176:8,13 180:18 182:1
188:9 191:2 192:9 198:20
209:7
perimeter (1) 72:23
period (19) 11:7,13 27:25
63:23 64:11 94:21 95:17
133:18 147:12 167:15
194:6 195:6 196:15,23
201:1,2,3 203:4 209:3,6
periods (1) 11:11
permission (2) 140:4 165:10
permits (1) 157:18
peroxide (23) 47:11 49:10
103:21 104:11,21 120:22
121:4 122:6,7,7 140:7
147:15,18 148:18 149:15
150:4,8 151:4 152:5
153:7,16 187:12,16

perpetrated (1) 151:9
perpetrator (7) 66:24 73:24
74:9 77:8,22 78:25 88:16
person (25) 3:22 41:8
56:16,19 70:22 78:25
88:2,8 103:11 107:4
108:13,18 116:4
145:6,9,14 146:11 147:21
155:1 164:23 165:7 170:6
181:13,15 200:2
personal (3) 69:6 188:3
212:5
personally (3) 13:18 23:8
174:1
persons (2) 6:2 95:7
perspective (5) 91:23 101:2
148:14 203:20 212:5
pertaining (1) 195:5
petrol (4) 113:3,8,18 155:9
phase (6) 2:23 6:7 32:12,23
33:5 173:12
phases (2) 27:21 32:21
philp (10) 100:20,23 114:9
118:19 119:17 134:10,23
135:17 138:17 214:12
philps (1) 135:21
phone (18) 84:24 96:7,11,25
97:20,24,24 158:6,7
163:25 164:8 166:13
177:5,10,15,16,19,20
phones (11) 28:12 163:23
164:4,5,13,15 176:23
177:13,23,25 183:4
photograph (2) 78:15 87:22
photographed (1) 94:1
photographic (1) 65:6
photographs (4) 78:8,19
83:19 129:6
phrase (1) 102:20
phrased (1) 65:22
phrases (1) 17:6
pick (1) 156:16
picked (1) 125:19
pickering (3) 18:1 34:16
35:14
piece (11) 25:14 85:20
112:23 137:14,16 155:23
164:2 170:11,19 171:20
198:18
pieces (2) 77:11,13
pilsworth (1) 173:23
pinkish (1) 204:8
pipá (1) 12:16
place (20) 1:14 3:25 15:23
27:11 28:22 43:12 64:5
71:14 78:18 116:25 119:11
126:1 130:22 135:22 157:5
162:16 178:24 179:5
181:22 182:14
placed (4) 34:22 53:20
132:24 179:10
places (2) 84:1 100:14
plain (1) 82:4
plainly (3) 80:8 129:5 199:15
plan (5) 153:22 163:11
166:18 184:9 194:23
planning (9) 1:23 2:3 4:2,2
45:20 46:4,18 168:3
172:13 211:17
plastic (1) 128:18
plate (2) 81:4 157:16
platform (5) 63:22 64:2,16
87:2 148:15
play (3) 83:25 85:11 132:6
played (10) 33:13 45:19
46:4,17 83:11 84:12
132:10 156:20 189:23
190:8
playing (9) 84:18
85:14,16,18 86:6 156:16
190:15 191:18 192:7
plays (1) 200:6
pleaded (3) 151:23 153:12
154:2
please (40) 7:4,7 10:5 23:17
67:17,20 69:3 76:21 83:24

84:10,13 85:7,13 86:5 87:5
91:20 100:14,19,22 105:25
114:7 118:19 131:12,24
132:8 133:8 135:17 139:17
142:1,2 152:16 156:2
181:8 189:21 205:5 206:25
208:6 209:5 210:4 211:4
pleased (1) 212:19
plenty (1) 120:25
plot (7) 63:11,12 168:23
185:23 190:10 198:2
209:11
plus (1) 2:16
pm (5) 134:14,16 195:21,23
213:4
pocket (2) 107:20,21
poer (66) 5:15,22 6:10 46:12
67:2,16,19,20 82:23
83:3,14 84:10 85:7 86:2,24
98:13 100:11,15,17,21,22
105:16 116:18 117:23
118:18 119:16,21 121:12
131:20 132:23 133:15
134:18 139:15 154:1 158:25
162:7,24 164:19 166:6
168:16 174:7,21,25 176:25
178:4,12 179:2 185:14
193:20 194:16 195:3,14,24
196:8 198:1 200:15 203:9
204:15 206:1,8,12 212:19
213:2 214:7,13,18
points (10) 51:2 73:4 112:5
134:25 137:23 157:12
160:17,18 166:8,14
poisoning (1) 12:6
police (30) 7:11,18,22 9:5
10:6,10 11:8,9,23 14:18
15:21 26:8 37:6,7 38:23,23
39:7 68:4,21 79:2 90:7
94:9 109:22 144:14 161:19
165:2 177:18,18 191:20
197:16
policies (1) 70:5
policies (1) 23:23
policing (5) 8:23 19:15 23:21
67:25 68:25
policy (4) 24:2,5 36:5,7
polish (1) 49:21
political (1) 91:15
poorly (1) 65:22
portable (1) 115:3
pose (1) 4:21
posed (1) 23:12
position (12) 7:17,22 11:21
43:25 57:20 58:18,24 64:6
92:13 101:8,11 126:6
positioning (1) 158:5
positions (1) 87:9
positive (8) 79:19 80:1 88:7
113:20 115:11,18 136:14
141:4
possession (1) 155:4
possibility (2) 130:14 194:14
possible (18) 21:22 22:7
65:15 66:5,24 74:21 83:22
96:3 108:16,20,23 114:2
118:21 119:15 125:23
158:9 186:14 209:14
possibly (3) 128:7 173:14
186:17
post (1) 179:13
postattack (1) 17:16
postblast (1) 14:19
postdetonation (1) 87:24
postmortem (2) 89:5,19
potential (9) 29:19 64:7
91:16 104:17 110:2 123:8
125:1 139:1 191:7
potentially (4) 86:7 90:20
103:11 106:24
pounds (1) 205:23
power (2) 120:13,17
powering (1) 48:17
ppe (4) 72:20 81:20 82:1,5
practice (2) 35:20 45:5
practising (1) 44:23

<p>praise (1) 139:25 pray (1) 44:25 prayers (1) 9:21 prearranged (1) 163:11 precautions (1) 124:22 precise (2) 66:6 154:2 precisely (5) 89:23 139:12 155:18 166:10 198:15 precursor (14) 47:5 98:20 121:25 141:13,21,25 142:6 144:18 168:7 181:18 192:5 198:3 209:4,18 precursors (1) 157:5 prefer (1) 93:2 prefiguring (1) 80:22 preliminary (3) 77:25 106:4,16 premises (17) 28:6 55:22 60:11,22 94:16,18 135:25 136:3,8,11,13 169:14 178:14 181:4,12 182:19,21 preparation (11) 1:23 2:3 28:18 42:2 44:13 45:20 46:5,18 168:3 172:14 211:18 preparatory (2) 132:17 201:13 prepare (1) 3:1 prepared (9) 43:15,17,21,24 106:4 110:23 156:4 190:7 211:16 prepared (1) 43:16 presence (1) 94:25 present (11) 20:23 22:15 57:10 74:2 113:15 117:19 118:6 126:4,21 154:10 160:2 presented (1) 114:12 preserve (2) 40:13 95:19 preserved (1) 94:1 press (2) 3:16 90:9 pressed (1) 99:6 presumably (3) 92:4 159:19 161:11 pretty (1) 197:23 prevent (2) 21:15 44:17 preventability (1) 2:20 prevented (1) 3:11 preventing (1) 22:3 previous (4) 140:18 146:6 149:3,5 previously (5) 83:12 110:17 121:18 148:22 207:2 price (4) 142:14 146:7 147:18 209:14 primary (6) 102:18,20,25 103:1,7,14 principal (9) 15:11 21:2,13 91:12 101:4,7,12 103:19 202:5 principally (5) 30:12 70:9 143:5 156:8 212:1 principles (1) 49:2 prior (2) 83:25 130:17 priorities (1) 72:18 priority (3) 74:1,3 85:2 prison (1) 46:8 private (1) 165:12 privileged (1) 31:6 proactive (1) 21:14 proactivity (1) 34:18 probably (14) 25:18 35:2 45:9 50:17 65:22 66:6 137:12 161:13 162:1 165:14 176:6 185:13 193:21 203:4 problems (2) 1:12,19 procedure (1) 133:7 procedures (1) 197:9 proceed (2) 194:17 212:21 proceedings (7) 1:3 3:14 4:5 39:2 40:6 41:7 42:20 process (47) 7:19,25 22:25 23:2,18 24:24 29:18 31:14 33:17 37:3,4,5,14,21 38:3,14 43:23 63:7 65:3</p>	<p>79:19 80:11 114:14 115:10 122:23,25 123:2,2,4,5,7,13,16 124:17 125:12 130:17,22,25 131:5 137:11,13 140:20 152:12 153:5 172:23 175:6 179:20 procurement (2) 141:11,12 produce (2) 26:1 115:5 produced (6) 31:25 39:19 95:22 112:15,20 122:14 produces (1) 102:23 producing (1) 20:3 product (4) 19:24 20:1 75:21 121:4 production (2) 138:25 139:1 professional (1) 10:5 profiling (1) 41:17 programme (1) 10:16 progressed (1) 41:24 prohibited (1) 145:15 prohibits (1) 3:18 prois (1) 45:19 promised (1) 27:17 promoted (1) 10:19 proper (2) 178:20,24 properly (2) 5:1 50:23 properties (1) 171:25 property (13) 43:7 112:25 126:4 155:2,8,11,14 169:20 179:6 180:3 182:12,19 183:17 prophet (1) 140:2 proportionate (1) 30:17 proposed (1) 60:3 proposing (1) 176:25 proposition (1) 140:22 prosecute (2) 29:4 38:4 prosecuted (4) 29:6,22 51:15 151:20 prosecution (23) 26:20 29:7,8,10,14 30:2,5,23 31:5 38:13,15 42:23 46:21,22,22 48:21,25 51:8,11 56:25 57:2 60:3 114:16 prosecutions (2) 50:19 160:4 prosecutors (1) 51:9 protection (1) 22:2 protective (1) 72:21 prove (2) 139:6 158:3 proved (5) 52:23 54:3 66:7 88:7 139:9 proven (2) 152:24 164:5 proves (1) 4:6 provide (11) 12:20 30:17 68:24 69:2 90:20 96:8 105:24 142:23 158:5 168:5 171:9 provided (6) 8:11 44:8 69:11 97:2 107:15 151:2 provides (2) 69:5 109:24 providing (1) 69:4 provision (2) 28:14 32:3 provisions (1) 28:14 proximity (4) 96:1 158:13 159:5 164:20 public (16) 7:25 20:20 31:8,25 34:19 72:23 73:2 84:5 90:22 91:1,5,10,15 93:19 104:22 173:6 publicised (1) 3:12 publicly (4) 4:15 83:12 90:17 209:16 published (1) 112:6 pulled (1) 107:10 pun (1) 174:22 pungent (1) 105:5 purchase (20) 47:11,16 51:21 57:18 58:12 142:11,16 143:2,9,12 144:12,17 147:10 148:8 150:12 172:11 183:7 209:4 210:6 211:11 purchased (12) 48:1 49:7 57:5 58:9 105:1 109:22 151:7 191:20 209:10,20</p>	<p>210:1,5 purchases (13) 2:4 5 48:14 51:16 144:9 149:10 151:4 152:4,8 172:6 191:9 211:1,5 purchasing (3) 98:19 210:10,25 pure (1) 62:10 purpose (8) 71:20 74:5 78:9 91:12 109:23 146:3 184:8 194:12 purposes (4) 36:10 88:18 90:2 145:19 purse (1) 21:7 pursued (1) 50:23 pursuing (1) 93:21 pursuit (2) 168:22 209:11 putting (4) 18:24 32:13 33:7 84:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <p>q (884) 7:10,13,17,21,24 8:10,14,17,19,22 9:1,5,22 10:1,4,9,13,18,21,23,25 11:7,11,13,16,22 12:1,4,9,14,18,25 13:4,13,18,22,25 14:3,6,17,22 15:2,6,10,22 16:1,7,12,14,17 17:15,17,21,24 18:5,8,12,14,19,22,24 19:2,9,13,17,20,24 20:6,10,13,15,18,23 21:2,4,7,10,13 22:4,6,11,14,20,23 23:2,5,8,15 24:15 25:9,17,21,25 26:4,7,15,20,24 27:5,9,17 28:3,6,9,12,14,20,25 29:6,10,13,21 30:1,8,10,21,25 31:3,12 32:11,18,23 33:3,18 34:1,5,11,21 35:17,20 36:2,7,15,18,22 37:1,6,8,10,13,22,25 38:6,14,17 39:2,10,13,15,18,21 40:9,12,15,18,20 41:3,13,17,20,24 42:4,8,11,14,17,20,23 43:1,3,5,9,12,14,17 44:5,10 45:25 46:7,11,14,21,25 47:4,8,14,19,25 48:4,7,10,16,20,24 49:6,10,13,20,23 50:4,6,9,12,17 51:1,13,19,21,24 52:1,7,10,13,16,18,23 53:1,4,9,15,20,25 54:15,25 56:14 57:1,8,10,13,16,18,25 58:3,6,12,18 59:2,6,9,12,14 60:8,16,19 61:1,5,7,23 62:4,8,13,19,23 63:2,11,13,20,25 64:7,15 65:6,8,10,12,15,21 66:3,9,16,18,23 67:22,25 68:3,6,10,12,16,20,24 69:2,10,14,16,19,21,24 70:2,4,7,9,15,17,20,23,25 71:10,16,23 72:1,3,12,22 73:8,12,14,20,23 74:1,5,8,12,15,24 75:3,9,19,24 76:4,12,15,17,21 77:6,10,13,16,24 78:3,7,11,13,18,21,24 79:2,6,9,16,19,25 80:5,11,13,18,21 81:1,5,14,17,24 82:3,8,18 83:10 84:17 86:10,21 88:4,6,11,14,19,25 89:4,9,12,15,17,22 90:1,7,12,15,25</p>	<p>91:8,12,14,19 92:17,20,23 93:4,9,13,15,17,21,24 94:3,5,9,12,15,18,21 95:3,6,10,13,16,19,22 96:1,3,8,11,13,21,24 97:2,5,9,14,19 98:1,8,13,19,22,25 99:3,9,16,18,20,22,24 100:1,5,24 101:8,11,13,16,20,23,25 102:2,4,7,10,14,19 103:6,9,16,19,23,25 104:4,6,11,15,21,24 105:3,21 106:7,16,23 107:3,14,19,23 108:4,9,19,25 109:9,15,23 110:2,7,11,16,21 111:2,5,9,15,19,23 112:5,13,19,22 113:10,14,19 114:2,7,14,25 115:3,11,15,20,23 116:6,11,24 117:5 118:8,11,24 119:3,8 120:12,19,22 121:3,6,8,18,24 122:9,16 123:4,10,17 125:2,6,11,15,25 126:6,10,13,20 127:5,10 128:23 129:8,22 130:4,11,15,20,24 131:7 132:4,20 135:13,21 136:2,5,14,17,21 137:2,4,9,19,25 138:5,8,14,17,21,24 139:9,15,21,23 140:10,13,16,21 141:3,7,13,20,23 142:8,14,18,20,23 143:1,5,8,11,15,19,23 144:4,10,16,20,23,25 145:6,9,13,17,21,24 146:1,5,10,14,18,21,24 147:3,6,9,12,17,21,25 148:5,8,16,20,24 149:2,8,11,14,18,22,24 150:2,6,11,15,19,22,25 151:11,13,15,17,20,23,25 152:3,16,18,21,25 153:5,9 154:12,18 155:1,6,11,14,17,21 156:7,13,25 157:3,8,12,15,18,21,25 158:8,14,18 159:7,10,15 160:1,13,19 161:2,6,8,11 162:10,14 163:2,8,11,13,16 164:25 165:5,12,18,22 166:10,15,20 167:1,5,7,9,14,18,21,25 168:9,17,25 169:5,8,12,19,23 170:1,5,9,15,18,21,24 171:1,3,12,15,23 172:5,9,13,17,19,24 173:16 175:4,9,12,17,20,22,24 176:11,13,19 178:7 179:9,13,16,20,23 180:2,10,24 181:2,6,13,18,22 182:1,8,12,18,21,23,25 183:2,9,13,16,19,23 185:20,25 186:2,5,8,12,19,22,24 187:2,5,8,11,16,18,21,23 188:1,4,7,13,18,24 189:4,6,10,12,15 190:2,7,12,16,20 191:2,6,14,19 192:3,5,17,19 193:1,4,8,14,18 196:13,16,20,23 197:1,4,8,12 198:7,10,13,20,22 199:2,4,6,8,14,18,21,25</p>	<p>200:5,10,18,20,23 201:1,4,6,10,15,19,25 202:3,5,9,13,16,19,23 203:13,16,21 204:3,8,13,21 205:2,5,10,14,18 206:17,25 207:7,15,23 208:5,13,16,20 209:1,14,23 210:1,4,9,13,17,23 211:4,8,14,21 qr (2) 96:7,8 qualification (1) 68:12 qualifications (5) 68:6 114:7 137:20 138:8,12 qualified (1) 204:24 quality (2) 111:24 115:6 quantities (6) 103:5,6,8 115:20 116:9,20 quantity (12) 110:25 118:1,4,6,7,21 121:17,22 129:24 130:1 142:5 148:17 quarter (1) 67:11 question (16) 32:18 55:1,4 65:22 66:9 86:16 97:19 109:23 131:12,21 132:14,20 161:18 192:22 202:18 206:8 questioning (2) 136:22 137:4 questions (41) 2:22 4:6,9,21 5:13 7:6 10:4 20:19 23:12 43:14,15 44:7 58:9 67:19 86:25 87:1,7,16 100:7,21 112:22 119:17 120:1,3 122:11 131:22 133:4 134:18 135:18 144:5 155:6 177:4 189:19 199:9 214:4,7,10,13,14,15,18 quest (1) 203:4 quickly (4) 19:3 24:11 31:12 42:8 quietly (1) 16:20 quite (14) 11:20 22:4 63:9 81:7 82:4 106:2 129:19 152:23 153:17 157:8 164:2 178:18 184:25 196:6</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <p>r (2) 41:12 76:23 rabie (1) 200:3 radia (1) 45:14 radicalisation (1) 2:19 radicalised (1) 100:3 railway (4) 63:15 71:18,19,23 raise (2) 17:8 124:3 raised (1) 196:2 ramadan (2) 175:18 189:7 randomly (2) 8:15,17 rang (1) 66:22 range (2) 145:1 156:21 rank (1) 10:19 rapidly (2) 26:21 196:4 rate (7) 34:5 40:24 41:10 47:25 66:18 96:4 162:16 rather (10) 55:4 93:3 118:8 142:8 161:25 163:22 184:15 190:6,20 207:20 ratified (1) 36:3 reach (8) 6:1 51:1 109:1 112:8 116:24 119:10 175:24 183:23 reached (5) 17:10 33:3 39:24 185:16,22 reaching (1) 195:4 reacting (1) 34:23 reaction (3) 115:4 130:25 131:5 reactive (3) 21:16 34:19 35:2 read (9) 22:14,23 43:25 44:4,22,25 45:8 142:8 171:22 readily (5) 15:13 104:1 120:25 121:4 177:1 ready (7) 1:16,17 125:13 130:17 132:16,22 133:1</p>	<p>real (6) 21:24,25 90:20 152:14 210:9 212:12 really (11) 1:19 26:4 30:17 92:9 130:24 134:12 154:8 174:4 182:11 185:3 200:22 rear (1) 116:21 reason (11) 5:5 87:8 89:18 160:23,24 161:2,3 184:11,12,13,16 185:17 188:13 201:10 206:23 reasonable (5) 15:3,5 24:9 27:1 185:6 reasonably (1) 17:6 reasons (4) 80:6 110:16 180:25 197:4 reassess (1) 82:11 recall (2) 35:8 133:21 recalled (1) 2:20 receive (5) 38:19 69:21 87:6 90:23 205:15 received (8) 7:15 10:14,18 11:4 16:3 23:5 108:9 109:6 receiving (1) 91:1 recent (1) 99:20 recently (2) 7:10,14 receptacle (2) 128:11,13 recheck (1) 190:23 recipient (2) 203:13 204:5 recognise (1) 155:12 recognised (7) 7:24 19:4,11 21:21 23:2 95:10 159:22 recognition (3) 41:14 78:9 157:16 recollection (4) 57:13 160:10 165:15 178:7 reconnaissance (2) 2:3 97:19 record (6) 23:20 66:18,19 75:3 79:10 180:14 recorded (4) 20:15 23:25 42:6 71:15 recording (1) 24:23 records (3) 24:7,21 65:10 recover (9) 28:9 41:9,10 72:16,19,19 98:8 177:18 182:11 recovered (36) 59:24 97:7 110:9 111:1,7 114:20 115:19 124:11 125:24 126:20 128:12,15,17 139:14 155:17 169:23 170:2,12 171:5 172:17 173:3 175:1,12 177:17 179:4 180:15 184:17 186:22,24 188:1 189:25 190:3 191:25 192:6,16 209:23 recovering (1) 39:13 recovery (6) 65:19 72:21 115:2 173:13 175:6 184:7 red (2) 158:15 171:12 reduce (2) 34:8 90:25 reduced (1) 199:18 refer (6) 3:16 26:12 65:23 125:7 171:8 176:12 43:19 72:3 86:2 132:8 137:14 139:9 160:17,18 166:14 169:8,14 171:3 173:8 205:15 references (2) 138:19 182:4 referred (17) 4:4 5:18 36:4 50:25 51:9 88:7 98:10 123:12 129:23 130:6,7 155:6,22 163:14 181:6 192:3 211:14 referring (1) 124:10 refers (1) 125:3 reflects (1) 33:9 refund (5) 199:8,11,23 200:11,18 refunds (2) 185:9,10 refused (2) 43:15 44:6 regard (9) 12:24 14:9 18:15 23:21 30:18 37:4 55:10 91:20 211:22 regarding (2) 69:8 98:19</p>	<p>regime (1) 35:21 region (1) 68:25 registered (1) 164:14 regular (2) 28:22 35:21 reinforced (1) 75:25 relate (1) 142:11 related (1) 86:21 relates (7) 5:14,22,24 6:2,4,20 193:12 relating (4) 5:13 13:8 65:2 168:3 relation (34) 17:17 19:18 20:10 25:15 27:1 41:4 42:5 50:24 51:2 53:15 75:4 94:6,22 98:23 99:9 143:2 149:14 158:6,12 160:23 164:4 168:6 171:4 173:1,12,14,17 176:8 191:10 193:13 196:1 199:10 203:11 206:22 relationship (1) 207:17 relative (6) 109:4 142:18 145:7,18,22 146:1 relatively (4) 116:20 137:18 161:22 201:1 release (5) 33:11 34:14 90:8,19 92:14 released (7) 32:8 33:4,20 34:6 90:17 140:23,25 relevance (9) 2:17 52:23 54:3 60:10,10,19 109:10 137:23 190:17 relevant (2) 2:4,6 14:12 19:21 21:7 23:20 31:22 35:18 36:9 52:7 60:16 93:22 105:17 106:24,24 108:5 114:19 138:10,22 157:21 200:1 211:17 reliable (2) 48:22 117:15 religion (1) 45:5 rely (1) 117:17 remain (7) 7:18 31:6 34:3 42:17 49:2 64:10 195:15 remainder (1) 200:21 remained (5) 62:25 64:1,16 80:15 90:15 remains (3) 63:17,21 208:7 remaining (4) 6:24 64:20 95:23 195:15 remark (1) 48:7 remarkable (1) 139:4 remarks (1) 154:1 remember (3) 35:8 153:18 176:2 remembers (1) 160:11 remind (4) 35:4 84:11 162:14 178:6 remotely (2) 40:21 119:19 remove (5) 61:20 108:14,18 109:4 186:9 removed (7) 108:21,24 113:13 128:3,5 132:24 194:4 replace (1) 24:1 report (8) 31:21,24 32:1 36:10 40:2 106:4 117:19 171:7 reported (3) 44:16 197:15 202:20 reporting (1) 3:18 reports (4) 26:1 42:8,11 186:8 represent (1) 160:14 request (2) 142:4 151:5 requested (2) 79:21 82:12 requesting (1) 159:17 require (2) 13:4 140:19 required (12) 13:14 19:4,10 47:16 48:12,16 51:21 69:12 103:20 127:22 173:19 183:24</p>
--	---	---	---	---	---	---

requiring (1) 140:18
research (2) 94:9 98:22
resemblance (1) 76:6
reset (2) 177:20,21
residents (1) 54:6
resolve (2) 97:21,22
resources (2) 15:23 34:22
respect (1) 3:7
respective (1) 193:8
respectively (1) 189:7
response (5) 8:11 15:22
17:13 24:4 197:6
responses (1) 39:8
responsibilities (1) 71:10
responsibility (3) 36:16 71:4
202:11
responsible (6) 12:4,5 23:11
36:15 87:11 90:9
rest (1) 120:14
restauro (1) 142:15
rested (1) 29:7
restricted (1) 4:10
restriction (2) 3:13,14
result (10) 4:23 5:3 31:12
40:5 42:4,20 66:21 92:20
197:12 203:9
results (4) 26:1 33:6 125:24
127:20
resume (2) 85:15 194:19
resuming (1) 134:19
retained (1) 114:5
retired (3) 7:14,15,17
retirement (1) 8:3
retreat (1) 82:9
retreated (3) 81:25 82:3,11
return (10) 23:15 42:20
54:14,18 57:25 100:7
177:24 182:18 208:6 210:9
returned (8) 7:21 11:24
42:18 61:2 115:9 183:5
185:4 194:3
returning (3) 58:16,25 63:22
returns (4) 61:8 166:25
167:1,2
reveal (8) 47:9 49:25 51:15
53:4 58:6 61:13 62:19 84:4
revealed (8) 27:19 49:6
50:19 63:13 64:17,20
92:14 168:20
reveals (1) 33:22
review (5) 106:23 107:14
135:2 203:25 212:20
reviewed (3) 31:20 71:13
209:3
reviews (1) 28:22
righthand (6) 75:7 107:21
163:18 171:16,20 204:3
rightly (1) 176:2
ringed (1) 158:14
rings (2) 192:8,11
ripper (1) 26:10
risk (4) 4:18 13:20 145:13
184:23
road (13) 94:10 156:25
157:19 158:23 169:15,16
170:13 171:5,10 180:17
186:5 187:14 196:2
robert (5) 66:12,16 67:18,21
214:6
role (20) 7:13 8:5 11:1 12:25
13:4,9,13 17:22 29:2 37:15
67:22 68:7,24 69:14
71:3,12 80:8,16 86:18
107:6
roles (3) 18:12,15,22
room (23) 15:16 27:7
40:4,21 63:18,21 64:1,18
71:24 73:16 74:2,9,25
77:11 78:5 80:21 81:2,6,20
82:17 83:6 87:23 105:20
rooms (1) 75:14
rough (1) 130:1
round (5) 72:9 74:22 75:22
154:10 163:6
route (2) 49:7 166:10
routinely (1) 169:11

row (14) 61:15 109:19,20,24
110:9 128:6 137:7
142:8,8,9 147:4 182:13
192:21 208:1
rows (1) 205:3
roxburgh (1) 12:9
royal (6) 102:2 196:18 197:1
206:13,18 207:16
rubbish (2) 173:23 174:6
rucksack (16) 61:18,19,20
62:16 63:16,23 77:11,12
108:11,21 169:1 172:11,24
175:13,15 176:4
rules (5) 2:15 6:12,16,19 7:2
ruling (1) 6:23
run (6) 2:16 13:11 18:6 24:3
35:12 141:23
running (2) 66:5 205:7
runs (1) 83:16
rusholme (2) 52:24 159:17
russ (1) 9:4
ryder (4) 86:2 170:5 171:24
195:4

S

safe (4) 56:18 60:5 82:9
125:4
safer (2) 123:15 130:6
safety (8) 20:21 34:19 80:25
93:19 123:14,20 124:1
131:4
sale (1) 57:10
salman (125) 1:24 2:6 5:24
15:17 40:25 41:9,12 42:1
43:5 47:4 51:16 54:14
57:22 58:7,13 59:3
60:12,21 61:7,14,17,19
63:9 66:14 76:23 78:16
79:9 85:1 86:19 87:23
88:9,23 89:23 90:8,24
94:7,9 95:4 100:3 108:11
109:2 112:9,20 125:18
128:2,23 132:1 135:23
137:10,21 146:19 147:7,14
154:23 157:1,23 158:19
159:12,22 160:2,7,24
162:16 163:4,17,21
164:6,20,23 165:7
166:22,25 167:2,14
168:4,22 169:9,16 172:5
173:15,19 175:7,14,20
176:5,15 177:4,21 179:24
181:8 182:15,23 183:5,25
184:5,12 185:5 193:10
194:3 196:11 197:13
198:24 199:10 200:10,23
201:11,15,20,24 202:11
203:10 204:16,22 206:2,19
207:3,18,20,24 208:9,2
210:24 212:1,7,11
salmans (3) 204:10 205:11
210:9
same (26) 35:17 55:15 58:15
88:1 89:23 94:13 95:14
109:21 145:3 146:7
148:21,21
149:14,18,18,19,20,24
150:9,15 158:24 166:13
167:5 172:24 175:15
179:13
samia (1) 201:16
sample (4) 89:6 114:21
115:8 127:24
sampled (1) 116:21
samples (3) 89:5 114:23,23
samuel (1) 67:21
sat (1) 117:10
saunders (119) 1:11,18 6:16
8:2 16:19,23 17:4
24:1,8,20 25:2 31:17,24
32:6 35:4,11 45:10,12,17
55:24 56:3 58:21 67:6,10
82:20 83:2 84:9,19,22,25
85:3,6 92:3,11 105:7,11,13
116:12,15 117:13,22
118:12,14,17 122:17

123:22 124:8,14 127:19
128:9 129:11 131:19
133:5,14 134:6,8,10,12
153:11,14,20,24 158:22
161:24 162:2,5,20,23
163:21,25 164:7,13,18
165:23 166:2
174:1,3,9,13,17,20,22
176:23 177:3,9,13,15,23
178:2,9,23 184:24 185:2
194:1,9,14,25 195:10,18
196:4,7 197:15,17,19,25
200:13 203:2,5,8 204:14
205:22 206:5,11
212:1,7,14,18,22 213:3
saw (8) 20:1 83:10 84:19
108:10 119:11 133:9
159:11 179:3
saying (4) 22:2 24:21 33:15
164:7
sayso (1) 73:6
scale (7) 38:7,21 39:3,23
51:5 55:23 135:7
scene (38) 21:4 40:10
66:16,21 71:2,3,5,10,11
74:12,16,17,19,22 75:1
77:9 79:22,23 80:9,16
83:1,20 86:18 93:13,25
95:24 102:13 106:1,10
107:7 109:25 110:4,15
115:3,15 121:14 124:5
133:21
scenes (3) 76:8 107:8,8
schedule (5) 142:3 181:18
191:15 211:9,15
schedules (1) 38:12
schematic (1) 59:19
school (1) 138:8
schools (1) 105:8
science (6) 68:7,18
101:20,23,23 102:5
scientific (4) 68:13 101:2
170:18 182:4
scientifically (1) 180:21
scientist (1) 170:5
scoops (1) 128:18
scope (1) 39:23
scotland (5) 196:18 197:1
206:13,19 207:17
scrapped (1) 186:22
screen (8) 5:20 43:18 85:8,9
86:11 100:14 115:8 159:1
screwfix (1) 211:6
screws (3) 51:19 111:2
209:20
scrutinised (1) 49:4
sd (1) 78:19
seal (3) 192:14,23,25
sealed (1) 117:6
seals (2) 192:11,12
search (11) 23:10 40:9 68:21
73:4 94:12,18
95:2,13,13,16 202:21
searchable (2) 26:3,11
searched (3) 94:16 173:24
174:5
searches (1) 94:22
searching (1) 28:6
seat (9) 40:16 75:22 77:1,5
96:1 116:21,21 117:10,12
seats (1) 117:7
second (11) 3:3 22:11 52:23
64:11 81:19,23 82:6,8,9
167:7,9
secondary (2) 103:1 138:8
secondly (2) 13:18 64:9
seconds (5) 63:3 85:7,12
132:8 139:19
secret (1) 26:18
secrets (1) 49:20
section (17) 3:10 11:17
28:16 43:13 50:14 85:11
107:22 168:5 189:15
191:14 194:20
195:4,6,7,24 212:20,21
116:12,15 117:13,22
sections (3) 84:3,7 195:8

secure (4) 21:4 22:8,18
165:16
securing (1) 93:13
security (5) 4:14 161:16
162:13 163:3 184:20
see (120) 22:20 32:7,24
33:21 34:1 54:19 56:14
57:1 64:14 75:22 76:3,11
77:12 81:9 85:20 86:12
87:8 96:5 97:9 98:1,2
114:17,23 115:11,17,20
116:9,18,20 117:23
118:4,9,20 129:6,16
142:9,14,15 143:11,15
144:16,20,25 145:17,18
146:5,7,15 147:3,12,17,21
149:11 150:15,19 152:5,7
153:5 156:7,21
157:12,21,25 158:14,25
159:11,15 160:1,8,13,15
161:6 162:11 163:3,18
165:5,18 166:6,7 170:18
171:12 173:3 176:15
180:19 189:24 191:15
192:1,8 193:8,11 203:23
204:3,13,16 205:2,10,14
206:1,12,25
207:4,8,15,16,20,23
208:5,9,16,22 209:5,9,19
210:4,9,18,24 211:4,11
212:24
seeing (5) 84:25 163:8
164:25 190:2 191:20
seek (2) 27:18 131:8
seeking (4) 32:23,25
200:18,20
seem (4) 33:5 127:20
184:4,24
seems (3) 56:4 92:13 205:15
seen (26) 19:24 20:3 25:1
39:8 61:17 64:18 83:10
95:22 111:23
129:3,7,10,14,19 130:4
131:24 132:2,12 136:14
137:15 144:4 167:11 180:2
181:18 185:3 195:15
seize (1) 55:9
seized (5) 83:5,20 107:1
109:16 171:9
seizing (1) 39:13
selected (1) 8:14
send (1) 185:10
sending (1) 48:16
senior (18) 2:11 7:22 8:6
10:15 13:6,15 14:8 17:20
19:13 23:7 25:21,21
31:9,10 77:6 100:24 101:6
103:25
sense (9) 32:12,14,14 56:4
160:18 185:18 187:15
196:20 212:12
sensible (2) 184:5,25
sensitive (13) 4:13,14 11:18
49:14 50:6,9 73:15 102:18
103:2,9,13 120:5 124:24
sent (4) 78:19 79:2 164:11
170:24
sentence (1) 46:8
sentenced (1) 151:25
sentences (3) 12:18 14:6
17:1
sentencing (1) 154:1
separate (3) 117:20 160:6
161:9
separated (1) 160:23
separately (3) 36:11 160:25
161:4
separating (1) 161:21
september (1) 11:22
sequence (7) 81:24 86:17
136:1,21 183:2 198:18
211:2
sergeant (2) 167:16 210:23
serious (3) 1:19 43:7 92:3
serve (1) 14:16
served (1) 11:9

service (16) 10:9,10 11:9
29:8,10,14 30:2,5,23 31:5
38:15 42:24 46:22
48:21,25 51:8
serving (1) 46:8
session (1) 4:10
set (14) 3:4 20:8,10 23:8
36:18 38:14 55:9 74:23,25
75:2 119:17 139:21 161:9
165:24
sets (5) 28:6 89:1 162:20
163:2 192:11
setting (3) 43:25 72:17,18
seton (2) 5:9 191:4
several (5) 14:22 24:22,24
65:4 115:19
severe (1) 99:24
shall (6) 102:10 134:8 149:3
173:3 200:13 206:7
share (4) 14:23 193:24
208:18 212:3
sharp (1) 105:6
sheldon (1) 119:22
shift (2) 17:25 18:8
shifted (1) 34:18
shock (2) 45:21 102:23
shocked (1) 44:18
shoplifting (1) 88:12
shopping (2) 178:21,22
short (20) 13:13 15:2 16:11
31:3 47:25 67:14 70:15,16
85:11 90:1 118:19 133:18
165:3 166:7,14 168:5
173:16 194:19 195:22
201:1
shortly (19) 8:5 16:17 17:10
23:16 102:10 112:24
113:15 141:6,8 154:16
156:22 157:12,15,21
160:13 163:2 172:14
200:20 207:16
should (25) 1:17 2:14,21 4:8
5:20,21 6:20 24:19,25
26:14 29:22 30:8,15,21
38:20 49:2 50:23 51:10
55:1 58:21 82:14 96:24
125:3 171:7 189:19
shouldnt (2) 133:8 197:21
show (4) 48:11 59:19 126:21
209:7
showing (1) 96:11
shown (5) 5:19,20 122:23
123:3 131:9
shows (1) 63:20
shrapnel (8) 76:15 111:7
169:2 191:7 199:16
210:1,10,21
shudhill (3) 61:14,22 62:14
siblings (3) 57:23 58:25 59:2
side (2) 75:7 204:3
significance (4) 57:4 101:18
190:20 192:9
significant (3) 55:23 117:24
192:2
sim (3) 183:10,11,13
similar (10) 95:17 113:8
137:17 146:1 151:3 180:17
182:1 201:11,14 207:10
similarities (2) 139:2,4
similarly (1) 149:22
simon (8) 2:10 7:5,9 87:15
134:17 214:3,9,17
simple (18) 12:18 14:6
23:16,18 24:15 36:18
52:18 57:4 79:6 97:24
123:2,4 130:24,25
140:4,6,19 184:20
simultaneously (2) 24:3
151:17
since (3) 9:5 75:1 102:8
single (2) 35:3 58:10
sinister (2) 152:15 170:16
sink (4) 116:3,4,5,8
sio (15) 10:15 11:1 12:10
14:4 16:9 18:2,20 24:5

27:5 32:2 34:15,16,16
35:13,14
sios (2) 19:17 24:2
sir (175) 1:5,9,11,18,21 3:17
4:3 6:12,13,16 7:3 8:2,4
16:19,22,23 17:4
24:1,3,8,20,22 25:2
31:17,24 32:6 35:4,11
45:10,12,16,17 55:24
56:2,3 58:21 67:6,9,10,16
82:20,22,23,24 83:2,14
84:2,9,19,21,22,24,25
85:2,3,5,6 86:2 88:4
92:3,11 105:7,11,13
116:12,15 117:13,22
118:12,14,17 122:17
123:22 124:8,14 127:19
128:9 129:11 131:19,20
132:6 133:5,14,15,21
134:6,7,8,9,10,12,19
153:11,14,17,20,24 154:3
158:22 161:24
162:1,2,5,20,22,23
163:21,25 164:7,13,18
165:23 166:1,2
174:3,9,13,17,20,22
176:23 177:3,9,13,15,23
178:2,9,12,16,23 179:2
184:24 185:2 193:21
194:1,7,9,14,16,25
195:10,13,18,24 196:2,4,7
197:15,16,17,19,25 200:13
203:2,4,5,8 204:14,15
205:22,24 206:5,9,11
212:1,7,14,17,18,19,22
213:2,3
sit (3) 64:2 69:14 194:25
site (4) 78:18 158:2,4 160:20
sits (1) 198:19
sitting (3) 63:22 117:6 195:1
situ (2) 73:11 87:23
situated (1) 62:3
sixth (2) 5:7 22:12
size (4) 34:7 35:23 38:7 51:5
skills (1) 68:13
slaughter (1) 152:17
sleep (1) 194:5
slide (5) 87:9,12 100:17
133:17 171:4
slight (1) 21:19
slightly (4) 87:2 89:17 121:5
193:20
slow (1) 94:23
small (11) 13:18 20:19 50:18
54:4 81:1 98:8 103:4,6,7
110:5 117:6
smaller (2) 91:4 107:8
smartphone (1) 97:25
smashed (2) 81:10,13
smell (9) 104:7,10,21,23
105:1,2,5 113:8 180:12
smelt (2) 155:7,9
snapshot (1) 180:20
society (4) 66:14 68:17
102:2,4
soe (1) 176:12
software (2) 25:15 94:3
soi (1) 12:15
solicitor (2) 43:25 44:1
solid (1) 160:9
soliman (4) 146:16,18,22,23
solvent (2) 104:4 115:7
somebody (7) 77:21 116:7
117:9 121:6 131:14
187:21,6
someone (7) 33:23 35:4 64:9
66:12 93:3 177:22 203:6
somerton (33) 52:11,20,21
53:12 54:10,11 59:12,15
113:1,16 115:16 116:1,11
123:17 124:6 125:16,25
126:7 135:19,22
136:9,15,24 155:3,24
158:14,17,20 159:13
160:5,6,21 179:3
something (21) 9:6 20:15

36:11 65:23 75:4 77:9
78:21 83:10 85:22 113:17
127:4 132:2 133:10
137:16,25 155:21
161:13,16,20 21 199:25
sometimes (4) 35:22 44:5
96:3 108:12
somewhere (2) 52:5 113:7
son (1) 202:7
sonata (1) 187:6
sophisticated (2) 25:10
131:6
sort (12) 32:16 69:2
105:23,24 111:24
113:5,11,21 133:9 181:12
201:13,14
sought (2) 47:14 148:17
soul (1) 174:5
sound (1) 94:21
source (2) 49:15 98:22
sourced (3) 122:1,3,5
sources (2) 203:21 204:5
south (1) 163:16
space (9) 181:12 183:21,24
184:2,4,8,11 185:14,19
spark (2) 50:7 103:4
speak (8) 16:22,25 34:3
70:14 134:2 142:20 168:13
205:19
speaker (1) 140:10
speaking (2) 99:4 203:5
speaks (2) 183:19 191:2
specialism (1) 94:4
specialist (2) 30:23 94:3
specific (5) 19:17 35:14,24
148:4 184:8
specifically (6) 9:12 29:10
60:21 149:9 152:12 194:13
speculation (1) 62:10
speculative (2) 184:25
185:13
spend (2) 184:3 194:5
spending (1) 185:7
spend (5) 10:9 129:1 136:11
198:16 211:22
spine (1) 2:9
split (1) 35:23
spoke (2) 70:11 82:25
spoken (4) 16:20 50:12
146:18 182:21
spot (1) 56:8
spotted (2) 64:8,9
spread (1) 105:20
staff (6) 19:14 38:23 39:6
71:7 73:3 79:4
stage (56) 3:16 5:20 6:14 7:4
9:17 17:17,24 21:14 22:4
23:9 25:4,12 28:9 29:24
30:18 31:20 32:5,16,25
34:13 37:8,16 40:6,15 42:4
48:10 52:18 54:1,17 57:20
66:23 67:2 69:24 70:25
73:23,25 75:25 76:13
81:15,16 82:9 90:13,18
95:19 98:15 106:9,19
133:3 149:4 150:2 161:15
168:15 169:19 176:24
198:14 210:13
stages (4) 26:7 27:5 38:22
40:9
stairs (5) 71:23 72:1,6,9 73:9
stand (3) 51:11 65:25 114:25
standard (1) 25:14
standing (1) 159:2
stands (6) 45:10 102:17
115:2,21,22 195:3
start (11) 1:15 42:8 84:10
100:12 101:7 169:15
184:18 194:21 195:4
203:25 209:17
started (4) 30:5 81:22
194:17 198:2
starting (3) 1:6 142:9 209:6
starts (1) 21:19
stated (2) 110:17 144:2
statement (56) 2:8 5:7

64:5,8 10:25 11:16,17
 15:11,14,15 25:6 29:2
 34:11 36:7 39:15,22
 43:16,18,21,24 44:8 45:8
 51:1 61:12 62:13 63:4
 65:24 77:16,20 78:7,13
 79:25 82:22 91:8 97:12,15
 100:25 107:11 118:20
 127:17 134:20 135:1 138:5
 139:24 142:23 154:21
 168:1,5 169:13 176:19
 178:1,13 180:9 196:9
 199:8
statements (3) 2:16 5:2
 39:16
states (3) 14:20 91:17 92:15
static (1) 158:11
stating (1) 212:9
station (11) 61:15,24,25
 62:2,5,15 63:15,17 75:15
 82:24 106:13
stay (4) 64:4 75:12 81:5
 194:6
stayed (2) 125:18 194:7
staying (2) 75:7 181:11
step (6) 17:17 41:21 42:4
 87:21 132:17 141:11
stepping (2) 12:6 83:17
steps (23) 35:17 47:10
 75:12,13,15 87:18 88:19
 90:15 93:9,25 95:3,19
 96:5,13 97:9 98:14 99:3
 129:19 140:16 141:4,9,16
 173:7
still (13) 3:25 27:19 33:15
 38:1 39:21 63:23 81:8
 101:12 105:11 158:12
 160:20 162:22 199:6
stills (1) 129:19
stimuli (1) 103:3
stockport (1) 12:7
stolen (1) 202:21
stop (10) 16:19 62:3,6
 84:2,11,19 85:17 164:23
 193:1 195:10
stopped (4) 86:10 161:18,19
 207:3
storage (5) 2:5 54:9 130:6
 154:19 189:1
store (4) 56:5 117:6 125:11
 209:21
stored (11) 52:4 54:11,23
 60:8,14 125:3 129:22
 137:2 155:25 157:11
 167:22
stores (1) 49:19
storing (1) 125:7
story (2) 33:13 154:9
straight (1) 153:22
straightaway (1) 76:2
straightforward (7) 24:15
 125:8 137:18 140:20
 153:22,23 177:4
strands (5) 65:4,15,25 66:4
 98:23
strange (1) 120:15
straps (1) 77:12
strategic (1) 12:16
strategies (2) 72:17,18
street (12) 52:24 53:8,13,15
 61:22 104:1 149:6 154:15
 157:8 175:10 181:7 182:2
strength (1) 49:11
strict (1) 65:16
strong (2) 173:22 181:3
structure (5) 2:24 14:12
 27:20 34:9 38:1
struggle (1) 17:9
stub (1) 175:22
stuck (1) 77:9
student (11) 204:18,25
 206:2 207:1 208:1,13
 212:2,4,5,10,12
subboxes (1) 171:19
subject (10) 3:9 6:17,21
 102:15 108:9 145:10

168:10 185:20 195:12
 207:2
subjects (1) 33:12
subset (1) 179:10
submitted (1) 107:12
subscribe (1) 45:6
subscriber (1) 152:21
subsequent (4) 54:14 106:20
 132:22 136:12
subsequently (5) 25:9 48:4
 59:24 90:3 137:5
substance (9) 9:7 43:6
 112:15 113:22 123:6
 124:20 135:3 140:7 203:3
substances (3) 53:17 120:25
 140:5
substantial (15) 19:13 22:20
 38:9 71:16 73:17 75:20
 104:12 111:20 152:23
 189:12 198:4,17 204:17
 206:17 207:1
succeed (1) 148:11
successful (7) 63:2 144:17
 145:24 147:4 150:7,20
 152:5
successfully (2) 150:3 153:6
suffered (1) 124:25
sufficient (2) 120:17 122:7
suggest (7) 24:5 32:15,18
 39:7 126:18 136:17 184:6
suggested (3) 45:25 125:8
 127:10
suggesting (1) 163:11
suicide (1) 16:6
suicide (23) 128:24
 129:4,5,16 130:9,10
 167:10,19,23
 172:2,7,17,18
 173:1,9,18,20 174:14,21
 176:10,19,23
 184:14 191:21,23 192:20
suleman (1) 175:18
sulphuric (25) 47:12 48:15
 49:8 59:25 103:23,24
 104:16,19 105:3,4 142:12
 143:3,9,13,25 144:6 145:2
 146:6 147:6,13 150:3
 153:9 186:15,18 192:5
sum (2) 206:3 208:5
summarise (3) 57:19 58:24
 139:15
summarised (1) 127:17
summarising (1) 24:9
summary (14) 5:12 27:18
 38:19 39:22 46:20 71:17
 73:16 80:14 87:17 93:24
 143:1 167:18 171:9 211:19
sump (1) 116:3
sums (2) 198:7,16
sun (1) 81:14
superintendent (4) 7:12
 10:19 18:10 70:12
supervise (2) 78:11,12
supervised (1) 78:22
supplementary (1) 131:23
supplied (1) 44:6
supply (1) 55:12
support (12) 7:25 22:24 37:5
 41:15,17 45:1,4 68:13
 140:21 142:23 154:6 159:1
supported (2) 33:1 181:13
supports (1) 187:9
suppose (5) 64:7,10 123:23
 161:17 173:12
sure (30) 15:11,12 17:8
 24:18 31:22 44:3,3,4 46:2
 56:9 60:6 64:15 66:9 71:13
 122:10,19 129:11 137:24
 151:12 174:12 188:16
 190:19 192:24 193:23
 197:23 200:16 205:25
 206:9,16,23
surface (4) 114:1,6 115:8
 116:2
surfaces (1) 127:24
surrounding (1) 71:6
surveillance (1) 61:9

survived (2) 43:3 98:25
suspect (8) 34:6,14 42:7
 74:1 78:8,15 86:19 194:19
suspected (7) 16:5 28:17
 40:15 77:21 78:25 86:22
 197:6
suspects (3) 32:8 48:2 50:13
suspicious (2) 10:11 64:6
suter (1) 46:12
swabbed (1) 180:24
swabs (1) 115:7
swap (1) 100:14
swiftly (1) 120:22
switch (8)
 120:7,9,11,19,20,21
 133:11,13
sworn (10) 2:14 7:4,5
 67:17,18 100:19,20
 214:3,6,12
sympathy (1) 45:1
symposiums (1) 14:23
system (16) 23:15,17,19
 24:15 25:3,12,14,17,23
 26:16,22 27:2 36:4 103:5
 157:16 165:16
systems (3) 25:9,10 94:9

T

tab (1) 106:1
tablets (1) 28:12
tactics (1) 165:2
taghdi (2) 188:9 189:10
taken (39) 11:18 36:2 41:21
 42:4 47:10 75:1 78:7,8,24
 87:18,23 88:12,19 89:17
 93:9,25 95:3,19 96:5,13
 97:9 98:15 100:18 115:3
 116:25 118:24 124:22
 126:1 129:3,16 130:22
 141:9,16 157:15 159:17
 162:10 173:7,23 203:11
takes (3) 33:22 61:14 98:13
taking (10) 15:22 39:16
 63:18 78:13,18 79:25 84:7
 85:8 111:5 135:20
tale (1) 59:14
talk (2) 55:18 175:13
talked (1) 206:21
talking (4) 102:15 124:1
 202:1 204:5
tap (1) 116:8
target (3) 194:24 195:10,14
task (1) 19:22
tasks (1) 35:14
tatp (88) 50:4,9 52:3,16,21
 54:9,23 59:10 60:5,5,13,23
 94:25 98:16,20 102:16,17
 103:13,19,21,24 105:21
 111:16,18 112:2,17
 113:7,9,15,17,20,21
 114:1,3,5,20,24 115:11,19
 116:2,5,7 117:3,6,8,9
 118:22 122:8,24 123:3
 126:3,13,21,25
 127:3,6,10,14
 128:3,6,7,14,20 129:22,24
 130:2,5,10,17 131:1
 135:23 136:1,8,13,14,18
 138:10 139:1 140:10,13
 154:24 158:16 179:4,6
 184:23 192:20 193:16
 210:13
taxi (28) 59:21 61:14,15,21
 62:4 129:17 157:23
 159:11,16,18,19,23,24
 160:2,10,11,25
 161:17,23,24 162:21
 163:22,23 164:22
 165:2,19,22,23
team (37) 9:9,11,12 10:2
 13:15 18:25 29:23 30:11
 31:4 34:7,9,15
 35:3,18,22,23,25 37:23
 38:9 41:10 42:23 43:10
 46:9,11 48:20 51:7 52:20
 62:23 68:21 73:7 74:5

75:12 142:4 146:25 148:1
 156:9 196:1
teams (10) 10:21 11:23 27:6
 29:17 35:1,15 36:1 46:21
 59:9 73:4
technical (3) 1:7,11,19
technique (1) 74:15
techniques (8) 90:4 117:20
 123:12 131:6 140:18,19
 153:1,2
technology (1) 87:11
teesside (1) 68:10
teeth (3) 41:20 89:12,13
telecommunications (1)
 179:17
telephone (15) 16:3,10
 69:21 95:23 96:4,18
 98:11,12 154:5 157:22
 183:7,9,12 187:9 202:24
telephones (2) 98:3 159:5
telling (2) 7:7 176:6
temporary (1) 9:3
tenant (1) 179:6
tend (3) 4:2,6 90:25
terk (1) 114:25
termed (2) 107:15 111:10
terminates (1) 207:17
terms (38) 2:1 3:4,18 9:10
 12:18 14:6 23:16
 36:8,18,23,25 39:3 50:18
 52:18 57:4 72:5,22 78:21
 79:6 85:24 93:10 102:19
 104:17 110:21 111:24
 112:3 116:13 119:5 122:25
 124:20 135:18 144:11
 146:2 154:19 183:2,3
 206:17 207:11
terrible (1) 9:16
terrorism (12) 15:7,24 20:6
 28:4,16,19 43:13
 50:14,16,20 94:12 99:24
terrorist (2) 31:18 44:11
terrorists (1) 4:16
test (1) 193:15
tested (6) 113:19 115:11,18
 127:13,21 192:25
text (3) 97:6 159:15 165:18
texting (1) 159:3
thank (52) 7:3 8:4 17:7,9
 24:8 25:2 32:6 35:11
 45:12,17 56:3 82:18 83:2
 84:9,17 85:6,17
 86:5,10,13,24 92:11
 117:22 118:11,17,18
 119:16 120:2 131:17,19
 132:11,20 133:4,14,15
 134:6,12 154:12 164:18
 168:16 178:11 193:20
 196:4,7 197:25 203:8,24
 206:11 212:18,22,23 213:3
thankfully (1) 174:2
thats (299) 7:20,23 8:1,9,18
 9:3 10:3,8,17 11:6 12:8
 13:3,17,21 15:1,9
 17:4,14,23 18:3,18
 19:1,16,19 20:2 21:12
 22:10,22 23:4,7,14 24:17
 25:8,12 26:2,6,11
 27:4,8,14 28:2,13,24
 29:5,9,25 30:12 31:2
 32:10,16 34:4,20 35:19
 36:6,21 37:1,9,24 39:7
 40:8,14 41:11,16
 42:3,13,22 44:9 45:24
 46:13,20 47:7,13 48:19
 49:9,12 50:3,8 51:12,25
 52:6 53:19,24 54:1,6 56:13
 57:7,15 58:2,11,15
 59:5,8,13 60:15 61:23
 62:2,22 63:1 64:15 65:14
 66:8,15 68:2,19 73:1,3
 75:8 76:12 78:6,10 80:17
 88:3,5,10 89:21 90:6,14
 93:20 94:4 95:9,15,18,25
 96:6,23 97:4,18 98:10,21
 101:10 105:21 106:1 114:3

118:8,12,15,15,24 119:18
 122:23 127:19,25 130:11
 131:18 135:3,12 136:16,20
 137:1,8 138:4,16
 139:3,12,20 141:19,22
 142:17,22 143:10,14
 144:8,22 145:5,23 146:4,9
 147:11,20 148:19,23
 149:7,17 150:1,5,14,18,21
 152:21 153:8,10 155:13
 156:24,25
 157:2,8,10,10,13,14,24
 158:17 159:6,9,9,21
 160:8,16,22 162:4,17
 163:10,15 164:2 165:14,21
 166:19 167:4,24 168:8
 169:7,18,22 170:15,23
 171:19 172:8,25 174:21
 175:11,19,21 176:16
 177:14 178:18,24
 179:12,19 180:5 181:1,5
 182:24 183:8,15,22
 185:12,13,24
 186:1,11,11,21
 187:1,7,17,20,22
 188:3,6,12,22 189:3,14
 190:1,11 191:5,9,23
 192:18 193:11
 196:19,22,25 197:14,24
 198:6,9,12 199:1,17,20,24
 200:9,25 201:9,15
 202:2,12 203:18
 204:2,7,12 205:1,9 206:20
 207:14,22 208:2,4,15,19
 209:25 210:8,22
 211:7,10,13,19 212:13
themselves (7) 47:10,15
 117:8 124:16 127:21
 161:17 181:24
theories (2) 184:1 185:15
theory (8) 62:8 63:25
 125:15,22 127:5 128:1,5
 160:4
thereabouts (1) 162:25
thereafter (6) 12:1 29:7
 41:17 88:19 200:20 207:16
therefore (19) 1:25 13:13
therein (1) 159:3
 79:14 88:14 90:1 109:6
 118:5 124:25 125:11 127:5
 128:8,20 160:4 181:11
 193:23
theres (28) 1:7 24:22 63:5
 72:25 96:24 100:12 113:14
 120:15 121:3 122:21
 140:21 146:10 157:22
 160:22,24 161:13,16
 164:21 165:18 166:10
 176:24 184:11,12,13
 185:17 191:12 192:10
 207:23
theresa (1) 37:25
they'd (2) 55:20 117:9
theyre (9) 37:2 120:3 158:7
 159:3,4 162:13
 166:2,12,13
theyve (4) 158:18,23 161:17
 178:14
thing (4) 26:2 176:6 194:1
 206:20
thinking (1) 45:6
thinks (1) 133:8
third (11) 3:8 49:13 53:25
 64:10,12 106:7 133:6
 147:4 149:14 182:12 211:5
thomas (1) 61:22
though (2) 112:13 139:6
thought (8) 19:9 64:8 91:2
 154:7 162:7 164:15 212:20
thoughts (2) 9:21 64:11
threat (6) 20:20,24 21:20
 22:16 93:18 99:24
three (20) 29:16 30:10
 49:17,24 64:8 103:20
 131:23 133:5 150:16,19
 152:4,8 185:22 191:24

192:12,13 204:3,4 205:10
 208:8
throw (1) 177:21
through (37) 27:13 31:14
 37:5 40:20 49:7 50:22,22
 55:25 56:2 63:13 69:2
 71:23 75:11 77:10,20
 108:13 136:21 141:23
 148:15 152:23 160:12
 162:11 173:21,25 175:7,16
 179:16,21 180:21 181:9
 182:19 183:16 190:21,25
 192:1 203:3,14
throughout (8) 9:1,19 29:17
 33:10 38:15 58:23 196:23
 211:2
throw (1) 117:13
throwing (1) 24:6
thrown (2) 155:15 176:7
thrust (1) 91:4
thursday (1) 1:21
tickets (3) 58:10,12,19
tie (1) 56:11
ties (2) 55:19,19
tight (1) 194:20
timberland (1) 176:3
time (80) 1:15 2:25 4:23,24
 5:3,3 12:1 14:17 16:11
 31:20 32:7 35:17
 45:3,3,4,25 56:8 58:22,23
 59:23 61:7,13,14,18 64:4
 66:1,6,10 78:8 79:13,15,25
 80:9,21 81:5,12 82:9 84:11
 86:22 90:16 91:25 95:2
 99:6 100:12 105:7 114:5
 126:5 129:2 133:18 136:11
 141:15,20 143:25 149:15
 154:23 157:1,19,21 158:7
 162:20 164:8 166:11
 167:7,9 173:16 183:25
 185:4 188:17 194:10,25
 195:1,6 196:5 198:22
 199:12 201:23 202:1 203:4
 206:6 212:11
timed (1) 23:24
times (8) 18:1 78:13 82:14
 116:14 145:3 164:17
 171:15 181:6
timing (1) 186:12
timings (2) 78:7 180:5
tin (4) 109:12,14,17,18
tiny (1) 126:20
tip (2) 173:23,23
title (2) 8:10,16
today (8) 87:3 101:11
 133:23 140:3 191:15
 194:18 208:21 212:24
together (12) 6:9 18:24 59:4
 60:24 93:17 131:11
 142:5,14 166:12,17 168:2
 181:2
told (19) 16:4 48:12 65:12
 73:8 75:12 77:17 86:15
 88:14 120:23 125:20,25
 132:23 146:2 154:18
 164:23 178:11 179:23
 196:1 202:9
tomorrow (8) 6:1 29:2 41:14
 86:3 165:6 170:9 191:15
 212:24
tonnes (2) 173:25 174:5
 55:2
took (7) 50:21 62:14 71:12
 128:6 173:22 177:8 199:11
tools (4) 140:6 168:21 169:5
 210:5
topics (1) 168:3
topup (2) 96:22 97:2
total (7) 2:16 28:3,9 29:15
 39:18 147:6 209:20
totalled (1) 205:7
totalling (1) 198:8
touch (1) 75:4
touched (1) 176:21
towards (9) 34:19 142:9

147:14 158:1 163:4 201:14
 205:2,6 210:18
toyota (1) 185:25
trace (13) 56:11,11 94:24,24
 113:22 24:25 115:2 118:8
 125:23 127:17,23 179:4
traced (1) 99:1
traces (7) 52:16 124:11
 125:25

turning (6) 1:22 99:10,11
 109:9 200:23 212:14
 turns (2) 128:23,24
 twice (3) 146:5 159:12 207:1
 type (7) 23:3 74:4 99:16
 109:3,18 173:2 201:11
 typed (1) 43:21
 types (1) 102:25

U

ug (1) 118:14
 uk (12) 14:13
 58:1,3,22,23,25 61:8 172:6
 175:15 182:18 183:5
 207:25
 ultimate (1) 163:16
 ultimately (3) 112:20 144:23
 186:22
 unable (1) 97:21
 unaccounted (1) 192:17
 uncomfortable (1) 16:23
 underestimate (1) 20:2
 undergo (1) 102:22
 underlies (1) 142:5
 underlying (1) 5:5
 underpinning (1) 5:2
 understand (19) 17:3 33:15
 43:23 49:3 55:8 57:20
 58:21 60:9 75:9 85:3,4
 92:23 123:24 125:15
 126:10 132:24 143:25
 173:7 194:14
 understanding (6) 32:19
 34:5 59:10 91:19 108:4
 142:21
 understands (1) 135:7
 understood (7) 33:18 45:13
 51:4 56:10 87:21 121:24
 143:6
 undertake (1) 12:10
 undertaken (1) 1:24 36:2
 40:12 94:6 95:1 99:6
 undetectable (1) 118:8
 undisturbed (1) 74:13
 unfair (1) 131:12
 unfortunately (2) 170:20
 177:19
 unit (3) 13:2 69:4,11
 united (7) 11:8 14:20
 42:18,21 61:2 91:17 92:15
 university (2) 68:10,13
 unless (4) 6:13 124:22
 156:18 212:21
 unlikely (2) 159:2 174:10
 unnecessary (2) 92:2 184:23
 unpredictable (1) 50:10
 unrelated (2) 1:8 84:23
 unsafe (1) 82:4
 unsatisfactory (1) 201:8
 unstable (1) 103:13
 unsuccessful (4) 141:20
 148:8 149:12,22
 until (12) 6:1 7:10,19 64:17
 74:13 85:12 125:18 134:7
 165:23 178:3 194:21 213:5
 unusual (2) 108:22 197:24
 unusually (1) 29:15
 updated (3) 22:12,14,23
 upon (19) 1:23 34:7,22 35:9
 44:7 46:3 54:21 69:12 71:8
 83:4 90:12 94:15 100:6
 140:2 148:24 154:2 182:18
 185:16 210:9
 upper (2) 75:7 187:13
 usable (1) 125:9
 used (61) 24:1 25:3,10
 26:16,18 47:23 50:1 51:14
 52:20 53:5,6 54:8 56:25
 62:24 74:4 98:16 102:19
 103:4,6,7,24 104:4,12
 105:8,8 112:15,18 114:21
 115:7 116:4 117:5 118:22
 122:2,8 123:1 128:13,20
 139:13 141:17 143:12
 144:1 145:17 147:9 148:22
 150:9 153:1 158:15 164:17

169:1 172:2,22 181:4
 182:13 183:13 188:25
 191:7 197:9 199:16 201:20
 210:10,21
 usefull (1) 54:16
 uses (4) 14:8 120:23,24
 121:7
 using (15) 47:15 53:17,21,22
 56:5 90:4 94:3 119:9 140:6
 148:9 149:18 158:7 159:4
 160:16 181:22
 usual (1) 5:6
 usually (3) 44:1 69:7 105:15
 utilised (2) 27:3 71:20
 utilising (1) 53:16

V

vacate (2) 81:20 82:17
 vacuum (1) 116:21
 various (6) 25:18 65:15,24
 90:4 98:23 180:20
 vary (1) 115:20
 vast (3) 5:3 59:25 142:5
 vegetable (1) 170:2
 vehicle (21) 54:12 55:10
 56:5 126:19 127:24 157:18
 161:12 165:10 166:21
 184:15 186:2,12,15
 187:2,11,18 188:1,21,22
 189:10 190:3
 vehicles (3) 28:7 56:7 185:23
 vendor (6) 142:15 145:3
 146:8 147:18 149:15 150:9
 verdict (1) 7:16
 verdicts (1) 135:10
 version (1) 43:21
 via (5) 58:14 61:15 79:20
 97:20 193:9
 viability (1) 122:15
 vicinity (2) 160:6 176:16
 victim (2) 11:5 22:25
 victims (5) 6:5 21:10 22:24
 23:12 92:2
 victoria (10) 61:24,25
 62:2,5,15 63:15 72:9 75:15
 82:24 106:13
 video (45) 5:18,20,21
 84:12,18 85:14,16,18 86:6
 111:23
 112:1,6,10,12,14,17
 122:9,12,14,17,22,24
 123:3,11,15 124:6
 125:3,7,11 130:7,8 131:8
 132:10 138:25 139:7,16,18
 140:17,25 141:7 156:20
 189:23 190:15 191:18
 192:7
 videorecorded (1) 94:1
 videos (6) 111:10,12,20
 112:3,7 138:15
 viewed (1) 112:4
 viewing (1) 39:2
 views (2) 44:24 45:19
 virtue (3) 135:24 181:12
 190:5
 visible (5) 117:25 118:4,7
 119:23 128:19
 visit (6) 55:3 102:10 106:5
 167:5,7,19
 visiting (1) 45:4
 visits (2) 167:9 172:6
 visual (1) 182:8
 voice (3) 17:2,5 154:12
 voltage (1) 120:18

W

wait (3) 87:4 165:23 206:7
 waits (1) 61:15
 walk (1) 75:17
 walked (1) 75:11
 walking (7) 62:15 64:22
 74:22 75:6,13,22 76:3
 wall (1) 75:7
 wallet (1) 77:4
 warmer (2) 107:16 115:12

warning (1) 84:1
 warrant (2) 94:12 95:13
 warrants (1) 30:14
 wash (1) 116:4
 washed (1) 116:8
 wasn't (13) 32:18 69:19
 79:15 92:4 122:19 130:21
 146:10 156:4 165:16
 172:18 176:25 188:9 206:5
 waste (1) 2:24
 wasteland (1) 175:10
 watch (4) 41:6 132:13
 155:21 156:14
 watched (7) 112:9,11 122:22
 139:7,11 140:22 166:15
 watching (5) 15:16 17:8
 40:20,21 85:4
 wave (1) 102:23
 way (45) 4:7,24 24:9 33:7,8
 34:11 45:6,14 54:17 62:13
 64:18 85:1 86:21 87:7,17
 97:14 101:3 105:21
 108:17,21,23 110:3 118:6
 120:15 124:2 125:7,12
 128:9 129:1,22
 130:8,11,12,15 136:7
 137:12 139:17 146:14
 161:23 162:7,11 193:2,15
 208:8 209:9
 wear (1) 45:3
 weatherby (19)
 119:18,20,21,23 120:1,2
 122:19 124:2,12,19 127:25
 128:11 129:13,15
 131:17,19 135:19 137:5
 214:14
 weatherbys (1) 136:21
 website (1) 148:21
 wed (2) 47:2 92:6
 week (7) 1:21 3:2 34:17
 58:6,7 151:25 200:5
 weeks (1) 144:25
 welcome (1) 174:19
 wellfounded (1) 46:23
 wellknown (2) 11:20 49:13
 went (15) 31:20 70:12 71:11
 81:7 82:5,25 154:20,23
 166:24 173:21 179:11
 184:13,14 191:11 212:16
 weren't (1) 107:3
 werfalli (7) 150:13
 151:2,7,20 153:11 154:4,9
 werfallis (1) 150:22
 weve (48) 3:3 18:1 19:24
 35:4 45:13 50:12 51:4 53:9
 59:19 64:18 72:3 77:6
 95:6,22 99:3 100:1 103:25
 125:23 129:14,23 130:7
 131:1 134:23 136:14
 138:17 140:17 144:4
 146:18 150:11 154:22
 164:4,4,16 166:14,15
 172:1 180:10 181:6 182:8
 185:22 187:24 188:24
 192:12,13 202:17 204:4
 206:21 208:20
 whatever (3) 113:16 186:24
 203:6
 whats (4) 158:2,22 164:11
 179:13
 whatsoever (1) 104:25
 whereas (1) 131:8
 wherever (1) 174:19
 whilst (11) 21:18 31:3 34:5
 40:3 42:12 54:23 61:20
 78:4 148:9 155:25 202:6
 whistles (1) 82:16
 white (2) 140:8 165:19
 whoever (2) 123:18 124:15
 whole (5) 5:12 26:18 29:18
 107:11 194:12
 wholly (2) 1:8 9:13
 whom (3) 18:1 58:8 112:7
 whos (3) 73:7 145:6 180:9
 whose (4) 40:5 47:22 163:25
 164:1

william (1) 18:10
 willing (1) 181:11
 willynilly (1) 74:22
 window (5) 56:1,2 76:9,19
 173:16
 windows (1) 76:1
 wire (1) 133:9
 wired (3) 108:17 109:7 133:2
 wiring (4) 64:19 108:13,15
 132:1
 wish (10) 4:21 6:14,18 7:1
 31:7 34:3 45:16 83:15
 105:24 171:8
 wished (1) 197:22
 wishes (2) 9:14 180:19
 withdraw (1) 197:12
 withdrawals (1) 198:4
 withdrawn (2) 198:8,10
 withdrew (1) 87:13
 witness (21) 2:15 3:24 4:1
 6:4,8 11:16 15:11 29:1
 34:11 36:7 39:21 77:16
 85:23 87:13 100:19 112:24
 114:10 122:20 140:18
 142:23 177:17
 witnesses (6) 4:3 5:17 98:25
 108:10 168:12 186:8
 witness (4) 3:22,23,25
 133:16
 wonder (6) 87:4 132:6 185:2
 189:15 193:1 208:20
 wondering (1) 123:25
 wont (7) 16:14 27:2 88:22
 124:19 149:11 171:6 209:6
 work (29) 3:25 7:21 11:8,11
 18:9 20:2 23:19 24:18,25
 29:13 34:25 36:1,22 38:25
 39:6 63:14 65:17 68:3,16
 108:4 119:8 127:18 148:13
 152:23 155:23 164:2
 166:15 198:18 203:19
 worked (6) 1:13 18:22
 29:17,23 106:18 165:16
 working (7) 18:8,16 68:3
 82:10 99:12 128:1 166:17
 workload (1) 13:8
 world (1) 14:11
 worn (1) 88:21
 worth (3) 195:19 208:16
 212:23
 wouldnt (2) 125:9 164:15
 written (1) 121:9
 wrong (1) 26:9
 wyre (1) 175:10

X

x (1) 214:1

Y

y (1) 144:16
 yahya (4) 150:13,22 151:20
 154:4
 yards (1) 62:1
 year (6) 5:8 46:7 69:5,10
 135:9 193:25
 years (10) 9:19 14:19 15:6
 18:22 25:18 33:10,17
 101:13,15 196:21
 yellow (1) 171:12
 yet (4) 146:18 150:3 162:16
 187:24
 yorkshire (1) 26:10
 youd (2) 47:1 56:6
 youll (11) 15:13 35:8 46:2
 54:18,25 61:10,23 95:16
 100:7 160:8,15
 younger (2) 57:22 58:25
 yours (23) 16:19,24 22:1,4
 24:21 32:23 33:15,18
 46:25 56:4,5,17 93:5
 119:23 123:9 124:1,10
 126:6 146:13 148:5,5
 195:10 204:20
 yourself (6) 9:8 23:5 50:17
 64:3 125:21 185:19

youth (1) 3:10
 youtube (1) 4:5
 youve (36) 11:4,18 19:2 33:3
 34:6 50:17 51:5 65:12
 86:10 102:19 103:9 113:10
 119:8 121:20,24 122:23
 123:4,4 125:20,20,25
 130:4,15 132:23 136:6
 154:18 157:3 164:23 167:1
 170:15 172:2 178:11
 182:14 185:18 202:9
 203:16

Z

zero (1) 116:16
 zeros (1) 116:16
 zebra (1) 200:3
 zuhir (2) 147:22 187:8

0

0000001 (1) 118:16
 0001 (1) 118:13
 0106 (1) 25:5
 0135 (2) 82:23,24
 0150 (1) 82:25
 0158 (1) 66:11
 0220 (1) 66:20
 0229 (1) 78:9
 0245 (1) 84:11
 0305 (1) 85:10
 0312 (1) 85:12
 0321 (1) 22:11
 0324 (1) 85:15
 0443 (2) 78:14 88:4
 0448 (2) 85:17 86:5

1

1 (15) 5:11,18 15:10 20:20
 39:21 57:25 58:7 64:13
 89:17 99:9 100:11 116:17
 142:12 164:20 189:1
 10 (16) 18:4 63:17 72:5 75:4
 76:5 80:23 81:18 94:19
 111:5 116:14 132:8 133:24
 146:6 147:13 148:17
 195:18
 100 (3) 207:24 214:12,13
 1000 (2) 38:23 204:17
 10000 (3) 173:25 174:5
 208:10
 1017 (1) 9:18
 1035 (4) 80:2 88:6,14 90:2
 11 (2) 95:17 106:1
 1125 (1) 205:15
 1130 (1) 42:6
 1132 (1) 67:13
 1147 (1) 67:15
 12 (3) 6:6 63:3 173:24
 120 (1) 214:14
 1235 (1) 162:24
 1240 (1) 161:8
 13 (19) 2:18,20,22 3:1
 57:5,18 59:6 99:11 100:8
 139:18 156:7 168:10 188:7
 196:24 198:24 204:21
 206:8 207:21 210:7
 131 (1) 214:15
 134 (2) 214:17,18
 135 (1) 70:23
 137 (1) 154:20
 139 (1) 134:14
 14 (11) 2:18,22 3:1 28:21
 30:19 98:6 125:17 139:13
 156:7 168:10 180:4
 147 (1) 111:2
 15 (12) 58:4,14 59:2,6,9
 60:12 117:18 146:5 147:17
 148:21 166:24 191:11
 1500 (2) 198:10 206:18
 1510 (1) 211:12
 1519 (1) 25:6
 15th (1) 156:23
 16 (4) 49:8 147:6 150:2
 153:9

1600 (1) 198:8
 16000 (1) 39:11
 17 (4) 42:18 114:19 135:11
 201:3
 1700 (1) 206:12
 17000 (1) 39:13
 1721 (1) 90:10
 179 (1) 183:4
 18 (16) 28:7 34:12 54:14
 60:12 61:2,8 142:10
 166:25 167:3 173:13
 179:18 182:16 184:13
 187:19 194:3 209:6
 18000 (1) 208:16
 18th (1) 176:11
 19 (7) 25:6 101:15 125:18
 128:3 147:17 172:3,10
 195 (1) 196:8
 1955 (1) 61:11
 1988 (1) 10:7
 1999 (1) 3:11
 19th (3) 61:9 128:23 184:14

2

2 (22) 5:14,18 14:19 15:20
 20:11,23 22:14 44:10
 64:13 98:14 100:12,24
 134:20 138:1 145:1 176:19
 189:20 193:22 195:4,6
 205:14 207:19
 20 (7) 36:8 63:21 87:4
 148:16 184:4 207:2 210:19
 2000 (1) 28:16
 20000 (1) 39:18
 2003 (1) 10:18
 2005 (1) 11:12
 2007 (1) 11:12
 2010 (1) 11:22
 2011 (2) 196:21,24
 2012 (4) 12:9,15 88:12 89:7
 2014 (2) 12:25 14:3
 2016 (7) 14:17 141:1,16
 179:9 203:25 204:19 205:6
 2017 (31) 7:10 8:12 9:11
 15:2,18 44:12 47:6 53:1
 57:25 67:22 68:24 69:17
 101:3,6 106:4 141:16
 142:10,11 145:1,1 154:24
 189:1 196:13,14,24 198:24
 200:24 202:3 206:1
 209:3,19
 2018 (2) 62:20 101:7
 2019 (1) 42:18
 2020 (3) 1:1 15:15 213:6
 2023 (1) 62:20
 2030 (2) 63:15 64:17
 2048 (1) 63:18
 2051 (2) 63:21 64:1
 20th (1) 150:9
 21 (15) 2:1,2 94:10 134:21
 146:5 147:6 156:25
 169:15,16 170:13 171:5,10
 180:17 196:2 199:4
 211448 (1) 208:5
 2133 (1) 64:21
 21st (2) 61:9 211:11
 22 (22) 1:25 2:3 8:12 9:11
 15:18 29:18 40:3,5 43:1,13
 44:12 46:7,16 61:9,11
 69:17 88:23 131:25 173:13
 198:7 199:6 200:8
 2230 (1) 64:22
 2231 (2) 15:17 40:3
 22nd (2) 169:1 176:11
 23 (29) 2:1,5 16:17 17:11
 20:11 22:11 28:3,15 29:18
 35:9 42:6 44:14 47:21
 66:11 70:23 80:2 88:4,6
 90:2,10 94:13,19
 95:11,14,17 102:11 106:5
 186:5 207:10
 230 (3) 134:8,10,16
 2327 (1) 16:4
 235 (1) 134:7
 23rd (3) 25:5 30:6 133:24

24 (8) 18:6 30:8 69:10
 102:11 142:11 187:5
 198:10 208:3
 247 (1) 69:4
 24hour (3) 18:7 34:10,17
 24th (1) 106:5
 25 (4) 1:6 38:21 150:8
 209:19
 26 (1) 106:4
 268 (1) 2:16
 27 (3) 5:8 15:15 135:9
 28 (1) 187:14
 2926 (1) 110:24

3

3 (12) 3:17 5:22 16:25 21:2
 44:22 100:12 114:19
 135:10 169:12 195:7,24
 212:20
 30 (2) 5:6 25:18
 3000 (1) 111:7
 3021 (1) 142:14
 31 (1) 89:22
 3104 (1) 208:18
 35 (3) 9:19 33:10,17
 212:20
 360degree (1) 94:4
 365 (2) 69:5,10
 37 (1) 178:13
 39 (2) 60:16 182:13

4

4 (8) 5:24 21:4 29:1 63:2
 114:19 178:7 206:10
 212:21
 400 (1) 62:1
 4000 (1) 39:16
 41 (2) 28:16 50:14
 410 (1) 195:21
 42 (1) 28:6
 424 (1) 195:23
 43 (1) 61:12
 430 (1) 194:19
 44 (6) 52:24 53:8,13 149:6
 154:15 181:7
 45 (1) 195:7
 450 (1) 213:4
 46 (1) 3:10
 48 (1) 65:24

5

5 (9) 6:2 15:14 21:7 29:1
 51:1 54:19 83:17 141:1
 145:1
 500 (2) 62:1 194:20
 51 (1) 139:19
 55 (2) 49:10 153:6
 5923 (1) 209:21

6

6 (11) 6:4 11:1 21:10 22:23
 33:20 35:7,10 58:3,25
 204:17,19
 67 (2) 214:6,7

7

7 (7) 1:1 6:8 11:2 34:17
 64:20 214:3,4
 71 (1) 97:15
 72 (2) 90:7 91:8
 74 (15) 52:11,20,21 53:12
 59:12 115:16 116:11
 135:19,22 136:9,15,24
 155:3 158:17 179:3

8