

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 45

December 8, 2020

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1 Tuesday, 8 December 2020  
 2 (9.30 am)  
 3 MR DE LA POER: Sir, good morning. The first witness this  
 4 morning is Mr Paul Ryder. We are interposing him in the  
 5 SIO's evidence to deal with the oil cans because they  
 6 were a discrete piece of work within the investigation  
 7 and so this goes back to the device and its construction  
 8 in part 2 of Mr Barraclough's evidence.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 10 MR PAUL RYDER (sworn)  
 11 Questions from MR DE LA POER  
 12 MR DE LA POER: What is your full name, please?  
 13 A. Paul Francis Ryder.  
 14 Q. Mr Ryder, I'm going to look at your qualifications  
 15 firstly to establish your expertise. Do you have  
 16 a Bachelor of Science degree?  
 17 A. I do, yes.  
 18 Q. Are you a chartered chemist?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. A member of the Royal Society of Chemistry?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And do you have over 30 years of experience in the  
 23 practice of forensic science?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Is your particular area of interest and specialism marks

1

1 and trace evidence?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. At the trial of Hashem Abedi, you gave evidence over the  
 4 course of 2 days in relation to three principal areas of  
 5 investigation; is that right?  
 6 A. I did, yes.  
 7 Q. Those three areas related to the blue barrels recovered  
 8 from the Nissan and 21 Elsmore Road; is that right?  
 9 A. That's correct, yes.  
 10 Q. That included comment on their sealing rings, which we  
 11 saw yesterday in the animation?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. You also commented upon tape recovered from the arena  
 14 scene and from Granby Row; is that right?  
 15 A. I did, yes.  
 16 Q. Finally, and perhaps most substantially, you dealt with  
 17 the reconstruction of oil cans?  
 18 A. I did.  
 19 Q. Let's just deal with the first two areas very briefly.  
 20 So far as the barrels are concerned, we need to say  
 21 no more than this, do we, for present purposes, that  
 22 Mr Barraclough gave evidence yesterday about them; is  
 23 that right?  
 24 A. I understand so, yes.  
 25 Q. So we'll leave those. As to the tape, is it correct

2

1 that there were two types of tape recovered from within  
 2 the City Room?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right, yes, at the arena.  
 4 Q. Thank you. Also two types of tape recovered from  
 5 Granby Row?  
 6 A. There was more than two types, but two types  
 7 corresponded with those.  
 8 Q. In particular?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And that you compared two of the types of tape recovered  
 11 from Granby Row with the two types recovered from the  
 12 arena and you found those to be visually and chemically  
 13 indistinguishable?  
 14 A. That's correct, yes.  
 15 Q. You regarded that as a significant finding?  
 16 A. I did.  
 17 Q. And that was consistent with the tape being used in  
 18 Granby Row also being used from the same roll in the  
 19 device?  
 20 A. That's correct, yes.  
 21 Q. That again formed an important part of the evidence  
 22 against Hashem Abedi; is that right?  
 23 A. That's right, yes.  
 24 Q. Having dealt with those first two areas in summary form,  
 25 let's turn to the oil cans. What instruction were you

3

1 given in relation to your work in relation to the oil  
 2 cans?  
 3 A. We had pieces of can, oil can, that were recovered  
 4 from — there was a single piece from the arena, some  
 5 pieces from Elsmore Road, and other pieces from  
 6 Granby House. So the purpose was to determine whether  
 7 or not there was any association between these pieces of  
 8 metal, either through being able to reconstruct barrels  
 9 or the drums and/or any tool mark correspondences  
 10 between them to indicate that they'd all been cut by the  
 11 same tool.  
 12 Q. Was the principal significance of that because it was  
 13 plain that part of an oil can was used in the device?  
 14 A. That's correct, yes.  
 15 Q. So establishing who had handled other parts of the can  
 16 that had been cut from may be evidentially significant?  
 17 A. That's right, yes.  
 18 Q. And finding examples which may amount to experimentation  
 19 with the oil cans, designed at working towards  
 20 prototype, was also evidentially significant?  
 21 A. That is what's believed, yes.  
 22 Q. Let's deal, given that you have mentioned them, with  
 23 tools. Was a pair of tin snips, as they're referred to,  
 24 recovered from the Nissan Micra?  
 25 A. Yes.

4

1 Q. And is that a tool which can be used to cut thin sheet  
 2 metal?  
 3 A. Yes, it is.  
 4 Q. Was there also a pair of pliers seized from  
 5 21 Elsmore Road?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And are both of those tools capable of being used in the  
 8 cutting and manipulation of thin sheet metal?  
 9 A. They are, yes.  
 10 Q. Were you given any other tools that were, in your view  
 11 relevant to your assessment of the oil cans?  
 12 A. I was provided with, I think it was two pairs of  
 13 scissors, but those were readily eliminated because they  
 14 weren't capable of cutting the metal that we were  
 15 considering.  
 16 Q. What technique did you use to establish whether or not  
 17 the tools that you'd been given had been used  
 18 in relation to the pieces of can that were also provided  
 19 to you?  
 20 A. In terms of the can, what we do is we make an assessment  
 21 of the type of tool that's been used and from  
 22 examination under a microscope we could determine that  
 23 the pieces of metal had been cut by a twin-bladed tool  
 24 with blades that actually cross over each other in  
 25 a scissor-type action. But because they were cutting

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1 through sheet metal it was obviously going to be  
 2 something more substantial than scissors, something  
 3 along the lines of tin snips. So in terms of doing  
 4 a comparison with the tools that we were provided with,  
 5 we then create test impressions with the actual tools  
 6 and then compare the detail and the marks that we  
 7 created at the laboratory with the detail in the marks  
 8 on the pieces of metal that we'd been provided with.  
 9 Q. At the end of that examination and experimentation, did  
 10 you reach a conclusion about whether or not the tools  
 11 that you'd been given had been used to cut the cans?  
 12 A. All the tools that we'd been provided with were  
 13 excluded.  
 14 Q. So does that mean therefore that one or more tools that  
 15 were not recovered by the investigation must have been  
 16 used?  
 17 A. That's correct, yes.  
 18 Q. Were you able to identify how many tools were used?  
 19 A. We believe that the cuts to the side walls of the cans  
 20 were all made by a single tool.  
 21 Q. So we've dealt with this in just a couple of minutes,  
 22 but extremely detailed and careful work?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just as a matter of interest, and it  
 25 really doesn't matter, can you tell by looking at a tool

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1 uniquely whether it has caused a cut on the metal?  
 2 A. You can, yes.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's like a fingerprint?  
 4 A. Effectively. There are features imparted on to a tool  
 5 as a result of the manufacturing, which will be unique  
 6 to the tool at the point that it is new in some cases.  
 7 And as a tool is used it will become damaged and worn  
 8 and that will add additional character to it, so if you  
 9 get sufficient correspondence you can say conclusively  
 10 that a tool has made a particular mark.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 12 MR DE LA POER: So in addition to that careful and detailed  
 13 work, did you also look to reconstruct, so far as you  
 14 were able, the pieces of can with a view to determining  
 15 which cans those pieces came from?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. In effect, and I'm not looking to downplay the  
 18 complexity of the task, like reassembling a jigsaw?  
 19 A. That's effectively what it was, yes.  
 20 Q. Did that lead you to conclude that there were two types  
 21 of oil can that you had pieces for?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. One of the types being a branded KTC?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And one type being branded Consumer Pride?

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1 A. That's right, yes.  
 2 Q. As part of your process, did you give each of the pieces  
 3 of metal that you'd been given an identifier?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. And as you reconstructed them, did you give each of the  
 6 oil cans a letter to designate it separate from the  
 7 others?  
 8 A. That's right, yes.  
 9 Q. At the end of the process, had you reconstructed oil  
 10 cans, to a greater or lesser degree, A through to G?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. Of those oil cans, and we'll look at the reconstructions  
 13 for each, was oil can F the most significant?  
 14 A. I believe so, yes.  
 15 Q. And is the reason for that significance because oil  
 16 can F is the oil can from which the piece recovered from  
 17 the arena came?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. Having performed your reconstruction, no doubt carefully  
 20 photographing and scheduling as you went, did you then  
 21 work with a computer design programme to create an  
 22 animation which shows the reconstruction?  
 23 A. I provided the materials for a computer analyst,  
 24 a computer designer to do that work. I had no other  
 25 involvement in it other than reviewing the end product.

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1 Q. I can see you smiling. Is that because it was an  
 2 extremely technical task undertaken by someone with  
 3 expertise that you don't have?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. You have reviewed those animations and you are satisfied  
 6 that they accurately represent the work that you did?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. So what we're going to do now is consider three of those  
 9 animations, each of them relatively short, and we'll  
 10 begin with the oil drum F animation. {CPS000166/1}.  
 11 (Video played to the inquiry)  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So F came from Elsmore Road?  
 13 MR DE LA POER: That part of F did, sir.  
 14 The parts highlighted in blue -- is this right,  
 15 Mr Ryder -- they came from Elsmore Road?  
 16 A. The blue ones, yes.  
 17 Q. The blue highlighted ones, yes, but I think we're to  
 18 come to pieces that were recovered from two other  
 19 locations.  
 20 (Video playing continued)  
 21 These pieces here, Granby Row?  
 22 A. That's correct, yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure it looks much easier than it  
 24 was.  
 25 A. It was a challenge to put them back together, yes.

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1 MR DE LA POER: Pause it there, please, Mr Lopez.  
 2 We can see that it is piece 34 that is the piece  
 3 that was recovered from the arena.  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. Whereas we can see that the large section principally  
 6 came from, or rather entirely came from, Elsmore Road?  
 7 A. That's right.  
 8 Q. And the other smaller pieces, Granby Row?  
 9 A. That's correct, yes.  
 10 Q. Play on, please.  
 11 (Video playing continued)  
 12 Thank you very much indeed.  
 13 The next animation is one that I think you are aware  
 14 of, although it is outside of your expertise, but it  
 15 follows on immediately from this one. I think you're  
 16 aware that your colleague, Philip Balduini, who is an  
 17 expert in fingerprints, analysed the pieces that you had  
 18 reconstructed for the purpose of establishing whether  
 19 there were fingerprints connected to those who were  
 20 being investigated; is that right?  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. So we'll just, as part of the sequence of your evidence,  
 23 albeit it's outside your expertise, just play that,  
 24 please. {CPS000167/1}.  
 25 I think in the course of this animation we're going

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1 to see photographs of the actual pieces as they were  
 2 found.  
 3 (Video played to the inquiry)  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they're all pieces with  
 5 Hashem Abedi's fingerprints on them?  
 6 MR DE LA POER: Indeed, sir.  
 7 (Video playing continued)  
 8 A. This particular piece of metal was found inside the  
 9 bigger piece, it was folded up, and it doesn't actually  
 10 form any part of those oil drums, it forms part of some  
 11 of the catering tins.  
 12 Q. It appears this piece of metal with those lines in it  
 13 had been used to form, as we're going to see here,  
 14 a container in its own right?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And that was the state it was found in?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 (Video playing continued)  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So a reasonable inference, we're looking  
 20 at experiments of making a bomb or something like that?  
 21 A. That would be outside my area of expertise, but it's  
 22 forming some sort of parcel with it.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, thank you.  
 24 (Video playing continued)  
 25 MR DE LA POER: We see now the state in which those pieces

11

1 of metal were recovered in?  
 2 A. That's right, yes.  
 3 Q. Namely as tubes?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 (Video playing continued)  
 6 A. I think the significant issue with some of these  
 7 fingerprints is the location on the inner surface  
 8 in that you cannot access that without actually  
 9 physically cutting up the drum in the first place.  
 10 Q. We saw this yesterday with Mr Gallagher. It perhaps  
 11 takes on a clearer meaning when we see it in the context  
 12 of this animation.  
 13 (Video playing continued)  
 14 Thank you very much, Mr Lopez. We can take that  
 15 down now.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We've seen a great many of  
 17 Hashem Abedi's fingerprints and of course this was  
 18 prepared for his trial.  
 19 MR DE LA POER: Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does that mean that there weren't  
 21 Salman Abedi's fingerprints on the cans at all or simply  
 22 they're not there because this was the trial of  
 23 Hashem Abedi and not Salman Abedi?  
 24 MR DE LA POER: We will confirm this in a moment with the  
 25 senior investigating officer when he returns, but my

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1 understanding is that Salman Abedi's scientific trace  
 2 evidence was included where found --  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: -- so that it wasn't excluded and we saw, in  
 5 fact, on that last piece from the arena, it was his DNA,  
 6 but we'll confirm that with Mr Barraclough.  
 7 The final animation is oil drums 8E and G, please.  
 8 {INQ033894/1}. These were all recovered from  
 9 21 Elsmore Road, weren't they?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. But, as we've touched on already, the state they were in  
 12 reveals that one explanation is that they were being  
 13 used in experiments?  
 14 A. That's what I understand, yes.  
 15 (Video played to the inquiry)  
 16 Q. It seems with drum A nothing more was done to it than to  
 17 open it, presumably for the purpose of removing its  
 18 content?  
 19 A. Part of the lid was removed, but for what purpose  
 20 I don't know.  
 21 (Video playing continued)  
 22 Q. I think here we have a good example of what you were  
 23 referring to about the fingerprints, that without  
 24 cutting into the can, it's not possible to put  
 25 a fingerprint on the inside where it was found?

13

1 A. That's correct, yes.  
 2 Q. In other words, it must be the case that that  
 3 fingerprint was left after the can had been cut?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 (Video playing continued)  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that has answered the question  
 7 I had about whether Salman Abedi's fingerprints were  
 8 shown as well, and they clearly were.  
 9 MR DE LA POER: Finally, sir, we are to hear from a witness  
 10 next week who owned a takeaway, who used brands, among  
 11 others KTC, which we saw was oil can E, who permitted  
 12 Hashem to take that oil can away.  
 13 Mr Ryder, thank you very much indeed. Those are the  
 14 questions I have for you. We don't have notice that  
 15 there are any questions from core participants for you,  
 16 but as with Mr Gallagher, can I just ask you to wait  
 17 outside for a period of about 20 minutes, just in case  
 18 anything has arisen during your evidence and if it has,  
 19 we'll let you know.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Ryder, thank you very much. We've  
 21 gone through your evidence extremely quickly. I'm well  
 22 aware it would have taken a huge amount of time,  
 23 dedication and effort by those forensic scientists who  
 24 achieved what they did in the evidence they presented to  
 25 the trial, so thank you.

14

1 (The witness withdrew)  
 2 MR DE LA POER: As Mr Ryder leaves and we prepare for  
 3 Mr Barraclough to return, may we put the holding slide  
 4 on for a couple of moments?  
 5 (Pause)  
 6 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued)  
 7 Questions from MR GREANEY (continued)  
 8 MR GREANEY: Mr Barraclough, in a moment we'll turn to  
 9 part 4 of your main witness statement, but as you will  
 10 recall, yesterday you undertook to conduct some further  
 11 enquiries into certain deposits that were made into the  
 12 bank account of Salman Abedi. I know that you do have  
 13 answers to the questions that were posed by Sir John.  
 14 What I'm going to ask is that you just delay giving us  
 15 those answers and Mr de la Poer will ask you further  
 16 questions, if not later today then tomorrow morning, and  
 17 you can give him the answers at that stage.  
 18 A. Thank you, Mr Greaney.  
 19 Q. So I'm turning then, as I indicated, to part 4 of your  
 20 witness statement, which addresses the investigation of  
 21 Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi in further detail.  
 22 Sir, I'm at page 50, paragraph 212, of that witness  
 23 statement.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 25 MR GREANEY: So that everyone knows what's coming, in this

15

1 part you address 10 separate, albeit to some extent  
 2 connected, topics. First of all, the family of  
 3 Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi and their personal  
 4 history.  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. Secondly, the movements of, in particular, Salman Abedi.  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. Thirdly, the travel of the Abedi family.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Fourthly, the neighbours of the Abedis.  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Fifthly, you deal with the topic of radicalisation,  
 13 which of course we're parking until chapter 13.  
 14 A. I understand.  
 15 Q. Sixthly, you deal very briefly indeed with Prevent,  
 16 which, as we know, is one of the strands of CONTEST, but  
 17 again you do so only very briefly because you defer to  
 18 your colleague Dominic Scaly in relation to that issue.  
 19 A. Yes, I do.  
 20 Q. Seventhly, you deal with the convictions and cautions of  
 21 the Abedi family.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Eighth, reconnaissance, by which I mean hostile  
 24 reconnaissance.  
 25 A. Yes.

16

1 Q. Ninth, you deal with the topic of work for G4S, or at  
2 any rate Salman Abedi's application to work for that  
3 organisation.  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And tenthly, you deal with the extradition of  
6 Hashem Abedi from Libya to the United Kingdom.  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. Let's deal with those in turn. The first topic --  
9 you're just about to be handed a folder. Thank you.  
10 The first topic is the family of Salman Abedi and  
11 Hashem Abedi and their personal history.  
12 Did the identification of members of Salman Abedi's  
13 family, once he had been identified, come from three  
14 principal sources?  
15 A. Yes, it did.  
16 Q. First of all, was a source the research of police  
17 systems?  
18 A. Yes, it was.  
19 Q. Because, as we're going to hear, Salman Abedi and other  
20 members of the Abedi family had previously had what I'll  
21 describe at this stage as interactions with the police?  
22 A. That's correct, yes.  
23 Q. The second source, checks with relevant public  
24 authorities?  
25 A. Yes, that's right.

17

1 Q. And thirdly, speaking to those believed to be associated  
2 with Abedi, either in the sense of being family members  
3 or friends?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. Within an hour of Salman Abedi being identified, had his  
6 home address been confirmed?  
7 A. Yes, it had.  
8 Q. Did that enable in turn other occupants of that address  
9 to be identified and then investigated?  
10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
11 Q. In the hours and days of the investigation that  
12 followed, were very many enquiries conducted, including  
13 checks with local and Central Government departments?  
14 A. Yes, comprehensive checks.  
15 Q. Did those include, simply by way of example, checking  
16 council tax records and making enquiries of the  
17 Department for Work and Pensions?  
18 A. That's right, yes.  
19 Q. Did those checks, among others, discover details of  
20 Salman Abedi's parents?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. His siblings?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Other addresses linked to his home address?  
25 A. Yes.

18

1 Q. Details, or at least some of them, of his communications  
2 data?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Some of his travel history?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. And also financial information?  
7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
8 Q. So really, from a very early stage did you start to  
9 develop a picture about this man, Salman Abedi?  
10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
11 Q. By 29 May had your team been able to pull together  
12 something that is referred to as an intelligence subject  
13 profile?  
14 A. Yes, that's right.  
15 Q. I believe there's nothing sensitive about this document  
16 and it is worth just looking at a couple of passages to  
17 seek your further assistance, if you can provide  
18 assistance at this stage. If you can't, just say,  
19 because you'll remain in the witness box for certainly  
20 the rest of today and tomorrow.  
21 The INQ reference for the intelligence subject  
22 profile is {INQ030643/1}. Next page, please.  
23 {INQ030643/2}. And the next page, {INQ030643/3}.  
24 We can see that by this stage you had a photograph  
25 of him at the airport; is that correct?

19

1 A. That's correct, yes.  
2 Q. Was this a photograph of him on 15 April as he travelled  
3 from the United Kingdom to Libya?  
4 A. I am not entirely sure, but I think that would make  
5 sense, yes.  
6 Q. I think that's right.  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. It doesn't look like the photo on his return --  
9 A. No it doesn't, no.  
10 Q. The only detail I wanted to draw attention to was that  
11 you had by this stage, 29 May, already identified  
12 a number of telephone numbers that were associated with  
13 him?  
14 A. That's correct, although these are quite historic,  
15 I think.  
16 Q. Yes. One of the numbers, indeed it is given as current  
17 telephone number, is a number that ends 3458?  
18 A. Yes, that's right.  
19 Q. You'll be able to confirm now, or if not now in due  
20 course, that 3458 is a number that is of importance, is  
21 it not?  
22 A. I think so, but I'd have to refer to ...  
23 Q. There are a lot of numbers, I fully appreciate that.  
24 Let me remind you because I have been able to do the  
25 check. 3458 is an important number and will become

20

1 increasingly important as we proceed into chapter 13,  
 2 radicalisation , because 3458 is a number that was  
 3 established to have been in contact extensively with  
 4 a man called Abdalraouf Abdallah.  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. You don't need me to tell you that there are concerns  
 7 about the extent to which that convicted terrorist  
 8 played a role in the radicalisation of Salman Abedi;  
 9 am I correct?  
 10 A. Yes, it forms part of the concern and picture, yes.  
 11 Q. We're going to need to look at 3458 in that connection.  
 12 While we're dealing with it, 3458, let me remind  
 13 you, was also in contact -- so 3458, Salman Abedi's  
 14 number, was also in contact with a name that you'll be  
 15 familiar with, Abdul Rahman Benhammedi; does that name  
 16 ring a bell?  
 17 A. Yes, it does.  
 18 Q. Who, at the time at which Abedi was in contact with him,  
 19 was charged with an offence under the Terrorism Act,  
 20 namely possession of an article for a purpose connected  
 21 with terrorism. And you will remember, he was  
 22 discovered at the airport with a sniper manual. Do you  
 23 recall that?  
 24 A. I do recall. I'd have to check the detail of the phone  
 25 and the actual date.

21

1 Q. And no doubt you will do that, but for the time being,  
 2 I am sure you will take it from me --  
 3 A. Yes, I will.  
 4 Q. -- that 3458 was in touch with each of those persons,  
 5 but out of fairness I ought to indicate that while  
 6 Abdalraouf Abdallah is a convicted terrorist, Abdul  
 7 Rahman Benhammedi was in fact acquitted of the offence  
 8 with which he was charged.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Again, When we deal with telephone  
 10 numbers, we will just use the last four numbers as is  
 11 conventional in court?  
 12 MR GREANEY: That is my plan, yes, sir, unless there is some  
 13 good reason for not doing so.  
 14 In relation to relatives and friends who were  
 15 identified, from some of them you were able to obtain an  
 16 account about the family history; is that correct?  
 17 A. Yes, that's right.  
 18 Q. Some of those accounts were obtained voluntarily from  
 19 the witnesses and some of them were obtained during  
 20 interviews under caution?  
 21 A. Yes, they were, that's correct.  
 22 Q. One of the relatives from whom you obtained an  
 23 account -- and I'm now at paragraph 219 of your  
 24 statement -- was a person named Rabaa Abedi; is that  
 25 correct?

22

1 A. Yes, that's right.  
 2 Q. Is Rabaa Abedi the aunt of Salman and Hashem Abedi?  
 3 A. She is, yes.  
 4 Q. And the sister of the father of those brothers, Ramadan  
 5 Abedi?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. She, I think, is resident in Canada?  
 8 A. She is, yes.  
 9 Q. Did she explain that her brother, Ramadan, had joined  
 10 the Libyan police?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. In the early 1990s, he had entered into an arranged  
 13 marriage with Samia, the mother of Salman Abedi and  
 14 Hashem Abedi?  
 15 A. Yes, that's what she said.  
 16 Q. Did she explain that a year after their wedding, Ramadan  
 17 and Samia had fled Libya?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Ramadan having been interrogated by the authorities amid  
 20 accusations that his wife, Samia, was practising  
 21 religion?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And did Rabaa explain to you that fearing for their  
 24 safety, the couple had left Libya and travelled first to  
 25 Tunisia and then to Saudi Arabia and then to the

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1 United Kingdom?  
 2 A. That's correct, yes.  
 3 Q. We'll return to her account in due course.  
 4 Having received that explanation from her, and  
 5 I don't know, perhaps before, did the investigation  
 6 conduct enquiries with the Home Office to see what was  
 7 known about the immigration status of Ramadan and Samia?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. I will set this out because it may become relevant in  
 10 due course. Did Home Office records indicate that  
 11 Ramadan had married Samia on 16 December 1990 in  
 12 Tripoli?  
 13 A. That's correct.  
 14 Q. That he arrived into the United Kingdom on 3 July 1993  
 15 and applied for asylum 5 days later on 8 July?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Did the enquiries that you conducted further establish  
 18 that Ramadan's asylum application was originally refused  
 19 and at that time his nationality had been shown as  
 20 Lebanese, not Libyan?  
 21 A. That's right, yes.  
 22 Q. And that that refusal had been based on the assessment  
 23 of the Home Office that Ramadan's claims regarding  
 24 employment in the security services in Libya were false?  
 25 A. Yes.

24

1 Q. That the claimed nature of his departure from Libya was  
2 not credible?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. That there were, it was thought, numerous  
5 inconsistencies in his application?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. That he had produced a forged medical letter in relation  
8 to his wife?  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. And that he had failed to claim asylum in Tunisia, which  
11 was one of his points on his journey to the  
12 United Kingdom?  
13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
14 Q. Did the records further reveal that Ramadan appealed  
15 that decision on 11 May 1995, but again that appeal was  
16 refused?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. But that he persisted with several further appeals and,  
19 in the end, he was granted what you describe in your  
20 statement as refugee status on 28 November 1997?  
21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
22 Q. By virtue of their marriage, was Samia granted that same  
23 status at around the same time?  
24 A. Yes, she was.  
25 Q. Just completing the picture in relation to the parents'

25

1 immigration status, following a further application was  
2 Ramadan granted indefinite leave to remain in the  
3 United Kingdom on 26 September 2002?  
4 A. Yes, he was.  
5 Q. Did he go on to apply for British citizenship, but that  
6 was refused on 6 September 2004?  
7 A. That's correct, yes.  
8 Q. With, as you established, that refusal having occurred  
9 on character grounds as a result of his previous  
10 convictions to which we'll turn?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. From July 1993 to September 1993, was Ramadan Abedi  
13 providing an address in London?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. But from the latter of those dates, September 1993, was  
16 he shown as resident in Manchester?  
17 A. He was.  
18 Q. The position, I believe, is that Ramadan was finally  
19 naturalised following his second citizenship application  
20 on 9 May 2007?  
21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
22 Q. That deals with information provided by Rabaa Abedi, the  
23 aunt, and your confirmatory investigations with the  
24 Home Office.  
25 Still dealing with what other family members were

26

1 able to tell you about the family circumstances, as  
2 I believe you have told us already, Ismail Abedi, the  
3 elder brother of Salman and Hashem Abedi, was arrested  
4 on 23 May and interviewed extensively?  
5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
6 Q. In interview, did he explain that he had recently,  
7 that's to say recently to May 2017, asked for help from  
8 his parents in relation to both Salman and Hashem Abedi?  
9 A. He said that, yes.  
10 Q. Did he explain that his parents had been residing in  
11 Libya with the younger children at the time?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. And that he, Ismail, had developed a concern that Hashem  
14 and Salman were behind with their studies?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. He had found out that they'd dropped out of education  
17 and members of the community had approached him, Ismail,  
18 to let him know that Hashem was taking illegal drugs?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. And did he also explain that he himself held suspicions  
21 that both Hashem and Salman were involved in fraud?  
22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
23 Q. Did Ismail go on to say that the fact that he contacted  
24 his parents to deal with these issues had caused  
25 a degree of friction between himself and his two

27

1 brothers?  
2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
3 Q. And that he felt he lacked parental control over Salman  
4 and Hashem, who resided at a different address from him?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does anybody know how much older Ismail  
7 is than Salman?  
8 MR DE LA POER: We certainly do know. I think  
9 Mr Barraclough is looking.  
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If necessary, we can wait for a break  
11 for people to find out.  
12 A. I'm hoping that my filing system works, sir.  
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Undoubtedly things will come up, so feel  
14 free to say you will deal with them later.  
15 A. Ismail Abedi's date of birth is **DPA**  
16 MR GREANEY: So he's 17 months older than Salman?  
17 A. So Salman is 31 December 1994. Hashem Abedi is  
18 8 April 1997. The other siblings are considerably  
19 younger.  
20 Q. Indeed.  
21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
22 MR GREANEY: Sir, there is a family tree produced by  
23 Mr Barraclough, which is helpful. I deliberately  
24 haven't introduced it so far because there may be some  
25 issues of sensitivity concerning certain aspects of it.

28



1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's answered the question that  
 2 I immediately wanted to know the answer to, so that's  
 3 fine, thank you.  
 4 MR GREANEY: So there was a degree of friction, as you have  
 5 explained Ismail explained. Did he go on to say this  
 6 was a problem because, as the eldest in the UK, he was  
 7 expected to keep an eye out for his brothers, but this  
 8 was almost impossible because they would frequently, for  
 9 example, change their mobile telephone numbers?  
 10 A. Yes, that was his account, yes.  
 11 Q. And that when he did contact them, they would hang up?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. So he was effectively presenting a situation in which  
 14 he was expected to keep an eye out for them, but they  
 15 were not under his control?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. As you'll appreciate, we're going to look in further  
 18 detail at Ismail Abedi in due course in your evidence.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Did you also interview, on this same topic of what  
 21 family members contributed, a man called  
 22 Abderahman Forjani?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And is he a cousin of Hashem and Salman Abedi?  
 25 A. He is.

29

1 Q. Was he able to provide you with a deal of information --  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. -- about the family circumstances? Indeed, in due  
 4 course, he was to provide you with a signed statement  
 5 dated 31 May 2017?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. Did he explain that the Abedi family was deeply  
 8 religious?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And that members would visit the mosque for nearly all  
 11 of the five prayers each day?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Did he explain that he had been friendly with his  
 14 cousin, Salman, whilst growing up and that at one stage  
 15 at least they had considered each other best friends?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. Did he explain, as indeed you were to hear from other  
 18 witnesses, that Salman had led a relatively normal  
 19 teenage life?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Hanging out, partying, drinking and smoking cannabis?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And that indeed they had tried other drugs, including  
 24 ecstasy and cocaine?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

30

1 Q. But throughout the period of that behaviour, they had  
 2 still made time for prayers and, as he put it,  
 3 maintaining their faith?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. But he was to go on to explain, as you will confirm,  
 6 although this is something for examination in  
 7 chapter 13, there came a time in about 2015 or 2016 when  
 8 Salman Abedi's behaviour changed drastically?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. Abderahman was to go on, I believe, to explain something  
 11 of the relationship between the Abedi family and the  
 12 Libyan political situation; is that correct?  
 13 A. That's correct, yes.  
 14 Q. Indeed, as we'll come on to see, you were to learn that  
 15 Ramadan Abedi had been heavily involved in the  
 16 anti-Gaddafi movement?  
 17 A. Those are the accounts we received, yes.  
 18 Q. Did Abderahman, the cousin of the brothers, explain that  
 19 following the downfall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011,  
 20 Salman Abedi had travelled to Libya and obtained a job  
 21 locating Gaddafi supporters?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And at that stage, Salman Abedi would have been 16 years  
 24 of age?  
 25 A. Yes, he would.

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1 Q. He turned 17 at the very end of that year.  
 2 Abderahman, I believe, explained that Salman had  
 3 been involved in raves during that period?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Had had his own flat and enjoyed his life?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And had started using the strong painkiller, tramadol?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And importantly for our purposes, and we'll see more of  
 10 this in due course, did Abderahman explain that he had  
 11 been shown by Salman Abedi photographs of military  
 12 vehicles, weapons and rocket launchers?  
 13 A. He did, yes.  
 14 Q. And when Salman returned to the United Kingdom after  
 15 about 9 months, did Abderahman Forjani explain that  
 16 he had been told to stay away from Salman?  
 17 A. Yes, he did.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: By whom?  
 19 A. By his family, sir, by his parents.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 21 MR GREANEY: The account of Abderahman didn't end there. He  
 22 explained, I think, that after the summer of 2012,  
 23 Salman returned to the United Kingdom to start at  
 24 Manchester College.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. That he was still taking tramadol and that his "partying  
2 got worse like he was on a bender for quite a long  
3 time".  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And he, Salman, had mentioned suicidal thoughts,  
6 dizziness and feeling weak when he tried to come off  
7 tramadol?  
8 A. Yes, that's correct.  
9 Q. Pausing for a moment, we're going to come on very  
10 shortly to deal with the medical records of Salman Abedi  
11 and Hashem Abedi, but in short there was nothing to  
12 indicate any history of mental illness, was there?  
13 A. No, there was not.  
14 Q. On 8 July 2014, as Abderahman explained to you, Salman  
15 had travelled from Manchester to Tripoli?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. Since the uprising, the situation in Libya had been at  
18 times chaotic, violent and unpredictable?  
19 A. Yes, that's right.  
20 Q. As a result of which, on 4 August 2014, Salman and  
21 Hashem Abedi had been evacuated to the United Kingdom  
22 aboard HMS Enterprise via Malta?  
23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
24 Q. And as we'll adduce from you when you return in  
25 chapter 13, Abderahman thereafter gave you a lot of

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1 information about the circumstances in which  
2 Salman Abedi had changed?  
3 A. That's correct.  
4 Q. Including the fact that Abderahman was to explain that  
5 he had seen Salman Abedi in the company of  
6 Abdalraouf Abdallah?  
7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
8 Q. Other members of the Forjani family also gave you  
9 accounts; is that correct?  
10 A. Yes, that's right.  
11 Q. And in those accounts, they confirmed the changes in  
12 Salman Abedi and indeed Hashem Abedi to which Abderahman  
13 had referred?  
14 A. That's correct, yes.  
15 Q. You also spoke to a witness that we are calling Trial  
16 Witness 3; this is paragraph 234 of your statement.  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. The principal importance of that witness is that he was  
19 to corroborate the change in Salman Abedi's lifestyle?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. But there's just one other aspect that I would like you  
22 to confirm from his account: did Trial Witness 3 explain  
23 that, in 2016, an associate of Salman Abedi had been  
24 murdered?  
25 A. Yes, he did.

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1 Q. Was the name of that associate Abdul Wahab Hafidah?  
2 A. Yes, it was.  
3 Q. And had he been murdered in a gang-related incident in  
4 this city?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. In very simple terms, and this is information that's  
7 available from open sources, he was murdered in  
8 May 2016?  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. It was claimed during the course of the prosecution case  
11 that he was part of a gang called the Rusholme Crips?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. And he was killed, as convictions at trial established,  
14 by members of a Moss Side gang?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Known as Active Only or AO?  
17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
18 Q. Did your investigation — and if there is any  
19 sensitivity about this, I know you'll tell me, I don't  
20 believe there is — reveal any connection between Salman  
21 and/or Hashem Abedi and the Rusholme Crips criminal  
22 gang?  
23 A. No, it did not.  
24 Q. In any event, you conducted some investigations into  
25 what Trial Witness 3 told you in this regard and the

35

1 investigation identified that the New York Times was  
2 reported to have spoken to Ramadan Abedi, the father of  
3 the brothers, on the telephone after the attack?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And that he had, according to that newspaper, stated  
6 that Salman had been distressed by the death of Hafidah?  
7 A. Yes, apparently.  
8 Q. A number of family members and associates, you will  
9 confirm, commented about recreational drug use by both  
10 Salman and Hashem Abedi.  
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really sorry, just so we don't get  
12 any confusion about... We are talking about the  
13 New York Times spoke to Ramadan after the murders of the  
14 22?  
15 MR GREANEY: We are talking about a conversation after the  
16 arena attack, yes.  
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. It's just possible that it could  
18 be ambiguous which one we are talking about.  
19 MR GREANEY: We are not talking about a conversation after  
20 the attack on Hafidah, we're talking about  
21 a conversation after 22 May 2017. So thank you, sir,  
22 for that clarification.  
23 As you confirmed, I think, a number of family  
24 members and associates to whom the investigators spoke  
25 referred to recreational drug use by both of the

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1 killers ?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Both were known to smoke cannabis and to drink alcohol?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Salman was reported, as you've told us, to have taken  
 6 tramadol and witnesses suggested that family and friends  
 7 had concerns about the drug taking of both brothers?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Did the investigation reveal whether there came a stage  
 10 at which Salman and Hashem Abedi's mother appeared to  
 11 share those concerns?  
 12 A. Yes, it did.  
 13 Q. When was that?  
 14 A. That was some time in 2011, so this was when Salman's  
 15 mother actually attended the GP and raised these  
 16 concerns.  
 17 Q. We're at page 236. What was the result of those  
 18 concerns being raised?  
 19 A. The doctor actually agreed to see Salman, but clearly  
 20 would not then subsequently discuss that with Salman's  
 21 mother. When we come on to the medical records, there  
 22 is confirmation that that process has taken place.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just up a bit with the voice,  
 24 Mr Barraclough. I know you have a long time to go, but  
 25 just a fraction.

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1 A. Sure.  
 2 MR GREANEY: I believe what happened is the mother said to  
 3 the GP that she would ask her son, Salman, to attend for  
 4 a routine checkup. Salman did attend for routine tests.  
 5 The mother went back to chase up the results and the  
 6 doctor said that the bloods appeared normal but didn't  
 7 disclose any specific details of those results.  
 8 A. That's quite right, yes.  
 9 Q. So that's a quick journey through what was understood  
 10 about the personal circumstances of the family. I am  
 11 next going to deal with page 56 of your statement --  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm just going to ask you to stop for  
 13 a moment. There's one bit I didn't... You said you  
 14 made investigations about an involvement with Salman and  
 15 the Rusholme Crips or did I misunderstand that?  
 16 MR GREANEY: You considered whether there was an established  
 17 connection and you concluded there was no established  
 18 connection?  
 19 A. (Overspeaking).  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I just wanted to check I got  
 21 that right.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm trying to get through a lot of  
 23 information.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Please don't worry, I've got the  
 25 statement as well, so I can certainly keep up.

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1 MR GREANEY: It is, as Mr de la Poer put it, an  
 2 information-dense environment. If I'm going too  
 3 quickly, not something I'm often accused of...  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And we can all read back through the  
 5 transcript.  
 6 MR GREANEY: Next, the treatment of family members as  
 7 suspects.  
 8 As we know already, the parents of the brothers  
 9 travelled from the United Kingdom to Libya on  
 10 15 April 2017.  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Are both believed still to be in Libya?  
 13 A. Yes, they are.  
 14 Q. With no indication that either has returned to the  
 15 United Kingdom since the arena attack?  
 16 A. They have not, no.  
 17 Q. Has it been possible to deploy officers to Libya to  
 18 attempt to speak to them?  
 19 A. No, it's completely out of the question.  
 20 Q. I think your voice is dropping now.  
 21 A. Sorry. It is completely out of the question.  
 22 Q. Why is that out of the question?  
 23 A. For a number of reasons. Clearly, it's a significantly  
 24 hostile environment for UK officials to operate in. But  
 25 also, there are clearly issues around law and order and

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1 policing in that country that aren't necessarily at the  
 2 standards that we would operate at.  
 3 Q. So to put it very simply, they've shown no signs of  
 4 coming back here to be interviewed?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. And, for reasons that all will understand, I suspect,  
 7 it is not feasible to deploy officers to attempt to  
 8 interview them?  
 9 A. No, it's not.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The New York Times rang him up and he  
 11 spoke to them. Is that possible for you to do that or  
 12 would that just not be something that you could do? It  
 13 might require a caution and things like that which  
 14 couldn't be done over the phone.  
 15 A. I don't think we could be confident in any way, sir,  
 16 that that would conform to the Police and Criminal  
 17 Evidence Act. It wouldn't conform to any part of it and  
 18 of course we could never be sure who we were talking to.  
 19 MR GREANEY: Indeed, this is an issue that you faced not  
 20 just in relation to the parents but also in relation to  
 21 others who have, to put it neutrally, left the  
 22 jurisdiction, such as Soliman to whom we'll turn.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. In terms of the parents, did you decide that  
 25 Ramadan Abedi should be given the status of suspect?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Did that occur on 18 August 2017?  
 3 A. Yes, it did.  
 4 Q. And suspected of what?  
 5 A. So this is in relation to the overarching suspicion of  
 6 commission, preparation and instigation. So this is an  
 7 involvement in this process. Whether that — and I know  
 8 we're going to come to talk about radicalisation later,  
 9 so that's not appropriate.  
 10 Q. I quite understand.  
 11 A. But there are pieces of evidence that we need to talk to  
 12 Ramadan Abedi about. Some of that is forensic and some  
 13 of that is about his account in relation to coming to  
 14 the UK to collect Hashem and Salman and return them to  
 15 Libya.  
 16 Q. No doubt some of it is mindset?  
 17 A. Some of it is mindset, but again that comes back to  
 18 radicalisation.  
 19 Q. The offence that is suspected is really the offence that  
 20 was suspected of all or almost all of those who were  
 21 arrested?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Samia Tabbal, the mother of the brothers, was she also  
 24 determined to be a suspect by you?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. On 14 November 2018?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. We know that there is the benefit claim issue  
 4 in relation to her, but is she also suspected of the  
 5 same terrorism offence as her husband?  
 6 A. Yes, that is correct. Again, the grounds are slightly  
 7 different in relation to that. So with regard to that,  
 8 clearly we have the financial aspect of this  
 9 investigation, so there are enquiries that need to be  
 10 put to her around terrorism financing, and there are  
 11 again issues about the removal of the two Abedis to  
 12 Libya and then clearly Salman Abedi's return on 18 May.  
 13 Q. I'm going to take your statement slightly out of order  
 14 because it suits my purposes and ask you a little more  
 15 at this stage about Ramadan Abedi because there is  
 16 a crossover between chapter 8, planning and preparation,  
 17 and chapter 13, radicalisation. It's convenient to  
 18 receive your evidence about him at this stage. I'm now  
 19 at paragraph 243.  
 20 To say the least, have extensive investigations into  
 21 Ramadan Abedi been made by your team?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Has that included checks with the Home Office, the  
 24 Passport Office and the DVLA?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Have travel, financial and communications data all been  
 2 investigated?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And also have social media enquiries taken place?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. I'm going to ask you again about his immigration status,  
 7 but is it the position that Ramadan Abedi is known to  
 8 have changed his name?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Did he change his name on 25 March 2002 to  
 11 Hannah Joseph?  
 12 A. Yes, that's right.  
 13 Q. Have you been able to identify definitively why he did  
 14 so? This is 245, sir.  
 15 A. No, we have not. There is an explanation as to why the  
 16 name from his sister, Rabaa, but...  
 17 Q. What did Rabaa have to say about this issue?  
 18 A. I think she said it was an old school friend whose name  
 19 he decided to adopt, but why he did that we don't know.  
 20 Q. Did you receive information that Ramadan Abedi had  
 21 returned to, and that's the name I'll use, Libya in 2008  
 22 under a scheme for returning exiles?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And had worked with the Libyan government security  
 25 force?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Did you also receive extensive information that Ramadan  
 3 had associated with many exiled Libyans, linked to  
 4 an organisation known as the Libyan Islamic Fighting  
 5 Group or LIFG?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. Indeed, did various open source reporting state that  
 8 Ramadan had been an active member of the LIFG?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. At one stage was the LIFG a proscribed organisation  
 11 under UK terrorism legislation?  
 12 A. Yes, it was, until very recently.  
 13 Q. Whether for this reason or partly for this reason, was  
 14 the LIFG said to be associated with Al Qaeda?  
 15 A. It was, yes.  
 16 Q. Since being able to return to Libya under that scheme,  
 17 has Ramadan Abedi travelled extensively between Libya  
 18 and the United Kingdom?  
 19 A. He has.  
 20 Q. Indeed, does the data available to the investigation  
 21 suggest that he has spent, since 2015, only 102 days  
 22 in the United Kingdom?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. Has Rabaa, the sister of Ramadan, explained that so far  
 25 as she understands it, Ramadan Abedi's marital status is

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1 currently unclear?  
 2 A. It is.  
 3 Q. That Ramadan and Samia may have split up, with Ramadan  
 4 marrying another woman?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. But that in turn, that relationship may also have ended  
 7 with Ramadan being back in a relationship with Samia?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Did you establish that media reporting suggested that  
 10 the Abedi family were friends with the family of and  
 11 with a man called Anas al-Libi?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. We're going to hear a little more about him in due  
 14 course. In very simple terms, in a few sentences, who  
 15 is al-Libi?  
 16 A. Al-Libi is a man who spent some time living in  
 17 Manchester, but was heavily linked to Al Qaeda and  
 18 indeed, I believe, Osama Bin Laden, and became wanted by  
 19 the FBI in 2013, I think it was -- no, I'm sorry, became  
 20 wanted by the FBI in relation to an attack on  
 21 United States embassy buildings in Nairobi and Dar Es  
 22 Salaam. I think that was 1998.  
 23 Q. Indeed. And so the relevant information is digested in  
 24 your statement very helpfully.  
 25 In 1995, he was in exile in Manchester?

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1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. When, as we know, Ramadan Abedi was also resident in  
 3 Manchester. He was at one stage, al-Libi, on the FBI  
 4 most wanted list for terrorism offences?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Linked to the US embassy bombings in 1998. As you have  
 7 mentioned, one is Nairobi, in which 213 people were  
 8 killed?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. And the second in Dar Es Salaam in which 11 people were  
 11 killed?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. He was captured in Tripoli in October 2013 by US forces?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. But died of natural causes before he could be brought to  
 16 trial?  
 17 A. Yes, that's right.  
 18 Q. On his Facebook profile, did Ramadan Abedi have a  
 19 picture of al-Libi, along with the words:  
 20 "The Prophet knows how many have a picture of this  
 21 lion in their profiles, the weak are forbidden from  
 22 sharing it"?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. And while we're dealing with al-Libi, I can simply  
 25 invite you to confirm -- sir, for your note, this is

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1 paragraphs 272 to 277 of the statement, we don't need to  
 2 turn these up. In connection with Abu Anas al-Libi, did  
 3 you become aware of a report in the Times of  
 4 an interview between Times reporter David Collins and  
 5 one of the Forjanis, Abdallah Forjani?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. In which it was reported that Forjani had suggested that  
 8 Salman and Hashem Abedi had been radicalised by the  
 9 children of al-Libi?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. And I think you drilled into that but couldn't obtain  
 12 anything that tended to confirm that? Would that be  
 13 fair?  
 14 A. No, that's right. With regard to the interview, yes.  
 15 Q. Yes, you obtained the rushes of the interview, but  
 16 really that was a suggestion by Abdullah Forjani that  
 17 went nowhere?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Still dealing with Ramadan, and I'm now back at  
 20 paragraph 248, was Ramadan described by a number of  
 21 witnesses as being a mosque official who summoned the  
 22 faithful to prayer?  
 23 A. Yes, he was.  
 24 Q. And who would recite the call to prayer for the  
 25 Manchester community and Didsbury Mosque?

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1 A. Yes, that's right.  
 2 Q. And obviously, the Didsbury Mosque is an issue that  
 3 we will look at closely, not now but during chapter 13.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Had Ramadan Abedi himself described himself as an imam  
 6 for the Al Hikmah mosque when stopped by the police?  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. And your investigation also revealed an association that  
 9 he had with another mosque, the Al-Furqan mosque?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. Was there an occasion upon which Ramadan was stopped and  
 12 spoken to by the police or indeed occasions?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Would you explain to us what those were, please?  
 15 A. So he was spoken to by police twice in November 2011.  
 16 On 2 November, after flying into Manchester from  
 17 Tunisia, and on 17 November when he was travelling  
 18 through Dover on his way to Libya.  
 19 Q. What information, if any, did he provide to the police  
 20 on those occasions?  
 21 A. Well, he told the police that he went by the name of  
 22 Abu Ismail and had previously been part of aid conveyed  
 23 from the UK to Libya and had given medical aid to rebel  
 24 fighters. He had not had any military or medical  
 25 training and had not taken up arms against the

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1 government. Ramadan claimed that whilst working in the  
 2 Libyan police in the early 1990s, he'd passed  
 3 information on persons being watched to his  
 4 brother—in—law and he became a member of a group which  
 5 would distribute leaflets against the Gaddafi regime.  
 6 At this time, Ramadan denied being a member of LIFG.  
 7 Q. Just to complete the picture at this stage in relation  
 8 to Ramadan, and in the context of his denial of being  
 9 an LIFG member, one of the pieces of information that  
 10 the sister, Rabaa, provided you with was that in 2011  
 11 Ramadan Abedi had returned to Libya in order to fight  
 12 against the Gaddafi regime?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And indeed he had received a shrapnel wound in his back?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Which he stated had stopped him from fighting?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. You will remember that we were dealing with the  
 19 treatment of family members as suspects. I am now going  
 20 back to paragraph 239 of your statement. I am sorry to  
 21 jump around, but I hope that the structure of this will  
 22 make more sense on the transcript and to those who are  
 23 viewing.  
 24 Next, Ismail Abedi. As we know, he was named as  
 25 a suspect and within 12 hours of the attack had been

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1 arrested under section 41(1) of the Terrorism Act.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Was taken into custody and interviewed before being  
 4 released on 5 June 2017?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. For reasons that we're going to look at shortly, I'm  
 7 confident that you will agree that he has relevant  
 8 evidence to give to this inquiry?  
 9 A. Yes, I agree.  
 10 Q. Both generally and on the topic of radicalisation?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And as you will know, we have a commitment to obtaining  
 13 that evidence from him.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Hashem Abedi, of course, the brother of Salman Abedi  
 16 and, very quickly, you designated him a suspect?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. He was known to be detained in Libya from 23 May?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Based on the evidence that you had, a warrant in the  
 21 first instance was obtained from the Magistrates' Court,  
 22 indeed within this very building, on 23 October 2017?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. And his extradition from Libya to the United Kingdom  
 25 applied for at Westminster Magistrates' Court on

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1 24 October 2017?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. We'll turn to deal with extradition later in your  
 4 evidence. And tomorrow it may well be the case that  
 5 we'll deal in a little further detail with his  
 6 confession to Mr de la Poer and Mr Suter on 22 October  
 7 of this year.  
 8 So far as the younger siblings of Ramadan and Samia  
 9 are concerned, I don't believe we even need to name  
 10 them. Nothing linking the younger siblings to the  
 11 attack has been identified; is that correct?  
 12 A. That's correct, yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And their ages are?  
 14 MR GREANEY: One born in 1998, 2002 and 2007.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they are aged?  
 16 MR GREANEY: 22, 18 and 13.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Certainly nothing should be done to  
 18 identify the 13-year-old.  
 19 MR GREANEY: No. Sir, you're quite right. There is frankly  
 20 no reason for anyone to name any of them, given what the  
 21 SIO has just confirmed.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 23 MR GREANEY: We can take the next section very briefly. We  
 24 know in terms of other members of the family that you  
 25 spoke to, either as volunteers or in custody, that you

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1 spoke to Rabaa, a number of members of the Forjani  
 2 family, and others including people we'll describe as  
 3 Relative C and Trial Witness 3; is that correct?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. Next, under this first heading of personal circumstances  
 6 of the Abedi family, as I indicated — and when I say  
 7 you, I generally mean your team — you obtained the  
 8 medical records of Salman and Hashem Abedi. Is that  
 9 correct?  
 10 A. That's right.  
 11 Q. They were obtained at a very early stage of the  
 12 investigation?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And neither set of medical records shows any evidence of  
 15 mental health issues; is that correct?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. Or any other relevant condition?  
 18 A. No.  
 19 Q. Subject only to the very small point you've made about  
 20 the mother's visit to the GP?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. Next, still dealing with personal circumstances, did you  
 23 make investigations into the education of Salman and  
 24 Hashem Abedi?  
 25 A. Yes, we did.

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1 Q. As you'll appreciate, this is a topic that we'll address  
 2 in chapter 13, but there are perhaps a couple of points  
 3 to pick up on in dealing with planning and preparation.  
 4 Your investigation, I believe -- I'm at  
 5 paragraph 253 -- established that Salman Abedi had  
 6 attended the following establishments: the Burnage High  
 7 School for Boys from 2009 to 2011?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Where in his GCSEs he received one A star, subject not  
 10 specified, a C, four Ds, three Es and an F?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Then the Manchester College, leaving in 2013, with  
 13 a BTEC level 2 in information technology?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Then Trafford College, leaving in 2015 with a BTEC  
 16 level 3 in business, GCSE English, and two A levels in  
 17 Arabic?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And then Salford University from 2015, where he began  
 20 studies in business and management?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Effectively dropping out with, as I indicated with  
 23 Mr de la Poer yesterday, his last attendance seeming to  
 24 have been on 13 January 2017?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does that include an examination or was  
 2 that in February?  
 3 MR GREANEY: The examination I think was in February.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 5 MR GREANEY: What you did, was you spoke to people at the  
 6 university and also considered his computer usage?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And it seemed as if the last occasion upon which he  
 9 attended, subject to the point the chairman has made,  
 10 was 13 January?  
 11 A. Yes, and the examination I think he pretty much walked  
 12 out of.  
 13 Q. Yes. And the chairman summarised the position  
 14 yesterday.  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Not that Salman Abedi had a glittering academic career,  
 17 but Hashem Abedi's was even less impressive, was it not?  
 18 A. Yes, it was.  
 19 Q. He attended Burnage High School for Boys from 2009 until  
 20 September 2011 --  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. -- when he was removed from the register due to  
 23 continued absence?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And he didn't receive even a single graded secondary

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1 school qualification; is that right?  
 2 A. No, that's right.  
 3 Q. He then went to Manchester College, attending between  
 4 2014 and 2015, where he received a level 2 City & Guilds  
 5 in electrical installation before then enrolling on  
 6 a BTEC first diploma in engineering for the 2015/2016  
 7 year, as well as enrolling for GCSE maths and English,  
 8 but stopping attending college and formal education in  
 9 March 2016; is that correct?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. So earlier in the case, I described the two of them as  
 12 being entirely undistinguished and that would seem  
 13 correct so far as their academic achievements are  
 14 concerned?  
 15 A. I think that's fair.  
 16 Q. Just a few things to pick up in relation to chapter 8.  
 17 First, the tutor who taught Hashem at Manchester College  
 18 was interviewed; is that correct?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. A man called Miles Benjamin?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. He explained that Hashem did a diploma in an engineering  
 23 course starting in September 2015?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. His attendance had been poor?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. He missed lessons for periods of time in the 6 months  
 3 he was on the course and stopped attending altogether  
 4 about March 2016?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. He had been taught, at a year 7 level, in electrical  
 7 devices, resistance and circuits, including how to  
 8 solder and build a simple circuit?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. A statement was also taken from Ian Douglas Fenn, the  
 11 headteacher of Burnage High School?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Paragraph 259. Did he describe Salman Abedi as lazy and  
 14 doing the bare minimum?  
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 16 Q. He had been placed in the inclusion unit several times  
 17 for throwing stones at windows, breaking school  
 18 equipment and being disruptive?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Did he state, to pick up on a point that Mr Weatherby  
 21 was exploring yesterday with witnesses:  
 22 "It's our belief that Salman would have needed  
 23 extensive support and guidance to build a bomb"?  
 24 A. He did say that. I'm not entirely sure how valuable  
 25 that is, though, to be honest.

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1 Q. Really that's what I wanted your assistance in relation  
 2 to. That was his view based upon his experience of  
 3 Salman Abedi, who was at that school between 2009 and  
 4 2011. What would your comment be of the headteacher's  
 5 view that he needed extensive support and guidance?  
 6 A. Generally, with respect to Mr Fenn, he's never had the  
 7 opportunity to assess either of the Abedi brothers in  
 8 their bomb-building capabilities.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or seen the video to see whether that  
 10 would actually provide the instruction and support that  
 11 would be necessary?  
 12 A. Indeed, absolutely.  
 13 MR GREANEY: And the observation you make in your statement  
 14 is that that was made in the context of a historical  
 15 relationship?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And obviously with the benefit of hindsight?  
 18 A. Yes, or a mixture of hindsight and foresight. I'm not  
 19 sure which.  
 20 Q. The next topic, which we can deal with briefly, social  
 21 media use.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We've done an hour and a half, I think.  
 23 I'm quite happy to carry on longer, but you're going  
 24 quite quickly and the shorthand writers may be  
 25 complaining, but I'm not sure.

1 MR GREANEY: I'll find out if they're complaining in the  
 2 break, which I'll invite you to have at this stage.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll have 15 minutes. That wasn't  
 4 suggesting they're complaining about the speed, it's  
 5 just they might need the break.  
 6 MR GREANEY: I hope I'm taking it at a pace that's helpful  
 7 to everyone, but there is a lot to get through.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine, I'm not complaining about  
 9 the pace.  
 10 (11.05 am)  
 11 (A short break)  
 12 (11.20 am)  
 13 MR GREANEY: Just one thing that we need to correct. The  
 14 image on the intelligence report that we saw earlier of  
 15 Salman Abedi, I suggested to you that that was him going  
 16 out to Libya. In fact, that was wrong, it was him  
 17 returning from Libya on 18 May.  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. Insofar as that's of any importance.  
 20 In your statement, we'd reached paragraph 260,  
 21 page 63. You deal with social media use by Salman and  
 22 Hashem Abedi. We're going to deal with that in further  
 23 detail when we reach part 5, so we'll park that for now.  
 24 You then deal with three issues which we've either  
 25 addressed or which are really, frankly, not particularly

1 relevant any longer.  
 2 So I'm going to turn next to paragraph 278, page 67  
 3 of your statement, and an issue which is or may be of  
 4 some significance to planning and preparation. It's  
 5 Operation Traverso, the February 17th Martyrs Brigade.  
 6 Mr Barraclough, you were asked by the inquiry to  
 7 address any links that the investigation had found  
 8 between Salman Abedi and the February 17 Martyrs  
 9 Brigade?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And to identify the background to a police operation  
 12 called Operation Traverso?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14 Q. First the basics then. Is the February 17th Martyrs  
 15 Brigade known to be an Islamist militia in Libya,  
 16 originally formed at the time of the revolution that led  
 17 to the overthrow of the former ruler, General Gaddafi?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct, hence the name.  
 19 Q. Was Operation Traverso a police operation designed to  
 20 examine the extremist activities of a man called  
 21 Akila Hafiane?  
 22 A. Yes, Akila and her family, yes.  
 23 Q. So both Akila and other members of her family?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And there is further information available to the

1 inquiry, but we just need to deal with the basics.  
 2 Did Akila Hafiane have an eldest son?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Was his name Ibrahim Almazwagi?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Was he killed in Syria in February 2013 whilst fighting  
 7 for an Al Qaeda affiliated militia?  
 8 A. Yes, he was.  
 9 Q. Furthermore, when considering any terrorist connections  
 10 of Akila Hafiane, is it known that two of her daughters  
 11 also travelled to Syria and are believed to have  
 12 co-located with Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups?  
 13 A. Yes, that's right.  
 14 Q. The two daughters having left the United Kingdom in 2013  
 15 and 2014?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Furthermore, on 2 January 2017, was Akila Hafiane,  
 18 together with two of her other children, stopped whilst  
 19 attempting to board a flight for Istanbul?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And the flight she was attempting to board was at  
 22 Heathrow; is that correct?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. At that point this time, was Akila Hafiane and one of  
 25 her children subject to a schedule 7 port stop



1 examination?  
 2 A. Yes, they were.  
 3 Q. And that's an issue, port stops, obviously that we're  
 4 going to be turning to look at in much detail later on  
 5 in the oral evidence hearings.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Were the two of them questioned about the reasons for  
 8 their travel, giving different accounts?  
 9 A. Yes, they were.  
 10 Q. Was £5,600 seized from the two of them under the  
 11 Proceeds of Crime Act?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And their passports were retained?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And in simple terms, was the suspicion that what  
 16 Akila Hafiane and her two children were seeking to do  
 17 was to travel with money and goods for their Syria-based  
 18 family members?  
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 20 Q. Against that background of attempted travel and other  
 21 terrorist connection, did officers from what is known as  
 22 SO15 attend the home address of Akila Hafiane on  
 23 12 January 2017?  
 24 A. Yes, they did.  
 25 Q. SO15 being?

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1 A. It's effectively Counter-terrorism Policing for the  
 2 Metropolitan Police and capital city.  
 3 Q. Did those officers execute a schedule 5 Terrorism Act  
 4 2000 search warrant?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Akila Hafiane, I believe, was arrested on that occasion  
 7 but more to the point that we're exploring, were  
 8 a number of media devices seized at the address?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Was one of the devices a Toshiba hard drive recovered  
 11 from Akila Hafiane's bedroom?  
 12 A. Yes, it was.  
 13 Q. Which, among other things, revealed five video  
 14 recordings and 65 photographs which appeared to have  
 15 been made during the Libyan civil war of 2011?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Did many of those files show Akila Hafiane's estranged  
 18 husband and their deceased son in camouflage uniforms  
 19 holding weapons?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. With a logo, thought to be of the February 17th Martyrs  
 22 Brigade, believed to be visible in some of the  
 23 photographs?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 25 Q. Just to get to the point, did one of the 65 photographs

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1 show a male, apparently in his late teens, carrying  
 2 a rifle?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. Did that male with the rifle have a strong resemblance  
 5 to Salman Abedi?  
 6 A. Yes, he did.  
 7 Q. We're going to look in a moment at other evidence that  
 8 supports the proposition it was Abedi. The view that  
 9 you now hold that the person has a strong resemblance to  
 10 Salman Abedi, was that a view that has been formed since  
 11 22 May or was it a view that was formed back at the time  
 12 of the search of Akila Hafiane's home or can't you say?  
 13 A. I would say it's certainly beyond 22 May. There's  
 14 absolutely no reason for that to be identified prior to  
 15 that. If memory serves me right, we were notified about  
 16 this some time afterwards as well.  
 17 Q. So you'll understand why --  
 18 A. Yes, of course, yes.  
 19 Q. -- (overspeaking) and we need to establish whether that  
 20 was known at the time.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. The image that I have just referred to, thought to be  
 23 that of Salman Abedi, was reviewed by the SO15  
 24 photographic identification cell; is that correct?  
 25 A. Yes, that's right.

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1 Q. The way that you put it is that:  
 2 "Due to the poor quality of the image, they were  
 3 unable to confirm whether the male in the photograph was  
 4 definitely Salman Abedi. However, the likeness is  
 5 startling."  
 6 A. Yes, that's right.  
 7 Q. Is there an insignia on the wall behind the person  
 8 believed to be Salman Abedi, which has been assessed as  
 9 being the insignia of the February 17th Martyrs Brigade?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. In fact, your statement also answers the question  
 12 I posed because paragraph 284 confirms that  
 13 North-west CTU was provided with the image for the first  
 14 time on 14 November 2018.  
 15 A. Sorry, yes. But the link between the identification  
 16 also was post, so even though it had only been provided  
 17 in November...  
 18 Q. I'm sorry, you're quite right, that is the important  
 19 issue so far as chapter 14 is concerned, whether the  
 20 identification had been made before the bombing, and  
 21 your clear evidence is that that identification had not  
 22 been made.  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. Thank you for that clarity.  
 25 In terms of other information that tends to support

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1 the view that you plainly hold that that photograph does  
 2 show Salman Abedi, was the metadata of the image  
 3 investigated?  
 4 A. Yes, it was.  
 5 Q. I don't want to get into a lot of detail, but that's  
 6 basically data which underlies the image which provides  
 7 data about it?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Did that establish that the image had been captured on  
 10 17 August 2011?  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 12 Q. When Salman Abedi would have been 16 and a half?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. It is known that Salman Abedi, would you confirm, left  
 15 Burnage High School in June 2011 and did not attend any  
 16 further educational establishments until September 2012?  
 17 A. That's correct.  
 18 Q. So this was not a case of you being able to say: it  
 19 looks like him but it can't be him because we know  
 20 he was studying physics on that particular day?  
 21 A. No, that's not the case.  
 22 Q. Furthermore, did travel analysis further support the  
 23 proposition that Abedi was in Libya prior to  
 24 14 September 2012?  
 25 A. Yes, that's right.

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1 Q. Because a male with a name recorded as Suleman Al Abedi,  
 2 using his passport, arrived into Manchester Airport from  
 3 Tripoli on that date?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. And the Libyan passport of Salman Abedi is known to have  
 6 been in that name; is that correct?  
 7 A. Yes, I believe so. I can always check that.  
 8 Q. We'll check that, but that's my recollection.  
 9 Furthermore, during a search of the home address of  
 10 the Abedis, post-attack, was among other items a hard  
 11 drive disc recovered?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Did a digital forensic examination of that hard drive  
 14 reveal numerous images of both Salman Abedi and  
 15 Hashem Abedi in military uniform?  
 16 A. Yes, it did.  
 17 Q. With the metadata showing that the images on that device  
 18 were taken in 2011?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. So pulling those various images together, in your  
 21 judgement do they indicate that Salman and Hashem Abedi  
 22 did receive some level of military training?  
 23 A. Yes, I agree with that.  
 24 Q. And indeed, in one of the images is Salman in full  
 25 military dress, displaying a ID card?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Which in your judgement indicates that he was part of an  
 3 organised group?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And the way in which you put it in your statement,  
 6 paragraph 288, no doubt being appropriately cautious, is  
 7 this:  
 8 "Therefore it is not unreasonable to suggest that  
 9 Salman Abedi may have either fought with the  
 10 February 17th Martyrs Brigade during the Libyan uprising  
 11 of 2011 or attended a training camp or both."  
 12 A. Yes, correct.  
 13 Q. As I indicated, your evidence in part 4 is divided into  
 14 a series of sections. We have now dealt with the first  
 15 section, which is, I can reassure everyone, the longest  
 16 section.  
 17 The next section is movements. We can deal with  
 18 this relatively briefly because either at the end of  
 19 this week, by which I mean Thursday, or the beginning of  
 20 next week, Detective Sergeant Hazelwood will come and  
 21 talk us through the sequence of events chart that deals  
 22 with Abedi's movements between 18 and 22 May.  
 23 But in simple terms just to establish the basics,  
 24 Salman Abedi returned to the United Kingdom on 18 May,  
 25 having travelled on his UK passport?

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1 A. Yes, that's right.  
 2 Q. He initially travelled from Libya to Turkey, but no  
 3 details are available of that particular leg of his  
 4 journey?  
 5 A. That's right.  
 6 Q. He then travelled from Istanbul to Dusseldorf?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And then from Dusseldorf direct to Manchester?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. As we are going to see when we look at another section  
 11 of part 4, at one stage it was possible to travel direct  
 12 from the UK to Libya?  
 13 A. Yes, directly to Tripoli.  
 14 Q. But the situation in Libya became so volatile that such  
 15 direct travel became impossible at some point in time?  
 16 A. Yes, correct, yes.  
 17 Q. CCTV recovered from Manchester Airport shows  
 18 Salman Abedi arriving at passport control in Terminal 2  
 19 on 18 May at 11.13 hours; is that correct?  
 20 A. Yes, that's right.  
 21 Q. Did he collect any luggage?  
 22 A. He did not.  
 23 Q. What did he do?  
 24 A. He made his way to Terminal 3, where he is seen to enter  
 25 WH Smith. He then leaves the airport before being seen

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1 arriving at Wythenshawe bus station at 11.49 hours on  
 2 the number 43 bus. We don't have any CCTV coverage of  
 3 him whilst he's actually on the bus or boarding.  
 4 Q. In terms of what he did in WH Smith's, as I recall  
 5 Mr de la Poer established yesterday, he acquires  
 6 a SIM card?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. The Nissan Micra, as Mr de la Poer also established  
 9 yesterday, had made a journey from Somerton Court to  
 10 Devell House before the travel of the Abedi brothers to  
 11 Libya?  
 12 A. Yes, that's right.  
 13 Q. Next we're going to look at what happened to the Micra  
 14 between 15 April and 19 May. Was CCTV footage recovered  
 15 from Devell House?  
 16 A. Yes, it was.  
 17 Q. Did that occur on 2 June, which was the date upon which  
 18 the investigation became aware of the significance of  
 19 the Nissan Micra?  
 20 A. Yes, that's right.  
 21 Q. Did the footage at that stage -- and this is something  
 22 that you were dealing with yesterday -- go back not to  
 23 15 April but to 20 April?  
 24 A. Yes, that's right.  
 25 Q. No doubt that was because, as everyone knows, CCTV

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1 systems generally override footage after a period of  
 2 time?  
 3 A. Yes, and that's what happened in this case.  
 4 Q. So you had the footage, however, from 20 April. Did  
 5 that footage establish that the Nissan Micra remained in  
 6 the same position, namely parked in bay 30 of the car  
 7 park between 20 April and 2 June, when you recovered the  
 8 vehicle?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 10 Q. On 23 April, and this is obviously information that you  
 11 obtained from the footage, did two vehicles drive into  
 12 the car park at Devell House and park near to the Micra?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Did the drivers of those vehicles leave their own cars  
 15 and appear to look at the Micra?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. In your statement you were able to give the names of at  
 18 least some of those who appeared to look into the Micra.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. I'm not going to name them because my understanding is,  
 21 but tell me if I've got this wrong, that their actions  
 22 were thought to be entirely non-sinister and irrelevant?  
 23 A. Completely, yes.  
 24 Q. So let's just pass over them.  
 25 On 29 April, at 11.59 hours, was a male identified

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1 as Anas Abuhdaima seen standing to the rear offside of  
 2 the vehicle with his left hand to his ear?  
 3 A. Yes, he was.  
 4 Q. Walking away some 7 seconds later?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. On 7 May at 18.25 hours, was a male identified as  
 7 Ahmed Alzilitni seen to walk towards the Nissan Micra,  
 8 looking in the passenger door of the vehicle, and then  
 9 walking away?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. Have both of those two men, whose names I won't repeat  
 12 again, been subject to the TIE process?  
 13 A. Yes, they have.  
 14 Q. Were they asked, each of them, about their interactions  
 15 with the Micra?  
 16 A. Yes, they were, although Mr Abuhdaima was extremely  
 17 recent.  
 18 Q. And what did the two of them have to say?  
 19 A. They don't recall having done this, is my recollection.  
 20 Certainly with Abuhdaima, but I'd have to check with  
 21 Alzilitni.  
 22 Q. I'm at paragraph 296 of your statement.  
 23 A. I'm sorry, yes.  
 24 Q. You mustn't apologise; there is a huge amount of  
 25 information in here.

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1 Mr Alzilitni was asked about his interactions with  
 2 the Micra during an interview he attended voluntarily.  
 3 He said he didn't recognise the car and thought it was  
 4 being used to store drugs, which is why he looked into  
 5 it.  
 6 A. I beg your pardon, Mr Greaney, that's correct, yes.  
 7 Q. Really, that would be consistent with what your  
 8 investigation established was actually going on in the  
 9 car park?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm quite concerned that a man's name  
 12 has been mentioned. Nothing has been said in this  
 13 inquiry to indicate that he has committed any sort of  
 14 offence.  
 15 A. No, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He's not been convicted of any offence,  
 17 in any way -- or has he?  
 18 A. No, sir, not in relation to anything that we're dealing  
 19 with here.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Sir, that's a perfectly fair point.  
 21 In relation to the other gentleman, he was wanted,  
 22 I think, at the time by the police in connection with  
 23 something unconnected. At the time of your statement  
 24 he had not been traced; has he yet been traced?  
 25 A. Yes, he has.

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1 Q. Is it thought that there is anything sinister about his  
2 actions in relation to the vehicle on 7 May?  
3 A. No, he has no recollection of it.  
4 Q. The movements of Salman Abedi between his return to the  
5 United Kingdom and 22 May. Were vast amounts of CCTV  
6 footage recovered covering that period by the  
7 investigation?  
8 A. Yes, huge amounts.  
9 Q. Was something called a full strategy document prepared,  
10 addressing how that material was to be dealt with?  
11 A. Yes, it was.  
12 Q. We don't need to go to it, but you deal with that at  
13 paragraphs 306 to 310 of your statement.  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. As we know from evidence given in answer to  
16 Mr de la Poer's questions yesterday, something called  
17 cell site analysis is also possible?  
18 A. Yes, that's right.  
19 Q. So locating a mobile telephone within certain  
20 parameters, not to a precise spot but within  
21 a particular area?  
22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
23 Q. And was cell site analysis conducted in relation to  
24 telephones where you were aware of telephones that were  
25 being used?

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1 A. Yes, that's right.  
2 Q. Within Greater Manchester Police, is there a unit called  
3 the VERA Unit?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And what is the VERA Unit?  
6 A. It stands for visual evidence retrieval and the people  
7 who work in the VERA Unit are specialists in regard to  
8 the recovery of CCTV. On the face of it, that would  
9 seem quite a simple task, but depending —  
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure it's not.  
11 A. Well, depending on the multitude of systems that are  
12 used by, not just local authorities but other government  
13 institutions and private premises and shops, it's very  
14 specialist indeed.  
15 MR GREANEY: The way in which it's done is, first of all,  
16 you have to obtain the CCTV?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. Then you have to do something called calibrating the  
19 CCTV so to — what is often the case is that the CCTV  
20 timing will not be accurate for various reasons.  
21 A. No.  
22 Q. So you need to show what time it's actually showing.  
23 And then it all needs to be put together to provide  
24 a coherent whole showing what a particular person's been  
25 doing at a particular time.

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1 A. Yes, it does and sometimes it is actually very difficult  
2 to recover because of how it's stored, which is an  
3 additional problem.  
4 Q. I'm not going to embarrass you by saying this because  
5 the VERA Unit is separate from the unit for which you  
6 were responsible, but the VERA Unit within Greater  
7 Manchester Police is very well-known for the quality of  
8 its work on major investigations.  
9 A. Thank you.  
10 Q. As a result of the work that was done by the VERA Unit,  
11 was a video compilation produced for Salman Abedi's  
12 movements on each day following his return to the  
13 United Kingdom?  
14 A. Yes, it was.  
15 Q. And were also documents called sequences of events  
16 prepared for each of those days?  
17 A. Yes, they were.  
18 Q. For a long period of time were each of those categories  
19 of material working documents that were updated as more  
20 material became available?  
21 A. Yes, they were, that's true.  
22 Q. As I say, Detective Sergeant Hazelwood will deal with  
23 the detail of this subsequently, but where it comes to,  
24 I believe, is this, that over the whole of that period,  
25 is there only one occasion when there is what you

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1 describe as a CCTV loss of Salman Abedi so that it is  
2 not known where he is or where he goes?  
3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that the one that coincides with  
5 getting rid of the suitcase or is that another one?  
6 A. No, this is on 20 May, in the morning of the 20th. So  
7 it's...  
8 MR GREANEY: So in relation to the chairman's question,  
9 is that a CCTV loss or is that an occasion upon which  
10 you know the general area to which he goes, but haven't  
11 been able to identify exactly —  
12 A. I think that's actually the distinction, sir. So there  
13 have been momentarily or momentary losses but we know  
14 where he is, whereas this is a period of time, an  
15 extended period of time, where we — again, we know  
16 roughly where he is, but not what he's done over that  
17 30-minute or so period.  
18 Q. Obviously you don't have CCTV footage of him for the  
19 whole of that period. For example, there is no footage  
20 from within the flat at Granby.  
21 A. No, that's very true. But obviously, what we do know is  
22 he's not left the building, so having examined all of  
23 the CCTV —  
24 Q. So we've understood what you mean by CCTV loss. And the  
25 single loss, applying the definition that you've given

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1 us, occurred on the morning of 20 May; is that correct?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. When Abedi is seen to leave Granby House, getting into  
 4 a taxi which takes him to Great Western Street at  
 5 06.45 hours?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And where in the geography of Manchester is Great  
 8 Western Street? Where is it near to that we might know?  
 9 A. I think our view of this is we're looking at the area  
 10 towards the Micra, so again this is speculation, sir, so  
 11 if you don't want me to say so, I won't.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think at the moment you're simply  
 13 helping us identify where Great Western Street is in the  
 14 area.  
 15 A. My view is it's towards Devell House.  
 16 MR GREANEY: So he goes to that area at 06.45, but he's next  
 17 seen to arrive back on Granby Row when he's on foot at  
 18 07.22 hours?  
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 20 Q. So a period of 37 minutes during which it is not known  
 21 where he had been, what he had done and so on?  
 22 A. No.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It seems a remarkable achievement to  
 24 have traced as many of his movements as you did, bearing  
 25 in mind he goes off in a taxi somewhere and you have no

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1 idea except the general direction of where he's going.  
 2 MR GREANEY: Indeed. Then finally on this topic of  
 3 movements, paragraph 301, Salman Abedi's telephone  
 4 contacts, 18 May to 22 May.  
 5 Did the investigation establish that during that  
 6 period, Salman Abedi had used the telephone number  
 7 ending 3230?  
 8 A. Yes, that's right.  
 9 Q. Sir, we are going to come on to telephones in more  
 10 detail later on, although probably not today.  
 11 Was that a number that he had brought back into the  
 12 UK or the number that he had obtained from WH Smith?  
 13 A. No, this is from WH Smith.  
 14 Q. And did your investigation conduct a full review of call  
 15 data to establish who he was in communication with  
 16 whilst using that number in order to establish his  
 17 movements via location and mobile data?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. Did that establish that his number was used to  
 20 communicate with taxi firms and shops?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Banks and car dealers?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Letting agents and online traders?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And the landlady of Granby Row?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. With Libyan telephone numbers, including numbers  
 4 attributed to the Abedi family?  
 5 A. Yes, that's right.  
 6 Q. One of which you told us about yesterday.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And then with four particular named individuals?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 MR GREANEY: Sir, I know you're anxious that particular  
 11 individuals aren't named, but it's going to be difficult  
 12 to tell some parts of the story without naming  
 13 individuals.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm happy for them to be named. It must  
 15 not be assumed, without them having the option to give  
 16 an explanation, that they're necessarily involved in any  
 17 way with what happened. That's what I'm seeking to  
 18 avoid.  
 19 MR GREANEY: That's an entirely fair observation, sir.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Using the names is not something I'm  
 21 prohibiting; it's just people jumping to conclusions  
 22 that may not be justified.  
 23 MR GREANEY: In relation to each of them I will make plain,  
 24 where it's appropriate, that consideration was given to  
 25 a charge and it was concluded that no charge was

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1 appropriate.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 3 MR GREANEY: The four particular individuals, most of whom  
 4 were connected with a money transfer I believe were  
 5 Adel Abuzeid.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Mosbah Zargon?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Mahsoud Chilby?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And Alaaedeen Sicri?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Now tell me the paragraph number so  
 14 I have some help with spelling these.  
 15 MR GREANEY: Paragraph 302, sir.  
 16 Were each of those four men arrested, given the  
 17 contact they'd had with Abedi?  
 18 A. Yes, they were.  
 19 Q. And each of them was released without charge?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. What follows from that, just to pick up on the  
 22 chairman's point, is that it was considered that there  
 23 was no sufficient evidential basis to suggest that they  
 24 had any connection with the plot of the Abedi brothers?  
 25 A. I'm sorry, there may be actually an inaccuracy here. If

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1 I may just check. I need to check that Mr Chilby was  
 2 actually arrested.  
 3 Q. We're going to get to Mr Chilby in part 5 and if you  
 4 would check that over lunch, that would be extremely  
 5 helpful.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. At any rate, those four people I have named, whether  
 8 arrested or spoken to voluntarily, there was no basis  
 9 upon which it was considered they could be charged with  
 10 any offence?  
 11 A. They were released without charge. The evidence  
 12 in relation to how we approach this from a charging  
 13 decision perspective is, I presume, later.  
 14 Q. It's a point you have made already a number of times  
 15 that obviously the exact nature of the discussion that  
 16 you had with the CPS and with leading counsel must  
 17 remain confidential for an extremely good reason. But  
 18 we've been assured by you and, certainly so far as CTI  
 19 is concerned, accept that careful consideration was  
 20 given by the police, CPS and counsel to the charging  
 21 decisions that were made.  
 22 A. Yes, in relation to the evidence that was presented.  
 23 Q. Yes. Are you making the point that the evidence might  
 24 always change from now on?  
 25 A. I think I'm making the point that there is a difference

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1 between that ongoing process and effectively a full code  
 2 test application for a charging decision. I understand  
 3 that's semantics --  
 4 Q. It isn't semantics.  
 5 A. -- and something of a nicety.  
 6 Q. I do understand the point you're making, which is that  
 7 the evidence has to reach a particular point before  
 8 a formal decision is called for from the Crown  
 9 Prosecution Service.  
 10 A. Yes, and that's a very formal process.  
 11 Q. But there will be many of these individuals that never  
 12 even reach the point of that --  
 13 A. Yes, exactly.  
 14 Q. So I have understood your point, which is one, if I may  
 15 say, that is properly made.  
 16 The next topic, whilst we're dealing in part 4 with  
 17 the family, is travel.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I check on this? We've heard some  
 19 evidence that Salman Abedi was actually going round with  
 20 two mobile phones.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The other one that he was going round  
 23 with was?  
 24 A. The Alcatel is the one that he comes to the UK with and  
 25 then he buys the single SIM card from WH Smith.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you know the last four digits of the  
 2 Alcatel?  
 3 A. That's the number that we've just referred to earlier,  
 4 which ends 3230. That's the SIM card. The SIM card is  
 5 swapped between the Alcatel and the Samsung which he  
 6 subsequently buys.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Your recollection is quite correct. There is  
 9 an occasion at the arena during the hostile  
 10 reconnaissance when Abedi is filmed with two phones. So  
 11 the Alcatel handset -- because we need to draw  
 12 a distinction between handset and SIM card, do not we?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Is it believed that the Alcatel handset is a handset he  
 15 returns to the UK from Libya with in his possession?  
 16 A. Yes, that's right. I think they have had that phone for  
 17 some considerable time. So he has had it whilst he is  
 18 in Libya and he brings that back.  
 19 Q. You have just mentioned, and we'll no doubt come on to  
 20 tomorrow, the fact that he also purchases another  
 21 handset following his return to the UK on 18 May.  
 22 A. Yes, that's right, and that's the Samsung.  
 23 Q. Were you saying that the 3230 SIM card that is purchased  
 24 from WH Smith is swapped between two handsets?  
 25 A. That's correct, and the significance of that is clearly

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1 that Samsung is a smartphone, so it's enabled with the  
 2 ability to use on the internet with apps and all the  
 3 other things that come with a smartphone, whereas the  
 4 Alcatel is a very straightforward, very simple phone.  
 5 Q. We are dipping ahead slightly, but this would help us to  
 6 know what's to come. Did you recover the Alcatel or any  
 7 part of it?  
 8 A. Yes, that was at the scene itself.  
 9 Q. And the Samsung, was that recovered?  
 10 A. It was subsequently recovered on the waste ground.  
 11 Q. With the passport?  
 12 A. And both were examined -- no, no, separately from the  
 13 passport.  
 14 Q. In the same general area?  
 15 A. Within walking distance of Granby.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But without a SIM card in it?  
 17 A. No, there was no SIM card.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 19 MR GREANEY: So travel next. We'll be able to deal with  
 20 this, I think, fairly efficiently. By travel I mean,  
 21 were you asked to deal with what had been discovered  
 22 about the travel of Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi and  
 23 their immediate family in the 6 years before the  
 24 bombing?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And to provide a chronology of that travel?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Had you established that there was a significant amount  
 4 of travel, both into and out of the UK by the Abedi  
 5 family?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. But at the stage before you were asked by the inquiry to  
 8 deal with what had been revealed, had you identified  
 9 that only specific flights were of relevance to your  
 10 investigation?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. With the result that only those flights were the subject  
 13 of evidential recovery?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Does that mean that further enquiries were only  
 16 conducted on flights assessed as being relevant to the  
 17 prosecution case?  
 18 A. Yes, that's right.  
 19 Q. Has nonetheless a chronology been prepared on that basis  
 20 of travel by the Abedi family?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Mr Lopez, we're going to ask for this to be placed on  
 23 the screen. I am going to give you the INQ reference,  
 24 but please don't put it on the screen until I have given  
 25 you the page number as well, please.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It is only significant travel we're  
 2 going to deal with?  
 3 MR GREANEY: Only significant travel. Really what I'm going  
 4 to do is put it on the screen so it's available for you  
 5 and for anyone else to ask about, then I'll just pick  
 6 out a very small number of details, in fact only two,  
 7 from it.  
 8 The INQ reference is {INQ034649/139}.  
 9 It would take the rest of the day to go through that  
 10 line by line, which isn't proportionate. What we can  
 11 say by way of summary, before looking at a few  
 12 individual details, is that there were many flights  
 13 between the UK and Libya, direct until 2014 and  
 14 thereafter indirect, taken by the Abedi family?  
 15 A. Yes. That's right.  
 16 Q. We can see that Hashem Abedi spent some time in Germany  
 17 in 2016?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. Which is or may be relevant for reasons to which we'll  
 20 turn.  
 21 Just a few other details. First of all, as we know,  
 22 on 4 August 2014, the Abedi brothers, Hashem and Salman,  
 23 were evacuated from Libya by the Royal Navy on board  
 24 HMS Enterprise; is that correct?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. They were taken to Malta, from where they subsequently  
 2 took a connecting flight to Manchester on 6 August?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. In 2015, and this will be relevant when we come to  
 5 radicalisation because some witnesses will describe it,  
 6 did both Hashem and Salman Abedi fly to Saudi Arabia via  
 7 Jordan?  
 8 A. Yes, they did.  
 9 Q. Did they travel for the purposes of Hajj?  
 10 A. Yes, that's the account yes.  
 11 Q. As part of a group of pilgrims?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. I mentioned the trip by Hashem to Germany. Have you  
 14 been able to obtain some payment details in relation to  
 15 that trip?  
 16 A. Yes, we have, yes.  
 17 Q. And what did those investigations reveal?  
 18 A. The payment details were either by Hashem, Salman or by  
 19 an associate, and we have one payment in the name of H  
 20 Nassrat, and this is Hajer Nassrat.  
 21 Q. You're right to draw the distinction between the name  
 22 that you haven't given and the name you have.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. So Hajer Nassrat is the sister of someone we have heard  
 25 about, because he was involved in the acquisition of

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1 precursor materials?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Hajer Nassrat is the sister of Zuhir Nassrat, is that  
 4 correct?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. An associate of the Abedi brothers?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. We mentioned port stops earlier and I am now at  
 9 paragraph 322. Is it the position that unless Border  
 10 Agency staff or police port officers have cause to stop  
 11 and speak to travellers, then the intention and purpose  
 12 of their travel will not be known?  
 13 A. That's correct, yes.  
 14 Q. Can you confirm that neither Salman Abedi nor  
 15 Hashem Abedi were subject to a port stop under  
 16 schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 between 2010 and  
 17 2017?  
 18 A. I can.  
 19 Q. And that no requests were made to carry out a port stop?  
 20 A. I can confirm that, yes.  
 21 Q. As you'll appreciate, that is an issue that will be the  
 22 subject of investigation in chapter 14.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Does it come to this, in the absence of a port stop  
 25 being conducted, Greater Manchester Police and/or

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1 North-west CTU have no knowledge of the purpose or  
 2 intention of any travel undertaken by the Abedi family  
 3 with one exception?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. And is that exception when Ramadan Abedi was spoken to  
 6 by port officers at Dover on 17 November 2011?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. When, as you told us earlier today, he declared that  
 9 he was travelling to Libya as part of an aid convey?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 MR JAMIESON: Sir, I have just had an indication that the  
 12 families are struggling to hear.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: To hear both?  
 14 MR JAMIESON: Principally the witness.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry. Just speak up a bit, would you  
 16 mind? Could we turn the microphone up if necessary?  
 17 Thank you for telling us that.  
 18 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Jamieson, that's  
 19 appreciated.  
 20 That's all I want to ask you about travel. The next  
 21 topic that you address in your statement that I am going  
 22 to pose questions about relates to neighbours of the  
 23 Abedi family. We're at paragraph 328 now. We can deal  
 24 with this very briefly indeed.  
 25 The Abedi family, as we know, lived at

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1 21 Elsmore Road in Manchester.  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. Having moved to that property on 1 November 2013?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And they still held that tenancy at the time of the  
 6 attack?  
 7 A. Yes, they did.  
 8 Q. As part of the investigation, were house-to-house  
 9 enquiries conducted in the area around the Abedi family  
 10 home address?  
 11 A. Yes, they were.  
 12 Q. There's detail about the outcome in your statement, but  
 13 in summary, is the position that nothing of evidential  
 14 value arose from that aspect of the investigation?  
 15 A. That's accurate, yes, nothing of evidential value was  
 16 recovered.  
 17 Q. Although lines of enquiry were followed up to their  
 18 conclusion, leading to what you describe as anecdotal  
 19 knowledge of the Abedi family?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. Next in your statement, from paragraph 336, you go into  
 22 considerable detail about the issue of radicalisation,  
 23 do you not?  
 24 A. I do.  
 25 Q. As I've said now a number of times, that is an issue

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1 that we're going to investigate with you, not now but in  
 2 chapter 13, and so I'm going to deal with none of that  
 3 save for a short passage at page 96.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I was just slightly concerned about what  
 5 you said about port stops with the family. You  
 6 mentioned Ramadan had and there is also one for Ismail?  
 7 MR GREANEY: There is also one for Ismail on his return from  
 8 his honeymoon, you're quite right, sir. In fact that's  
 9 the very issue that I'm going to turn to --  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I thought I remembered it, but  
 11 then when you took us to page 96, of course that's where  
 12 it is.  
 13 MR GREANEY: You're quite right. I did encourage the  
 14 witness to say that there was a single exception and in  
 15 fact there are two exceptions. There's the Ramadan and  
 16 Ismail Abedi. I was about to remind myself, but  
 17 thank you for getting in first.  
 18 So we're dealing with Ismail Abedi. In the whole of  
 19 the section dealing with radicalisation, which is  
 20 lengthy, there is one section which is relevant to  
 21 chapter 8 and it relates to Ismail Abedi. Was he, as  
 22 the chairman has pointed out, subject to a port stop at  
 23 Heathrow Airport on 3 September 2015?  
 24 A. Yes, he was.  
 25 Q. And as part of that process, were electrical and storage

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1 items of his downloaded and examined?  
 2 A. Yes, they were.  
 3 Q. We'll go through the detail of all of that in due course  
 4 in chapter 13, but was a further device -- I'm now at  
 5 page 97 -- recovered from an address associated with  
 6 Ismail Abedi, exhibit KLS/9?  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. Was that recovered at about the same time as a result of  
 9 what had been revealed by the port stop?  
 10 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?  
 11 Q. Of course, yes. I'm just trying to make sure  
 12 I understand the chronology. 3 September 2015 is the  
 13 port stop of Ismail Abedi.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. His devices are downloaded and examined, and to put it  
 16 very neutrally at the moment, that work indicated that  
 17 Ismail Abedi had an interest in Islamic State?  
 18 A. Yes, that's true.  
 19 Q. There was then, if we turn over the page, recovered from  
 20 an address that I won't give, an exhibit KLS/9. So the  
 21 first question is: the port stop has occurred, a concern  
 22 has developed about Ismail Abedi. Was his home address  
 23 then the subject of search, revealing exhibit KLS/9 or  
 24 did KLS/9 come into the possession of the police in  
 25 a different way?

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1 A. No, KLS/9 came into the possession of the police as  
 2 a result of Operation Manteline. So as a result of the  
 3 search that was carried out at that particular address.  
 4 Q. So that's my fault for misunderstanding. We're now --  
 5 A. It may be my statement, actually.  
 6 Q. We now understand that there was a port stop, we will  
 7 come to the detail of that in due course, and now we  
 8 understand that Ismail Abedi's home was searched, as you  
 9 told us about earlier, post--22 May 2017, and was a disc  
 10 drive, exhibit KLS/9, recovered from his home address at  
 11 that time?  
 12 A. Yes, it was.  
 13 Q. So between 23 May and early in June when the search  
 14 occurred?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. On that device were there a number of images that may be  
 17 considered supportive of an extremist mindset?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Including, and we'll return to this, burnt bodies and  
 20 one depicting an ISIS flag with "I pledge allegiance"?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Did it also show, which may be relevant to chapter 8,  
 23 a number of images of a young Salman Abedi holding  
 24 firearms and weapons?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. That were assessed as having been taken outside of the  
 2 United Kingdom?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. An image of Ismail Abedi himself holding a firearm?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Video lectures by the, you describe him as a preacher,  
 7 Anwar Al--Awlaki? I'm at (ix), page 97.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. He is now dead, but was a senior recruiter for Al Qaeda;  
 10 is that your understanding?  
 11 A. Yes, that is correct.  
 12 Q. Also recovered during that search was a further disc  
 13 drive, KLS/3, which contained a number of images of  
 14 Salman Abedi holding various weapons; is that correct?  
 15 A. That's correct, yes.  
 16 Q. Those images assessed as being taken not within the UK?  
 17 A. No.  
 18 Q. And at least one of those images showed Salman Abedi  
 19 wearing camouflage clothing?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in relation to Ismail Abedi, it is  
 22 the intention to call him to the inquiry?  
 23 MR GREANEY: It is.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And he will be given the opportunity to  
 25 give further details or explanations of this material

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1 before the inquiry?  
 2 MR GREANEY: Yes. Your recollection is correct.  
 3 I identified in opening that we fully intend to call him  
 4 to give evidence to the inquiry and he will be able to  
 5 give his explanations.  
 6 Some of the images shown Salman Abedi armed in  
 7 camouflage clothing alone, whilst others had him  
 8 standing with other males and some with his brother,  
 9 Hashem Abedi?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Other images on that device of Ismail Abedi holding  
 12 various weapons?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Again assessed as being taken outside the UK. Then  
 15 a video file showing Salman Abedi and other males firing  
 16 weapons?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Which appears to have been loaded to the device between  
 19 2009 and 2012?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. There were, we won't go through all of it now, other  
 22 images of Salman Abedi and Ismail Abedi showing them  
 23 holding weapons; is that correct?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. We'll come back to deal with this in due course in

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1 detail, but on page 99, at (xii), your view was:  
 2 "There are indications that Ismail Abedi may have  
 3 been aware of the radicalisation or changing opinions of  
 4 Salman Abedi."  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. "In some respects [you added] it also appears that  
 7 Ismail was sympathetic to the ideals of ISIS, as  
 8 evidenced by the material discovered on his devices  
 9 which were seized from his home address when he was  
 10 arrested."  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that is subject to any explanation he  
 13 may give?  
 14 MR GREANEY: It is, sir, yes.  
 15 As I indicated at the very beginning of today, or  
 16 near the beginning, your statement also deals briefly  
 17 with the issue of Prevent. But essentially, you defer  
 18 to the evidence of Detective Chief Superintendent  
 19 Dominic Scally, who is the head of CT Policing  
 20 North--west?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And there's nothing that you feel you'd need to address?  
 23 A. No.  
 24 Q. Were you also asked to address the criminal convictions  
 25 and criminal conduct of Salman Abedi, Hashem Abedi and

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1 their associates, including family members?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. In relation to the criminal convictions of the many  
 4 associates of Salman and Hashem Abedi, did your work  
 5 reveal that many of them had been involved in not only  
 6 various levels of criminality but also gang-related  
 7 activity?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. I'm now at page 103 --  
 10 A. Yes, I understand.  
 11 Q. -- and paragraph 391.  
 12 So far as Salman Abedi, Hashem Abedi and other  
 13 members of the Abedi family are concerned, did you  
 14 identify that, first of all, Salman Abedi had been  
 15 involved in what is properly described as minor  
 16 criminality, dating from about 2010 when he was 15 years  
 17 of age?  
 18 A. Yes, that's right.  
 19 Q. On 14 October, was Salman Abedi, together with another  
 20 man that we are going to be asking further questions  
 21 about, called Elyas Elmehdi, suspected of stealing  
 22 a mobile telephone at Burnage Media College?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. But the phone, I think, was recovered and the victim did  
 25 not wish to support a prosecution?

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. In November 2011 various driving offences that we can  
 3 pass over.  
 4 Then on 11 October 2012, the top of page 104, was  
 5 information received that Salman Abedi had assaulted  
 6 a woman by punching her in the head at  
 7 Manchester College?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Was he interviewed?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And did he admit committing that offence?  
 12 A. Yes, he did.  
 13 Q. In the result, on that occasion, was Salman Abedi  
 14 prosecuted?  
 15 A. No, it went through what they call a restorative justice  
 16 process.  
 17 Q. Is that a process which involves dealing with  
 18 non-serious offences without the need for court  
 19 proceedings?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. Where the offender has fully admitted the offence and,  
 22 moreover, demonstrated remorse?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. The officer who dealt with that incident, did he prepare  
 25 a report, noting that restorative justice accorded with

1 the victim's wishes?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. That Abedi had fully admitted the offence and was "very  
 4 sorry"?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Did it also identify that Salman Abedi was attending  
 7 anger management classes?  
 8 A. It did.  
 9 Q. Has your investigation revealed anything further about  
 10 those classes?  
 11 A. No, I'm afraid not. I don't know the answer to that.  
 12 I can ask again whether we asked the question.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't think it's going to be of great  
 14 importance to me.  
 15 MR GREANEY: To complete the picture in relation to  
 16 Salman Abedi's criminality, on 29 November 2012 theft,  
 17 handling of stolen goods in relation to a pair of  
 18 tracksuit bottoms stolen from Sports Direct in the  
 19 Arndale Centre?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. In respect of which he made admissions and received  
 22 a caution?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And perhaps the main significance of those events, it  
 25 was on that occasion that his fingerprints were taken

1 from his left hand which were used to aid in his  
 2 identification after the attack?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct, and his DNA was sampled as well.  
 4 Q. So, as it's sometimes described, Salman Abedi was  
 5 lightly convicted?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. So far as Hashem Abedi is concerned, just one matter to  
 8 draw attention to --  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How necessary is it? I'm sorry, I've  
 10 read it, it ended up with there being insufficient  
 11 evidence to proceed with the prosecution.  
 12 MR GREANEY: Sir, I don't wish to adduce evidence that  
 13 you're not going to find helpful.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, is it helpful?  
 15 MR GREANEY: It's for you to decide whether it's helpful.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It doesn't help me at the moment,  
 17 I don't think.  
 18 MR GREANEY: All I will do then is identify that within this  
 19 statement, which can be available for your use if  
 20 necessary, there is information about what is frankly  
 21 limited or alleged criminality by Hashem Abedi,  
 22 Ismail Abedi and, at page 106, Ramadan Abedi.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In relation to Hashem, let me explain:  
 24 the reason why there's no prosecution is there was  
 25 insufficient identification evidence to identify him as

1 being the perpetrator and in those circumstances, to  
 2 read that out in a way that alleges that he did commit  
 3 that offence, would seem to me to be undesirable.  
 4 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm entirely in your hands. The extent to  
 5 which it's necessary to go into what's been described in  
 6 different contexts as granular detail about the  
 7 background of these people is a matter for you. It  
 8 perhaps is important to establish that Salman Abedi is  
 9 lightly convicted, Hashem Abedi had no convictions,  
 10 there was simply one incident in his background which  
 11 didn't result in a prosecution. Ismail Abedi, again,  
 12 lightly convicted, and Ramadan Abedi lightly convicted,  
 13 and Samia Abedi, the mother, no previous convictions.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 15 MR GREANEY: I won't go into those matters in any further  
 16 detail.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If any core participant wants to  
 18 persuade me that it is desirable or relevant to my  
 19 considerations then of course I will listen to those  
 20 arguments in due course.  
 21 MR GREANEY: So we're going to turn next, Mr Barraclough, to  
 22 reconnaissance. We can deal with this efficiently  
 23 because, as you know, we already know and have received  
 24 evidence about the hostile reconnaissance by  
 25 Salman Abedi in the period leading up to 22 May and

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1 indeed on 22 May itself at 6.30.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Within Greater Manchester Police -- I'm now at  
 4 paragraph 404, page 108 -- is there a system for  
 5 recording any incident that is detected of hostile  
 6 reconnaissance?  
 7 A. Yes, there is.  
 8 Q. In very general terms, what is that system, please?  
 9 A. Sorry, I'm trying to find myself...  
 10 Q. I'm at page 108, paragraph 404.  
 11 It might suffice simply for me to state that you  
 12 observe:  
 13 "In every case there is a system for recording these  
 14 reporting streams and if the hostile reconnaissance was  
 15 related to, or suspected to be related to, terrorism,  
 16 the information would always be sent through to CTPNW,  
 17 where we further maintain our own database of recorded  
 18 or reported incidents."  
 19 So perhaps it's not important for us to know any  
 20 more than that there are established systems in place.  
 21 A. Sorry, that's what I was being careful about, whether to  
 22 go any further on that. Thank you.  
 23 Q. Your care is probably well-placed. The point we come to  
 24 this is: in the case of the Manchester Arena attack,  
 25 have all available police systems been interrogated --

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1 A. Yes, they have.  
 2 Q. -- for any recorded or reported incidents of hostile  
 3 reconnaissance between 18 and 22 May?  
 4 A. Yes, they have.  
 5 Q. And what is the result of that interrogation?  
 6 A. There are no recorded incidents.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we know of a matter which was  
 8 reported certainly internally on 18 May.  
 9 MR GREANEY: Yes.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's apparent from that that that  
 11 information -- I'm not saying it relates to  
 12 Salman Abedi, it clearly doesn't, but that was seen as  
 13 being potentially hostile reconnaissance, but it didn't  
 14 actually get through to the CT police.  
 15 MR GREANEY: Yes, that seems to be the position based on the  
 16 work that you have done.  
 17 A. Yes, I think so. I will double-check that, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's all right. We have heard about  
 19 it, so I'm just seeing how these things are dealt with  
 20 and how they happen in practice.  
 21 MR GREANEY: You make the obvious point that the fact that  
 22 there are no records doesn't mean that there was no  
 23 hostile reconnaissance, and indeed I'm sure that  
 24 you will be able to confirm the view expressed by the  
 25 security experts that there was clearly hostile

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1 reconnaissance conducted by Salman Abedi between 18 and  
 2 22 May?  
 3 A. Yes. Clearly, we have looked back at that as  
 4 a consequence of the bombing itself. In other words, we  
 5 found the hostile reconnaissance as a result of what he  
 6 has actually done.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You didn't know in advance, you found  
 8 out afterwards?  
 9 A. Absolutely not, no.  
 10 MR GREANEY: The question, of course, arises of whether  
 11 there was hostile reconnaissance conducted by either/or  
 12 both of the Abedi brothers before they travelled to  
 13 Libya on 15 April.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Has it been possible for the investigation to reach any  
 16 conclusion about that issue?  
 17 A. No, and that refers back to your issue of overwriting of  
 18 CCTV.  
 19 Q. As has been explained --  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry. I don't want to know precisely  
 21 when, but by the time you came to want to look at what  
 22 had happened before 15 April, that was not available?  
 23 A. Not as far as I'm aware, sir. But again I will check  
 24 the exact date for you.  
 25 MR GREANEY: As we know from evidence that we heard during

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1 chapter 7, one of the things that security operatives  
 2 and police officers should be keeping an eye out for,  
 3 when they have hostile reconnaissance in mind, is such  
 4 a person using a mobile telephone to film security at  
 5 a location.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. So in this case, where your investigation seized digital  
 8 media devices, were they analysed to see whether they  
 9 revealed any evidence of hostile reconnaissance?  
 10 A. In relation to Salman Abedi?  
 11 Q. Yes.  
 12 A. Well, again, we go back to the issue of what was  
 13 possible in relation to the phones that he used --  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You couldn't get anything off his phones  
 15 anyway?  
 16 A. Yes. So the Alcatel was effectively destroyed beyond  
 17 use, apart from one small snippet of information. There  
 18 was no useful information from the Samsung.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Then whatever useful information there  
 20 may have been may have been recorded on the SIM card  
 21 rather than on the device?  
 22 A. It could have been, yes.  
 23 MR GREANEY: You're quite right to focus my question into  
 24 Salman Abedi. It was directed to a rather more general  
 25 issue, which is paragraphs 409 and 410 where you

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1 observe:  
 2 "When dealing with suspects and in some cases  
 3 witnesses, digital media devices such as mobile phones,  
 4 laptops and tablets have been seized in order that the  
 5 data they hold be interrogated -- including data  
 6 associated to social media activity ..."  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. And you observe that one of the things that they were  
 9 interrogated for was evidence of hostile reconnaissance?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. In the final two lines on page 410, you state:  
 12 "No evidence of hostile reconnaissance was recovered  
 13 from any of the devices subjected to this process."  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Despite initial concern that existed in relation to one  
 16 piece of footage?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. That was a piece of footage that was recovered from  
 19 a mobile telephone seized following the arrests of Yahya  
 20 and Mohammed Werfalli?  
 21 A. Yes. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. There were some images that were, put it very simply,  
 23 initially thought capable of being evidence of hostile  
 24 reconnaissance?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. But that was the subject of very careful investigation  
 2 and was revealed to be non-sinister?  
 3 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 4 Q. Whilst we're engaged in the exercise of dispelling  
 5 suspicion, which of course is one of the functions of  
 6 the inquiry, I'm going to ask you about an issue that  
 7 you deal with at paragraph 413 and following of your  
 8 statement because you -- page 110 -- were specifically  
 9 asked about apparent evidence of a person making  
 10 relevant threats, by which I mean threats to the arena,  
 11 in the period leading up to the bombing, so threats  
 12 before the bombing itself.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Were investigations conducted into that issue?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Did they relate to a particular social media feed on  
 17 Twitter, which included three posts, each of which  
 18 referenced the Manchester Arena in a threatening tone?  
 19 A. That's correct, yes.  
 20 Q. Did the tweets on their face show times of 6.24 pm,  
 21 6.28 pm and 6.32 pm on 22 May?  
 22 A. Yes, they did.  
 23 Q. So before the attack had taken place?  
 24 A. Yes, apparently.  
 25 Q. And with at least one of them having an Islamic State

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1 slant?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. So obviously, those tweets will have been of concern to  
 4 the investigation given the point at which they appear  
 5 to have been made?  
 6 A. Yes, they were.  
 7 Q. As a result, was that closely investigated as well?  
 8 A. Yes, it was.  
 9 Q. Was it revealed that in fact the account from which they  
 10 were tweeted had been created at 21.48 on 22 May?  
 11 A. Yes, that's UTC time, yes.  
 12 Q. Equating to 22.48 GMT?  
 13 A. Yes, that's right.  
 14 Q. And therefore post attack?  
 15 A. Yes, that's right.  
 16 Q. So that whatever appeared on the face of the tweet, did  
 17 you conclude that these tweets were made after Abedi had  
 18 launched his attack?  
 19 A. They were made after Abedi launched his attack.  
 20 Q. And that had been made by some unpleasant and malicious  
 21 character who, in the result, has not been traced?  
 22 A. That's correct. Is it worth saying that that ... If  
 23 memory serves me right, that actually was traced to an  
 24 overseas ...  
 25 Q. I believe --

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1 A. If that might help, I think that's ...  
 2 Q. It was created in Palestine, I think.  
 3 A. That's right. Just to put some reassurance around that.  
 4 It wasn't some extremely unpleasant person in the UK.  
 5 Q. This is the point, isn't it, I suppose in the aftermath  
 6 of any terrible event such as this, there will be idiots  
 7 who post things and try to claim that they knew things  
 8 that they didn't know at the time?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. You have had to investigate such things, this is one of  
 11 them, and you're able to provide us with reassurance  
 12 that this was not in fact posted by someone who had any  
 13 prior knowledge?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right, absolutely.  
 15 Q. We're getting very much towards the end of part 4 of  
 16 your statement. The next topic is Salman Abedi's  
 17 applications to work for G4S.  
 18 Were you asked about Salman Abedi's links to that  
 19 organisation and, in particular, whether he ever applied  
 20 for employment with G4S as a safety steward?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. I believe that the issue being raised by the inquiry was  
 23 not the first time that you had been aware of that  
 24 issue? I'm now at paragraph 433.  
 25 A. No, that's correct.

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1 Q. Page 114.?  
 2 A. The information actually came from G4S.  
 3 Q. And indeed was raised by them with you on the afternoon  
 4 of 25 May?  
 5 A. Yes, that's right.  
 6 Q. Did they tell you that Salman Abedi had applied to G4S  
 7 for a job?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And that as a result, they held a file on Salman Abedi?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Did they undertake to forward that file to your  
 12 investigation?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And indeed did you receive it within a matter of  
 15 minutes?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. When analysed, did the file consist of two incomplete  
 18 application forms?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. Was the first application made in October 2013?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. For the position of safety steward?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. And the second part completed, made in December 2013?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. For the position of Manchester customer care steward?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. In the upshot, was Salman Abedi unsuccessful in both  
 4 applications?  
 5 A. He was unsuccessful, yes.  
 6 Q. Is it the position, moreover, that he did not work at  
 7 any stage for G4S in any capacity?  
 8 A. He did not.  
 9 Q. Obviously, Salman Abedi, given what he did on 22 May,  
 10 applying to work as a safety steward, is bound to raise  
 11 concern, but this occurred in 2013, did it not?  
 12 A. It did.  
 13 Q. And that may well have been at a stage on the evidence  
 14 before he became radicalised?  
 15 A. It may.  
 16 Q. In any event, is it the position that there is no  
 17 evidence as to where Salman Abedi hoped to work in the  
 18 event that his applications had been successful?  
 19 A. Yes, that's absolutely certain.  
 20 Q. Both of the applications were, can you confirm this, for  
 21 generic steward vacancies?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. So that if successful, Salman Abedi would have been part  
 24 of a pool in the north-west supporting any events work  
 25 that was available?

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1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. Which would have spanned many different types of  
 3 concerts, festivals and sporting events?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. So even leaving the issue of radicalisation to one side,  
 6 this was not a situation in which, for example,  
 7 Salman Abedi was focusing his wish to work on any  
 8 particular location?  
 9 A. No.  
 10 Q. The final topic that we'll deal with in part 4 is the  
 11 extradition and trial of Hashem Abedi. Perhaps when  
 12 we've finished that, we'll take an early lunch. Just  
 13 before I deal with this issue, I'm going to check one  
 14 topic if I may, please.  
 15 (Pause)  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just let me say this. For all lawyers  
 17 taking instructions, it's quite difficult to maintain  
 18 social distancing when doing so, but it is quite  
 19 important that we do so, so if people actually want me  
 20 to rise so they can talk more conveniently, please don't  
 21 hesitate to ask, or we'll all listen to your  
 22 conversations, whichever is easier.  
 23 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much. I hope that the perspex  
 24 saved me from a COVID breach.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure it did, that was just a general

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1 remark because lawyers are used to taking instructions  
 2 in a way which is not overheard by other people.  
 3 MR GREANEY: Yes. You're quite right, that's something we  
 4 all need to bear in mind, notwithstanding that V Day, as  
 5 I understand it's to be called, has now arrived.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 7 MR GREANEY: We're dealing with the extradition and trial of  
 8 Hashem Abedi. On 23 May 2017, was it learned that  
 9 Hashem Abedi had been detained in Libya by the  
 10 authorities there and was being held for his part in the  
 11 attack?  
 12 A. Yes, it was.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm going to ask, through you, before  
 14 I raise something that the families are not aware of,  
 15 whether the bereaved families' lawyers can confirm  
 16 whether or not the families have been made aware of the  
 17 content of an email that Mr Suter circulated early  
 18 yesterday evening that relates to Hashem Abedi in Libya.  
 19 MR COOPER: I'm not aware of that. I'm aware of the  
 20 document that my learned friend refers to, but I haven't  
 21 taken instructions, sir. Knowing the assiduous  
 22 behaviour of my solicitors, I expect they have, but if  
 23 I can take instructions on that, I would like to.  
 24 MR GREANEY: The most efficient way of dealing with this  
 25 is that it's now 12.40. If we can break early for lunch

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1 and return early from lunch at 1.40, we can sort all of  
 2 this out in the meantime.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'd prefer family members not to be  
 4 taken by surprise by things and we've tried to achieve  
 5 that. It hasn't always been successful. But it's  
 6 obviously better if we check and find out before  
 7 anything is revealed before everybody else.  
 8 MR GREANEY: And it would have been better if I'd raised  
 9 this in the break, I'm sorry that I didn't do so.  
 10 I take that responsibility.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. 1.40. Thank you very much.  
 12 (12.40 pm)  
 13 (The lunch adjournment)  
 14 (1.43 pm)  
 15 MR GREANEY: Mr Barraclough, where we had reached before  
 16 lunch was the extradition and trial of Hashem Abedi, so  
 17 we're now at page 115 of your witness statement and  
 18 paragraph 437.  
 19 As you have confirmed, on 23 May 2017 it was learned  
 20 by your investigation that Hashem Abedi had been  
 21 detained in Libya by the authorities there?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And was being held for his part in the attack in  
 24 Manchester?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. What I know you will be aware of is the following, and  
 2 really you just need to say yes or no, if you don't  
 3 mind, in answer to these questions.  
 4 First of all, it has been claimed by counsel who  
 5 represented Hashem Abedi in the criminal proceedings  
 6 against him that he was subject to mistreatment in  
 7 Libya.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Secondly, it has been maintained by counsel on his  
 10 behalf that as a result of that treatment whilst in  
 11 Libya he made a confession to involvement in the arena  
 12 attack?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Just to bring you up to date, sir, I have had  
 15 a discussion with Mr Weatherby over lunch, who raised  
 16 an issue in relation to the purported Libyan confession  
 17 some time ago now. What we have agreed between  
 18 ourselves is that at this stage I will not ask  
 19 Mr Barraclough any further questions in relation to the  
 20 purported Libyan confession and Mr Weatherby, pending  
 21 instructions from his lay clients, equally will ask no  
 22 questions on this particular topic, but that the senior  
 23 investigating officer will return next week if it proves  
 24 necessary for questions to be asked and I have had an  
 25 opportunity to discuss that with counsel representing

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1 other bereaved families and they are content with it.  
 2 I haven't discussed it with Mr Horwell, I'm sorry,  
 3 but I'm sure that he will be content enough.  
 4 Does that make sense to you, Mr Barraclough?  
 5 A. It does make sense, yes.  
 6 MR GREANEY: Sir, are you content with that approach?  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Let's just deal with some of the very basic  
 9 facts in relation to the extradition.  
 10 As your investigation developed, did it become clear  
 11 that an evidential case was being made out implicating  
 12 Hashem Abedi in the preparation of the attack carried  
 13 out by his brother?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And in due course was it that evidential case that was  
 16 to lead to Hashem Abedi's conviction at the Central  
 17 Criminal Court on 17 March of this year?  
 18 A. Yes, it was.  
 19 Q. In order to reach that point and bring Hashem Abedi from  
 20 Libya to the UK and to a courtroom in London, was it  
 21 necessary for you and the Crown Prosecution Service to  
 22 follow a particular process?  
 23 A. Yes, it was.  
 24 Q. I don't believe we need to go into it because what we  
 25 know is that process was negotiated successfully by you

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1 and the Crown Prosecution Service.  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. During the time steps were being taken to secure the  
 4 extradition of Hashem Abedi, did your team continue to  
 5 investigate the attack?  
 6 A. Yes, they did.  
 7 Q. Focusing on the investigation into those who had  
 8 previously been arrested?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And other persons of interest known as TIE subjects?  
 11 A. That is correct, yes.  
 12 Q. We're going to look in part 5 at what that term means.  
 13 Once Hashem Abedi had been returned to the  
 14 United Kingdom, the criminal proceedings against him  
 15 in the UK were started; is that correct?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. And as part of the preparation for that trial, did  
 18 a number of consultations take place between police, the  
 19 Crown Prosecution Service and leading counsel for the  
 20 prosecution?  
 21 A. Yes, they did.  
 22 Q. On those occasions, with highly experienced leading  
 23 counsel and highly experienced CPS lawyers, were the TIE  
 24 subjects in general discussed?  
 25 A. Yes, they were.

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1 Q. And without delving into matters that are privileged,  
 2 was it agreed by all present, the investigating team,  
 3 the CPS counter-terrorism division and leading counsel  
 4 that there was no prosecutable case, as you put it,  
 5 against any individual other than Hashem Abedi?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. The trial of Abedi commenced, as you will no doubt very  
 8 clearly recall, at the Old Bailey on 27 January?  
 9 A. That's correct, yes.  
 10 Q. He was charged with 22 counts of murder, one count of  
 11 attempted murder encompassing many other people who were  
 12 harmed or put at risk of harm, and one count of  
 13 attempting to cause an explosion with intent; is that  
 14 correct?  
 15 A. That is right, yes.  
 16 Q. At the conclusion of that trial, he was found guilty on  
 17 all counts and whilst at the time you made your  
 18 statement he awaited sentence, as we all now know,  
 19 he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum  
 20 term of 55 years?  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. That brings my questions about part 4 of your statement  
 23 to a conclusion. I'm going on next to ask you about  
 24 part 5.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just say this without, I hope,

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1 treading on anything I shouldn't. I don't believe the  
 2 whole extradition procedure was that simple and all  
 3 those involved in it are to be congratulated, in my  
 4 view, on achieving their aim in getting Hashem Abedi  
 5 back, facing justice, and in the end a jury deciding, as  
 6 we now know correctly, that he was guilty of those  
 7 crimes.  
 8 A. Thank you, sir.  
 9 MR GREANEY: Thank you.  
 10 Part 5 of your statement is entitled "Persons of  
 11 interest", is it not?  
 12 A. Yes, it is.  
 13 Q. Did the inquiry identify for you a series of questions  
 14 relating to associates of Salman Abedi?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. In your statement you deal with a significant number of  
 17 persons, and we'll look at most but not all of those in  
 18 due course, but first of all it might assist if you were  
 19 to help us with the framework of your responsibilities  
 20 as counter-terrorism senior investigating officer with  
 21 reference to the associates of the bomber.  
 22 At a very early stage, having identified  
 23 Salman Abedi as the bomber, or likely to have been so,  
 24 did you make a policy decision about others?  
 25 A. Yes, I did.

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1 Q. I'm now at paragraph 448. What was your policy  
 2 decision?  
 3 A. The policy decision is recorded as:  
 4 "Identify any further offenders who present an  
 5 immediate threat or have assisted the commission of this  
 6 attack by any means, to arrest such individuals, and  
 7 secure evidence where available".  
 8 Q. And a team of specialist officers, is this correct, was  
 9 established to carry out interviews with such persons?  
 10 A. Yes. So when you say "team", this was the  
 11 responsibility of the entire investigation, but the  
 12 people who were involved in this were appropriately  
 13 trained to the level they needed to be.  
 14 Q. That was the point I was trying to express. The  
 15 interview strategies for each individual had been  
 16 prepared by specialist officers?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Did you establish a strategy in relation to all  
 19 interviews carried out with associates of Salman Abedi,  
 20 whether they were arrested or not?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And that may have gone through a number of iterations,  
 23 but so far as relevant did it provide that the  
 24 objectives were to establish any link or association  
 25 between the person being interviewed and Salman Abedi?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. To establish their involvement, if any, in the arena  
 3 attack?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. In its commission, preparation or instigation?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. To explore and identify any evidence of extremist  
 8 ideology or motivation, sympathy or support for such  
 9 ideology?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And that's an indication, is it not, of what you told us  
 12 about yesterday, namely that you identified, really from  
 13 the outset, that the motivation for this terrible attack  
 14 was ideological?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Other objectives were to establish links and association  
 17 to other suspects in the investigation?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. To establish the knowledge of the interviewee and/or  
 20 experience in the preparation and production of  
 21 home-made explosives, including locations used,  
 22 individuals involved and any wider network?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And the final objective: the attribution and use of  
 25 known media devices and social media accounts?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. As I indicated, some people were designated for arrest,  
 3 were they not, such as Ismail Abedi?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. But others were designated a different status, namely  
 6 TIE.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. What is TIE, please?  
 9 A. It may help if I just give reference to HOLMES, which is  
 10 the Home Office Large Major Enquiries System that we  
 11 use --  
 12 Q. If it would help by all means do.  
 13 A. -- as a database in any homicide investigation. The  
 14 main purpose of HOLMES is to record information in  
 15 a manner which is searchable so that it's useful to us.  
 16 So for any individual, there may be many different  
 17 references to that individual and how they live their  
 18 lives or who they are. So for example, there might be  
 19 criminal records, there might be descriptions, there  
 20 might be a vehicle used, there might be home premises,  
 21 there might be premises they are associated to, and all  
 22 of these different things go into lists.  
 23 Therefore if the police investigation gets a piece  
 24 of information about, for example, a premises, that  
 25 premises can be searched against lists and other people.

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1 So it makes the whole system very searchable. In the  
 2 same way then we categorise people within that system,  
 3 so the simplest term for anybody who we would wish to  
 4 speak to in the course of an investigation is a TI,  
 5 which is a person who we would wish to trace and  
 6 interview. A TI is effectively, at the most basic  
 7 level, a witness or a potential witness.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 A. A TIE is somebody who may fall into a category where  
 10 they may have an involvement in the offence, so they are  
 11 not suspected of the commission of the offence but have  
 12 done something or contributed in some way that may mean  
 13 that they are of interest in relation to that offence.  
 14 Q. I see.  
 15 A. In order to categorise them, we therefore declare them  
 16 as a TIE, which is -- traditionally it was a trace,  
 17 interview and eliminate process and of course then it  
 18 became a trace, interview, eliminate or implicate  
 19 process.  
 20 In this investigation, it is described as a trace,  
 21 interview and evaluate process. That is purely to  
 22 evaluate their status within the investigation and to  
 23 understand what part they may have played in the actual  
 24 story of the offence.  
 25 Q. Who during this investigation, Operation Manteline, was

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1 responsible for designating a particular individual as  
 2 either a TI or a TIE or a suspect?  
 3 A. That was my sole responsibility.  
 4 Q. Did you have criteria that you applied to the making of  
 5 those decisions?  
 6 A. It's actually very difficult in an investigation such as  
 7 this to actually apply criteria because there is no  
 8 effective elimination criteria. The way of describing  
 9 elimination criteria in the simplest form is if, for  
 10 example, at a murder scene you have a fingerprint, say  
 11 a fingerprint in the victim's blood, then the presence  
 12 of that fingerprint would indicate that a person, the  
 13 person who's responsible, and obviously this depends on  
 14 the circumstances, but the person responsible has left  
 15 that fingerprint in blood, so in a sealed environment.  
 16 So everybody else who hasn't got that fingerprint,  
 17 by virtue of that, is not responsible. So the  
 18 elimination criteria would therefore be that forensic  
 19 fingerprint.  
 20 Q. So that's a simple example?  
 21 A. That's a simple example. But there are many forms of  
 22 elimination criteria. So another example might be an  
 23 alibi. So if we know that an offence has been committed  
 24 at a particular time, then if somebody has an alibi for  
 25 that time on a particular date, so for example they are

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1 with other people who will verify that they could not  
 2 have been at the scene of the murder —  
 3 Q. Or caught on CCTV?  
 4 A. On caught on CCTV — that would therefore become  
 5 elimination criteria .  
 6 Q. Here it was much more complex?  
 7 A. Here it was much more complex because we're talking  
 8 about a very wide potential conspiracy. So at any stage  
 9 in the development of this offence, if you treat it as  
 10 a continuous offence, people may have come in and out of  
 11 any particular role and may have contributed to that  
 12 offence in any number of different ways. So in effect ,  
 13 with all of the individuals in this investigation  
 14 we have had to look at those individuals as a separate  
 15 entity and then decide how, if possible, we can  
 16 eliminate them or at least investigate them to a stage  
 17 where either we're satisfied that they've played no role  
 18 whatsoever or indeed we have nothing further that we can  
 19 contribute to the investigation .  
 20 Q. I see. So at all events you would hope in relation to  
 21 a particular TIE subject that the investigation would  
 22 come to a natural conclusion with all the reasonable  
 23 lines of enquiry having been conducted?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct .  
 25 Q. And at the stage that that point was reached, would the

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1 TIE subject be given a status?  
 2 A. Yes, they would.  
 3 Q. Who would give them the status?  
 4 A. The process that we worked under was clearly each of the  
 5 TIE subjects had a team around them who would be  
 6 responsible for that investigation . They were then  
 7 responsible for preparing all the material that sat  
 8 within that investigation and any conclusions that they  
 9 could draw from that. That would then go to my  
 10 detective inspector, who headed up investigations. It  
 11 would then pass to my deputy and then finally it would  
 12 pass to me and I would make the decision as to where  
 13 that status sat.  
 14 Q. We don't need to go into the detail of what each status  
 15 meant, but I'll simply identify what they are. They are  
 16 at paragraph 456 of your statement: deceased, which  
 17 of course applied to Salman Abedi; charged; convicted;  
 18 suspect; suspect under review; TIE under review; TIE  
 19 evaluated; is that correct?  
 20 A. Yes, that's right .  
 21 Q. So with all of that in mind, that helpful introduction,  
 22 let's move on to the individuals whose positions you  
 23 felt it necessary to address.  
 24 A. Could I just add one further explanation if I may?  
 25 Q. Of course.

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1 A. It might be helpful. So people may wonder why you have  
 2 a different category for suspect and suspect under  
 3 review.  
 4 Q. Indeed.  
 5 A. Similarly, a TIE under review or a TIE who's evaluated.  
 6 Q. Yes.  
 7 A. A TIE under review or a suspect under review will be  
 8 at the stage where we have investigated probably as far  
 9 as we can go, but we need to continually review their  
 10 status in respect of any further information that might  
 11 come in. In other words, we've not finished, and if  
 12 there's new information, that's something that we would  
 13 want to consider as we move forward in the  
 14 investigation .  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 A. I don't know whether that's helpful.  
 17 Q. It is helpful and it makes sense.  
 18 With that explanation in mind, have you grouped the  
 19 individuals who fall into those categories into four  
 20 sub-categories?  
 21 A. Yes, I have.  
 22 Q. Those being associates who were arrested? I'm at  
 23 paragraph 457.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Associates who were not arrested?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Other individuals who were arrested?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And finally, witnesses?  
 5 A. Yes. I do think, though, that some of those categories  
 6 sort of interweave.  
 7 Q. I'm sure that's right, yes.  
 8 A. There are other groupings that we've used as well.  
 9 Q. So let's deal with those categories in turn. First  
 10 then, associates who were arrested. (1), a name that  
 11 we are all now very familiar with, Ismail Abedi, the  
 12 elder brother of Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. In view of his family relationship with Salman Abedi and  
 15 the fact that he had arranged the travel back to Libya  
 16 for his brothers, was Ismail Abedi arrested on 10.30 on  
 17 the morning of 23 May?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. On suspicion, in common with I think all of the people  
 20 we'll be mentioning, of people involved in the  
 21 commission, preparation or instigation of acts of  
 22 terrorism?  
 23 A. That's correct, yes.  
 24 Q. Was he in custody from Tuesday 23 May until 5 June,  
 25 which was a Monday?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. During that time was he interviewed as a suspect on  
 3 a total number of 25 occasions?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. In simple terms, initially at least in those interviews,  
 6 did he answer questions?  
 7 A. He did.  
 8 Q. And did he in those answers deny any involvement in or  
 9 knowledge of the arena attack?  
 10 A. Yes, he did.  
 11 Q. Account for his movements on 22 May?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And provide information about his family and Salman and  
 14 Hashem Abedi in particular?  
 15 A. Yes, he did.  
 16 Q. From Wednesday 24 May, did Ismail Abedi provide  
 17 a prepared statement and then largely give no comment to  
 18 the questions of the investigators?  
 19 A. He did.  
 20 Q. In the prepared statement, did he deny any knowledge of  
 21 or involvement in his brother's actions?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Or in the radicalisation or assistance of Salman Abedi  
 24 in relation to the attack in any way?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. We've already dealt with some of his devices that we'll  
 2 turn to in due course. But in short, were all lines of  
 3 enquiry available in relation to Ismail Abedi thoroughly  
 4 investigated?  
 5 A. Yes, they were.  
 6 Q. And was a conclusion reached that there is no evidence  
 7 meeting the charging standards for any offence relating  
 8 to him being involved in the commission, preparation or  
 9 instigation of the attack?  
 10 A. Yes, that was certainly the assessment. But you must  
 11 understand, again, that the investigation continues  
 12 in relation to this and there will be further attempts  
 13 by the investigation to speak to Ismail Abedi in due  
 14 course as well.  
 15 Q. So we must always bear that in mind. As matters stand,  
 16 bearing in mind the evidential assessment that was made,  
 17 he has not been charged, and I'm going to phrase this  
 18 question carefully, with any offence in connection with  
 19 the bombing?  
 20 A. That's correct, yes.  
 21 Q. Second is Alharth Forjani, who is a cousin of Hashem and  
 22 Salman Abedi. Their mothers are sisters; is that  
 23 correct?  
 24 A. That's right.  
 25 Q. As we know from evidence that's been given on a number

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1 of occasions, on 18 January he was involved in the  
 2 purchase of sulphuric acid, was he not?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And was he also, as your investigation revealed, in  
 5 regular contact with Hashem and Salman Abedi prior to  
 6 their return to Libya on 15 April?  
 7 A. Yes, he was.  
 8 Q. As a result of those matters, was he arrested at  
 9 05.45 hours on Wednesday, 24 May?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. On suspicion of the offence we've identified?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Was he detained between 24 May and 6 June?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And interviewed during that period on 13 occasions as  
 16 a suspect?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. During interview, did he produce a prepared statement --  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. -- involving a denial of any wrongdoing or involvement  
 21 in the arena bombing?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. At that stage I believe he was released, but that was  
 24 not an end of the investigation into him?  
 25 A. No.

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1 Q. I'm at the bottom of page 124. Because the purchase of  
 2 the acid and the contact with the Abedi brothers had to  
 3 be further investigated; is that right?  
 4 A. Yes, that's right.  
 5 Q. There's considerable detail in your witness statement,  
 6 but I think that what then happened can be summarised in  
 7 this way: it was established, following his release in  
 8 June that his, Alharth Forjani's, mobile telephone had  
 9 been used to contact Hashem Abedi on 25 March?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And on 27 March had been used either by Salman Abedi or  
 12 perhaps by himself to contact one of the Werfallis?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14 Q. As a result, was he interviewed again?  
 15 A. Yes, that's right.  
 16 Q. And again denied any wrongdoing?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. I am now at page 126. In due course, after that further  
 19 interview, did he provide a witness statement to the  
 20 investigation and indicate a willingness to attend  
 21 court?  
 22 A. Yes, he did.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And did attend court?  
 24 A. Yes, he did, he gave evidence.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

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1 MR GREANEY: And we do have a transcript of his evidence.  
 2 You're quite right, sir, to identify that fact.  
 3 (3). Another cousin of Salman and Hashem Abedi,  
 4 Abdalla Adel Forjani; is that correct?  
 5 A. Yes, that's right.  
 6 Q. Also sometimes known as Isaac; is that right?  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. Was he arrested at 1.30 on the morning of 24 May, along  
 9 with his brother Abderahman Forjani?  
 10 A. Yes, he was.  
 11 Q. Were the two of them at that stage in a vehicle?  
 12 A. Yes, they were.  
 13 Q. And were they arrested for the same offence as the  
 14 others that we've mentioned?  
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 16 Q. Was he, bearing in mind his relationship with  
 17 Salman Abedi, which had given rise to his arrest,  
 18 interviewed while in custody on a total of 11 occasions?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. Between 24 and 30 May?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And after consultation with the Crown Prosecution  
 23 Service, was a decision made that the evidence  
 24 in relation to him did not meet the charging criteria  
 25 for any offence?

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1 A. That's correct, yes.  
 2 Q. Had he denied, whilst in custody, any involvement in or  
 3 knowledge of the bombing?  
 4 A. Yes, he did.  
 5 Q. And in due course, he was to provide a witness statement  
 6 to the investigation; is that right?  
 7 A. That's correct, yes.  
 8 Q. Which, insofar as it dealt with anything relevant,  
 9 described witnessing a conversation between his mother  
 10 and Salman Abedi's mother and then being informed that  
 11 the brothers were going to Libya?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Fourthly, the third Forjani brother, so again a cousin  
 14 of Hashem Abedi and Salman Abedi, Abderahman Forjani.  
 15 Given his relationship with Salman Abedi, was he  
 16 arrested, as we've heard already, at 1.30 on the morning  
 17 of 24 May with his brother Abdallah?  
 18 A. Yes, he was.  
 19 Q. Was he interviewed as a suspect nine times between 24  
 20 and 30 May?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Denying any wrongdoing?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. But just as in relation to his brother, was a decision  
 25 made that the evidence in relation to him did not meet

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1 the criteria for charging him with any offence?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. And in due course he also provided witness statements to  
 4 the investigation?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Fifthly, Rabie Zreba, who is a witness from whom we hope  
 7 to hear next week. Was he arrested at 3.38 pm on  
 8 24 May?  
 9 A. Yes, he was.  
 10 Q. Was the background to his arrest that Salman Abedi had  
 11 been in contact with him on 22 May, just hours before  
 12 the arena attack?  
 13 A. That's correct, yes.  
 14 Q. By that stage, is it also correct that it had been  
 15 established by the investigation that the first  
 16 telephone contact was a call from Salman Abedi, using  
 17 his 3230 number, to Zreba at 5.11 pm on the day of the  
 18 attack?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. With that call lasting for 1 minute and 21 seconds?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. But followed by a series of short further calls between  
 23 the two?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 25 Q. Had your investigation also revealed that the two men,

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1 Zreba and Abedi, had met at 6.14 pm outside the Muslim  
 2 youth centre that same day?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. So for those reasons, obviously he was a person of very  
 5 considerable interest to the investigation?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Was Zreba held in custody for 13 days and interviewed on  
 8 13 occasions?  
 9 A. Yes, he was.  
 10 Q. During that period did he give what you describe in your  
 11 statement as a full account of his movements and  
 12 interactions with Salman Abedi?  
 13 A. Yes, he did.  
 14 Q. Did he explain that the purpose of those phone calls,  
 15 which otherwise appeared sinister, and of the meeting  
 16 was the result of Salman Abedi, who had given a false  
 17 name, requesting Zreba to send money to Libya on his  
 18 behalf, using a hawala banking system?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. That system being an informal money transfer system  
 21 popular in the Middle East?  
 22 A. Yes, that's right.  
 23 Q. In short, did the investigation, having received that  
 24 explanation, obtain no evidence to suggest that Zreba  
 25 had any previous knowledge or association with any

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1 member of the Abedi family?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. And was he therefore released from custody, a decision  
 4 having been made that the evidence did not meet the  
 5 charging criteria?  
 6 A. Yes, that's right.  
 7 Q. So he has not been charged, in common with the other  
 8 four people we've mentioned, with any offences  
 9 in relation to the bombing?  
 10 A. Yes, correct.  
 11 Q. And he too provided witness statements to the  
 12 investigation?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. The next person is frankly irrelevant and I'm not going  
 15 to deal with him. So we'll go on to the list at (7),  
 16 Aimen Elwafi. What is Mr Elwafi's home address?  
 17 A. It is 74 Somerton Court.  
 18 Q. We saw a photograph of that earlier today. That's  
 19 a two-bedroom flat in a tower block rented through the  
 20 Northwards Housing Association?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. So as will be apparent already, is Mr Elwafi's  
 23 association with your investigation that it was  
 24 discovered that he rented that address to Salman and  
 25 Hashem Abedi?

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1 A. Yes, that's right.  
 2 Q. For a 6-week period between the end of February 2017  
 3 until their departure for Libya on 15 April of that  
 4 year?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. Had the investigation also established that that was  
 7 following the placing of an advertisement by Mr Elwafi  
 8 on a social media site?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. As you've explained already, the significance of  
 11 74 Somerton Court is that it is believed that whilst  
 12 there, Salman and Hashem Abedi produced explosive  
 13 materials, namely the TATP that was used in the attack?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Against that background, was Aimen Elwafi arrested at  
 16 2.41 hours on Thursday 25 May?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Had he voluntarily attended the police station for that  
 19 purpose?  
 20 A. Not for that purpose, but he had voluntarily attended  
 21 the police station.  
 22 Q. I see. During the course of the period from the 25th to  
 23 the 30th May, did he remain in custody?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And was he interviewed as a suspect seven times during

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1 that period?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. Did he explain to officers that he had sublet his flat  
 4 to Salman Abedi?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. And that after returning to the flat, he had discovered  
 7 items there that caused him concern because, by that  
 8 stage, the arena attack had occurred?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. Did he insist that he had no knowledge of or involvement  
 11 in the bombing?  
 12 A. He did.  
 13 Q. And state that he was neither aware of nor familiar with  
 14 any member of the Abedi family prior to the subletting  
 15 of his flat?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. As Mr de la Poer identified yesterday with the forensic  
 18 scientist who gave evidence, did he go on to explain  
 19 that once he moved back to the flat, he had noticed  
 20 a distinct smell?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Namely a strong smell similar, as he put it, to petrol  
 23 or diesel in the flat?  
 24 A. Yes, that's right.  
 25 Q. Did he also observe that the fire alarm had been

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1 disabled and that there were several empty plastic  
 2 2-litre bottles in the kitchen?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. The content of which smelt strongly of chemicals and was  
 5 oily in substance?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And he went on to describe, is this right, a further  
 8 three 2-litre plastic bottles in the freezer containing  
 9 the same cloudy liquid?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. And a long piece of metal in a location we don't need to  
 12 go into, and a large plastic container with the  
 13 "Ad-Blue" label on it?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Salman Abedi, I believe he explained, had contacted  
 16 Mr Elwafi on 17 April and said that he'd left some  
 17 things at the flat and if he didn't return to retrieve  
 18 them, then Mr Elwafi could have them?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. Mr Elwafi said that he asked about the substance in the  
 21 bottles and states that he was told not to worry about  
 22 it and that they belonged to Hashem Abedi.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Did Mr Elwafi acknowledge that he had disposed of the  
 25 bottles that he found in his flat and that after seeing

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1 the photograph of Salman Abedi on Tuesday 23 May, so  
 2 after the bombing and following his identification as  
 3 the bomber, he had then disposed of all the items  
 4 belonging to Salman that were still in the flat?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. So he gave a detailed account including acknowledging  
 7 what he had done with those items?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Were all lines of enquiry that were identified  
 10 in relation to Mr Elwafi then followed?  
 11 A. Yes, that's right.  
 12 Q. Was it the position that no evidence to implicate him in  
 13 the bombing was found?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And indeed, the contact which you were able to establish  
 16 had occurred with Salman and/or Hashem Abedi supported  
 17 the account that he had given?  
 18 A. It did, yes.  
 19 Q. As a result, in common with others that we've looked at,  
 20 was he released without charge on the basis that the  
 21 evidence did not meet the charging standard?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. And he has not been charged with any offence relating to  
 24 the bombing?  
 25 A. No.

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1 Q. And he too was to provide a statement to the  
 2 investigation?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct, and again that statement was used  
 4 in the trial.  
 5 Q. Next, Mosbah Zarkun. Is his relevance that he had  
 6 contact with Salman Abedi on 22 May 2017?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And given the proximity of that contact to the bombing,  
 9 in your judgement did that make his arrest necessary in  
 10 order to establish what that contact had been and what,  
 11 if anything, he knew about the attack?  
 12 A. Yes, that's right.  
 13 Q. As a result, was he arrested at 2.30 on Friday, 26 May?  
 14 A. He was.  
 15 Q. And interviewed as a suspect on a total of 10 occasions  
 16 during the period of his detention between 26 May and  
 17 8 June?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. During those interviews, did Mr Zarkun deny any  
 20 involvement in or knowledge of the arena bombing?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Did he give what you judged to be a full account of his  
 23 interaction with Salman Abedi?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Who had called himself Mohammed during the exchanges?

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1 A. That's correct, yes.  
 2 Q. And did Mr Zarkun explain that that contact had been in  
 3 connection with the sending of money to Libya?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And that as a result of that contact, did he explain he  
 6 had given Mr Zreba's details to Salman Abedi?  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. Would it be reasonable to say that all lines of further  
 9 enquiry were exhausted with no evidence uncovered that  
 10 met the charging standards?  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 12 Q. So that he has not been charged with any offence  
 13 relating to the bombing?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Next, and I'm now at page 134, where we have an example  
 16 in the final three paragraphs on that page, I don't  
 17 propose to adduce it unless it seems to be of relevance  
 18 to ---  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Next person, Adel Mohamed Abuzeid. Was it  
 21 established that he had had telephone contact with  
 22 Salman Abedi on or near to the day of the bombing?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. And so for the same reasons that you gave in relation to  
 25 Mr Zarkun, did you judge it necessary that he should be

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1 arrested?  
 2 A. I did.  
 3 Q. Did his arrest then occur at 18.50 hours on Friday,  
 4 26 May?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Did he remain in custody from that date until 8 June?  
 7 A. Yes, he did.  
 8 Q. Did he, during those interviews, deny any involvement in  
 9 or knowledge of the attack?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And, moreover, deny any knowledge of Salman or  
 12 Hashem Abedi?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Did he account for the telephone contact between himself  
 15 and Salman Abedi on 22 May by stating that he had  
 16 received a telephone call from a man who called himself  
 17 Ahmed?  
 18 A. Yes, that's right.  
 19 Q. Who you believe to be Salman Abedi?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And did Mr Abuzeid explain that the subject matter of  
 22 the call had been a desire on the part of Abedi to  
 23 transfer money to Libya?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Did he explain that, ultimately, he declined to make

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1 that transaction because he had a "bad feeling" about  
 2 Abedi?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And that he then referred Abedi to a man called  
 5 Alla Sicri?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Your investigation established, I believe, that Abuzeid  
 8 did have links and associates involved in offering  
 9 currency exchange facilities for the Libyan community?  
 10 A. Yes, that's right.  
 11 Q. So therefore information that supported his account.  
 12 And on the other side of the balance, the investigation  
 13 identified no evidence that met the charging standards  
 14 in relation to him?  
 15 A. Yes, that's right.  
 16 Q. And as a result he has not been charged with any  
 17 offences in relation to the bombing?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You may well have said it and I just  
 20 missed it, but in relation to Zarkun, he also, I think,  
 21 said that he had not sent any money to Libya and had  
 22 refused to do it.  
 23 MR GREANEY: Yes, I believe that's correct, sir.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It just perhaps explains why we have  
 25 three separate people who are asked for money, only one

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1 of whom actually did that.  
 2 MR GREANEY: I think what I did establish when we dealt with  
 3 his account is that the call had been about sending  
 4 money to Libya and the way in which he had concluded the  
 5 discussion was to give Mr Zreba's details to  
 6 Salman Abedi.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. Thank you.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Sir, your analysis, I'm quite sure, is correct.  
 9 So that concludes the position in relation to  
 10 Mr Abuzeid. No doubt everyone will understand why you  
 11 considered it appropriate to arrest him, but when it  
 12 came to it, there was no evidence that satisfied the  
 13 charging standard, so he has not been charged with any  
 14 offence relating to the bombing?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. Really very similar observations play in relation to the  
 17 next person we're going to deal with, who was mentioned  
 18 by Mr Abuzeid. It's Aladeen Sicri. Was he someone of  
 19 interest to the investigation because he too had had  
 20 telephone contact with Salman Abedi on 22 May?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. So that you judged it necessary that he should be  
 23 arrested so that you could investigate what that contact  
 24 was about?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And whether he knew anything about and had been involved  
 2 in the attack, was Mr Sicri arrested at 04.34 hours on  
 3 Monday, 29 May?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And held in custody between that date and 4 June?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Did he give a full account of his interaction with  
 8 Salman Abedi during that interview process?  
 9 A. Yes, he did.  
 10 Q. Making clear that he had neither involvement in nor  
 11 knowledge of the bombing?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And did he explain that his contact with Salman Abedi on  
 14 22 May had been as a result of a request by Abedi of  
 15 him, Mr Sicri, to send money to Libya?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. It being known that Mr Sicri provided that service and  
 18 indeed he advertised that service on Facebook?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. Did Mr Sicri explain that he didn't know the man who had  
 21 called him, Abedi?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. That he became suspicious of the caller?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And therefore ultimately he declined to provide any

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1 assistance to Salman Abedi?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. Lines of enquiry were identified, is that correct?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Did the investigation corroborate the fact that the man,  
 6 Salman Abedi, had been given Mr Sicri's contact details  
 7 by Adel Abuzeid?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. No other evidence was found by the investigation to  
 10 implicate Mr Sicri in any offence in connection with the  
 11 attack; is that correct?  
 12 A. Yes, that's right.  
 13 Q. And as a result, in common with others, was a decision  
 14 made that the charging standard was not met so that he  
 15 has not been charged with any offence relating to the  
 16 bombing?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. Next, someone that we've heard about already —  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Forgive me for summarising it to get it  
 20 clear in my mind. A number of people asked to send  
 21 money?  
 22 MR GREANEY: Yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who, if anyone, said they had sent  
 24 money?  
 25 MR GREANEY: Sir, whether he had or had not in the result,

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1 I don't know, but Mr Zreba had agreed that he would  
 2 effect the transfer.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 4 MR GREANEY: As I've said, sir, we're expecting evidence to  
 5 be received by you from him next week.  
 6 Next, Mr Yahya Werfalli. Was he arrested because  
 7 information had been received, as we have heard,  
 8 regarding the purchase of hydrogen peroxide in the name  
 9 of Yahya Werfalli?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. As a result, did you judge that it was necessary for him  
 12 to be arrested?  
 13 A. I did.  
 14 Q. And did that arrest occur at 2.55 hours on 27 May?  
 15 A. Yes, that's right.  
 16 Q. Was he held in custody between that date and 6 June?  
 17 A. Yes, he was.  
 18 Q. And interviewed as an aspect on a total of nine  
 19 occasions?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. During those interviews did he answer questions  
 22 regarding his dealings with Salman and Hashem Abedi —  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. — and the purchases that had been made in his name?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. We don't need to go into the precise details of it, but  
 2 in general terms did he explain that the purchases made  
 3 were in connection with a fraud?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Did he say that he didn't know what had been purchased?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And denied any involvement in the arena attack?  
 8 A. Yes, he did.  
 9 Q. Thereafter, did the investigation identify from  
 10 communication information that there was support for the  
 11 account given by Werfalli in interview?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And that no other evidence was found to implicate  
 14 Mr Werfalli in the arena attack?  
 15 A. Yes, that's right.  
 16 Q. And that in common with others that we've looked at,  
 17 a decision was made that the charging standards, so far  
 18 as such offences are concerned, was not met and he has  
 19 not been charged with any offence in connection with the  
 20 attack?  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. What he was charged with were offences connected with  
 23 the fraud; is that correct?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. I said yesterday that we have a transcript of the

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1 sentencing remarks of His Honour Judge Field Queen's  
 2 Counsel. We can put those on the screen. They are  
 3 {INQ039188/1}.  
 4 Can we go to the next page, please? {INQ039188/2}.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It seems quite a long time after the  
 6 charge. There may well be a very good reason for that,  
 7 so I'm not asking for anyone to tell me that.  
 8 MR GREANEY: I'm sure we can find out, but you're quite  
 9 right, this is a long time down the line.  
 10 Was it your team that dealt with the prosecution or  
 11 did you leave this to other officers?  
 12 A. There was some delay in this. It was referred to the  
 13 City of Manchester division.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't need to explain it. There's  
 15 often a good explanation, but it takes time to arrive at  
 16 it maybe.  
 17 A. I think so and I think it was that whole process that  
 18 took time.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that was Judge Field's job, if  
 20 anybody's, not mine.  
 21 MR GREANEY: At paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 on that page,  
 22 Judge Field explained in straightforward terms, if I may  
 23 say so, what form the fraud had taken. We perhaps don't  
 24 need to go into that and said:  
 25 "You were quite candid when interviewed by the

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1 police, telling them that you had done this, namely the  
 2 fraud, before and had got away with it, relying on the  
 3 bank not to raise questions over small transactions on  
 4 your statement. The bank, however, was suspicious and  
 5 no refund was ever made."  
 6 Then over the page {INQ039188/3}, the second full  
 7 paragraph down:  
 8 "What is clear, however, is that you in March and  
 9 April 2017 had no idea of what the Abedi brothers were  
 10 up to, you had no idea what they intended to purchase.  
 11 Indeed, it seems you thought they might be buying mobile  
 12 phones and you had no idea they were plotting mass  
 13 murder."  
 14 The judge goes on to recognise the appalling tragedy  
 15 caused by the actions of the Abedi brothers, but  
 16 identifies that he needed to focus upon the culpability  
 17 of Mr Werfalli.  
 18 If we go to {INQ039188/5}, the final page, we can  
 19 see that the judge concluded that the appropriate  
 20 sentence was a community order of 12 months' duration  
 21 with two requirements.  
 22 We can take that from the screen. Thank you.  
 23 In relation to Yahya Werfalli, the only other issue  
 24 to mention is one we've touched on already. During his  
 25 time in custody, images of Manchester Arena were

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1 discovered, is this correct, on a mobile phone  
 2 associated with both Yahya Werfalli and his sister?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right.  
 4 Q. And this is what you told us about earlier today gave  
 5 rise to a suspicion of hostile reconnaissance?  
 6 A. Yes, it did initially.  
 7 Q. But in the result, as a result of investigations, was it  
 8 established that this was the kind of photograph that  
 9 the sister tended to take on her mobile phone as she was  
 10 interested in photography?  
 11 A. Yes, and the images don't -- they would not be useful as  
 12 hostile reconnaissance.  
 13 Q. And moreover had never been disseminated?  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're beginning to drop your voice a  
 15 little?  
 16 A. Sorry, sir.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, it's just that we'll be having  
 18 calls through.  
 19 A. Sorry, I said the images would not be useful.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I heard it; it's just that it is getting  
 21 a bit quiet, if you don't mind. I know it is a long  
 22 time, so I do understand.  
 23 MR GREANEY: Just to answer directly the question that the  
 24 chairman asked yesterday, the offences with which  
 25 Werfalli had been charged and to which he pleaded guilty

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1 were two charges of fraud by false representation.  
 2 Next, page 139 now, the brother of Yahya Werfalli,  
 3 Mohamed Omar Werfalli. Is he the younger brother of  
 4 Yahya?  
 5 A. Yes, he is.  
 6 Q. Did he become of interest to your investigation because  
 7 of a bank transfer that he had made to his brother,  
 8 Yahya, on 3 April?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Which money was then used the same day to purchase  
 11 hydrogen peroxide?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. Did you judge that it was necessary that he should be  
 14 arrested so that you could explore whether that  
 15 involvement was knowing involvement in the plot --  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. -- or unknowing involvement in the plot?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. As a result, was he arrested on 27 May at 2.50 in the  
 20 morning?  
 21 A. Yes, that's right.  
 22 Q. And held in custody between that date and 6 June?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And interviewed on a total of 10 occasions?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. In short, did the investigations that were conducted,  
 2 both during the interview process and subsequently,  
 3 provide no basis for contending that he had been  
 4 involved in terrorist offences?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. And as a result, was a decision made that the evidence  
 7 didn't meet the charging standard?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. So that he has not been charged with any offence  
 10 relating to the arena attack?  
 11 A. No.  
 12 Q. Next, Ahmed Taghdi, who is a witness, sir, again, that  
 13 we expect to hear from next Tuesday or Wednesday.  
 14 Did your investigation reveal that he had been  
 15 involved in the purchase of the Nissan Micra which was  
 16 subsequently used to store component parts and chemicals  
 17 that were used in Abedi's bomb?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. As a result, was a decision made that he should be  
 20 arrested in order to account for that if he could?  
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 22 Q. Was he therefore arrested at 2.25 on Sunday, 28 May?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And detained in custody until Sunday, 11 June?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. During which period he was interviewed as a suspect on  
 2 a total of 13 occasions?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. During the interviews was it established that Mr Taghdi  
 5 knew the Abedi family because, as he described it, they  
 6 were all part of the Libyan community in Manchester?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And did he go on to explain something that we'll be  
 9 looking at in closer detail in chapter 13, that he and  
 10 Salman Abedi had visited Abdalraouf Abdallah in prison?  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 12 Q. Did he state that he'd known Salman Abedi since  
 13 childhood?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. In relation to the Micra, did he tell your interviewers  
 16 that on 13 April he had sourced a Nissan Micra for  
 17 Salman and Hashem Abedi?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And that he had done so through the use of the buying  
 20 and selling website Gumtree?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Did he say that he'd taken Salman and Hashem to see that  
 23 car in an area of Manchester?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Travelling there in his own vehicle?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. And did he say that the two males selling the vehicle  
 3 were Nathan Grice and James Keighron?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Who we'll come on to deal with, but your investigation  
 6 was to establish that they were wholly without blame?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. Did Taghdi deny any knowledge of the bombing or being  
 9 involved in any way?  
 10 A. Yes, he did.  
 11 Q. At that stage was a decision made that the charging  
 12 standard was not met?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. So that he was not charged with any offence relating to  
 15 the bombing?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. And indeed was released from custody?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. That being on 11 June.  
 20 As you've explained to us, investigations continued  
 21 even after people had been released from custody?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And indeed I have no doubt continue to this day. In  
 24 Mr Taghdi's case do we see an example of that occurring?  
 25 A. Yes, we do.

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1 Q. Because in his case, following analysis of CCTV  
 2 evidence, was it discovered that Mr Taghdi had visited  
 3 Devell House at 3.16 pm on 23 May?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. And that he'd looked in the car park?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Had it also been established that Mr Taghdi had used  
 8 a mobile phone with a number ending 876 to contact  
 9 a number of other individuals who were of interest to  
 10 you?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Including a man called Elyes Blidi and Elyes Elmehdi?  
 13 A. Yes, that's right.  
 14 Q. And such contact had occurred at key times?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And was assessed to have been to hide his involvement in  
 17 the case?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And was it further assessed that Mr Taghdi's primary  
 20 phone number had been, as you put it, deliberately left  
 21 sterile from that contact?  
 22 A. Yes, that's right.  
 23 Q. And what do you mean by that?  
 24 A. Well, it hadn't been used so it could not be effectively  
 25 recovered in evidence. So in other words, he had used

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1 other people's contacts to do so or other people's  
 2 phones. Sorry, does that make sense?  
 3 Q. It does make sense, yes. Essentially trying to put  
 4 distance between himself and that contact?  
 5 A. Yes, precisely.  
 6 Q. Had you also, in the course of the further  
 7 investigations following his release from custody,  
 8 established that Mr Taghdi had been in WhatsApp contact  
 9 with a Libyan number associated with the Abedi family?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And that that contact had occurred between 15 April 2017  
 12 and 1 May 2017 when, of course, the Abedi brothers were  
 13 in Libya?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Did you establish that the last message from Libya to  
 16 Mr Taghdi was an instruction to delete the number, so  
 17 the Libyan number, and "all old chats"?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. Furthermore, was it established that Mr Taghdi had used  
 20 his mobile telephone to take a photo of  
 21 Mohammed Alzoubare's mobile telephone which was  
 22 displaying the Abedi Libyan mobile number and that he'd  
 23 done so on 16 May 2017?  
 24 A. Yes, that's right.  
 25 Q. Which photograph had been deleted from Mr Taghdi's phone

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1 but had been recovered from his MacBook?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Armed with all of that information, which was fresh to  
 4 you following his release from custody, was Mr Taghdi  
 5 interviewed again?  
 6 A. Yes, he was.  
 7 Q. Did that interview take place on Monday, 15 April of  
 8 last year, 2019?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Did he, by way of a witness statement, assert that  
 11 everything he'd said in the interview process was true,  
 12 essentially denying any knowing involvement in the plot?  
 13 A. Yes, he did.  
 14 Q. Sir, as I've indicated, we expect to receive evidence  
 15 from him next week.  
 16 So next, Zuhir Nassrat. Did the investigation  
 17 reveal that he was linked to IP addresses that had been  
 18 used to attempt to purchase hydrogen peroxide on 19 and  
 19 20 March?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. Was it also discovered that he had links to  
 22 Salman Abedi?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Did you decide therefore that he should be arrested?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Did that occur on 28 May 2017?  
 2 A. Yes, it did.  
 3 Q. Was he held in custody until 10 June?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. And during that period, was he interviewed a total of  
 6 13 times?  
 7 A. He was.  
 8 Q. During those interviews did he deny any involvement  
 9 in the arena attack?  
 10 A. He did.  
 11 Q. And did he give what you describe in your statement as  
 12 an open account of his relationship with Salman and  
 13 Hashem Abedi?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And acknowledge that he had given Hashem Abedi his debit  
 16 card details?  
 17 A. He said that, yes.  
 18 Q. Did enquiries that were then carried out show that the  
 19 telephone numbers and email addresses and delivery  
 20 addresses used in the attempted purchases were connected  
 21 with Salman and Hashem Abedi rather than with  
 22 Zuhir Nassrat?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. On 10 June 2017 was he released from custody?  
 25 A. Yes, he was.

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1 Q. With a decision having been made that the evidence  
 2 didn't meet the charging standard?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. So that he was not charged with any offence at that  
 5 stage relating to the arena bombing?  
 6 A. No.  
 7 Q. In his case, also, following his release, was further  
 8 information discovered by the investigation?  
 9 A. Yes, it was.  
 10 Q. Was that information that on the afternoon of  
 11 17 April 2017, a red Vauxhall Corsa had been recovered  
 12 following a fail to stop following a road traffic  
 13 accident in Manchester?  
 14 A. Yes, that was the information.  
 15 Q. And had Mr Nassrat reported that vehicle stolen about  
 16 12 hours after the accident?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Were two mobile telephones recovered from the vehicle?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. One of which was an iPhone belonging to Mr Nassrat?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. The other belonging to a man called Illyas Abudaber?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Did the investigations further identify that the  
 25 recovered phone of Mr Nassrat had been used to search

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1 for sulphuric acid?  
 2 A. That's correct, yes.  
 3 Q. So that by this stage, following his release, he was  
 4 therefore associated with two of the chemicals required  
 5 to manufacture TATP, namely hydrogen peroxide and now  
 6 sulphuric acid?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. To put it in very simple terms, did the timing of that  
 9 search appear to be significant in relation to the  
 10 timing of an order for sulphuric acid by a person that  
 11 we won't name?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. Was Mr Nassrat further interviewed as a voluntary  
 14 attendee, albeit under caution, on Friday, 16 August of  
 15 last year?  
 16 A. Yes, he was.  
 17 Q. Did he answer all questions and reiterate that he was  
 18 not involved in the bombing in any way?  
 19 A. He did.  
 20 Q. In his case, on the basis of the evidence that was  
 21 available at that stage, was a decision made that the  
 22 charging standard was not met?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. So that he has not been charged with any offence  
 25 relating to the arena attack?

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1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. Sir, as you will recall, he is a witness that the  
 3 inquiry would have wished to call, but without  
 4 identifying where he is, he is not within the  
 5 jurisdiction.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 7 MR GREANEY: Next, Elyes Blidi, a person to whom we've made  
 8 reference already. Did he come to the attention of the  
 9 inquiry because of the receipt of intelligence  
 10 indicating that he may have had knowledge of the Micra  
 11 being parked at Devell House whilst Salman Abedi was out  
 12 of the country?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Indeed, had he approached the police on 2 June when the  
 15 Micra was found parked at Devell House?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Did you judge therefore that he ought to be arrested?  
 18 A. Yes, I did.  
 19 Q. Did that occur at 20.15 hours on Friday, 2 June?  
 20 A. Yes, that's right.  
 21 Q. Was he held in custody until his release on 8 June?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And interviewed on a total of four occasions during that  
 24 period?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. Did he give an account in interview in which he stated  
2 that it was a friend of his, Elyes Elmehdi, who had  
3 given Salman Abedi permission to park the Micra at  
4 Devell House?  
5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
6 Q. Did he say he knew Salman Abedi, although only through  
7 playing football?  
8 A. Yes, that's right.  
9 Q. And maintained that he had no knowledge of the car or of  
10 the attack?  
11 A. Yes, that's true.  
12 Q. In his case, was a decision made also that the evidence  
13 didn't meet the charging standard?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. So that he has not been charged with any offence  
16 relating to the arena attack?  
17 A. That's correct, yes.  
18 Q. There is an issue relating to criminality separate from  
19 the arena attack that I need to ask you about  
20 in relation to him. It takes us back to something that  
21 you said yesterday about why persons who visited the  
22 Micra during the period that it was present within the  
23 car park may not necessarily have been visiting because  
24 of any knowledge of the chemicals that were within it  
25 and the explosives within it.

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1 During your investigation, did it come to light that  
2 a large quantity of drugs had been found in a flat at  
3 Devell House and in a vehicle linked to that address?  
4 A. Yes, in the vehicle and a large amount of cash, I think,  
5 was in the flat.  
6 Q. So cash in the house and drugs in the vehicle?  
7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
8 Q. It's important to be clear about these things. Was that  
9 investigation handled by the appropriate unit of Greater  
10 Manchester Police?  
11 A. Yes, it was.  
12 Q. Did a prosecution ensue?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. And Mr Blidi, I think, had been charged in connection  
15 with that offending but was found not guilty of  
16 conspiracy to supply class A and class B drugs.  
17 A. He was, yes.  
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was he the only person charged or were  
19 there others?  
20 A. No, sir, he was not. I'm sure Mr Greaney will come on  
21 to --  
22 MR GREANEY: I'm about to come on to someone else who was  
23 charged, sir, which is why I have given that contact.  
24 The next person, Elyes Elmehdi. Was intelligence  
25 received, and in any event had suspicion been generated,

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1 that Mr Elmehdi had knowledge of the Micra being parked  
2 at Devell House?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. And did that lead to his arrest?  
5 A. Yes, it did.  
6 Q. At 21.31 hours on Saturday, 3 June?  
7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
8 Q. Was he held in custody until 8 June?  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. And interviewed on five occasions during that period?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. During the course of those interviews did he deny any  
13 involvement in the arena bombing?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. And I think I've understood this from your statement,  
16 but you'll confirm whether I've got this right or wrong.  
17 Did he say that he had allowed Salman Abedi to park the  
18 Micra at Devell House as a favour?  
19 A. Yes, he did, and effectively that was on behalf of the  
20 previous (overspeaking) --  
21 Q. Mr Blidi?  
22 A. So he gave permission on behalf of Blidi, yes.  
23 Q. At that stage was a decision made --  
24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just say that again: Elmehdi gave  
25 permission on behalf of?

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1 A. On behalf of Blidi.  
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because Blidi lived there but Elmehdi  
3 didn't?  
4 A. That's right. Elmehdi was a frequent visitor, but he  
5 felt empowered to make that decision.  
6 MR GREANEY: Quite right. That wasn't clear from my  
7 examination in relation to Blidi.  
8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I actually didn't hear it is the  
9 problem.  
10 MR GREANEY: He denied involvement in the arena bombing and  
11 said he'd given permission on behalf of his friend who  
12 lived at Devell House for the vehicle to be parked  
13 there.  
14 Was the decision at that stage that the evidence did  
15 not meet the charging standard?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. So that he was not charged with any offence relating to  
18 the arena bombing?  
19 A. Yes, that's correct.  
20 Q. In his case, also, following his release, did further  
21 information come to light?  
22 A. Yes, it has.  
23 Q. Was that information that Elmehdi had had a lengthy  
24 telephone conversation with Salman Abedi on 15 May?  
25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. So only 3 days before Abedi's return to the  
2 United Kingdom?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. And just a week before the arena attack?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. And furthermore, by that stage, had the CCTV material  
7 been examined and revealed that Elmehti had approached  
8 the Micra and appeared to look in the passenger window  
9 on 21 May?  
10 A. That's correct, yes.  
11 Q. Which conflicted with the account that he gave when  
12 first interviewed?  
13 A. Yes, that's right.  
14 Q. As a result, was a decision made that he should be  
15 further interviewed?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. However, in the result, before that interview could  
18 happen, and indeed prior to a trial we're going to come  
19 on to, did Elyes Elmehti leave the country?  
20 A. Yes, he did.  
21 Q. Is it the position that he has, so far as you know, not  
22 returned?  
23 A. He has not returned.  
24 Q. But you continue to want to pose questions to him about  
25 that call, just 7 days before the attack?

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1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
2 Q. And about what he was doing in relation to the Micra the  
3 day before the attack?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. So we can be clear, he remains a suspect within your  
6 investigation?  
7 A. He does.  
8 Q. I indicated that we needed to ask you about another  
9 trial. As we've discussed already, during the  
10 investigation it came to light that a large quantity of  
11 cash had been found in a flat and drugs in a house.  
12 That's correct, is it not?  
13 A. In the vehicle that was parked next to the Micra.  
14 Q. I probably caused confusion. In the flat, which was the  
15 flat of Mr Blidi, what was found, cash or drugs or both?  
16 A. Cash.  
17 Q. And a vehicle that was linked to Mr Blidi's address was  
18 parked beside the Micra, is that correct?  
19 A. Very near to it.  
20 Q. And within that vehicle, a quantity of drugs was found?  
21 A. That's correct, yes.  
22 Q. That drugs investigation was handed over, as you've  
23 explained, and a prosecution ensued. Was Elyes Elmehti  
24 tried in his absence?  
25 A. He was, yes.

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1 Q. Because he had left the UK. Was he, unlike Mr Blidi,  
2 found guilty of conspiracy to supply class A and class B  
3 drugs?  
4 A. Yes, he was. And I think he was sentenced as well at  
5 the same time.  
6 Q. If that's of any relevance, no doubt we can establish  
7 it.  
8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was anybody else convicted?  
9 A. Yes, they were, sir.  
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't need to know their names, it was  
11 just to find out whether they were. Thank you.  
12 A. Yes.  
13 MR GREANEY: So we'll deal with the next four persons and  
14 then I'll invite the chairman to take a break. Each of  
15 them will be short.  
16 The next person is Ahmed Abdullah Hamad. Was  
17 intelligence received relating to his links to an  
18 address we are all now familiar with: 44 Lindum Street?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Which was an address used by Salman Abedi and  
21 Hashem Abedi for the delivery of precursor materials?  
22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
23 Q. As a result of the information you received, did you  
24 consider that Mr Hamad ought to be arrested?  
25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And as a result, was he indeed arrested on 6 June 2017?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. Held in custody until 8 June?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And interviewed during that period on three occasions?  
6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
7 Q. Did he acknowledge that 44 Lindum Street was his home  
8 address?  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Did he deny any involvement in or knowledge of the arena  
11 attack?  
12 A. Yes, he did.  
13 Q. Did he state that he had allowed Salman and Hashem Abedi  
14 to stay at 44 Lindum Street because they had told him  
15 that family were visiting so that they needed somewhere  
16 to stay?  
17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
18 Q. And he, Mr Hamad, been out of the country at the time?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. And his friend, Mr Ahmed Dughman, had been the keyholder  
21 while he was away?  
22 A. Yes, that's right.  
23 Q. Did enquiries that were then carried out by your  
24 investigation tend to support the account given by  
25 Mr Hamad?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. So that a decision was made that the evidence in his  
 3 case didn't reach the charging standard?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And so he has not been charged with any offence relating  
 6 to the bombing?  
 7 A. No.  
 8 Q. Next, the next two individuals that you identify we'll  
 9 deal with very quickly. Nathan Grice and  
 10 James Keighron. The investigation revealed that they  
 11 had been involved in selling the Micra?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. The Micra, of course, was of a high degree of importance  
 14 because it had been used to store the TATP whilst  
 15 Salman Abedi was out of the country.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. As a result, did you conclude that it was necessary to  
 18 arrest Nathan Grice and James Keighron?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Was Nathan Grice arrested on 6 June and released on  
 21 8 June, having been interviewed four times?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And was James Keighron arrested on 8 June and released  
 24 on 9 June, having been interviewed during that period on  
 25 two occasions?

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1 A. That's correct, yes.  
 2 Q. In short, was the view formed that they were simply two  
 3 men who had sold a car?  
 4 A. They were.  
 5 Q. And that in their case, the evidence certainly didn't  
 6 meet the charging standard so they had not been charged?  
 7 A. No, they had not.  
 8 Q. Finally under this heading of associates who were  
 9 arrested, I'm at page 151, and we're going to deal with  
 10 a person that we will describe as Relative C for reasons  
 11 I gave at the very beginning of your evidence, in fact  
 12 just before you were sworn.  
 13 Did Relative C come to the notice of your  
 14 investigation because that person purchased sulphuric  
 15 acid?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. On behalf of Hashem Abedi?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Was that person arrested?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And kept in custody, during which period that person was  
 22 interviewed eight times?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. Was that person, as you put it, open about what had  
 25 occurred?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Stating that they had been innocently duped into making  
 3 the purchase?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. Subsequently, did enquiries reveal nothing to undermine  
 6 the account that Relative C had given?  
 7 A. No.  
 8 Q. As a result, was it decided that the charging standard  
 9 was not met in Relative C's case?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. So that Relative C has been charged with no offence?  
 12 A. That's correct, yes.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Sir, we're moving next to the second  
 14 sub-category, associates who were not arrested.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll break. Is he under the age of 18?  
 16 MR GREANEY: Relative C, and I'll check, is one of those,  
 17 if we identified Relative C, would lead to the  
 18 identification of one of the section 46 witnesses.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you. Is a quarter of  
 20 an hour long enough or would you like longer?  
 21 MR GREANEY: A quarter of an hour is fine, sir.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 3.20. Thank you very much.  
 23 (3.05 pm)  
 24 (A short break)  
 25 (3.20 pm)

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1 MR GREANEY: We are turning next to associates who were not,  
 2 for one reason or another, arrested. First of all,  
 3 Mohammed Younis Eisa Soliman. Is he a suspect within of  
 4 the investigation of the arena attack.  
 5 A. Yes, he is.  
 6 Q. Is that because of the enquiries that have been carried  
 7 out into the purchase of precursor chemicals used in the  
 8 manufacture of TATP?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And information received that he had ordered sulphuric  
 11 acid and that he was an associate of Hashem Abedi?  
 12 A. Yes, that's right.  
 13 Q. In view of this, did it become important in your  
 14 judgement for your investigation to speak to him?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Has that proved possible?  
 17 A. No.  
 18 Q. Why not?  
 19 A. Because he is not in the jurisdiction.  
 20 Q. I'll ask you a little bit more about that in a moment.  
 21 So he isn't in the jurisdiction at the moment. If he  
 22 were to be in the jurisdiction, would he be interviewed?  
 23 A. He would be interviewed, yes.  
 24 Q. As a suspect?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Just to look a little more at the evidence that relates  
2 to him, did the investigation reveal that on Thursday,  
3 23 February, a telephone that you attribute to  
4 Mr Soliman was used to search for sulphuric acid?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. And that a purchase was then made on 15 March of  
7 sulphuric acid and delivered to Mr Soliman at his home  
8 address on 21 March?  
9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
10 Q. Furthermore, was it established that he had been in  
11 contact with both Hashem and Salman Abedi over that  
12 period?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. And indeed, over an earlier period?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. So from billing data for the period from 29 January 2017  
17 to 7 April 2017, were there a total of 339 outgoing  
18 communications from Mr Soliman to numbers used and  
19 attributed to Salman and Hashem Abedi?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And looking at it from the other direction, between  
22 22 January of that year and 28 March, were there a total  
23 of 122 incoming communications --  
24 A. Yes, that's correct.  
25 Q. -- to Soliman from numbers used and attributed to Salman

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1 and Hashem Abedi?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. In other words, 461 contacts over a period of not much  
4 more than 3 months?  
5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
6 Q. I'm at the top of page 153 of your statement, (vii).  
7 How would you describe the position in relation to  
8 Mr Soliman?  
9 A. I have said in my statement the evidence that has been  
10 collected with regards to Mohammed Soliman would point  
11 to him being complicit in and having knowledge of the  
12 Manchester Arena bombing. He's the only purchaser of  
13 material linked to the device yet to be spoken to by the  
14 investigation team and, as I say, he therefore remains  
15 a suspect.  
16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to say something about this.  
17 It is to be hoped that Mr Soliman will at some stage be  
18 available for interview by you?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You will then be looking to see whether  
21 he has an explanation for the matters which you've just  
22 set out?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which is what you did with all the other  
25 suspects?

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1 A. Yes.  
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In the event no one else within the same  
3 position as him was charged, but that was dependent on  
4 what explanation could be given and the view which was  
5 taken of it. If he is interviewed and were it to be  
6 decided that there was evidence to charge him, of course  
7 it is essential that he has a fair trial. Therefore  
8 I am quite concerned, or I am concerned, that any  
9 reporting should not make the eventual fair trial of him  
10 impossible if it were to take place.  
11 A. Yes.  
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I hope that's a reasonable stance to  
13 take. I am well aware that often there's adverse  
14 publicity and that a trial takes place despite that on  
15 the basis that a jury can deal with it. But the true  
16 position is that he is in the same position as a number  
17 of others who, because of the explanations they were  
18 able to give, were not actually charged.  
19 MR GREANEY: Sir, I won't express a view about that last  
20 remark, but you are certainly right to invite the press  
21 to exercise caution. Mr Gardham is here today in the  
22 adjacent courtroom. I'm certain that he will have heard  
23 and will report responsibly. Equally, I know that there  
24 will be explored with Mr Barraclough tomorrow, on behalf  
25 of the bereaved families, the position in relation to

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1 a number of other individuals and the same type of issue  
2 is likely to arise in relation to them.  
3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And I'm sure that will be borne in mind  
4 by everyone who is doing it. I'm probably wrong to say  
5 he's in the same position, Mr Soliman. Each one has  
6 their own position and they are each independent and  
7 different. I don't want anything to happen here which  
8 may prejudice a fair trial in the future or lead to  
9 a trial being stayed on that basis.  
10 MR GREANEY: Sir, with those remarks we are entirely  
11 sympathetic and we are sure that they are correct and  
12 equally sure the press will exercise restraint, both in  
13 relation to their reporting, if there is any, about  
14 Mr Soliman and their reporting about others in respect  
15 of whom Mr Barraclough --  
16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have no doubt they will and can  
17 I invite counsel as well to have similar restraint  
18 because if there were a possibility of these people  
19 facing trial, I'm sure the last thing anybody would want  
20 to happen was for that trial not to be able to take  
21 place because of prejudice arising out of this inquiry.  
22 MR GREANEY: I know Mr Weatherby is taking the lead  
23 in relation to this issue on behalf of the bereaved  
24 families. I know that he will be watching these  
25 proceedings, he will have heard what you have to say,

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1 but equally I know that he will want to press  
 2 in relation to some of these people and, we consider,  
 3 will be entitled to do so and we know, sir, that you are  
 4 unlikely to disagree with that.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.  
 6 MR GREANEY: At all events, we'll see what happens tomorrow.  
 7 Mr Soliman, you have expressed your firm view about  
 8 him.  
 9 A. Sorry, Mr Greaney, there was a final sentence to that  
 10 paragraph, which actually accords to this. It does say:  
 11 "Until such time he is interviewed, his status in  
 12 this investigation cannot be evaluated."  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I'm sorry to have cut you off,  
 14 Mr Barraclough. It would have been sensible if I'd  
 15 waited somewhat.  
 16 MR GREANEY: The point is we shouldn't think that you have  
 17 formed a final view about Mr Soliman and his role?  
 18 A. That's absolutely correct, Mr Greaney.  
 19 Q. And you would welcome the opportunity to seek from him  
 20 his explanation in relation to these matters?  
 21 A. Indeed.  
 22 Q. And perhaps in relation to others.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Horwell, not only are the families  
 24 here to investigate, but you are here too, also on  
 25 behalf of GMP, who clearly have an interest in what is

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1 said in this inquiry, and I'm sure you'll pay close  
 2 attention to what has been said as well.  
 3 MR HORWELL: I have indeed sir, of course, thank you.  
 4 MR GREANEY: So he isn't in the UK so you can't seek the  
 5 explanation from him as matters stand. It may be that  
 6 I'll ask you a little bit more about this tomorrow, but  
 7 is it the position that he left the United Kingdom in  
 8 April 2017?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 10 Q. I am not going to ask you if he know where he is and if  
 11 you do, where he is, but let's just assume for the  
 12 moment that you did know where he is and had a means of  
 13 communicating with him. In your view, and you touched  
 14 on this earlier, would it be appropriate for you to seek  
 15 explanations from him in the location he is, namely not  
 16 in the UK?  
 17 A. No, it would not.  
 18 Q. Why is that?  
 19 A. Again, this is for -- particularly in relation to an  
 20 individual who's suspected of an offence, it's very  
 21 important that any evidence through the process of an  
 22 interview is captured in an evidential format and to do  
 23 that it needs to comply with -- well, effectively it  
 24 needs to comply with the Police and Criminal Evidence  
 25 Act here. Overseas, with him being overseas, it would

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1 have to comply with the relevant legislation within that  
 2 country. I'm not entirely sure that would work in this  
 3 case.  
 4 Q. That's all I want to ask you about Mr Soliman, although  
 5 I dare say you'll be asked more about him tomorrow.  
 6 Next, page 154. Mr Ahmed Alzilitni. Did he first  
 7 become a person of interest and then a suspect  
 8 in relation to the attack as a result of intelligence  
 9 received and on being identified as a male who had  
 10 approached on several occasions the Nissan Micra whilst  
 11 parked at Devell House?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Was he interviewed as a voluntary attender, albeit under  
 14 caution, on Thursday, 8 August of last year?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Did he give an explanation that I'll turn to in a moment  
 17 about the Micra and did he also describe his knowledge  
 18 of Salman Abedi and the changes he had noticed in him  
 19 over the 12 months prior to the bombing?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. At that time in August of 2019, when you interviewed  
 22 Mr Alzilitni, had he been charged with and was he due to  
 23 stand trial for drugs offences?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Was he alleged to be part of the Devell House conspiracy

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1 to which you have made reference?  
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 3 Q. Did that present any complication in terms of  
 4 interviewing him about any involvement that he had  
 5 in the bombing?  
 6 A. To a degree, yes. Yes, it did.  
 7 Q. In short, did it mean that you had to recognise with him  
 8 and his solicitor that he was facing that trial and  
 9 might incriminate himself?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And was he therefore given what you describe in your  
 12 statement as an appropriate warning through his legal  
 13 adviser that that could be the case?  
 14 A. Yes, that's right.  
 15 Q. Nonetheless did Mr Alzilitni go on to answer questions  
 16 about the Micra?  
 17 A. Yes, he did.  
 18 Q. Did he say that he thought the vehicle was what he  
 19 described as a stash?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Explaining that he thought it might be used to store  
 22 valuable items?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Did he add that the vehicle had been parked in its  
 25 location at Devell House for quite a long period and had

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1       seemed out of place?  
 2   A. Yes.  
 3   Q. But that he hadn't connected the vehicle with  
 4       Salman Abedi because, as far as he was aware, Abedi had  
 5       a silver car?  
 6   A. Yes.  
 7   Q. Did he say that a few days after the bombing,  
 8       Elyas Elmehdi had told him that:  
 9       "The guy's car was downstairs."  
 10   A. Yes.  
 11   Q. But when questioned, Mr Alzilitni denied knowing  
 12       what was stored in the Micra?  
 13   A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14   Q. Is it the position that, as matters then stood, it was  
 15       concluded that the evidence didn't satisfy the charging  
 16       standard?  
 17   A. Yes.  
 18   Q. So that he has not been charged with any offence  
 19       relating to the bombing?  
 20   A. No, he has not.  
 21   Q. However, was he convicted of the conspiracy to supply  
 22       class A and class B drugs?  
 23   A. Yes, he was.  
 24   Q. Which we know Mr Elyas Elmehdi was also convicted of?  
 25   A. Yes, that's correct.

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1   Q. Next, Mr Muhammed Benjama. Did he first come to the  
 2       notice of your investigation because he was an alibi  
 3       witness for Ismail Abedi?  
 4   A. Yes.  
 5   Q. What decision did you make in relation to him?  
 6   A. I decided that his status should be that of a TIE, so  
 7       trace, interview and evaluate. If I may explain, that  
 8       was part of the process of checking that alibi and  
 9       making sure that that was a truthful account.  
 10   Q. So in the result, was he interviewed as a voluntary  
 11       attender on 5 February of last year?  
 12   A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13   Q. Did he deny any involvement in or knowledge of the  
 14       attack?  
 15   A. Yes.  
 16   Q. And give an account of his movements over relevant  
 17       periods and his relationship with the Abedi family?  
 18   A. Yes.  
 19   Q. In the result, was it the position that no evidence was  
 20       uncovered to suggest that Mr Benjama was involved in any  
 21       way in the bombing?  
 22   A. Yes.  
 23   Q. So as with others, the charging standard was not  
 24       considered to be met and no charges have been laid  
 25       against him in relation to the bombing?

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1   A. No.  
 2   Q. Next, someone who's going to take a little longer to  
 3       deal with: Mr Mohammed Alzoubare. Was he arrested for  
 4       unrelated matters on 25 May 2017?  
 5   A. Yes.  
 6   Q. Did he say to officers that Salman Abedi had contacted  
 7       him a week prior to the attack and that they knew each  
 8       other?  
 9   A. Yes.  
 10   Q. Did it become known through research that was carried  
 11       out that Mr Alzoubare was an associate of the Abedi  
 12       family?  
 13   A. Yes.  
 14   Q. And that he and Salman Abedi had planned to visit  
 15       Abdalraouf Abdallah in prison on 6 March 2017?  
 16   A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17   Q. Was he moreover shown on CCTV at Devell House in the  
 18       days after the bombing?  
 19   A. Yes.  
 20   Q. Did telecommunications data also confirm the contact  
 21       between Mr Alzoubare and Salman Abedi prior to the  
 22       bombing on 15 May 2017?  
 23   A. Yes, that's right.  
 24   Q. As a result of receiving all of that information, what  
 25       decision did you make about Mr Alzoubare?

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1   A. I sanctioned an approach to Alzoubare to obtain an  
 2       account from him so that his role, if any, around events  
 3       in the attack could be assessed.  
 4   Q. As a result, was he interviewed as a witness on 13 May  
 5       of last year?  
 6   A. Yes, he was.  
 7   Q. Did he provide an account of his relationship with the  
 8       Abedi family?  
 9   A. Yes.  
 10   Q. And did he confirm what you knew, namely that he had  
 11       spoken to Salman Abedi in the period before the arena  
 12       attack?  
 13   A. Yes.  
 14   Q. Did he state that Salman Abedi had contacted him from  
 15       Libya about a week before the attack?  
 16   A. Yes.  
 17   Q. And indeed we know it was exactly a week before the  
 18       attack. But he said that he couldn't recall the exact  
 19       date?  
 20   A. No.  
 21   Q. But he had known it was Salman Abedi and knew that it  
 22       was a Libyan number calling him due to the code that  
 23       came up on his phone?  
 24   A. Yes.  
 25   Q. And as we know, on that date, 15 May, Salman Abedi was

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1 still in Libya, it was 3 days prior to his travel?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. In the account that he gave, did Mr Alzoubare state as  
 4 follows:  
 5 "The call I received was from a Libyan number.  
 6 I recognised it due to the code. I can confirm it was  
 7 Salman Abedi who contacted me. The call was out of the  
 8 blue as I had not really heard much from him. The call  
 9 was quite general in nature. I was aware that Salman  
 10 was in Libya. When I received the call I was surprised  
 11 as I have the number stored and I thought it was maybe  
 12 family calling. As I said, previously looking back, the  
 13 call could have been his farewell call. Although  
 14 I stress that nothing in the conversation was or gave  
 15 concern of what happened. I was shocked when I heard  
 16 and read it was Salman who was responsible for the  
 17 attack as I thought he was still in Libya. I didn't  
 18 realise he had come back to the UK."  
 19 Did he also account for his presence at Devell House  
 20 in the period after the attack?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Is there anything more to be said about Mr Alzoubare at  
 23 this stage?  
 24 A. No, there is not.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There is an obvious loose end that

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1 I will ask about, but if for any reason it shouldn't be  
 2 done now or is sensitive, then please do tell me. He  
 3 planned, apparently, to visit Abdallah with Salman Abedi  
 4 on 6 March, but that visit never took place?  
 5 A. I think that was the visit that was cancelled, yes.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wondered whether Mr Alzoubare was  
 7 asked about this and whether he said what the purpose of  
 8 the visit was, which is what I wish to ask. Is that  
 9 a problem?  
 10 MR GREANEY: That isn't a problem, but may I suggest the  
 11 best way of dealing with that is when Mr Barraclough  
 12 returns tomorrow morning, as undoubtedly he will, he can  
 13 have checked that, we can have checked it on our side,  
 14 and he can give the answer at that stage if you're happy  
 15 with that, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm absolutely happy with that, yes.  
 17 MR GREANEY: The plan is to go on until about 4.15 or 4.30  
 18 today if that suits you.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: A normal day.  
 20 MR GREANEY: A normal day.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: A normal court day.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Not quite, because we started at 9.30. Apart  
 23 from that, yes.  
 24 Next Mr Illyas Abudaber. Why did he become of  
 25 interest to Operation Manteline?

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1 A. His association to Operation Manteline is an IP address  
 2 used in the attempted purchase of hydrogen peroxide was  
 3 actually resolved to his address, so that was this  
 4 address of 21A Victory Street.  
 5 Q. So an IP address connected with an attempted purchase of  
 6 hydrogen peroxide?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Did it also become apparent that Mr Abudaber was an  
 9 associate of Salman and Hashem Abedi and also  
 10 Zuhir Nassrat?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Was he spoken to by your officers?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Was that under arrest or with some different status?  
 15 A. No, he was not arrested, and he would not provide  
 16 a witness statement.  
 17 Q. But did he, in discussion with the officers, deny any  
 18 knowledge of the purchase of chemicals? You might want  
 19 to check this, but I'm looking at (iv).  
 20 A. Yes. I'm sorry, yes, Mr Greaney, yes, you're quite  
 21 right, he did.  
 22 Q. It's also, I believe, (v), the position that no evidence  
 23 has come to light which would implicate Mr Abudaber in  
 24 the arena attack and, as a result, on the basis we've  
 25 identified a number of times, he has not been charged

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1 with any offence relating to the attack?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. Next, Mr Hodifa Al Ghiryani. Did he come to the  
 4 attention of the investigation because he was said to  
 5 have informed a friend that he had "vital pictures for  
 6 the investigation"?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. I'm at page 159, sir.  
 9 Did you identify him as a suspect, a TIE individual,  
 10 or give him some different status?  
 11 A. He was identified as a TIE.  
 12 Q. Was research undertaken to establish where he was?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Where was he?  
 15 A. He was in Hong Kong.  
 16 Q. Did he, however, return to the United Kingdom?  
 17 A. Yes, he did.  
 18 Q. Was that on 16 July of last year?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. And did he provide an account to officers denying  
 21 knowledge of any such photograph or photographs?  
 22 A. Yes, he did.  
 23 Q. Had communications data shown that on a single occasion  
 24 in February 2017, Salman Abedi had attempted to call  
 25 Mr Al Ghiryani?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. But without success?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. But there was no evidence of any further contact between  
 5 the pair?  
 6 A. No.  
 7 Q. Was the information that had been received that the  
 8 vital photograph had been on his telephone?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. But Mr Al Ghiryani denied that was so?  
 11 A. He did deny that was so, yes.  
 12 Q. The phone in his possession, was that examined?  
 13 A. Yes, it was.  
 14 Q. And no image of importance was detected upon it; is that  
 15 the position?  
 16 A. No, that's the position.  
 17 Q. In addition, he denied any knowledge of the  
 18 Manchester Arena bombing and who had carried out until  
 19 someone had told him?  
 20 A. That's correct, yes.  
 21 Q. In short, therefore, no evidence has been obtained by  
 22 the investigation to suggest that Mr Al Ghiryani had any  
 23 involvement in or knowledge of the attack?  
 24 A. No.  
 25 Q. And on the basis that you've dealt with a number of

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1 times, he has therefore been charged with no offence?  
 2 A. No.  
 3 Q. Next, Mr Anas Abuhdaima. Why did he become of interest  
 4 to the investigation, please? Page 160.  
 5 A. Once again, this is a man who's been identified as  
 6 approaching the Nissan Micra whilst it was parked at  
 7 Devell House.  
 8 Q. Were steps therefore taken to trace, interview and  
 9 evaluate him?  
 10 A. Yes, that's right.  
 11 Q. With what outcome?  
 12 A. This was only achieved recently and Mr Abuhdaima has no  
 13 recollection whatsoever of actually looking in the Micra  
 14 or the Micra itself.  
 15 Q. Does he fall into a category of person in respect of  
 16 whom the charging standard is not met so that he has not  
 17 been charged with any offence relating to the bombing?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. The next individual, numbered 28, does not appear to  
 20 have any relevance in the result. I'm therefore going  
 21 to pass over to someone who was mentioned today and you  
 22 correctly recalled that he had not been arrested.  
 23 A. That was my mistake in the earlier part of my statement.  
 24 Q. That person is Masoud Ali Chilby. Did he become of  
 25 interest to the investigation through telecommunications

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1 data?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Did data from his phone reveal that he was in contact  
 4 with Salman Abedi on 21 May 2017?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Had Abedi initiated that contact on that day?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Making 12 attempted calls to Mr Chilby between 9.17  
 9 in the morning and 8.52 in the evening?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. In the result, of those 12 calls, was only one  
 12 a successful contact?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And that, a call lasting for 56 seconds?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. During that period had Mr Chilby sent one text message  
 17 to Salman Abedi and received two messages from him?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Was Mr Chilby treated as a TIE or suspect?  
 20 A. As a TIE.  
 21 Q. Was he spoken to by your officers?  
 22 A. Yes, he was.  
 23 Q. Did he outline his dealings with the Abedi family and  
 24 Salman in particular?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Stating that he knew the family through the father,  
 2 Ramadan?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And that he, Mr Chilby, was well-known in the community  
 5 through his business?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. That he had seen or would see Hashem and Salman Abedi  
 8 at the mosque, but as they were younger than him, he  
 9 didn't have any particular reason to interact with them?  
 10 A. Yes, that's right.  
 11 Q. So far as the telephone contact on 21 May was concerned,  
 12 did he say that he didn't recall the number that had  
 13 contacted and attempted to contact him and did not  
 14 recall speaking to Salman Abedi?  
 15 A. That is correct, yes.  
 16 Q. Did he add that through his links within the community  
 17 he had become aware that Salman Abedi had arranged to  
 18 send money back to Libya through Rabie Zreba?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. And his personal suspicion therefore was that the reason  
 21 Salman Abedi had attempted to contact him on the 21st  
 22 was in order to seek to move money?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right, and that would accord with the  
 24 business that Mr Chilby was in.  
 25 Q. So in short, was he another of those in respect of whom

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1 the charging standard was not met and who therefore has  
 2 not been charged with any offence relating to the  
 3 bombing?  
 4 A. Yes, that's right.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do I infer correctly that the text you  
 6 mention, the contents of those texts were never  
 7 recovered, you just know the text was sent?  
 8 A. No, I think we've got the content of the text, but  
 9 I don't think they are of any significance. So it is  
 10 literally a greeting. There's nothing to inform on the  
 11 actual process, I don't think.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 13 MR GREANEY: The next witness is numbered 30. This witness  
 14 we will describe, pursuant to the restriction order and  
 15 the section 46 order, as Trial Witness 1.  
 16 Did Trial Witness 1 become of interest because of  
 17 information received that they had been asked to  
 18 purchase sulphuric acid on behalf of Hashem Abedi?  
 19 A. Yes, that's right.  
 20 Q. Was Trial Witness 1 traced and spoken to as a witness on  
 21 10 June?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. Did that person confirm that Hashem Abedi had asked them  
 24 to purchase sulphuric acid?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And go on to state that as they were trying to make the  
 2 purchase, they had spoken to their father?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Who had expressed some concerns?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. And that therefore Trial Witness 1 had decided not to go  
 7 through with the purchase?  
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 9 Q. And furthermore, had avoided further contact with  
 10 Hashem Abedi?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. At all stages, was Trial Witness 1 therefore treated as  
 13 a witness, not as a suspect?  
 14 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 15 Q. Next, a witness that we will be calling Trial Witness 4.  
 16 Was Trial Witness 4 spoken to by officers at a location  
 17 in June 2017?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Did he deal with the fact that he had had contact with  
 20 Hashem Abedi in Germany?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. He, I think, again was at all stages treated as  
 23 a witness?  
 24 A. Yes, that's right.  
 25 Q. And Trial Witness 4 provided a witness statement?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Next, 32. Ahmed Benhammedi. Is he related to Abdul  
 3 Rahman Benhammedi with whom the 3458 number was in  
 4 contact? Or would you like to check that?  
 5 A. I would like to check that because there is some  
 6 confusion over this and there is some duplication of  
 7 names as well.  
 8 Q. Is there? I had understood that they were brothers, but  
 9 you'll be able to give the definitive answer tomorrow.  
 10 A. Yes, I will.  
 11 Q. So we will park that until then.  
 12 For what reason did this Mr Benhammedi become of  
 13 interest to Operation Manteline?  
 14 A. He is believed to be a close associate of Hashem Abedi  
 15 and he has been named by another witness as someone whom  
 16 Hashem Abedi had approached to use his bank account for  
 17 chemical purchases.  
 18 Q. Is Mr Benhammedi believed to be resident in Germany?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. And to be involved in the property market and investment  
 21 business there?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. He was, as you said, a close associate of Hashem Abedi.  
 24 Was he named by Zuhir Nassrat as someone who  
 25 Hashem Abedi had approached to use his bank account for

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1 chemical purchases?  
 2 A. Yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. Did a witness who gave evidence at trial, namely Trial  
 4 Witness 4, also provide information that whilst in  
 5 Germany with Benhammedi, Hashem Abedi had asked both  
 6 him, Trial Witness 4, and Mr Benhammedi over the  
 7 telephone to make a purchase of a liquid?  
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 9 Q. Are there a number of indications in the investigation  
 10 of strong links between Mr Benhammedi and Hashem Abedi?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Including some indication of a financial association?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And also telecommunications data showing an association  
 15 between Mr Benhammedi and Hashem Abedi?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 17 Q. For example, data showing 17 outgoing calls from  
 18 a number linked to Mr Benhammedi to Hashem Abedi's  
 19 mobile number ending 6514 between 31 October 2016 and  
 20 13 February 2017?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And indeed, is there evidence in the telecommunications  
 23 data of one incoming call to the number attributed to  
 24 Mr Benhammedi on 24 February 2017 from a number linked  
 25 to Salman Abedi?

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1 A. Yes, that's right, to Salman Abedi.  
 2 Q. Would the investigation like to speak to Mr Benhammedi?  
 3 A. Yes, I think we would speak to Mr Benhammedi again if he  
 4 were in the UK.  
 5 Q. You may have answered this question already in what you  
 6 just said, but why have you not yet spoken to  
 7 Mr Benhammedi?  
 8 A. I think the process around this is in relation to the  
 9 benefit that you would actually get from an individual  
 10 witness. In order to engage in obtaining a statement  
 11 I think that would involve a legal process to actually  
 12 travel to Germany and obtain that statement and to add  
 13 value to the prosecution that has already occurred. It  
 14 wouldn't necessarily do that.  
 15 Q. Is the point you're making that bearing in mind the cost  
 16 and effort that would have had to have gone into  
 17 speaking to Mr Benhammedi before the trial, it was not  
 18 thought proportionate to go to Germany?  
 19 A. Yes, and I think also we have to make an assessment from  
 20 our own knowledge as to whether that would be a useful  
 21 process or not. I think that takes into account an  
 22 awful lot of different things.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may have been a slip of the tongue,  
 24 but you did said you would like to speak to him again.  
 25 Have you spoken to him at all?

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1 A. No, we haven't.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I thought it might be a slip of the  
 3 tongue and I just wanted to check up.  
 4 A. Sorry, it was a slip of the tongue, yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 6 MR GREANEY: The next named individual, 33 —  
 7 A. Sorry, can I just finish on that?  
 8 Q. Of course, please do.  
 9 A. I don't want anybody to read anything into this, but  
 10 clearly, having identified the account that we've had  
 11 from the witness who we can't identify, it's important  
 12 that we share that information where it's appropriate,  
 13 and of course we have done that. But the benefit of  
 14 actually going to Germany to get a statement from this  
 15 man was not deemed to be significant. It's as  
 16 straightforward as that. It is nothing more.  
 17 Q. I completely understand. I hadn't intended to load my  
 18 questions.  
 19 A. Sorry, yes, it was just in case anything was kind of  
 20 built into that.  
 21 Q. No, there wasn't, I assure you.  
 22 A. I can assure you we haven't spoken to him before, sorry.  
 23 Q. The reality was that you had an abundance of evidence  
 24 that Hashem Abedi had been involved in the acquisition  
 25 and attempted acquisition of precursor materials, his

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1 fingerprints and DNA were all over relevant items?  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. And I would have thought most people, if not all people,  
 4 could understand why sending officers to Germany to  
 5 speak to Mr Benhammedi, given the contribution that he  
 6 was capable of making was not thought to be  
 7 proportionate?  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we now fully understand one another?  
 9 MR GREANEY: I think we do. It is getting late in the day.  
 10 A. Sorry, sir, that's my fault.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's neither of your faults. That's  
 12 perfectly all right. I'm just glad you've reached  
 13 a concordat.  
 14 MR GREANEY: The next number of individuals I'm going to  
 15 invite you to agree with me don't seem to be relevant.  
 16 Number 33. A person who was forensically linked to  
 17 Flat 39 Granby House but had a perfectly good  
 18 explanation for that.  
 19 A. Yes, that's correct. Not relevant.  
 20 Q. Then witness 34. Some intelligence was received about  
 21 this information, but frankly it went absolutely nowhere  
 22 at all.  
 23 A. Absolutely correct, yes.  
 24 Q. And it wouldn't seem important to name that person.  
 25 Witness 35. Again, a person who was linked

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1 forensically to flat 39, but again this person had  
 2 a perfectly genuine reason for that link, do you agree?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. No need to name them.  
 5 Witness 36. Again, a person who became of interest  
 6 to Operation Manteline as a result of anonymous  
 7 information that was received that this person had  
 8 played a main role in the Manchester Arena bombing.  
 9 Necessarily, enquiries and research were undertaken, if  
 10 that is correct, and no evidence of this person being  
 11 involved in or linked to the attack in any way was  
 12 uncovered.  
 13 A. Correct.  
 14 Q. So again, we won't name that person.  
 15 Person 37. An anonymous letter was received by the  
 16 Metropolitan Police in July 2018 about this person, who  
 17 resides outside of the United Kingdom. Again, enquiries  
 18 were undertaken to locate this person and they were  
 19 traced and, frankly, it came to nothing at all; do you  
 20 agree?  
 21 A. Yes, I do.  
 22 Q. Witness 38, we will deal with. This is Ebrahim Sadigh.  
 23 Why did he come to your attention and with what status?  
 24 I am now at the bottom of page 167.  
 25 A. This effectively returns to the issue of the

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1 investigation around Zuhir Nassrat, who actually said  
 2 that images of his bank card were sent to Sadigh on  
 3 Saturday, 18 March 2017 in order to give to  
 4 Hashem Abedi. So in other words, he had been an  
 5 interface in that attempted purchase of hydrogen  
 6 peroxide.  
 7 Q. Did telecommunications data also suggest that Sadigh was  
 8 an associate of both Salman and Hashem Abedi?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 10 Q. What status did he have, a suspect or a TIE individual?  
 11 A. He was a TIE. Yes, he was a TIE.  
 12 Q. Are you able to tell us how that resulted?  
 13 A. He provided a statement, so he was spoken to, gave an  
 14 account, and made the decision that he should provide  
 15 a statement as to what had happened.  
 16 Q. We can check this if necessary if you don't have an  
 17 immediate recollection, but did he provide an  
 18 explanation of the role, if any, that he had played?  
 19 A. Well, he got to a stage on, I think, beyond Friday,  
 20 2 June — I'd have to check the dates — where he no  
 21 longer engaged with us and wouldn't cooperate.  
 22 Q. We'll look in case it is relevant to see what he did say  
 23 when he gave his statement, but the position is that  
 24 several further attempts after 2 June were made to speak  
 25 to him to obtain an account as to his knowledge of the

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1 provision of the financial details and for what purpose,  
 2 but those attempts had been unsuccessful at the date of  
 3 your statement and from what you've said have still been  
 4 unsuccessful because he has not cooperated?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. Next, 39, his brother, Ayoub Sadigh? Was he spoken to  
 7 by officers at his home address on 28 May 2017?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And what did he say on that occasion that was of  
 10 interest to your team?  
 11 A. He said that he was a friend of Abdalraouf Abdallah and  
 12 that he visited him in prison with Salman Abedi on  
 13 18 January 2017.  
 14 Q. Was that an event that you and your team would have  
 15 liked to have discovered more about from him?  
 16 A. Yes, it is.  
 17 Q. Has he therefore been approached by your officers?  
 18 A. He has.  
 19 Q. With what outcome?  
 20 A. He has remained uncooperative.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So apart from telling you he went with  
 22 Salman Abedi on that date to see Abdallah, he has told  
 23 you nothing about what was talked about?  
 24 A. Well, he's effectively had an interaction with officers  
 25 and he's volunteered that information. I'm not entirely

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1 sure how the conversation went.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 3 A. But yes, that's more or less the limit of what is of  
 4 interest.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 6 A. And beyond that, he's not cooperating.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Greaney, I think the details of what  
 8 was said should be looked at.  
 9 MR GREANEY: I agree.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 11 MR GREANEY: Next, subject 40. We won't name him, but  
 12 he was a person who became of interest because of  
 13 a forensic link that he had to 44 Lindum Street; is that  
 14 correct?  
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 16 Q. So it became important to speak to him to understand  
 17 what the explanation for that was?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. He gave an explanation which was assessed to be entirely  
 20 genuine; is that correct?  
 21 A. Yes, that's right, nothing to do with our investigation.  
 22 Q. Next is Majdi Alamari. I believe that he came to the  
 23 attention of the investigation for two reasons; is that  
 24 correct?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. First of all, his involvement in purchasing welding  
 2 accessories from China in circumstances in which  
 3 financial enquiries showed that the funds for the  
 4 purchases came from the bank accounts of Salman Abedi  
 5 and Relative C?  
 6 A. Yes, that's right.  
 7 Q. In February 2017, Abedi had deposited an amount of cash  
 8 into Relative C's bank account?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Which appeared to be so that an electronic transaction  
 11 could be conducted in order to purchase that welding  
 12 equipment from China?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. What was thought to be the significance of that  
 15 purchase?  
 16 A. Of the welding equipment?  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 A. We don't know. So this is equipment that may have gone  
 19 back to Libya, but it does not appear to have any  
 20 significance to our investigation.  
 21 Q. But was something that was occurring during the currency  
 22 of the plot because it occurred in February 2017?  
 23 A. Yes, that's right.  
 24 Q. So the first reason that this person became of interest  
 25 to you may or may not be significant, you think probably

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1 not, but secondly, on Sunday, 21 May were there calls  
 2 between Salman Abedi and the user of a particular  
 3 number?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. How was that contact thought to be relevant to  
 6 Mr Alamari?  
 7 A. Again, I can't comment on that because I just simply  
 8 don't know — sorry, the investigation does not know,  
 9 it's not just that I can't answer it.  
 10 Q. But it's thought that that communication on 21 May may  
 11 in some way have a connection with Mr Alamari?  
 12 A. It may do. That's why we would, in an ideal world, like  
 13 to speak to him.  
 14 Q. Is he a suspect or a TIE individual?  
 15 A. He is a TIE.  
 16 Q. Has he yet been spoken to by the investigation?  
 17 A. No, he has not.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The association appears to be the  
 19 telephone number that the Chinese company have got is  
 20 the same telephone number that Salman Abedi called in  
 21 Libya on 21 May.  
 22 A. Yes, that's right.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that name, because of the contact,  
 24 would be attributed to Alamari as he's put down as being  
 25 the customer?

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1 A. That's right.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Maybe I missed that. That's what's  
 3 in the statement.  
 4 A. Yes. Previous to this being described as the TIE of  
 5 Mr Alamari, it was described as the TIE of user 717.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who may be Mr Alamari.  
 7 A. So again, it's not putting a huge emphasis on this,  
 8 it would be — so within the investigation this was  
 9 a man who we would have liked to have spoken to in order  
 10 to get that account and understand why he was engaged in  
 11 this. Again, there was nothing more sinister than that.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Let's try to deal with a number of other  
 14 individuals falling into this second sub-category and  
 15 aim to finish no later than 4.30.  
 16 Individual 42, Abdal Raouf Ali. Is he the cousin of  
 17 Mohammed Alzoubare that we have considered already?  
 18 A. Yes, he is.  
 19 Q. Moreover, is he married to Khawla Abdallah?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Is she the sister of Abdalraouf Abdallah?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Who of course is going to be the subject of close  
 24 consideration in chapter 13.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Is it known that he, Abdal Raouf Ali, has visited his  
 2 brother—in-law in prison on several occasions?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right.  
 4 Q. Has he been treated as a suspect?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. Has he been treated as a trace, interview, evaluate  
 7 individual?  
 8 A. My understanding is he's just provided a witness  
 9 statement, but I can check that.  
 10 Q. And in any event, his significance really is his  
 11 connection and visits to Abdallah?  
 12 A. It is. He may have technically been declared a TIE, but  
 13 the purpose was to get that statement.  
 14 Q. Khawla Abdallah, someone to whom I have just made  
 15 reference, individual 43, is the wife of Abdal Raouf Ali  
 16 and the daughter of a person called Nagah Abdallah?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And as we've agreed, the sister of Abdalraouf Abdallah?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Did officers approach her seeking information —  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. — as a witness? With what outcome? First of all, what  
 23 information did they seek and then what outcome?  
 24 A. Officers approached her as a witness as a telephone  
 25 number attributed to Abdal Raouf Ali was registered to

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1 her. Officers attempted to obtain a witness statement  
 2 from her on 14 June — that's 2019 — but she would not  
 3 engage with the police any further and no witness  
 4 statement was obtained.  
 5 Q. And that number is one that we may need to look at again  
 6 later in the oral evidence hearings. So the number that  
 7 was registered to her in which your officers were  
 8 interested was an 8305 number?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. Next, 44, Nagah Abdallah, another name that will feature  
 11 later in the oral evidence hearings. He is the father  
 12 of Abdalraouf Abdallah and Khawla Abdallah?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And the father—in-law of Abdal Raouf Ali?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. What approach was decided in relation to him?  
 17 A. Again, the approach was in order to get his cooperation  
 18 as a potential witness. That was to establish his link  
 19 to the Abedi family and the purpose of any contact he  
 20 had between him and Salman Abedi.  
 21 Q. As a result, did officers attend what was understood to  
 22 be his home address on Wednesday, 11 September 2019?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. Did they speak to his wife?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And what did she tell them?  
 2 A. That he had returned to Libya and she didn't know when  
 3 he would be back.  
 4 Q. 45, and we're nearly at the end of this sub-category,  
 5 we'll try to finish it, Mansoor al-Anezi. Is he  
 6 a deceased male?  
 7 A. Yes, he is.  
 8 Q. Did he become a TIE individual within  
 9 Operation Manteline because of contact between him and  
 10 Salman and Hashem Abedi in the months prior to his  
 11 death?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. And the fact that Salman Abedi attended hospital to see  
 14 him in the days prior to his death?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And attended his funeral in Manchester with Hashem Abedi  
 17 on Tuesday, 17 January 2017?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. Was there established to be telecommunications data  
 20 showing telephone contact between Salman Abedi,  
 21 Hashem Abedi and Mr Al-Anezi?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Between October 2016 and January 2017?  
 24 A. Yes, that's right.  
 25 Q. And Mr Al-Anezi, I think, was also of interest in this

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1 context to the investigation because he had been  
 2 a religious figure in the south-west?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right.  
 4 Q. And had been the last person to have contact with  
 5 a person who attempted to become a suicide bomber in the  
 6 south-west?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. Did your investigations wish to understand what type of  
 9 connection there was between Mr Al-Anezi and the Abedi  
 10 brothers?  
 11 A. Yes, that's right.  
 12 Q. Were they able to do so?  
 13 A. No. Whatever connection there was, clearly Mr Al-Anezi  
 14 is dead and Salman Abedi is dead as well, but there was  
 15 clearly a connection of significance.  
 16 Q. Next, 46, Ismail Ibrahim Kamoka. Mr Kamoka, who open  
 17 source material demonstrates to be both a Libyan  
 18 diplomat, is that right, or to work at the embassy at  
 19 any rate?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And who is believed to have or is reported to have had  
 22 links to the LIFG; is that correct?  
 23 A. I'm not entirely sure because, sorry, I'm reading from  
 24 173.  
 25 Q. You're at 173. We can, I'm sure, confirm those details

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1 in due course. Can you tell us why Ismail Kamoka came  
 2 to the attention of your investigation?  
 3 A. This was in relation to a boarding pass that was  
 4 recovered at 21 Elsmore Road during our search of those  
 5 premises. On the boarding pass there was a mobile  
 6 number actually written on the pass. It's the mobile  
 7 number that is attributed to Mr Kamoka.  
 8 Q. I believe the position is that your investigators  
 9 approached Mr Kamoka?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And the upshot was that he could not account for why  
 12 a mobile telephone number attributed to him should be on  
 13 a boarding pass at 21 Elsmore Road, or I think perhaps  
 14 within a shed there, but he added he was well-known  
 15 within the Libyan community?  
 16 A. Yes, that's what he said, yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The boarding pass, do we know the date  
 18 of it, do we know whose it was?  
 19 A. We do have those details. I do know it doesn't really  
 20 add any value to our investigation.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.  
 22 A. But we've certainly got as much detail as we could get  
 23 from it.  
 24 MR GREANEY: Sir, for your note, and I'm not going to adduce  
 25 what is a lot of detail, it's paragraphs 529 and

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1 following, page 199, of the statement.  
 2 Mr Kamoka is someone that we will be considering  
 3 further when we reach chapter 13, at least to some  
 4 extent.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 6 MR GREANEY: 47, Abdulrahman Gheith. Why did he come to the  
 7 attention of the investigation?  
 8 A. He's a male who came into the investigation because  
 9 a letter was found in a cell search of  
 10 Abdalraouf Abdallah's cell, where he has actually named  
 11 three individuals as friends. So this particular letter  
 12 was postmarked on 3 January from an unnamed sister.  
 13 Q. So this is a letter from a sister, it would appear to  
 14 be, of Abdalraouf Abdallah?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. To him, naming three particular individuals as friends.  
 17 Mohammed Alzoubare was one of them?  
 18 A. That's right.  
 19 Q. Abdulrahman Gheith was another?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And the third was Salman Abedi?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Had all three of those persons visited  
 24 Abdalraouf Abdallah in prison?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. As a result, did your investigation wish to obtain from  
 2 Mr Gheith an explanation of what this was all about?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right.  
 4 Q. With what result?  
 5 A. He would not provide a statement and would not engage  
 6 with the police.  
 7 Q. Finally under this heading, Aoub Oun, individual 48.  
 8 What were the circumstances in which he came to the  
 9 attention of the investigation?  
 10 A. He came to the attention of the investigation on  
 11 Wednesday, 24 May 2017, when a Manchester University  
 12 student card in his name was recovered from  
 13 Ismail Abedi's home address. Our enquiries revealed  
 14 that he had been a student at the university.  
 15 Q. So he had attended, I think, Manchester College between  
 16 2012 and 2014?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. At the same time as Ismail, Hashem and Salman Abedi?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. So he had an association with the subjects of your  
 21 investigation?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. The item pertaining to him had been recovered from  
 24 Ismail Abedi's home address and indeed had items  
 25 relating to him also been recovered from Mr Blidi's flat

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1 at Devell House?  
 2 A. Yes. That's not actually in this statement, I don't  
 3 think.  
 4 Q. I think it is.  
 5 A. I'm so sorry, yes.  
 6 Q. There's no need to apologise. We're very near finishing  
 7 now:  
 8 "As a result of his associations with subjects of  
 9 Operation Manteline and items pertaining to him  
 10 recovered from Ismail Abedi's home address as well as  
 11 [and then Mr Blidi's home at Devell House is given],  
 12 this man [Mr Oun] was made the subject of trace and  
 13 investigate action"; is that right?  
 14 A. Yes, "trace and interview" that should read.  
 15 Q. Trace and interview.  
 16 A. But you're quite right and I do apologise, yes.  
 17 Q. With what result?  
 18 A. So attempts were made to contact him between 8 and  
 19 27 August 2019, and again to no avail. I think the  
 20 reason to do so became less important because of this  
 21 explanation of his association with Ahmed Alzilitni and  
 22 also the commission of other criminality which I'm sure  
 23 you're going to come on to.  
 24 Q. I was going to come on to that very thing just finally  
 25 for today, because was he one of those who was charged,

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1 along with Mr Alzilitni and Mr Elmehdi and indeed  
 2 Mr Blidi with conspiracy to supply class A and B drugs?  
 3 A. Yes, that's right.  
 4 Q. So the Devell House conspiracy. Was he convicted?  
 5 A. He was convicted, yes.  
 6 Q. So what this part of your statement explains to us  
 7 is that there were five individuals who were charged  
 8 with that conspiracy?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Mr Oun, Mr Alzilitni and Mr Elmehdi, who were convicted?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Mr Blidi, who was acquitted, as we know, and another  
 13 individual that we don't need to name, who was also  
 14 acquitted?  
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 16 MR GREANEY: Mr Barraclough, that concludes your analysis of  
 17 the associates of Salman Abedi and Hashem Abedi who were  
 18 not arrested.  
 19 Sir, we are making very good progress and the  
 20 progress we expected to make.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's quite an effort, I know, for both  
 22 of you, so thank you very much. Getting through this at  
 23 this rate requires considerable consideration and there  
 24 are a large number of people you have had to deal with.  
 25 MR GREANEY: Could we now break until 9.30 tomorrow morning?

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can, thank you very much.  
 2 Thank you, Mr Barraclough, you can go and get your  
 3 voice back overnight.  
 4 (4.30 pm)  
 5 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am on  
 6 Wednesday, 9 December 2020)  
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1 I N D E X

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3 MR PAUL RYDER (sworn) .....1

4 Questions from MR DE LA POER .....1

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6 DCS SIMON BARRACLOUGH (continued) .....15

7 Questions from MR GREANEY (continued) .....15

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