

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 61

February 8, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1 Monday, 8 February 2021  
 2 (10.00 am)  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Greaney, before we start the  
 4 proceedings, the listed proceedings for the day, I want  
 5 to say something about a previous judgment that I issued  
 6 in writing.  
 7 I wonder, as it relates to Greater Manchester  
 8 Police, if Mr Horwell is listening .  
 9 MR GREANEY: I am sure Mr Horwell is listening and watching  
 10 and I will invite him to join us.  
 11 MR HORWELL: Good morning, sir.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Good morning. I wish to clarify the  
 13 ruling which I issued in writing on the application for  
 14 core participant status by Chief Inspector Sexton and  
 15 Superintendent Dexter.  
 16 Up until I issued my ruling, their interests had  
 17 been looked after by Greater Manchester Police although  
 18 they had separate legal representation. The reason for  
 19 granting their applications was because I was satisfied  
 20 that both met the criteria to be designated as core  
 21 participants .  
 22 This status enables the applicants to have access to  
 23 more disclosure than they were able to receive as  
 24 witnesses being represented by Greater Manchester  
 25 Police. The applicants were dependent on Greater

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1 Manchester Police to supply them with material in  
 2 accordance with their status as witnesses, although with  
 3 separate representation .  
 4 Due no doubt to the way I expressed myself in the  
 5 judgment it has been suggested in at least one media  
 6 report that I was criticising the conduct of Greater  
 7 Manchester Police towards their own officers. That is  
 8 not correct and I apologise to Greater Manchester Police  
 9 for giving that impression. I intended no criticism of  
 10 Greater Manchester Police and no criticism was  
 11 justified .  
 12 The difficulty arose over the status of the  
 13 applicants as witnesses, the only way of satisfactorily  
 14 resolving the difficulty was for the applicants to  
 15 become core participants in their own right, which would  
 16 give them access to all the disclosure in chapter 10.  
 17 Mr Horwell, I hope that will clear up any possible  
 18 misunderstanding.  
 19 MR HORWELL: Sir, thank you very much indeed for that  
 20 clarification . We're very grateful .  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Not at all. Thank you.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Thank you, sir. The gentleman in the witness  
 23 box is Andrew Buchan, who is going to assist us today --  
 24 and I hope his evidence will be finished by lunchtime --  
 25 with the work of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of

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1 Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, and so I'll  
 2 ask that he be sworn at this stage, please.  
 3 MR ANDREW BUCHAN (sworn)  
 4 Questions from MR GREANEY  
 5 MR GREANEY: Could you begin please by telling us your full  
 6 name?  
 7 A. Andrew John Buchan.  
 8 Q. Did you retire from Sussex Police in the rank in the  
 9 rank of detective chief superintendent?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And could you describe, please, your career in just  
 12 a few sentences?  
 13 A. I joined the police in 1989, having served a short  
 14 career commission in the Royal Navy beforehand. My time  
 15 was spent mainly in uniform up until I got promoted to  
 16 detective chief inspector and from then on in I stayed  
 17 within CID, investigating serious organised crime,  
 18 counter--terrorism and homicide offences.  
 19 I then moved to the ACPO TAM, which is  
 20 the Association of Chief Police Officers and Allied  
 21 Matters Business Group, now known as CTPHQ, and I worked  
 22 for Protect and Prepare. That was in 2011 prior on the  
 23 Olympics.  
 24 In 2014 I moved, on promotion to detective chief  
 25 superintendent, to HMIC, where I was the lead staff

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1 officer for counter--terrorism. After a couple of years  
 2 I became the deputy portfolio director and ultimately  
 3 the portfolio director, which is a coordination role for  
 4 all the specialist inspections that HMIC undertake,  
 5 including counter--terrorism.  
 6 Q. Just to pull out a few of those details, you worked for  
 7 CTPHQ, as we now know it, from, did you say 2011?  
 8 A. 2011 through to 2014.  
 9 Q. You were, I think, as we have learned from your witness  
 10 statement, qualified as a senior investigating officer  
 11 to what is known as PIP level 4; is that correct?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. What does that mean, please?  
 14 A. It's a professional qualification under the auspices of  
 15 the College of Policing. There are four levels and  
 16 certainly to be a senior investigating officer you need  
 17 to have achieved PIP level 3. PIP level 4 looks at the  
 18 coordination of serious offences and working with chief  
 19 officers and other interested parties on the conduct of  
 20 serious offences.  
 21 Q. So you were, to put it in very simple terms, an  
 22 experienced senior investigating officer?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. With much experience of senior crime, including  
 25 counter--terrorism?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. From 2014 you worked for Her Majesty's Inspectorate of  
 3 Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. Which we'll refer to as "the Inspectorate". And were  
 6 you an associate inspector?  
 7 A. I was an associate inspector from 2019. When I retired  
 8 the associate scheme allows the Inspectorate to access  
 9 people to support their inspections who have significant  
 10 experience, particularly specialist experience.  
 11 Q. In terms of your specialist experience did you lead  
 12 throughout the period that we're concerned with, so both  
 13 before and after 2017, the specialist inspections  
 14 programme of the Inspectorate?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. And what is that programme, please?  
 17 A. It looks at inspecting a number of forces that don't  
 18 fall under the Home Office. Those would include the  
 19 Civil Nuclear Constabulary and British Transport Police  
 20 together with other thematic issues such as organised  
 21 crime and other agencies such as the National Crime  
 22 Agency. There are a number of other specialist forces  
 23 we look at, those used by the military, included  
 24 in that, and, on invite, British overseas territories  
 25 policing as well.

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1 Q. Did you lead the Inspectorate's three counter-terrorism  
 2 inspections and special grant review that are of  
 3 particular interest to this inquiry?  
 4 A. Yes, I led the teams that undertook those inspections.  
 5 Q. Just before we delve into the substance of your own  
 6 evidence, can I ask you to confirm that you have  
 7 a colleague named Matthew Parr?  
 8 A. I do.  
 9 Q. Who is and was during the period with which we are  
 10 concerned an inspector with the Inspectorate?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. I know from discussions I had with you before you went  
 13 into the witness box, you know he has provided a witness  
 14 statement dated 21 January of last year --  
 15 A. He has.  
 16 Q. -- dealing with the statutory framework for the  
 17 Inspectorate?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And I'll give the INQ reference for the transcript: it's  
 20 {INQ029822/1}. Whilst I'm at it, I'll give the  
 21 reference for your first statement, {INQ029796/1}.  
 22 What I'm going to do, Mr Buchan, is to summarise his  
 23 evidence and then we can consider whether it is  
 24 necessary to upload his statement to our website at some  
 25 later stage. I'll simply ask you to confirm that what

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1 I'm going to summarise from his statement is accurate,  
 2 and obviously if it's not, you'll tell me.  
 3 The Inspectorate was established along with the  
 4 requirement that every county and borough set up and  
 5 maintain a permanent salaried police force in 1856 --  
 6 A. Correct.  
 7 Q. -- as a result of an act of Parliament?  
 8 The Inspectorate's current functions are set out in  
 9 the Police Act of 1996 as amended by the Police Reform  
 10 and Social Responsibility Act of 2011 and the Policing  
 11 and Crime Act 2017?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. The Inspectorate has no separate legal existence or  
 14 personality?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. It is not a subsidiary of or part of the Home Office and  
 17 it is independent of government and also the police  
 18 service?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. However, the Inspectorate is funded and resourced in the  
 21 sense of the provision of staff, et cetera, by the  
 22 Home Office?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. There are currently six inspectors of constabulary,  
 25 including the chief inspector?

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1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. And the Inspectorate consists of the inspectors and  
 3 those who assist the inspectors, namely assistant  
 4 inspectors of constabulary, civil servants, conduct  
 5 police officers and members of police staff?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. So I hope that will suffice as a summary of the  
 8 statutory framework.  
 9 I'm now going to go to your first witness  
 10 statement -- you provided two witness statements and  
 11 you have copies in front of you. I'm going to page 3,  
 12 paragraph 6. Is there a requirement under section 55.1  
 13 of the Police Act for the Inspectorate to publish  
 14 reports?  
 15 A. There is.  
 16 Q. Is that a requirement to publish reports in such manner  
 17 as appears appropriate?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. But is the Inspectorate required to exclude from  
 20 publication anything that it considers would be contrary  
 21 to the interests of national security or which might  
 22 jeopardise the safety of any person?  
 23 A. We are.  
 24 Q. But even where such matter is excluded from publication,  
 25 are you required to disclose that information to the

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1 Secretary of State?  
 2 A. Yes, we are.  
 3 Q. As I indicated a short time ago, we're going to be  
 4 considering three reports of the Inspectorate for which  
 5 you were responsible dealing with counter—terrorism.  
 6 Have you described those reports in your statement as  
 7 CT1, CT2 and CT3?  
 8 A. Yes, I have.  
 9 Q. So far as CT1 is concerned, did you submit your full  
 10 report to the Secretary of State on 19 December 2016?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. When we say Secretary of State, are we talking about the  
 13 Home Secretary?  
 14 A. We are talking about the Home Secretary.  
 15 Q. Insofar as CT1 is concerned, did you decide that the  
 16 publication of that report would be contrary to the  
 17 interests of national security?  
 18 A. We did.  
 19 Q. As a result was it not published?  
 20 A. The full report was not published.  
 21 Q. Does it follow from that answer that a summary version  
 22 of the full report was published?  
 23 A. It was.  
 24 Q. Did that occur on 11 April 2018?  
 25 A. It did.

1 Q. And from it, was the sensitive material excluded?  
 2 A. It was.  
 3 Q. As we're going to come on to consider with you, and  
 4 indeed as we heard on Wednesday of last week, prior to  
 5 the publication of that summary did you share your  
 6 findings with the NPCC lead for counter—terrorism?  
 7 A. Yes, we did.  
 8 Q. Enabling that person to consider your recommendations in  
 9 advance of publication?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. So does that reflect a sense also experienced by this  
 12 inquiry that where important things are being  
 13 discovered, they need to be shared in real time or  
 14 shortly afterwards as opposed to being stored up for the  
 15 publication of a report?  
 16 A. That's absolutely the case with counter—terrorism  
 17 policing, yes.  
 18 Q. Did you see the evidence of Richard Thomas given on  
 19 Wednesday of last week?  
 20 A. I have seen it, yes.  
 21 Q. He was very much describing what you have just told us  
 22 about, namely the requirement that those who are on the  
 23 ground or at the cutting edge, however one wants to  
 24 describe it, of counter—terrorism, they need to know  
 25 what the Inspectorate is discovering as soon as it is

1 discovered?  
 2 A. Yes. In the context of the Inspectorate and publishing  
 3 reports, that's not normally the case: we wait until  
 4 we've finished our work, assessed it, had it checked and  
 5 then we publish our reports and share those findings.  
 6 But we certainly took the view with our  
 7 counter—terrorism policing inspections that were we to  
 8 start to find issues it's absolutely in the interests  
 9 of, I think, public safety that we disclose those as  
 10 soon as we possibly can.  
 11 Q. Not to get too involved in the detail at the moment, but  
 12 one of the things that you discovered in the course of  
 13 the work for CT1 was the risk that during an  
 14 Operation Plato incident the FIM or FDO would become  
 15 overwhelmed?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And that was information that you felt it was important  
 18 to communicate to CTPHQ as soon as you knew about it?  
 19 A. That's correct.  
 20 Q. I did jump ahead a little bit. We were dealing with  
 21 those three Counter—terrorism Policing reports.  
 22 CT2. Did you submit your full report to the Home  
 23 Secretary on 20 December 2017?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Did the Inspectorate decide not to publish that report

1 or a summary because it was assessed that it contained  
 2 sufficient information that, when put together in  
 3 a mosaic, it would be contrary to the interests of  
 4 national security?  
 5 A. That's correct.  
 6 Q. CT3. Did the Inspectorate publish the full report to  
 7 the Home Secretary on 27 November 2018?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. As with CT2 and for the same reasons, was a decision  
 10 made not to publish the report or a summary?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. You have told us that the findings of CT2 were shared  
 13 with the NPCC lead for counter—terrorism ahead of  
 14 publication; was that also the position for CT3?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. In addition, for CT2 and CT3 was something called a "hot  
 17 debrief" conducted?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. What did the hot debrief involve, just in general terms,  
 20 for the —  
 21 A. For each force, because this is a national inspection,  
 22 we call it a thematic inspection, we're not inspecting  
 23 each individual force per se, as you would with our  
 24 other inspections, and we've referred to two in my  
 25 statement, PEEL inspections.

1 Q. Yes.  
 2 A. For the same reasons we disclose what we find to the  
 3 CT Network, we agreed to sit down and talk to the CT  
 4 lead for each force and just informally highlight what  
 5 it is we had found.  
 6 Q. Indeed, for CT2 and CT3 was such a hot debrief conducted  
 7 with the chief officer for each of the forces that you  
 8 visited during your fieldwork?  
 9 A. As I recall, yes.  
 10 Q. And indeed, in the case of CT2, did you debrief the  
 11 chief officer for counter-terrorism for GMP?  
 12 A. I did.  
 13 Q. Did you do that at the end of your fieldwork on  
 14 4 November 2016?  
 15 A. Yes, I did.  
 16 Q. Did you do that personally or was it a member of your  
 17 staff?  
 18 A. I did that personally.  
 19 Q. So on 4 November 2016, you personally debriefed the GMP  
 20 chief officer lead for counter-terrorism on what you had  
 21 discovered?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you give me the date again?  
 24 MR GREANEY: 4 November 2016.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that's the debrief on CT1?

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1 MR GREANEY: We'd better check that, sir. You picked up on  
 2 something that was crossing my mind. I'm at page 4,  
 3 paragraphs 11 and 12.  
 4 Would that be a reference to CT1?  
 5 A. CT2, I think we're talking about.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, the full report was published on  
 7 20 December 2017, you told me. That full report went to  
 8 the Home Secretary, but you didn't publish that full  
 9 report or a summary as it was contrary to national  
 10 security, so I assume that took place in 2017.  
 11 CT1, the report was submitted to the Home Secretary  
 12 on 19 December 2016. But you did publish a summary  
 13 in April 2018.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Let me see if I've understood that.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's obviously quite important.  
 16 MR GREANEY: It is important. Let me see if I've understood  
 17 this correctly, putting it together with the evidence of  
 18 Richard Thomas, and I may have created a problem with my  
 19 questions.  
 20 CT2, was that a report, the findings of which were  
 21 communicated to CTPHQ ahead of the arena attack but the  
 22 results of which were published subsequently?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 MR GREANEY: Sir, when we have our break I'll make sure that  
 25 all of these dates are correct.

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1 Let's go back over this. The work in relation to  
 2 CT2 was underway certainly during the course of 2017 and  
 3 perhaps 2016 as well?  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can get in a terrible muddle with  
 5 this if we're not careful. Would it help if I rose for  
 6 10 minutes?  
 7 MR GREANEY: It probably would, sir.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you just tell me when you're ready?  
 9 MR GREANEY: I will, sir. Thank you very much.  
 10 (10.23 am)  
 11 (A short break)  
 12 (10.40 am)  
 13 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm sorry about the confusion, which was  
 14 entirely created by me, not by Mr Buchan.  
 15 Let's just do what we can to make sure there's  
 16 clarity. We were dealing with those three  
 17 counter-terrorism reports.  
 18 First of all, CT1. We're going to consider the  
 19 subject matter of CT1 in due course, albeit not in very  
 20 much detail, but was CT1 concerned with or at any rate  
 21 principally concerned with the role of the CT commander?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. So although we have received evidence about that role,  
 24 it is not at the forefront of what we are considering in  
 25 this inquiry, would you agree?

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1 A. I agree.  
 2 Q. That report was submitted to the Home Secretary on  
 3 19 December 2016?  
 4 A. Correct.  
 5 Q. A summary version was published on 11 April 2018?  
 6 A. Correct.  
 7 Q. And the content of that report was shared with the NPCC  
 8 lead for counter-terrorism?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. But that is not the sharing of information that  
 11 Richard Thomas was telling us about on Wednesday of last  
 12 week?  
 13 A. No, the information we were sharing about that report  
 14 was how officers are selected to become CT commanders,  
 15 how they are trained, and how they are kept up to date  
 16 with developments in counter-terrorism policing so those  
 17 were the areas that we were looking at in that  
 18 inspection.  
 19 Q. That is the first CT report and we will consider the  
 20 headlines from it. But for the time being we can draw  
 21 a line under that report, would you agree?  
 22 A. I agree.  
 23 Q. We then have CT2, which was submitted to the Home  
 24 Secretary on 20 December 2017; is that correct?  
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. CT2 was the report that was concerned with  
 2 Operation Plato issues?  
 3 A. It was. It sought to find out how well equipped  
 4 a police force was to deal with the first few hours of  
 5 a Plato incident.  
 6 Q. So this was the report that considered the operation of  
 7 a force control room?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. The operation of or the actions of an FIM --  
 10 A. That's right, yes.  
 11 Q. -- or FDO, as it would be described in Greater  
 12 Manchester Police?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And this was the report that identified the risk of the  
 15 overloading of the FDO during an Operation Plato  
 16 incident?  
 17 A. That's correct.  
 18 Q. As we were discussing earlier, the results of the  
 19 fieldwork done by the Inspectorate that ultimately  
 20 resulted in CT2, those results were discussed ahead of  
 21 publication with CTPHQ?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. Leading into what Richard Thomas described as the  
 24 refreshed Operation Plato guidance of 2017?  
 25 A. Yes. We certainly spoke to CTPHQ early on as we were

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1 starting to find some consistent findings that would  
 2 point to their guidance needing updating.  
 3 MR GREANEY: Sir, I hope that's now clear, what Richard  
 4 Thomas was telling us about on Wednesday of last week  
 5 was the provision of information that later emerged in  
 6 CT2.  
 7 CT3 was provided to the Home Secretary on  
 8 27 November 2018?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. What did CT3 deal with in headline form, please?  
 11 A. CT Policing has developed significantly and has become,  
 12 in my words, a quasi-national policing endeavour. What  
 13 we wanted to understand was: was central policy and  
 14 central strategy being translated to delivery on the  
 15 ground? So how did -- I know Richard has used the term  
 16 before -- the golden thread from policy reach down into  
 17 service delivery. So that was the aim of that  
 18 inspection.  
 19 Q. Let me make sure I have understood that. We heard from  
 20 Assistant Commissioner Basu last week about the role of  
 21 SNC in Counter-terrorism Policing?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. So that is a national role and that chief constables  
 24 around the country, this is my word, it may not be  
 25 entirely accurate, would defer to the role of SNC where

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1 there is a terrorist incident?  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. So CT3, your report, was looking at whether that scheme  
 4 was actually working?  
 5 A. That was part of it, but more so what are the strategies  
 6 that CT Policing have developed and how they are  
 7 delivered on the ground.  
 8 So for instance, does a policy around Prevent, for  
 9 instance, reach down into a local police force and what  
 10 work they should be doing to support that national  
 11 strategy?  
 12 Q. Just whilst we're dealing with reports, and in summary  
 13 form, there were, I think, two other counter-terrorism  
 14 reports prepared by the Inspectorate. CT4?  
 15 A. That's correct, yes. That looked at Prevent, the  
 16 Prevent strand of the Government's counter-terrorism  
 17 strategy, CONTEST, which focuses on radicalisation and  
 18 deradicalisation of individuals.  
 19 Q. In the break I'll ask you to check the dates on which  
 20 that was provided to the Secretary of State and  
 21 published, if it was published. I won't put you on the  
 22 spot now.  
 23 And was there also a CT5?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. What in general terms did CT5 deal with?

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1 A. It had two aims, CT5. One was to look at how the  
 2 investment in increasing the number of firearms officers  
 3 had gone, known as the firearms uplift, and we also  
 4 revisited some of our recommendations from CT2. At the  
 5 time of writing my statement that report had not been  
 6 completed.  
 7 Q. I am going to jump ahead for a moment. I hope this is  
 8 helpful. In CT5, did the Inspectorate consider the  
 9 practical remedies for the potential overloading of the  
 10 FDO or FIM?  
 11 A. Yes, we certainly looked at progress that forces had  
 12 made against the recommendations we made, particularly  
 13 around providing support to the FIM or force duty  
 14 officer in the case of GMP.  
 15 Q. That's probably a better way of looking at it.  
 16 In CT2, the issue with the FIM -- shall we just call  
 17 the FIM the FDO because that's the relevant term in our  
 18 case?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. In CT2 the issue with the potential overloading of the  
 21 FDO had been identified, some recommendations, as we'll  
 22 discuss, had been made and in CT5 you were looking at  
 23 whether those recommendations had been implemented and,  
 24 if so, with what outcome?  
 25 A. Yes.

20

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because you call them CT1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
 2 they all look sequential; was work being done  
 3 concurrently on these, work on the ground which became  
 4 conclusions?  
 5 A. No, I think they were all separate.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they all followed on from each  
 7 other? So for CT1 the work started first?  
 8 A. Yes, they are chronologically in order.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 10 MR GREANEY: Certainly CT2 comes before CT5 because CT5 is  
 11 looking at whether recommendations from CT2 had been  
 12 implemented and, if so, whether they were working.  
 13 A. That was part of the aim of the inspection, yes.  
 14 Q. It is helpful just to get this out there straightaway:  
 15 in CT2 had the idea of action cards been identified?  
 16 A. Yes. Forgive me, I can't recall at what point we did  
 17 the fieldwork in the overall inspection in GMP, but we'd  
 18 already identified in some forces where action cards had  
 19 been designed and used, that appeared on the face of it  
 20 to take some of the pressure, particularly the  
 21 logistical pressure, off the force duty officer, which  
 22 is something we were keen to explore and highlight as  
 23 good practice.  
 24 Q. Let's just take a practical example of how that might  
 25 work. A terrorist incident has occurred,

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1 Operation Plato has been declared by the FDO and we know  
 2 that a whole series of things then need to be done, for  
 3 example, the other emergency services need to be  
 4 contacted and a three-way conversation needs to start.  
 5 That obviously requires someone to know the telephone  
 6 number of the other emergency services.  
 7 A. Yes. I think they have an automatic line that's set up  
 8 for that in most control rooms. I think that's the case  
 9 for GMP. But there's an awful lot of units and  
 10 interested parties to contact in a terrorist incident  
 11 because it does have such a national implication,  
 12 national footprint, that a lot of those tasks, if they  
 13 fall to the force duty officer, would be a significant  
 14 distraction away from their primary role, which is as  
 15 the tactical firearms commander to direct police  
 16 resources, firearms resources, to the scene, but also to  
 17 work with others on the ground and with unarmed officers  
 18 as well, which must be their primary role.  
 19 So we were trying to see if there were ways that the  
 20 police could spread that workload around and some forces  
 21 had come to a solution of action cards, a fairly simple  
 22 and straightforward thing to do where tasks are  
 23 allocated to all those in the control room to undertake.  
 24 Q. So there will be obviously matters of strategy that the  
 25 FDO will need to be dealing with very quickly after such

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1 an incident has occurred. But there will also be  
 2 matters of detail that need to be dealt with, particular  
 3 units that need to be spoken to, and the idea was to  
 4 take those matters of detail away from the FDO so that  
 5 he can focus on the big issues?  
 6 A. No, I think it's to take away a lot of the  
 7 administrative, the logistical work, that needs to  
 8 happen quickly away from the FDO whereas the FDO, as the  
 9 tactical firearms commander, needs to focus as much as  
 10 possible on providing that command to armed and unarmed  
 11 police officers at the scene.  
 12 Q. So matters of administration. When you talk about  
 13 action cards, are you talking about a physical card that  
 14 provides instructions to other members of the force  
 15 control room about what they are to do in that  
 16 situation?  
 17 A. Exactly that.  
 18 Q. Just to go back to where we were before we took our  
 19 break --  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I'm just going to stop that. So  
 21 when were you doing a debrief about this with GMP  
 22 in relation to the FDO, which is obviously something  
 23 we have to consider? So do you know when? How long  
 24 before the May attack?  
 25 MR GREANEY: This is the very point that I was just coming

23

1 to.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm so sorry. We did hear from  
 3 Mr Thomas that it didn't all come as a big revelation  
 4 with CT2 that there was this pressure on the FDO and it  
 5 doesn't seem -- I know the best ideas are those which  
 6 appear very simple and no one thought of them, that  
 7 actually having action cards or distributing the work  
 8 around other people to do it to take the pressure off  
 9 doesn't seem like it was that difficult to work out.  
 10 A. Yes, you're right, sir. Other forces had done that. We  
 11 saw them in other forces. That's the advantage of  
 12 visiting a number of forces to look at how they do  
 13 things, best practice, highlight issues that they need  
 14 to improve on. By the time we got to GMP, we had been  
 15 to a few forces so we had an idea of what was out there  
 16 and knew when the force might want to consider doing  
 17 something like that.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So too much work to one person, you have  
 19 to distribute it among a number. That's absolutely  
 20 basic.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: A means of doing it, having these action  
 23 cards, perhaps more difficult and less obvious, but  
 24 nevertheless something that people do within the police  
 25 force?

24

1 A. Yes. Certainly from the control rooms we went to in  
 2 other forces where they produced these. It seemed like  
 3 a very simple, straightforward solution. In an area  
 4 that is — that really relies heavily on technology to  
 5 help manage, demand and manage prioritisation, if you  
 6 can imagine the technology that's supporting this  
 7 inquiry, you can be swayed by trying to put it on  
 8 a computer, when actually maybe in the high pressure of  
 9 the early stages, and we're talking about the very early  
 10 stages of a terrorist attack, the simple,  
 11 straightforward method is probably going to be the most  
 12 effective.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We won't tell our IT assistants  
 14 that they can go home now as a result of that!  
 15 Thank you.

16 MR GREANEY: Let's pick up on a few aspects of that. First  
 17 of all, you are familiar with Exercise Winchester  
 18 Accord —

19 A. I am.

20 Q. — which, as we know, occurred in 2016?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That was during the period that CT2 was being prepared.  
 23 Was it Exercise Winchester Accord that alerted the  
 24 Inspectorate to the risk that the FDO would be  
 25 overloaded or was that apparent from other work you had

25

1 done?

2 A. No, that was apparent from work we'd done.

3 Q. So this was something that was emerging around the  
 4 country as a potential problem?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Secondly, and I think you've probably said this already  
 7 but it's worth emphasising, there was no scheme for  
 8 action cards within GMP at the stage at which you were  
 9 preparing CT2?

10 A. No.

11 Q. But other forces, having recognised the FDO issue, had  
 12 implemented action cards?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And thirdly, the point the chairman first asked you  
 15 about, the stage at which GMP was made aware of this  
 16 issue, and I hope I've got this right, I think where we  
 17 left off before the break was that you were telling us  
 18 that you personally had debriefed the GMP chief officer  
 19 lead for counter-terrorism on the evidence that the  
 20 Inspectorate had obtained in the course of CT2 at the  
 21 end of the fieldwork that you had done and that you did  
 22 that on 4 November 2016?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Is there any reason why you shouldn't tell us the  
 25 identity, by which I mean the name, of the GMP chief

26

1 officer you spoke to?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Could you tell us who it was?

4 A. I think it was Cath Harkinson (sic).

5 Q. I think we're going to understand in terms of chronology  
 6 that that's 4 November 2016. We know then from Richard  
 7 Thomas' evidence that on 23 March 2017, the refreshed  
 8 CTPHQ guidance is sent out to chief officers with  
 9 a suggestion that there was an urgency. We know that on  
 10 8 and I think 11 May, there is then training delivered  
 11 in terms of the refreshed guidance. You'll remember  
 12 that from the evidence of Mr Thomas?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And, as we are going to discover from Mr Whittle  
 15 a little later on today, on 12 May GMP pushes out its  
 16 own refreshed guidance to those who needed to know. So  
 17 I think that's where we're going to get to.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

19 MR GREANEY: Just before we get into CT2 and what it dealt  
 20 with in more detail, I'm going to ask you to help us  
 21 with one or two other things. First of all, PEEL. What  
 22 is PEEL so far as the Inspectorate is concerned?

23 A. It's a programme of inspection where the Inspectorate  
 24 will examine a police force's efficiency, effectiveness  
 25 and legitimacy through three rounds of inspections, and

27

1 at the time of the reports I've included in my  
 2 statement, those are force inspections, which are  
 3 force — each individual force will receive a report and  
 4 a graded judgement on its performance across a number of  
 5 areas.

6 Q. As you describe in your witness statement, paragraph 13,  
 7 the PEEL assessments are designed to provide  
 8 a year-on-year comparison?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So that among others, no doubt, the public can see how  
 11 each police force's performance changes over time  
 12 including in relation to other forces?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Do the questions that make up the PEEL assessments  
 15 remain the same year on year?

16 A. They are reviewed, but in the main they examine much the  
 17 same issues for policing.

18 Q. But no doubt they adapt to what may be changing  
 19 priorities and circumstances in policing?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Generally, as you just told us, do they draw on evidence  
 22 to support judgements that are graded?

23 A. They do.

24 Q. And typically is evidence obtained in a number of  
 25 different ways?

28



1 A. It is.  
 2 Q. What are those ways, please?  
 3 A. Data that is accumulated on the performance of the force  
 4 through data submissions around things like response to  
 5 calls, crime recording, et cetera. It relies on ongoing  
 6 liaison with a force, undertaken by a specific personnel  
 7 within HMIC — sorry, the Inspectorate. It relies on  
 8 documentation that's provided by the force and through  
 9 fieldwork.  
 10 Q. Does fieldwork involve actually interviewing officers  
 11 at the force that is being reviewed?  
 12 A. It does.  
 13 Q. And also work through focus groups within that force?  
 14 A. It does.  
 15 Q. Where individual officers are spoken to, are they spoken  
 16 to in a way in which they would expect publicity to be  
 17 given to what they've said or in a different way?  
 18 A. No, they would not. There is an expectation of  
 19 confidentiality about the identification of the officers  
 20 that we speak to. We want them to speak freely and  
 21 unfettered, so we give them that assurance with a number  
 22 of caveats.  
 23 Q. And although no doubt that is for very good reason,  
 24 there is one officer to whom you spoke as part of CT2  
 25 that we will be identifying in the course of your

29

1 evidence a little later.  
 2 When you conduct such interviews, will you be  
 3 speaking to those who have direct involvement in the  
 4 subject areas that are being inspected?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Does that include policy leads?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Subject matter experts?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And others who will have been selected randomly because  
 11 of their knowledge of the particular subject area?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. Will it involve, therefore, speaking to people across  
 14 a variety of ranks within the force?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Once the evidence has been gathered and graded  
 17 judgements are given, what is the range of judgements?  
 18 A. They range from good down to...  
 19 Q. I'm at paragraph 17 of your statement, page 6.  
 20 A. Outstanding, good, requires an improvement, and  
 21 inadequate.  
 22 Q. We're going to be considering the inspections that were  
 23 conducted of GMP in 2016 and 2017; I'm at paragraph 18.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. What was being assessed, at least principally, in those

30

1 inspections?  
 2 A. There were sort of five key areas. How effective  
 3 a police force was at preventing crime and tackling  
 4 anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe. That's  
 5 one objective. How effective they are at investigating  
 6 crime and reducing crime. Another one was how good they  
 7 were at protecting vulnerable people and supporting  
 8 victims. Fourth one, tackling serious organised crime.  
 9 And the fifth one, the force's specialist capabilities.  
 10 Q. And the fifth one, specialist capabilities, would that  
 11 have any relevance to the issues we're exploring in this  
 12 inquiry?  
 13 A. It could touch on them, particularly around the firearms  
 14 availability within a force.  
 15 Q. Let's deal as efficiently as we can with those two  
 16 inspection reports for GMP. Did the Inspectorate  
 17 publish its 2016 PEEL report relating to GMP in  
 18 March 2017?  
 19 A. It did.  
 20 Q. What was the overall grading of GMP?  
 21 A. The overall grading was good.  
 22 Q. Against a series of core questions, was GMP graded good  
 23 for preventing crime?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people safe?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. But did it require improvement in some areas?  
 3 A. It did.  
 4 Q. I'm at the top of page 7. What were the areas in which  
 5 improvement was required?  
 6 A. Investigating crime and reducing re-offending,  
 7 protecting vulnerable people from harm, and supporting  
 8 victims.  
 9 Q. On the other hand, was GMP graded as outstanding at  
 10 tackling serious and organised crime?  
 11 A. It was.  
 12 Q. Did the report of the Inspectorate identify eight areas  
 13 for improvement?  
 14 A. It did.  
 15 Q. What were those, please?  
 16 A. They covered GMP's approach to problem solving, the  
 17 conduct and supervision of initial crime investigations;  
 18 the force's ability to capture digital evidence; the  
 19 management of sex offenders; and the accurate and timely  
 20 assessment of risk, particularly when safeguarding  
 21 vulnerable people.  
 22 Q. As you told us, part of the report dealt with the  
 23 effectiveness of GMP's specialist capabilities. Did  
 24 that include the arrangements in place to respond to  
 25 a major incident, including a terrorist attack?

32

1 A. It did.  
 2 Q. I'll ask that we have on the screen the relevant page of  
 3 the report, and we'll pick out a couple of passages.  
 4 The reference, Mr Lopez, is {INQ008368/1}.  
 5 Just whilst that's being brought up, we know now  
 6 that there are gradings given to particular questions.  
 7 Would a force's preparedness to respond to a firearms  
 8 attack be graded?  
 9 A. No. For this inspection the Inspectorate took the view  
 10 that they would produce a narrative judgement as opposed  
 11 to assigning a grade to it.  
 12 Q. Why was that?  
 13 A. I can't recall.  
 14 Q. But nonetheless that's how it was dealt with. So we can  
 15 see here it is, the 2016 report. It's a substantial  
 16 document that runs to 63 pages. Can we go to  
 17 {INQ008368/52}, please, Mr Lopez?  
 18 We'll just highlight the top of the page, thank you  
 19 very much:  
 20 "How well prepared is the force to respond to  
 21 a firearms attack?"  
 22 And then there's a reference to the Paris attacks in  
 23 2015:  
 24 "Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on  
 25 13 November 2015, the Government allocated £143 million

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1 to the 43 England and Wales police forces to increase  
 2 their armed capability. This funding has enabled some  
 3 forces to increase the number of armed police officers  
 4 able to respond to a terrorist attack. These attacks  
 5 include those committed by heavily armed terrorists  
 6 across multiple sites in quick succession as in Paris.  
 7 These attacks are known as marauding terrorist firearms  
 8 attacks. The funding is for those forces considered to  
 9 be at greatest risk of a terrorist attack."  
 10 Then can we increase the size of the second half of  
 11 the page, please?  
 12 So in other words the PEEL report in 2016 did have  
 13 well in mind the risk of an MTFA within the  
 14 United Kingdom?  
 15 A. It did.  
 16 Q. "Greater Manchester Police is aware of its broader  
 17 national responsibilities to support other forces in  
 18 response to national threats. The force understands the  
 19 threat posed by an attack requiring an armed response  
 20 and that this understanding is based on recent and  
 21 relevant information. Greater Manchester Police is the  
 22 identified Regional Incident Coordination Centre for the  
 23 north-west. The level of knowledge and awareness of  
 24 staff in the control room, most notably the cadre of  
 25 force incident managers who provide the initial command

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1 and control of critical and spontaneous incidents, is  
 2 reassuring."  
 3 So at that stage it would seem the Inspectorate felt  
 4 that GMP was in a good place to respond to a Plato-type  
 5 incident?  
 6 A. Correct.  
 7 Q. Thank you very much, we can take from that the screen.  
 8 Just to go back to page 7 of your statement,  
 9 paragraph 23, is the position that the inspection team  
 10 recognised the work that GMP had undertaken, including  
 11 the force's involvement in national and local exercises  
 12 that tested its response to a terrorist attack?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And were reassured, as we've just seen, that GMP had  
 15 good command and control arrangements for the initial  
 16 response to a terrorist attack?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. How would that judgement about the ability of GMP to  
 19 respond to an Operation Plato-type incident have been  
 20 formed?  
 21 A. They would have undertaken fieldwork, reviewed  
 22 documents, spoken to individuals during the course of  
 23 the inspection, but bearing in mind this is just one  
 24 question amongst a number of other questions that are  
 25 going to enable the force to come to judgements across

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1 a whole swathe of policing in GMP.  
 2 Q. We know already that there were counter-terrorism  
 3 reports being prepared by the Inspectorate and indeed by  
 4 your team. Should we understand that the PEEL reports  
 5 are being prepared parallel with the CT reports?  
 6 A. I think the PEEL inspection pre-dated our CT2  
 7 inspection, but at the time we did discuss the questions  
 8 set that they were going to use and whether we could use  
 9 some of the evidence that they captured and vice versa.  
 10 Q. We're going to look just in a moment at the PEEL report  
 11 for 2017, which would be contemporaneous, I think, with  
 12 CT2. What was happening with the Inspectorate? Were  
 13 there two different teams preparing from different  
 14 reports?  
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 16 Q. Were they communicating with each other, the two teams?  
 17 A. Yes, there was some communication, particularly -- what  
 18 we didn't want to do was duplicate effort, and I think  
 19 the focus of the PEEL reports were to look at how well  
 20 the force was ensuring it had sufficient armed officers  
 21 and with the uplift money that was provided, how they  
 22 were going about providing those. The focus for CT2, as  
 23 we discussed earlier, was how does the force command  
 24 control that incident in the first few hours before  
 25 anybody else might come over the horizon to help.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The difference is, isn't it, that the  
 2 PEEL report gets full publication and the sort of report  
 3 we see in the papers all the time?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: "Such—and—such a police force has been  
 6 declared to be good, average or whatever", whereas the  
 7 CT report doesn't actually get publicity .  
 8 A. Correct.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the problem about that is that if  
 10 a police force is declared to be poor, it gets quite  
 11 a lot of publicity locally , quite a lot of pressure is  
 12 put on people to do something about it, whereas if  
 13 you're reporting in your CT report that something needs  
 14 looking at, that doesn't get that sort of pressure.  
 15 A. It doesn't, no.  
 16 MR GREANEY: And indeed, just to pick up on that, the PEEL  
 17 report would have a much wider focus than the CT reports  
 18 you have told us about?  
 19 A. A very broad focus, yes.  
 20 Q. Let's look at the PEEL report for 2017. Was the  
 21 Inspectorate's PEEL report for Greater Manchester  
 22 Police — I'm at paragraph 24 now — for 2017 published  
 23 in March of 2018?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Having been graded as good in the 2016 report, how was

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1 GMP graded in the 2017 report?  
 2 A. It was graded as requiring improvement.  
 3 Q. Against the core questions that were posed, was GMP  
 4 graded good for certain matters?  
 5 A. It was.  
 6 Q. And what were those?  
 7 A. For preventing crime, tackling anti—social behaviour,  
 8 and keeping people safe.  
 9 Q. Was it graded as outstanding again at tackling serious  
 10 and organised crime?  
 11 A. It was.  
 12 Q. But in certain areas was it graded as requiring  
 13 improvement?  
 14 A. It was.  
 15 Q. What were those areas?  
 16 A. Investigating crime and reducing offending; protecting  
 17 those who are vulnerable from harm; supporting victims.  
 18 Q. Did the report highlight one cause for concern in GMP's  
 19 failure to respond appropriately to some people who were  
 20 vulnerable and at risk?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Did it make two recommendations that GMP should improve  
 23 its understanding of demand for its services and improve  
 24 the force response to vulnerable victims?  
 25 A. It does.

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1 Q. And did it highlight three areas for improvement,  
 2 covering initial recording of evidence, supervision of  
 3 investigations and the establishment of a system to  
 4 better obtain feedback from victims of domestic abuse?  
 5 A. It did.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just trying to do a quick comparison  
 7 between 2016 and 2017, the actual findings against the  
 8 core questions appear to me to be identical.  
 9 A. They are very similar , yes.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, they appear identical. I may be  
 11 wrong. It is only a quick look at paragraph 20 of your  
 12 statement as against paragraph 25. I may be wrong, I'm  
 13 only quickly scanning across both of them.  
 14 MR GREANEY: The question is, if the findings were  
 15 effectively the same, at least in headline form, why had  
 16 the overall grading changed from good to requiring  
 17 improvement?  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That was exactly my next question,  
 19 Mr Greaney.  
 20 MR GREANEY: We'll bear in mind that you weren't the author  
 21 of the PEEL reports.  
 22 A. Yes. I have to say I don't know.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 24 MR GREANEY: At all events, that was the finding of the  
 25 person who was responsible.

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1 Again, did the 2017 report consider the  
 2 effectiveness of GMP's capabilities?  
 3 A. It did.  
 4 Q. Including the arrangements in place to respond to  
 5 a major incident, including a terrorist attack?  
 6 A. It did.  
 7 Q. Again, in 2017, I think that that part of the report was  
 8 ungraded?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. But instead, a narrative judgement was given?  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct .  
 12 Q. We'll just look at one section of that part of the  
 13 report. Mr Lopez, the INQ reference, I hope, is  
 14 {INQ008353/1}.  
 15 {INQ008353/24}, first of all.  
 16 This is the section dealing with specialist  
 17 capabilities , ungraded. As I've indicated, this was  
 18 published in March 2018, so after the arena attack. If  
 19 we go to the next page, the very top of it ,  
 20 {INQ008353/25}:  
 21 "The force's arrangements to manage major incidents  
 22 were thoroughly tested during the terrorist attack at  
 23 the Manchester Arena in May 2017 and were found to be  
 24 effective ."  
 25 That was the view of the Inspectorate, was it?

40

1 A. That was the view of the Inspectorate.  
 2 Q. Although as you'll appreciate, that is one of the very  
 3 issues we are exploring in this inquiry?  
 4 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 5 Q. "Greater Manchester Police carefully debriefs after  
 6 training exercises and major incidents to identify  
 7 learning points and ensure its operation to subject to  
 8 continuous improvement."  
 9 A. That's what the inspectors said, yes.  
 10 Q. And again, as you'll appreciate, one of the things the  
 11 inquiry is keen to understand is whether that is  
 12 correct.  
 13 A. Mm—hm.  
 14 Q. Because as witnesses have said already, the very purpose  
 15 of exercising is not just to learn lessons but to ensure  
 16 that those lessons are truly learned and changes are  
 17 implemented.  
 18 A. Agreed.  
 19 Q. And you would, as you have just, agree with that?  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I suspect that nobody looking at  
 21 the information that we have been given, and obviously  
 22 this needs to be tested, so I'm not forming any  
 23 pre-emptive conclusions, but I doubt if anyone who's  
 24 looked at the mass of evidence that we have looked at  
 25 would actually come to that conclusion.

41

1 A. Yes, you're right.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we explain that how?  
 3 A. At the time they would have been — will have spoken to  
 4 people at GMP, just like we did during the CT2  
 5 inspection, and the force — a number of interviewees we  
 6 spoke to highlighted that the force thought they were  
 7 good at dealing, working with their partners in the  
 8 other blue light services. A lot of them drew on the  
 9 Commonwealth Games as probably being the starting point  
 10 of greater closer working with other blue light  
 11 services. That would have been given to the inspectors  
 12 who compiled this report at the time.  
 13 GMP do participate in a number of exercises, they do  
 14 try and test their systems. Around the  
 15 counter-terrorism world a lot of that testing is focused  
 16 on its ability to get firearms officers forward and to  
 17 deal with a terrorist attack.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not, if I may say so — please don't  
 19 take this as a general criticism, it is absolutely not,  
 20 but the fact that they took part in testing, it is  
 21 actually just the contents of that particular paragraph  
 22 which I think you have agreed is probably unlikely that  
 23 anyone knowing what we now know would actually have  
 24 reached that conclusion in relation to this particular  
 25 attack on this particular day.

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1 A. Sir, I would agree with that.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 3 MR GREANEY: Would you also agree that if, as seems to be  
 4 the case, coordinated working with emergency service  
 5 partners did not work well on 22 May, and if at the  
 6 stage of speaking to the Inspectorate those responsible  
 7 didn't recognise that that had gone wrong, that that  
 8 would highlight the need to identify lessons and learn  
 9 from them?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. We'll deal with CT1 and then I would invite the chairman  
 12 to consider taking a break. I'm now at page 8,  
 13 paragraph 29 of your statement. I'm not quite making  
 14 the progress that I'd hoped in this session.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's probably my fault.  
 16 MR GREANEY: I'm sure it isn't, sir.  
 17 This is the first report, CT1, submitted to the  
 18 Secretary of State on 19 December 2016, and as we  
 19 identified after the short break we took, the terms of  
 20 reference for CT1 were to examine the role of CT  
 21 commander?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. And to report upon a series of matters; is that correct?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. We don't need to go through those, they're set out at

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1 paragraph 30 of your statement. Was the methodology  
 2 used on that inspection of the role of CT commander one  
 3 that mirrored that of the PEEL inspections?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And did the inspection take place between April and  
 6 September of 2016?  
 7 A. It did.  
 8 Q. Over the page at page 10, did you find — and you were  
 9 responsible for this particular report, were you not?  
 10 A. I was.  
 11 Q. Did you and your team find that the level of  
 12 responsibility ascribed to CT commanders was  
 13 particularly high?  
 14 A. It is.  
 15 Q. And did you conclude that all current CT commanders as  
 16 of that time met a sensible and pragmatic set of role  
 17 requirements?  
 18 A. We did.  
 19 Q. What did you mean by that conclusion?  
 20 A. We were fortunate enough to observe the course that CT  
 21 commanders have to go on before they can take up the  
 22 role. We were also able to interview every CT commander  
 23 who's passed that course and also look at the training  
 24 material. We formed that view that they had been  
 25 through what can best be described as a very rigorous

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1 test of their decision—making to enable them to  
 2 undertake the role.  
 3 Q. And so we can understand what that role is, although we  
 4 did hear about it from Assistant Commissioner Basu last  
 5 week, you have told us already that national  
 6 arrangements exist in England and Wales to counter the  
 7 threat of terrorism and those include that  
 8 chief constables have agreed under certain circumstances  
 9 to cede control of their resources to a police commander  
 10 working on their behalf, namely the SNC?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. Who in turn will appoint one or more counter—terrorism,  
 13 CT, commanders to lead the combined response by police  
 14 and counter—terrorism agencies?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. To return to CT1, having reached those conclusions, did  
 17 your report make four recommendations aimed at improving  
 18 the selection of candidates for the CT commanders  
 19 course?  
 20 A. It did.  
 21 Q. A greater focus on continued professional development  
 22 following completion of the course?  
 23 A. It did.  
 24 Q. Course accreditation?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And to improve awareness of the CT commander across the  
 2 wider policing establishment?  
 3 A. That's right.  
 4 Q. In relation to the latter recommendation, to improve  
 5 awareness of the CT commander across the wider policing  
 6 establishment, what was that recommendation focused  
 7 upon?  
 8 A. If a CT commander is appointed, we took the view that  
 9 those commanders who were already in place for  
 10 a terrorist incident, ranging from the FDO through to  
 11 the Silver commander and maybe the Gold commander,  
 12 should have an understanding of the role and remit of  
 13 the CT commander to enable them to support that  
 14 commander once they are appointed.  
 15 Q. Across the work that you've done personally in this  
 16 area, from CT1 all the way through to CT5, has it been  
 17 apparent to you that it's not just important for those  
 18 at the top of a CT operation to understand what roles  
 19 and responsibilities are but for those at the bottom of  
 20 it also to understand?  
 21 A. Yes, it is. And if I can sort of qualify that,  
 22 responding to a terrorist incident to some may seem like  
 23 a spontaneous firearms incident, we have dealt with  
 24 similar things or we have dealt with serious incidents  
 25 in the past. This is one of those, thankfully, rare

1 occurrences and officers and staff need to perform very  
 2 well, very quickly. So we think it's essential that  
 3 those people in the command chain and those people  
 4 supporting those commanders understand their role  
 5 clearly so they can do the best job they possibly can.  
 6 Q. We're going to move on next to CT2. What we're going to  
 7 do is deal with that in two parts, so first of all  
 8 summarise your overall conclusions from that report and  
 9 then, secondly, we'll look at the matters that were  
 10 specific to Greater Manchester Police.  
 11 In relation to the second part, am I right that you  
 12 looked at the practice and policy across, I think,  
 13 15 forces?  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. And one of those forces was Greater Manchester Police?  
 16 A. It was.  
 17 MR GREANEY: Sir, would that be a convenient time for  
 18 a short break?  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. If we come back at quarter to.  
 20 Thank you.  
 21 (11.27 am)  
 22 (A short break)  
 23 (11.45 am)  
 24 MR GREANEY: Just before we resume the evidence of  
 25 Mr Buchan, can I give you an update about the second

1 witness that we are due to hear from later on today?  
 2 That witness is David Whittle, who is a retired Greater  
 3 Manchester Police officer who had involvement in the GMP  
 4 Operation Plato MTFA plans.  
 5 Just before we started the evidence today, we  
 6 received an email from the GMP solicitor disclosing to  
 7 us an email that had very recently come to her  
 8 attention, and there's no doubt that it had only very  
 9 recently come to her attention and her team's, and  
 10 I will simply read out what we were told:  
 11 "Ahead of the witness David Whittle giving evidence  
 12 to the inquiry this afternoon, his old GMP email account  
 13 was searched for anything that may be relevant to his  
 14 evidence proposal. The below email has been found which  
 15 we consider is relevant as the MTFA joint services  
 16 commander training referred to in the email is contained  
 17 within his EP. It is therefore now disclosed to the  
 18 inquiry for uploading on to Magnum. Unfortunately, the  
 19 date, time and sender details from the top of the email  
 20 chain are missing at present. Work is urgently ongoing  
 21 to clarify these and I will notify you immediately when  
 22 these details are found."  
 23 Can we say, first of all, that although it is  
 24 unfortunate that this has come to light at this stage,  
 25 we are very grateful to the GMP solicitor for attending

1 to it urgently once she became aware of it. The email  
 2 undoubtedly does give rise to some issues of  
 3 significance relating to what was being considered in  
 4 relation to an MTFA within GMP before the arena attack.  
 5 We need to be fully informed before Mr Whittle gives  
 6 evidence about whether this is the full extent of all  
 7 emails touching upon this topic and moreover all core  
 8 participants will need to be fully informed. We are  
 9 considering at the moment whether it is fair to the  
 10 inquiry, fair to core participants and indeed fair to  
 11 Mr Whittle to embark upon his evidence before we are  
 12 fully informed.

13 We have not yet made a decision in relation to that  
 14 and if other core participants who will have received  
 15 the email within the last few minutes have a view about  
 16 it, we would invite them to communicate that view to  
 17 Mr Suter before lunchtime in order that we can make an  
 18 informed decision about that issue.

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Obviously we're grateful to  
 20 have had the disclosure. Any late disclosure always  
 21 induces the worry of whether there is more late  
 22 disclosure which has not been made. Therefore obviously  
 23 we need to make sure that everyone is looking for other  
 24 matters which need to be disclosed. But we'll leave  
 25 that for the moment.

1 Mr Weatherby has come to light, which means I expect  
 2 he wants to say something. Mr Weatherby (overspeaking).  
 3 MR WEATHERBY: Very quickly, it may just short circuit  
 4 something here. The document that's being referred to,  
 5 in the email that Mr Greaney has just referred to,  
 6 appears to be a different iteration of the document that  
 7 we've had disclosed to us. It may be that that needs to  
 8 be looked into. I'm leading for the families and beyond  
 9 that I'd be happy to carry on, but I do think that needs  
 10 to be properly looked into by GMP's solicitors.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you just explain what you mean by  
 12 a different iteration?

13 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. There's a training pack which is  
 14 {INQ019107/1}, which is on the evidence proposal, and  
 15 it's a JESIP north-west armed police and collaboration  
 16 commander training, which took place, partly designed by  
 17 Mr Whittle, in January of 2017 and is quite significant.  
 18 So we have what appears to be the PowerPoint of that,  
 19 the reference I have just given, but the email that's  
 20 just been disclosed to us appears to refer to that  
 21 document, but the page numbers are quite significantly  
 22 different. So it appears that there's a different  
 23 iteration of that document.

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you for that.

25 MR GREANEY: Sir, I don't want to engage in a discussion

1 with Mr Weatherby over the link about this, but as  
 2 I think Mr Weatherby will understand, what we are keen  
 3 to understand is the section of the email headed "Common  
 4 issues being reported through joint organisational  
 5 learning" and the extent to which that fed into the  
 6 training that was given in January of 2017.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you for that, Mr Weatherby,  
 8 your indication is you're able, subject to that being  
 9 explained, what you have referred to as the other  
 10 iteration, you're happy to carry on this afternoon with  
 11 Mr Whittle?

12 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. The document I have just referred to is  
 13 the training that Mr Greaney is talking about.

14 MR GREANEY: That's a very helpful indication by  
 15 Mr Weatherby and we'll look forward to receiving the  
 16 views of others. We entirely agree that whilst we are  
 17 grateful to GMP for providing this disclosure, there  
 18 will need to be an explanation of how this has arisen at  
 19 this stage and an explanation of whether there is any  
 20 further material.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you very much.

22 MR GREANEY: So, Mr Buchan, I'm sorry to have dealt with  
 23 that whilst you were in the witness box. We will now  
 24 return to your evidence.

25 As you will recall, we are now dealing with the

1 Inspectorate's report CT2, "A joint inspection of the  
 2 command and control arrangements and supporting  
 3 infrastructure used by the police forces of England,  
 4 Wales and Scotland in response to a terrorist attack".  
 5 We'll deal with that, as I said, in stages.

6 We did look at this in detail with Mr Thomas, as you  
 7 know, so I'm certainly not going to look through those  
 8 same passages with you, that'd be a waste of time, but  
 9 I will ask that we look at the introduction to it.  
 10 {INQ025071/1}.

11 We can see that this is the report dated  
 12 August 2017, but the content of which was communicated  
 13 to CTPHQ before March.

14 If we go to {INQ025071/4}, please, to a point that  
 15 the chairman picked up on last Wednesday. Can we go to  
 16 the paragraph that's right at the bottom of where  
 17 we are?

18 "Based on media reports of the Operation Plato  
 19 response to the Manchester and London attacks, it is  
 20 plainly evident that the Metropolitan Police Service,  
 21 City of London Police, British Transport Police and  
 22 Greater Manchester Police responded very quickly and  
 23 decisively. The effective coordination of armed and  
 24 unarmed officers in these cases reflects the preparation  
 25 undertaken by these forces to respond. This report

1 recognises that planning alone does not ensure an  
 2 effective response and it explores the preparations for  
 3 command and control, and the supporting infrastructure  
 4 on which a wider group of forces would rely upon if  
 5 faced with a similar event. An MTFA could take place in  
 6 an area where armed resources are less readily available  
 7 or where the nearest armed officers are under the  
 8 control of a national force or a neighbouring local  
 9 force."

10 And I'm sure immediately, Mr Buchan, you'll  
 11 appreciate that I'm going to make the observation,  
 12 without saying anything about the response to the London  
 13 attacks, which are nothing to do with this inquiry, that  
 14 one of the things the inquiry is going to consider is  
 15 whether the Inspectorate was correct to conclude that  
 16 British Transport Police and Greater Manchester Police  
 17 responded very quickly and decisively to the Manchester  
 18 attack.

19 A. I accept that.

20 Q. In CT2 were the Inspectorate particularly interested in  
 21 the plans and preparations of local police forces for  
 22 their response to an MTFA?

23 A. We were.

24 Q. What was the question, I'm at paragraph 39, that the  
 25 Inspectorate was seeking to answer?

1 A. How well prepared the police services in England, Wales  
 2 and Scotland were to respond effectively to a terrorist  
 3 attack.

4 Q. Did the Inspectorate do that by considering two  
 5 statements?

6 A. We did.

7 Q. What were those statements?

8 A. The first is how effective are the command and control  
 9 arrangements covering the initial police response to  
 10 a terrorist attack, including the transfer of that  
 11 command and control from force control rooms to the  
 12 National Counter-terrorism Network.

13 The second point was how well-connected is the force  
 14 command and control infrastructure with the CT Network  
 15 and across the police service?

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind, because I'm going to forget  
 17 to ask this: the work that you did on CT2 pre-dates the  
 18 attack?

19 A. Yes.

20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Within it there is this paragraph  
 21 dealing with the response to the attack.

22 A. So the report drafting certainly went on after the  
 23 attack.

24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But how much investigation were you able  
 25 to do in order to reach that conclusion, which has now

1 been removed --

2 A. Yes.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- about the effective response?

4 A. From the information we knew at the time, we were  
 5 certainly not in a position to examine that in the  
 6 detail that certainly this inquiry has gone into.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, but did you have the opportunity to  
 8 investigate it to the normal level you would in order to  
 9 put in one of your reports? Do you understand what  
 10 I mean?

11 A. I do understand what you mean, sir, and no we didn't.

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So why is that not made clear?

13 A. That's a very good point, sir, I can't answer that.

14 MR GREANEY: Did you know at the time the report was  
 15 finalised that the very problem you had identified  
 16 during the course of your work across the forces, the  
 17 very problem that had been identified at Exercise  
 18 Winchester Accord, namely the overloading of the FDO,  
 19 was something that had happened?

20 A. We weren't, no.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Not just that, you actually refer to the  
 22 effective coordination of armed and unarmed police, and  
 23 one of the matters we're investigating is whether there  
 24 was actually adequate command at the scene of unarmed  
 25 police. And it may be that it's part of GMP's case that

1 actually there wasn't for a particular reason.

2 A. I agree, sir, and obviously it's beyond the terms of  
 3 reference of this inquiry, but we've also mentioned the  
 4 attacks in London as well. I think we were referring  
 5 there to the initial reporting that had come out of  
 6 those incidents and had not applied the same rigour, no  
 7 follow-up, around that statement, so that's something  
 8 that we have done or, one could argue, not done as  
 9 effectively as the rest of the report.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it's not even as if it's a report  
 11 which is going to be made public?

12 A. Absolutely.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, okay.

14 MR GREANEY: So as the chairman has observed, one of the  
 15 issues, critical issues, we're going to be looking at is  
 16 the issue of coordination. You're not here as an  
 17 expert, you're here to give factual evidence about your  
 18 reporting. But I am certain that you will be able to  
 19 confirm from your work of preparing these reports that  
 20 where there is a terrorist incident, whether  
 21 Operation Plato is engaged or not, coordination between  
 22 the emergency services is critical?

23 A. Absolutely critical.

24 Q. And just to pick up secondly, before we return to your  
 25 statement, the issue of armed and unarmed assets at the

1 scene, obviously where there is a response to  
 2 a terrorist incident it will be very common that there  
 3 are officers falling into those two different  
 4 categories.  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. And you did hear the evidence of Richard Thomas on  
 7 Wednesday and, in fact in answer to the chairman's  
 8 questions, he was asked who at the scene should be in  
 9 command of the armed and unarmed assets, unarmed in  
 10 particular, and his response was: it could be a person  
 11 falling into a number of different descriptions but what  
 12 is important is that the person who has that command  
 13 should understand he or she has that command. Would you  
 14 agree with that?  
 15 A. Absolutely agree with that, yes.  
 16 Q. The chairman established with you that the fieldwork  
 17 that you undertook concluded before the arena attack and  
 18 indeed was that work conducted between October 2016 and  
 19 March 2017?  
 20 A. For the report, yes.  
 21 Q. Did the methodology that was adopted for CT2 comprise  
 22 three elements? I'm at paragraph 40 of your statement.  
 23 A. Yes, it did.  
 24 Q. What was the first of those three elements, please?  
 25 A. A review of any relevant national and local

1 documentation.  
 2 Q. Did you review almost 300 documents in total?  
 3 A. We did.  
 4 Q. Had those been provided by each of the forces that you  
 5 inspected, including GMP?  
 6 A. They did.  
 7 Q. Consisting of their Plato plans, briefing papers,  
 8 PowerPoint presentations and training material?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Did you also review national guidance?  
 11 A. We did.  
 12 Q. Including, no doubt, the first MTFA guidance of what was  
 13 then ACPO TAM in 2012 relating to MTFAs?  
 14 A. We did.  
 15 Q. That was the first aspect of the methodology. The  
 16 second was? Paragraph 41.  
 17 A. We visited control rooms in each force and sought to  
 18 undertake a test of their arrangements.  
 19 Q. So was this the way in which you identified that some  
 20 forces had action cards in place for a response to  
 21 a Plato attack?  
 22 A. Yes, and through some of the interviews we conducted  
 23 with those staff as well.  
 24 Q. The third element of your methodology was?  
 25 A. We designed a common question set that we asked specific

1 people from each force through interview or focus group.  
 2 Q. And as you identified earlier, did you interview those  
 3 who seemed best placed to assist you with your work?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Including policy leads?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Subject matter experts?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And randomly selected officers or civilians who would be  
 10 expected to be involved in the initial response to  
 11 a terrorist attack?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. I'm at paragraph 44. What were the core questions that  
 14 you were asking those you interviewed?  
 15 A. We were particularly keen to identify what protocols and  
 16 processes the force had in place to deal with or manage  
 17 an MTFA, how prepared the force was for that initial  
 18 response, what has the force done to ensure  
 19 understanding, learning and sharing of best practice is  
 20 circulated, and how well does the force work with  
 21 others, other forces, forces in the region and the  
 22 CT Network.  
 23 Q. Did you make a series of recommendations?  
 24 A. Yes, we made ten.  
 25 Q. The purpose of those recommendations was?

1 A. To improve the performance of police in their management  
 2 of a Plato incident.  
 3 Q. Did your review of the national guidance issued to  
 4 forces form the basis for a number of your  
 5 recommendations?  
 6 A. It did.  
 7 Q. That guidance, so it's the guidance that we've called  
 8 the 2012 guidance, did it, paragraph 47, have, in the  
 9 view of the Inspectorate, three areas of omission?  
 10 A. It did.  
 11 Q. What were those?  
 12 A. First of all, that was about what advice should be given  
 13 or the lack of advice within the guidance to unarmed  
 14 officers who will invariably form the initial response  
 15 to a terrorist incident. The arrangements for armed  
 16 response officers to receive footage and images of the  
 17 incident, particularly those collected by the public.  
 18 And the arrangements for joint working with armed  
 19 officers from Home Office forces working alongside those  
 20 from national forces, and I alluded to those earlier on,  
 21 but in particular the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the  
 22 Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport  
 23 Police.  
 24 Q. We discussed earlier that one of the issues that was  
 25 apparent to the Inspectorate was a problem with the FDO



1 so I'm going to ask that we put on the screen the part  
 2 of your report that addressed directly this issue. It's  
 3 {INQ025071/29}. The bottom half of that page, please.  
 4 It's the heading "Force incident managers". It  
 5 reads:  
 6 "Force incident managers in local forces play  
 7 a particularly important role in the initial response to  
 8 a Plato incident, as they must declare the Plato  
 9 incident and command the initial response."  
 10 And had that been recognised for a number of years  
 11 before your report, the importance of that role?  
 12 A. Yes, it had.  
 13 Q. "Only the police can declare a Plato incident, which is  
 14 designed to trigger a specific response from the other  
 15 emergency services."  
 16 A. That's correct.  
 17 Q. So again, emphasising that this is important not only  
 18 for the police but also for the Fire and Rescue Service  
 19 and the Ambulance Service?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. "The declaration of a Plato incident will prompt  
 22 a three-way conference call between commanders in the  
 23 emergency service control rooms. This call is intended  
 24 to help develop a common understanding of the incident  
 25 and agree initial actions for a joint response that

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1 saves lives."  
 2 A. Yes, it does.  
 3 Q. So the result of the Inspectorate's understanding and  
 4 work was that the whole purpose of a joint response was  
 5 to save lives?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. And the Inspectorate added:  
 8 "We tested the arrangements for making such a  
 9 conference call in all the local forces we visited and  
 10 are satisfied that in all cases this call would be  
 11 made."  
 12 A. Absolutely.  
 13 Q. So what did you mean by that?  
 14 A. That the call could physically be made, so when we  
 15 tested in control rooms we asked them to show us how  
 16 that call would be made and the inference is we asked  
 17 them to make it.  
 18 Q. "The response to a Plato incident will be led by  
 19 the police who are responsible for identifying, locating  
 20 and confronting the threat. The police also have  
 21 responsibility for coordinating the multi-agency  
 22 response. All emergency services will be located  
 23 together at or near the scene to undertake a joint risk  
 24 assessment and determine a coordinated response to treat  
 25 casualties and save life."

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1 A. Correct.  
 2 Q. Again, was it the result of the Inspectorate's fieldwork  
 3 that there was an understanding across forces, including  
 4 within GMP, that all emergency services should be  
 5 located together at or near the scene?  
 6 A. A forward control point, yes.  
 7 Q. The report continues:  
 8 "All the force incident managers we spoke to  
 9 described receiving Plato updates through their firearms  
 10 command continuous development programme. However, the  
 11 majority said they felt ill-equipped for the critical  
 12 role they would perform in a Plato incident and needed  
 13 more training, guidance and exposure to Plato  
 14 exercises."  
 15 A. Correct.  
 16 Q. "This point was illustrated by one force incident  
 17 manager who said, 'I get 2 days on how to command  
 18 a vehicle pursuit and approximately 1 to 2 hours in  
 19 MTFA.'"  
 20 And the Inspectorate concluded:  
 21 "We think that there is a balance to be struck  
 22 between preparing for the most likely incident and for  
 23 the most demanding incident."  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And then the final paragraph dealing with this issue:

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1 "The force incident manager may retain command of  
 2 a Plato incident for a significant period of time.  
 3 During our fieldwork we interviewed some specialist  
 4 tactical firearms commanders who would take command from  
 5 the force incident manager. It was surprising that the  
 6 force incident managers we spoke to had not received  
 7 this specialist additional training."  
 8 So we're seeing, am I correct, the identification by  
 9 the Inspectorate of what you've told us about, namely  
 10 that it was recognised across your work that there was  
 11 a problem with the FDO or might be?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. We're going to hear from the policing experts in due  
 14 course that the FDO was, potentially at least, a single  
 15 point of failure in the response to an Operation Plato  
 16 incident. Do you have any comment upon that based on  
 17 your work?  
 18 A. I think a lot of the training that an FDO receives,  
 19 particularly in these circumstances, is focused on their  
 20 role as a TFC, a tactical firearms commander, but as  
 21 we've seen, and we'll probably explore later on, there's  
 22 an awful lot more to doing the FDO role, an awful lot  
 23 more responsibility than just dealing with the tactical  
 24 firearms command. That's what we were certainly  
 25 pointing out, that more needs to be done to help them

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1 manage those situations where the demand is incredibly  
 2 high.  
 3 Q. We understand already that the FDO will also have this  
 4 role as ITFC, as it's described, initial tactical  
 5 firearms commander.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Is it inevitable that the FDO should also have that role  
 8 in responding to a terrorist incident?  
 9 A. Certainly from our fieldwork we found that all the FDOs  
 10 around the country were tactical firearms commanders, so  
 11 they would be the first person qualified to take command  
 12 of the police assets to respond, police officers to  
 13 respond to a terrorist attack, be they armed or unarmed.  
 14 Q. Is it, in your view, based upon your work, a problem  
 15 that the FIM or FDO also has that role as ITFC?  
 16 A. A problem -- I think it's probably the right place to  
 17 have it because that's the person who's on call who's  
 18 working 24 hours a day. So it seems to me to be the  
 19 right place to hold that responsibility. But when you  
 20 add on all the other ancillary duties and tasks that  
 21 an FDO will have to oversee, be responsible for, in  
 22 those initial few hours of a terrorist attack, that  
 23 seems an awful lot of work, an awful lot of  
 24 responsibility on one individual.  
 25 Q. So is this a fair way of putting the point: that it

1 makes good sense for the FDO to be the ITFC because they  
 2 have command in the initial stages, but what needs to be  
 3 achieved is a situation in which the burden upon them is  
 4 relieved or assisted?  
 5 A. Correct.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I want to raise a slightly different  
 7 point and it was something which was raised with  
 8 Mr Thomas and if you are not the right person to ask  
 9 this of, please say so.  
 10 What happened here and could well happen in this  
 11 sort of incident is after the explosion, the bomb went  
 12 off, members of the public started to do what they could  
 13 to help those who were injured actually in the  
 14 City Room. A paramedic arrived and started to do what  
 15 he could do as well to help members of the public.  
 16 The effect of declaring Plato is that the City Room  
 17 becomes a hot zone, so everyone has to be cleared out of  
 18 there, which would include, presumably, members of the  
 19 public who are assisting the injured and the dying, and  
 20 the one paramedic. That's what the rules at present  
 21 say; is that correct as you understand them?  
 22 A. As I understand them, yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there is no discretion to the FDO to  
 24 say, "In this circumstance I think it is better you stay  
 25 where you are"?

1 A. Yes, I can see your point, sir.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And if not, should there be  
 3 a discretion? By all means think about it. I do not  
 4 want an answer which takes you by surprise, so  
 5 absolutely think about it and respond to me in writing  
 6 if you wish to do so. I don't want an off-the-cuff  
 7 answer without an opportunity for you to think about it,  
 8 basically.  
 9 A. Yes, I'll do that.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: By all means, please do.  
 11 MR GREANEY: Let's just deal with some of the other things  
 12 that your work picked up on, and we're still dealing  
 13 with CT2.  
 14 So far as the force incident manager or FDO is  
 15 concerned, you found that there was a lack of specific  
 16 guidance relating to the unique demands of a Plato  
 17 incident; is that correct?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. And also that there was a lack of specific guidance  
 20 in relation to such an incident for unarmed patrol  
 21 officers and control room staff?  
 22 A. A lack of detailed guidance, yes.  
 23 Q. You found that forces had different interpretations of  
 24 the purpose of a Plato plan?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Which was illustrated by the variation in the scale and  
 2 content that you found across the documents that you  
 3 reviewed?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. As we heard from Mr Thomas last week, the shortest plan  
 6 that you examined was 16 pages, whereas the longest was  
 7 225 pages in two volumes, not including appendices?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. And you were concerned to find that plans had different  
 10 strategic aims, some of which were focused on managing  
 11 extreme threats or critical incidents in general rather  
 12 than a clearly defined response to a Plato incident?  
 13 A. That's right.  
 14 Q. Was this the idea, that a Plato incident is something  
 15 different and extraordinary but some of the plans dealt  
 16 with serious incidents more generally including Plato  
 17 incidents?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. In short therefore did you find that there was little  
 20 consistency in the content of plans?  
 21 A. That's right.  
 22 Q. Even those produced by neighbouring local forces with  
 23 shared firearms commanders?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. Was that obviously capable of having an adverse effect

1 on the ability of forces to work together?  
 2 A. Certainly where their plans don't dovetail, the natural  
 3 conclusion to that is it could cause challenges.  
 4 Q. Among those ten recommendations that were made was one  
 5 that the NPCC lead for counter-terrorism should examine  
 6 the arrangements in control rooms that support the FDO?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. That's what I want to ask you about, the general  
 9 findings of CT2. Can we turn next, please, page 14,  
 10 from paragraph 59, to deal with the specific findings  
 11 in relation to Greater Manchester Police.  
 12 In general what did the Inspectorate find so far as  
 13 the command and control arrangements were concerned?  
 14 A. We found and spoke to a number of commanders, both at  
 15 Bronze, Silver and Gold level, and found them to be very  
 16 experienced, which is probably not surprising from  
 17 people working in a very busy metropolitan force like  
 18 Manchester. So we found commanders to be good and  
 19 understood what they were seeking to achieve when it  
 20 came to a terrorist attack.  
 21 As with other forces, we found that specialists,  
 22 including firearms officers and those firearms  
 23 commanders, really did understand their role and the  
 24 tactics that were available to them. But there is  
 25 an issue, we found, and GMP was by no means the only

1 force, that that level of investment and that level of  
 2 thinking had not been translated to the unarmed  
 3 officers, who we have seen are the first response to  
 4 a terrorist attack.  
 5 Q. So did you believe that GMP could do more to raise the  
 6 level of understanding amongst its unarmed police  
 7 officers?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And also the level of understanding of control room  
 10 staff?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And by level of understanding, are we talking about an  
 13 understanding of GMP's plans to respond to a terrorist  
 14 attack?  
 15 A. Yes, and specifically their role in those plans.  
 16 Q. Why is it important that unarmed staff and control room  
 17 staff should understand how a force proposed to respond  
 18 to such an attack?  
 19 A. There's two points I'd like to make. First of all,  
 20 a busy force like Manchester will have experience of  
 21 dealing with some very critical incidents, but we  
 22 believed that a terrorist attack does present some  
 23 unique challenges, not least of which the national  
 24 impact and national resources that can be brought to  
 25 bear on it. So one doesn't develop a muscle memory to

1 deal with a terrorist attack, because, as we discussed  
 2 earlier on, they are thankfully rare and so staff need  
 3 to understand their position in a plan and know it and  
 4 be able to undertake it quickly and accurately because  
 5 terrorist attacks invariably involve determination to,  
 6 unfortunately, kill as many as people as quickly as  
 7 possible, therefore individuals need to understand what  
 8 it is they're doing and undertake those roles accurately  
 9 and quickly, hence the need for people to understand  
 10 their role.  
 11 Q. So GMP, unfortunately over the years, and in the years  
 12 before May 2017, had had to deal with many firearms  
 13 incidents?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. One of the incidents, series of incidents, that a number  
 16 of those that you spoke to referred to concerned  
 17 Dale Cregan and the terrible crimes that he committed?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. And they were making the point, these officers: well, we  
 20 do have experience of dealing with firearms incidents.  
 21 Is the point that you're making that obviously  
 22 experience will be generated by dealing with such  
 23 incidents, but a terrorist incident is different in  
 24 nature?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. That those who are required to respond to it will not  
 2 have, as you put it, muscle memory for how to deal with  
 3 that incident?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. So they won't have the instinctive ability to or may not  
 6 have the instinctive ability to deal with it?  
 7 A. They may not.  
 8 Q. So that's why there needs to be a plan in place?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. That is clear on its face?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. That has been communicated to all staff, whether police  
 13 or civilian, armed or unarmed, who will have a role to  
 14 play?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And that is understood by them?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Against that background you told us earlier about the  
 19 three elements to the methodology that were adopted, so  
 20 we'll just look at what was revealed, and we're still  
 21 dealing with GMP.  
 22 Did you receive and review GMP's Operation Plato  
 23 plan?  
 24 A. We did.  
 25 Q. Was the plan locally referred to -- and Mr Whittle will

1 tell us more about this. Was that plan referred to  
 2 locally as "The specialist operations branch firearms  
 3 standard operating procedure 47 for a marauding  
 4 terrorist firearms attack (Operation Plato)"?  
 5 A. It was.  
 6 Q. Did you understand that that standard operating  
 7 procedure, 47, had been regularly reviewed?  
 8 A. That's our understanding.  
 9 Q. I'm at paragraph 62 of your statement. Did you examine  
 10 version 5 that had been updated in October 2016?  
 11 A. We did.  
 12 Q. We'll look at just a short part of it in a moment, but  
 13 you looked at version 5, so does it follow that that's  
 14 the version that you were supplied with by GMP?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. What was your judgement about that standard operating  
 17 procedure 47?  
 18 A. It was very tactically focused, particularly on the  
 19 roles and responsibilities of armed officers and  
 20 firearms commanders. It did not go into detail about  
 21 working with other agencies. There was only bullet  
 22 point reference to the joint emergency service  
 23 interoperability principles, JESIP, ie working with  
 24 other agencies. Although the plan included some of the  
 25 Stay Safe guidance, which unarmed officers are

1 encouraged to follow, there's no detail around who would  
 2 communicate that, what that actually looked like on the  
 3 ground, what work had been done to try and equip  
 4 officers to stay safe whilst undertaking whatever role  
 5 they were asked to do.  
 6 Q. I'm going to come to the FDO in just one moment, but  
 7 version 5, very tactical and focused on the roles,  
 8 responsibilities and tactics of armed officers and  
 9 firearms commanders?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. No mention of working with other agencies and only  
 12 bullet point references to JESIP?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And although the plan included the Stay Safe guidance  
 15 that Richard Thomas explained to us, it didn't identify  
 16 how that would be communicated to those who actually had  
 17 to respond to a terrorist attack?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. In relation to the role of the FDO, did the plan  
 20 recognise the extreme workload that was likely to be  
 21 experienced by the person with that responsibility?  
 22 A. It did.  
 23 Q. I hope I have this reference correct. The plan that you  
 24 examined, I think, is {INQ039970/1}. Can we go to  
 25 {INQ039970/6}, please, where I hope we'll find the FDO

1 role described.  
 2 Towards the bottom of that page:  
 3 "Force duty officer actions. The actions of the  
 4 force duty officer in the initial stages of a marauding  
 5 terrorist attack are crucial. The following actions are  
 6 not exhaustive and the FDO will need strong support from  
 7 the OCB team."  
 8 OCB being?  
 9 A. Operations command branch.  
 10 Q. You seem a little uncertain about that, which is no  
 11 criticism. We'll just check that in the break:  
 12 "Some of the actions are likely to be delegated to  
 13 OCB supervision."  
 14 So this appears to be acknowledging, am I right, the  
 15 very point you're making: there's a lot to be expected  
 16 of the FDO so some actions will need to be delegated to  
 17 others?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. "FDO actions include the declaration of Operation Plato.  
 20 Personnel from any service may report a suspected  
 21 marauding terrorist firearms attack, however it is the  
 22 FDO's responsibility to formally declare such an attack  
 23 and initiate the multi-agency response and set the  
 24 initial working strategy."  
 25 Then over the page {INQ039970/7}, please.

1 If we scroll down, I won't read out all of them, we can  
 2 see a very long list of actions required of the FDO.  
 3 Scroll down a little, please, Mr Lopez.  
 4 Your phrase, as I have said already, is that the  
 5 plan recognises the "extreme workload that is likely to  
 6 be experienced by the FDO"?  
 7 A. It does.  
 8 Q. In the view of the Inspectorate, did the plan identify  
 9 how the FDO was to be supported during that period of  
 10 very high demand?  
 11 A. It did not.  
 12 Q. So I'm now at paragraph 64. What was the view of the  
 13 FDO therefore?  
 14 A. GMP had placed an over-reliance on the FDO to lead their  
 15 response to a terrorist attack.  
 16 Q. Was it the view of the Inspectorate that GMP needed to  
 17 provide more support to the FDO, allowing that person to  
 18 focus on commanding the initial response?  
 19 A. That's correct.  
 20 Q. I'm going to ask that we put on the screen a document  
 21 that sets out the review that was conducted by the  
 22 Inspectorate of that plan. We'll just look at three  
 23 entries within it. The reference is {INQ008345/1}.  
 24 Could you just, first of all, tell us what we're  
 25 looking at on the screen here, please?

1 A. What we have is — we devised a standard set of  
 2 questions that the person reviewing the Plato document  
 3 would consider and seek to form a view on as they  
 4 examined the document. This is the evidence—gathering  
 5 template — we call it an EGT, obviously — where we  
 6 record the evidence that we've found.  
 7 Q. As I said, we'll pick out three entries that are or may  
 8 be of particular relevance to the work of the inquiry.  
 9 Role 4, first of all. Is John Bunn, who is there  
 10 named, the person who's carrying out the review?  
 11 A. He is.  
 12 Q. It reads:  
 13 "No joint working of the emergency services in the  
 14 force plan. There are two mentions quoting joint  
 15 operating procedures for the emergency services  
 16 edition 2. Both mentions are bullet points referencing  
 17 the title that add no substance or narrative as to what  
 18 might be the role of the relevant parties. There is no  
 19 flow chart or explanation of joint working within the  
 20 hot/warm zones."  
 21 And the hot/warm zones are obviously a reference to  
 22 the zoning that will occur or may occur after the  
 23 declaration of Operation Plato?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's a reference to JOPs. You

1 included when you said a reference to JESIP as being the  
 2 bullet points. Are we treating them as interchangeable?  
 3 A. The joint operating procedures are — they're  
 4 interchangeable here, but no, the joint operating  
 5 procedures, as I understood it, was the three-way call  
 6 and for the three services to get together to (a) get  
 7 a clear picture and (b) identify how they're going to  
 8 tackle it, including the declaration of zones.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So should we be regarding — the  
 10 reference to JOPs there should properly be a reference  
 11 to JESIP?  
 12 A. JESIP, yes, sir.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Thank you, sir.  
 14 {INQ008345/2}, please, row 7:  
 15 "Yes, there is evidence of this in the force plan.  
 16 The FCR is the force duty officer. The evidence  
 17 indicates that the FDO is expected to control the early  
 18 stages of a Plato and to call out and inform various  
 19 roles, ranks and units. The evidence is set out in  
 20 bullet points with no narrative."  
 21 That must be a reference to what we just looked at:  
 22 "The number of tasks the FDO is expected to perform  
 23 in all likelihood are so many that it may be that some  
 24 will not be completed or at least not in the order  
 25 expected, which is acknowledged in the force plan. One

1 point the force plan makes is the pressure the FDO is  
 2 going to be under, including transfer of command to  
 3 a cadre tactical firearms commander. This is raised in  
 4 a paragraph as 'will bring its own challenges' but there  
 5 is no resolution to this question and it is left  
 6 unresolved."  
 7 And then in the final column:  
 8 "Such apparent vagueness may cause confusion or  
 9 doubt in a live scenario. There is a need to provide  
 10 the FDO with more immediate support or resources to  
 11 assist with all the functions expected of that role."  
 12 A. Correct.  
 13 Q. So that we're clear, as I'm sure we're all now very  
 14 clear about it, the problem with the FDO potentially  
 15 being overburdened was something you identified across  
 16 your work but was most certainly something you  
 17 specifically identified within GMP?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And would identify in the debrief that  
 20 you did to them?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We were living under a threat level  
 23 which was severe at the time.  
 24 A. Correct.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you have conveyed in your debrief

1 the urgent need for something to be done about this  
 2 problem?  
 3 A. That's why we were having the hot debrief, sir, to  
 4 highlight those issues that the force should take  
 5 cognisance of as soon as possible.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 7 MR GREANEY: Just one final row. {INQ008345/5}, Mr Lopez,  
 8 row 24.  
 9 Mr Bunn has observed:  
 10 "A force Plato plan that lacks details and relevant  
 11 information and is very tactical, dealing in large part  
 12 with the armed roles of ARVs, OFCs, TFC cadre, SFCs and  
 13 the FDO initial response to a possible Plato by first  
 14 responders, unarmed, is a gap that requires to be  
 15 covered. There is no question that the FDO is being  
 16 overloaded with tasks in the initial stages of  
 17 a potential Plato and will require urgent help. No  
 18 referencing to imaging transfer. No specific reference  
 19 to the initial information/intelligence gathering within  
 20 the FCP."  
 21 So no doubt from what you have said this is  
 22 something that was being communicated to the CT lead  
 23 within GMP at the back-end of 2016 and there is no  
 24 question that the FDO is being overburdened with tasks  
 25 in the initial stages of a potential Plato and will

1 require urgent help?  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. Thank you, Mr Lopez, we can take that from the screen.  
 4 Just carrying on with the work that was done within  
 5 GMP specifically, what does the term "contingency  
 6 planners" mean?  
 7 A. This is an interview that GMP asked us or invited us to  
 8 undertake. It's a group within the force who work with  
 9 local authority planners to produce plans that enable  
 10 agencies to respond in the best way they can to  
 11 a terrorist attack.  
 12 Q. Did you conduct an interview with an officer from GMP's  
 13 civil contingencies and resilience unit, the CCRU?  
 14 A. We did.  
 15 Q. And also in fact from a member of the CCRU of  
 16 the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities?  
 17 A. Yes, we did.  
 18 Q. What did you find?  
 19 A. First of all that there seemed to be a fair amount of  
 20 join-up between the force and local authorities, of  
 21 which there are a number of in the GMP area. We found  
 22 that they were responsible -- the unit was responsible  
 23 for the development of training and exercising  
 24 throughout GMP and that the force had delivered a number  
 25 of CT exercises, and you've referred to one recently,

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1 Winchester Accord.  
 2 Q. During the course of your work, did you discover that,  
 3 among other exercises, Exercise Winchester Accord had  
 4 been undertaken during 2016?  
 5 A. That's correct, yes, together with a series of exercises  
 6 at the airport.  
 7 Q. Can we have on the screen, Mr Lopez, {INQ008360/1},  
 8 please.  
 9 Is this a document produced by the Inspectorate?  
 10 A. It is.  
 11 Q. What is it, please?  
 12 A. It's part of the evidence--gathering template and these  
 13 are the questions, suggested questions, we use once  
 14 we're interviewing or conducting focus groups with  
 15 people.  
 16 Q. Could we go to {INQ008360/4}, please. And could we  
 17 enlarge, please, the bottom half of that screen,  
 18 I think.  
 19 We can see row 6:  
 20 "GMP has recently conducted a multi-agency  
 21 MTFA-related exercise, Operation Winchester Accord."  
 22 It carries on a little later down:  
 23 "Exercising with partners provides an opportunity  
 24 for the force and its partners to identify where  
 25 improvements in planning are needed."

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1 Then the next box down:  
 2 "GMP has recently tested force control room staff  
 3 regarding their response to an MTFA. In Operation  
 4 Winchester Accord the force tested its control room  
 5 staff by tasking unarmed officers to call up and  
 6 volunteer to respond to the incident. In all cases  
 7 dispatchers told them not to deploy but to wait until it  
 8 had been established if it was safe to do so. As such  
 9 the exercise umpires determined that the control room  
 10 function had been delivered appropriately in this  
 11 exercise."  
 12 So against that background, and I'm not suggesting  
 13 there may not be other rows that are relevant, what did  
 14 the Inspectorate understand Exercise Winchester Accord  
 15 had revealed?  
 16 A. Winchester Accord had tested the response to a terrorist  
 17 attack in a shopping centre and, on the basis of this  
 18 entry, it would appear that that exercise had tested  
 19 unarmed officers through calls and also the control room  
 20 staff. That was from the contingency planners, but we  
 21 then went on to get evidence from control room staff  
 22 themselves that pointed to the fact their role had been  
 23 to man the Silver suite as opposed to necessarily  
 24 undertake their control room functions.  
 25 Q. Just to complete the picture in relation to exercising,

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1 did the Inspectorate discover that GMP, as a large  
 2 metropolitan force, had a great deal of experience in  
 3 dealing with major and critical incidents?  
 4 A. We did.  
 5 Q. And that in preparing for a terrorist attack, it relied  
 6 upon that experience?  
 7 A. It did.  
 8 Q. From what you've said to us already, would it be  
 9 reasonable to say that there are some dangers in relying  
 10 upon such experience in preparing for that eventuality?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. I'm at paragraph 69. Did the Inspectorate conclude that  
 13 more needed to be done by GMP to address some of the  
 14 challenges that a terrorist attack would present?  
 15 A. We did.  
 16 Q. Particularly in preparing its control room staff and  
 17 unarmed initial responders?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. Did the Inspectorate also carry out something that was  
 20 described as a force control room reality check?  
 21 A. We did.  
 22 Q. What did that involve?  
 23 A. We first look at their plans, how the GMP would use its  
 24 command and control arrangements to conduct their  
 25 response. We then go and test that by talking to people

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1 within the control room and particularly access to the  
 2 information, which we've described in my statement at  
 3 71, around how they would access what it is they needed  
 4 to do and when they needed to do it.  
 5 Q. Yes. When you did that work, what was the finding?  
 6 A. There were arrangements on the computer system through  
 7 drop-down messages for the completion of a number of  
 8 actions but these weren't allocated to any one  
 9 particular individual. There were contingencies in  
 10 place should the computer system fail and these were two  
 11 stand-alone laptop computers that -- one wasn't  
 12 available and the other one was not functioning at the  
 13 time.  
 14 Q. Were you shown numerous documents stored and in fact  
 15 readily available in a locked cabinet that might be used  
 16 to assist control room staff?  
 17 A. Yes. Staff referred to a number of documents that they  
 18 would access to help them try to respond, but the point  
 19 is there are a number of documents, as opposed to  
 20 something straightforward and clear that they could  
 21 follow.  
 22 Q. So was the view of the Inspectorate that having numerous  
 23 documents was less than ideal and that what there ought  
 24 to have been in place was an identifiable  
 25 counter-terrorism plan to which the staff could readily

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1 refer?  
 2 A. Certainly a clearly labelled plan would be beneficial  
 3 and supported by a means of making that plan deliverable  
 4 and we discussed earlier on about action cards, which is  
 5 one way some forces had identified as helping them get  
 6 the right things done in the right order at the right  
 7 time.  
 8 Q. We've spoken about patrol officers already. By patrol  
 9 officers should we understand that we're referring to  
 10 unarmed officers?  
 11 A. They would be unarmed officers on patrol at any one time  
 12 in an area.  
 13 Q. The Inspectorate, as you've told us, were concerned to  
 14 know whether unarmed officers understood what their  
 15 roles and responsibilities were in the event of  
 16 a terrorist attack.  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. So was evidence obtained by the Inspectorate from  
 19 a focus group comprised of front line uniformed patrol  
 20 officers in GMP?  
 21 A. It was.  
 22 Q. I'm now at paragraph 74. What was the principal finding  
 23 from the work of that focus group?  
 24 A. Basically none of the officers were aware of the plans  
 25 GMP had in place to respond to a terrorist attack.

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1 However, when pushed, going back to what they would  
 2 normally do, they would make their best endeavours in  
 3 terms of cordoning and helping people try to supply  
 4 information back to the control room to assist  
 5 commanders.  
 6 Q. The way in which you put it in your statement was, as  
 7 you've just told us:  
 8 "None of the officers in the group were aware of the  
 9 force plans to respond to a terrorist attack..."  
 10 And you added:  
 11 "... or where they might access them."  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. Some of the group were aware of the Stay Safe  
 14 principles?  
 15 A. They were.  
 16 Q. And thought that in an attack their role would be to  
 17 cordon the incident and assist members of the public to  
 18 evacuate?  
 19 A. That's right.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But they wouldn't know the details of  
 21 Operation Plato and the hot, warm and cool zones?  
 22 A. That's correct, sir, they wouldn't or they didn't.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 24 MR GREANEY: As a result of the discussion with the members  
 25 of that focus group, did it seem that the members of it

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1 were prepared to respond effectively to a terrorist  
 2 incident? I'm at paragraph 75.  
 3 A. Yes, they would respond, but none of them felt they knew  
 4 what they had to do in responding.  
 5 Q. Was it the position that the focus group identified that  
 6 no training had been given to unarmed staff beyond some  
 7 online training?  
 8 A. That's right, yes.  
 9 Q. And that those interviewed felt that that was  
 10 inadequate?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And no member of that focus group had participated in  
 13 a counter-terrorism exercise?  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. The way you put it is:  
 16 "The group had a clear understanding of how a  
 17 response would be commanded and felt it would run along  
 18 the same lines that the force used for any spontaneous  
 19 firearms incident."  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. So without suggesting any fault on the part of those  
 22 officers, there was a lack of appreciation of the  
 23 difference you've told us about between a firearms  
 24 incident, even a serious one, and a terrorist incident?  
 25 A. That's right.

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1 Q. Paragraph 77. What therefore did the Inspectorate  
 2 conclude?  
 3 A. Like other forces, we believed that GMP needed to do  
 4 more to prepare staff who are undoubtedly going to be  
 5 the initial officers at the scene of a terrorist attack  
 6 to work effectively and make the best job they possibly  
 7 can in very trying circumstances.  
 8 Q. The next group of officers who would be expected to  
 9 respond to a terrorist attack, OFCs or operational  
 10 firearms commanders. Again, was evidence obtained by  
 11 the Inspectorate from a focus group of police constables  
 12 and sergeants who had been accredited as OFCs?  
 13 A. There was.  
 14 Q. Paragraph 79. What did the Inspectorate find in that  
 15 regard?  
 16 A. We found a good level of understanding of firearms  
 17 officers who were trained to act as OFCs around the  
 18 contingency plans and how they would deal with  
 19 a terrorist attack.  
 20 Q. So that is obviously on the positive side. Did the  
 21 group, however, also identify something not so positive  
 22 in relation to training?  
 23 A. Yes. They believed they needed more of it and of  
 24 a better quality.  
 25 Q. Moreover, did it appear from the focus group work that

1 there was no training to ensure armed and unarmed  
 2 officers were able to work together effectively?  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. Next group, tactical firearms commanders. Was evidence  
 5 obtained by the Inspectorate during focus group work  
 6 with the group comprised of two superintendents and two  
 7 chief inspectors who undertook the role of tactical  
 8 firearms commander, or TFC, in GMP?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. I'm now at paragraph 82. What did the work of that  
 11 focus group identify for the Inspectorate?  
 12 A. That those people we spoke to had a good understanding  
 13 of GMP's arrangements and planning for dealing with  
 14 a terrorist attack.  
 15 Q. Did all have ready access to the plans?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And understand the command and control arrangements that  
 18 would be used to lead the police response once  
 19 Operation Plato had been declared?  
 20 A. They did.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did the tactical commanders include the  
 22 ground-assigned tactical firearms commander?  
 23 A. Those undertaking the tactical firearms commander role  
 24 would take on either ground assigned or work to take  
 25 over from the FDO. I guess which one they did depended

1 on the duties they were doing at the time.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wondered whether what you were  
 3 doing was looking into the ground assigned as well as  
 4 those who would be based at headquarters or anything  
 5 like that.  
 6 A. We took that as a generic TFC so we would have expected  
 7 people would have undertaken both roles.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would that training -- you may not know  
 9 this, but did they have a good understanding, those who  
 10 were doing a ground-assigned job, of what their duties  
 11 were in relation to unarmed as well as armed? If you  
 12 can't answer that --  
 13 A. No, I can't answer that, sir. I would make a summation,  
 14 but I can't answer that from the evidence we captured.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you.  
 16 MR GREANEY: You might be able to say a little about  
 17 training -- I'm at paragraphs 83 and 84 -- because the  
 18 focus group comprised of TFCs were able to inform the  
 19 Inspectorate that they had completed several CT  
 20 exercises over the previous couple of years.  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 Q. Including, of course, Exercise Winchester Accord.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Then paragraph 84. What did that focus group identify  
 25 in relation to training?

1 A. Again, limitations. More training was needed to better  
 2 equip them with the skills they needed to mount what  
 3 would be the first armed officers at the scene.  
 4 Q. But it would be fair to say that notwithstanding that,  
 5 that group was confident that GMP could mount an  
 6 effective response to a terrorist attack?  
 7 A. Yes, they were confident.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But none of the exercises that they had  
 9 done would have involved using unarmed as well as armed  
 10 police?  
 11 A. You're right, sir. At the time, exercising focused on  
 12 deploying armed officers as quickly as possible and how  
 13 the force can support that and get them directed.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not necessarily saying it's wrong,  
 15 just something one has to look at.  
 16 A. In some respects if you look at the key aims to locate,  
 17 identify and neutralise, that is going to be done by  
 18 armed police officers and, without wishing to sound  
 19 crude, the more of them you can get there as quickly as  
 20 you can, the better. I think that's where exercising  
 21 was focused at the time.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the general impression I have so  
 23 far, which could change, is that actually getting enough  
 24 there quickly did actually occur on 22 May.  
 25 A. As I understand, but not from our inspection reports,



1 but --  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That proves like exercising like that  
 3 does work.  
 4 A. Yes, and it's that ability for -- as we have seen from  
 5 recent terrorist attacks, unarmed officers will be the  
 6 first people there, and how well do unarmed officers  
 7 work with armed officers. I think -- and certainly this  
 8 is what we're getting to -- that that should form part  
 9 of exercising going forward.  
 10 MR GREANEY: This is the very point I wanted your assistance  
 11 on. The chairman is undoubtedly right that we expect  
 12 the evidence will reveal that firearms officers in  
 13 substantial numbers arrived at the scene and did so  
 14 promptly and secured the City Room, moreover.  
 15 But as you have told us already, the OFC focus group  
 16 identified an absence of training to ensure armed and  
 17 unarmed officers were able to work together effectively .  
 18 What is it that makes it important in a situation where  
 19 a terrorist attack is being responded to that the armed  
 20 and unarmed assets should work together effectively?  
 21 A. Well, the first point is it's an incredibly dynamic  
 22 environment. As we have seen from all the terror  
 23 attacks that have happened, you will get unarmed  
 24 officers ahead of armed officers, and that presents  
 25 a challenge, particularly with ensuring officer safety

1 and the safety of the public.  
 2 How well can they work together? How best can they  
 3 work together? I think that's something exercising and  
 4 testing can actually show. Yes, I think that's the  
 5 point we were coming to. Exercising has really honed  
 6 and refined, as you pointed out, sir, some aspects of  
 7 the police response. The inevitable is that unarmed and  
 8 armed officers will be mixed at the scene, commingled,  
 9 if you like. How can they work effectively together, is  
 10 the key thing, bearing in mind in some instances they  
 11 will become the targets themselves.  
 12 Q. Yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does sound like something you feel  
 14 quite strongly about.  
 15 A. I'm glad that's come over, sir.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And did you feel strongly about it  
 17 before what happened on 22 May?  
 18 A. It was an emerging feature through our fieldwork and our  
 19 ongoing work with the CT Network. As alluded to  
 20 previously when I worked for ACPO TAM, Protect and  
 21 Prepare, we did a lot of work around exercising and the  
 22 next step forward was to make sure that armed and  
 23 unarmed officers could operate effectively together.  
 24 MR GREANEY: We'll all understand how important it is that  
 25 armed officers should exercise their response to

1 a terrorist attack. As you have made plain, the way  
 2 they work together with unarmed officers is of a high  
 3 degree of importance. Should we understand that such  
 4 exercising between armed and unarmed officers does now  
 5 occur or does that remain something that there is a need  
 6 to improve?  
 7 A. I'm afraid I can't -- I don't know. I can't answer  
 8 that.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll find out from someone who does  
 10 know.  
 11 MR GREANEY: I think we should understand that your view  
 12 is that such exercising should occur?  
 13 A. Yes. With unarmed officers I think they need to do as  
 14 much as possible to try and give them some initial aims  
 15 and objectives to achieve and, more importantly, what do  
 16 they look like at a local level? Because that's where  
 17 you'll find unarmed officers. If the instruction, as we  
 18 have seen, the Stay Safe principles, if it's "see, hide,  
 19 tell", what does that actually mean to local officers in  
 20 their area? And I think that's an important aspect of  
 21 planning and exercising and testing unarmed officers.  
 22 Q. We were dealing with tactical firearms commanders and  
 23 then --  
 24 A. Sorry, I digressed.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I did!

1 MR GREANEY: For whatever reason it was no doubt important  
 2 we should secure your views about that.  
 3 Just to complete the picture in relation to the OFC  
 4 focus group before we break for lunch, as you told us,  
 5 the group was confident that GMP could mount an  
 6 effective response to a terrorist attack.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. But should we also add that some of those who formed  
 9 part of the group drew on the then recent force  
 10 operation to locate and confront Dale Cregan to support  
 11 their confidence? Paragraph 84.  
 12 A. Yes. That was the tactical firearms commanders that  
 13 came from.  
 14 Q. From what you have said, without criticising them in any  
 15 way, that perhaps failed to acknowledge the real  
 16 difference between an operation such as that and an  
 17 operation responding to a terrorist incident?  
 18 A. That knowledge and experience gained will be incredibly  
 19 useful in the response to a terrorist attack, there's no  
 20 doubt. But a terrorist attack presents additional  
 21 challenges and considerations for those commanding it.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Sir, would that a convenient moment to break  
 23 for lunch?  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. 2 o'clock.  
 25 (1.02 pm)

1 (The lunch adjournment)  
 2 (2.00 pm)  
 3 MR GREANEY: Sir, just to inform you, and indeed the core  
 4 participants, of the plan: the plan is that we will  
 5 finish the evidence of Mr Buchan today. We will not  
 6 attempt to start the evidence of Mr Whittle today but  
 7 instead he will return in order to give evidence at  
 8 10 am tomorrow morning. The witness June Roby, who was  
 9 due to give evidence after Mr Whittle, will not now give  
 10 evidence this week but will give evidence after the  
 11 half-term break.  
 12 Once Mr Whittle has concluded his evidence tomorrow,  
 13 he'll be followed by Michael Lawlor, a GMFRS station  
 14 manager. That will be the evidence for tomorrow,  
 15 9 February.  
 16 Then on Wednesday, as planned, we will hear evidence  
 17 from John Fletcher, a retired GMFRS group manager.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 19 MR GREANEY: We'll now resume the evidence of Mr Buchan.  
 20 You'll recall that we were dealing with your report,  
 21 CT2. We had dealt with your findings in summary and we  
 22 had begun to delve into the findings that were specific  
 23 to Greater Manchester Police. I'm going to turn next,  
 24 please, to a further category of person, namely  
 25 strategic firearms commanders.

1 In common with other groups, was evidence obtained  
 2 during a focus group of strategic firearms commanders?  
 3 A. It was.  
 4 Q. Did that group comprise a chief superintendent and an  
 5 assistant chief constable?  
 6 A. It did.  
 7 Q. Both of whom performed the role of strategic firearms  
 8 commander, or SFC, in GMP?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. I'm now at page 18, paragraph 86, of your statement.  
 11 What did the Inspectorate find in relation to those  
 12 officers?  
 13 A. They had a good understanding of the force's policy and  
 14 procedures in relation to their response to a terrorist  
 15 attack.  
 16 Q. Did they have ready access to plans and demonstrate  
 17 a good understanding of the command and control  
 18 arrangements and the role of the SFC?  
 19 A. They did.  
 20 Q. What was their understanding like in relation to the  
 21 relationship between an SFC and the CT commander?  
 22 A. They both understood that, they both knew how they would  
 23 work to support the CT commander, particularly in  
 24 handing over command. Both understood the capabilities  
 25 and capacity of the CT Network and the types of

1 resources that the CT commander could bring with them.  
 2 Q. Had both officers in the position of SFC been involved  
 3 in counter-terrorism exercises?  
 4 A. Both had.  
 5 Q. And like the TFCs, were they able to detail numerous  
 6 exercises that GMP had been involved in in order to test  
 7 the effectiveness of the response to a terrorist attack?  
 8 A. They had.  
 9 Q. Obviously in dealing with SFCs, you were concerned with  
 10 officers of a senior rank?  
 11 A. That's correct, yes.  
 12 Q. Were you concerned to understand from them what they  
 13 considered to be the position in relation to the working  
 14 relationship with other emergency responders?  
 15 A. Yes, we were.  
 16 Q. What did the focus group of SFCs tell the Inspectorate  
 17 about that issue?  
 18 A. They believed the working relationship with other blue  
 19 light responders in the Manchester area was good and  
 20 they cited their work in advance of the Commonwealth  
 21 Games that was held in 2002 as forming the bedrock of  
 22 that belief and that good relationship.  
 23 Q. Next, the communications room lead. In this context,  
 24 the context of a terrorist attack, what is the  
 25 communications room?

1 A. The communications room is the room in which a force  
 2 will control its officers on the ground through radio  
 3 communication, record incidents on the command and  
 4 control system, and allocate resources accordingly.  
 5 Q. Did the Inspectorate interview a person or persons in  
 6 connection with the operation of the communications  
 7 room?  
 8 A. We did.  
 9 Q. Who was it that was interviewed?  
 10 A. We interviewed the communications room lead and then we  
 11 went on to conduct a focus group with staff involved in  
 12 the communications room, and we also interviewed the FDO  
 13 and had a focus group with the FDO, I think.  
 14 Q. We'll break down those different categories. So first  
 15 of all, the communications room lead. Did the  
 16 Inspectorate interview a chief superintendent who, in  
 17 addition to his role as head of the operational  
 18 communications branch, that's the OCB we were  
 19 considering earlier, was a TFC?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. What was discussed with the chief superintendent?  
 22 A. He was in charge of the department under which the  
 23 communications room staff would work. He pointed out  
 24 some issues particularly around the command and control  
 25 system used by Greater Manchester Police at the time

1 that was later replaced.  
 2 Q. Did you discover when the system was replaced?  
 3 A. I don't have any evidence of that.  
 4 Q. Your statement says it was due to be replaced in --  
 5 A. 2017.  
 6 Q. So we'll look at when it was in fact replaced with other  
 7 witnesses.  
 8 As for the system that was in place at that stage,  
 9 did the chief superintendent identify that GMP, like  
 10 most forces, run the risk of being swamped with calls  
 11 during the first hours of a terrorist attack?  
 12 A. He did.  
 13 Q. Particularly if the incident was at a place such as  
 14 a busy shopping centre or football ground?  
 15 A. Yes, any large crowded place, yes.  
 16 Q. What did he describe GMP having in place to deal with  
 17 that risk if anything?  
 18 A. He believed that the force had well-practised  
 19 contingency plans that would enable them to certainly,  
 20 in terms of the volume of calls, share that call demand  
 21 with other forces.  
 22 Q. What did the chief superintendent say in relation to how  
 23 the staff from the control room would work?  
 24 A. He focused on the Silver commander, Silver command  
 25 suite, and that staff would be used to man a Silver

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1 control room.  
 2 Q. So a Silver control room would be opened for a CT  
 3 incident; is this what was being said?  
 4 A. Yes, that's certainly what he told us, that a dedicated  
 5 command and control suite for Silver command would be  
 6 opened. That's not uncommon amongst forces.  
 7 Q. And that staff from the control room would be used to  
 8 assist the Silver commander in that area?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. We've mentioned Exercise Winchester Accord a number of  
 11 times already. Did the chief superintendent say  
 12 anything about Exercise Winchester Accord in this  
 13 connection?  
 14 A. That the Silver control room arrangements had been  
 15 tested during Winchester Accord, so that would have been  
 16 control room staff taking up position in the Silver room  
 17 and supporting the Silver commander.  
 18 Q. In your statement you observe that the  
 19 chief superintendent was unaware of any lessons learned  
 20 from previous operations or exercises filtering through  
 21 to control room staff.  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. And did that observation, so far as you understood it,  
 24 apply equally to Exercise Winchester Accord?  
 25 A. I don't think I'm in a position to confirm that.

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1 Q. But in any event, did the chief superintendent identify  
 2 a lack of training for control room staff on how best to  
 3 respond to a terrorist attack?  
 4 A. He did.  
 5 Q. You indicated that you also received information or  
 6 evidence from a focus group in relation to  
 7 communications.  
 8 A. We did.  
 9 Q. Was that focus group comprised of eight control room  
 10 staff of the operational communications branch?  
 11 A. It was.  
 12 Q. Some of the information in your statement, for good  
 13 reason, is operationally sensitive, but we'll identify  
 14 the key facts that don't fall into that category.  
 15 Did the staff that we've just described work over  
 16 three sites in Manchester?  
 17 A. Correct.  
 18 Q. With calls from the public received to one of those  
 19 sites?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Whether those calls were to the emergency 999 number or  
 22 to the non-emergency 101 number?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Where a police response was required, was it explained  
 25 that the logged call would be forwarded to one of two

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1 radio despatch or control rooms?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. From each of which officers would be deployed?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. What did that group describe as their expectation in the  
 6 event of a terrorist attack occurring?  
 7 A. I think they were very mindful that there'd be an awful  
 8 lot of calls coming in and one of their tasks was to try  
 9 and reduce that number down so that they could focus on  
 10 getting the best information they possibly could and to  
 11 make sure that staff, the right staff, were deployed to  
 12 the incident.  
 13 Q. So there appeared to be a recognition of the risk of the  
 14 communications branch being overwhelmed --  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. -- or swamped? And they explained that they, in the  
 17 circumstances of a terrorist attack, would work to  
 18 reduce the amount of radio channels, enabling more staff  
 19 to be allocated to the pressing incident?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. I'm now at the top of page 20.  
 22 Was the Inspectorate keen to understand issues  
 23 in relation to the training of those members of staff?  
 24 A. Yes, we were.  
 25 Q. What was the result of the questions that were asked

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1 about that?  
 2 A. None of the group had received any training relevant to  
 3 their role in a terrorist attack.  
 4 Q. Did the group recognise any limitations of the command  
 5 and control system?  
 6 A. Yes, they did.  
 7 Q. What did they say about that?  
 8 A. It needed replacing, it didn't provide them with the  
 9 best support to help them allocate resources.  
 10 Q. But they added, I think, that they were able to use the  
 11 command and control system in conjunction with the  
 12 Sherlock, as it was called, document management system  
 13 to ensure operators had access to the relevant force  
 14 plans for dealing with a critical incident?  
 15 A. They did.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you're talking about having other  
 17 people to help the FDO, are these the people who would  
 18 be doing that?  
 19 A. These are the people, sir.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they'd had no training?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 MR GREANEY: These are the people actually in the force  
 23 control room?  
 24 A. These are the people that would be manning screens and  
 25 telephones and helping run the day-to-day business of

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1 the force. These are the people that we identified as  
 2 -- if that's where the support is going to come from for  
 3 the FDO, what training has been given to them to enable  
 4 them to do that work?  
 5 Q. And you identified that they had received none?  
 6 A. They told us they'd received none.  
 7 Q. Is this the group that in some forces had the action  
 8 cards you referred to earlier?  
 9 A. That's the case, yes.  
 10 Q. Had any of the group participated in any CT exercising?  
 11 A. Some had participated in some CT exercises.  
 12 Q. What did those who had participated in some exercises  
 13 explain about the utility of that?  
 14 A. The exercises didn't actually test their role in the  
 15 control room, what it did test, particularly  
 16 Winchester Accord, was how they would work in the Silver  
 17 suite, supporting the Silver commander, which to them  
 18 didn't reflect or didn't read across well to their  
 19 day-to-day role.  
 20 Q. By day-to-day role, do you mean that it didn't transfer  
 21 across to their role within the control room?  
 22 A. That's correct, yes.  
 23 Q. Within the FCR?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Were those who had taken part in Winchester Accord able

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1 to tell you about feedback that they'd had?  
 2 A. They'd had no formal feedback.  
 3 Q. In some forces -- should we understand from the evidence  
 4 you have given already that in some forces specific  
 5 roles had been given to particular individuals within  
 6 the control room beyond the FIM or FDO?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. That was a very poorly expressed question but I think  
 9 you understood it. The FDO would be designated in the  
 10 control room?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. But in some forces other individuals within that room  
 13 had also been given designated roles?  
 14 A. Certainly once a Plato had been called by the FDO, they  
 15 would be allocated particular roles invariably around  
 16 the task cards that would follow.  
 17 Q. Within GMP, so far as the focus group work revealed, had  
 18 GMP designated specific roles to particular individuals  
 19 beyond the FDO?  
 20 A. No.  
 21 Q. So in the event of Operation Plato being declared, what  
 22 would staff have to do in order to be allocated a task?  
 23 A. They would have to access the documentation that would  
 24 tell them what needed to be done and then between  
 25 themselves organise that work, and when we pressed them

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1 they said they'd ask the FDO what to do.  
 2 Q. So this is the FDO who is under or capable of coming  
 3 under extreme pressure, the other staff felt that they  
 4 would have to speak to that person to see what job was  
 5 expected of them?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. The simple way in which you express it in your statement  
 8 at paragraph 100 is:  
 9 "Staff would have to rely on the FDO to allocate  
 10 tasks, whereas in other forces a series of simple prompt  
 11 cards had been developed."  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. What view did the Inspectorate form of that state of  
 14 affairs?  
 15 A. We believed that that's a gap in their ability to manage  
 16 the incident at a very -- under a huge pressure,  
 17 certainly in those first few moments. This, we  
 18 believed, was a gap in their abilities.  
 19 Q. So where we have reached, and we're going to look at the  
 20 FDO in a moment, is that the FDO was capable of becoming  
 21 overburdened in the event of Operation Plato being  
 22 declared?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. And here was, as you've put it, another gap in the  
 25 system whereby the staff would not know or would not

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1 necessarily know what was expected of them unless told  
 2 by the FDO?  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. Which might be thought to be a state of affairs that was  
 5 somewhat less than ideal.  
 6 A. Yes, very much less than ideal.  
 7 Q. In relation to the FCR, we've now looked at the  
 8 chief superintendent, the control room staff, and next  
 9 I'm going to ask you about the force incident managers,  
 10 the FDO. Did the Inspectorate interview one of GMP's  
 11 force duty officers?  
 12 A. We did.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are we able to know who it is or at  
 14 least know whether it was Chief Inspector Sexton or not?  
 15 MR GREANEY: We are, sir, and it was Mr Sexton. You'll  
 16 remember I indicated that we would name one person; that  
 17 was the person.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That was your next question?  
 19 MR GREANEY: It was my next question.  
 20 Was Mr Sexton able to explain that he was a TFC?  
 21 A. He did.  
 22 Q. Tactical firearms commander, which is a prerequisite  
 23 qualification to undertake the FDO role?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. What was the FDO's level of understanding of the command

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1 and control arrangements GMP had in mounting a response  
 2 to a terrorist attack?  
 3 A. He was very clear he understood the processes and  
 4 procedures and policies.  
 5 Q. In the interview that was conducted with him, did he  
 6 identify with clarity his initial tasks --  
 7 A. He did.  
 8 Q. -- in response to a terrorist attack, namely declaring  
 9 Operation Plato if that was appropriate?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Ensuring the safety of unarmed officers?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Briefing the crews of armed response vehicles?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Obtaining tactical advice and appointing OFCs?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Did Mr Sexton produce anything for you?  
 18 A. He had produced an aide-memoire for him and his  
 19 colleagues, the other FDOs in GMP, to help them through  
 20 these initial stages, drawing together the number of  
 21 documents into one ready reckoner, would probably be  
 22 a good way of describing it, an aide-memoire.  
 23 Q. So is this a reference to the fact that, as you  
 24 explained earlier, within GMP there were a number of  
 25 documents providing information about the response to

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1 a terrorist incident?  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. What Mr Sexton had done was to draw together the strands  
 4 from those documents into a single document --  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. -- for his use and the use of his FDO colleagues?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. Did that document comprise prompts on declaring  
 9 Operation Plato?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And on setting up a dedicated Airwave radio channel with  
 12 the ambulance and fire and rescue services?  
 13 A. It did.  
 14 Q. And prompts on developing situational awareness?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And on setting up an FCP or forward control point?  
 17 A. That's correct.  
 18 Q. I'm now at the top of page 21, paragraph 104.  
 19 Did Mr Sexton express any view about what might  
 20 occur in the early stages of a terrorist attack so far  
 21 as volume of calls was concerned?  
 22 A. Yes, he thought the force would become overwhelmed with  
 23 the sheer volume of people ringing in.  
 24 Q. But did he express the view that there were established  
 25 systems in place to share the load with other forces?

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1 A. He did.  
 2 Q. Did he express a view about communication links with the  
 3 CT Network?  
 4 A. He did.  
 5 Q. What was that view?  
 6 A. He said that there were good communications between the  
 7 force control room, the FDO role, and the CT Network.  
 8 Q. What did he say in relation to training?  
 9 A. That all FDOs had undertaken training, particularly that  
 10 in relation to their qualification as a TFC. That  
 11 training is updated with regular updates and inputs and  
 12 he undertakes the continuous professional development  
 13 programme that all TFCs must complete.  
 14 Q. One final category of person. Duty inspectors is the  
 15 description given at paragraph 107 of your statement.  
 16 What should we understand by that term, duty inspectors?  
 17 A. The duty inspector role is a uniformed inspector,  
 18 invariably geographically based throughout a force area.  
 19 They will spend some time being the duty inspector that  
 20 the FDO can call on to lead and brigade and deploy  
 21 unarmed officers to an incident.  
 22 Q. Was evidence obtained from a focus group held with four  
 23 inspectors who undertook the duty uniform inspector's  
 24 role in Greater Manchester Police?  
 25 A. It was.

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1 Q. What did they explain in relation to CT training  
 2 specific to the duty inspector role?  
 3 A. None had received any CT training to assist them in  
 4 their inspector role in a CT incident.  
 5 Q. What did they say about their feelings of preparedness  
 6 to deal with the complex challenges posed by a terrorist  
 7 attack?  
 8 A. They expressed their concern, they felt ill –prepared for  
 9 that eventuality .  
 10 Q. You say in your statement, and have just repeated:  
 11 "All felt ill –prepared to deal with that situation."  
 12 But did they add that they would all draw on their  
 13 individual experiences of dealing with previous critical  
 14 incidents?  
 15 A. They did.  
 16 Q. Did each member of the focus group express the view that  
 17 GMP needed to do more to train and test unarmed uniform  
 18 staff?  
 19 A. They did.  
 20 Q. Did they explain why they felt more training and testing  
 21 was needed?  
 22 A. One of the group underlined this general view, saying  
 23 that in this particular case specific training could  
 24 actually save lives .  
 25 Q. So was the point that was being made that they were the

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1 most likely to be the first responders to a terrorist  
 2 attack?  
 3 A. Undoubtedly.  
 4 Q. And such training therefore could literally save lives ?  
 5 A. Exactly.  
 6 Q. That was the view that was expressed within the focus  
 7 group; did the Inspectorate agree?  
 8 A. We agreed.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did this include first aid training,  
 10 which is something uniformed police officers, I think,  
 11 after this attack referred to as they felt they had  
 12 inadequate first aid training? It may be quite  
 13 impossible to give them first aid training which would  
 14 be adequate for this .  
 15 A. Sir, we didn't cover first aid training. However,  
 16 I guess to clarify we formed the view that we'd want to  
 17 see them given training to lead people towards or to  
 18 respond to a terrorist attack and given some key points  
 19 to achieve and provide them with some advice on how to  
 20 (a) respond, undertake their duty, and work with armed  
 21 officers that are undoubtedly going to be there very  
 22 quickly, as opposed to first aid training per se.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, I understand.  
 24 MR GREANEY: Just to complete the position in relation to  
 25 duty inspectors, did the Inspectorate ask that focus

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1 group whether there had been feedback from CT operations  
 2 and exercises?  
 3 A. We did ask and none had been received.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you move on, are you about to  
 5 move on?  
 6 MR GREANEY: I'm shortly going to move on from CT2, but  
 7 I was moving on to a separate aspect of it, sir .  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I will leave you to do that first.  
 9 MR GREANEY: It's a very short point and it's just to pull  
 10 all of this together. In the work that was done by the  
 11 Inspectorate, shortcomings had been identified in the  
 12 way in which GMP might be expected to respond to  
 13 a terrorist attack.  
 14 A. Some shortcomings, yes.  
 15 Q. I'm not suggesting the picture was universally bad, but  
 16 among those shortcomings were the risk of the FDO  
 17 becoming overwhelmed?  
 18 A. Correct.  
 19 Q. And the extent to which those around him within the  
 20 control room would understand what they needed to do to  
 21 take a share of his burden or her burden?  
 22 A. Correct.  
 23 Q. Should we understand from what you've said to us earlier  
 24 that when you conducted your debrief of the GMP chief  
 25 officer lead for counter–terrorism, you would have been

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1 explaining those shortcomings that you had identified,  
 2 including those that I have just emphasised?  
 3 A. Yes, that was the purpose of the hot debrief, to do just  
 4 that.  
 5 Q. The report in due course was circulated and we have the  
 6 date of that. Before the circulation of the actual  
 7 report, did you or anyone else from the Inspectorate  
 8 brief any other person or was it just the person we've  
 9 just identified ?  
 10 A. Do you mean in the context of GMP?  
 11 Q. Yes, GMP.  
 12 A. No. During the fieldwork I only briefed the ACC at the  
 13 end of our inspection work. We were certainly in  
 14 contact with the CT Network, the National CT Police  
 15 Headquarters, regularly during the course of the  
 16 inspection .  
 17 Q. I have now understood why you responded in the way in  
 18 which you did. Within GMP your briefing was to the  
 19 chief officer lead for counter–terrorism?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. But more generally, as we heard from Richard Thomas,  
 22 you, throughout the course of the process, were in touch  
 23 with CTP Headquarters?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. To inform the work they were doing to refresh their MTFA

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1 guidance?  
 2 A. Yes, following the principles we outlined earlier that  
 3 we're not going to wait and sit on our views, we're  
 4 going to get them aired because of the type of policing  
 5 challenge we're facing here.  
 6 Q. The balance of your statement we can deal with more  
 7 swiftly, I believe --  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we do that, one of the matters  
 9 identified again by Winchester Accord, which went wrong,  
 10 was the Fire Service didn't turn up there until 2 hours  
 11 after the hypothetical attack had taken place and that  
 12 was a lack of communication or not the right information  
 13 getting through. Were you aware of this when you  
 14 carried out your inspection?  
 15 A. We'd been told of Winchester Accord. We weren't  
 16 focusing on the issues relating to the Fire Service or  
 17 the Ambulance Service. In the inspection we focused on  
 18 the command arrangements in GMP and the FDO and  
 19 specifically, I guess on your point, sir, would they be  
 20 able to (a) declare a Plato and (b) once they'd done it,  
 21 could they talk to the other blue light agencies. So  
 22 that was the focus. So in terms of that not working on  
 23 Winchester Accord I've got no evidence to say that was  
 24 the way or not.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

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1 MR GREANEY: What your work had, it seems, identified was  
 2 that there was knowledge on the part of the FDO of the  
 3 need to communicate the declaration of Operation Plato  
 4 to emergency partners?  
 5 A. Absolutely.  
 6 Q. Indeed, it's one of the prompts in the aide-memoire.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. I think you told us that the arrangements in the control  
 9 room were tested and it was possible to arrange  
 10 a three-way call.  
 11 A. Yes. We tested that everywhere we went. If it couldn't  
 12 be done, we'd certainly have found out it couldn't be  
 13 done.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Did it happen on 22 May,  
 15 a three-way call? I'm afraid I've momentarily  
 16 forgotten.  
 17 MR GREANEY: We know that the declaration of Operation Plato  
 18 was not formally communicated to the other emergency  
 19 services.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were the dedicated Airwave radio  
 21 channels set up?  
 22 MR GREANEY: Sir, I don't want to give -- I believe I know  
 23 the answer to that. I'll make sure after the break that  
 24 that is answered.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm quite happy to wait for the

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1 evidence, so if it's a matter I need to wait for, that's  
 2 fine.  
 3 MR GREANEY: I don't think it is. I don't think there will  
 4 be any controversy at all.  
 5 Before we move on to CT3 then, as you'll appreciate,  
 6 the inquiry's current understanding is that Exercise  
 7 Winchester Accord identified the risk of the  
 8 overburdening of the FDO, and you would expect the force  
 9 to learn the lessons of such exercising, as you have  
 10 told us.  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And furthermore, that very issue was one that your work  
 13 identified, not just from Exercise Winchester Accord but  
 14 from other research and investigations around the  
 15 country?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And that was communicated in the debrief that you  
 18 conducted?  
 19 A. Yes. It's not an issue that GMP faced alone. We found  
 20 that in a number of forces we went to.  
 21 Q. Yes, that's an important qualification for you to make.  
 22 So CT3 next. This is:  
 23 "Counter-terrorism Policing part 3: a joint  
 24 inspection of the effectiveness of the CT Network in  
 25 providing the bridge between the national and local

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1 levels of policing in England, Wales and Scotland to  
 2 reduce the risk from terrorism."  
 3 I'm now at the bottom of page 21 of your statement.  
 4 This is a report which was circulated after the  
 5 arena attack; is that correct?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And was based upon work that was done after the arena  
 8 attack?  
 9 A. Correct.  
 10 Q. I've read out the title of the report. Could you  
 11 explain in simple terms what the Inspectorate was here  
 12 focused upon?  
 13 A. Yes. It's very wordy, but in a nutshell it's how  
 14 effective is the CT Network in getting its strategies  
 15 that are developed centrally down to local forces, local  
 16 units, to deliver.  
 17 Q. To that end did you inspect three separate areas?  
 18 A. Yes, we did.  
 19 Q. Which were?  
 20 A. The national strategic direction for CT, how is it being  
 21 channelled to forces through the CT Network, so in  
 22 essence how is that strategy communicated. How  
 23 connected the CT Network was with regional and local  
 24 areas of policing in relation to CT matters. And  
 25 looking at the Government's arrangements of

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1 counter—terrorism, particularly at a national and  
 2 a regional level. All for the purpose of ensuring that  
 3 there is an effective police response to terrorism  
 4 locally and nationally.  
 5 Q. The fieldwork, I believe, was conducted between  
 6 December 2017 and March 2018?  
 7 A. Correct.  
 8 Q. And involved the review of nearly 100 documents?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Did you also carry out, much as with CT2, interviews and  
 11 focus group meetings?  
 12 A. We did.  
 13 Q. Bearing in mind that this doesn't deal with the core  
 14 issues with which we're concerned in chapter 10, the  
 15 emergency response, we can deal with this briefly.  
 16 Could I ask you to turn to page 23, please?  
 17 Paragraph 117. In CT3 you made, I believe, a number of  
 18 recommendations; is that correct?  
 19 A. That's correct.  
 20 Q. Was it the position that the CT specialist that you  
 21 interviewed had a clear understanding of the strategy  
 22 and link between national, regional and local policing  
 23 on counter—terrorism?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. But was it the position that many front line staff and

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1 their managers within forces didn't understand how they  
 2 were expected to contribute to the combined CT effort?  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. So that remained the position after the attacks of 2017?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. What did the Inspectorate conclude, therefore?  
 7 Paragraph 120.  
 8 A. That the national CT strategy had yet to become  
 9 embedded, recognised in policing, particularly local  
 10 policing.  
 11 Q. You concluded, I think, that beyond those with  
 12 a full—time CT role, the strategy had little resonance  
 13 and had not achieved its aim of establishing the  
 14 direction for CT policing.  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. While the inspection was being undertaken, was a new CT  
 17 strategy being drafted for 2018 to 2021?  
 18 A. It was.  
 19 Q. Did you find any particular omissions in local plans?  
 20 A. Certainly. We found a lack of clarity around the roles  
 21 and responsibilities of staff in forces and regions with  
 22 CT responsibilities.  
 23 Q. Were you concerned as an organisation, the Inspectorate,  
 24 to find that senior officers in some forces felt  
 25 isolated from CT Policing following the establishment of

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1 the CT Network?  
 2 A. Yes, we were.  
 3 Q. And to counter that perceived gap, did you recommend  
 4 that local and regional plans should include a detailed  
 5 engagement strategy to ensure all police officers and  
 6 staff consider the threat of terrorism in their daily  
 7 duties?  
 8 A. We did.  
 9 Q. I do want to ask you about that, but first of all, just  
 10 to understand the concern. As you've explained, the way  
 11 in which counter—terrorism became arranged in the  
 12 United Kingdom was that there developed a national  
 13 responsibility?  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. And that chief constables around the country ceded their  
 16 responsibility to that national organisation in certain  
 17 circumstances?  
 18 A. In certain circumstances, yes. I guess the term  
 19 national organisation, it's the closest policing in  
 20 England and Wales gets to a national reach for policing.  
 21 Q. So that there was a risk which seemed to be eventuating  
 22 to some extent that where you create something with  
 23 a national reach, more locally they might felt left out  
 24 of it?  
 25 A. Yes. I think it's worth considering that certainly with

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1 the advent of the terrorist threat as we see it now,  
 2 Counter—terrorism Policing had gone from a fairly narrow  
 3 threat vector to something considerably broader that  
 4 could happen in any police force and we'll all know that  
 5 terrorist attacks have happened throughout the country.  
 6 So it's that broadening out of counter—terrorism that  
 7 I think has presented the challenge.  
 8 Q. And broadening out, as you say in your statement, you  
 9 recommended local and regional plans which were designed  
 10 to ensure that all police officers and staff consider  
 11 the threat of terrorism in their daily duties?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. By May 2017, as we've understood it, the threat level  
 14 within the United Kingdom had been at severe for quite  
 15 some considerable period of time.  
 16 A. It had.  
 17 Q. A number of years, I think, in fact.  
 18 A. In fairness, you're right.  
 19 Q. It's a point that the chairman has explored a number of  
 20 times. Is there a risk that where the threat level  
 21 remains so high for such a long period of time, a level  
 22 of complacency develops?  
 23 A. I think people get used to the word "severe" and may  
 24 lose sight of what that actually means.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think complacency is not actually the

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1 right word. I think it just goes out of people's minds.  
 2 A. I think you're right, sir. I think because you are at  
 3 such a high threat level, independently assessed for  
 4 very good reasons, the impact of that on people's  
 5 thinking and day-to-day business probably gets lost.  
 6 Certainly when you move ---  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that's a good way of expressing  
 8 it.  
 9 A. Certainly when you move to critical, there is  
 10 a noticeable upshift in terms of the police's  
 11 preparedness, what they need to do for that, so I guess  
 12 people got used to it.  
 13 MR GREANEY: This is or may be a problem, do you agree,  
 14 because where the threat level is severe, as we've heard  
 15 many, many times in this inquiry already, it means an  
 16 attack is highly likely?  
 17 A. Highly likely, yes. It's interesting, isn't it, because  
 18 that is independently arrived at? It's not the police's  
 19 job to do that, nor government's.  
 20 Q. It's JTAC's job?  
 21 A. It's JTAC's job to do that and it's interesting how you  
 22 could reinforce what that actually means because every  
 23 time I heard it on the telly, there's always that  
 24 explanation that an attack is very likely. So yes,  
 25 I think people have just got used to it being severe.

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1 Q. And how do you prevent what that really means being  
 2 lost?  
 3 A. Oh, communication, continual communication. We found  
 4 a lot of forces have a particular banner on their front  
 5 page of their website to reinforce the message to staff  
 6 and to the public. It's a really difficult one. I wish  
 7 I had an answer, but I don't, to the conundrum.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's not just the threat level is severe  
 9 in the country, the threat level is severe here in your  
 10 particular police force?  
 11 A. That's exactly the point and was the point of the  
 12 inspections, CT3, about you hear about counter-terrorism  
 13 on the news and you automatically think of a national  
 14 effort with other agencies and everybody understands it.  
 15 But it happens locally and it's maintaining that  
 16 traction locally that's the key.  
 17 MR GREANEY: I suppose you might even develop or consider  
 18 the problem in the following way: if it's not  
 19 straightforward to ensure this message has traction with  
 20 police officers, it's all the more difficult to ensure  
 21 it has traction with the private sector and with the  
 22 public or may be?  
 23 A. Yes. Yes, I can't disagree with that. I think you're  
 24 right. That is one of the challenges. And despite the  
 25 efforts and energies that have gone into making sure

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1 people are clear, I think that can be a factor.  
 2 Q. Just to conclude the position in relation to CT3, the  
 3 Inspectorate concluded -- I'm at paragraph 124 -- that  
 4 an additional senior national coordinator, SNC, should  
 5 be appointed to oversee the production and delivery of  
 6 messages to forces following a terrorist attack?  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. And what are such messages known as and what is their  
 9 purpose?  
 10 A. They're known as advisory group messages. As you'll  
 11 know, chief constables retain operational command  
 12 responsibility for their force areas. That's why the  
 13 term "advisory" is used. But in the wake of a terrorist  
 14 attack, the advisory group will seek to provide a clear  
 15 briefing on what has happened and to recommend various  
 16 responses to assist in mitigating any further threat,  
 17 reassure the public, so increase patrolling, or if it's  
 18 an incident on the transport network, then making sure a  
 19 visible presence is there.  
 20 Q. And your final recommendation in CT3 echoed, I believe,  
 21 your findings from CT2. What was that final  
 22 recommendation?  
 23 A. That the lessons you learned from training and exercises  
 24 and operations do get filtered down to front line staff.  
 25 Q. As you identified at the very beginning of your

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1 evidence, there was a CT4, which dealt with Prevent  
 2 issues; is that correct?  
 3 A. It did.  
 4 Q. As you'll appreciate, in chapter 10 we are not  
 5 considering such issues and whether we need to have  
 6 regard to that report later on in the case will remain  
 7 to be seen. I am sure you'll assist us if that proves  
 8 necessary.  
 9 A. I will.  
 10 Q. Finally, so far as my knowledge is concerned, there was  
 11 a CT5; is that correct?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. I'm now on page 24. What was the title of that report?  
 14 A. "An inspection of the effectiveness of the police  
 15 firearms response to terrorism."  
 16 Q. So where did this fit in terms of CT1 to 3? Was it  
 17 a review of where any of those had reached or something  
 18 that was free-standing of them?  
 19 A. It is free-standing in its construct, but in looking at  
 20 the effectiveness of the firearms response, we found  
 21 ourselves getting drawn into some of the areas covered  
 22 by CT2, so the inspection examined some of those issues.  
 23 Q. Did you set out to ascertain whether forces had the  
 24 capability and capacity to respond effectively to  
 25 a terrorist attack?

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1 A. We did.  
 2 Q. And whether that response was consistent and connected  
 3 across regions and forces in the United Kingdom?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. At the time that you prepared your first witness  
 6 statement, the work on CT5 was underway --  
 7 A. It was.  
 8 Q. -- and had not been completed?  
 9 A. It was.  
 10 Q. I suspect bearing in mind that that report will deal  
 11 with the current approach to CT policing --  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. -- the content of it may be sensitive.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. So we'll leave that for the time being. It may be again  
 16 in due course we'll have some questions about it.  
 17 In the balance of your first statement you deal with  
 18 a special grant review, so a request by Greater  
 19 Manchester Police for additional funding.  
 20 A. It's a request from the Mayor, it's actually the Mayor  
 21 who brings it.  
 22 Q. Which was found to be well-founded. I'm not going to go  
 23 into any of the detail of that. You also deal with  
 24 disclosure of materials to the inquiry.  
 25 I will ask you to help us with the section of your

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1 statement headed "Conclusion", which is at page 29,  
 2 please, paragraph 150. Would you, to use a phrase  
 3 that's used many times, draw the strands together for  
 4 us, please?  
 5 A. So HMIC in the period of interest to the inquiry have  
 6 completed a number of inspections. The PEEL ones  
 7 touched on the forces' ability to respond to a terrorist  
 8 attack, very briefly, but certainly our  
 9 counter-terrorism inspections, and CT2 in particular,  
 10 shone a light on the areas that I've been led to believe  
 11 the inquiry are really interested in.  
 12 Our views and observations in the reports are  
 13 national, they're not specific to GMP. However, on GMP,  
 14 as I said earlier in my statement, we found good command  
 15 and control arrangements. In terms of the quality of  
 16 the people undertaking the role, the experience of the  
 17 people undertaking the role, their understanding of  
 18 their role, we found that all to be good. But in some  
 19 cases, as we've alluded to earlier and we've examined  
 20 earlier, more work needed to be done.  
 21 First and foremost is the demand placed on the FDO  
 22 and the force raising its game in providing unarmed  
 23 officers and control room staff with the training and  
 24 ability to test their skills before the awful time when  
 25 a terrorist attack actually happens.

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1 In many respects those points we found throughout  
 2 England and Wales in the forces we went to.  
 3 Q. As you say at the very end of that statement, to be  
 4 fair, you observe that in the aspects that you'd  
 5 identified where you had been less than impressed, GMP  
 6 were similar to many other forces that you had visited  
 7 in the course of the CT2 inspection?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. In a second statement you have provided, dated  
 10 12 March 2020, we don't need it on the screen, but I'll  
 11 give the INQ reference for the purposes of the  
 12 transcript. It's {INQ032090/1}.  
 13 In that second statement you were asked to provide  
 14 information about the inspections of British Transport  
 15 Police; is that correct?  
 16 A. That's correct.  
 17 Q. Had there been a number of reports, so far as relevant,  
 18 dealing with BTP?  
 19 A. There had.  
 20 Q. And to identify them, a PEEL report in 2017?  
 21 A. That's correct.  
 22 Q. And also CT2, the report we've looked at in detail?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. So far as the first of those is concerned, the 2017 PEEL  
 25 report, was BTP graded as good?

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1 A. It was.  
 2 Q. Paragraph 7. Was it graded as good for preventing  
 3 crime, tackling anti-social behaviour and keeping people  
 4 safe.  
 5 A. It was.  
 6 Q. Good for investigating crime and reducing re-offending?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Good at protecting those who are vulnerable from harm  
 9 and supporting victims?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And good at tackling serious and organised crime?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Did the report raise no cause for concern?  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. And make no recommendations?  
 16 A. That's also correct.  
 17 Q. Paragraph 9. Did it highlight five areas for  
 18 improvement?  
 19 A. It did.  
 20 Q. Which were?  
 21 A. The force establishment of detectives, so that's the  
 22 number of detectives available to the force. The  
 23 identification of arrested foreign nationals. The  
 24 conduct of initial investigations, including vulnerable  
 25 victims. And to develop a better understanding of the

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1 impact of the operations it mounts on serious organised  
2 crime.  
3 Q. As we now know to expect, did part of the report deal  
4 with the effectiveness of BTP specialist capabilities?  
5 A. It did.  
6 Q. Including the arrangements in place to respond to  
7 a major incident, including a terrorist attack?  
8 A. That's correct.  
9 Q. I'm going to frame these questions carefully. Was this  
10 part of the report prepared after the arena attack?  
11 A. I can't say immediately.  
12 Q. Did the inspection team recognise the work BTP had  
13 undertaken so far as specialist capabilities was  
14 concerned, including steps taken to increase and/or  
15 improve the deployment of armed BTP officers in a number  
16 of locations?  
17 A. That's correct.  
18 Q. Did the inspection team recognise also that BTP had  
19 taken part in national and local exercises that tested  
20 its response to a terrorist attack?  
21 A. Yes, it did.  
22 Q. And had exercised with rail operators and other  
23 Government departments?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. The report I think also recognised the courage of BTP

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1 officers responding to the terrorist attacks in London.  
2 A. It does.  
3 Q. So far as the second relevant report is concerned, now  
4 at page 4, CT2, British Transport Police evidence and  
5 findings, paragraph 12, in general how did  
6 the Inspectorate find BTP?  
7 A. We found BTP had good command and control arrangements  
8 in place and had developed, unsurprisingly for a force  
9 of national reach, good working relationships with  
10 police forces. Now for countering terrorism, the bulk  
11 of BTP's resources and effort were in London, so we  
12 particularly singled out their working relationships  
13 with the Metropolitan Police. However, as you earlier  
14 highlighted, they were seeking to expand that across  
15 other hubs throughout England and Wales.  
16 Q. Yes, and without going into any details, the inquiry  
17 does know that BTP has achieved the aim of having  
18 a capability at locations other than London.  
19 A. Okay.  
20 Q. Was fieldwork undertaken by the Inspectorate in BTP  
21 in relation to the areas that we considered in relation  
22 to GMP?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Was it found that BTP had an Operation Plato plan?  
25 A. It did.

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1 Q. Was a force control room reality check carried out?  
2 A. It was.  
3 Q. So far as patrol officers are concerned, did the focus  
4 group feel prepared to respond effectively to  
5 a terrorist attack?  
6 A. They were.  
7 Q. And did the Inspectorate conclude that BTP had provided  
8 staff with some guidance to assist those involved in the  
9 initial unarmed response to a terrorist attack?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Equally in relation to the OFC and TFC, was it the  
12 position that no particular concerns were identified?  
13 A. None.  
14 Q. In relation to the communications lead, was evidence  
15 obtained from a joint interview with a senior police  
16 staff manager and a chief inspector?  
17 A. It was.  
18 Q. I'm now at paragraph 33 and following. Was it the  
19 position that all staff working in the control room had  
20 access to the BTP Plato plan? Paragraph 36.  
21 A. Yes, they did.  
22 Q. And they would be issued with action cards to direct the  
23 initial action in the event that an Operation Plato was  
24 declared?  
25 A. They would be.

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1 Q. Did the interviewees identify a lack of specific  
2 counter-terrorism training and exercising for control  
3 room staff?  
4 A. They did.  
5 Q. And all staff had completed mandatory Stay Safe  
6 training, but believed that a lack of role-specific  
7 training could lead to staff being unprepared to deal  
8 with a terrorist attack?  
9 A. That's correct.  
10 Q. So far as the operational communications branch staff  
11 were concerned, did that group describe how in the event  
12 of a terrorist attack being reported the day-to-day  
13 calls would be directed to one of the control rooms,  
14 enabling the other to focus on the attack?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Were the group confident in BTP's ability to cope with  
17 such a transfer and the anticipated increase in call  
18 volume?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. And they were, I think, able to point to real world  
21 examples of how they had managed in the past?  
22 A. Yes, including the recent tram derailment in Croydon.  
23 Q. Over the page, we learnt from you what GMP's position  
24 was about the designation of specific roles. In BTP,  
25 paragraph 42, what was the position?

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1 A. That they had actually designated specific roles to  
 2 those working in the control room in the event of  
 3 a terrorist attack.  
 4 Q. Did those roles have a dedicated action card to prompt  
 5 the necessary actions?  
 6 A. Each role had an action card.  
 7 Q. The roles being the FIM, the force incident manager?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. The deputy FIM?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. The call-taker?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. The radio operator?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And the communications supervisor?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. So specific roles had been designated within the control  
 18 room?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Each of those people had a dedicated action card?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. So they would not have to, at least generally, speak to  
 23 the FIM and say, "What should I do now"?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. And did the work of the Inspectorate reveal that staff

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1 understood the content of the cards and had been trained  
 2 on what to do in the event of Operation Plato being  
 3 declared?  
 4 A. We did.  
 5 Q. Was the inquiry concerned to obtain evidence from the  
 6 force incident manager?  
 7 A. It did.  
 8 Q. Did the Inspectorate interview a BTP police inspector  
 9 undertaking the role of force incident manager?  
 10 A. We did.  
 11 Q. A role very similar to the FDO role in GMP?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. What did the Inspectorate find in relation to the force  
 14 incident manager?  
 15 A. We found that the FIM was supported by two supervisors,  
 16 one in each of their control rooms.  
 17 Q. Was it the position that the force didn't receive 999  
 18 calls direct?  
 19 A. That's right, they would go to the local force.  
 20 Q. So any report of a terrorist attack was likely to be  
 21 passed on by the local force?  
 22 A. And from a 999 call, yes.  
 23 Q. Did the BTP FIM have ready access to the force Plato  
 24 plan and all other relevant plans?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And had BTP tested and exercised not only the FIM but  
 2 also the supporting control room staff?  
 3 A. Yes, and they had done this through their Exercise Blue  
 4 Shield.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have we gone past paragraph 45 now?  
 6 MR GREANEY: We have, sir.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What's said in paragraph 45 is because  
 8 BTP don't respond to 999 calls, if you have a terrorist  
 9 attack, the calls are likely to come into the  
 10 Home Office force who respond to 999 calls.  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The procedure, as I understand it from  
 13 paragraph 45, is that then the Home Office force tells  
 14 BTP.  
 15 A. That's certainly our impression from the evidence we've  
 16 gathered.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: BTP then take it over, but then hand it  
 18 back to the Home Office local force as soon as possible?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's clearly not what happened.  
 21 A. No.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Nor would you necessarily expect it to.  
 23 A. Not really, no. I mean, a lot of —  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If that's the correct procedure, it's  
 25 bizarre, isn't it? That's maybe the wrong word, sorry.

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1 A. I can't stress enough that for terrorism their set-up,  
 2 their operation, had started with their close working  
 3 relationship and their assets with the  
 4 Metropolitan Police, which — they have a joint  
 5 operating procedure — no, a memorandum of understanding  
 6 about how the forces in Central London work together and  
 7 it'll probably come as no surprise that the  
 8 Metropolitan Police tend to command and control  
 9 everything in London, be that on BTP estate or not. So  
 10 that would actually be quite seamless. Where the issue  
 11 comes is where you get an attack outside London, and as  
 12 you describe it, that does sound like an unusual  
 13 arrangement.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It sounds like it's a recipe for delay.  
 15 A. Yes, every time you hand over control, I think most  
 16 people would recognise that there is a delay.  
 17 MR GREANEY: I just want to make sure that I've understood  
 18 correctly. You did tell us at the beginning of this  
 19 section of your evidence that you were focused upon the  
 20 relationship between the Metropolitan Police and BTP.  
 21 A. Yes, because that's where BTP had invested its  
 22 counter-terrorism effort and investment, particularly  
 23 around firearms officers.  
 24 Q. And did you say, and I may have misheard you, that there  
 25 was in London, where you were focused, a memorandum of

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1 understanding between the Metropolitan Police --  
 2 A. Yes, there is.  
 3 Q. -- and BTP?  
 4 A. And there continues to be, yes.  
 5 Q. This will be of interest to the inquiry for reasons that  
 6 go beyond chapter 10.  
 7 Do you mean by that that there will be a memorandum  
 8 of understanding dealing with which of those forces had  
 9 primacy in different situations?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. From your perspective, is it desirable that there should  
 12 be such a memorandum of understanding in relation to  
 13 primacy between the Home Office force and British  
 14 Transport Police?  
 15 A. Certainly for certain incidents you'd expect that or  
 16 you'd like to see that.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just playing into this, and I'm not  
 18 talking about London where on 7/7, the Met Police took  
 19 it over immediately, despite the fact that things were  
 20 happening on buses.  
 21 A. I don't remember that. I've got no evidence to say  
 22 that.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're too young!  
 24 A. I wish I was, sir!  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If we're talking about something in

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1 Manchester, it just seems inconceivable that the system  
 2 you set out in paragraph 45 could possibly operate in  
 3 a sensible way.  
 4 A. It is likely that where the 999 call comes into the  
 5 control room in the Home Office force, that certainly if  
 6 it's a terrorist attack or a firearms incident, they  
 7 will already start to undertake those command and  
 8 control arrangements. I guess it's in those rare  
 9 instances where BTP would be the first people to find  
 10 out about it -- and there are some routes, but  
 11 unlikely -- that they would take command and then hand  
 12 that over to the Home Office force, who are undoubtedly  
 13 going to be able to bring to bear far more resources to  
 14 deal with the incident than BTP are, even in London  
 15 where they have the largest number of people, with the  
 16 Metropolitan Police surrounding you, they are likely to  
 17 be able to bring more resources, so it absolutely makes  
 18 sense that the Metropolitan Police undertake that  
 19 command and control arrangement.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be -- in this particular incident  
 21 there were BTP people on the scene immediately because  
 22 they were there in the station. Then members of the  
 23 public were making 999 calls. So who got to know  
 24 first -- and I don't even know whether we know the  
 25 answer to that.

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1 A. I'm sorry, sir, I'm not going to be able to give you  
 2 evidence that adds any clarity to that. I don't know.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no. It just seems to me to be  
 4 a recipe for confusion, but perhaps I'm being too  
 5 simplistic about that.  
 6 A. I don't think you are, sir. Like I say, the vast  
 7 majority of times, it will come to you on a 999 call,  
 8 I have no doubt, and then it's the Home Office force  
 9 that will deal with that and then inform BTP that that's  
 10 happening.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does it make any difference or add to  
 12 difficulty that the ordinary police forces, if they  
 13 don't mind me calling them that, come under the control  
 14 of the Home Office and BTP come under the control of the  
 15 Department of Transport?  
 16 A. They do. Operationally -- I know you've taken evidence  
 17 from Sean O'Callaghan from BTP.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 19 MR GREANEY: And he's coming back.  
 20 A. I don't think that makes a difference at all. Obviously  
 21 they're funded in such a way where part of their funding  
 22 is from the rail operators and they have a particular  
 23 idea what they want BTP officers to do. But I certainly  
 24 can't identify any instances where that has got in the  
 25 way of a real time deployment of officers to something

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1 of this magnitude. In fact, I'd go as far as to say I'd  
 2 be really surprised if it ever entered anybody's mind  
 3 that that would.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 5 MR GREANEY: Just to add a little bit of information around  
 6 the edges, you expressed the view that it might be rare  
 7 that BTP would become aware of a terrorist incident  
 8 before the Home Office force.  
 9 A. Yes. In some respects, because this incident happened  
 10 on BTP property, you can understand an incident -- this  
 11 is possibly one of those situations where they may well  
 12 have been the first to know through, I don't know,  
 13 monitoring CCTV or something like that. So this is  
 14 probably one of those rare occasions when that may well  
 15 have been the case.  
 16 Q. They heard the explosion and groups of BTP officers ran  
 17 straight to the scene. So within a minute, officers  
 18 were on their radios, saying, "There's been a loud  
 19 bang", and then that there had been a bomb.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Whilst the evidence will reveal it, it does seem as if  
 22 they knew first of all.  
 23 Did you follow the evidence of ACC O'Callaghan?  
 24 A. I didn't, no.  
 25 Q. It is perhaps unfair of me to ask you in any event to

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1 express a view, but for your information one of the  
2 issues that the inquiry is looking at is the existence  
3 of an MoU between Greater Manchester Police and BTP  
4 in relation to Victoria Railway Station and where the  
5 evidence rests is that there is an ongoing dialogue  
6 between GMP and BTP but no MoU is yet in existence, but  
7 we await a update.

8 So we were dealing with the force incident manager,  
9 and as the chairman identified, I'd rather passed over  
10 the most important paragraph. We'll complete the  
11 picture in relation to CT2 and BTP.

12 Duty inspectors. As with GMP, did you receive  
13 evidence from a focus group with three duty inspectors  
14 who undertook the duty uniformed inspector role?

15 A. We did.

16 Q. What was revealed about CT training for those officers?

17 A. None of the group had received any CT training specific  
18 to their role as duty inspector.

19 Q. However, unlike the GMP inspectors you spoke to, did all  
20 of the inspectors that you spoke to from BTP feel well  
21 prepared to deal with a terrorist attack?

22 A. Yes, they did.

23 Q. Citing the major rail incidents they'd dealt with and  
24 previous terrorist attacks on the railway and  
25 underground?

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Finally, assistant chief constable — was evidence  
3 obtained from an interview with one of BTP's assistant  
4 chief constables?

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. Did that person have a clear understanding of BTP's  
7 response to a terrorist attack and his role as either  
8 a Gold commander or SFC?

9 A. He did.

10 Q. Was he confident that BTP kept its plans under continual  
11 review?

12 A. He was.

13 Q. And did he describe how the force's strategic firearms  
14 group had worked to ensure that force plans and  
15 procedures were sufficiently clear that staff would be  
16 able to perform the roles required of them in the event  
17 of a Plato incident being declared by the FIM?

18 A. He did.

19 Q. So in conclusion, what did you find in relation to BTP's  
20 preparedness for a response to a terrorist attack?

21 A. We found that their command and control arrangements  
22 were good and well understood. They understood the role  
23 of the force. I used the phrase "in the larger command  
24 and control space to a policing" — sorry, "to  
25 a terrorist attack". By that I mean they understood

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1 where they sat with the CT Network, CT commanders, and  
2 certainly within London how they could interact with  
3 their role in responding alongside the  
4 Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police.

5 Q. All those, I believe, you spoke to were confident that  
6 BTP could mount an effective response to a terrorist  
7 attack?

8 A. Yes, they were.

9 Q. Finally, at one stage the Inspectorate was known as  
10 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, full stop,  
11 was it not?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Then its remit was broadened also to become the  
14 Inspectorate for Fire and Rescue Services?

15 A. It was.

16 Q. And we do have the date of that somewhere. I can't  
17 remember exactly when it was, but it was in the  
18 relatively recent past, was it not?

19 A. Yes, it was. 2017. July 2017.

20 Q. So it now follows that the Inspectorate for  
21 Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service will be  
22 HMICFRS, as it is now known?

23 A. They will be inspected by HMICFRS and have been.

24 Q. And prior to the arena attack, had there been an  
25 inspection of GMFRS?

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1 A. No.

2 Q. In any event, even if there had been, it would not have  
3 been conducted by you because of your particular area of  
4 expertise?

5 A. Exactly.

6 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Buchan.

7 There are, as you will appreciate, sir, questions on  
8 behalf of some core participants, but it's probably  
9 sensible to have a short break at this stage.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 3.30.

11 Sorry, it's taken a lot longer than expected but  
12 you've been very helpful, thank you.

13 (3.14 pm)

(A short break)

15 (3.30 pm)

16 MR GREANEY: Sir, a Rule 10 request was made on behalf of

17 Greater Manchester Police and I'll therefore call upon  
18 Mr Horwell to ask his questions first.

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Horwell.

20 Questions from MR HORWELL

21 MR HORWELL: Thank you, sir. Could I ask, please, that your  
22 first witness statement is put on the screen? That's  
23 {INQ029796/4}. You have that with you, I see.

24 A. I do.

25 Q. Thank you. Could you go, first, to paragraph 11 on

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1 page 4.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Mr Buchan, we can see there where you have described how  
 4 in both CT2 and CT3 you conducted a hot debrief with  
 5 a chief officer in each of the police forces visited ,  
 6 and then to paragraph 12:  
 7 "In the case of CT2..."  
 8 And this is the one I'm asking you about:  
 9 "... I debriefed the GMP chief officer lead for  
 10 counter—terrorism on the evidence we obtained  
 11 (summarised between paragraphs 55 and 104 below) at the  
 12 end of our fieldwork on Friday, 4 November 2016."  
 13 Is it the case that you have no notes of that  
 14 meeting?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. And that there was no follow-up letter or document in  
 17 writing between you and GMP?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. And there's not a note or a record of the person you  
 20 saw?  
 21 A. No. I seem to recall it was ACC Harkinson (sic).  
 22 Q. No note or record of when you saw the person? By that  
 23 I mean a contemporaneous note or record.  
 24 A. No.  
 25 Q. And no note of the times between which you saw the

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1 person?  
 2 A. No. The only record I have was the timetable when  
 3 this — when we were to debrief the ACC lead for CT.  
 4 Q. Was that a timetable that was set out in advance of the  
 5 meeting?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Right. At this meeting do I understand correctly again  
 8 that you did not have the EGTs, the evidence—gathering  
 9 templates?  
 10 A. No, they would have been completed during the course of  
 11 the inspection, but we insisted on them being completed  
 12 by the start of the following week.  
 13 Q. Right. Again, so that we can understand this process,  
 14 the EGTs are written from a series of confidential  
 15 anonymous meetings?  
 16 A. That's right, yes.  
 17 Q. The officers that you speak to, you know, of course,  
 18 their identities, but their identities are not later  
 19 revealed?  
 20 A. No, with some caveats, this being one of them.  
 21 Q. Right. And you thought, Mr Buchan, that you saw the GMP  
 22 chief officer lead for counter—terrorism?  
 23 A. Yes, the person responsible for counter—terrorism in  
 24 GMP.  
 25 Q. That's the person you thought you saw?

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1 A. That's the person — that's the ACC I spoke to.  
 2 Q. Right. If we look at paragraph 12 of your witness  
 3 statement — there's no need to put it back on the  
 4 screen, you've got it in front of you — you set out  
 5 in that paragraph that you summarised paragraphs 55 to  
 6 104 of your witness statement.  
 7 A. Yes, I summarised the evidence that we captured during  
 8 the week with GMP which I later summarised  
 9 (overspeaking).  
 10 Q. Thank you. And to have summarised those 50 paragraphs  
 11 that must have taken a long time, Mr Buchan.  
 12 A. Sorry, I don't follow. Are you saying I summarised all  
 13 those paragraphs during the debrief?  
 14 Q. I'm just reading, Mr Buchan. I'm doing no more than  
 15 look at your witness statement:  
 16 "In the case of CT2, I debriefed the GMP chief  
 17 officer lead for counter—terrorism on the evidence we  
 18 obtained (summarised between paragraphs 55 and 104  
 19 below) at the end of our fieldwork on Friday,  
 20 4 November 2016."  
 21 A. Yes. So at that meeting I would have summarised what we  
 22 found during the week. I wouldn't have seen the EGTs,  
 23 it's what I would have gathered from colleagues during  
 24 the week.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the suggestion is it must have

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1 taken a long time.  
 2 A. No, not particularly. It didn't take a long time. When  
 3 you look at the themes that were coming out, we only  
 4 covered the key areas that I thought it was worthwhile  
 5 that the force understand what it is we found in the  
 6 spirit of us wanting to share what we found with the  
 7 force early on, which we'd done with other police  
 8 forces.  
 9 MR HORWELL: The person that you saw was  
 10 ACC Catherine Hankinson, not Harkinson, but  
 11 ACC Catherine Hankinson. Does that name ring a bell?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct. That's an error on my part, sir.  
 13 Q. Don't worry, I'm not saying any of this in a critical  
 14 manner, let me make that clear. But ACC Hankinson was  
 15 not the GMP lead for counter—terrorism at that time.  
 16 A. Okay.  
 17 Q. You didn't know that, it seems.  
 18 A. I thought, recalling back, that she was. I'm mistaken  
 19 on that point.  
 20 Q. Not that I suggest this matters at all, but I suggest  
 21 that in fact you saw her on 3 November 2016.  
 22 A. Yes, that's completely possible. I took the date in  
 23 preparing the statement from the timetable which may  
 24 have been amended.  
 25 Q. And I would suggest — I can't... Don't worry,

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1 Mr Buchan. I cannot tell you, I'm afraid, how long the  
 2 meeting lasted, but I suggest it was allocated to last  
 3 1 hour and no more.  
 4 A. Yes, that's in line with other meetings.  
 5 Q. The inspection that led to the CT2 report was,  
 6 of course, a national inspection, with a view to making  
 7 national recommendations.  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. Is that right?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. Have you seen the handwritten note of ACC Hankinson?  
 12 It's in the list of documents that you were asked to  
 13 look at, Mr Buchan.  
 14 A. Yes, I have been made aware of that recently.  
 15 Q. Let's put that on the screen.  
 16 A. I have seen it, yes.  
 17 Q. Mr Buchan, may I say at once, it's always difficult  
 18 being shown somebody else's note, so I'm not suggesting  
 19 that this is a straightforward process. If we could  
 20 have it put on the screen, please. It's {INQ035779/1}.  
 21 Let's look at the whole document first of all. That is  
 22 it, Mr Buchan. That is ACC Hankinson's note of the  
 23 meeting on 3 November 2016.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. If we can just look at the top section of that note,

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1 please. We can see there that she has written:  
 2 "CT hot debrief. FDO very good."  
 3 Then what appears to be a question. There's not  
 4 a question mark, I appreciate that, but the way it is  
 5 written:  
 6 "Is there enough resilience around FDO."  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And that is the only note that she has written on the  
 9 topic of the FDO.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Then, of course, we can see in the line immediately  
 12 below:  
 13 "OCB [operational communications branch] staff  
 14 unsure about what their exact role is."  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. So that is the only record that exists of this meeting;  
 17 is that correct?  
 18 A. Yes, it is.  
 19 Q. And it's never the practice -- I think you've made this  
 20 clear already, Mr Buchan, but I'm just asking you for  
 21 clarity -- to reduce the hot debrief into writing,  
 22 either during the meeting or afterwards?  
 23 A. Certainly for this inspection, it wasn't. For PEEL  
 24 inspections, the hot debrief is more formalised and it's  
 25 the combination of what it is they found and it in

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1 itself would be contained in an EGT. But on this  
 2 occasion, it was our desire to speak to the force just  
 3 to outline what it is we found whilst we were with them  
 4 during the week, accepting that everything we were  
 5 gathering was going towards a national inspection  
 6 report.  
 7 Q. It's not your position, is this correct, to issue  
 8 instructions to an ACC in circumstances such as this?  
 9 A. No, we're an inspectorate, not a regulatory body. We  
 10 don't have the power to issue instructions.  
 11 Q. I'm not suggesting that you do.  
 12 Can I ask you now about one further topic, and if we  
 13 could go back to your witness statement, please,  
 14 {INQ029796/19}. It's a very simple point. At the top  
 15 of page 19, at paragraph 90:  
 16 "Communications room lead."  
 17 This is an interview and you have told us about this  
 18 already. This is an interview of a chief superintendent  
 19 who, in addition to his role as head of the operational  
 20 communications branch, was a TFC.  
 21 If we could go to paragraph 92, please:  
 22 "The interviewee described how staff from the  
 23 control room would be used to assist the Silver  
 24 commander in the Silver command suite that would be  
 25 opened for a CT incident. This had been tested during

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1 Exercise Winchester Accord."  
 2 Mr Buchan, I'm sure it's totally clear from that  
 3 paragraph, but what was described to you was a response  
 4 to a terrorist attack where Silver, the Silver  
 5 commander, would be in the Silver command suite at force  
 6 headquarters.  
 7 A. Correct, that's my understanding.  
 8 MR HORWELL: Thank you, Mr Buchan. That's all I ask you.  
 9 Thank you, sir.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 11 MR GREANEY: Mr Atkinson is taking the lead on behalf of the  
 12 families. I'll ask him to ask his questions next,  
 13 please.  
 14 Questions from MR ATKINSON  
 15 MR ATKINSON: Mr Buchan, can you hear and see me?  
 16 A. Yes, I can.  
 17 Q. As a starting point, the role of HMICFRS as it now is,  
 18 and HMIC as it was then, is, as defined by section 54.2  
 19 of the Police Act, "to inspect and report on the  
 20 efficiency and effectiveness of police forces"?  
 21 A. That's correct.  
 22 Q. And the PEEL inspections, which we'll come to in  
 23 a moment, in one respect, the CT reports in another, are  
 24 each doing that job.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Or aspects of that job?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. As you've already made clear, the Inspectorate is  
 4 exactly that, it inspects and reports on rather than  
 5 regulates police forces?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. And you and your colleagues in the Inspectorate can  
 8 identify areas where a particular force can improve in  
 9 a particular way, but it is for the force to decide  
 10 what, if anything, to do about it?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I missed one word from that. It is  
 13 whose job to decide what's done about it?  
 14 MR ATKINSON: The force's, sir.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the chief constable?  
 16 A. The chief constable yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I missed what you said.  
 18 MR ATKINSON: The Force is clearly not strong enough with  
 19 me, sir!  
 20 To take an example, you've been shown the PEEL  
 21 reports in relation to GMP for 2016 and 2017. In each  
 22 of those, one of the areas that required improvement was  
 23 protecting vulnerable persons.  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. I think, in fact, that remained an area of concern so

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1 far as the Inspectorate were concerned going forward  
 2 from 2017.  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. But all you could do, is this right, is identify that  
 5 this is an area the force needed to improve?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And if the force chose not to do it, you would just come  
 8 back the following year and tell them again?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Presumably, measuring something like that, that there  
 11 was protection of vulnerable persons, is partly  
 12 identified through the various means you have told us  
 13 about, speaking to people and viewing documents, but  
 14 also through statistics that forces would keep  
 15 in relation to that kind of thing?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. In relation to specialist capabilities of police forces,  
 18 is this right, it's rather more difficult to measure how  
 19 a force is doing?  
 20 A. For some of those specialist capabilities, yes, it is.  
 21 Q. And to take as an example its response to the threat  
 22 from terrorism and to look at the PEEL report from 2015,  
 23 please. This is {INQ008365/1}, Mr Lopez.  
 24 {INQ008365/40}. You can see halfway down the page,  
 25 the bold type:

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1 "How effective are the arrangements in place to  
 2 ensure that the force can fulfil its national policing  
 3 responsibilities?"  
 4 If we can slightly enlarge the text just below that,  
 5 Mr Lopez, please.  
 6 We see these words:  
 7 "It is beyond the scope of this inspection to assess  
 8 in detail whether forces are capable of responding to  
 9 these national threats. Instead, HMIC has checked  
 10 whether forces have the necessary arrangements in place  
 11 to test their own preparedness for dealing with these  
 12 threats should they materialise."  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Not a criticism at all, Mr Buchan, but those words  
 15 appear virtually verbatim in 2016 and 2017 in this  
 16 context. Is the reality that there was a limit to what  
 17 a PEEL inspection could do in relation, for example, to  
 18 a force's preparedness to respond to an act of  
 19 terrorism?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. And without, as we can see, being able to grade how  
 22 effective or efficient a force was in that regard?  
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 24 Q. And having really to rely on what the force told them as  
 25 to whether the force considered itself to be prepared?

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1 A. That's part of the evidence that would have been  
 2 gathered.  
 3 Q. Because you told us that there would be the fieldwork,  
 4 the speaking to people, the focus groups, reviewing  
 5 documents. Those really are the things that the  
 6 Inspectorate would be doing?  
 7 A. Yes, throughout the fieldwork period for this PEEL  
 8 report, we'd have covered all the questions that PEEL  
 9 wanted covering.  
 10 Q. So is this fair: the focus on the preparedness of  
 11 a force for the threat from terrorism was but a small  
 12 part of a range of issues that you would be considering  
 13 in a PEEL report?  
 14 A. Yes, that's a fair assessment.  
 15 Q. And it would depend on who you talked to within the  
 16 force about that topic as to what you would be able to  
 17 say about that topic in a PEEL report?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. One of the things that may have been clear from what you  
 20 were saying this morning in the context of CT2 was that  
 21 some of the more senior officers, the strategic level  
 22 officers, that you spoke to had a higher level of  
 23 confidence in the force's preparedness, the  
 24 effectiveness of its training and so on than some of  
 25 those lower down the pecking order, patrol officers by

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1 way of example.  
 2 A. Yes. However, we found a good level of understanding of  
 3 those specialist officers throughout the strata of the  
 4 forces we visited, particularly firearms officers.  
 5 Q. But if you were speaking to strategic level officers or  
 6 specialist officers about, for example, terrorism,  
 7 in the context of a PEEL report, you may get a very  
 8 different impression from them as to preparedness than  
 9 if you'd spoken to patrol officers or control room  
 10 officers about it?  
 11 A. That is certainly possible.  
 12 Q. In the context of this particular report from 2015,  
 13 we can see at the bottom of the page it reads:  
 14 "The force is an integral member of the  
 15 Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum, which has  
 16 undertaken a comprehensive assessment of potential risks  
 17 in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004."  
 18 In that regard, I think it's right that as part of  
 19 the CT2 process, you spoke to the GMP Civil  
 20 Contingencies and Resilience Unit about their  
 21 preparedness and their training and so on in relation to  
 22 terrorism, and they talked about the relationship  
 23 between the GMP and its Local Resilience Forum?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. And to help you with that, I wonder, Mr Lopez, if we

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1 could have {INQ008360/1}, please.  
 2 If we could go down a couple of pages to where we  
 3 start having the answers rather than the questions.  
 4 {INQ008360/4}. If we could enlarge that page so we can  
 5 see row 5, please, which is about halfway down.  
 6 (Pause)  
 7 What it says there is:  
 8 "GMP coordinates its exercising with that of other  
 9 agencies. In Greater Manchester there is a multi-agency  
 10 training exercise coordination group that reports  
 11 through the Resilience Development Group to the Local  
 12 Resilience Forum. This may help to ensure GMP can work  
 13 effectively with non-police partners in the event of  
 14 an MTFA."  
 15 Further down the page at row 8:  
 16 "GMP has formal processes in place for sharing the  
 17 learning from exercises and operations. GMP has a major  
 18 incident, public order and events steering group chaired  
 19 by Chief Superintendent John O'Hare. Exercise debriefs  
 20 are forwarded to this group and then on to the Local  
 21 Resilience Forum. This may lead to closer and more  
 22 effective joint working between the force and its  
 23 partners."  
 24 And finally, over the page, please, Mr Lopez,  
 25 {INQ008360/5}, row 16:

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1 "There are formal processes in place in Manchester  
 2 for debriefing of exercises and incidents. The Local  
 3 Resilience Forum in Greater Manchester maintains a cadre  
 4 of debriefers trained to College of Policing standards.  
 5 These debriefers come from all agencies, eg police,  
 6 fire, ambulance, et cetera. Access to these debriefers  
 7 after an exercise or incident can be arranged through  
 8 the GMP Civil Contingencies and Resilience Unit. The  
 9 deployment of trained debriefers from diverse  
 10 backgrounds may mean that more effective learning from  
 11 an exercise or incident can take place."  
 12 Does it follow from that that what you were being  
 13 told in the context of the Local Resilience Forum was  
 14 that that forum played an important part in learning  
 15 from training exercises so far as GMP was concerned?  
 16 A. That's definitely the view that comes over from the  
 17 evidence.  
 18 Q. So that's what you or your colleagues who were carrying  
 19 out this inspection or interview were being told, that  
 20 the resilience forum had an important role in that?  
 21 A. That's right, allowing the force to work across the --  
 22 I think there's about ten local authorities in the GMP  
 23 area.  
 24 Q. And that the resilience forum had specialist debriefers  
 25 who had an important role to play in debriefing after

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1 training exercises?  
 2 A. That's correct.  
 3 Q. Thank you, Mr Lopez, we can take that document down.  
 4 If we move to the following year's PEEL inspection,  
 5 the 2016 one, and this is {INQ008368/51}.  
 6 This is the report for the year 2016, published in  
 7 March of 2017, and based presumably on that process of  
 8 fieldwork, of focus groups, of viewing documents during  
 9 the course of 2016 to allow for a report on that year?  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. So it follows, does it not, that albeit that it was  
 12 a separate exercise involving separate persons from the  
 13 Inspectorate, there was an overlap in time between the  
 14 fieldwork exercise that led to this report and the  
 15 fieldwork exercise that led to the CT2 report?  
 16 A. I might have to refer to my statement.  
 17 Q. Because you told us that the CT2 report, so far as  
 18 Manchester is concerned, you spoke to -- you carried out  
 19 your fieldwork in relation to that at the beginning of  
 20 November of 2016, culminating in the meeting with the  
 21 assistant chief constable whose name you clarified for  
 22 Mr Horwell earlier.  
 23 The point I'm seeking to make, Mr Buchan, and please  
 24 check if you need to, is that these are both exercises  
 25 that were happening during the course of 2016 --

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. -- albeit not at the same time, by a month, as each  
 3 other.  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. Realistically, the position as it has been described to  
 6 your team on the CT2 would have pertained to earlier  
 7 in the year?  
 8 A. I've got no reason to doubt that.  
 9 Q. So where it says at the beginning of the bottom  
 10 paragraph on that page --  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, Mr Atkinson, we lost the  
 12 beginning of that question. We didn't know whether it  
 13 was a poignant stop or what, but we joined it halfway  
 14 through, I'm afraid, sorry. Could you start the  
 15 question again for us?  
 16 MR ATKINSON: Starting again with that bottom paragraph on  
 17 the page, Mr Buchan, if you're with me --  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. "Greater Manchester Police has the necessary  
 20 arrangements in place to ensure that it can fulfil its  
 21 national policing responsibilities."  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And further down that paragraph:  
 24 "The force has conducted a range of exercises in the  
 25 previous 12 months, including several major live

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1 exercises such as a marauding terrorist exercise that  
 2 took place at the Trafford Centre."  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. In terms of the force having the necessary arrangements  
 5 in place to ensure it can fulfil its national policing  
 6 responsibilities, and mentioning exercises there, what  
 7 it does not mention in that context was the disconnect  
 8 between exercises and learning from exercises and  
 9 disseminating the learning from exercises that was  
 10 a message that was coming to you and your team on CT2.  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 12 Q. If we go down to the next page, please, Mr Lopez,  
 13 {INQ008368/52}, and enlarge the top half of the page,  
 14 this is a section you were taken to earlier today by  
 15 Mr Greaney, which talks about the readiness and  
 16 preparedness of the force to deal with an MTFA-type  
 17 attack.  
 18 Now, the inspection does not flag up, does it, the  
 19 concerns that CT2 was to flag up in relation, for  
 20 example, to the adequacy of Greater Manchester Police's  
 21 then Operation Plato plan?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. Or the degree to which those who would be having to act  
 24 under such a plan had been trained to do so?  
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. So does this potentially highlight a difficulty so far  
 2 as HMIC, as then they were, inspections are concerned in  
 3 terms of in such important areas as the preparedness of  
 4 a force for terrorism, the difficulties you as an  
 5 Inspectorate may have in identifying where there is more  
 6 that needs to be done?  
 7 A. I don't think there are difficulties in identifying  
 8 where more work is needed. I think in comparing and  
 9 contrasting these concluding paragraphs in the PEEL  
 10 report with the deeper dive, if I can call it that,  
 11 around CT2, it's probably indicative of the timetable  
 12 that PEEL operates to than the need to cover a large  
 13 area of policing that may be -- well, I know that the  
 14 inspectors involved in this report would not have got  
 15 down into the detail that we had.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I have no idea, but bearing in  
 17 mind the limitations that you found with Plato relating  
 18 to terrorist attacks, would you be likely to put those  
 19 in a public document?  
 20 A. I doubt... unlikely. We would certainly have to really  
 21 think that through, but unlikely into a public document.  
 22 MR ATKINSON: Taking that point entirely on board, though,  
 23 isn't the difficulty that someone reading this document  
 24 would not obviously know the details of a potentially  
 25 sensitive Operation Plato plan but would have no idea

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1 that there were any issues at all as to the preparedness  
 2 of Greater Manchester Police for an MTFA incident at  
 3 a time when your CT2 inspection was to show that there  
 4 were real difficulties?  
 5 A. I think what I would read from this report is that --  
 6 have they made preparations to deal with a terrorist  
 7 firearms attack? Yes, they have. Have they tested and  
 8 exercised those? Yes, they have. In terms of a deeper  
 9 dive, that is what HMIC thematics do, and I don't  
 10 remember the timescale, I don't remember the -- I can't  
 11 recall the exact drafting arrangements that went on with  
 12 this, this report, but it's wholly consistent that you  
 13 would get into more detail in a deep dive inspection  
 14 report like CT2.  
 15 Q. If we slightly move up that page, Mr Lopez, if we could,  
 16 so what is now our first new paragraph on the screen as  
 17 we leak at it now, can we see towards the end of that  
 18 paragraph that begins "Greater Manchester Police is  
 19 aware" -- do you see that, Mr Buchan?  
 20 A. Yes, I've got that.  
 21 Q. Towards the end of that paragraph, four lines from the  
 22 bottom:  
 23 "The level of knowledge and awareness of staff in  
 24 the control room, most notably the cadre of force  
 25 incident managers to provide the initial command and

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1 control of critical and spontaneous incidents, is  
 2 reassuring.”  
 3 As you were telling us earlier today, in terms of  
 4 the personnel who will be in the control room, the staff  
 5 in the control room, a step down from the force incident  
 6 manager’s level, it wasn’t quite so reassuring, was it?  
 7 A. No, you’re completely right. In fact, we’ve said that  
 8 knowledge of the FDO, which is the force incident  
 9 manager that’s referred to there, was good, but we  
 10 certainly didn’t find that the knowledge and awareness  
 11 of staff supporting the FDO was good or indeed  
 12 reassuring.  
 13 Q. Because if we go, Mr Lopez, please, to {INQ008355/1},  
 14 and if we could go down to the first of the pages that  
 15 has the rows of answers on it, please. Probably the  
 16 next page or two.  
 17 {INQ008355/4}. If we could focus in on the bottom  
 18 of that page, please. What that row says, when zoomed  
 19 in on, is:  
 20 “GMP control room staff have not received specific  
 21 training regarding the force response to an MTFA. Some  
 22 members of the control room staff focus group described  
 23 how they were given JESIP manuals some years ago, and  
 24 while these described tasks to be undertaken by control  
 25 room staff in the event of a major incident, they did

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1 not relate specifically to a terrorist incident. No  
 2 further training had been provided. This may mean that  
 3 control room staff do not know immediately what to do  
 4 in the event of an MTFA.”  
 5 A. Yes, that’s correct.  
 6 Q. If we go on to the next page, please, {INQ008355/5}.  
 7 Row 5 makes a reference to limitations with the IT  
 8 system. I don’t need to dwell on that, but those were  
 9 being reported. At row 7:  
 10 “Not all GMP control room staff were aware of  
 11 contingency planning undertaken by the force.”  
 12 And finally for these purposes, row 10:  
 13 “GMP control room staff receive dedicated training  
 14 but with limited content about the response to an MTFA.”  
 15 I think you were taken to that by Mr Greaney  
 16 earlier.  
 17 The point perhaps is this, Mr Buchan: you told us  
 18 that CT2 was part of an exercise undertaken by the  
 19 Inspectorate in which you visited, was it 15 forces  
 20 around the country?  
 21 A. Correct.  
 22 Q. And were therefore able to drill down in much more  
 23 detail in relation to those 15 forces about their  
 24 preparedness for a terrorist attack?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. If the Greater Manchester Police had not been one of  
 2 those, all that there would be in relation to its  
 3 preparedness as at 2016 is the PEEL report?  
 4 A. Yes, that’s correct.  
 5 Q. Which does not in fact, as we now know, fully reflect  
 6 the position so far as its effectiveness and efficiency  
 7 in that regard are concerned?  
 8 A. Yes, that’s correct. The question set that CT2 would  
 9 have used would have enabled you to undertake a deeper  
 10 dive than certainly was done during the PEEL  
 11 inspections.  
 12 Q. Are there ways that the Inspectorate can undertake  
 13 a more detailed examination in relation to, for example,  
 14 preparedness for terrorism in the same way it does  
 15 in relation to any number of other areas of a police  
 16 force’s task as part of the PEEL report if there are  
 17 more questions about the terrorist aspect?  
 18 A. Yes, undoubtedly it could. However, the challenge for  
 19 those who run the PEEL inspection programme is to  
 20 provide the best spread of questions covering what is  
 21 broad areas of policing that can be realistically  
 22 delivered in the time frame available, and with the  
 23 start of actually a CT programme, that would have  
 24 undoubtedly played into the considerations of how deep  
 25 to examine any one particular area.

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1 Q. In relation to the 2017 PEEL report — this is  
 2 {INQ008353/25} — right at the top of the page, this is  
 3 a paragraph the chairman has already asked you about:  
 4 “The force’s arrangements to manage major incidents  
 5 were thoroughly tested during the terrorist attack  
 6 at the Manchester Arena in May 2017 and were found to be  
 7 effective. Greater Manchester Police carefully debriefs  
 8 after training exercises and major incidents to identify  
 9 learning points and ensure its operation is subject to  
 10 continuous improvement.”  
 11 In relation to the second of those sentences first,  
 12 again in relation to learning points from incidents and  
 13 from training exercises, would it be fair to say that  
 14 some of the focus groups that took part in CT2  
 15 identified real limitations in relation to how much  
 16 there was organised and structured learning from  
 17 exercises, did they not?  
 18 A. That’s correct.  
 19 Q. And yet although that process had been undertaken at the  
 20 end of 2016, this report based on 2017 and published  
 21 early in 2018 doesn’t seem to reflect that learning at  
 22 all, does it?  
 23 A. No, it does not. The evidence they’ve gathered during  
 24 the course of the PEEL — we gathered during the course  
 25 of this PEEL inspection certainly hasn’t identified

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1 that.

2 Q. And again may be a consequence of who was or was not --

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry to interrupt. This is not

4 something to do with maintaining public confidence as

5 this appears in this document?

6 A. Sir, sorry, I don't understand.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If one was actually putting in there

8 what you had discovered in CT2, you would have been

9 saying, "Well, there do appear to have been some

10 failings in taking on board, anyway, quickly enough the

11 learning from various exercises".

12 A. Yes.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That might have a difficult effect on

14 public confidence and I wonder if that's how something

15 like this comes to be in here to try and maintain public

16 confidence.

17 A. I'd be surprised if we had written something to maintain

18 public confidence. That's really not our job.

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That means that the PEEL inquiry found

20 out something -- came to a different conclusion on its

21 research than you did on your research?

22 A. So the evidence they have gathered has led them to

23 write -- I'm talking about "them", it's my organisation

24 as well -- for us to have written what we have done

25 there. The deeper dive, and one could argue

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1 unsurprisingly, has unearthed additional issues and

2 potentially challenged that. So the issue for us is:

3 why was one half of the organisation saying one thing

4 and the other half was saying another?

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you resolved that issue yet?

6 A. We did and do speak continually around these issues,

7 particularly when it gets into the specialist areas of

8 policing, of which this is one, where a lot of the work

9 is done through national thematic inspection work as

10 opposed to trying to assess a force's overall

11 efficiency -- sorry, in this case overall effectiveness.

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Atkinson, I'm sorry to intervene.

13 I'll hand over to you again.

14 MR ATKINSON: No, not at all, very helpful, sir.

15 In relation to the first sentence there as to the

16 effectiveness of the force's arrangements for a major

17 incident, of course by this time the CT2 review had

18 uncovered its concerns in relation to the

19 Operation Plato plan for the Greater Manchester Police.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And within that plan, the limitations to the

22 multi-agency, the JESIP, elements of any such response?

23 A. Sorry, are you saying that in CT2 we identified failings

24 in the JESIP response?

25 Q. Sorry, in CT2 you uncovered limitations to the way that

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1 JESIP was addressed within the Operation Plato plan?

2 A. Yes. Yes, you're right, yes.

3 Q. And also the limitations to the extent to which those

4 who might have to act under that plan were aware of it

5 and what their roles would be under it?

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. So the force's arrangements to manage a major incident

8 in those respects weren't effective, were they?

9 A. I think, as we found in CT2, those roles that you've

10 referred to there, and we have referred to in the Plato

11 plan, and we have referred to in the report, were not

12 subject to test. That comment may have had its origins

13 in the fact that the force did actually conduct a fairly

14 large scale exercise, Winchester Accord. So in many

15 respects their response was tested, but in some that we

16 highlighted in CT2 it was not. Primarily, that of the

17 unarmed officers who are likely to be the first at the

18 scene and, secondly, the force control room staff, who

19 I think we certainly took the view would have a key role

20 in supporting the FDO in those initial -- yes, those

21 initial moments, those initial throes of trying to

22 respond effectively to a terrorist attack.

23 Q. If Mr Lopez, we could go to {INQ008345/1}, please. This

24 is a document that Mr Greaney took you to a little

25 earlier so I won't spend very long on it. We can see at

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1 the bottom of that page, row 4, reference to the fact

2 that there was no joint working of the emergency

3 services in the force plan and just the references to

4 joint operating procedures rather than a narrative

5 in relation to them. So an acknowledgement that they

6 existed rather than how that was to work alongside the

7 Plato plan in effect.

8 A. Yes, that's certainly the impression I got. It was just

9 flagging that they existed as opposed to what does that

10 mean to GMP and how will they take those forward.

11 Q. Just a small point while we're on this page for

12 convenience. We can see from box 1 at the top of the

13 page that it gives the title of the plan, it says it's

14 the version from October 2016, and says that it consists

15 of eight pages. A little earlier in your evidence, and

16 it's reflected, I think, at paragraph (inaudible:

17 distorted) of your statement -- I'll just check that's

18 right. Yes, it is. You talked about how there was

19 a lack of consistency between Operation Plato plans from

20 across the country that you viewed, the shortest of

21 which you said in that context was 16 pages. Does it

22 appear that the GMP one was in fact half as short again

23 as anything else that you saw?

24 A. I've certainly not picked up that before and that

25 certainly appears to be the case. I'd have to go back

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1 and look to see if there were any appendices to the  
 2 plan, but I don't recall there being any.  
 3 Q. Certainly in the version that we have of it there are  
 4 not, but we can check that. Thank you, Mr Buchan.  
 5 Staying with this document, though, if we could go  
 6 on, please, I think to the next page, Mr Lopez,  
 7 {INQ008345/2}. I think Mr Greaney's taken you to those.  
 8 So one more page on {INQ008345/3}.  
 9 We can see row 11, again a reference to:  
 10 "Joint working with other emergency services and  
 11 their safety are not evidenced."  
 12 Again I think a reference to JESIP and to joint  
 13 operating procedures.  
 14 Finally in this document, over the page again,  
 15 {INQ008345/4}, row 15. We can see that that's  
 16 a reference within this document to something you've  
 17 touched on earlier, Mr Buchan:  
 18 "No evidence in the force plans of action cards that  
 19 are role specific or action cards, flow charts for any  
 20 reason."  
 21 And that very much tied in with the results of your  
 22 focus group with those in the control room that they  
 23 lacked clear instruction that action cards would have  
 24 given them as to what to do when Operation Plato was  
 25 declared?

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1 A. Yes. We first saw those in other forces, looked at  
 2 them, spoke to staff who performed similar roles in  
 3 other forces, and concluded that they would probably  
 4 help manage the workload, hence our comments in the  
 5 report.  
 6 Q. And indeed the FDO who you spoke to in relation to the  
 7 Greater Manchester control room had effectively created  
 8 his own set of action cards, hasn't he, a list of points  
 9 that he prepared for himself to help him in dealing with  
 10 a Plato incident?  
 11 A. He'd certainly prepared an aide-memoire that was  
 12 designed to help him and his colleagues undertake the  
 13 FDO role, something to refer to when making those  
 14 decisions.  
 15 Q. The difference between that and the action cards is the  
 16 action cards would be available to the other people  
 17 working in the control room for them to have immediate  
 18 access to rather than having to go to him for him to  
 19 tell them from his aide-memoire what they needed to do?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. And the information you were getting from others in the  
 22 room is that's exactly what they would do, is go to the  
 23 FDO and ask him what to do next?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. At a time when he had more than enough else to be doing?

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1 A. That was certainly our view.  
 2 Q. I think two final points. You were asked about the BTP  
 3 position. This, if it helps you, Mr Buchan, is your  
 4 second statement, paragraph 45, which is page 8.  
 5 This is the point about what the BTP Plato planning  
 6 indicated would happen or rather what the force incident  
 7 manager you spoke to from the BTP indicated would happen  
 8 if BTP was the first force to deal with a Plato incident  
 9 in terms of how they would come to know about it and the  
 10 moving between them and a local force as to who would be  
 11 in control of it.  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. As I think has already been ventilated, clearly the  
 14 whole point of having planning for an Operation Plato  
 15 incident is so that the right decisions can be made  
 16 incredibly quickly early on?  
 17 A. I agree.  
 18 Q. And the right people can make decisions early on and  
 19 inform those who need to know about it in the right  
 20 order and at the right time?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Because in almost any Plato-type incident it will be  
 23 more than one emergency service or emergency responder  
 24 that will be involved?  
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. What potentially you were being told by the BTP's FIM in  
 2 this context was that there was a lack of that strategic  
 3 thinking in advance that would mean that the right  
 4 people were in control of a Plato incident from the  
 5 beginning?  
 6 A. The BTP FIM we spoke to said if he ended up or started  
 7 to command a Plato incident, then he would seek to hand  
 8 that over to the Home Office force as soon as  
 9 practicable, if on those rare occasions it was the BTP  
 10 FIM.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What would make it impractical? Why  
 12 isn't it just practical to do it straightaway?  
 13 A. That's my terminology, sir. It should happen  
 14 straightaway.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 16 MR ATKINSON: Because one can envisage the situation that  
 17 happened in Manchester, which is that BTP officers on  
 18 patrol were the first police officers of any kind to  
 19 know about the incident. Certainly our understanding  
 20 is that the same pertained in relation to London Bridge,  
 21 where it was the BTP staff on duty at London Bridge who  
 22 were the first to become involved. Given the area that  
 23 BTP covers in relation to railway stations, in relation  
 24 to railways, it's not beyond the realms of possibility  
 25 that BTP officers may be the first officers to have

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1 knowledge of an incident?  
 2 A. I would agree.  
 3 Q. Yet do we understand that it was really only in London  
 4 that that kind of joined-up thinking had happened by the  
 5 time of the incident in May of 2017 to ensure that the  
 6 local force had control effectively from the outset?  
 7 A. Certainly, as I said before, a lot of the investment BTP  
 8 had made in counter-terrorism was in London, so working  
 9 with the Metropolitan Police. I think working with the  
 10 Metropolitan Police for BTP in London is quite a normal  
 11 routine event, but certainly for counter-terrorism  
 12 that's where their investment was and those arrangements  
 13 were subject to an MoU, if you like.  
 14 Q. Had the Inspectorate identified a need more generally  
 15 for thought -- more than just thought, action -- to be  
 16 taken between the BTP and local forces to regularise the  
 17 position nationally rather than just in London?  
 18 A. We didn't.  
 19 Q. Equally, but still perhaps with the input of the BTP,  
 20 in relation to high risk or iconic sites, to ensure that  
 21 there were joined-up arrangements in place for those?  
 22 A. Yes, you should have a plan, an understanding, of what  
 23 it is you're going to do. If you designate something  
 24 a site then you should have an idea what it is you're  
 25 going to do in responding to that. We didn't cover

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1 those in this inspection, we were just looking at the  
 2 command and control arrangements in forces.  
 3 Q. Finally, so far as I'm concerned, can we go back to the  
 4 handwritten note of the assistant chief constable.  
 5 {INQ035779/1}.  
 6 We appreciate that this is not your note, Mr Buchan,  
 7 but certainly what we have picked up from your evidence,  
 8 and indeed from your witness statement, is that you had  
 9 spoken to a whole series of focus groups and key  
 10 individuals in the Greater Manchester Police, and we  
 11 know from the documents, some of which we've looked at  
 12 today, that those conversations and focus groups were  
 13 the first couple of days of November, 2 November is in  
 14 fact the date of the ones that we've looked at so far.  
 15 So this debrief, hot debrief, with the assistant  
 16 chief constable was after those focus groups and  
 17 discussions had happened?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And the things that you had picked up from those  
 20 included, as we understand it, the risk of the FDO being  
 21 overloaded and overwhelmed?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. The limitations to the training and knowledge of the  
 24 staff in the control room as to what their roles should  
 25 be?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Limitations in relation to the Operation Plato plan for  
 3 GMP and limitations to the knowledge that the unarmed  
 4 police officers who may have to respond to an incident  
 5 had as to what their role should be?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Would you agree that each of those topics is, albeit in  
 8 very shorthand form, touched on in this page?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And so does this note accord therefore with your  
 11 recollection that these were areas of concern to you,  
 12 having undertaken your focus groups in the preceding  
 13 days, that you thought the force needed to know about  
 14 straightaway?  
 15 A. Yes, those were the things we identified during the  
 16 course of our fieldwork.  
 17 Q. And they needed to know about them straightaway because  
 18 they were things that you considered they ought to think  
 19 about doing something about straightaway rather than  
 20 waiting for your report to come out in due course?  
 21 A. Yes. We'd certainly entered into that undertaking with  
 22 CT Policing that we would talk to forces as we went to  
 23 draw their attention to what we found in their force,  
 24 although the ultimate report would be a national level  
 25 report as opposed to a report examining the performance

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1 of GMP, for instance.  
 2 Q. I don't know if the position has changed, Mr Buchan, but  
 3 certainly you indicated that at this stage such hot  
 4 debriefs were not reduced by your side of the  
 5 conversation to writing. Do you now consider that would  
 6 be a beneficial exercise?  
 7 A. Oh yes, in hindsight, that's definitely an error and,  
 8 undoubtedly in this case, an error on my part.  
 9 Subsequent hot debriefs will be -- are recorded.  
 10 Q. But certainly the points that you wanted to cover are  
 11 flagged up on this page?  
 12 A. Yes, I think the points I wanted to cover. Yes, I did  
 13 cover those and they were the obvious ones to cover.  
 14 MR ATKINSON: Thank you very much, Mr Buchan.  
 15 Thank you, sir, that's all I need to ask.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Atkinson.  
 17 MR GREANEY: Mr Cooper had indicated that he had a very  
 18 small area of questioning and subject to that area not  
 19 being covered by Mr Atkinson.  
 20 Questions from MR COOPER  
 21 MR COOPER: Thank you, Mr Greaney. Thank you, sir.  
 22 You'll understand, Mr Buchan, that as far as the  
 23 families are concerned, particularly those that  
 24 I represent, they want to be reassured of Greater  
 25 Manchester Police's ability to hear recommendations and

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1 to act on them. It's a basic principle, but you  
 2 understand that's important to us, don't you?  
 3 A. I do.  
 4 Q. And I want to ask you about recommendations, for  
 5 instance, that the Inspectorate have given to Greater  
 6 Manchester Police and their track record generally of  
 7 response to them so that we can perhaps be reassured  
 8 that whatever recommendations the chair may come to, so  
 9 far as Greater Manchester Police are concerned, they're  
 10 going to act on them.  
 11 I want to take you to PEEL, and this is the only  
 12 part of the statement I am taking you to, so that will  
 13 give you an indication I won't be long. If you want to  
 14 go back to your statement to refresh your memory on  
 15 {INQ029796/1} and it is paragraphs 24 onwards, dealing  
 16 with PEEL and its effectiveness. You may want to just  
 17 have that in front of you to refresh your memory if  
 18 needs be from paragraph 24 onwards.  
 19 If we look, for instance, at paragraph 25,  
 20 a recommendation or an observation was made of Greater  
 21 Manchester Police that they require improvement for  
 22 investigating crime. Do you see that?  
 23 A. Yes, I do.  
 24 Q. Let's understand what "requires improvement" means. The  
 25 "requires improvement" is one step away from inadequate,

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1 isn't it?  
 2 A. That's right.  
 3 Q. In terms of requires improvement for investigating  
 4 crime, does that include all crime?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. So for instance, any report of terrorist –related crime  
 7 or suspicions from the public in relation to  
 8 terrorist –related crime would be included in that  
 9 category?  
 10 A. That's a very good question. I don't know whether  
 11 terrorism formed part of the data set that they looked  
 12 at.  
 13 Q. I'm asking for a particular reason. You're probably  
 14 ahead of me now. Because we know that Greater  
 15 Manchester Police was placed in special measures, wasn't  
 16 it, at the end of last year?  
 17 A. It was.  
 18 Q. And that was because of its failure to record more than  
 19 80,000 crimes in the space of a year, and that was the  
 20 year up to 30 June. Greater Manchester Police were  
 21 urged, as you know, weren't they, to improve this and  
 22 they didn't, did they?  
 23 A. That's where we got to the report — the recent victims'  
 24 report that we've published.  
 25 Q. So what we have, and again it's a question as to how

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1 much the families can rely on Greater Manchester  
 2 Police's actions rather than any words, as far as their  
 3 actions are concerned on this related matter, "Requires  
 4 improvement for investigating crime", which may or may  
 5 not include terrorist –related crime, that might be  
 6 clarified in due course, they were told of that back in  
 7 2016 and they didn't do anything about it; that's right,  
 8 isn't it?  
 9 A. I can't comment on what GMP did or did not do on the  
 10 back of that grading.  
 11 Q. Let's just remind ourselves what the Inspectorate  
 12 guidelines are for placing a police force into special  
 13 measures, as the Greater Manchester Police presently are  
 14 in special measures. I'm going from the Inspectorate  
 15 guidelines. That is only introduced if:  
 16 "A force is not responding to a cause of concern or  
 17 if it's not succeeding in managing, mitigating or  
 18 eradicating those causes of concern."  
 19 That's your definition; yes?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. So what we can assume from that is that Greater  
 22 Manchester Police were informed back in 2016/2017 that  
 23 improvements were required for the investigation of  
 24 crime, which may or may not include terrorist crime, and  
 25 they did not respond to that cause of concern or, if

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1 they did, they had not succeeded in managing, mitigating  
 2 or eradicating that cause of concern. That must be  
 3 right, mustn't it, because that's why they were placed  
 4 in special measures?  
 5 A. That would follow, yes.  
 6 Q. And no doubt, and I'm not going into that aspect of  
 7 special measures, I'm simply asking for reassurance,  
 8 that Greater Manchester Police are now being looked at  
 9 very carefully as to how they respond to recommendations  
 10 from the Inspectorate, aren't they?  
 11 A. Yes. The report includes — the most recent victims'  
 12 report includes the line that there will be a return in  
 13 6 months' time (overspeaking).  
 14 Q. Because clearly there is, even on this aspect of the  
 15 evidence I'm putting to you, a little bit of a track  
 16 record here of Greater Manchester Police not responding  
 17 to recommendations or advice?  
 18 A. It would appear that those requiring improvement  
 19 judgements have been levelled at the force for  
 20 investigating crime on successive PEEL inspections.  
 21 Q. And they've done nothing about it?  
 22 A. Whether what they've done is insufficient to bring them  
 23 above requiring improvement or whether they've done  
 24 nothing, I just don't know the answer to that question.  
 25 Q. Do you know generally what Greater Manchester Police's

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1 track record is of responding to advice and  
 2 recommendations from the Inspectorate?  
 3 A. I personally do not.  
 4 Q. Again, you'll understand why I'm asking because we want  
 5 confidence that they'll listen to this inquiry.  
 6 A. I can completely understand the question.  
 7 Q. One other aspect I want to ask you about, and that  
 8 relates to the terrorist attack. It's paragraph 27 of  
 9 your statement in relation to PEEL. It seems a long  
 10 time ago now, Mr Buchan, it was this morning, and you  
 11 told us to remind you that terrorist attacks are  
 12 ungraded, and this was the practice in 2017, as you say  
 13 in your statement:  
 14 "As the methodology only required a narrative  
 15 judgement."  
 16 Can you just help me what you mean by that? Was it  
 17 just that simply there was a practice that was going on  
 18 that only required a narrative judgement or was there  
 19 a rationale behind the process that only a narrative  
 20 judgement should be given rather than a grading?  
 21 A. I can't answer that question because I don't know the  
 22 decision-making around why only a narrative judgement  
 23 was made. I will probably have to go and find out.  
 24 Q. Again, you'll forgive me for asking on behalf of those  
 25 we represent as to why it was when it related to

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1 a terrorist attack Greater Manchester Police or any  
 2 police force were not graded. Maybe you might help,  
 3 obviously guided by the chair, as to why terrorist  
 4 attacks were treated somewhat differently to other  
 5 aspects that were graded and perhaps you can give us  
 6 some idea as to the thinking behind that. There might  
 7 be a good reason but perhaps you could explain it to us  
 8 in due course, subject to the chair's permission.  
 9 Can I ask you this: regardless of what the situation  
 10 was then, is that still the situation now, that  
 11 terrorist attack assessments are still not graded and  
 12 they are still addressed on a narrative perspective?  
 13 A. I do not know that question for the PEEL inspections  
 14 that are currently being completed, but I will include  
 15 that in my follow-up answers for the inquiry.  
 16 Q. This is my last question, really more of an enquiry, if  
 17 I may be a little impertinent. It's simply this: the  
 18 families are concerned, certainly those that  
 19 I represent, to understand why a terrorist attack  
 20 capability, as far as policing is concerned, is assessed  
 21 differently and whether perhaps, this is my last  
 22 question of you, it should be graded so that there's  
 23 a clear direction given to police forces as to when  
 24 they're doing well or when they're doing not so well and  
 25 it's crystal clear to them rather than a narrative which

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1 may be lost in a little bit of muddiness? What do you  
 2 think about that?  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't know the reason for it?  
 4 A. No, I don't.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But assuming there is no particular  
 6 reason which convinces you of it, would you think it  
 7 might be a good idea to grade it?  
 8 A. I think terrorism — the police response to terrorism as  
 9 it stands in the UK is... Although it happens locally,  
 10 there is a large national element to it. So there is  
 11 the performance of regional teams and national-based  
 12 assets that all need to be considered. And as terrorism  
 13 policing is — thankfully it's not a regular occurrence,  
 14 although tragic when it happens, I believe that it's an  
 15 area of policing that absolutely needs a deep dive, like  
 16 we have conducted in our CT programmes, to examine how  
 17 efficient and effective the police are responding and  
 18 dealing with a terrorist attack, particularly if that  
 19 response requires working with so many other agencies  
 20 and partners that are often beyond the capabilities and  
 21 capacities of any one single force — and I include the  
 22 large metropolitan forces in there.  
 23 So yes, I take your point that it is clear that it's  
 24 an area of importance that is not ascribed a judgement.  
 25 However, my own view, I have some concerns about how —

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1 the merit of doing that as opposed to the deep dive  
 2 thematic inspections that we described today.  
 3 MR COOPER: Lastly, this, and simply a suggestion within  
 4 a question: there's no reason why a narrative and a  
 5 grading can't be given, is there?  
 6 A. No.  
 7 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Cooper.  
 9 MR GREANEY: Sir, Mr Gibbs on behalf of British Transport  
 10 Police has indicated that he thinks he can bring some  
 11 further clarity to bear in relation to paragraph 45 of  
 12 Mr Buchan's witness statement, which is the issue in  
 13 respect of which you have asked some questions, and  
 14 we would suggest that he be given permission to ask  
 15 questions to provide that clarification, subject to the  
 16 opportunity for anyone else who is particularly  
 17 interested in that issue, by which I mean other  
 18 questions today, to come back.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 20 MR GREANEY: Mr Gibbs.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Come and shine light on the situation.  
 22 Questions from MR GIBBS  
 23 MR GIBBS: Thank you. It may be that Mr Atkinson's already  
 24 cleared it up, but just in case he hasn't. It's your  
 25 second statement, the one that deals with BTP,

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1 Mr Buchan. Paragraph 45. It may contain two separate  
2 things. You say at the end of the paragraph, quite  
3 clearly, that in a situation where the BTP FIM has taken  
4 command of a terrorist incident he will or she will seek  
5 to hand over that command to the local Home Office force  
6 as soon as practicable and will then play the BTP role  
7 in the incident.

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. But the report of that incident may have come to BTP  
10 from a number of places, it may have come from  
11 Network Rail staff or the train operating company staff  
12 or a member of the public who's got in touch with its  
13 text messaging facility, but it may have come in as  
14 a 999 call to the local Home Office force; yes?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. In which case, that force will have passed the 999  
17 message to BTP?

18 A. Yes. That's the usual arrangement, yes, as I understand  
19 it.

20 Q. Just to clarify, the chairman was anxious about  
21 a situation potentially where the Home Office force  
22 might take command of the situation and then pass it to  
23 BTP, who would then have to pass it back to the  
24 Home Office force. But correct me if I'm wrong, that's  
25 not what you're describing here, is it?

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1 A. I think that's incredibly unlikely to happen. I think  
2 if the Home Office force received a 999 call that gave  
3 them the impression that a terrorist attack was  
4 underway, I don't envisage them ringing British  
5 Transport Police and saying in essence, "Over to you",  
6 because that's not how the arrangements that we've been  
7 told about work.

8 Now, the detail surrounding that I'm unaware of,  
9 but -- yes.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure it is that (inaudible:  
11 distorted). No doubt in practice it wouldn't happen but  
12 in theory what Mr Gibbs has said to you is the 999 call  
13 comes in, says there's a terrorist attack at the local  
14 station, that 999 call is then passed to BTP, who then  
15 have command of it and then they pass it back. Isn't  
16 that how it's meant to work? Pragmatically it may not.

17 A. Pragmatically -- I guess that's what's driving my  
18 answer. Pragmatically, I just don't see that happening.

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, Mr Gibbs, it may not happen in  
20 practice, but it does seem to me the theory may be what  
21 that prescribes.

22 MR GIBBS: I don't think there's anything more I can do to  
23 help. I'd hoped I was going to help, but if I haven't,  
24 I'm sorry about that.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just ask you, which is nothing to

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1 do with this, are you in an art gallery?

2 MR GIBBS: No, I had a difficulty with Wi-Fi at one place in  
3 chambers and I've had to move to another.

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They look like they're very grand  
5 pictures behind you.

6 MR GIBBS: I won't say anything about that.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Gibbs.

8 I have a couple of questions to ask. They are  
9 short. Mr Basu has told us about how they had  
10 a considerable debrief into what had happened at  
11 Manchester and the two London attacks and they came up,  
12 I think he told us, with 103 recommendations. Did the  
13 Inspectorate play any part in that?

14 A. Not that I'm aware of.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.

16 The other thing which I think Deputy or Assistant  
17 Commissioner Lucy D'Orsi raises is that she thought  
18 there may be some problem surrounding the setting up of  
19 an SCG; is that something that you looked at at all?

20 A. No, we didn't. We didn't look at that. Our focus and  
21 the evidence we gathered on the way sort of reaffirmed  
22 that that focus was on how does a police force deal with  
23 this when it comes in. So in terms of the SCG,  
24 strategic coordination group, being set up afterwards,  
25 no, we didn't look at that.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. You have no power to direct  
2 a police force what to do, you make recommendations?

3 A. That's correct.

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When we talk about PEEL, your findings,  
5 recommendations, are all made public?

6 A. True.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And when we have something that happened  
8 when Manchester gets put into special measures, that is  
9 something that gets an enormous amount of publicity and  
10 an enormous amount of pressure is put politically and  
11 among the police force itself.

12 A. Yes, that's certainly the case.

13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Things if they haven't been done, and  
14 I'm not here criticising GMP or anything or saying that  
15 it was right or wrong to be put into special measures,  
16 but things happen.

17 A. Yes.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: With your CT reports, they're not  
19 graded, they're not made public, there's no way of  
20 enforcing the recommendations, and if the police force  
21 don't carry them out, that's not made public either, so  
22 there can be no political pressure of the sort that  
23 we're talking about. Is that a desirable situation?

24 A. I can only talk from my own experience here, sir. The  
25 CT Network were incredibly keen, and let's say on the

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1 front foot, in understanding what it is we had found as  
 2 soon as possible. In some respects it was them who  
 3 suggested we debrief each force as we go just to  
 4 highlight these issues because we can't wait for  
 5 a report to unearth these things.  
 6 The evidence I've got, particularly around their  
 7 willingness to examine their national Plato guidelines  
 8 so quickly shows to me or demonstrates to me a real  
 9 willingness to take on these recommendations and do  
 10 something about them quickly. So in terms of  
 11 Counter—terrorism Policing, I have a degree of  
 12 confidence that that political leverage that you've  
 13 referred to isn't necessarily needed to deliver a result  
 14 on the recommendations we make.  
 15 If it helps, a lot of our inspection team are drawn  
 16 from CT Policing, from other agencies, firearms experts,  
 17 those sort of things, so we do go around with a fair  
 18 degree of operational and strategic credibility, which  
 19 I think helps the police respond so quickly before  
 20 seeing our final report.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not suggesting any particular fault  
 22 with GMP, so please, this is not to be taken the wrong  
 23 way. I'm just really talking about police forces, like  
 24 everyone else, have restrictions on their budget.  
 25 A. Mm—hm.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are some areas of improvement  
 2 which can be identified where a lot of political  
 3 pressure can be put: you are not solving enough crimes,  
 4 you are not dealing with victims properly. It gets  
 5 a lot of publicity and it's in the paper. So the  
 6 recommendations which do not see the light of day  
 7 publicly, if you are there with your limited budget,  
 8 I just wonder whether they don't take the priority which  
 9 perhaps they could do.  
 10 A. Obviously chief constables have to make decisions on  
 11 where they spend their money. There obviously is  
 12 a national CT grant that is distributed in a number of  
 13 particular ways, but there is additional funding to look  
 14 at some of the recommendations. I would say a lot of  
 15 the recommendations we've been discussing today, none of  
 16 which comes with a particularly high price tag...  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much. That's all  
 18 I wanted to ask.  
 19 MR GREANEY: Sir, I have no questions, and that's as far as  
 20 we can take the evidence today.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I'm very grateful. It has taken  
 22 a lot longer than you anticipated, but you've been  
 23 a considerable help to me and I'm very grateful for your  
 24 time.  
 25 A. Thank you very much, sir.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 10 o'clock tomorrow?  
 2 MR GREANEY: Yes, please, sir.  
 3 (4.57 pm)  
 4 (The inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am  
 5 on Tuesday, 9 February 2021)  
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