

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 75

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Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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Tuesday, 16 March 2021

1  
2 (10.00 am)  
3 MR DE LA POER: Sir, good morning.  
4 SERGEANT ANDREW BEASLEY (affirmed)  
5 Questions from MR DE LA POER  
6 MR DE LA POER: Can you please state your full name?  
7 A. Andrew Beasley.  
8 Q. What is your rank?  
9 A. Police sergeant.  
10 Q. Sergeant Beasley, you are a police sergeant with Greater  
11 Manchester Police; is that correct?  
12 A. Yes, sir.  
13 Q. When did you join Greater Manchester Police?  
14 A. In November 2001.  
15 Q. When did you qualify as a sergeant?  
16 A. In 2004 but, I'm sorry, the exact date escapes me.  
17 Q. Not at all. It will follow, as everybody will  
18 appreciate from that, that you'd been a sergeant for  
19 some many years by the time of the incident we're going  
20 to focus on.  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. What we're going to do is review some of your training  
23 records before we come to the incident on 22 May. Your  
24 records are in a slightly different format to those of  
25 British Transport Police that we looked at last week.

1

1 Unfortunately, the first document, and I make no  
2 criticism of anyone, is not laid out chronologically, so  
3 we may just need to spend a few moments identifying the  
4 lines that we're talking about in it.  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. As you appreciate, and as I said last week, Mr Horwell,  
7 Queen's Counsel, on behalf of Greater Manchester Police  
8 is listening and will have an opportunity to ask you  
9 questions. If I miss any out, I'm sure he will draw  
10 your attention to them if he thinks it appropriate.  
11 The first records we're going to look at are  
12 labelled NCALT. That is the National Centre for Applied  
13 Learning Technologies. Would I be right in concluding  
14 that that was e-learning conducted online?  
15 A. That's correct, yes.  
16 Q. Mr Lopez, let's bring up the record, which as I say  
17 unfortunately is not laid out chronologically,  
18 {INQ040571/1}. We'll need to go to the second page  
19 {INQ040571/2}.  
20 If we go towards the bottom, it's about ten lines up  
21 at my estimate. I'll just draw your attention to the  
22 first one so that you can confirm the extent to which  
23 this is relevant.  
24 About ten lines or so up, sergeant, do you see that  
25 there is an entry:

2

1 "GMP Terrorism Act sections 43 and 44."  
2 Which is dated 10 January 2008?  
3 A. Yes, sir.  
4 Q. You will know, but not everybody or members of the  
5 public will know, that those sections within the  
6 Terrorism Act are a reference to police powers of  
7 arrest, aren't they?  
8 A. Yes, that's correct. It's guidance on the police powers  
9 and procedures in relation to terrorism.  
10 Q. So although generally relevant to the subject of  
11 terrorism, the focus of that training is not upon  
12 a response to a terrorist attack but rather the police  
13 powers when dealing with a suspected terrorist?  
14 A. That's correct, yes.  
15 Q. So I have mentioned that bearing in mind that this  
16 document will be published on the website so everybody  
17 understands what the reference to section 43 and 44 is.  
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What does "retired" mean?  
19 MR DE LA POER: Retired? The officer is probably best --  
20 A. I would imagine, sir, it's probably that training  
21 package has been changed as opposed to -- because the  
22 powers and procedures are still important.  
23 MR DE LA POER: As we will see in a moment, sir -- we're  
24 trying to help people understand this document, which is  
25 why I've drawn attention to that so that people

3

1 understood that it wasn't something we'd overlooked. In  
2 fact we're going to see that in 2013, you had training  
3 on the same topic and the reference to "retired" is not  
4 next to it. So it may be that your expectation is  
5 correct.  
6 There is a reference, I'm not going to bring it up  
7 because the navigation of this document is not easy, to  
8 HOT assessment in 2012. We heard something about that  
9 in chapter 7. HOT is an acronym standing for "hidden,  
10 obviously suspicious, typical". Again, that is  
11 training, is this right, sergeant, in relation to the  
12 identification of potential terrorist activity as  
13 opposed to the emergency response to an attack?  
14 A. Yes. So it would be things that you might look for when  
15 on patrol that would identify somebody committing or  
16 potentially committing a terrorist act.  
17 Q. If we can scroll towards the top, we see a couple more  
18 entries that I'll draw your attention to, sergeant.  
19 About ten lines down we see the "GMP, section 43,  
20 Terrorism Act 2000" against an entry on 3 December 2013.  
21 That looks to be similar training to that which you'd  
22 had a couple of years, about 5 years before; is that  
23 right?  
24 A. Yes, sir.  
25 Q. We can also see two below that, "GMP terrorism", which,

4

1 if we follow that line across, we will see was on the  
 2 same date. It appears to have been started, if I've  
 3 interpreted this correctly, at 18.39 and completed that  
 4 same day about 20/25 minutes later?  
 5 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 6 Q. Are you able to help us, several years later, with the  
 7 content of that GMP terrorism training course?  
 8 A. I'm sorry, sir. I would guess, but it would be a guess,  
 9 that that would be about the legislation, as opposed to  
 10 anything else, because it's an NCALT training package,  
 11 but the actual contents of it, no, I couldn't.  
 12 Q. Two down from that, another entry on the face of it that  
 13 may be relevant but you'll tell us, "Public protection  
 14 initial response". That's in May 2014. Are you able to  
 15 help us with the nature of that training?  
 16 A. Again, sir, I couldn't say what the content of that  
 17 training was after several years.  
 18 Q. Then, and this will not be easy to find, but I hope if  
 19 you give me a moment I can navigate this document. I've  
 20 found it here.  
 21 We can see about one third of the way down, "CBRN  
 22 initial operational response". That is 7/7/2015.  
 23 "CBRN" — chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear?  
 24 A. Yes, sir.  
 25 Q. "Initial operational response." Now, was that

5

1 training — and we're going to have a look and see where  
 2 you've done quite a lot more CBRN training recorded in  
 3 a different system. Was that training in relation to  
 4 a potential terrorist attack?  
 5 A. Yes, sir. So that would have been — well, not  
 6 necessarily terrorist attack, sir. It would have been  
 7 in relation to anything that could cause harm  
 8 in relation to either chemical or biological, so it  
 9 could be that it was a terrorist attack, it could just  
 10 be an industrial spillage, or it could be some sort of  
 11 an accident where chemicals were spilt, and it's about  
 12 officers attending that scene and keeping themselves  
 13 safe in just that initial response to it.  
 14 Q. So is the focus upon how officers should take  
 15 appropriate steps to keep themselves safe as opposed to  
 16 the management of the public or any casualties?  
 17 A. It would be a combination of both, sir, because you  
 18 could imagine a situation, if somebody was feeling the  
 19 effects of a chemical spillage, that rushing in to help  
 20 that injured person would make you a casualty of the  
 21 same spillage. So it was about how you keep yourself  
 22 safe and how to make assessments on going in to assist.  
 23 Q. Because you've done a number of other CBRN trainings,  
 24 I don't want to just artificially extract one course  
 25 from it, because obviously you were the sum of your

6

1 collective training in May 2017. I'm not proposing to  
 2 take you to any other NCALT course on this document.  
 3 Mr Horwell can do if he wishes.  
 4 What I'm going to ask you to consider now is  
 5 something that is labelled "SQL training". Does that  
 6 acronym mean anything to you?  
 7 A. The acronym doesn't, no, but I've been informed that  
 8 it's just the admin use of — that my training was  
 9 stored on.  
 10 Q. So it's an administrative label?  
 11 A. I believe so, yes.  
 12 Q. So Mr Lopez, {INQ040666/1}, please.  
 13 (Pause)  
 14 I imagine that Mr Lopez is shortly going to tell us  
 15 that that is a document he's having some difficulty  
 16 accessing.  
 17 (Pause)  
 18 I'll deal with it in a different way. There's no  
 19 mystery about this, this is a document that has only  
 20 recently been uploaded. That's no criticism of you  
 21 whatsoever, or indeed of anyone else, but I'm going to  
 22 just take you through what I'd identified on that  
 23 document. Perhaps you can take it from me and, if  
 24 necessary, we can look at that document when it becomes  
 25 available, but it may be that we don't need to.

7

1 What I identified on that training record is that in  
 2 March of 2009 you did something which is labelled "CBRN  
 3 refresher".  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. The NCALT training is online. This separate storage of  
 6 your training record, is that a different sort of  
 7 training or is that more of the same in terms of  
 8 e-learning?  
 9 A. I think that — my initial CBRN training would have  
 10 actually been in 2008 and I think it should be on that  
 11 document somewhere. Then there is refresher training  
 12 almost every 12 months and the training is actually  
 13 partially classroom training, most of it is actually  
 14 hands-on, physical training in that we are learning to  
 15 put on our protective equipment.  
 16 Q. Is that the focus of the practical training, how to put  
 17 on what is probably quite technical equipment?  
 18 A. The main focus of it is, yes, how to correctly put on  
 19 the PPE, your protection equipment, how to safely take  
 20 it off, how to decontaminate your clothing, and then  
 21 also some practical sessions about how you can  
 22 physically move in it, what you can actually physically  
 23 do in it and then there'll be some practical sessions on  
 24 examination of evidence and things like that, so that  
 25 you get an idea of how difficult it is to move in this

8

1 equipment.

2 Q. So when we come to think about what you were required to

3 do on 22 May 2017, was there any of that training which

4 you think was relevant to what you were needing to do or

5 was it of a different focus?

6 A. So CBRN training, most people will know it from events

7 like the Salisbury Novichok poisoning when you see

8 officers in the PPE equipment, so that's where you would

9 see it. So most of that training -- you would be

10 responding more slow time, in a controlled manner in

11 order to go to the scene. But there would be some level

12 of the training which might carry over because we do in

13 CBRN training talk about hot, warm and cold zones. And

14 we do talk a little bit about command posts and holding

15 areas, for want of a better term.

16 Q. So the characteristics of a major incident response?

17 A. Yes, and we do talk a little bit about joint emergency

18 service response as well.

19 Q. I was going to draw your attention particularly to some

20 training. It's before JESIP was JESIP, but on

21 14 October 2009 one of the pieces of training is

22 identified as "CBRN multi-agency".

23 A. Yes. My recollection of that, and I believe it is that

24 date, having seen my training documents, I believe, sir,

25 this would have been a training exercise held at

9

1 Salford University, which was a joint exercise with

2 police, Fire Service and ambulance. Students at the

3 university took a role as casualties and then it was how

4 we jointly responded to that and it gave us an

5 opportunity to test our equipment, to test how we worked

6 together, to test how we decontaminated.

7 Q. As I say, that date is before JESIP --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- as a concept was certainly rolled out nationally, but

10 whether it existed on paper anywhere else.

11 Was that a successful multi-agency exercise in your

12 view or did it reveal some difficulties back in 2009?

13 A. I think there were some difficulties, but as with all

14 training exercises, that's the idea behind it, in that

15 you can learn from the experience. It was certainly for

16 ourselves a good experience in knowing how physically

17 demanding it might be to work within our PPE. But also

18 you could see some of the different equipment that the

19 various agencies had at their disposal.

20 Q. With his typical efficiency, Mr Suter has provided hard

21 copies of your training, bearing in mind that it isn't

22 available for us to bring up on screen.

23 Perhaps, sir, I could just pass that copy to you.

24 (Handed)

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

10

1 MR DE LA POER: And Mr Suter will bring you a copy,

2 sergeant, so you have it in front of you, just so that

3 I don't fall into error in terms of the dates that

4 I have recorded on my notes.

5 A. I think it works backwards, doesn't it?

6 Q. It does, it's in reverse order. The entry we were just

7 looking at is 14 October 2009, which is, I think, on the

8 third page. It may be that my note is wrong. We will

9 come back to that because unfortunately that column is

10 slightly compressed so it's difficult to read.

11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It is 14 October and it is the third

12 page. It says "CBRN CPD". Third from the bottom.

13 MR DE LA POER: I have it there, sir. The point I was

14 making when I said that column was compressed is that on

15 the version that I'd seen it on, it made clear it was

16 multi-agency, which is not immediately apparent. It's

17 not a difficulty at all because fortunately... There

18 we are.

19 Sure enough, three lines down, sir, you can see that

20 multi-agency addition that's not apparent on the hard

21 copy. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez. That's

22 much appreciated and will make it easier for everyone to

23 follow, I'm quite sure.

24 We can see, as you have told us, that you have that

25 CBRN training and I think you have given us a good

11

1 flavour for its content. You had three separate

2 occasions of that training in 2009, two further ones in

3 September 2010, we don't need to look at every line of

4 this, and another one in 2011. So, as you've told us,

5 annual, if not more frequent than that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And it had that practical element that you've told us

8 about, particularly in relation to PPE. I would like to

9 move forward, please, to 7 February 2012, which is an

10 entry entitled "Emergency first aid at work".

11 Mr Lopez, I'll need your help just to navigate us to

12 that. As the sergeant has said, the closer to the top,

13 the more recent the date.

14 (Pause)

15 7 February 2012. One third of the way down, we can

16 see that entry there. Do you recollect that first aid

17 training?

18 A. Yes, sir. I think that would be the standard first aid

19 training that police officers are given.

20 Q. Did you receive first aid training when you initially

21 joined GMP in 2001?

22 A. Yes, I do believe that I did. I would have done. I've

23 had it regularly throughout my career.

24 Q. When you say regularly, is that as frequently as annual,

25 more frequently than that or less frequently?

12

1 A. I think my training would have been once every 3 'years.  
 2 Q. Once every 3 years.  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Was it a practical form of training where you got to  
 5 practice what you were being taught or was it all  
 6 lecture based?  
 7 A. There was a combination of both, so some PowerPoint  
 8 presentations, but also practical demonstrations such as  
 9 CPR and things like that.  
 10 Q. And approximately how long would that training session  
 11 take?  
 12 A. I have a recollection that it would have been a full  
 13 day, but now you've asked the question, sir, it might  
 14 even have been over 2 days, but definitely 1 day.  
 15 Q. At least 1 day?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Were you taught how to apply a tourniquet, do you  
 18 recall?  
 19 A. No, sir.  
 20 Q. Sorry, that was my bad question. Is it no, you don't  
 21 recall or no, you weren't trained?  
 22 A. I wasn't trained.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you still aren't?  
 24 A. No, I'm not, sir.  
 25 MR DE LA POER: There's another entry of first aid at work

13

1 which we will note when we get to it in your timing.  
 2 I'm not going to look at every incident of CBRN training  
 3 because you've covered that adequately and we've seen  
 4 that it is regular.  
 5 One other to draw your attention to. 15 March 2013.  
 6 A. Is that 15 February, sir?  
 7 Q. Did I say 15 March? Yes, I did, and I think you are  
 8 correct, yes.  
 9 A. Critical incident training.  
 10 Q. Quite right, that's my mistranscription. Do you recall  
 11 that training?  
 12 A. Yes. I recall that that would have been a training  
 13 session at -- like a tabletop training session held at  
 14 Sedgley Park for myself and a number of sergeants, there  
 15 was quite a large group. It was a training session  
 16 about a high-risk missing person. That was the  
 17 scenario. The training was more about how we made  
 18 critical decisions based on the information that we were  
 19 given as opposed to it just being about a missing  
 20 person.  
 21 Q. Was there any multi-agency element to it?  
 22 A. I don't believe so. I think it was all Greater  
 23 Manchester Police sergeants or inspectors.  
 24 Q. At all events, plainly not the same sort of incident as  
 25 on 22 May 2017?

14

1 A. No. It was designed for how you made critical decisions  
 2 but it wasn't -- it was a missing from home scenario.  
 3 Q. What I'm going to do now, sergeant, is leave your  
 4 training records. As I say, there will be an  
 5 opportunity for Mr Horwell to ask you about any I've  
 6 missed out. Rather than ask you in terms of where you  
 7 were in your understanding at this stage, we're going to  
 8 move to 22 May, review your actions, as we did with  
 9 witnesses last week, on 22 May, and then, through  
 10 a debrief document that you've prepared, we're going to  
 11 reflect, or you're going to reflect, upon the issues  
 12 that you encountered, what went well and what went in  
 13 a way that might be improved.  
 14 A. Yes, sir.  
 15 Q. Let's move to 22 May. I'm going to take you through the  
 16 witness statement that you made on 16 December 2017.  
 17 But before I do, can you help us with the timing of that  
 18 statement? Obviously it's many months post-incident.  
 19 Why was it, so far as you're aware, that you didn't make  
 20 a witness statement in relation to your involvement  
 21 until then?  
 22 A. I was only asked to provide a statement at that late  
 23 stage, so I made my statement on being asked to provide  
 24 one to the inquiry.  
 25 Q. At the time that you made it did you have any access to

15

1 radio logs, CCTV images or any other objective record of  
 2 what had taken place?  
 3 A. I did have access to the incident log because it was  
 4 available on police systems. However, radio  
 5 communications or CCTV, no, no access at all.  
 6 Q. And do you recall whether you accessed the police log to  
 7 help you in setting things out in your best  
 8 recollection?  
 9 A. Yes. So I looked at the police log in order to see was  
 10 my number, my collar number, available on there to give  
 11 me an idea of what times I might have arrived. But that  
 12 just gave me a start of what I could remember in my own  
 13 chronology.  
 14 Q. I think that you also indicate at the start of your  
 15 statement that you had, by the time you had given your  
 16 statement, seen and read multiple media reports, which  
 17 may have had an influence on your understanding of  
 18 events.  
 19 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 20 Q. On 22 May 2017, were you undertaking a tour of duty  
 21 which started at 9 pm?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. Were you based at Central Park Police Station?  
 24 A. Yes, sir, I was.  
 25 Q. Is that where you were when you became aware of the

16

1 explosion at the arena?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Was anybody with you at the time that you became aware?  
 4 A. I had another sergeant working with me and then there  
 5 were obviously other PCs because my team was on duty.  
 6 Q. Just help us with the identity of those people as far as  
 7 you can remember.  
 8 A. Sergeant Dave McRitchie was my sergeant for the night,  
 9 so the two of us working with the night shift .  
 10 Inspector Smith was the inspector. He was not my usual  
 11 inspector, my inspector was on annual leave, so  
 12 Inspector Smith was covering. He was actually covering  
 13 two separate divisions that evening.  
 14 Q. How big an area was that?  
 15 A. Inspector Smith would usually cover — it gets a bit  
 16 technical, but we split into three divisions, North,  
 17 Central and South. Central is Longsight and into the  
 18 city centre. North is Levenshulme up to Cheetham Hill,  
 19 and so Inspector Smith was therefore covering Central  
 20 and North.  
 21 Q. Was he in the same room when you became aware of the  
 22 explosion?  
 23 A. From my recollection, yes.  
 24 Q. We know that he deployed to the scene very quickly  
 25 because we have records. Did you deploy at the same

17

1 time as him?  
 2 A. I deployed slightly after, but within minutes based on  
 3 log times.  
 4 Q. This will seem like an obvious question, but help us:  
 5 why did you go?  
 6 A. It was clear immediately that this was a very serious  
 7 incident. I've got a lot of experience — my entire  
 8 career has been in uniform armed response and so it is  
 9 normal practice for me to go out to serious incidents,  
 10 whatever they might be, to take control of officers that  
 11 are attending. So it just seemed to be normal practice  
 12 for me then to attend because this was such a serious  
 13 incident.  
 14 Q. Do your standing instructions as to how you conduct  
 15 yourself during a shift allow you to self-deploy or do  
 16 you need to be ordered or directed by somebody to go to  
 17 an incident of this type?  
 18 A. No, it is my decision on what I attend unless — I can  
 19 be directed to go somewhere by radio comms or by  
 20 a senior officer. Police officers might request that  
 21 I come out to the scene if they need some guidance, but  
 22 I would usually make the decision personally.  
 23 Q. And that's what you did on the night?  
 24 A. That's what I did that evening.  
 25 Q. Did you travel by car?

18

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Was anybody in the vehicle with you?  
 3 A. No, I went alone.  
 4 Q. Did you park in the area of Trinity Way?  
 5 A. Yes, sir .  
 6 Q. Was it an ordinary police vehicle that you drove in?  
 7 A. Yes, a standard police patrol car .  
 8 Q. Was there to your knowledge any first aid equipment  
 9 within that car?  
 10 A. So we conduct weekly checks of the vehicles in order to  
 11 keep them maintained, and one of the things that you are  
 12 required to do in those checks is to look and make sure  
 13 that there is a first aid kit within the vehicle. So  
 14 I would have expected it to be, but I didn't check the  
 15 vehicle before I left, but if it's gone through its  
 16 weekly check, there should be a first aid kit .  
 17 Q. When you got out of the vehicle did you look for that  
 18 first aid kit with a view to taking it in with you?  
 19 A. No, sir .  
 20 Q. Was there any particular reason for that?  
 21 A. No, and looking back, I don't know why I made that  
 22 decision, but I just entered the arena.  
 23 Q. Did you have a determination to get to the scene as fast  
 24 as possible?  
 25 A. Yes, sir . So I was just responding to see what exactly

19

1 was going on, and my thoughts would be to give as much  
 2 information as possible and get enough resources to the  
 3 scene to deal with the scenario.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you left the police station, had  
 5 you directed any of your constables to come with you or  
 6 were you going to get to the scene and see what was  
 7 required?  
 8 A. I was already aware that officers were attending but  
 9 because the arena is actually on Central division rather  
 10 than my own, I didn't direct my team to attend. My  
 11 intention was to go and see what was going on and then  
 12 call resources in .  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: The equipment that you had on your person  
 15 that night when you got out of the vehicle, do you have  
 16 any first aid equipment as part of the rig that you had  
 17 on?  
 18 A. We carry like a plastic shield for giving CPR as part of  
 19 that, but that would be the only thing that I would be  
 20 carrying on my person.  
 21 Q. We're going to look at the schedule of audio that  
 22 you have in front of you, just to help us with the  
 23 timings and what you were doing at particular moments.  
 24 Could I invite your attention to the first row, which is  
 25 identified as 2,747. The time for this whole exchange

20

1 is recorded in it as 22.53.33.  
 2 Can you confirm that the first broadcast there  
 3 recorded from you is you say:  
 4 "I'm down at the scene of the foyer, we've got  
 5 absolute gridlock. I know that we haven't been asked  
 6 for extra staff, but can anyone that's currently at  
 7 Central Park try to come down and get people away from  
 8 the scene? At the moment we're blocking ambulances."  
 9 A. Yes, sir, that's my radio communications.  
 10 Q. Does that pick up from something you told us earlier  
 11 about the fact that initially, because it wasn't on your  
 12 divisional patch, you were there to get some situational  
 13 awareness and it would appear that you thought that at  
 14 that stage officers from your division could help?  
 15 A. Yes, sir. I arrived on Trinity Way and there was  
 16 already officers that were starting to put on a cordon  
 17 of sorts, blocking the road with their own vehicles, but  
 18 that meant that with roads blocked, junctions were  
 19 becoming congested. So that radio communication is me  
 20 as I arrive and I'm thinking about the area outside of  
 21 the arena and how emergency vehicles are going to  
 22 attend. So I was thinking more along the lines of: if  
 23 I could get officers into those junctions, they could  
 24 clear the junctions and free up the traffic.  
 25 Q. A little further down, we can see a colleague of yours,

21

1 I think he's a sergeant, Sergeant Brealey, say:  
 2 "Andy, is there an appropriate place for them to  
 3 park up that's not going to make the situation worse?"  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. And what you say is:  
 6 "Got a sterile area outside the foyer where the  
 7 Old Boddington's Brewery used to be. If they could park  
 8 up there, we can park vehicles there, but we just need  
 9 to get the traffic out of the way."  
 10 Were you there talking about ambulances or the staff  
 11 that you had requested to come and join you?  
 12 A. I believe that I would be talking about police vehicles  
 13 and staff that I had asked to come to attend the scene  
 14 because that area would be free to park police vehicles  
 15 in without causing any further congestion.  
 16 Q. By this stage of the evening, 22.53, we know from other  
 17 audio records that, some minutes before, Inspector  
 18 Michael Smith had proposed a rendezvous point of the  
 19 parking area near the cathedral.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. That's timed at 22.36. Were you aware of his broadcast  
 22 there?  
 23 A. No, I wasn't.  
 24 Q. At the time you made that broadcast, were you aware that  
 25 any point had been designated a rendezvous point?

22

1 A. I wasn't aware, but it would be standard practice to  
 2 actually nominate a rendezvous point, but I hadn't heard  
 3 one be nominated at that point, no.  
 4 Q. How does what you were trying to achieve with this radio  
 5 broadcast interact with the idea of a rendezvous point?  
 6 A. So this would mean that we had somewhere where we could  
 7 park vehicles for people to get out and do anything  
 8 physical like enter the arena or direct traffic outside.  
 9 It just for me meant that there was somewhere people  
 10 could head to and not create further congestion within  
 11 the forecourt of the railway station. I mean,  
 12 Trinity Way is obviously just round the corner from  
 13 what was nominated as the RVP that you've just  
 14 described.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sergeant Beasley, none of this is  
 16 intended to be critical, but what you were suggesting  
 17 then was not actually a rendezvous point in your mind?  
 18 A. No, sir, it wasn't.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But would not the intention of  
 20 a rendezvous point mean to get everyone actually in the  
 21 same place so as to coordinate?  
 22 A. Yes, sir. That would have been the case. I think from  
 23 looking at my radio comms there, if I was nominating  
 24 an RVP I would have said so. I think looking back at my  
 25 comms, I'm actually just thinking about how I can get

23

1 staff to the scene, where they can park without causing  
 2 congestion, and how they can then be useful.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you were envisaging them in fact  
 4 going straight to the scene in reality? That's where  
 5 you can park and then you can go from there to the  
 6 scene?  
 7 A. Yes, sir. A rendezvous point in all but name, really.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, thank you.  
 9 MR DE LA POER: At the point that you were nominating that  
 10 parking area, if we call it that, did you have any idea  
 11 that the FDO had declared Operation Plato?  
 12 A. No, sir.  
 13 Q. If somebody had said to you Operation Plato before  
 14 May 2017, would you have known what that meant?  
 15 A. I do not believe that I would have done, sir, no.  
 16 Q. But at all events, as you were travelling to the scene,  
 17 you had not heard that phrase so far as you're aware?  
 18 A. No, sir. Going back over events, there was clearly  
 19 a terrorist act in London on Westminster Bridge prior to  
 20 the events in Manchester. I know that I have seen  
 21 a presentation that I've given on a briefing, PowerPoint  
 22 presentation, that outlines Operation Plato, about what  
 23 to do. It's just a general overview to give officers  
 24 some idea of how to respond. What I can't recall  
 25 clearly is whether that came prior to the

24

1 Manchester Arena or after. It's difficult to remember.  
 2 I think that it probably came after, but there could  
 3 have been that presentation given in response to the  
 4 events that happened in London.  
 5 Q. Do you think that the timing of that presentation is  
 6 something you'd be able to go away and find out for us?  
 7 A. Only if that presentation still exists, sir.  
 8 Q. Well, could we invite you to do that?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. That might help us with your state of knowledge at the  
 11 time.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In any event, it didn't affect you  
 13 because you didn't know Operation Plato had been  
 14 declared?  
 15 A. No, sir.  
 16 MR DE LA POER: What was your understanding as you were  
 17 giving that direction about where people from your  
 18 division should come to, close to the arena, about the  
 19 scene that you were going to?  
 20 A. It was clear to me from information that came in on the  
 21 original incident log that I saw whilst I was still in  
 22 Central Park Police Station that this had been  
 23 a bombing, a bomb had gone off, and so I was aware that  
 24 I would be going to the scene of a bomb. So yes, but  
 25 apart from that, that's really all I knew.

25

1 Q. Did you have any concern that there might be an active  
 2 terrorist with a firearm at the scene that you were  
 3 going to?  
 4 A. No, that didn't — I didn't consider that fact and none  
 5 of the information that I had received up to that point  
 6 suggested that there would have been.  
 7 Q. We're going to just time your arrival. You've had an  
 8 opportunity to see a single still of yourself, haven't  
 9 you?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And identify when you arrived, which is extremely  
 12 helpful to us. Can you confirm that your arrival time  
 13 in the vicinity of the arena was 22.55.49?  
 14 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 15 Q. So just after that radio broadcast or about the time of  
 16 that radio broadcast?  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. Once you arrived did you enter the Victoria Station  
 19 complex via the NCP car park?  
 20 A. Yes, sir.  
 21 Q. As we know, that's on Trinity Way, isn't it?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And did you make your way in the direction of the  
 24 City Room?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

26

1 Q. You stopped on that journey to speak to some casualties;  
 2 is that correct?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. But is this right, we know, as you can see from  
 5 line 3,524, that by 22.59.37, you are in the City Room?  
 6 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 7 Q. That gives us an idea of the sort of time that you took.  
 8 Let's have a look at that entry now. That is taken  
 9 from body cam and it appears to record just a snippet of  
 10 a conversation between you and Inspector Smith; is that  
 11 right?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. He was effectively your line manager that night, wasn't  
 14 he?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. At the time that you found him in the City Room, did you  
 17 know that he was the Bronze scene commander?  
 18 A. I didn't know for sure, but I would have — yes, I would  
 19 have taken it as read that he would have taken control  
 20 of it there and therefore have been the Bronze.  
 21 Q. And did you report to him on that basis?  
 22 A. Yes, I did.  
 23 Q. I'm just going to gist this: did Inspector Smith say  
 24 words to the effect that anybody who was injured should  
 25 be carried out in any way that was possible?

27

1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. Did you say to him, "We've got a secure area outside  
 3 near Boddington's, I'm getting everybody there"?  
 4 A. Yes. I said something — I said that we had that secure  
 5 area outside Trinity Way.  
 6 Q. And again, does that pick up on your earlier broadcast  
 7 when you were on Trinity Way about having identified the  
 8 Boddington's car park as a potential place?  
 9 A. Yes, I (inaudible: distorted) Trinity Way. I mean, I'm  
 10 calling it Boddington's because it used to be, but  
 11 Trinity Way would have been...  
 12 Q. At the time you said that, did you know that in fact the  
 13 ambulances were congregating on the Victoria Station  
 14 concourse?  
 15 A. No, I didn't know that, sir.  
 16 Q. So when you said that to Inspector Smith, was that just  
 17 to give him an idea from what you knew?  
 18 A. Yes, so I was just obviously providing additional  
 19 information. It clearly is not picked up on there that  
 20 I was advised other, but clearly from actions that  
 21 I took later I was made aware of where the ambulances  
 22 were congregating.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you just explain to me what you  
 24 meant by it being a secure area?  
 25 A. We had made it so there was no public there. It was

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1 devoid of traffic so that we could safely work within  
 2 that area?  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there were other officers there  
 4 stationed at it?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who were keeping it clear?  
 7 A. Yes, sir.  
 8 MR DE LA POER: Did it occur to you whether or not it needed  
 9 to be checked for a secondary device?  
 10 A. No, it didn't.  
 11 Q. Just a few seconds later, line 3,571, we can see  
 12 a further conversation which you participated in and all  
 13 that I draw your attention to is the final line in which  
 14 you address PC Whittle, relaying what Inspector Smith  
 15 had said seconds before; is that right?  
 16 A. That's correct.  
 17 Q. Namely you instructed Police Constable Whittle that the  
 18 injured people needed to be removed?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. At the time that you were giving PC Whittle that  
 21 instruction, and we'll come to your debrief in due  
 22 course, were you aware of whether or not there was one  
 23 or more paramedics in the vicinity?  
 24 A. I recall there only being one paramedic within the  
 25 City Room.

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1 Q. Did you speak to that paramedic at any point?  
 2 A. Yes, I did. At some point during the time I was in  
 3 there, yes, I did have a conversation.  
 4 Q. We'll try and time it in a moment, but do you recall  
 5 what the subject matter of that conversation was?  
 6 A. From my recollection, I think that I was pointing out  
 7 other casualties that I was aware of to the paramedic.  
 8 Q. At any point in that discussion did you mention to the  
 9 paramedic that more paramedics were needed or query  
 10 where other paramedics were?  
 11 A. I don't recall ever making that statement, no.  
 12 Q. Was that a thought that at any point that evening  
 13 crossed your mind, the fact that there was just one  
 14 paramedic that you saw in the City Room?  
 15 A. I think that, yes, it occurred to me that it was too  
 16 much for one paramedic. I believe that I put that in my  
 17 statement, that the paramedic looked completely  
 18 overwhelmed.  
 19 Q. What about his appearance led you to conclude that he  
 20 looked completely overwhelmed?  
 21 A. Just because of the number of casualties and the way  
 22 that he was having to move between casualties.  
 23 Q. In fact, we know that in addition to that first  
 24 paramedic there were two paramedics from the Hazardous  
 25 Area Response Team who arrived shortly after 11.15. Did

30

1 you become aware of their presence in the City Room at  
 2 any point?  
 3 A. No.  
 4 Q. So your perception on the night was just one paramedic  
 5 at any point in the City Room?  
 6 A. Yes, that was my perception.  
 7 Q. We were just looking at a timing of just before  
 8 11 o'clock. We're going to show just a single image of  
 9 you now. So everybody understands, this is an image  
 10 which is taken from the emergency response sequence of  
 11 events, redacted in the way that people who watched  
 12 Inspector Russell's evidence will be familiar with, and  
 13 it's going to show an image of you on the pedestrian  
 14 footbridge.  
 15 Mr Lopez, {INQ035612/185}.  
 16 We just show this to timestamp a particular moment  
 17 in the evening and we'll look at a corresponding piece  
 18 of audio that's been identified. We can see from that  
 19 you've left the City Room, is that correct --  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. -- just after 11 o'clock?  
 22 At some point in the evening, you interacted with at  
 23 least one of the casualties who was on that overbridge;  
 24 is that right?  
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

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1 Q. But at this point we can see that you're walking in the  
 2 direction of other police officers; is that right?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And did you provide a briefing to those officers on the  
 5 footbridge?  
 6 A. I did, yes.  
 7 Q. Thank you, Mr Lopez, you can take that down.  
 8 We're going to look at that briefing now because  
 9 it's captured within the audio. Line 3,823. It was  
 10 captured, at least in part, on a piece of body-worn  
 11 footage. Did you inform the officers you were speaking  
 12 to the number of casualties as you understood it to be  
 13 at that time?  
 14 A. Yes, I did.  
 15 Q. And did you give them a warning about what they were  
 16 about to encounter?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. The body-worn camera is switched off at some point  
 19 during that briefing, it would appear. I'm not  
 20 suggesting there's anything sinister or improper about  
 21 that, but it means that we haven't got it captured.  
 22 What was it you were hoping those officers would do?  
 23 A. From my experience of attending serious incidents, it is  
 24 often the case that officers arrive -- become  
 25 a little -- I was going to say shell-shocked, that's the

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1 wrong term really, but a little bit like rabbits in  
 2 headlights, and cannot react quickly enough. So from my  
 3 experience it is better to gather everyone together,  
 4 tell them what they're about to walk into so they've got  
 5 that in their mind, and give them some clear direction  
 6 on what to do. That stops any delay and it stops  
 7 anybody standing trying to find a job, you know,  
 8 something to do. So that was what I was trying to  
 9 achieve in that brief, and it would have been merely  
 10 seconds, but it's just enough to direct staff and get  
 11 them focused on what they were heading into.  
 12 Q. Were you doing that of your own initiative or because  
 13 Inspector Smith had asked you to do that?  
 14 A. On my own initiative.  
 15 Q. Is that what you would expect of your role as  
 16 a sergeant?  
 17 A. Yes. My role as a sergeant at a serious incident would  
 18 be to direct staff and get them doing the activity  
 19 that is necessary.  
 20 Q. So were you essentially following what we've seen  
 21 Inspector Smith had given you the instruction to do,  
 22 namely to try and move as many casualties as possible?  
 23 A. That's correct, yes.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you'd gone out for what particular  
 25 purpose? Had you gone out to meet and find more police

1 officers?  
 2 A. Sir, my recollection is that I was -- I told people  
 3 within the City Room the instructions Inspector Smith  
 4 had given me and that I had gone out and seen other PCs  
 5 arriving and so decided that it was best to brief them  
 6 outside of the City Room because it was so noisy and  
 7 chaotic inside and I could give my briefing outside.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are these particular officers whose  
 9 names I can see on the schedule? Did they come from  
 10 your police station or did they come from Central?  
 11 A. The officers that attended are actually from my team  
 12 that --  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's your team?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they would be expecting to get  
 16 instructions from you as to what to do?  
 17 A. Indeed, sir, yes.  
 18 MR DE LA POER: We know from the body-worn footage, I don't  
 19 ask you to linger on it beyond looking at row 4,089 and  
 20 the time 23.04 and the fact that you are back in the  
 21 City Room, as shown by the third column to the right,  
 22 that having given that briefing, you returned to the  
 23 City Room. Does that accord with your recollection?  
 24 A. Yes, it does.  
 25 Q. We can see that 5 seconds after that entry, row 4,106,

1 you broadcast over the radio; is that right?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Is that a person-to-person broadcast or was that  
 4 a broadcast that anybody on that channel could hear?  
 5 A. The broadcast is open to anyone with their radio on, but  
 6 that would be me directing to the comms room, the comms  
 7 operator.  
 8 Q. So we can see it's an Officer Sweeney who replies to  
 9 your initial identifier. That is directed to those  
 10 sitting in Force Control?  
 11 A. Yes, sir.  
 12 Q. What you say is this:  
 13 "I'm sure ambulance are doing what they can but  
 14 we've still got at least three critical that aren't  
 15 being looked after by anybody with any medical  
 16 training."  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. Again, it no doubt speaks for itself, but you tell us,  
 19 what were you trying to communicate there to control?  
 20 A. I was asking for more medically trained personnel to  
 21 come to the scene because I felt that there were people  
 22 that I'd identified that needed urgent medical  
 23 attention, and I think I talk about some of those in my  
 24 statement.  
 25 Q. You do and you'll understand why we're not going into

1 the detail of that.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Were you expecting that this broadcast would result in  
 4 medically trained people from Greater Manchester Police  
 5 coming or that it would be relayed to another  
 6 organisation?  
 7 A. I was expecting that to be relayed to the  
 8 Ambulance Service. It is about giving as much  
 9 information as you can in these situations so that  
 10 everyone has an idea or the best picture they can get.  
 11 Q. At this or any other point in the incident did you --  
 12 did it strike you that the Fire and Rescue Service were  
 13 not actively participating in what you were doing at  
 14 that time?  
 15 A. During the incident, no, I hadn't given it any thought  
 16 to were they needed or why they weren't present.  
 17 Q. A little further down --  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to dig a bit into that.  
 19 Is that because there was no fire and perhaps you didn't  
 20 have it in your mind at the time the assistance which  
 21 the Fire Service are able to give in the removal of  
 22 casualties?  
 23 A. Yes, sir. Thinking back to the incident, I don't know  
 24 why I didn't consider why the Fire Service weren't there  
 25 because I have been to many incidents where the Fire

1 have been some of the first people there. If we're  
 2 going to a very serious road traffic accident, I'd  
 3 expect Fire to be maybe there before we were because  
 4 they have the necessary tools and the necessary training  
 5 to deal with casualties. Why I didn't consider it on  
 6 the night, I can't say, sir.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 8 MR DE LA POER: Row 5,030, timed at 23.11.23. Do we see  
 9 a PC Williams speaking to you about towels?  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. I think what PC Williams says to you is:  
 12 "It's as good as it gets."  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. At this point in the evening, did you think that there  
 15 was sufficient first aid equipment available to those  
 16 in the City Room?  
 17 A. The first aid provision that would be in normal patrol  
 18 vehicles is useful, but the injuries that we were  
 19 encountering that night meant that that first aid kit  
 20 was clearly superficial, it was not up to the level of  
 21 dressings that were required.  
 22 Q. Was that a sense that you had on the night?  
 23 A. Yes, it was.  
 24 Q. So although it's PC Williams saying, "This is as good as  
 25 it gets", that would accord with your own perspective?

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1 A. Yes, that's correct. I think he's alluding to the fact  
 2 that he's brought something that could be used as  
 3 a dressing, but it's not a medical dressing, it's just  
 4 an item he's picked up, thinking ...  
 5 Q. Of course we remind ourselves that that's timed at  
 6 23.11, so we are talking about 40 minutes after the  
 7 explosion at that point.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. This afternoon we are going to hear from a police  
 10 community support officer, Abdurahman Mohamed. Was he  
 11 a person that you knew before that incident?  
 12 A. No, sir.  
 13 Q. Bearing in mind you didn't know him, it may be that you  
 14 therefore won't recollect the encounter, but I'm sure  
 15 you'll take it from me that at 23.25 there is an image  
 16 of you speaking to him in the City Room.  
 17 A. Okay, sir, yes.  
 18 Q. Do you have any recollection of speaking to a PCSO  
 19 in the City Room --  
 20 A. No, sir.  
 21 Q. -- specifically?  
 22 A. No, sir.  
 23 Q. I dare say you spoke to a number of officers that night.  
 24 A. Yes, I spoke to quite a lot of officers.  
 25 Q. I have just given that time reference bearing in mind

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1 that we're going to hear from him and what he has to say  
 2 about that encounter.  
 3 What he says, for your comment and it may be that  
 4 this was typical, is he was asking you where you wanted  
 5 him.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Is that what you would expect of GMP officers, to come  
 8 to you as a sergeant and seek direction?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 10 Q. In the course of the incident your statement records  
 11 that you and Inspector Smith conducted a risk  
 12 assessment.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Do you recall doing so?  
 15 A. I do recall doing so, yes.  
 16 Q. Would that have taken place at about the time the body  
 17 cam has recorded you speaking to Inspector Smith, in  
 18 other words before you give that briefing just before  
 19 11 o'clock?  
 20 A. I think that chronology is slightly out, sir. I think  
 21 I spoke to Inspector Smith several times during the  
 22 evening, but I have a recollection of conducting that  
 23 risk assessment quite early on.  
 24 Q. Quite early on?  
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 Q. So do you think it was before 11 o'clock or after  
 2 11 o'clock?  
 3 A. I would think from the timings when I arrived, it would  
 4 be after 11 o'clock, but I would think that it would not  
 5 be long after 11 o'clock, sir.  
 6 Q. So that we get the sequence, you're there at 22.55.  
 7 We have you in the City Room speaking to Inspector Smith  
 8 at 22.59.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. You go out on to the bridge at 23.01 in order to brief  
 11 those officers from your division. You return to the  
 12 City Room. So you think some time in that period  
 13 immediately following that briefing?  
 14 A. I do, yes, and the reason I think that is because I was  
 15 asked the question by a PC, had I considered a secondary  
 16 device.  
 17 Q. So that's how this risk assessment process starts, is  
 18 it?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. At the time you were asked that question, had you  
 21 considered a secondary device?  
 22 A. I hadn't, sir, and that's why it sticks in my memory,  
 23 because being asked the question shocked me why I hadn't  
 24 thought of it.  
 25 Q. So walk us through what happened then. The PC asked

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1 you, "Have you considered a secondary device?" What  
 2 do you do in response?  
 3 A. So I then walked over to Inspector Smith to talk about  
 4 a secondary device and to consider the safety of  
 5 everybody within the City Room. I've written it in my  
 6 statement, not verbatim, but I'm talking about the  
 7 process that I would have gone through with  
 8 Inspector Smith and in my own mind. It probably takes  
 9 me longer to write it out and for you to read it, sir,  
 10 than it actually took us to go through that assessment.  
 11 However, we went through it using, in my own mind,  
 12 what's called the national decision-making model, which  
 13 is a process that police officers are trained to go  
 14 through.  
 15 Q. Talk us through that process, if you can.  
 16 A. So it would be for you to consider as much information  
 17 as you have available to you to assess the threat or the  
 18 risks to certain actions or to personnel, to consider  
 19 any policies or powers that might be relevant to that  
 20 risk, to make a decision based on what you've thought  
 21 about, and then to follow through that action.  
 22 Q. When you spoke to Inspector Smith about the possibility  
 23 of a secondary device, did he say or do anything which  
 24 indicated one way or the other as to whether or not that  
 25 was something that he had previously considered?

1 A. I feel that he had considered that because my  
 2 recollection of the interaction was that he gave me  
 3 additional thoughts on it. I'm wary about how far I go  
 4 with this, sir.  
 5 Q. Well, I think I know where you're going with it. To  
 6 make sure that I haven't misunderstood, can I ask you to  
 7 look at your statement. At the bottom of page 2, there  
 8 are two bullet points.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Were you about to refer to the first of those?  
 11 A. Yes, I was.  
 12 Q. Yes. I'll try and put it as sensitively as I can. Was  
 13 the conclusion that you and Inspector Smith both reached  
 14 in that conversation that the person who had caused the  
 15 detonation no longer posed a threat?  
 16 A. Correct, sir, yes.  
 17 Q. Were there a number of other factors that you had in  
 18 mind when conducting that in-the-moment risk assessment?  
 19 A. Yes. There were physical factors that we could see.  
 20 There was information that we'd been provided from  
 21 people within the room that had a bearing on the  
 22 information that we were given and that allowed us to  
 23 conclude that the likelihood of a secondary device was  
 24 so small that we could ignore it and carry on as  
 25 we were.

1 Q. One of the indications was the height of the explosion,  
 2 you say in that third bullet point:  
 3 "Low down."  
 4 A. Yes, sir, and that would have been information that you  
 5 could see from some of the injuries, but also  
 6 information that would have been given by witnesses.  
 7 Q. Did it all lead you to the conclusion that that was  
 8 a person-borne device as opposed to a bag that had been  
 9 deposited?  
 10 A. I think that we came to the conclusion that it was  
 11 either carried in and still worn or carried in and  
 12 placed down and that clearly the bomb was brought in as  
 13 opposed to it being hidden and detonated.  
 14 Q. The conclusion you reached, as you've just told us, was  
 15 that it was appropriate for you and your colleagues to  
 16 remain in the City Room?  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. In that moment, just describe what you thought the  
 19 extent of the risk was to the people who remained  
 20 in that room.  
 21 A. The (inaudible: distorted) from a secondary device, we  
 22 believed that we could therefore say that risk didn't  
 23 exist and that we could carry on. Other risks which  
 24 I might have thought of subsequently, looking back  
 25 at the evening, we didn't consider at the time.

1 Q. Were you aware of GMP firearms officers --  
 2 A. Yes, I was.  
 3 Q. -- in and around the City Room?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. At the time, just after 11 o'clock or so that you were  
 6 conducting this risk assessment with Inspector Smith,  
 7 did you have any concern about a threat to you or anyone  
 8 else in the City Room from a terrorist attempting to  
 9 gain access to the City Room?  
 10 A. That was not something that occurred to me and I didn't  
 11 consider it on the evening, no.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you saw the firearms officers, what  
 13 were they doing?  
 14 A. They arrived and they took up positions both within the  
 15 City Room and then moved into the arena itself.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they were moving around?  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Armed?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is this before you have made your  
 21 decision about the safety of it or afterwards or  
 22 difficult to say?  
 23 A. I can't give you that level of detail, but I believe  
 24 it would have been after.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What would you think they were doing,

1 the firearms officers ?  
 2 A. No, I don't know, sir. I didn't --  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In hindsight it's obvious, but at the  
 4 time it didn't particularly occur to you?  
 5 A. No, it didn't.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you didn't talk to them directly --  
 7 A. No, sir, because they seemed to have a direction and  
 8 know what they were doing. They moved through and some  
 9 went into the arena. I didn't consider why they were  
 10 there. I have done subsequently.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's obviously not a criticism in any  
 12 way; it's just trying to work out how people do react  
 13 in these sort of circumstances.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: Do you think you might have, fleeting though  
 15 it may have been, taken comfort from the fact that they  
 16 were there or is it just so typical to see firearms  
 17 officers at a large incident of this nature that it just  
 18 doesn't really register?  
 19 A. I don't think I was surprised to see them arrive. It  
 20 was a terrorist situation, it was a terrorist bombing.  
 21 I know that I've talked about it in my debrief document.  
 22 Q. Yes.  
 23 A. I would change my perception on it now in that actually  
 24 thinking back, it was probably comfort, but I didn't  
 25 think of it as a comfort at the time, no.

1 Q. Having conducted this risk assessment, did you  
 2 communicate it to anybody in the City Room?  
 3 A. No, sir, because it didn't change what we were doing.  
 4 Had we come to a different conclusion that it wasn't  
 5 safe and that we needed to move out, that would have  
 6 changed our actions. But because we'd ruled it out,  
 7 I didn't feel it necessary to communicate it further.  
 8 Q. Having conducted that risk assessment, did you  
 9 communicate it to anybody outside the City Room?  
 10 A. No, sir.  
 11 Q. Were you aware of either Inspector Smith or anyone else  
 12 who was party to your conversation communicating it out  
 13 of the City Room?  
 14 A. I wasn't aware of that, no.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If there was a responsibility to do  
 16 that, whose would it have been?  
 17 A. It would have been mine if I'd come to that conclusion  
 18 or Inspector Smith probably, his responsibility,  
 19 particularly if we'd come to a different conclusion and  
 20 it wasn't safe for us to be there, then yes of course it  
 21 would have been the inspector's decision to move people  
 22 away from potential threat.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 24 MR DE LA POER: At the time that you were performing this  
 25 risk assessment, did it cross your mind that people

1 outside of the City Room might find your conclusion  
 2 useful?  
 3 A. It didn't come to mind, sir, no, because I was  
 4 considering the safety of those that were working within  
 5 the City Room, and having come to the conclusion that  
 6 they were safe to carry on, we just allowed them to  
 7 carry on working.  
 8 Q. Bearing in mind that you had a recollection of only  
 9 seeing one paramedic in there, at any stage did it cross  
 10 your mind that an explanation for that may be because  
 11 paramedics were holding back from coming into the  
 12 City Room?  
 13 A. No, that didn't cross my mind, sir.  
 14 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, when people in  
 15 a situation such as you and Inspector Smith found  
 16 yourselves in actually conduct a risk assessment and  
 17 consciously do so, interacting with another officer, do  
 18 you think the procedure should be that that is  
 19 communicated outside the environment that you're in?  
 20 A. That would be the best procedure, yes, sir, so that  
 21 people arriving knew that that risk assessment had been  
 22 conducted, which I am sure is why the PC asked me the  
 23 question in the first place.  
 24 Q. Because it was, as you say, clearly a thought that had  
 25 crossed an officer's mind.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the fact that you didn't do it, and  
 3 again, please, no criticism, it could have been a result  
 4 of just what was happening and the emergency situation  
 5 and the awful situation which you found yourself in, or  
 6 it could be as a result of the fact, well, actually your  
 7 training had never covered that?  
 8 A. It would come back a little bit, sir, to my CBRN  
 9 training in that one of the things that we talk about in  
 10 CBRN training is to give as much information out of the  
 11 scene to those that are outside. But I did obviously go  
 12 to the Bronze commander and conduct that risk assessment  
 13 with the Bronze commander. Now, I could take  
 14 responsibility and give that information out myself or  
 15 the Bronze commander could give that information out.  
 16 In hindsight, it would have been useful to give that  
 17 information out.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I well understand that Inspector Smith  
 19 might do it, but you actually never talked to him about  
 20 getting the information out at the time?  
 21 A. No, sir.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: Sergeant, is this a fair characterisation,  
 23 and do disagree with me if I've not captured entirely  
 24 what you're saying. Given the way in which this risk  
 25 assessment arose, it seemed that the principal question

1 in your mind, tell me whether this is right or not, is:  
 2 should we carry on or not? And having decided that it  
 3 was safe for you to carry on, you carried on?  
 4 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 5 Q. So the focus of the risk assessment was confined to that  
 6 and those people in the room?  
 7 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 8 Q. Rather than thinking about it as a risk assessment for  
 9 the benefit of everyone who might need to come into the  
 10 room?  
 11 A. Correct, yes.  
 12 Q. You've mentioned your CBRN training. Did that training  
 13 or any other training convey to you the importance of  
 14 conducting a risk assessment that was for the benefit of  
 15 everyone who might need to come into the environment?  
 16 A. You can conduct risk assessments for all sorts of  
 17 different areas. You might conduct a risk assessment  
 18 for the RVP, you can't expect someone in the City Room  
 19 to conduct a risk assessment for everywhere, so  
 20 I conducted a risk assessment for where I was working  
 21 and came to the conclusion that it was safe to carry on  
 22 for me and my colleagues to carry on, and that's as far  
 23 as I went on the evening.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Again, I well understand, but the  
 25 reality is that when you're dealing with an area where

1 there are casualties, the more everyone knows about what  
 2 the situation is, and you had decided it was safe for  
 3 people to work there, the more people who know it, the  
 4 better?  
 5 A. Yes, that would be correct. There's a slight caveat  
 6 in that if officers are not being told it's unsafe to  
 7 enter, you kind of think, well, it is safe to enter  
 8 because someone's done a risk assessment.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And in fairness again, no one's  
 10 actually, as far as you are concerned, declared  
 11 Operation Plato --  
 12 A. Correct.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- which might be the indication that  
 14 actually it may be unsafe to enter?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 MR DE LA POER: Can I just explore that previous answer of  
 17 yours just a little bit. What you've described there is  
 18 a system whereby police officers, as you understand it,  
 19 do things until they are told it's not safe to do them.  
 20 Is that a fair encapsulation of what you are saying?  
 21 A. Yes, sir. So you are obviously required to keep your --  
 22 yourself personally safe and to make your own risk  
 23 assessments. And officers might well do that, for  
 24 example, if they are making an arrest or going into  
 25 a situation, they might decide -- they might make

1 a personal risk assessment and decide it's not safe for  
 2 them to enter on their own and they need another  
 3 colleague before they enter a certain situation. So  
 4 officers are asked and trained to make those risk  
 5 assessments.  
 6 However, in large-scale situations where more senior  
 7 officers or sergeants or inspectors are involved,  
 8 you will often find officers attending and thinking,  
 9 rightly or wrongly, that risk assessments have been made  
 10 and it's therefore safe to carry on.  
 11 Q. But the method or approach you're describing is the  
 12 approach, as you understand it, that Greater Manchester  
 13 Police officers take?  
 14 A. I'm a Greater Manchester Police officer and I would take  
 15 that approach, yes.  
 16 Q. Absolutely and so you're conducting yourself on the  
 17 assumption, if I've understood it correctly, that  
 18 because there are a number of Greater Manchester Police  
 19 officers in that room and those officers are not telling  
 20 other officers not to come in, that other officers will  
 21 come in?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. As part of your training, were you given any  
 24 understanding of how other emergency services might  
 25 approach the question of whether it's safe for them to

1 go in?  
 2 A. I will have looked at some joint working practices  
 3 within my CBRN training, but it would have been only an  
 4 overview of what I might expect if other emergency  
 5 services are there, and I would expect other emergency  
 6 services to conduct their own risk assessments, whether  
 7 they do them personally or whether they do them together  
 8 or whether they do them in joint operations.  
 9 Q. Well, one of the JESIP principles is a shared  
 10 understanding or joint understanding of risk. Would it  
 11 be fair to say that the approach that you were taking,  
 12 although it included everybody in the City Room, was  
 13 focused upon the way in which Greater Manchester Police  
 14 would approach risk?  
 15 A. My risk assessment was based on the fact that I was  
 16 asked a specific question and I therefore conducted  
 17 a risk assessment on that specific question. It has  
 18 stuck in my mind because -- why didn't I think of that  
 19 personally?  
 20 Q. Would it be any part of your responsibility in the role  
 21 that you had to be thinking about the other agencies'  
 22 response and how communication inter-agency might take  
 23 place or is that a Bronze commander's job?  
 24 A. I would... I would say that was a Bronze commander's  
 25 job, but the risk assessment I conducted was for

1 everybody in the City Room and not just for the police.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you go on, when are we  
 3 intending to break? I don't mind.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: Very shortly, sir. I was going to reach the  
 5 point where we look at this officer's debrief document.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to ask one further question:  
 7 are you aware of how the general structure for the  
 8 police, as coordinated with other emergency services,  
 9 works in this situation? For example, are you aware  
 10 that the force duty officer is the sort of central pivot  
 11 of the whole thing and information goes in to him --  
 12 this is how it's meant to work -- and then  
 13 he distributes it out?  
 14 A. As a general principle, yes, sir, but in detail, no.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Right, sorry.  
 16 MR DE LA POER: Can I just conclude this session, before,  
 17 sir, inviting you to take a break, by summarising, and  
 18 this is only a summary of what you did that night, the  
 19 remainder of what you did, and after the break we'll  
 20 look briefly at your debrief document. We've covered  
 21 much of it already. Did you continue to stay in the  
 22 City Room and make circuits of the area to make sure  
 23 that casualties were being moved?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Once all of the casualties were removed, did you leave

1 the City Room area in order for the criminal  
 2 investigation or the criminal investigators to do their  
 3 work?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Down on the station concourse, did you put officers into  
 6 pairs and invite them to or instruct them, rather, to go  
 7 and speak to any casualties that remained in that area?  
 8 A. Yes, because we had casualties that were not being  
 9 evacuated rapidly. They'd been triaged, so I instructed  
 10 them to talk to those casualties.  
 11 Q. Did you attend a briefing within the public house within  
 12 Victoria Station at about 2.30?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. Before ultimately returning to Central Park Police  
 15 Station and standing down from duty at 5.30 am?  
 16 A. Yes, sir.  
 17 MR DE LA POER: Sir, if it's convenient, we can now take  
 18 a break and then we can look at this officer's debrief  
 19 document.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Beasley, I hope you will understand  
 21 that what we are trying to do is work out whether things  
 22 could have been done better and, if so, what they should  
 23 have been. They're certainly not intended to be  
 24 critical of the quite heroic acts which were done in the  
 25 City Room on that particular night, so please don't

1 think that we're sitting here criticising you in any  
 2 way. Few of us, I suspect, could have behaved in the  
 3 way that you did.  
 4 Quarter of an hour.  
 5 (11.21 am)  
 6 (A short break)  
 7 (11.36 am)  
 8 MR DE LA POER: Sergeant Beasley, on 26 July 2017, did you  
 9 participate in Operation Newtown?  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. That being an opportunity for you to provide a debrief?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. Have I understood things correctly, that there were two  
 14 parts to that, firstly a debrief form that you  
 15 completed?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And secondly, was there a group discussion?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 19 Q. I'm going to focus upon not the group discussion but  
 20 upon your comments in your individual debrief form.  
 21 Before I come to those, did those comments cover all  
 22 of your reflections about what went right and what went  
 23 wrong and what might be done better, or did you add to  
 24 them in the course of the discussion? And when I say  
 25 "add" I don't mean amplify, I mean new areas.

1 A. I recall only discussing the stuff that I'd already put  
 2 forward in written form in the discussion. I don't  
 3 think I added, although there were other elements in the  
 4 discussion that I contributed to verbally.  
 5 Q. Let's have a look at what you wrote in that debrief  
 6 form.  
 7 Mr Lopez, it's {INQ000802/3}.  
 8 Page 3 is what you have recorded, sergeant, under  
 9 the heading:  
 10 "From your own role perspective, what aspects of  
 11 Operation Newtown (response) did not go well?"  
 12 We're going to move through each of these, we won't  
 13 need to linger on some, but others may require some  
 14 follow-up questions.  
 15 Firstly, I have no doubt this has come from your  
 16 evidence already, but was your first point:  
 17 "Very chaotic scene inside the foyer with officers  
 18 moving around in a daze initially"?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. And was that your impression when you first went into  
 21 the City Room?  
 22 A. Not only was it my impression of other officers, it's  
 23 probably my impression of myself.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You clearly use the foyer in two  
 25 different ways. So here?

1 A. I've described the foyer as being the City Room, so when  
2 I say foyer, I meant City Room.  
3 MR DE LA POER: Next:  
4 "There was one paramedic in the foyer who was  
5 utterly overwhelmed by the casualty count."  
6 A. That was my impression, yes.  
7 Q. Is there anything to add to what you've told us about  
8 what about that paramedic's appearance led you to  
9 conclude that he was utterly overwhelmed?  
10 A. I would have said that purely by the numbers of  
11 casualties, there were too many for one person, I would  
12 have thought.  
13 Q. So not then a comment here about his presentation but  
14 about the scale of the task for one person?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Next:  
17 "Officers inside had only the lightest of medical  
18 kits, unsuitable for the trauma being experienced. No  
19 officers would have had the training to use more  
20 sophisticated medical kit. However, much larger  
21 dressings were required."  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. So your perception is that the first aid equipment  
24 available was inadequate?  
25 A. The first aid equipment available in the vehicles is

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1 a basic first aid kit rather than a trauma kit.  
2 Q. And equally, you are commenting upon the fact that the  
3 officers would not have had the training to use anything  
4 more sophisticated?  
5 A. Correct, sir.  
6 Q. Next, I won't read the whole of this out, but can  
7 I summarise it in this way, that there was a need for  
8 officers and that there was little guidance to start  
9 with, that the City Room was a difficult place to work,  
10 but that teams did form?  
11 A. Yes, sir.  
12 Q. And that what you say there is:  
13 "Those that worked best nearly always had a sergeant  
14 within their group and acted like a PSU serial."  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. Just tell us what you mean by PSU serial.  
17 A. PSU is an acronym for police support unit. It's the  
18 standard unit for attending disorder events, one  
19 sergeant and seven PCs.  
20 Q. We don't need to spend any time on the next one, suffice  
21 it to say that your reflection is, from an evidential  
22 perspective, the approach to saving life was in tension  
23 with that?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. I would like to ask you more about the next one:

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1 "I saw a chief inspector from BTP at the scene. She  
2 was unable to gain control from being inside the foyer  
3 and it would have been better to be outside giving  
4 instruction. Inspector Smith was running the situation  
5 inside."  
6 Can you explain to us what you're capturing there?  
7 A. My thoughts were that inside the City Room, it was  
8 extremely loud, you couldn't really hear radio  
9 communications because of voices and shouts, et cetera,  
10 going on, and that in order for someone senior to gain  
11 control and to talk about the wider control of the  
12 situation, they should be outside of that immediate  
13 environment.  
14 Q. When do you recall seeing the BTP chief inspector?  
15 A. I couldn't give a time on it, but I was aware that she  
16 was inside the City Room.  
17 Q. The precise time perhaps is yet to be established in the  
18 evidence, but as we understand it, it was some time  
19 shortly before midnight that Chief Inspector  
20 Andrea Graham from BTP was in the vicinity of the  
21 City Room. Would that stage of the evening accord with  
22 your recollection or are you just not able to say?  
23 A. I'm not able to say, sir.  
24 Q. In terms of the interaction between BTP and GMP, at any  
25 point did the issue of primacy cross your mind?

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1 A. No, sir.  
2 Q. What do you understand by the issue of primacy?  
3 A. Who is going to take control, whether it is control of  
4 communications or control with Silver or Bronze  
5 leadership. I'm aware that BTP cover events within the  
6 arena. Who took primacy I don't think I considered  
7 because this was about getting enough personnel there to  
8 assist in any way they could.  
9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have heard from someone else, a BTP  
10 police officer, to say if there's an inspector or  
11 sergeant from GMP there, and they tell me what to do,  
12 then I follow their instructions. Would the reverse be  
13 the same for you? So when you were there, had you come  
14 across an inspector from BTP, would you have done what  
15 he or she said?  
16 A. Yes, sir.  
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. And that applies, does it,  
18 across the forces?  
19 A. Yes, because we as police officers work on a rank  
20 structure, so if you come across a different force and  
21 a senior officer is saying, do this, do that, providing  
22 it's not unlawful, you would do what you're asked to do.  
23 MR DE LA POER: What about the question of the importance of  
24 working to a single joint plan? Was that a relevant  
25 consideration when assessing whether it was BTP or GMP

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1 in charge, or was that not the sort of situation that  
 2 you were facing?  
 3 A. I didn't give that any consideration on the evening,  
 4 sir .  
 5 Q. The next bullet point:  
 6 "The lack of suitable items to lift casualties was  
 7 massive and delayed the evacuation of some people for  
 8 a long time. I would have expected some store of  
 9 emergency equipment to be available at the arena."  
 10 Was that a reflection after the event, namely that  
 11 you would have expected some to be there, or did that  
 12 cross your mind at the time?  
 13 A. I was aware of the lack of suitable stretchers at the  
 14 time because we just used whatever was available and  
 15 I know that that's not unusual in high casualty events.  
 16 Reflecting afterwards, I was surprised that there  
 17 weren't available items to be used.  
 18 Q. At any point did it cross your mind to go and speak to  
 19 the paramedic that you had identified in the City Room  
 20 to see whether NWAS had any stretchers that might be  
 21 useful?  
 22 A. No, it didn't, sir .  
 23 Q. Looking back on it, do you think that that's a thought  
 24 process that was available to you at the time?  
 25 A. Looking back on it, yes, I probably could have made that

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1 decision. I don't think I thought of it at the time.  
 2 It certainly didn't cross my mind within the City Room.  
 3 Q. Why do you think that was?  
 4 A. Just the situation was so overwhelming, sir. These  
 5 thoughts probably didn't occur to me as I was dealing  
 6 with everything else .  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And actually getting a stretcher from an  
 8 ambulance is going to take a lot longer than using  
 9 something else which is on the spot, however unsuitable?  
 10 A. Yes, sir . Using the metal barriers that were there  
 11 provided really — they were good stretchers in moving  
 12 people round. They are not designed for that fact, but  
 13 you can certainly lift people on them with ease and  
 14 carry people on them.  
 15 MR DE LA POER: You've already touched on the radio comms  
 16 point, so we don't need to go into any more detail  
 17 there.  
 18 The next point is an evidential one to do with the  
 19 criminal investigation, so I'm not going to linger on  
 20 the first part, but I think your impression is  
 21 captured — tell me if I am wrong:  
 22 "For everyone inside the scene, the experience was  
 23 so overwhelming."  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Is that true of all of your experience that night?

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1 A. I think if you speak to anyone that was there, you would  
 2 find them using that term, yes, sir .  
 3 Q. Firearms officers . You have mentioned these already.  
 4 The point you make here, as I understand it, is that  
 5 because they were there as firearms officers and  
 6 equipped as such, that they weren't in a position to  
 7 help with the casualties?  
 8 A. Yes, sir .  
 9 Q. Did you ask any firearms officers whether they could  
 10 assist ?  
 11 A. I personally didn't ask firearms officers to assist, no.  
 12 Q. Do you know if any firearms officers were asked if they  
 13 could assist ?  
 14 A. I don't know that, sir .  
 15 Q. Do you think that that would have been an appropriate  
 16 request to make?  
 17 A. Yes, because firearms officers are given additional  
 18 training in trauma, first aid trauma, because of what  
 19 they're expected to go to.  
 20 Q. Did you have that in mind on the night?  
 21 A. Not on the night, no. That's my reflection afterwards.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you will see that maybe from other  
 23 points of view there were different considerations. You  
 24 go on to say the firearms officers were only required  
 25 outside, as events turned out, but actually the people

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1 in charge of the firearms officers wouldn't necessarily  
 2 know that at the time.  
 3 A. Yes, sir . Before coming in here today I've obviously  
 4 read through my documents.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Of course.  
 6 A. And my reflection on that paragraph now is different  
 7 because I've become more aware of what was going on  
 8 outside and so that firearms officers were deployed  
 9 inside now seems to me perfectly sensible. And I now  
 10 understand why they are there, that I probably didn't  
 11 when I wrote this document.  
 12 MR DE LA POER: On the next page you identify what went well  
 13 and which you highlight as —  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind if, before we leave this  
 15 page, could we just go back to the top? I'm conscious  
 16 that on some of these, and you're simply identifying  
 17 what went wrong without actually suggesting any remedy,  
 18 which is perfectly fair enough. In others you do  
 19 actually suggest how it could have been done better.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: For example, number 1:  
 22 "Very chaotic scenes inside the foyer with officers  
 23 moving round in a daze initially ."  
 24 Would you like to help me from your experience by  
 25 saying what you think could have happened which would

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1 have made it better?  
 2 A. When I took my role, sir, in giving officers briefing,  
 3 that is what I was trying to address, because officers  
 4 were arriving inside the City Room and then becoming so  
 5 overwhelmed that they became ineffective.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So people need to know, when they're the  
 7 first on the scene, they need to be briefing others who  
 8 arrive so they can be used effectively immediately?  
 9 A. Yes, and you would expect leaders, sergeants,  
 10 inspectors, or just even a senior officer, to take  
 11 a leadership role and give instructions. People  
 12 arriving in any situation work best if given clear  
 13 instruction rather than doing their own thing. So  
 14 that is the role I tried to take up on the evening:  
 15 giving clear instructions and getting people to focus.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's really helpful.  
 17 Leave the next one. The third one, when you're  
 18 talking about officers just not having suitable large  
 19 dressings, which they would need, you make the point  
 20 that had they had more sophisticated medical kit they  
 21 wouldn't have had the training to use it.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You are clearly suggesting that there  
 24 should be large dressings available.  
 25 A. Yes.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you suggesting that police officers  
 2 should have greater training to make them suitable to  
 3 use more sophisticated medical kit?  
 4 A. I think this comes, sir, into what we experience on  
 5 a daily basis for officers. Officers very, very often  
 6 go to situations where people need first aid and the  
 7 first aid training from my own personal view, the  
 8 first aid training that we are given, I am confident  
 9 personally to step in and use that first aid training.  
 10 I think that what we are given is good basic fieldcraft,  
 11 for want of a better term, and I have used it, both at  
 12 work and in my personal life, and I feel confident in  
 13 using it.  
 14 However, I feel that the first aid kits that we're  
 15 provided with should have better equipment inside them  
 16 because we often go to casualties that require more than  
 17 we're provided. We can usually get NAWAS or a firearms  
 18 officer or somebody with better kit to that casualty  
 19 very quickly, but the catastrophic injuries we were  
 20 faced with on that evening, we required really heavy  
 21 dressings where we could have used basic first aid  
 22 training in putting pressure on wounds and stemming  
 23 blood loss, but we need really big dressings for those  
 24 kind of injuries.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

1 MR DE LA POER: I think we're going to come on to some of  
 2 the proposals that you make, so if --  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: Not at all.  
 5 If we move on to {INQ000802/4}, please, Mr Lopez,  
 6 we'll see what went well and should be highlighted as  
 7 good practice.  
 8 The first point is about the scene cordons and that  
 9 was something that you've told us you helped to put in  
 10 place.  
 11 A. Or were already in place as I arrived, yes.  
 12 Q. And you say:  
 13 "How the decision was taken about where the  
 14 emergency services would attend and set up was taken.  
 15 I am not sure but this seemed well thought-out."  
 16 A. Yes, sir. I make the point there because you've asked  
 17 me questions about Trinity Way and whether I was setting  
 18 that up as an RVP, et cetera. But actually, the  
 19 forecourt of the station and that as a casualty clearing  
 20 point was a much better situation and who made that  
 21 decision and whether it's part of the plan, I don't  
 22 know, but that was much better because it was  
 23 a shorter -- gave people more access. It was easier to  
 24 get to than Trinity Way.  
 25 Q. The next bullet point is the point that you have already

1 made, I think in a number of different ways, that  
 2 essentially those in a leadership role did take control  
 3 of their units, but that you propose that all sergeants  
 4 should receive training in attending and dealing with  
 5 large-scale events and disturbances:  
 6 "The police tend to learn as they go, expecting  
 7 officers' experience to carry them through as they get  
 8 promoted rather than any formal training. Many officers  
 9 would be level 2 PSU trained and this would assist, but  
 10 not all, and there may be some training gaps for new  
 11 leaders."  
 12 Just explain what you mean by that.  
 13 A. We've already said that I was promoted in 2004, so my  
 14 training as a sergeant is maybe not the same as new  
 15 sergeants and sergeants that attended the scene. But  
 16 I haven't, other than my CBRN training, been given  
 17 specific training about leadership at large events.  
 18 However, I feel very experienced because of the number  
 19 of incidents, serious incidents, I've attended, so I've  
 20 learned through experience rather than formal training.  
 21 Q. Do we conclude from what you're saying here, you think  
 22 there should be formal training to help those who  
 23 haven't necessarily accrued the experience that  
 24 you have?  
 25 A. I think we'd say that anybody that's more highly trained

1 is more efficient .  
 2 Q. You identify that the focus on welfare, at the third  
 3 bullet point, after the event was excellent. And that  
 4 perhaps speaks for itself .  
 5 Then the final bullet point, a return to what we've  
 6 already touched on:  
 7 "Officers' ability to provide first aid was limited  
 8 by the first aid kit available but the training that  
 9 officers have seemed to be appropriate for basic  
 10 immediate care."  
 11 Is that you basically seeking to say what you have  
 12 told us already?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And then you have your recommendations. The first  
 15 relates to a store of emergency equipment that could be  
 16 quickly accessed.  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And here you mention the availability of equipment for  
 19 a CBRN incident but consider there should go something  
 20 different to that.  
 21 A. Yes. CBRN incidents are obviously very specific and  
 22 some of the kit that's required is very specific .  
 23 Q. I don't want you to go any further than you have in  
 24 relation to that.  
 25 A. Okay.

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1 Q. I think the point you're making, and I hope you won't  
 2 regard that interruption as disrespectful, is you think  
 3 something specific to this sort of incident, that might  
 4 be helpful?  
 5 A. Yes, sir .  
 6 Q. "All sergeants to be trained in response to major  
 7 incidents and how to control their staff to get the best  
 8 from the team."  
 9 So additional leadership training, the point you  
 10 covered above?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And:  
 13 "Trauma care. Could officers be given additional  
 14 training? Most seemed to know what they could do in the  
 15 circumstances but additional training would assist at  
 16 most incidents officers attend at."  
 17 A. Yes, sir . Just better training to give you more  
 18 confidence in using the training you've been given. If  
 19 you're confident about stepping in, even the most basic  
 20 interaction can assist in most circumstances.  
 21 Q. One thing you don't mention there that I'd like to seek  
 22 your views on is inter-agency interaction at large-scale  
 23 events.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. From your perspective, was that adequate at this event?

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1 A. No, sir .  
 2 Q. Do you think that you were adequately trained so that  
 3 you could play your part, insofar as it was required,  
 4 inter-agency?  
 5 A. I think that I had more training than a number of  
 6 officers that attended there and that I would have had  
 7 better knowledge of some joint operational training.  
 8 Was it sufficient for the night? No, I don't believe  
 9 so. I don't think even I had an adequate level for that  
 10 event.  
 11 Q. And how might that be done better in the future, do you  
 12 think?  
 13 A. It's quite a difficult one because the training that  
 14 I have undertaken has been classroom-based, you know,  
 15 talking about it and being shown it. There was the one  
 16 event in 2009 where I took part in a training day, but  
 17 actually for all of us, it depends how you learn as  
 18 well. Some people, like myself, will be better on  
 19 a practical basis rather than learning in a classroom,  
 20 so maybe some practical training would be beneficial.  
 21 Q. Do I take it from your answer in relation to the one  
 22 occasion of practical training you'd done that you  
 23 didn't participate in Exercise Winchester Accord?  
 24 A. I don't know that, sir, no.  
 25 Q. Even now, that doesn't mean anything to you?

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1 A. No, sir .  
 2 Q. And bearing in mind your answer a few moments ago that  
 3 you didn't think the inter-agency aspect of the response  
 4 went well, what about that in your perception didn't go  
 5 right?  
 6 A. On the night, and even probably by the time I gave this  
 7 written debrief, I felt that it was almost only police  
 8 that were involved within the City Room and that we took  
 9 casualties to NAWAS, who were outside the City Room, and  
 10 that's about as much of the interaction that I was aware  
 11 of on the night. I wasn't aware of any comms or  
 12 anything else going on.  
 13 Q. Do you think you were aware on the night that it was  
 14 inadequate or is that simply something that's come to  
 15 you once you've had a chance to step back from it?  
 16 A. Only since I've stepped back from it.  
 17 Q. Was that because you were just focused on what you were  
 18 doing or for some other reason?  
 19 A. Just because there was so much going on, I was focused  
 20 on what I was doing, sir .  
 21 Q. My final question is this: do you think engaging in  
 22 multi-agency training, where you and those training with  
 23 you have a better understanding of what other agencies  
 24 are doing, would be beneficial?  
 25 A. Yes, I do.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you just tell me the date of this  
2 particular document?  
3 MR DE LA POER: This document was 26 July 2017.  
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Clearly, the police, GMP, have had to  
5 consider a lot of recommendations, a lot of views.  
6 In relation to your specific recommendations, and they  
7 may simply not be accepted, I simply don't know, has  
8 anything changed in relation to them since that date  
9 that you're aware of?  
10 A. Not that I'm aware of, sir, no.  
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
12 MR DE LA POER: Thank you, Sergeant Beasley.  
13 I'm going to turn now, please, to Mr Weatherby,  
14 Queen's Counsel, who asks questions on behalf of the  
15 bereaved families.  
16 Questions from MR WEATHERBY  
17 MR WEATHERBY: Mr de la Poer asked you about the date of  
18 your statement and you've said that you had not -- the  
19 statement was made quite late because you hadn't been  
20 asked for one prior to that time. Is that right?  
21 A. Yes, sir.  
22 Q. There is in fact a very short debrief document, dated  
23 22 May. I think it probably was in fact completed on  
24 23 May given the obvious times. Do you recall that?  
25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. I don't think we need to put it up. Just for anybody's  
2 note, it's {INQ024180/1}. That's just a couple of  
3 sentences, Mr Beasley, isn't it, that just refers to you  
4 being in the City Room and helping casualties?  
5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
6 Q. Beyond that, you have no notes at all before the debrief  
7 and then your statement; is that right?  
8 A. That's correct, yes.  
9 Q. Is there a reason you didn't make any notes, for example  
10 a pocket notebook entry? Isn't that something that  
11 police officers do after any significant incident?  
12 A. Yes, sir. If I was -- you see, I would be focused on  
13 the criminal investigation and I do not think that my  
14 actions on the night would probably feed into that  
15 criminal investigation. So that's probably why I didn't  
16 make notes until I was asked to make a statement.  
17 Q. I mean, obviously this was a major crime scene, but  
18 you'd also obviously realise that there would be other  
19 inquiries and inquests?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Am I right that you actually did some PIP training,  
22 post-incident procedure training?  
23 A. No. PIP training is about the investigation of criminal  
24 events.  
25 Q. Right. But generally, as a sergeant in charge of other

1 police officers, you would expect them, wouldn't you, to  
2 make notes after a significant event such as this?  
3 A. If they were giving statements or had anything to add  
4 evidentially, yes.  
5 Q. You get to the debrief and at the time of the debrief  
6 you then give your views and you also discuss the issues  
7 with other officers.  
8 A. The officers that attended the same debrief, sir, yes.  
9 Q. Yes. I don't want to dwell on this, I'll move on  
10 quickly, but do you think with hindsight it would be  
11 better if you had made notes or a pocket notebook entry  
12 so that you'd have got matters and their order properly  
13 set down before other media or other officers' accounts  
14 got in the way of your recollection?  
15 A. I think with hindsight, sir, we could all say we could  
16 do things better.  
17 Q. Sure.  
18 Can I briefly move on to training because  
19 Mr de la Poer's dealt with most of it, but just so I can  
20 clarify. You told us at the time you think you didn't  
21 in fact know what Plato meant.  
22 A. That's correct.  
23 Q. So it would obviously follow from that, you'd had no  
24 training with respect to Plato?  
25 A. I made the point about whether there had been a briefing

1 document at some point but I don't recall having had any  
2 training when I attended the incident.  
3 Q. And that would mean, would it, that you'd had no  
4 training about marauding terrorist firearms incidents or  
5 indeed terrorist attacks? I understand that you have  
6 told us about the CBRN training, which involves some  
7 terrorism, but in general terms you'd had no training on  
8 terrorist attacks?  
9 A. Not that I can recall, sir, no.  
10 Q. In terms of the Greater Manchester Police major incident  
11 plan, had you had training on that?  
12 A. No, sir.  
13 Q. But you presumably, as a very experienced sergeant,  
14 would have a familiarity with the MIP?  
15 A. I would know that one would be in existence, yes.  
16 Q. And in terms of multi-agency exercise, you've told us  
17 about the day exercise in, I think it was 2009, around  
18 about that time?  
19 A. Yes, sir.  
20 Q. And that you'd done some tabletop work on multi-agency  
21 since then, I think.  
22 A. No, the tabletop exercise was Greater Manchester Police  
23 only.  
24 Q. I see. So the only multi-agency exercises or training  
25 that you've done was going back to 2009?

1 A. Practical training, yes, sir.  
 2 Q. You told us about first aid training and, again, have  
 3 I understood you correctly that it's more the equipment  
 4 that you're concerned about that's available to you  
 5 rather than the training? You think the training is  
 6 appropriate?  
 7 A. I feel ... Well, I can only talk for myself, sir, but  
 8 I'm confident in using it. So yes, the equipment was  
 9 lacking on the day, I felt.  
 10 Q. Obviously we're focused on very serious injuries and, in  
 11 particular, catastrophic bleeding. You've been asked  
 12 about tourniquets. Would it be helpful to you to have  
 13 training on the use of tourniquets?  
 14 A. It might in the right circumstances, sir, yes. However,  
 15 for most injuries that officers attend, pressure on the  
 16 wound is better than a tourniquet because tourniquets,  
 17 as I understand it, just from normal knowledge, are  
 18 difficult to use.  
 19 Q. Right, okay. We've heard some other evidence about  
 20 that, so I don't need to take that any further with you.  
 21 You've had training on the use of pressure on bandages;  
 22 is that right?  
 23 A. Yes, pressure on wounds, yes.  
 24 Q. But the problem you had on the night, and, I think, but  
 25 correct me if I'm wrong, the problem you're identifying

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1 more generally is that the bandages and equipment that  
 2 you have, in your view, is currently inadequate?  
 3 A. Yes. I mean, we're talking about exceptional  
 4 circumstances here.  
 5 Q. Yes.  
 6 A. So it might be that I'm talking -- I'm sort of mixing  
 7 general policing with the two. But yes, some larger  
 8 dressings in general policing would be useful as well.  
 9 Q. Yes, okay. Just finally in terms of equipment, you've  
 10 told us about the first aid equipment that you would  
 11 have in a patrol car.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And the fact that you would carry the CPR shield for  
 14 your use at a scene.  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. You deployed from a police station. Would there have  
 17 been a more comprehensive first aid bag available for  
 18 you to take from the police station or not?  
 19 A. Not at the time, no. No, sir.  
 20 Q. Would there now?  
 21 A. There might possibly be now. I've not been a response  
 22 sergeant for the last couple of years, so whether that's  
 23 changed...  
 24 Q. I see. Would you agree it's something that merits  
 25 looking at?

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1 A. As I've said, sir, you know, better equipment is always  
 2 useful, yes.  
 3 Q. Okay. Moving to the night in question, you were at the  
 4 Central Park Police Station when the news came through.  
 5 In your statement you refer to hearing of it by radio  
 6 and then looking at information that was available.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. What information was that? Was that what we know as the  
 9 FWIN?  
 10 A. Yes, sir, the FWIN or the incident log, as it's recorded  
 11 by the communications branch.  
 12 Q. So that's a log of information that's posted from calls  
 13 in from the public or officers or wherever?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. And that comes through to you and you are able to  
 16 monitor it, so before you left the police station you  
 17 picked up the very early record of what was coming in?  
 18 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.  
 19 Q. And as a result of that, you took the decision to  
 20 self-deploy to the scene?  
 21 A. Yes, sir.  
 22 Q. So you weren't deployed by the FDO or indeed by anybody  
 23 else?  
 24 A. No, that's correct.  
 25 Q. You were asked about self-deployment, but I confess I'm

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1 not at all clear on this. So far as you're aware, that  
 2 was in line with Greater Manchester Police policy at the  
 3 time, to self-deploy in these circumstances?  
 4 A. I could take the decision to go to a serious incident to  
 5 assess what was going on, to take a leadership role.  
 6 Yes, I could make my decision to do that.  
 7 Q. Right. Are you able to -- I don't want to put you on  
 8 the spot here, so if you're not able to, please say so.  
 9 Are you able to help us with where such policy might be  
 10 stated?  
 11 A. No, sir, I don't know whether that would be written down  
 12 as policy. That would come from my own personal  
 13 experience that I could self-deploy.  
 14 Q. Okay, and am I right that the arena was not on your  
 15 patch?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. So you were self-deploying to a -- you've described it  
 18 as a serious incident, a major incident on someone  
 19 else's patch?  
 20 A. Yes, sir, but the geography of it means that the  
 21 boundary of my area is the road outside, so we're  
 22 talking a matter of metres.  
 23 Q. Right. In your view, still today, there wasn't a need  
 24 to ask Control or the FDO whether you were needed at the  
 25 scene or whether there was some other role that you

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1 could undertake?  
 2 A. No, I was happy and I am happy with my decision, sir.  
 3 Q. Did you in fact try to get in touch with the FDO or  
 4 Control before self-deploying?  
 5 A. No, I made the decision to attend and I attended.  
 6 Q. Okay. Obviously at the centre of a major incident or  
 7 a serious incident, somebody has to be in control of  
 8 police resources; is that right?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. And initially, am I right, that would be the force duty  
 11 officer, the FDO?  
 12 A. In more serious situations, yes, they would take  
 13 control.  
 14 Q. And you'd assume that in this situation, it being  
 15 a bombing?  
 16 A. I would have -- yes, from experience, yes, I would say  
 17 that they would take control.  
 18 Q. If you self-deploy, how would the officer at the centre  
 19 of the wheel, the FDO, know what resources were on the  
 20 way and where they were?  
 21 A. Only by what was recorded onto that incident log about  
 22 who was saying where they were. So my radio comms as  
 23 I arrived gave my position that I deployed to the scene.  
 24 Q. Right. So until you actually had something to say, the  
 25 FDO, the Control, wouldn't in fact know that you were on

1 your way or what you were intending to do?  
 2 A. So because I work on a different area, I wouldn't be on  
 3 the same comms as the scene.  
 4 Q. I see. Can I just refer -- I think you've been asked to  
 5 have a look at this recently. I want to take you to  
 6 just two passages from the major incident plan. I'm  
 7 going to deal with this in more detail with another  
 8 officer, but two passages just to illustrate the  
 9 questions I'm asking you.  
 10 Could we have, please, Mr Lopez, {INQ007279/1}.  
 11 This is the major incident plan, just to orientate  
 12 ourselves, and this is the one I understand was in force  
 13 at the time.  
 14 Could we jump to {INQ007279/46}, please?  
 15 4.3, "Briefing". I know this is something you have  
 16 given evidence about the importance of at the scene.  
 17 Just reading down, and I won't read it all, it starts  
 18 with:  
 19 "The fundamental requirements and the cornerstone to  
 20 all health and safety legislation is to provide  
 21 information and share the results of the risk assessment  
 22 with those involved in the operation. Arranging staff  
 23 briefings is crucial to the success and safety of all  
 24 those involved in the operation. Before officers are  
 25 deployed in response to a major incident, they must be

1 fully briefed with as much information as is available,  
 2 even if limited. The content of the briefing must be  
 3 adequate for purpose and it should take place in  
 4 suitable surroundings, if possible at the RVP or  
 5 marshalling area."  
 6 Then:  
 7 "All staff involved in responding to a major  
 8 incident must understand their role and there must be no  
 9 ambiguity."  
 10 Just bearing that passage of the major incident plan  
 11 in mind, would you agree that it's very important that  
 12 people deploying to a major incident must have as much  
 13 information as is available before in fact they deploy?  
 14 I fully understand this refers to officers being  
 15 deployed, and you were self-deploying, but would you  
 16 agree that it's important that officers should be  
 17 briefed with as much information as is possible?  
 18 A. Yes, sir, I would agree with that.  
 19 Q. And very obviously, health and safety is referred to  
 20 there, but very obviously you may well be entering  
 21 a zone of real danger?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. And the reference there is that in deploying to a major  
 24 incident, the fact is you should deploy to an RVP or  
 25 marshalling area?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 2 Q. So again looking back at this, and again I'm absolutely  
 3 not wishing to be critical of, of course, the very  
 4 positive role you played on the evening, but looking  
 5 back at it, do you think you should have informed  
 6 Control that you were on the way and you should have  
 7 found out where an RVP or marshalling point was before  
 8 in fact going to the scene?  
 9 A. Well, this is the first time I've seen this document,  
 10 sir, but if you're referring to should I have followed  
 11 this document if I was aware of it, then yes, I should  
 12 have done.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Drilling down on this, this particular  
 14 document is to apply to all police officers who are  
 15 responding to major incidents?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you, as a very experienced sergeant,  
 18 have never seen it?  
 19 A. That's correct.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is it in your police station?  
 21 A. I don't where that is, sir.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You know where the police station is,  
 23 you don't know where the (overspeaking).  
 24 A. I don't know where the document is, if I can clarify  
 25 that.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry. Is that general as far as you're  
2 concerned?  
3 A. I have not seen this major incident plan, sir, before.  
4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were you aware that it existed?  
5 A. I would expect one to exist because we would be required  
6 to have one under legislation.  
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Okay, thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
8 MR WEATHERBY: Mr Beasley, I thought you had in fact been  
9 provided with two passages from this document before you  
10 gave your evidence. That was certainly my intention.  
11 A. My apologies, sir. When I say it's the first time I've  
12 seen it, the first time I saw it was when I looked at it  
13 yesterday. I had not seen it prior to that point.  
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, my question was not  
15 directed to that either. My question was directed to  
16 what he knew generally about it.  
17 MR WEATHERBY: Absolutely. I've fully understood that,  
18 thank you, sir.  
19 I am going to deal with this document with one of  
20 the commanders, but I did just want, in view of your  
21 evidence, to refer to these two passages. Could we have  
22 {INQ007279/35}, please, Mr Lopez.  
23 This relates to scene management and forward command  
24 posts first of all. Were you familiar with the concept  
25 of forward command posts at the time?

1 A. No, sir.  
2 Q. I won't ask you any more about that section then.  
3 3.3.2, below it, the second --- you see the heading.  
4 This deals with rendezvous points and I think you were  
5 familiar with the concept at least of rendezvous points,  
6 although not this document.  
7 A. Yes, sir. We use rendezvous points when attending  
8 serious incidents, most likely where people might be  
9 armed or something like that.  
10 Q. Yes. And of course this was a serious incident and, as  
11 you self-deployed, you knew that it was probably  
12 a terrorist attack and that a bomb had exploded ---  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. --- and potentially that there were firearms?  
15 A. I was not aware or it never crossed my mind that there  
16 were firearms. It seemed clear to me from the outset  
17 that this was a bomb.  
18 Q. Okay. Just reading a couple of passages:  
19 "The rendezvous point (RVP) is a location to which  
20 all police and emergency services personnel attending an  
21 incident should be directed. This ensures that the  
22 scene of the incident does not become inundated with  
23 resources, and personnel can be deployed in an orderly  
24 fashion. A designated RVP should be a location suitable  
25 for marshalling, briefing and deploying resources.

1 An RVP manager should be appointed to coordinate the RVP  
2 and these resources."  
3 I fully understand that when you arrived you were  
4 conscious of getting other officers down and you  
5 arranged or you suggested an RVP of your own for  
6 arriving police officers to park up; is that right?  
7 A. Yes, sir.  
8 Q. Bearing in mind this document, do you think it would  
9 have been appropriate for you to have asked Control  
10 where the RVP point was to which you should have gone to  
11 be deployed at the scene?  
12 A. I could have asked the question or I could have been  
13 told because it's become clear that Inspector Smith had  
14 nominated an RVP.  
15 Q. And I think at the time you weren't aware of that,  
16 though, were you?  
17 A. No, sir, I was not aware.  
18 Q. So is this right: you simply self-deployed, doing your  
19 best, trying to get to the scene to help as much as you  
20 could, and it didn't cross your mind as to whether you  
21 could go to the scene or to an RVP yourself?  
22 A. No, my intention was to go to the scene in order to  
23 assist in any way that I could --- more to assist in the  
24 management of resources ---  
25 Q. Yes, okay, thank you very much (overspeaking) --- I'm

1 sorry, I missed that.  
2 A. I said it is something that I would do or have done in  
3 previous incidents, not as serious as this, but in  
4 previous incidents that I've attended.  
5 Q. Yes. Well, just finishing on this point, in hindsight  
6 do you think that you should have, on the way, asked  
7 where the RVP was and gone there?  
8 A. Again, sir, with hindsight we could all do better.  
9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Where would you make that enquiry?  
10 A. Sir, about the RVP?  
11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. Who would you ask?  
12 A. I would radio Control, the comms operator.  
13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which is local to your station?  
14 A. No, it's its own station.  
15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Across Manchester?  
16 A. It's now based at force headquarters, but we used to  
17 have one at Trafford as well.  
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So this is where the FDO would be?  
19 A. Yes, sir.  
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So would it be him you're ringing to try  
21 and find that out?  
22 A. I would do it on my radio, sir. It would be the comms  
23 operator listening to the radio that would pass that  
24 information out.  
25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

1 MR WEATHERBY: So you arrive at the scene and at 22.53,  
 2 going from the log that I think you have in front of  
 3 you, you then start to do your best to sort out the  
 4 roadway outside, calling for extra resources.  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. And you make a suggestion of where arriving police  
 7 officers effectively can park up.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And you arrive at the Trinity Way entrances to the  
 10 arena, and am I right you enter that entrance simply  
 11 because of the geography or the route from your police  
 12 station to the arena?  
 13 A. Yes, sir. So it's easier to drive to that location than  
 14 it is to the front of the railway station.  
 15 Q. So it wasn't a choice you made based on anything other  
 16 than your route from your police station to the arena?  
 17 A. And also a little bit of my personal knowledge, having  
 18 gone to the arena before. I entered at that point and  
 19 so I naturally went to that point.  
 20 Q. Did you have any consideration as to whether that  
 21 entrance was safe to enter?  
 22 A. No, sir, I didn't.  
 23 Q. Did you make any communication to find that out?  
 24 A. No, sir.  
 25 Q. Did you check whether a major incident had been

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1 declared?  
 2 A. No, I didn't ask that question, sir.  
 3 Q. Did you understand the importance of that?  
 4 A. Yes, I understand the importance of the major incident  
 5 declaration.  
 6 Q. When you entered, you knew that Inspector Smith had  
 7 deployed to the arena. And on the night he was your  
 8 line manager; is that right?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. So presumably you had it in mind that he was the person  
 11 that you'd be looking for?  
 12 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 13 Q. So you weren't looking for a Bronze commander, you were  
 14 looking for your line manager to report to?  
 15 A. So a Bronze commander is not rank specific, so everybody  
 16 with the correct training could take up a position of  
 17 Bronze. However, I would have anticipated that because  
 18 of his rank, he would be taking the leadership role,  
 19 yes.  
 20 Q. It was an inelegant question from me. I'm simply trying  
 21 to drill down into who you might be looking for and you  
 22 were simply looking for somebody you knew who was there,  
 23 who was in fact your line manager?  
 24 A. Yes, or who I would have expected to take a leadership  
 25 role, yes, sir.

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1 Q. Yes. When you got there, did you discuss with  
 2 Inspector Smith the making of a METHANE report?  
 3 A. No, sir.  
 4 Q. Did you understand what that was?  
 5 A. I had knowledge of the METHANE acronym, yes.  
 6 Q. Was there any discussion with Inspector Smith when you  
 7 arrived there about reporting back to Control as much  
 8 information as possible?  
 9 A. As in him asking me to report back to Control, sir?  
 10 Q. Discussing whether you might do it or he had done it or  
 11 checking it had been done. Was there any discussion  
 12 about gathering the information and reporting it back to  
 13 the FDO or to Control?  
 14 A. He didn't ask me to do that and I didn't ask him if  
 15 he had done that. Sorry, that was a poor answer, but...  
 16 Q. No, no, thank you very much.  
 17 You have told us that Inspector Smith asked you to  
 18 engage in moving casualties from the City Room.  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. Was that instruction to move casualties from the  
 21 City Room across the bridge and down the stairs to what  
 22 we now know was the casualty clearing zone?  
 23 A. I can't remember, sir, that level of detail. However,  
 24 thinking back to the evening, I never considered moving  
 25 the casualties to anywhere else other than the concourse

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1 of the station.  
 2 Q. Okay. It's just that you'd arrived at Trinity Way and  
 3 you'd referred to getting officers down to facilitate  
 4 ambulances arriving, presumably down Trinity Way?  
 5 A. Yes, sir. But I clearly gathered more information  
 6 having entered the City Room.  
 7 Q. I see. That's where I was going to ask you next. So  
 8 having entered the City Room, did you come to understand  
 9 where the casualties would be taken from?  
 10 A. Yes. Again, I cannot recall the level of detail as if  
 11 someone exactly saying to me, "This is where the  
 12 casualty clearing post will be". However, at no point  
 13 did I consider that casualties should go anywhere else  
 14 other than the concourse of the railway station.  
 15 Q. So would it follow from that that, having arrived in the  
 16 City Room, Inspector Smith or somebody else had told you  
 17 that the ambulance paramedics and the ambulances were  
 18 going to collect casualties from the downstairs  
 19 concourse?  
 20 A. Yes. I think that would be the more logical conclusion  
 21 of what I'm saying, yes.  
 22 Q. You told us about the use of barriers as stretchers, and  
 23 of course they were used for quite some time, weren't  
 24 they?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. And of course they were capable of being used to move  
 2 casualties, but they're very heavy, aren't they?  
 3 A. Yes, they are, they are heavy.  
 4 Q. And they generally required something being put on them  
 5 before a casualty could be put on them?  
 6 A. Yes. Obviously, they're made of metal bars. It's very  
 7 uncomfortable and actually it would be better with  
 8 something laid on top, yes.  
 9 Q. Please understand that I'm not being critical of you  
 10 using barriers, I'm just trying to ask you to assist me  
 11 in assessing how appropriate they were. So you used  
 12 those barriers because, effectively, you didn't have  
 13 anything else?  
 14 A. That's correct, sir, yes. They were the thing that  
 15 could be used as a stretcher.  
 16 Q. Yes. And it would have been far better, wouldn't it, if  
 17 there had been stretchers from ambulances or fire  
 18 appliances?  
 19 A. Yes. I mean, there are all sorts of things available on  
 20 the market, I'm sure, that could be used as stretchers,  
 21 but the only thing that we had available were the  
 22 barriers.  
 23 Q. I'm not being critical of you using the barriers, it's  
 24 just that they were far less appropriate than stretchers  
 25 or field stretchers that are carried by both fire

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1 appliances and ambulances; isn't that right?  
 2 A. Um...  
 3 Q. Your job would have been much easier had you had  
 4 stretchers from the ambulances or from fire appliances?  
 5 A. Sir, that's almost impossible for me to answer. The  
 6 barriers that we used were not what you would choose  
 7 given a range of items. However, they worked very  
 8 efficiently for what we had available at the time.  
 9 Q. Yes. I'm not trying to suggest that it was wrong to use  
 10 them; I'm simply trying to gain your assistance that it  
 11 would have been much better to have had actual proper  
 12 casualty removing stretchers available to you.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I think you've already had, had  
 14 you the option of choosing between the two, you'd have  
 15 chosen the proper stretcher?  
 16 A. Yes, sir, if they were available, I would choose  
 17 something that was made for the job.  
 18 MR WEATHERBY: Bearing in mind you were being asked to move  
 19 casualties down to the concourse, to the route to the  
 20 ambulances on Hunts Bank, did it occur to you that you  
 21 might despatch an officer or ask one of the officers  
 22 carrying somebody, perhaps on a barrier, to get the  
 23 paramedics to send up their stretchers?  
 24 A. I didn't ask any officer to do that. It didn't occur to  
 25 me to ask that, no. (Overspeaking). I would have

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1 thought that if stretchers had been available then  
 2 officers would have brought them up because officers  
 3 were bringing further barriers up to the City Room.  
 4 Q. Bearing in mind that you were being asked to take the  
 5 casualties down to that place, were you aware whether in  
 6 fact paramedics were there at the time, at the time  
 7 those casualties were being taken down?  
 8 A. I don't have that level of detail, but going back to  
 9 what I've already said, it was clear to me that that's  
 10 where the casualties were going. But other than that,  
 11 that's all I can recollect from the evening.  
 12 Q. Again, given the evidence you have given about the one  
 13 paramedic who was in the City Room being overwhelmed,  
 14 did you ask any of the officers that were taking  
 15 casualties down to try to get other paramedics to come  
 16 up?  
 17 A. I didn't ask that question, no, not that I recall.  
 18 I may have done on the evening, but the level of detail  
 19 that I can recall, I didn't ask that question.  
 20 Q. Okay. Again, I'm not being critical, it wasn't,  
 21 frankly, your job, but I'm just asking you whether in  
 22 fact it did cross your mind, and your answer is that you  
 23 don't think it did, but you are not sure; is that right?  
 24 A. That's correct. I don't recall asking that question,  
 25 but I may have done.

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1 Q. Did you go to the one paramedic who was in the City Room  
 2 and ask him whether he had in fact called for other  
 3 paramedics to come up to the City Room?  
 4 A. I remember talking to the paramedic. My recollection  
 5 is that I spoke to him about casualties that I was aware  
 6 of to see whether he was aware of them. I don't recall  
 7 asking him whether he'd asked for further personnel to  
 8 come up.  
 9 Q. Would there be any reason why you wouldn't have done  
 10 that? For example, you might think it wasn't your job?  
 11 A. There would be no reason why I wouldn't have asked the  
 12 question had I thought of it.  
 13 Q. Do you recall discussing it with Inspector Smith, given  
 14 that he was the commander?  
 15 A. No, I don't recall.  
 16 Q. In terms of the casualties, you were tasked by  
 17 Inspector Smith to try to move as many of the  
 18 casualties, presumably the ones that were capable of  
 19 being moved, so you had to make a judgement about which  
 20 casualty should or shouldn't be moved; is that right?  
 21 A. I was asked by Inspector Smith to remove all casualties,  
 22 so that was the distinction between those that were  
 23 deceased and those that were casualties.  
 24 Q. Right. Again, I want to deal with this very broad-brush  
 25 and very swiftly: your task was to manage other

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1 officers , to direct other officers below you, to move  
 2 particular casualties and to do so as best and as  
 3 swiftly as you could?  
 4 A. Yes, sir .  
 5 Q. So you were moving round the room, organising the  
 6 resources that were available to you as best you could  
 7 to move the casualties as swiftly as possible?  
 8 A. Yes, sir , that’s correct .  
 9 Q. Just finally to return to a couple of points that  
 10 Mr de la Poer touched upon, he referenced a passage that  
 11 was seen on body-worn video at 23.11. So this is  
 12 40 minutes after the explosion. PC Williams has turned  
 13 up with some towels. Had he been tasked to go and look  
 14 for any equipment or anything that would help with the  
 15 injuries that could be seen?  
 16 A. Do you mean by myself, sir?  
 17 Q. Either by you or within your knowledge, had he been  
 18 tasked?  
 19 A. I couldn’t answer whether he’d been tasked, sir.  
 20 Q. So either he’s been tasked to do it or he’s done it off  
 21 his own initiative . He is heard to say, "It’s as good  
 22 as it gets", just to help stop the bleeding?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Would I be right that that highlights the lack of  
 25 equipment that was available to you and the lack of

1 medically trained personnel there to help at that time,  
 2 40 minutes after the explosion?  
 3 A. Yes, sir . As per my earlier evidence, we are trained to  
 4 use pressure on wounds, and that is a very good method  
 5 for stemming bleeding, but you require sufficient  
 6 dressings. That is not to say that something like a  
 7 towel is not a sufficient dressing and I have seen it  
 8 used before.  
 9 Q. I’m not suggesting it’s inappropriate --  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we’ve got the picture. That’s  
 11 not a criticism of you.  
 12 MR WEATHERBY: Not a criticism at all, not meant to be, no.  
 13 Finally, there’s another entry at 23.39.  
 14 A. Do you mean 23.29, sir? 6,823?  
 15 Q. Yes, I’m very sorry, I do mean that. Thank you for  
 16 correcting me. 6,823. So at that point, almost an hour  
 17 after the explosion has gone off, you are still using  
 18 barriers to remove the casualties; is that right?  
 19 A. Yes, sir . I understand that I will have been caught  
 20 within the image that that refers to.  
 21 Q. Yes, indeed. I’m just asking you to help me highlight  
 22 the fact that almost an hour after the explosion,  
 23 barriers were still being used to move casualties. I’m  
 24 not suggesting anything was inappropriate so far as  
 25 you’re concerned about that.

1 The final question from me: beyond Inspector Smith,  
 2 who was your commander on scene in the City Room, were  
 3 you aware of anyone above Mr Smith on scene whilst you  
 4 were there that evening from GMP?  
 5 A. GMP, sir, no. Not in the City Room.  
 6 Q. Okay. In the City Room or elsewhere on scene?  
 7 A. I believe there were more senior officers present when  
 8 I got down to the informal debrief at 2.30-ish.  
 9 Q. So until 2.30, you weren’t aware of a more senior GMP  
 10 commander on scene, and by on scene I mean generally on  
 11 scene, until that time? You weren’t personally aware of  
 12 any above Mr Smith?  
 13 A. I wasn’t personally aware, but then I spent the majority  
 14 of time in the City Room.  
 15 MR WEATHERBY: I see. Those are my questions, Mr Beasley,  
 16 thank you very much indeed.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before we move on --  
 18 MR DE LA POER: Mr Cooper has 5 minutes arising out of my  
 19 questioning.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It’s been pointed out to you what was  
 21 in the GMP major incident plan, which you’ve told us you  
 22 were not aware of the contents of.  
 23 A. Yes, sir .  
 24 Q. And it’s apparent from that, or appears to be if you  
 25 follow that, that before self-deploying you should have

1 got permission or told someone what you were going to  
 2 do, and secondly you should have asked for an RVP.  
 3 Assuming that to be right, what do you think would be  
 4 the net effect on your arrival at the arena?  
 5 A. I feel , sir , that I deployed so early on and for the  
 6 reasons that I wanted to get as much information and  
 7 assist that the net effect would be I would end up  
 8 in the same situation in the City Room organising staff.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you think you’d have got there later?  
 10 You obviously did a great deal of good work there in  
 11 organising people and helping with casualties. I wonder  
 12 if following the major incident plan would have actually  
 13 delayed your arrival .  
 14 A. It has been my experience that these things take so long  
 15 to get coordinated that if I was asked to be at an RVP  
 16 then you would be quickly forgotten about and you would  
 17 be constantly asking, should I go, should I not, and  
 18 I would have been stood and probably not done anything  
 19 at all .  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I’m not saying it’s the wrong thing,  
 21 I just think we need to understand what may be the  
 22 consequences of it.  
 23 Anyway, Mr Cooper, thank you.  
 24 Questions from MR COOPER  
 25 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.

1 Very briefly, if I can, officer. I represent also  
 2 some of the families and some particular families who  
 3 are concerned about the stretcher situation and the use  
 4 of barriers. I just wanted to clarify what your  
 5 evidence was on this particular issue, please, officer.  
 6 You, I think, and correct me if I'm wrong, said in  
 7 your evidence with Mr de la Poer that you felt that  
 8 metal barriers carried people with ease. Did you use  
 9 that expression?  
 10 A. Carry people with ease?  
 11 Q. Ease.  
 12 A. They could be used as stretchers and they were adequate  
 13 to be used as stretchers. I don't... With ease --  
 14 I may have used the term, sorry, sir.  
 15 Q. Do you go back on that? It's important because if you  
 16 do say they carried people with ease, I may have further  
 17 questions for you on the point.  
 18 A. They were used on the -- my impression is on the  
 19 evening, they were used as effective stretchers. That  
 20 would be a better term, sir.  
 21 Q. I emphasise, as Mr Weatherby did --  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: (Overspeaking) moment. You've accepted  
 23 they're not ideal and we also know that actually with  
 24 one particular individual it was remarkably  
 25 unsuccessful, but you may not have seen that at the

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1 time.  
 2 A. Okay.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, Mr Cooper.  
 4 MR COOPER: Let me emphasise again, I'm not criticising you,  
 5 officer, for your heroism and the application on that  
 6 night. Please don't take my questions as being  
 7 personally directed at you. But as the chairman has  
 8 indicated, there are particular examples, and  
 9 I represent one particular family who were impacted by  
 10 this example, where the stretcher, the use of the  
 11 barrier as a stretcher, was very uncomfortable indeed  
 12 for the individual. Indeed at one stage, he nearly fell  
 13 off. What do you say about that? Does that rather  
 14 clarify, knowing what you know now, your observation  
 15 that they were effective stretchers?  
 16 A. Sir, they are not designed as stretchers. However, you  
 17 could not have removed casualties from that room with  
 18 anything like the speed that we did without using them  
 19 as stretchers.  
 20 Q. I understand needs must in the enormity of the moment.  
 21 I emphasise again for the second time, I'm not  
 22 criticising you for using those items, indeed any item,  
 23 in the enormity of the situation. But would you accept  
 24 from me that they certainly did not at times universally  
 25 carry people with ease? It depended upon the situation

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1 that individual was in.  
 2 A. Sir, they are clearly not designed as stretchers and  
 3 they would therefore not be as effective as an item  
 4 designed as a stretcher.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they did cause problems on the  
 6 night, which you would accept? Not to your knowledge,  
 7 but you do know, Mr Cooper's just told you.  
 8 A. That's correct. That they caused problems would not  
 9 come as a surprise to me.  
 10 MR COOPER: Thank you, officer, that's fair of you.  
 11 Can I just take it one stage further? We have seen  
 12 the imagery and I won't go into it, but they took  
 13 a number of officers to control or to manoeuvre, didn't  
 14 they, particularly as they were so heavy?  
 15 A. Yes. That would be true of any stretcher though.  
 16 Considering the distance that you had to carry and that  
 17 you had to go down steps, I would not have expected  
 18 teams to work as twos, I would always expect more  
 19 because you can work more efficiently and safely with  
 20 more people carrying the stretcher, even if it is  
 21 (overspeaking).  
 22 Q. How many would you expect then, police officers, be  
 23 needed to handle a stretcher effectively? A stretcher,  
 24 not the barrier, a stretcher.  
 25 A. I'm confusing two things here, sir, because I would

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1 expect teams to work together and the normal way a team  
 2 would work would be a group of one and six, you know.  
 3 But I would think six people on a stretcher, that would  
 4 not be unusual, considering the amount of steps you were  
 5 having to go down.  
 6 Q. I'm going to suggest to you, officer, for your comment,  
 7 that the number of individuals needed to make these  
 8 stretchers anywhere near effective -- I call them  
 9 stretchers, barriers -- was in excess of those who would  
 10 be required, for instance, on conventional stretchers.  
 11 A. Sir, you're asking me something a little bit out of my  
 12 expertise and I did not go down steps with those  
 13 barriers, so I am taking wild guesses here a little bit.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We must remember, Mr Cooper,  
 15 mustn't we, that it does depend a bit on the type of  
 16 stretcher which is actually being used. So the Skeds  
 17 used by fire officers would require less people because  
 18 they're designed that way than maybe a stretcher coming  
 19 off an ambulance. I don't know, I don't have an  
 20 expertise either in it, but that seems quite likely.  
 21 MR COOPER: Sir, yes. You heard what the chair said. Would  
 22 you like to comment on that, officer?  
 23 A. The only time I've ever used an actual stretcher is at  
 24 a rugby match, and six of us carried the stretcher.  
 25 That was a designed stretcher.

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1 Q. I'll put my point succinctly at the end of that, that  
 2 the carriage, the portage of these stretchers, used  
 3 additional human resources which could have been  
 4 elsewhere if normal stretchers had been used? What  
 5 do you say to that?  
 6 A. I don't feel that's something that I can offer  
 7 a realistic answer to.  
 8 Q. All right then. Finally this: the speed of the  
 9 extraction of casualties on a metal barrier would be  
 10 slower, would it not, than on a proper stretcher, which  
 11 may be more lightweight?  
 12 A. If you have something that is specifically designed to  
 13 do the job, then yes, I think that would be more  
 14 efficient and you could do it at more speed.  
 15 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Cooper.  
 17 Further questions from MR DE LA POER  
 18 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I have a team of people who sit behind  
 19 me helping me, and at least two of them have been on  
 20 this. In the light of Mr Cooper's question, I'll give  
 21 the reference for everybody within the live transcript.  
 22 It's on [draft] page 61, and what you said, officer, is  
 23 this:  
 24 "Using the metal barriers that were there provided  
 25 really — they were good stretchers in moving people

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1 around. They are not designed for that fact, but you  
 2 can certainly lift people on them with ease and carry  
 3 people on them."  
 4 A. Right. So it wasn't a verbal answer, it was something  
 5 I wrote in the debrief?  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, somebody is making a note of  
 7 everything you're saying and it's being read back to  
 8 you.  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 MR DE LA POER: That was precisely what you said and that  
 11 was the question Mr Cooper was asking you about. Just  
 12 before I invite Mr Horwell, I think you have said this  
 13 already, but to be clear, whilst you were directing the  
 14 teams of people who were carrying others on barriers,  
 15 that wasn't your role on the night?  
 16 A. No, sir.  
 17 Q. Were you aware that at any point pieces of cardboard  
 18 were being used without the metal barrier?  
 19 A. I was aware that people tried to use — there were  
 20 some... I don't know whether they were cardboard or  
 21 hardboard in front of the concession stands. Some  
 22 officers tried to use those but they were too flimsy.  
 23 So it may be that those were put on to a metal barrier  
 24 and the two went together.  
 25 Q. I'm sure that in the case of a particular person,

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1 if we need to explore that further, we can do so at  
 2 another time. That's all I wanted to follow up on  
 3 before I give Mr Horwell the opportunity to ask you  
 4 questions on behalf of Greater Manchester Police.  
 5 Questions from MR HORWELL  
 6 MR HORWELL: Mr Beasley, you've been asked about the GMP  
 7 major incident plan and you have told the chairman that  
 8 yesterday was the first time that you had seen such  
 9 a plan.  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. The chairman has asked you about the section that  
 12 related to the RVP and you have accepted that if you had  
 13 followed that procedure, there would not only have been  
 14 a delay, but potentially a considerable delay, in your  
 15 attendance at the City Room.  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. You were asked about another section of the major  
 18 incident plan, the need to brief those who were  
 19 attending the scene, and you will remember from the  
 20 communications schedule, to which you were referred,  
 21 that at 23.02 that night you approached a group of  
 22 police officers who were on the bridge and the words of  
 23 the schedule state as follows:  
 24 "Sergeant Beasley approaches them on the bridge and  
 25 provides a briefing: 'Listen up, everybody.'"

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1 And so on. So that was your giving officers new to  
 2 the scene, those that had just arrived, a briefing. And  
 3 as the schedule indicates, the body-worn video is either  
 4 switched off or it switches off and we don't hear  
 5 everything that you had to say. But the briefing that  
 6 you gave those officers, would it have been a short one?  
 7 A. Yes, sir. It would have been a matter of seconds, but  
 8 it would have described what they were walking into and  
 9 it would also have given them instruction on what  
 10 I expected them to do when they entered.  
 11 Q. A short briefing because at that stage what or who were  
 12 your number one priority?  
 13 A. My number one priority were the casualties and removing  
 14 those casualties to where they could get the best  
 15 first aid or medical aid that they could receive.  
 16 Q. Just to some other aspects of your evidence that you  
 17 were asked. I want to start with CBRN training. We can  
 18 see from your records that your CBRN training was indeed  
 19 detailed. Between the years 2008 and 2017 there were  
 20 eight training sessions, sometimes more than one in  
 21 a year.  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. Just so that the chairman understands, a police force  
 24 must have a certain number of CBRN-trained police  
 25 officers; yes?

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1 A. That's correct, yes.  
 2 Q. But your attendance on this training, that was  
 3 voluntary, you decided to do that?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. Do zones feature in CBRN training and work?  
 6 A. Yes, sir. There are three zones, hot, warm and cold,  
 7 and we train extensively about the difference between  
 8 those, mostly in that field of work about what PPE is  
 9 required within those zones.  
 10 Q. One of the aspects of CBRN training is that the Fire  
 11 Brigade plays a very important part in CBRN work;  
 12 is that right?  
 13 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.  
 14 Q. So you were aware of the skills that the Fire Brigade  
 15 had in relation to CBRN training and, from your normal  
 16 police work, you were aware of the skills that the Fire  
 17 Brigade had in treating injured people?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. And the fact is that notwithstanding your considerable  
 20 experience and the knowledge that you had of what the  
 21 Fire Brigade could offer in an emergency, on the night  
 22 you never thought of them?  
 23 A. I have no recollection of thinking about the Fire  
 24 Service and why they weren't there or asking for them to  
 25 be called in.

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1 Q. The chairman will have to ask how or why that was. Are  
 2 you able to assist him in any way, you being  
 3 a particularly experienced police officer, Mr Beasley?  
 4 A. Sir, I can only think that because the situation that  
 5 I was in within the City Room was overwhelming, I failed  
 6 to think of it on the evening. That's the only reason  
 7 I can give.  
 8 Q. Your priority, as you've told us, was the treatment and  
 9 evacuation of those who were injured?  
 10 A. Yes, sir.  
 11 Q. One more question specifically about the events of that  
 12 night and, in particular, Inspector Michael Smith, the  
 13 Bronze for the City Room. He was in command of the  
 14 City Room; would that be right?  
 15 A. Yes, that would be the role that I would give him, sir,  
 16 yes.  
 17 Q. How well did he command those in the City Room? How  
 18 would you describe his performance on the night?  
 19 A. I have the utmost respect for Inspector Smith and what  
 20 he did. When I spoke to him, he gave me clear  
 21 instruction about what he wanted and then I carried out  
 22 that instruction about organising the casualties to be  
 23 evacuated. So I felt that he did really well in very  
 24 difficult circumstances.  
 25 Q. Was there any lack of command or lack of direction

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1 inside the City Room?  
 2 A. It was a very chaotic scene, sir, but Inspector Smith  
 3 had told me what he wanted, I knew clearly what he  
 4 wanted, and I felt that my role was to organise that,  
 5 facilitate it, and whilst we can all be critical of what  
 6 we did, I feel that we did it to the best of our  
 7 ability. I did my role to the best of my ability.  
 8 Q. In an emergency such as this, or in an emergency  
 9 generally, where do you expect the Silver commander to  
 10 be based from your experience, Mr Beasley?  
 11 A. From my experience, Silver would usually be based within  
 12 the communications hub, so probably away from the scene,  
 13 dealing with all the information and communication that  
 14 was coming in. It is not written in stone that there  
 15 should be only one Silver, you could have multiple  
 16 Silvers. You could have a Silver that attended the  
 17 scene, but the initial Silver commander I would expect  
 18 to be within the communications room.  
 19 Q. At force headquarters?  
 20 A. At force headquarters, yes.  
 21 Q. We have looked in some detail at your training records,  
 22 Mr Beasley, and we have heard a little, it's only been  
 23 a little, of your career and your experience as a police  
 24 officer. On the night of this attack, because of your  
 25 training and because of your experience, how well

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1 prepared were you to respond to these events?  
 2 A. I felt — it might come back to why I self-deployed.  
 3 I felt confident to go to offer my expertise and  
 4 leadership. I can only say that I was overwhelmed on  
 5 arrival and I remain overwhelmed by the experience.  
 6 MR HORWELL: That's all I ask. Thank you, Mr Beasley.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you go away, and in case you  
 8 need to follow up, Inspector Smith was in the City Room  
 9 with the casualties, doing his best to organise, with  
 10 your help, the removal of the casualties. Did he remain  
 11 in the City Room as far as you know?  
 12 A. As far as I am aware, sir, yes he did.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm just concerned, on the actual  
 14 situation on the night, so you've got Inspector Smith,  
 15 the Bronze, controlling the situation, but right in the  
 16 heart of the whole thing?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You've obviously got people arriving,  
 19 not just police but ambulance as well, who will be  
 20 arriving in different places.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wonder whether you think that it  
 23 might have been an advantage on the night to have some  
 24 other senior commander actually in a different area of  
 25 the complex. Don't be influenced by the way I have

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1 asked the question, you just give me your entirely  
 2 neutral view about it.  
 3 A. Sir, whilst I would have expected Inspector Smith, and  
 4 I have no criticism of him at all, to be within the  
 5 City Room initially, the inability to speak clearly,  
 6 listen to radio comms, make phone calls, I don't think  
 7 he should have remained there, I think he should have  
 8 been just outside, which would have given him more  
 9 opportunity to make comms. I would have expected other  
 10 Bronzes, it doesn't necessarily need to be senior  
 11 personnel, to take control of different areas, so  
 12 I would have expected there to be control of the  
 13 casualty clearing point, the RVP, you know, all of the  
 14 different aspects. So whilst Inspector Smith was in  
 15 control of the City Room, there should have been or  
 16 I would have expected -- and there may have been,  
 17 I don't know -- other officers acting in Bronze or even  
 18 Silver capacity at other points just outside or  
 19 elsewhere within the arena and station.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 21 Mr Horwell, by all means do come back on that if you  
 22 would wish to do so.  
 23 MR HORWELL: No, thank you, sir. There is obviously  
 24 extensive evidence to follow as to another Bronze and as  
 25 to the officer who was in command, but no further

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1 questions, thank you.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 3 MR DE LA POER: None from me, sir.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you very much, you have  
 5 finished. I'm really grateful for your evidence and for  
 6 your help. I do hope you don't think we've been unduly  
 7 critical. It's not intended that way. Everyone has  
 8 great admiration for everything you did on the night, so  
 9 thank you for that.  
 10 An hour, thank you.  
 11 (1.09 pm)  
 12 (The lunch adjournment)  
 13 (2.10 pm)  
 14 MR DE LA POER: Sir, good afternoon. I wonder whether the  
 15 witness may be sworn, please.  
 16 PC ABDIRAHMAN MOHAMED (sworn)  
 17 Questions from MR DE LA POER  
 18 MR DE LA POER: Please state your full name?  
 19 A. My full name is Abdirahman Mohamed.  
 20 Q. Is it right that you are, as at today's date, a police  
 21 constable with Greater Manchester Police?  
 22 A. That's correct, sir.  
 23 Q. Did you become a police constable in 2019?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. But at the time of events with which we are concerned,

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1 in May 2017, were you a police community support  
 2 officer?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. Did you join Greater Manchester Police as a PCSO in  
 5 2015?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. We're going to briefly review your training together and  
 8 look at two documents, the first, Mr Lopez, which I hope  
 9 is accessible to you on your system, is {INQ100060/1}.  
 10 We see, there at the bottom, you did your initial  
 11 8 weeks' training?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 Q. And that as part of that, four up from the bottom, we  
 14 see that on 29 January 2015 you undertook some emergency  
 15 first aid at work training.  
 16 A. Yes, sir.  
 17 Q. Was that, so far as you can recall, the only first aid  
 18 training that you had had before you attended the arena  
 19 in May 2017?  
 20 A. Yes, sir, that's the only first aid training that I can  
 21 recall I've had prior to the arena events.  
 22 Q. We've heard this described by a police officer, but  
 23 bearing in mind that you were training as a PCSO, I'd  
 24 just like to seek your best recollection of the nature  
 25 of that training, please. Was it in a classroom?

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1 A. Yes, sir, it was in a classroom.  
 2 Q. And how long did it take?  
 3 A. I believe it takes the course of a full day.  
 4 Q. Did you have the practical opportunity to demonstrate  
 5 what you'd learned in the course of the training?  
 6 A. Some aspects, yes.  
 7 Q. Do you recall whether or not your training included the  
 8 application of tourniquets?  
 9 A. There was no application of tourniquets within the  
 10 training package, sir.  
 11 Q. Next we're going to look at a different record of your  
 12 training. Mr Lopez, {INQ40590/2}.  
 13 Fortunately, I believe this has been sorted largely  
 14 chronologically, although there are exceptions to that.  
 15 The first entry that I wish to draw your attention  
 16 to is dated 20 February 2015. It's about 12 or 13 lines  
 17 down from the top. It's entitled "Firearms and active  
 18 shooter incidents: Stay Safe".  
 19 As we understand it, this record, which is called  
 20 NCALT, is e-learning; does that accord with your  
 21 recollection?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. Do you remember undertaking the "Firearms and active  
 24 shooter incident: Stay Safe" training?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Can you help us with your recollection of what that  
2 included?  
3 A. Mainly -- my recollection is that it tells us about just  
4 general standard procedures to follow in the instance of  
5 an active shooter incident, such as running away,  
6 hiding, and then making calls to the relevant people.  
7 Q. As far as you can recall, did it include any training on  
8 how to respond as part of Greater Manchester Police to  
9 a terrorist attack, by which I mean the emergency  
10 response?  
11 A. I cannot recall the specifics to that, sir.  
12 Q. I think it's towards the bottom of this document --  
13 we can see it on 15 January 2020, so some time after the  
14 attack -- you have JESIP training.  
15 Mr Lopez, I think you'll need to scroll down  
16 a little, unless it's one of those entries that's taken  
17 out of order.  
18 Do you recall having JESIP training prior to the  
19 Manchester Arena attack?  
20 A. No.  
21 Q. At the time of the attack, had you received any training  
22 about what JESIP was?  
23 A. From my recollection, no, sir.  
24 Q. We'll come back to training in due course, but what  
25 I would like to do is just turn, please, to the events

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1 of 22 May 2017.  
2 Mr Lopez, thank you very much, you can take that  
3 down.  
4 Constable, you provided a witness statement about  
5 your actions on 22 May 2017 on 23 November 2018; is that  
6 correct?  
7 A. That's correct, sir.  
8 Q. Plainly, a period of something in the order of 18 months  
9 after events?  
10 A. That's correct.  
11 Q. You had filled out a short debrief form; is that  
12 correct?  
13 A. That's correct, the following morning or when we were  
14 released from the incident.  
15 Q. We don't need to bring it on screen unless it's  
16 necessary, but would you agree it is a very short record  
17 of your recollection of the night?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. It's certainly not a step-by-step account of what you  
20 did, is it?  
21 A. No, it was a brief -- it was requested as part of  
22 a small debrief that we had.  
23 Q. So does your witness statement in November 2018  
24 represent the first time that you set out, as best you  
25 could recall it, the various actions that you took on

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1 the night?  
2 A. Can you repeat the question?  
3 Q. Of course. Does your witness statement, dated  
4 November 2018 -- is that the first occasion on which you  
5 set out on a step-by-step basis what you did on the  
6 night?  
7 A. Yes, sir.  
8 Q. Can you help us, please, to understand why it was that  
9 it was 18 months before you provided a witness  
10 statement?  
11 A. I can assist you in certain aspects.  
12 Q. Please.  
13 A. So on the night of the events, I was working an  
14 afternoon shift and I subsequently worked all the way  
15 throughout to the following morning.  
16 Q. Yes, and we will come to that.  
17 A. I believe that the line managers that we were doing the  
18 debrief with were well aware of that and were  
19 experienced and the idea was that our welfare was very  
20 important at the time. So they have sent us away  
21 because we have not had any respite at all and the idea  
22 was another debrief was going to follow.  
23 Now, I don't understand from the following debriefs  
24 all the way to me giving the statement -- in November?  
25 Q. November 2018.

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1 A. I've not been asked, as far as I'm aware, to give  
2 a statement. That was the only time I was asked to give  
3 a statement.  
4 Q. At the time that you completed your statement, did you  
5 have access to the incident log or any other records  
6 made on the night?  
7 A. No.  
8 Q. So does it represent your best recollection of events  
9 18 months on?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. As you've just told us, were you on duty on 22 May of  
12 2017, starting in the early afternoon?  
13 A. Yes, sir.  
14 Q. Which police station were you based at?  
15 A. The Town Hall Police Station.  
16 Q. And approximately how far from the arena is that?  
17 A. Close to a mile. Approximately a mile. So it would be  
18 0.7/0.8 of a mile.  
19 Q. How did you first hear of the attack?  
20 A. There was a lot of traffic on the radio and the radio  
21 comms were stating that there is a possibility that  
22 a bomb might have went off -- a bomb might have exploded  
23 in the arena. We were aware that there was a concert  
24 that night, but the traffic on the radio initially --  
25 I was also at the same time making a phone call with

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1 regards to a job that I was dealing with. But  
 2 a colleague of mine said to me, "We need to go, this  
 3 looks like something has actually happened this time".  
 4 Q. Let's unpack what you've just told us there. One of the  
 5 things that you said was that you were aware that there  
 6 was a concert, did I understand that correctly?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. How did you know that there was a concert that night?  
 9 A. The team in the city centre usually get some sort of  
 10 debrief with regards to all the events that go on in the  
 11 city.  
 12 Q. So had it formed part of your briefing on that shift  
 13 that there was a concert at the arena that night?  
 14 A. Yes. So at the end of every briefing, we'll have a list  
 15 of all the events that are going on in the city, and it  
 16 would have been in one of the slides, I believe.  
 17 Q. You heard information coming across the radio that there  
 18 may have been a bomb that had detonated?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. And you mentioned a colleague telling you that you  
 21 needed to go.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Which colleague was that?  
 24 A. Peter McDonald Hurst.  
 25 Q. Was Mr McDonald Hurst an officer who had rank over you?

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1 A. No, he was a PCSO, but I didn't hear everything that was  
 2 said on the radio because I was talking on the phone.  
 3 We'd just had a crime at the time, so he was probably  
 4 more aware of what was going on on the radio, so he  
 5 asked me that we leave immediately.  
 6 Q. Were you instructed by any officer of rank to deploy to  
 7 the arena?  
 8 A. No, sir.  
 9 Q. So was it simply the decision based upon your fellow  
 10 PCSO that led you to the arena?  
 11 A. Yes, and listening to the traffic as I put the phone  
 12 down, because I didn't continue the conversation with  
 13 regards to dealing with that crime that I needed to do  
 14 or the procedure that I needed to follow, so I just  
 15 carried on listening to the radio from there onwards and  
 16 from there the decision was made that we all rush  
 17 in that direction.  
 18 Q. Did you hear any instruction over the radio that applied  
 19 to you and meant that you should go, whether you  
 20 personally or you as a PCSO?  
 21 A. From my recollection, no.  
 22 Q. At all events, you and your colleague left the police  
 23 station; is that correct?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. And you describe in your witness statement running in

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1 the direction of the arena. As you approached the  
 2 Victoria Station complex, did you become aware of crowds  
 3 of people coming in the opposite direction?  
 4 A. I was aware prior to actually going to that.  
 5 Q. But certainly on your way --  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. -- at some point you became aware that in fact there  
 8 were people travelling in the opposite direction to you?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. We won't go into the detail of it, but was their  
 11 appearance such as to reinforce to you that something  
 12 very serious had occurred at Victoria Station?  
 13 A. Yes. As I was on the approach, that's when I've seen  
 14 some people who were injured.  
 15 Q. I think your route took you past the National Football  
 16 Museum; is that right?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Can I invite your attention to a schedule of radio  
 19 traffic just to see if we can identify precisely where  
 20 you were at the time. Line 2,903 has a person  
 21 identified as you, saying among other things:  
 22 "State 6, if I'm needed anywhere."  
 23 What is that a reference to, state 6?  
 24 A. State 6 is that I am on scene. It's just to clarify to  
 25 the radio operators that I'm at the location.

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1 Q. So would it be right to conclude that at 22.55 you had  
 2 arrived in the vicinity of the Victoria Station complex?  
 3 A. Yes. If my memory serves me right, I might actually  
 4 have arrived prior to that.  
 5 Q. You might have arrived prior to sending this message?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. We'll come to a dealing you had with a firearms officer  
 8 in a moment, but was it around the time, either before  
 9 or after, that you had dealings with the firearms  
 10 officer --  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. -- that you sent this message?  
 13 A. It will be after.  
 14 Q. After?  
 15 A. Probably.  
 16 Q. Let's complete this and then we'll go back to the  
 17 chronology. The person responded to what you said:  
 18 "Booking office, please, if you can."  
 19 Which you asked to be repeated and then they did so:  
 20 "Attend the booking office, please. Offer your  
 21 services there."  
 22 Where did you understand the booking office to be?  
 23 A. I understood it to be where I was on the station itself.  
 24 Q. So a reference to the booking office on the station  
 25 concourse?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. We can see in the next line a completion of what is  
 3 essentially the same conversation. So having declared  
 4 that you're on scene and available, having been told to  
 5 deploy to the booking office, and concluding that  
 6 you are where you need to be, did you stop broadcasting?  
 7 We certainly don't have another record of you doing so.  
 8 A. I believe so, yes, sir.  
 9 Q. What I would like to do is, because I've missed it out  
 10 in the chronology, deal with the firearms officer that  
 11 you encountered. Your recollection is this encounter  
 12 occurred before you sent that radio message?  
 13 A. Yes, sir.  
 14 Q. Where did you see the firearms officer?  
 15 A. On the Station Approach itself.  
 16 Q. On the street?  
 17 A. On the street, yes.  
 18 Q. What you say is that the firearms officer was shouting  
 19 at people, telling them not to go back into the  
 20 concourse. Is that a reference to not to go back into  
 21 the railway station?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Did you approach that officer?  
 24 A. I approached him from a distance because -- I shouted  
 25 towards him and he shouted me something back with

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1 regards to helping him. I cannot recall the exact  
 2 conversation that took place, sir.  
 3 Q. What you say in your statement was that:  
 4 "He told me that we need to get people out of the  
 5 area and away."  
 6 And you go on to say:  
 7 "I assisted the officer in clearing people away."  
 8 A. That's correct, sir.  
 9 Q. Did you see it as part of your role that night to act  
 10 under the instruction of people such as the firearms  
 11 officer to assist at the scene?  
 12 A. Yes, sir.  
 13 Q. Would it normally be the case that a police constable,  
 14 and you don't give the rank of the firearms officer,  
 15 gives instructions to PCSOs within Greater Manchester  
 16 Police?  
 17 A. In certain circumstances, yes.  
 18 Q. Was this one of those circumstances?  
 19 A. Yes, I would say so, yes.  
 20 Q. I think in the course of your journey into the station,  
 21 you also encountered an off-duty police sergeant from  
 22 Merseyside; is that correct?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. And you took that person's details?  
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. I think -- are we now caught up to the point where you  
 2 entered the station and near the booking office made the  
 3 broadcast that we've already looked at?  
 4 A. Yes, sir.  
 5 Q. Did you wait in that area for any length of time?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Why did you wait?  
 8 A. Two reasons. The first one was, there was an officer  
 9 which I cannot recollect, he was higher than me in rank,  
 10 I can only briefly remember his description, that was  
 11 down at that location where I believed -- where I was  
 12 looking for the ticket office. However -- and I've  
 13 asked him what he wants me to do. That was one of the  
 14 reasons why I've waited.  
 15 Another reason was that I was aware at that time  
 16 that (inaudible) resources were coming in, so I was just  
 17 going to wait for resources to arrive.  
 18 Q. Did that officer tell you what he wanted you to do?  
 19 A. No, sir.  
 20 Q. So what did you do?  
 21 A. I've waited within that area. I didn't go anywhere and  
 22 I believe the reason why he didn't tell me what to do is  
 23 because he was talking on his radio and the police  
 24 mobile at the same time. So I believe that he was quite  
 25 busy arranging for things.

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1 Q. Time is notoriously difficult to estimate. What you say  
 2 in your witness statement, 18 months after the event,  
 3 is that:  
 4 "After what seemed like 20 to 30 minutes, we were  
 5 told to go upstairs to the foyer area."  
 6 Is that, doing the best you can, approximately how  
 7 long you think you were waiting in that booking office  
 8 area?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. Were you joined by any other officers from GMP or any  
 11 other emergency service?  
 12 A. Yes, I recollect that we were joined by officers from  
 13 Longsight and Central Park.  
 14 Q. Both of those being a reference to GMP police stations?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. What were the circumstances in which you went up to the  
 17 City Room? Were you told to do so?  
 18 A. Yes. We were organised in lines in terms of teams and  
 19 we went up.  
 20 Q. Do you recall who it was who organised you?  
 21 A. No, no, sir.  
 22 Q. Was it a constable or somebody of a rank higher than  
 23 constable?  
 24 A. I believe it would be someone higher than a constable.  
 25 Q. And approximately how many of you from GMP were there

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1 at the point at which you were told to go up to the  
 2 City Room?  
 3 A. I would say there would be -- I would be only guessing,  
 4 but it was a lot of numbers.  
 5 Q. More than ten?  
 6 A. A lot more than ten.  
 7 Q. You did go up into the City Room, didn't you?  
 8 A. Yes, sir .  
 9 Q. I'm not going to ask you for any description of what you  
 10 saw there. Did you see a male officer in a yellow  
 11 fluorescent jacket in the City Room when you first went  
 12 in?  
 13 A. Yes, sir .  
 14 Q. Have you since learned that that person was Sergeant  
 15 Andrew Beasley?  
 16 A. Yes, sir .  
 17 MR DE LA POER: We have a time for that, sir, of 23.25.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 19 MR DE LA POER: Did you go and speak to Sergeant Beasley?  
 20 A. Yes, sir .  
 21 Q. Was he somebody who you had known before that night?  
 22 A. No, sir .  
 23 Q. But could you see that he was a sergeant?  
 24 A. Yes, from the epaulettes.  
 25 Q. What did you say to Sergeant Beasley?

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1 A. I cannot recall the exact conversation, sir . I can only  
 2 guess that I've asked him what would he like me to do  
 3 and where to go.  
 4 Q. Do you recall whether he gave you any direction at that  
 5 time?  
 6 A. No, sir .  
 7 Q. Is that simply because you don't recollect the detail of  
 8 the conversation?  
 9 A. Yes, sir .  
 10 Q. Did you leave the City Room for a period of time?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Before going back in?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Do you remember why you left the City Room?  
 15 A. At the time I remember walking into that room and it was  
 16 something that I've never experienced before, so  
 17 I needed a moment to compose myself.  
 18 Q. When you went in for the second time, did you then lend  
 19 assistance to casualties who were still within the  
 20 City Room?  
 21 A. Yes, sir .  
 22 Q. Did you provide any with first aid?  
 23 A. No, sir .  
 24 Q. Did you help carry people out of the City Room?  
 25 A. Yes, sir .

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1 Q. And did you help carry a number of people out?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Once all of the casualties were out of the City Room,  
 4 did you spend time on the station concourse?  
 5 A. Yes, sir .  
 6 Q. What were you doing there?  
 7 A. I remember after all the casualties were moved to the  
 8 station concourse, I went out at some stage to take  
 9 a breather and then I remember returning because I knew  
 10 that people would need assistance and help. I've  
 11 returned to see who I can help or who needs my  
 12 assistance.  
 13 Q. Did you help as best you could with those casualties who  
 14 were on the station concourse?  
 15 A. I dealt with one casualty in particular , yes, sir .  
 16 Q. I don't want to go into any of the details , but did you  
 17 support a doctor in the work that they were doing?  
 18 A. Yes, sir . If I may say, I don't recall if he was  
 19 a doctor or ... I don't know. He was someone in the  
 20 medical field but I cannot say specifically if he was  
 21 directly a doctor from memory.  
 22 Q. Did you remain on the station concourse until a period  
 23 approaching 2 am?  
 24 A. I've dealt with that one casualty until he was put in  
 25 the ambulance. When I safely saw him into the

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1 ambulance, I believe I assisted outside.  
 2 Q. You assisted outside?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Do you recall what time it was that you left the  
 5 Victoria Station complex area?  
 6 A. As in the whole of Victoria Station?  
 7 Q. Yes.  
 8 A. If memory serves me right, I don't recall the exact  
 9 time, but I believe that maybe a bit of light was coming  
 10 in at that time.  
 11 Q. I think you only ultimately retired from duty at 7.30 am  
 12 that morning.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And that was after you had travelled to Thompson Street  
 15 Fire Station and then to Central Park?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. It's important for us all to remember that you were  
 18 there in your role as a police community support  
 19 officer , but I'm sure it has already been conveyed by  
 20 all of your answers, but so we have it on the record, do  
 21 you think the training that you had had prepared you for  
 22 the role that you needed to play on that night?  
 23 A. On that night?  
 24 Q. Yes.  
 25 A. No, sir .

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1 Q. In what way do you think, bearing in mind you were there  
 2 as a PCSO, that training might have been improved?  
 3 A. Can you ask me the question again, sir?  
 4 Q. Of course. Bearing in mind that you were there as  
 5 a PCSO, in what way do you think the training might have  
 6 been improved to better equip you for what you needed to  
 7 do?  
 8 A. That's a difficult question to answer, sir. I have to  
 9 say, maybe we need to look at the role of a PCSO and we  
 10 need to understand that a PCSO is, for want of a better  
 11 word, civilian staff, and they get the first aid  
 12 training. No first aid training was adequate for what  
 13 has happened that night or to deal with what happened  
 14 that night. I don't know if that helps answer the  
 15 question.  
 16 Q. It does. And as I understand you, you are emphasising  
 17 that you attended as a PCSO?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And that we should bear that in mind when considering  
 20 the extent to which you may be trained to cope with an  
 21 incident of that gravity?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But equally, nothing could have trained  
 24 you for it, really?  
 25 A. That is correct, sir.

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1 MR DE LA POER: From your point of view, did you consider  
 2 that the directions that you were given, the  
 3 instructions you were given, were adequate for you to  
 4 understand what you could best do to help people?  
 5 A. What instructions are we talking about?  
 6 Q. Instructions from anybody in a superior position telling  
 7 you what you could do, how you could help.  
 8 A. There was clear instructions as we organised downstairs  
 9 to go upstairs to the City Room. There were  
 10 instructions when we were carrying instructions outside.  
 11 These are the only instructions I can think of in terms  
 12 of superiors giving me any instructions. Then there was  
 13 obviously the instructions from the doctor as I was  
 14 dealing with that casualty or that person from the  
 15 medical field. I believe, given the circumstances, they  
 16 were adequate to a certain extent.  
 17 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, constable. I'm  
 18 going to turn now to Mr Atkinson Queen's Counsel who  
 19 asks questions, taking the lead on behalf of the  
 20 bereaved family groups.  
 21 Questions from MR ATKINSON  
 22 MR ATKINSON: Mr Mohamed, can you hear me and see me?  
 23 A. Yes, sir.  
 24 Q. Mr Mohamed, can you first of all help us, because  
 25 you have the advantage of now being a police constable,

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1 is this right, but a PCSO, a police community support  
 2 officer, at the time, as to the difference in those two  
 3 roles? Were there limits to the type of incident that  
 4 you would have expected to have attended when you were  
 5 a PCSO?  
 6 A. To a certain extent, yes. It might not be specific  
 7 within the role, but to a certain extent, yes,  
 8 operationally, sir.  
 9 Q. Was it more the case when you were a PCSO that you would  
 10 be told to participate in something rather than using  
 11 your own judgement as to whether you should or not, or  
 12 otherwise?  
 13 A. Can you repeat the question, sir?  
 14 Q. Absolutely. Presumably when you were out working as  
 15 a PCSO, there may be any number of incidents that you  
 16 might come across and have to become involved in.  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Would you obtain direction normally as to whether you'd  
 19 get involved or not or would you use your own judgement  
 20 as to whether you did that?  
 21 A. As a PCSO I am at leisure of both worlds in a way -- can  
 22 I elaborate, sir?  
 23 Q. Please.  
 24 A. So as a PCSO I answer to the sergeants or higher in  
 25 terms of rank, such as a constable. So yes, I am

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1 required to be given directions. However, as a civilian  
 2 also I can withdraw certain consents to certain things  
 3 if I feel like I'm not prepared to do it or can't do it.  
 4 I don't know if that helps you.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you volunteer, basically, to do some  
 6 things?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 MR ATKINSON: Just as you volunteered to work as a PCSO at  
 9 all, you volunteer as to whether you become involved in  
 10 an incident or not; is that right?  
 11 A. Volunteer is the wrong word, sir. PCSO is a paid-for  
 12 role. However, you're a civilian staff, so the best way  
 13 to describe it is police officers or people within the  
 14 constabulary have a structure and a rank and certain  
 15 things, there are dos and don'ts, where we -- the  
 16 situations new deal with are more of a civilian point of  
 17 view into that world. I don't know if that helps answer  
 18 the question.  
 19 Q. It's just to understand that you've agreed with  
 20 Mr de la Poer that effectively you deployed yourself to  
 21 the arena that night.  
 22 A. That is correct.  
 23 Q. Rather than being directed by anyone to go there?  
 24 A. That is correct, sir. However, there was a direction as  
 25 we -- as we left the station, there was no direction in

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1 terms of being told. However, the radio communication  
 2 was more clear as we approached the station, as we were  
 3 running towards the station. So the radio communicators  
 4 were instructing us to go in that direction by that  
 5 time.  
 6 Q. And was there any instruction that you had as a PCSO as  
 7 to whether you should become involved in a major  
 8 incident or not?  
 9 A. Are you asking me if there is a document of some sort  
 10 that says that, sir?  
 11 Q. Or a standing instruction.  
 12 A. We are expected to perform our duties as is requested of  
 13 us or to the best of our ability. That's my  
 14 understanding of it, sir.  
 15 Q. Because in terms of dealing with a major incident and  
 16 being involved in the response to one, would it be fair  
 17 to say that your training at the time of these events  
 18 was very limited?  
 19 A. Yes, sir, my training would have been very limited,  
 20 that's correct.  
 21 Q. And that's not a criticism of you, that's just to  
 22 understand what the position was. Presumably, the  
 23 training that you received was the training that PCSOs  
 24 generally were receiving as you understood it at that  
 25 time?

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1 A. Yes, sir.  
 2 Q. So you had received training back in February 2015  
 3 in relation to firearms and active shooter incidents and  
 4 that was very shortly, I think, after you had started as  
 5 a PCSO; is that right?  
 6 A. Yes, sir.  
 7 Q. And that was an e-learning process; is that right? You  
 8 did it online?  
 9 A. Yes, sir.  
 10 Q. I think, as we understand it, it took about an hour.  
 11 A. I cannot recall the exact time that it took, sir.  
 12 Q. Did that give you an understanding of what your role  
 13 would be in an active shooter incident?  
 14 A. Yes, to an extent, yes.  
 15 Q. Well, help us as to what extent. Did you understand  
 16 whether you should become involved in such an incident  
 17 at all or not?  
 18 A. The involvement that I should have had from my point of  
 19 view would have been if I was within the vicinity then  
 20 to run, hide and report, as best as I can.  
 21 Q. Rather than to run in?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 Q. How did you understand that you would know whether it  
 24 was an active shooter incident or not?  
 25 A. Initially, the reports that came were a bomb, not an

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1 active shooter. At some stage, though, and I cannot  
 2 recall the exact moment now, we were informed that there  
 3 was consideration that there might be a secondary device  
 4 and probably an active shooter. However, I didn't --  
 5 the best way to say it is that there were firearms  
 6 officers already in the City Room or somewhere in the  
 7 station, looking for this active shooter at the time.  
 8 Q. Just taking that in stages, if we may, Mr Mohamed,  
 9 at the time that you were trained, what information, if  
 10 you can remember, were you given as to how you would  
 11 know whether you were dealing with an active shooter  
 12 incident or not?  
 13 A. How would we know, did you say, sir? Or how would  
 14 I know?  
 15 Q. How would someone in your position know from your  
 16 training, as opposed to what you were told on the night,  
 17 which we'll come to in a moment? From your training,  
 18 how would you know how to recognise an active shooter  
 19 incident?  
 20 A. From the package and the videos. All I can say to you  
 21 is that you listen to -- if there is a, I don't know,  
 22 a sound of a firearm being discharged, maybe you've seen  
 23 someone discharging it, things along these lines.  
 24 Q. Right. Was there anything that you can recall in your  
 25 training about messages that would be sent and who they

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1 would be sent from that would tell you that it was an  
 2 active shooter incident?  
 3 A. I cannot recall that, sir.  
 4 Q. On this night do you recall in the radio traffic that  
 5 you heard before you reached the arena anything being  
 6 said to you or your colleagues about this being an  
 7 active shooter incident?  
 8 A. I recall that at some stage there was the belief that  
 9 there might be an active shooter and a secondary device,  
 10 yes.  
 11 Q. Was anything said over the radio or in person to you  
 12 about what that meant you should or should not do?  
 13 A. No, sir.  
 14 Q. Were you, for example, told that you needed to leave the  
 15 scene?  
 16 A. I don't recall in the radio traffic that I was told to  
 17 leave the scene, no.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So when you actually went up to the  
 19 City Room where the casualties were and you helped, as  
 20 I understand it you were actually directed to go there  
 21 along with a number of other people by a senior officer?  
 22 A. Yes, sir.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who, I suppose, you might have suspected  
 24 wouldn't have sent you there if he knew there might be  
 25 an active shooter there?

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1 A. Yes, but that would be later on.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 3 A. From my recollection of events.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.  
 5 A. So, I don't know, I think ...  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So when you're downstairs in the station  
 7 area itself there's no sign for you of an active  
 8 shooter?  
 9 A. No, I think the firearms had already cleared the area by  
 10 that time.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Then you are waiting downstairs for some  
 12 time until you're sent upstairs?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, Mr Atkinson, thank you.  
 15 MR ATKINSON: Thank you, sir.  
 16 Dealing with another aspect of training, Mr Mohamed,  
 17 were you at the time of these events familiar with the  
 18 Greater Manchester Police major incident plan?  
 19 A. From recollection, no, sir .  
 20 Q. Just to see if it triggers your memory, if we could have  
 21 {INQ007279/1}, please.  
 22 That's the front cover of the document that we  
 23 understand to have been in operation back in 2017. Do  
 24 you recall having seen that document, Mr Mohamed?  
 25 A. No, sir. I have not seen this document, no.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So even now you haven't seen it? This  
 2 is the first time you've seen it?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 5 MR ATKINSON: And do you recall in the training that you'd  
 6 had up until May 2017 being talked through what your  
 7 role would be in a major incident?  
 8 A. No, sir. However, I have a general understanding of  
 9 what's expected of us as PCSOs.  
 10 Q. And what would that be, please, Mr Mohamed?  
 11 A. In certain incidents -- well, nothing of this magnitude  
 12 or scale, but there was other incidents where if we're  
 13 the first responders on the scene, we make sure that we  
 14 protect the scene, we make sure that we start a logbook  
 15 if we have a logbook with us or if we have a pocket  
 16 notebook then we start a log in our pocket notebook, and  
 17 we also make sure we put up scene tapes around the  
 18 scene.  
 19 Q. Let's see if this helps you with that. Within that  
 20 document, Mr Lopez, {INQ007279/72}, please.  
 21 If we enlarge the top half of the page first. This  
 22 is effectively a ready reckoner for the first officer on  
 23 scene as to what to do and not to do in relation to  
 24 a major incident. So this is, would you agree,  
 25 something that applied to people in your position at the

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1 time that you arrived on site that night?  
 2 A. I do not recall knowing this particular procedure  
 3 that is in front of me at the moment when I have  
 4 attended that scene or been trained in it .  
 5 Q. You hadn't had this explained to you?  
 6 A. In this particular exact order, no.  
 7 Q. Were you familiar with the mnemonic METHANE and the  
 8 giving of a METHANE message?  
 9 A. No, sir .  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Atkinson, I'm well aware that your  
 11 questions are prefaced on the basis of did he know it  
 12 at the time of the incident, but I'm quite interested to  
 13 know -- do you know about it now?  
 14 A. Yes, as a constable I have trained for this and for  
 15 JESIP as well.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 17 MR ATKINSON: Some of the things that you have outlined to  
 18 us, in fairness to you, Mr Mohamed, for example  
 19 in relation to starting a log, we can see the last of  
 20 the bullet points that's on the screen is exactly that.  
 21 So some of these things you did understand, some you  
 22 didn't; is that fair?  
 23 A. That's fair, sir .  
 24 Q. You can see five or six up from the bottom a reference  
 25 to a forward control point, an FCP. Were you aware that

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1 on attending a major incident, you needed to know where  
 2 the forward control point was?  
 3 A. No, sir .  
 4 Q. And when you arrived at the arena, was it obvious to you  
 5 where a location was that those who were in charge were  
 6 located?  
 7 A. No, sir, not when I first arrived, no.  
 8 Q. Or a source of central direction to what was going on?  
 9 A. Later on when resources were coming through and there  
 10 was this -- what I believed either to be a sergeant or  
 11 inspector on the station concourse, yes, that was what  
 12 I believed to be my sense of direction at the time.  
 13 Q. Rendezvous points. In your witness statement you record  
 14 that as you were going to the scene you were making  
 15 enquiries as to where the rendezvous point was and it  
 16 not being very clear that there was one.  
 17 A. Initially, there wasn't one, sir. That's what I believe  
 18 from my recollection.  
 19 Q. But do we understand that there came a point when you  
 20 and your colleagues collected together before you moved  
 21 on into the City Room?  
 22 A. That's correct, sir .  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So where would you say the rendezvous  
 24 point was?  
 25 A. At the time, the message was saying a ticket office,

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1 which I understood to be —  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The downstairs ticket office?  
 3 A. Ticket office .  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 5 MR ATKINSON: The third area of training before we look at  
 6 one more document, and then I think I'm done,  
 7 Mr Mohamed. You've already dealt at some length with  
 8 such first aid training as you had received at the time  
 9 of these events. Was that once you had received that or  
 10 had you received first aid training more than once by  
 11 the time of these events, do you think?  
 12 A. I believe that I've only had first aid training once, in  
 13 2015, prior to the incident happening in 2017.  
 14 Q. And that's certainly what the record relating to you  
 15 shows. Just taking a step back in relation to training,  
 16 do you think it would have been helpful to get refresher  
 17 training rather more often?  
 18 A. I would say yes, sir .  
 19 Q. Both in relation to first aid and in relation to dealing  
 20 with challenging incidents that you may encounter?  
 21 A. Yes, sir .  
 22 Q. Because while there's a limit to what training can  
 23 prepare you for, the more often you get the training,  
 24 the more likely you are to have some sense of what is  
 25 expected of you?

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1 A. That's correct, sir .  
 2 Q. I wonder if we could have an email on screen that  
 3 relates to a debrief process that you were a part of.  
 4 {INQ000804/1}.  
 5 If we could focus on the lower half of the page,  
 6 please. We can see that this is an email from someone  
 7 called Scott Lakes. Do you know who that is,  
 8 Mr Mohamed?  
 9 A. Yes, Scott Lakes used to be an officer with us, within  
 10 my relief from the Town Hall.  
 11 Q. We can see it's dated 25 July 2017. We can see it's  
 12 sent to Michael Smith. We know he was a Greater  
 13 Manchester Police police inspector. Did you know him?  
 14 A. Yes. Mr Michael Smith was my line manager, yes.  
 15 Q. We can see it says that Mr Lakes says:  
 16 "I've been asked to provide some feedback in terms  
 17 of positives and negatives in reference to events at the  
 18 arena on 22 May. The four of us self-deployed."  
 19 And those four are Mr Lakes, Police Constable  
 20 Eastham, SPC Dalton, and you. All right?  
 21 A. That is correct. There was more people. That was some  
 22 part of the people that attended.  
 23 Q. Do you recall having the conversation with those people,  
 24 identifying positives and negatives that you together  
 25 identified in relation to your attendance at the arena

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1 that night?  
 2 A. I have to say, I don't recall, prior to actually  
 3 preparing to being presented in front of you today,  
 4 seeing this email or having any input towards it.  
 5 That's the first thing that I would like to clarify with  
 6 you.  
 7 Secondly, I need to also inform you that prior to us  
 8 being stood down, when we went to the fire station and  
 9 when we went to the debrief, I was with these three  
 10 colleagues. That's the only bit that I can recall .  
 11 Q. Do you remember being with them when you were stood down  
 12 on the night, or in the morning, rather, the following  
 13 morning?  
 14 A. Yes. When we went to the fire station or close to it,  
 15 we stayed there for, I don't know, I don't recall how  
 16 long it took, prior to us being instructed to go to  
 17 Central Park, and then we'd also done the debrief  
 18 together.  
 19 Q. So you do recall a debrief with them but not this email?  
 20 A. I do not recall this email. I have to say that I have  
 21 just been cc'd to it. That's just attaching a person to  
 22 an email, so they're aware that it's been sent.  
 23 Q. We can see the second paragraph says:  
 24 "After the event, I have spoken with."  
 25 And you're one of the people listed and the points

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1 below are said to be "the collective views of the three  
 2 of us", and we can see that because SPC Dalton hadn't  
 3 replied yes, "the three us" was PC Eastham, Mr Lakes and  
 4 you. So do you think that you may have contributed some  
 5 of the views that are expressed in this email, albeit  
 6 that it was an email not sent by you?  
 7 A. This email has not been sent by me. I cannot remember  
 8 collaborating anything that is in it. Yes — and here  
 9 also I don't, when it says the word "after event", is  
 10 this after the event that morning or is it after the  
 11 event in July when the email was sent? I'm not clear.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, we don't know either. Shall we  
 13 see what's said in it and see what you agree with or  
 14 not?  
 15 MR ATKINSON: Exactly so, if I may, sir.  
 16 We can see there's a list of positives first .  
 17 There's reference to the deployment of resources, the  
 18 communication at the outset, the first responding  
 19 officers playing a pivotal role in triage, reference to  
 20 the excellence of paramedics and volunteers. Then one  
 21 bullet up from the bottom:  
 22 "Paramedics on-site coordination or resources and  
 23 deployment of their staff was excellent and well  
 24 managed, clear direction, but concerned they would not  
 25 allow their staff into the box office due to risks .

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1 Officers volunteered to take stretchers, but were  
 2 declined and had to resort to using Herris (sic)  
 3 fencing/wooden boards as temporary measures.”  
 4 This is what I would like your help with as to  
 5 whether this rings any bells with what you saw on the  
 6 night. Do you recall it being the case that paramedics  
 7 were being held back from going into, for example, the  
 8 City Room?  
 9 A. No, sir, I don't recall any paramedics up to the point  
 10 when we went to the City Room being on the scene at the  
 11 time. Whether they were held somewhere else, I couldn't  
 12 tell you because I was inside.  
 13 Q. And do you recall there being a shortage of stretchers  
 14 such that improvised alternatives were necessary?  
 15 A. On the night, I do not recall even seeing a stretcher  
 16 initially upstairs in the City Room. We had used the  
 17 barriers that ... We had the barriers that separate  
 18 people that we used to carry people but we put cardboard  
 19 on top at the time.  
 20 Q. And you did that because there were no proper  
 21 stretchers, if you understand what I mean, available?  
 22 A. I'm not aware there was any stretchers available, no.  
 23 Q. Were you aware that colleagues were asking for  
 24 stretchers?  
 25 A. No, sir, and that didn't occur to my mind. Because I've

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1 not asked for stretchers and because everybody were  
 2 making these makeshift stretchers, I was led to believe  
 3 that probably there was no stretchers to use, therefore  
 4 I just carried on with what everybody else was doing  
 5 at the time.  
 6 Q. If we go over the page, please, to the top of the next  
 7 page, {INQ000804/2}. And again this is just to see,  
 8 Mr Mohamed, if any of these accord with your  
 9 recollection or your views because we understand that  
 10 this is not your email, albeit you may have had a role  
 11 in the background to it. All right?  
 12 "Directions from any SLT seemed lacking."  
 13 SLT, do you know what that stands for?  
 14 A. Senior leadership team.  
 15 Q. Thank you:  
 16 "Save for a BTP chief inspector asking for the  
 17 ground commander and who would take responsibility for  
 18 the incident."  
 19 Was it clear to you, Mr Mohamed, when you were  
 20 there, who was in charge?  
 21 A. I would say yes, it was clear to me when we were  
 22 organised downstairs on the concourse and also when  
 23 I was in the City Room, when I approached  
 24 Sergeant Beasley, as I am led to know now that his name  
 25 is Sergeant Beasley. These are what I would call my

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1 senior leadership team.  
 2 Q. So in terms of someone giving you direction as to what  
 3 you should do, there was some (inaudible: distorted)  
 4 identifiable (inaudible: distorted) when you arrived?  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you like the question again?  
 6 Mr Atkinson, could you repeat the question? I was  
 7 talking while you were talking. If you could repeat the  
 8 question, I'd be grateful.  
 9 MR ATKINSON: Yes, of course.  
 10 Do we understand from what you have just said,  
 11 Mr Mohamed, that although when you first arrived there  
 12 was no rendezvous point, once there was a rendezvous  
 13 point downstairs there was also someone giving direction  
 14 to you from that location?  
 15 A. Yes, sir.  
 16 Q. And once you were upstairs, Sergeant Beasley was there  
 17 and able to give you direction?  
 18 A. Yes, sir.  
 19 Q. As to who was giving them direction, did you know?  
 20 A. No, not at the time, sir.  
 21 Q. Second bullet point:  
 22 "No trauma kits or medically trained staff at  
 23 immediate aftermath (police)."  
 24 And then a comment about the adequacy of GMP  
 25 first aid training. You've already told us that you

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1 agree that your first aid training was not adequate,  
 2 haven't you?  
 3 A. For an event of this magnitude, no. No first aid is  
 4 either, sir. That's my belief.  
 5 Q. Was it also your experience, without going into,  
 6 I stress, any detail at all of any specific things that  
 7 you had to do, was it your view that there was  
 8 insufficient kit for use in first aid?  
 9 A. There was no kit initially, no, not certainly upstairs  
 10 in the City Room.  
 11 Q. In terms of the next bullet point:  
 12 "Immediate [rendezvous point] needed setting up for  
 13 displaced members of the public/families."  
 14 I think one of the first things you told us you had  
 15 to do was to help clear people away from the area  
 16 downstairs.  
 17 A. Yes, sir.  
 18 Q. But was it not very clear where you were clearing them  
 19 away to?  
 20 A. Away from danger, sir.  
 21 Q. But to where?  
 22 A. To where? No specifics, provided they are away from the  
 23 danger. There was no specifics.  
 24 Q. This may or may not be something that you can help us  
 25 on. The next bullet point:

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1 "Communication between BTP and GMP was confusing."  
 2 Were you aware of communication between those two  
 3 forces going on when you were at the scene?  
 4 A. There was initial confusion upon the first — when  
 5 I first arrived. Obviously, there was a lot of radio  
 6 traffic that needs to be addressed in the sense that  
 7 there was a lot of officers that would be talking at the  
 8 same time. Because there was also fears of a second  
 9 explosion or a second explosive device, shall I say,  
 10 sorry, and maybe an active shooter, then that  
 11 probably — those are one of the things that needed to  
 12 be cleared initially on the initial arrival.  
 13 Q. I don't need to trouble you, unless anyone asks me to,  
 14 with the next couple of bullet points. We can see one  
 15 up from the bottom, you make a reference to the concern  
 16 about secondary devices and active shooters. Just so  
 17 it is clear in relation to that, was that something  
 18 you were hearing over the radio, references to that, or  
 19 was that something people were telling you on the  
 20 ground?  
 21 A. No, that's something that I was hearing on the radio.  
 22 After I arrived initially on the scene, prior to even  
 23 calling state 6, and it was one of the reasons probably  
 24 that we initially stated we were more concerned with  
 25 helping or I was concerned with helping the officer to

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1 clear people from the street outside. I believe things  
 2 were clearer afterwards by the time I returned from the  
 3 cordon with regards to the explosive — the secondary —  
 4 what was believed to be a secondary explosive device  
 5 because they've already, I think — a controlled  
 6 explosion was already done on that and firearms officers  
 7 already had done their sweep through the station. So  
 8 we were aware that there was no further shooters.  
 9 Q. And again —  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The reason for wanting to clear all  
 11 these people away from the scene as an emergency, in  
 12 effect, was because you were worried about a secondary  
 13 device or there being an active shooter, so you just  
 14 wanted to get everyone away and it didn't matter to you  
 15 where they went, as long as they went away?  
 16 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.  
 17 MR ATKINSON: The final bullet point, and this may not have  
 18 been something that occurred to you, Mr Mohamed, but the  
 19 firefighters should have been there earlier. Did it  
 20 occur to you at the time that the Fire Brigade were not  
 21 there?  
 22 A. No, sir, I don't... I don't recall paying any attention  
 23 to who was there helping. Providing they were wearing  
 24 the right, appropriate kit, I didn't pay any attention  
 25 to the Fire Service being there. It didn't occur to me

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1 why they were or weren't there because I didn't know  
 2 at the time whether they were there or not. Does that  
 3 help you, sir?  
 4 MR ATKINSON: It does. Thank you, Mr Mohamed. That's all  
 5 I need to trouble you with. Thank you, sir.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Atkinson.  
 7 MR DE LA POER: Sir, can I turn next to Mr Cooper, Queen's  
 8 Counsel, who I understand has a small number of  
 9 questions.  
 10 Questions from MR COOPER  
 11 MR COOPER: Thank you. Again, officer, you'll probably be  
 12 aware that I also represent a number of families. I'm  
 13 asking you questions, a very brief series of questions,  
 14 in relation to at least one of those I represent.  
 15 I'm going to ask you to remind yourself of three  
 16 lines of your questioning and that's the entirety of my  
 17 questioning for you. I don't want the statement put up,  
 18 it's simply for your benefit. Look at your statement at  
 19 page 3, please. Towards the bottom of it, the last but  
 20 one paragraph, the bottom three lines — just orientate  
 21 yourself if you can, officer. Don't read it out loud,  
 22 read it to yourself. It's the line that begins, "I saw  
 23 a large ..."  
 24 Can you read those last three lines to yourself just  
 25 to remind us what we're dealing with here?

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1 (Pause)  
 2 All right?  
 3 A. Yes, sir.  
 4 Q. Thank you. How long were you watching that particular  
 5 event for?  
 6 A. Can I just start reading from above that line just to  
 7 remind yourself?  
 8 Q. You must do whatever you need to do, officer, to  
 9 familiarise yourself. It's just those are the lines  
 10 I was going to ask you about, but please read in where  
 11 you were going to read in from.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, I well understand, having  
 13 read it myself, the sensitivities of this part. By all  
 14 means, just ask him whether he agrees, but if you're  
 15 going to ask questions, then I think the people  
 16 listening generally will need to have some idea what  
 17 we're talking about.  
 18 MR COOPER: Of course, sir.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I leave it to you to deal with in the  
 20 way you think best.  
 21 MR COOPER: If it assists you, sir, I've asked my  
 22 instructing solicitors to, if possible, speak to those  
 23 who may be impacted by these lines, so hopefully it  
 24 won't be a surprise.  
 25 Let me deal with it this way, officer: you have read

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1 yourself into that and you say you saw someone being  
 2 brought out of the foyer. Do you see that?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And we're given to understand that was John Atkinson; do  
 5 you understand?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. I just want to ask you a few questions. How long were  
 8 you watching that event for?  
 9 A. As in -- can you be more specific, sir, as in --  
 10 Q. How long did you see Mr Atkinson for?  
 11 A. If my memory serves me right, I would say anything  
 12 between 10 to 15 minutes, maybe even less.  
 13 Q. 10 to 15 minutes or seconds?  
 14 A. What, transporting him downstairs?  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 A. That would take about a minute or two. It won't take  
 17 a lot more than that.  
 18 Q. So you saw him being transported downstairs, did you?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 Q. And how many officers did you see around what you refer  
 21 to as a makeshift stretcher comprising of cardboard on  
 22 a metal crowd control railing? How many officers were  
 23 helping him?  
 24 A. If I remember from my statement, I believe that I have  
 25 said probably two or three of us. However, looking on

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1 some of the evidence -- some of the stills that I've  
 2 been shown to jog my memory, I believe there was quite  
 3 a few of us.  
 4 Q. And from what you saw, officer, were they struggling?  
 5 A. Were they what, sorry?  
 6 Q. Struggling. Were they struggling with the barrier and  
 7 Mr Atkinson on it? No criticism of them, I want to put  
 8 your mind at rest. But did they seem to be struggling?  
 9 A. Yes. We did struggle with not only Mr Atkinson but with  
 10 a lot of the casualties due to the design of the  
 11 makeshift stretchers and also obviously having people on  
 12 top of it, not only that is that because of the nature  
 13 of the terrain going downstairs, you need to be mindful  
 14 that the person doesn't fall.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do I gather from what you're saying that  
 16 you were one of those carrying Mr Atkinson downstairs?  
 17 A. That's what I was told.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Having looked at the stills?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Did you gather that, Mr Cooper?  
 21 MR COOPER: In fact, I didn't, I hadn't appreciated that.  
 22 I took it from the statement that this officer was  
 23 merely observing, so I'm grateful for that  
 24 clarification.  
 25 So you were one of the officers then assisting with

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1 Mr Atkinson (overspeaking)?  
 2 A. (Overspeaking) taking him downstairs, sir.  
 3 Q. I am going to caution you, I'm not asking you, and  
 4 you'll understand why, for any graphic details or  
 5 anything like that for obvious reasons, I'm just looking  
 6 at the mechanics of it. Those are my questions, on the  
 7 mechanics of it.  
 8 When did you first get to Mr Atkinson? Was he on  
 9 the stretcher, I'll call it a stretcher, or at that  
 10 stage was he not on the stretcher?  
 11 A. Without reading my statement, I cannot recollect now,  
 12 sir.  
 13 Q. There's nothing in your statement apart from those three  
 14 lines that I can see that may refer to Mr Atkinson. And  
 15 I haven't seen any other document from you that could;  
 16 again, no criticism. So I'm asking you to think, if you  
 17 can, not to guess, but if you can think.  
 18 A. I cannot, sir. I cannot at the moment, sir.  
 19 Q. No? Well, at some stage you did, as you've told the  
 20 chair, come to him. Can you at least help me with where  
 21 he was when you first saw him? Was he already being  
 22 transported by some officers on the stretcher and you  
 23 went to help them?  
 24 A. On the top of my head, I cannot say now, just looking at  
 25 my statement. I would need to refer to the other

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1 documents that --  
 2 Q. All right. I have to say, sir, I hadn't anticipated  
 3 that answer. We'd have had the images potentially  
 4 ready, but I'll leave it to sorting that out later with  
 5 your inquiry team.  
 6 Let me just persist a little, officer, with these  
 7 questions. You helped get Mr Atkinson down the stairs,  
 8 did you? Do you at least remember that?  
 9 A. Yes, I believe... I wouldn't know his name at the time  
 10 and I wouldn't know his name until I saw the stills.  
 11 That's when I was told of his name. I believe on the  
 12 night that I probably, from recollection, helped two  
 13 males to be taken down from the City Room.  
 14 Q. Did you see or were you there when Mr Atkinson perhaps  
 15 tried to sit up?  
 16 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I wonder, if I may just say something  
 17 and, Mr Cooper, I hope that you won't take it as any  
 18 discourtesy on my part. Certainly the inquiry legal  
 19 team envisages that in the currency of chapter 12, there  
 20 will be the possibility of a number of witnesses who  
 21 were involved with those who died to give live evidence.  
 22 We have certainly approached this evidence with as much  
 23 care as we can, and whilst I absolutely recognise that  
 24 Mr Cooper will want to avail himself of the  
 25 opportunities that are there, can I invite him to

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1 reflect on whether this witness needs to answer any more  
 2 questions about this as opposed to the possibility that  
 3 other witnesses who are already designated as being core  
 4 witnesses for chapter 12 might deal with it? I'm sure  
 5 Mr Cooper, you understand exactly what I'm saying. I'm  
 6 trying to be as respectful as I can.  
 7 MR COOPER: I totally understand and agree with that. My  
 8 only concern is this officer may or may not have  
 9 pertinent evidence to assist you. Might there be  
 10 a compromise here that we leave our options open to have  
 11 this officer recalled in chapter 12 if it's felt  
 12 appropriate to deal with these questions especially as  
 13 I now know he was carrying the individual? If so, I can  
 14 leave the matter now.  
 15 MR DE LA POER: Absolutely, Mr Cooper. In fact, I can tell  
 16 you, because it's work that the inquiry legal team have  
 17 commissioned with the cooperation of the  
 18 Operation Manteline team, that I anticipate that  
 19 you will receive a further statement from this officer  
 20 and other officers about the very event that you are  
 21 talking about and it may be that that will better inform  
 22 the question of who needs to give evidence in  
 23 chapter 12. I sincerely hope that helps.  
 24 MR COOPER: In that case I have no further questions at this  
 25 stage with this officer .

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 2 MR DE LA POER: Thank you, Mr Cooper. Can I turn now,  
 3 please, to Mr Horwell from Greater Manchester Police.  
 4 (Pause)  
 5 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we're just going to check whether  
 6 there's a technological barrier to Mr Horwell joining  
 7 us.  
 8 Sir, can I invite you to take a short break based on  
 9 information I have just been given? That empty chair in  
 10 fact seems to be entirely appropriate given what I have  
 11 just been told.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's right. It's rather like every  
 13 prison video you see: there's always an empty chair.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: We will try to make contact with Mr Horwell.  
 15 Can I invite you to rise until 3.40?  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. I'm sorry about the break, it  
 17 won't be much longer after we come back.  
 18 (3.29 pm)  
 19 (A short break)  
 20 (3.38 pm)  
 21 MR DE LA POER: Sir, thank you for the time. It's enabled  
 22 me to speak to Mr Horwell, who was detained for  
 23 completely legitimate reasons.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I've had it explained to me. It was  
 25 completely understandable that he wasn't in the chair at

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1 that time and, contrary to what I said, he was not  
 2 knocking to get in.  
 3 MR DE LA POER: That was somebody else. In any event,  
 4 he was able to explain to me that he doesn't have any  
 5 questions of Constable Mohamed, so as I have no further  
 6 questions, unless you do, sir, that concludes his  
 7 evidence.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. I'm very grateful. In dashing to  
 9 the scene and doing what you did, you obviously behaved  
 10 with great bravery and I am sure everyone is very  
 11 grateful for what you did do at the scene when you could  
 12 do it. Thank you for coming to tell us about it today.  
 13 A. Thank you.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: That means that we have completed the  
 15 witnesses that we scheduled for today. Tomorrow we will  
 16 hear from Mr Ennis, an advanced paramedic from NWAS, and  
 17 we may hear a little bit of evidence from another  
 18 witness if there's time, but that may not eventuate.  
 19 Can I invite you, please, to adjourn until 10 am  
 20 tomorrow?  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 22 (3.40 pm)  
 23 (The inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am  
 24 on Wednesday, 17 March 2021)  
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