

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 76

March 17, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Wednesday, 17 March 2021
 2 (10.00 am)
 3 MR GREANEY: Good morning, sir. The gentleman in the
 4 witness box is Patrick Ennis, generally known as
 5 Paddy Ennis, and I will ask that he be sworn, please.
 6 MR PATRICK ENNIS (affirmed)
 7 Questions from MR GREANEY
 8 MR GREANEY: Would you begin, please, by telling us what
 9 your full name is?
 10 A. It's Patrick Kevin Ennis.
 11 Q. Are you generally known, both professionally and
 12 personally, as Paddy Ennis?
 13 A. That's correct, yes.
 14 Q. Are you an advanced paramedic with the North West
 15 Ambulance Service?
 16 A. I was formerly an advanced paramedic with the North West
 17 Ambulance Service. I'm currently an advanced clinical
 18 practitioner for Stockport NHS Foundation Trust, working
 19 at Stepping Hill Hospital.
 20 Q. So what is the difference between the position you now
 21 hold and the position that you held as an advanced
 22 paramedic?
 23 A. It's a similar role, but having completed my master's
 24 degree in advanced paediatric and neonatal practice,
 25 I moved into the hospital to allow me to work in a more

1

1 patient-facing role as well as managerial.
 2 Q. Is it effectively a promotion from the position that you
 3 had as an advanced paramedic?
 4 A. It's a sort of -- yes, a slight promotion from that
 5 role, but a sideways move.
 6 Q. On 22 May 2017, were you an advanced paramedic with
 7 NWAS?
 8 A. I was, yes.
 9 Q. Were you the first paramedic to arrive at the arena on
 10 the night of the attack?
 11 A. I was.
 12 Q. And were you, moreover, the first paramedic to enter the
 13 City Room that night?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Mr Ennis, before we start to delve into your evidence,
 16 let me just set the parameters so that you understand
 17 and so that all others, both questioners and the public,
 18 understand. We're going to deal today with your
 19 background and your experience. We're going to deal
 20 with events up until your first entry that night into
 21 the City Room, but we will not be dealing with the
 22 events in the City Room itself, and I think you
 23 understand that's the position.
 24 A. Of course, yes.
 25 Q. Instead, you will return later in this chapter,

2

1 chapter 10, to give your general evidence about those
 2 events, as you understand.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And again in chapter 12 to deal with particular people
 5 that you dealt with.
 6 Sir, may I make clear, both to the witness and
 7 everyone else, that no one today should ask Mr Ennis
 8 about the events in the City Room.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 10 MR GREANEY: And no one should ask about any particular
 11 deceased person.
 12 Notwithstanding the limits that I have just
 13 indicated we've placed on your evidence today, as all
 14 will understand, the centrality of your role on the
 15 night means that your evidence is capable of being
 16 distressing and we would invite everyone to bear that in
 17 mind.
 18 Mr Ennis, let's get into your evidence. You have
 19 provided, have you not, two separate witness statements?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. The first is dated 29 January 2018 and was provided,
 22 I think, to an officer of Greater Manchester Police;
 23 is that correct?
 24 A. That sounds correct, yes.
 25 Q. I'll give the INQ reference for the transcript, which is

3

1 {INQ006713/1}.
 2 Your second statement is dated 12 November 2019 and
 3 was provided, I believe, with the assistance of the
 4 lawyers who represent NWAS; is that correct?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. I'll give the reference: {INQ025751/1}.
 7 Mr Ennis, those are the formal accounts that you've
 8 given, but I believe it's the position that you have
 9 given other accounts on other occasions, have you not?
 10 A. Yes, I have.
 11 Q. You gave an account to Lord Kerslake's panel on
 12 17 October 2017?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. You also gave an account to the BBC for a Panorama
 15 programme?
 16 A. That's true, yes.
 17 Q. And you gave an account to the Mail on Sunday or to one
 18 of their journalists?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. According to what we have seen, the BBC interview was
 21 broadcast on 29 May 2017, so a week after the attack.
 22 A. That sounds correct, yes.
 23 Q. And the Mail on Sunday article was published on
 24 27 May 2017, so 5 days after the attack; does that sound
 25 about right?

4

1 A. It sounds about right, yes.
 2 Q. Could I begin, please, by asking why it was that you
 3 gave interviews to the media?
 4 A. I was encouraged by the Ambulance Service to give those
 5 interviews.
 6 Q. Why were you encouraged by the Ambulance Service to give
 7 those interviews?
 8 A. The way I understood it was there was a large media and
 9 public interest in finding out more information and
 10 I was one of the people who was put forward to speak to
 11 the BBC and to the Mail on Sunday.
 12 Q. As you understood it, was there a desire on the part of
 13 NWSA to get its version of events out there?
 14 A. No, that's not the reason I understood it, so much as
 15 the reason was that people did want to know and they
 16 wanted to make sure that people were speaking to
 17 credible sources or -- sorry, speaking to appropriate
 18 news outlets. So I was approached personally by quite
 19 a number of different journalists afterwards, so the
 20 Ambulance Service wanted to make sure that rather than
 21 speaking to lots of people that I spoke to ones that
 22 they felt were appropriate, I think.
 23 Q. Did you sense at the time that there was -- and I'm not
 24 in any way criticising you or probably anybody -- was
 25 there a desire, as you perceived it, on the part of NWSA

5

1 to control the information about its conduct that was
 2 being put out there?
 3 A. No, I didn't feel that, no.
 4 Q. Did you sense that there were any concerns about the
 5 response of NWSA that you were being asked to address?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. So to put it in summary, was your understanding that the
 8 position of NWSA was that there was a huge amount of
 9 public interest in what had or had not happened that
 10 night and you were being put forward effectively as the
 11 public face of NWSA to answer those questions?
 12 A. Or one of, yes.
 13 Q. Or one of. Now, next I'm going to deal with your
 14 background and experience.
 15 Sir, I'm at the second statement of Mr Ennis, so
 16 {INQ025751/1}.
 17 Have you worked for the Ambulance Service since
 18 October of 2005?
 19 A. Yes, that's correct.
 20 Q. At that time which ambulance service did you join?
 21 A. Initially I joined Cumbria Ambulance Service.
 22 Q. Did you join as a trainee ambulance technician?
 23 A. Yes, that's correct.
 24 Q. Shortly thereafter becoming an ambulance technician?
 25 A. Yes.

6

1 Q. In September of 2008 did you transfer from Cumbria
 2 Ambulance Service?
 3 A. I did, yes.
 4 Q. And to where did you transfer?
 5 A. Cumbria Ambulance Service had already been accumulated
 6 into the North West Ambulance Service by then, but
 7 I transferred from the Cumbria area to
 8 Greater Manchester.
 9 Q. At the same time did you enrol on to a paramedic course?
 10 A. Yes, that's true.
 11 Q. Qualifying in that role in December 2008?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Could you explain in just a few sentences what the
 14 difference is between an ambulance technician and
 15 a paramedic, please?
 16 A. A paramedic is a more -- the next level of training
 17 above ambulance technician. It is a protected title
 18 that involves a specific -- at the time it was a
 19 training course, now a diploma or degree level
 20 education. It allows for the administration of various
 21 levels of drugs and clinical procedures that are more
 22 complex than an ambulance technician is able to provide.
 23 Q. So the paramedic is more highly qualified?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. More highly skilled?

7

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And able to administer a wider variety of treatments to
 3 a patient?
 4 A. Yes. Trained to respond to a whole variety of emergency
 5 situations and manage those.
 6 Q. Did you work as a paramedic up until 2012?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And at that point, in 2012, did you complete a higher
 9 education diploma in paramedic practice?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. Shortly afterwards, were you promoted to the role of
 12 senior paramedic?
 13 A. I was. I can't be entirely sure about the time period
 14 of completing the diploma course, but it was around that
 15 time that I completed it and started the senior
 16 paramedic role, yes.
 17 Q. Again, very shortly, can you describe the difference
 18 between a paramedic and senior paramedic, please?
 19 A. A senior paramedic is somebody -- a paramedic who has
 20 experience and is able to respond to a more difficult
 21 incident to provide clinical support to other ambulance
 22 clinicians. Part of the role was as a clinical manager
 23 with responsibility for looking after a team of
 24 paramedics and emergency medical technicians.
 25 Q. So the senior paramedic retains a clinical role but also

8

1 assumes some managerial responsibilities for other
 2 paramedics?
 3 A. Yes. It's a primarily clinical role in responding
 4 either in an ambulance car, one of the fast-response
 5 cars or on a double-manned ambulance, usually in a sort
 6 of mentorship teaching role, but also some office-based
 7 administrative duties as well.
 8 Q. In April 2015 were you promoted again, this time to the
 9 role of advanced paramedic?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And the same year, did you complete a BSc degree in
 12 paramedic practice?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Once more, just so that we understand, the difference
 15 between an advanced paramedic and a senior paramedic in
 16 a few sentences, please.
 17 A. An advanced paramedic is a more senior clinician able to
 18 provide clinical support to ambulance clinicians, both
 19 on scene at incidents and also remotely via telephone or
 20 radio in order to assist ambulance clinicians in being
 21 able to provide a high level of care. We're also --
 22 advanced paramedics have additional training and are
 23 able to administer a wider variety of drugs and
 24 medicines and other procedures as well.
 25 Q. So the advanced paramedic retains a clinical role and

9

1 indeed is able to provide a wider variety of treatments,
 2 have I understood correctly, but has also enhanced
 3 managerial responsibilities?
 4 A. Yes. So with responsibility for the clinical management
 5 of a team of senior paramedics and also a large team of
 6 paramedics and emergency medical technicians.
 7 Q. As an advanced paramedic, were you in May 2017 one of
 8 the clinical leads for the central Manchester sector?
 9 A. Yes, that's correct. There were three advanced
 10 paramedics who worked throughout the sector, which
 11 covers central Manchester and also Salford.
 12 Q. Would that have included the area of Manchester Arena?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And Victoria Railway Station?
 15 A. Yes, it did, yes.
 16 Q. Did you at that time therefore have responsibility for
 17 the clinical management of a large team of senior
 18 paramedics, paramedics and emergency medical
 19 technicians?
 20 A. Yes, I did.
 21 Q. Did your role involve office-based duties such as
 22 clinical audit?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Medicine management?
 25 A. Yes.

10

1 Q. And indeed investigations?
 2 A. Yes, clinical investigations, yes.
 3 Q. As well as responding in an ambulance car to support
 4 ambulance staff at difficult or traumatic incidents?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Did that include, for example, cardiac arrests?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Obstetric emergencies?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Mental health incidents?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Road traffic incidents?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And most pertinently as far as we are concerned,
 15 large-scale incidents?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. I'm going to ask you in a moment about your training.
 18 But first of all, you have just mentioned large-scale
 19 incidents. During the course of the interview that you
 20 gave to the panel of Lord Kerslake, you referred to the
 21 fact that you had had involvement in the response to
 22 what is sometimes called the Cumbria shootings.
 23 A. Yes, I did.
 24 Q. Sir, just to provide some context, that is a reference
 25 to the fact that, on 2 June 2010, a man that we don't

11

1 need to name murdered 12 people and injured others in
 2 a shooting spree in Cumbria.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. What was your role in relation to those events?
 5 A. I was an observer on the air ambulance, the helicopter
 6 operating from Blackpool Airport, that was one of the
 7 resources that was tasked to respond to that incident.
 8 Q. Did you treat any individual who had been shot or
 9 otherwise injured?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. What, if anything, did you learn from those events in
 12 2010 about responding to a major incident?
 13 A. I think the big learning point generally from that
 14 incident was that sometimes the management of a major
 15 incident, the response, is very difficult when spread
 16 across geographical locations, and I think because of
 17 the fact that the particular incident involved many,
 18 many miles being travelled in between each individual
 19 patient contact, it was very difficult to respond to
 20 because it was taking a long time for the information to
 21 get from the general public through to the control
 22 centres and then to the ambulance clinicians or to the
 23 helicopter.
 24 Q. One of the things that you mentioned to Kerslake was
 25 that there was a sense that came out of the Cumbria

12

1 shootings that the Ambulance Service had been "risk
 2 averse".
 3 A. Yes. I think the issue at that incident -- sorry.
 4 Q. No, you carry on, please. I'm keen to receive your
 5 evidence about this.
 6 A. There were people who had been seriously injured, there
 7 were members of the public who were calling 999 with an
 8 expectation that an ambulance would be sent directly in.
 9 The Ambulance Service were keen to ensure that before
 10 they sent an ambulance into that area that they could
 11 confirm that the gunman had left that area. Sometimes
 12 that took some time because it was a very rural area, it
 13 took some time before they could confirm his location,
 14 confirm that he wasn't there, which led to considerable
 15 delay, sometimes, before ambulances were sent into the
 16 area. I think the expectation from members of the
 17 public was that they felt it was safe or safe enough for
 18 them to be there, therefore emergency responders should
 19 be able to respond to that area.
 20 Q. So it may be that some of that resonates with what
 21 happened on the night of 22 May and we'll get to that in
 22 more detail when you return. But are you describing
 23 a sense that the Ambulance Service, whom the public
 24 might expect to get to a scene as soon as possible,
 25 might not get there as soon as physically possible

1 because there is a concern about their own safety or
 2 welfare?
 3 A. I think that that's a factor. I think one of the other
 4 problems in that area is because it is such a rural
 5 area, there are very few ambulances, so I think
 6 inevitably there is likely to be a delay in responding
 7 based on the very few ambulances, but potentially that
 8 could be further delayed by an ambulance being held off
 9 from scene because of fears that it might not have been
 10 safe.
 11 I should add at this point that --
 12 Q. Not safe for the ambulance crew?
 13 A. Not safe for the ambulance crew to attend, yes. This is
 14 information I have only been aware of from reading
 15 debrief reports from afterwards. It wasn't something
 16 I was aware of at the time because, obviously, I was in
 17 a helicopter at the time.
 18 Q. So you're talking about the Cumbria incident and
 19 becoming aware of the possibility that ambulance staff
 20 were risk averse in the aftermath of those events. I'm
 21 just going to ask you to broaden it out slightly.
 22 You've described this sense, which may be
 23 understandable, that crews don't always deploy as soon
 24 as physically possible because there may be a concern
 25 about their safety if they do so. Am I correct?

1 A. I think it's understood in emergency response that in
 2 order to be able to provide aid, that safety is a factor
 3 and is one of the really important things to consider
 4 when responding. So to provide perhaps a different
 5 analogy, if there was an isolated shooting incident in
 6 the city centre, an ambulance crew would be tasked to
 7 respond to that, but they would respond to a rendezvous
 8 point that was usually set by the police and then when
 9 the police decided that the scene was safe, then the
 10 ambulance crew would be responding in because if they
 11 were to come to harm, not only would they not be able to
 12 provide care to the casualty, but they would be
 13 additional casualty numbers that would then require
 14 further aid.
 15 Q. To your mind, sitting there now, with the benefit of the
 16 experience that you had, both in Cumbria and on 22 May,
 17 do you consider that to be the appropriate approach?
 18 A. I think that safety of rescuers has to be a factor. But
 19 I do think that there possibly have been cases where
 20 that has led to delays in ambulance response.
 21 Q. So there may have been cases where that's led to a delay
 22 in ambulance response. Are the events of 22 May such
 23 a case in your view?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. I'm not going to ask you to develop that answer at this

1 stage because, as you'll appreciate, we're going to get
 2 to that when you return, unless there is anything that
 3 you want to say further in response.
 4 A. I just wanted to say I don't think it delayed the
 5 ambulance response, but perhaps what we're talking about
 6 is the deployment of individual ambulance clinicians
 7 into certain areas, which is perhaps something that
 8 I could elaborate on later.
 9 Q. So that's obviously, as you will appreciate, a very
 10 important issue for us to explore, but I'm going to try
 11 to be as disciplined as I have suggested others should
 12 be and we won't go into that at this stage but once you
 13 return, but we'll park that for now, understanding that
 14 the extent to which there was a delay in deployment from
 15 within the station into the City Room is something that
 16 we will need to look at very closely indeed, will we
 17 not?
 18 A. Of course.
 19 Q. Let's look then at your training, as I said that
 20 we would. Throughout the course of your career as an
 21 ambulance technician and then as a paramedic, have you
 22 received training?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Indeed, have you undergone mandatory annual training?
 25 A. I have.

1 Q. As I believe you've told us already, on being promoted
2 to the role of advanced paramedic, did you undergo
3 further training specific to that role?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I'm going to ask that we put on the screen your training
6 records, although you were good enough to explain to me
7 when you spoke to me a little time ago that you have
8 conducted your own research into your training, have you
9 not?
10 A. I have.
11 Q. And you're in a position give us some further detail
12 about the training you've received over and above what
13 is recorded in the records?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. At all events, let's look at the records. Can we have
16 on the screen first of all, please, {INQ040292/1}.
17 Sir, could I warn you that I have forgotten my
18 spectacles today and there's every chance that I may
19 misread documents on the screen.
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's very helpful! Thank you for
21 that.
22 MR GREANEY: We can see that the bottom two entries on that
23 page are ones that pre-date the arena attack.
24 A. On that page, that's correct.
25 Q. And the two courses that pre-date the attack are "Mental

1 health awareness for healthcare professionals" and
2 "Making every contact count"; am I right?
3 A. You are correct.
4 Q. The second training record that we have is
5 {INQ040293/1}.
6 Could we move that over slightly, Mr Lopez, so I can
7 see the dates as well?
8 We can see that there are -- I think there are
9 14 entries relating to training in the period before the
10 arena attack, there or thereabouts. I'll just deal with
11 it globally. In the entries that we've looked at so
12 far, prior to the arena attack, there is no indication
13 that you received training in the response to major
14 incidents or in what you and I know to be called JESIP.
15 A. No, not from this training record.
16 Q. I am going to give you an opportunity to describe what
17 in fact the position was. But I do want to make sure
18 that we put the relevant documents on the screen. The
19 third document is {INQ040673/1}.
20 It is probably an Excel document, Mr Lopez. It
21 isn't. We can see this relates to mandatory training
22 and you received that training prior to the arena attack
23 on 28 July 2016.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. That's what the records show. No indication on the face

1 of it that you had received JESIP training or major
2 incident training. But is the position that you had
3 received training in those matters?
4 A. Yes. So part of the manager training for each of these
5 dates incorporated elements of major incident management
6 and JESIP awareness.
7 Q. I believe it's the position that you are confident that
8 on each of the occasions of mandatory training -- which
9 will be annual; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. You received training in the JESIP principles and in the
12 response to a major incident?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. The JESIP principles, as the inquiry knows very well
15 now, involve co-location --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- communication, coordination, the joint understanding
18 of risks, and shared situational awareness?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. To put it in very simple terms, this is all about joint
21 working by the various emergency services to ensure the
22 best possible response to an incident?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. On the night of 22 May, to your mind, were the JESIP
25 principles adhered to?

1 A. I think that it's difficult for me to comment on the
2 overall management of the major incident because of my
3 particular location throughout most of that. But
4 I would say that within -- and I know this is not to
5 discuss the City Room, but in terms of my location,
6 which was the City Room for the majority of the
7 incident --
8 Q. You give the answer as fully as you feel you need to.
9 A. Thank you. Certainly I was co-located with a number of
10 police officers and we did coordinate a response there
11 and communicate and I believe that they certainly shared
12 information that they had about the management of risk
13 with me. I'm not able to comment on, obviously, the
14 management of scene, of the whole major incident,
15 because I wasn't able to see how that was managed and
16 whether or not there was a similar level of
17 communication between emergency services.
18 Q. I believe that's a clear answer. What you're saying to
19 us is that within the City Room, you believe that JESIP
20 principles were adhered to, at least so far as the
21 police and Ambulance Service are concerned?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. But you can't speak as to the broader situation outside
24 of the City Room?
25 A. No. From an operational command perspective, that was

1 managed appropriately away from the City Room and
 2 I can't speak for how that was managed.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Other people have said that on a daily
 4 basis when the Ambulance Service and the police and/or
 5 fire are all jointly getting to a scene or arriving at
 6 a scene and operating at the scene, those JESIP
 7 principles are almost automatic when you're all there.
 8 together. Was that a similar situation for you on this
 9 particular night?
 10 A. Yes, I would say that's true. Certainly the police
 11 officers that I encountered shared the information that
 12 they had and I think we liaised together a number of
 13 times. I think those JESIP principles were present in
 14 the interactions and in the way that we responded
 15 together.
 16 MR GREANEY: When you return, obviously we're going to look
 17 at some of those interactions and look at what some of
 18 the police officers were saying to you about what they
 19 thought was needed within the City Room. Again, I know
 20 this is difficult for all of us, so we're just going to
 21 park that for the time being.
 22 At Kerslake you were asked whether there were any,
 23 and I quote, "screaming lessons" for JESIP from the
 24 events of 22 May. The reference is {INQ000247/31}. You
 25 said it was a good question but on the spot you had no

21

1 answer. Obviously, time has passed since then, so may
 2 I ask you the same question? To your mind, are there
 3 any screaming lessons for JESIP arising out of the
 4 events of 22 May?
 5 A. Again, I'm not sure I'm best-placed to answer that, just
 6 because of the... Where...
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, we understand you can only talk
 8 from your perspective of what you saw, so it may be that
 9 there were problems in JESIP at -- not a higher level,
 10 but a more remote level of people supervising. I think
 11 all you can answer is: were there any screaming lessons
 12 so far as you were concerned in what you were doing?
 13 MR GREANEY: That's exactly the point, sir.
 14 A. Thank you. Yes, I think that in terms of the principles
 15 of JESIP, I think that in terms of ensuring that at
 16 every level of the incident there was co-location,
 17 because we're talking about co-location potentially
 18 within the scene of the incident, co-location at the
 19 operational command level, co-location at the tactical
 20 and strategic command levels, potentially there was room
 21 for improvement there. And certainly in terms of joint
 22 understanding of risk, clearly there were different
 23 understandings of risk within the different services in
 24 terms of how they responded or potentially didn't
 25 respond. So I think in that way, I think there was

22

1 a definite -- there's definite room for improvement from
 2 a JESIP perspective in terms of the overall emergency
 3 services' response, yes.
 4 Q. So when you say that there's a lesson to be learned in
 5 terms of co-location at a more remote level, as the
 6 chairman puts it, can you tell me precisely what
 7 you have in mind?
 8 A. Within the City Room obviously there is and was a need
 9 for the emergency services present there to communicate
 10 and to work together. At the operational command level,
 11 which would be on or around the Victoria Station
 12 concourse, there is a need and was a need of the
 13 emergency services present to work together, to
 14 communicate, to co-locate. I genuinely don't know
 15 whether or not that occurred. But equally, at a remote
 16 from scene, at a more strategic or tactical level,
 17 I think there would be an understanding that the
 18 emergency services or representatives at the Silver or
 19 Gold level would also co-locate and work together.
 20 Q. In terms of the view that the different services were
 21 taking about risk, do you mean that there were police
 22 officers and paramedics in the City Room, the numbers is
 23 an issue that we'll need to look at, but there were not
 24 representatives of GMFRS? Is that what you mean by the
 25 reference you have made or are you talking about some

23

1 broader or different issue?
 2 A. No, that was one of the things I was referring to, yes,
 3 the fact that the Fire Service weren't there on scene.
 4 Q. Again, I'm going to apply discipline and not probe
 5 further on that issue at this stage.
 6 In your witness statement, I'm still dealing with
 7 training, you observe that you had participated in some
 8 training sessions specific to a major incident response
 9 as well as a one-day training session on JESIP. Could
 10 you tell us in a little more detail about the training
 11 you had received in relation to a major incident
 12 response, please?
 13 A. I'm just going to refer to my notes if that's okay.
 14 Q. I'm sure that's in order.
 15 A. Thank you. Initially, there were elements of major
 16 incident training in my basic training in 2005 as well
 17 as in my paramedic training in 2008 and, as well as
 18 that, in the annual manager training programme that you
 19 mentioned.
 20 I also had specific JESIP training around 2013 or
 21 2014 as a senior paramedic. Around the same time,
 22 interim Bronze commander training, so again around
 23 2013/2014, and then, somewhere in the region of
 24 2015/2016, I had major incident training specific to
 25 NWAS assistance at hospital evacuations of a major

24

1 incident, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
 2 attack management, and also MTFa training.
 3 Q. What were the key points that you learned from all of
 4 that training about how to respond to a major incident?
 5 A. At each of these major incident training sessions, the
 6 principles of major incidents were reiterated, which
 7 included to some degree of definition of major incident,
 8 how to declare a major incident, so how to pass
 9 a METHANE report. Information about the actions of the
 10 first and subsequent ambulance resources on scene. What
 11 the role of operational commander would take. How to
 12 separate an incident into zones according to the type of
 13 incident it was.
 14 Q. Do you mean hot, cold and warm zones?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. So that was something that you had received training in?
 17 A. Yes. And also the principles and application of primary
 18 and secondary triage and the medical care within
 19 casualty clearing stations and various other things.
 20 And then specific changes that would be required at
 21 certain incidents, so for instance a marauding terrorist
 22 firearms incident or a chemical, biological,
 23 radiological or nuclear incident.
 24 Q. So had you received specific training in the part that
 25 the Ambulance Service might play in responding to

25

1 a marauding terrorist firearms attack?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And when had you received that training?
 4 A. It was somewhere in 2015 to 2016. I'm afraid I can't be
 5 specific about the date.
 6 Q. What did you understand would be the approach that an
 7 ambulance service should adopt in such a situation?
 8 A. So the Ambulance Service has a number of AITs, so
 9 Ambulance Intervention Team, I think is the — the
 10 abbreviation is AIT — AIT-trained members of staff, the
 11 majority of which are formed from the HART team, the
 12 Hazardous Area Response Team, but also a number of
 13 paramedics and emergency medical technicians who work
 14 throughout the area who are trained in order to be able
 15 to provide an AIT response and have the additional
 16 personal protective equipment, so helmets and ballistic
 17 vests and other equipment, in order that they are able
 18 to respond specifically to a marauding terrorist
 19 incident.
 20 Q. This is a term I don't think I've come across before,
 21 that's probably my fault. What is the difference
 22 between HART and AIT?
 23 A. So the AIT could be a HART operative or it could be
 24 a paramedic who usually works on a fast-response car or
 25 works on an ambulance. But they've received specific

26

1 PPE and specific training in order to be able to operate
 2 within certain zones at a marauding terrorist firearms
 3 incident and are also trained to work alongside other
 4 services at that incident.
 5 I must stress that I haven't received AIT training.
 6 My training on marauding terrorist firearms incidents
 7 was about how potentially as a commander I would be able
 8 to manage that incident if required.
 9 Q. The next question that I am going to ask you, people
 10 will need to keep an eye on the answer to. I'm going to
 11 frame it carefully. I am not asking you about the
 12 position now. It may very well be different now. I'm
 13 asking you about the position on 22 May 2017. Within
 14 the Greater Manchester area on that date, we know that
 15 there was a HART capability. Was there also an AIT
 16 capability?
 17 A. Yes. I couldn't tell you the number of staff.
 18 Q. I don't want to know the number of staff. But there was
 19 such a capability?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Was it distinct from or did it form part of HART?
 22 A. As I understand it, all of the HART operatives are AIT
 23 trained.
 24 Q. Were you yourself HART trained or AIT trained?
 25 A. No.

27

1 Q. Let me ask you a question that's simple to ask, but it
 2 may be difficult for a number of reasons to answer. The
 3 training you had received, all of it, really, but
 4 specifically the training in responding to a major
 5 incident, did that equip you adequately for what you
 6 were confronted with on the night of 22 May?
 7 A. I think it's fair to say that regardless of the amount
 8 of training received, one could never be adequately
 9 prepared to deal with an incident of that type. Having
 10 said that, I feel that I was given adequate training to
 11 be able to perform my role on that night or to be able
 12 to undertake any of the other functional roles that
 13 night, so yes, I do feel that I had been given that
 14 training.
 15 Q. So insofar as ultimately it might be suggested to you on
 16 proper grounds that there were things that you might
 17 have done differently or things that you might not have
 18 done that you did do, you are not seeking to say that
 19 that's the consequence of any inadequacy in your
 20 training?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. A final point on training and then I'm going to move to
 23 22 May. Had you taken part in any exercises?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. We are then turning to deal with the events of the night

28

1 of the attack.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind if I just take that up
 3 in relation to training?
 4 MR GREANEY: Not at all, sir.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Exercising is part of training. You
 6 hadn't done any exercise for a major incident?
 7 A. I hadn't taken part in any of the live exercises, so
 8 there had been several joint agency exercises that had
 9 taken place. I'd not taken part in any of those.
 10 However, all of the — well, many of the major incident
 11 training days that I'd attended had incorporated
 12 tabletop major incident management. So for instance the
 13 hospital evacuation, the CBRN and the MTFA ones did
 14 involve taking part in tabletop exercises.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would it have helped to have had a live
 16 exercise?
 17 A. Potentially, yes. I think any time taking part in any
 18 exercise probably applies an extra dimension to the
 19 learning experience. It probably would have been
 20 helpful.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Clearly, some people in your position
 22 did do that sort of live training. How were people
 23 selected for it?
 24 A. They didn't happen very often because presumably the
 25 logistics of trying to organise something like that were

29

1 very complicated. But often it was volunteers were
 2 sought from every level that would be required, so
 3 within the advanced paramedic team there would have been
 4 volunteers sought and I imagine that that didn't... It
 5 certainly was something that I would have been
 6 interested in doing but probably didn't fit with my
 7 shifts and childcare, that type of thing.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But there was no particular arrangement
 9 by NNAS to ensure that in rotation all of the people
 10 were at least offered the chance to go to do one of
 11 those live exercises?
 12 A. My understanding is within certain roles in the
 13 Ambulance Service, that is expected. So for instance,
 14 those that are working specifically on a Bronze, Silver
 15 or Gold rota as operational commanders, that would be
 16 expected, but it wasn't specifically part of the
 17 advanced paramedic role.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 19 A. I did attend quite a few large-scale sporting events to
 20 provide medical cover as part of the Ambulance Service,
 21 and although that sounds very different to a major
 22 incident, actually the management of that does share
 23 a lot of principles with the Ambulance Service, so in
 24 terms of radio communication and... That was something
 25 that also to some degree enhanced my preparedness.

30

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 2 MR GREANEY: The point may be obvious and I'm certain it's
 3 one you can agree with. In circumstances in which JESIP
 4 requires, and indeed common sense requires, that the
 5 emergency services should operate together in the event
 6 that there is a major incident, you don't want to be
 7 testing that for the first time on the occasion of
 8 a major incident, do you?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. That's why perhaps exercising ahead of such an event is
 11 important; would you agree?
 12 A. I would agree.
 13 Q. As I indicated, I'm now moving to the events of the
 14 night of 22 May. I'm going to take this slowly and,
 15 I hope, carefully.
 16 So you know, what generally I'm going to do is to
 17 seek your narrative account of events in separate
 18 sections. Then I'll ask you to pause, we'll look at any
 19 images that we have of you from the CCTV, and we'll
 20 listen to any relevant calls that you made or
 21 conversations that you had or we'll look at a transcript
 22 of those conversations. Does that make sense?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Sir, I'm now at the second statement and I'm going to
 25 deal first of all with paragraphs 8 to 10.

31

1 On Monday, 22 May, were you working a night shift in
 2 your role of advanced paramedic?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. I think from what you've said to us already, you'd been
 5 in that role for just a month by that stage, being
 6 promoted, I think, in April 2017.
 7 A. Apologies, 2015. From 2015.
 8 Q. You're quite right, 2015. So you'd been in that role
 9 for 2 years. That's my mistake, not yours.
 10 Did your shift involve starting at 7 pm?
 11 A. It did, yes.
 12 Q. And finishing at 7 am the next morning?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Again, can I make plain I'm dealing with the position
 15 then, not now. That night, were you the only advanced
 16 paramedic on duty across Greater Manchester?
 17 A. I was.
 18 Q. Where were you based that night?
 19 A. I started and would finish my shift from Sharston
 20 Ambulance Station because that's where the advanced
 21 paramedic fast-response car is based. But I was based
 22 from Central Manchester Ambulance Station predominantly
 23 that night.
 24 Q. Did you say Sharston?
 25 A. Sharston Ambulance Station, yes.

32

1 Q. So you'd driven the advanced paramedic vehicle from
 2 there to Central Ambulance Station, had you?
 3 A. Yes., that's correct.
 4 Q. How far is the Central Ambulance Station from
 5 Manchester Arena?
 6 A. I guess it depends on which route you take, but only
 7 a few miles. I'm afraid I'm not sure exactly.
 8 Q. We can find out the exact distance. During the night
 9 when you were working, can you give us an idea of how
 10 long you'd have expected it to have taken you to drive
 11 in an emergency situation from Central Ambulance Station
 12 to the arena?
 13 A. Depending on traffic, which would obviously be — there
 14 wouldn't be much of at that time of the evening and
 15 depending on which route was taken, probably somewhere
 16 in the region of 5 to 8 minutes.
 17 Q. As the advanced paramedic on duty that night, was it
 18 your obligation to monitor the emergency incidents that
 19 were being received?
 20 A. It wasn't an obligation in the sense that the control
 21 centre would notify me of any incident that they felt
 22 required my attendance. However, it was an understood
 23 part of the role that, where possible, where we had
 24 access to the control screens, we would also monitor for
 25 incidents that we felt would be appropriate for our

33

1 attendance.
 2 Q. I think I've understood. So it's not your primary duty
 3 to be staring at the screen that is showing the
 4 incidents, but where you could, you'd be keeping an eye
 5 on what was happening?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. In order to identify any incident that was one that
 8 called for your particular level of seniority and
 9 expertise?
 10 A. Yes, that's true, and also to be able to see where my
 11 team of ambulance paramedics and emergency medical
 12 technicians were so that I could monitor where they were
 13 and see whether or not there was anything that they
 14 required assistance with.
 15 Q. Would you also be making decisions yourself about the
 16 deployment of the members of your team?
 17 A. No, that would be managed by the control centre.
 18 Q. I'm going to ask you to go back to 22.30 that night. At
 19 22.30, where were you?
 20 A. I was in the office at Central Manchester Ambulance
 21 Station.
 22 Q. And what were you doing?
 23 A. I don't recall specifically what I was doing, but one of
 24 my statements certainly talks about managing or
 25 undertaking a clinical investigation into a medicine

34

1 management issue. And I think in another statement
 2 I talk about answering emails as well. So I think I was
 3 doing a variety of things at roughly the same time
 4 whilst also monitoring the incidents occurring in
 5 Greater Manchester.
 6 Q. So you're dealing with some administrative tasks, but
 7 you also have a screen available to you, which is
 8 showing what is happening so far as the
 9 Ambulance Service is concerned?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. Did something in particular come to your attention
 12 shortly after 22.30?
 13 A. Yes, it did. I became aware of several 999 calls which
 14 were appearing on the screen in quite rapid succession.
 15 Q. Did they all relate to a single location?
 16 A. They did, yes.
 17 Q. That location being?
 18 A. Being the Manchester Arena.
 19 Q. Do incidents, when they appear on your screen, have
 20 a particular grading?
 21 A. They do, yes. They are colour coded according to the
 22 priority that's given by the AMPDS, which is the triage
 23 system that's in use within the control centre for the
 24 call-takers to use.
 25 Q. The calls that were coming in shortly after 22.30,

35

1 relating to the arena, what colour or grading did those
 2 calls have?
 3 A. These are an amber colour.
 4 Q. Meaning what?
 5 A. Meaning that — well, the highest priority calls are
 6 purple, followed by red, followed by amber, followed by
 7 green.
 8 Q. So at that stage these are calls which are in a kind of
 9 intermediate area?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is the grading given by the person who's
 12 actually taking in the emergency call?
 13 A. It's a system which is used internationally, I believe,
 14 called — the AMPDS stands I think for Ambulance Medical
 15 Priority Dispatch System and the priority given by
 16 somebody ringing 999, the call-taker will follow a card
 17 on the computer, so they will click on, if somebody has
 18 a breathing issue, they'd click on that card and it will
 19 tell them which questions to ask. It will populate
 20 a response according to the particular questions that
 21 are asked and what that triggers.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 MR GREANEY: Is it the position that these calls caught your
 24 attention because, whilst it's not uncommon to receive
 25 multiple calls for the same location, that does often

36

1 indicate a more serious type of incident?
 2 A. Yes, that's correct.
 3 Q. In a moment I'm going to ask you to deal with what
 4 happened when you clicked on one of those calls, but
 5 could I ask you, first of all, about the arena. Was the
 6 arena somewhere that you had ever visited before 22 May?
 7 A. I had responded to emergency incidents around that
 8 location on quite a number of occasions. I don't think
 9 I'd ever actually been into the arena itself, but
 10 certainly Victoria Station and the various areas around,
 11 including the City Room, I had been to on several
 12 occasions.
 13 Q. So you had been into the City Room?
 14 A. Yes, I had.
 15 Q. So how would you describe your knowledge of the
 16 geography of the arena and the areas around it?
 17 A. I would describe it as reasonable. Having worked within
 18 or around the city centre for quite a few years by that
 19 point, I had a fairly good local knowledge and working
 20 knowledge of the arena and the ways to access it.
 21 Q. At 22.30 that night did you know what was happening
 22 at the arena?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. By which I mean did you know that there was a concert on
 25 there that night?

1 A. No, I didn't.
 2 Q. Is there any system, or was there at the time, any
 3 system whereby the Ambulance Service, you in particular,
 4 as the advanced paramedic on duty, would be informed in
 5 a formal way of any particular event that was occurring
 6 in Manchester that might require your attention at some
 7 stage?
 8 A. There may have been systems in place to notify the
 9 Ambulance Service of specific areas, but it wasn't
 10 something that I as an advanced paramedic would have
 11 been notified of, and I presume because there are
 12 frequently and very regularly large-scale music concerts
 13 and other sporting events going on, so I wouldn't be
 14 notified specifically of any music concert, no.
 15 Q. I understand the point you're making. So when you came
 16 on duty each night, did you receive a briefing from
 17 anyone?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. So I think what you're saying to us is that there was no
 20 system whereby you would be told, for example, at the
 21 Etihad tonight or at Old Trafford there's a football
 22 match taking place with tens of thousands of people
 23 attending? You might know about it, but there was no
 24 system by which you'd be formally informed?
 25 A. No, that's correct.

1 Q. So when you came on duty that night at 7 o'clock, you
 2 had no idea one way or the other of whether anything was
 3 happening at the arena?
 4 A. No, I didn't, no.
 5 Q. Did you know as of 22.30 on 22 May anything about the
 6 medical capacity of those who worked at the arena?
 7 A. No.
 8 Q. So you didn't know anything, you were just telling us,
 9 about the medical capacity of those who worked at the
 10 arena?
 11 A. No, I didn't know anything about them, I'm afraid.
 12 Q. Had you ever worked together on any earlier occasion
 13 with those who provided a medical capacity on the
 14 occasion of events at the arena?
 15 A. No, I don't think I had.
 16 Q. What you tell us about at paragraph 10 of your statement
 17 is that you recall clicking on the first of the call
 18 records relating to the arena?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. When you did so, what in particular did you note about
 21 it?
 22 A. The location was the Manchester Arena. The
 23 information -- the coding, so the card that had been
 24 selected to best fit that emergency was a 07 code, as
 25 I recall, which is a bomb or explosion. And although

1 there was very little information in there, elsewhere
 2 in that call it said that there'd been an explosion.
 3 Q. So at that very early stage, and I think we're dealing
 4 with a period at and from 10.32, you knew that multiple
 5 calls were coming in about something that had happened
 6 at the arena?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And you knew that certainly one of the calls involved
 9 a description of that event being a bomb or an
 10 explosion?
 11 A. My recollection is that all of the calls that I'd
 12 seen -- and I believe that there were around six that
 13 I saw before I left the office to respond -- obviously
 14 there would have been more calls then populating the
 15 screen that I didn't see -- but they all had the same
 16 code, they all said bomb or explosion.
 17 Q. To put it in very simple terms, at that very early stage
 18 were you aware that something serious had or may well
 19 have occurred at Manchester Arena?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It seems quite surprising, doesn't it,
 22 to most of us to realise that it was the amber warning
 23 which came up for something which was actually on the
 24 coding a bombing? Is that something wrong with the
 25 coding and as a consequence do you not pay too much

1 attention to what the coding says?
 2 A. One of the very much understood things about the AMPDS
 3 system is that it vastly underemphasises the priority of
 4 traumatic calls. Now, this is an American system,
 5 I believe, that's in use throughout the UK and there
 6 isn't a means of changing individual parts of it. So
 7 it's very much understood that even very, very serious
 8 traumatic incidents will be under-triaged by this system
 9 and we've got various things within the
 10 Ambulance Service in place in order to override that.
 11 For instance, the trauma cell, who will be monitoring
 12 all of the calls and will try and identify serious
 13 incidents that aren't necessarily at the top of the
 14 stack, has a purple colour, for instance.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 16 MR GREANEY: So although this was not a purple or red
 17 incident, you realised that something very significant
 18 was likely to be underway at the arena?
 19 A. Yes, and my understanding is that so did the ambulance
 20 control and so did the advanced paramedic who was
 21 working on the trauma cell that night.
 22 Q. And the ambulance control is called the EOC?
 23 A. Yes, emergency operations centre.
 24 Q. As a result of what you were seeing on the screen, did
 25 you decide that this was an incident that required

41

1 senior presence at the scene?
 2 A. Yes, I did.
 3 Q. And as a result did you decide that it would be a good
 4 idea for you to attend in order to offer your senior
 5 input?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Furthermore, you were close to the arena?
 8 A. Yes, relatively close, yes.
 9 Q. In various accounts that you've given, you talk about
 10 self-deploying to the scene. Just before probably we
 11 break for our morning break, would you explain to us
 12 what self-deployment means, please?
 13 A. The majority of... So what that means is that within
 14 the advanced paramedic role, it's understood that I may
 15 be aware of incidents because of my perhaps greater
 16 clinical knowledge than the non-clinicians who work in
 17 the emergency operations centre, that I may identify an
 18 incident in which I feel my presence or skills might be
 19 beneficial. So it's understood that I could request the
 20 emergency operations centre to assign me to that role
 21 rather than wait to be allocated.
 22 Q. So you have a discretion to decide whether a particular
 23 incident is of such seriousness or potential seriousness
 24 that you should deploy; is that correct?
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

42

1 Q. I said we'd stop, but that answer was rather shorter
 2 than I expected, so let's make a little more progress.
 3 Having made that decision, what did you then do?
 4 A. I left my office, walked directly towards my ambulance
 5 car, which was parked right outside, and en route, as
 6 I recall, requested speech with the emergency operations
 7 centre, which is on my Airwave radio handset, pressed
 8 the button which alerts the control centre that I would
 9 like to speak to them.
 10 Q. So let's break that down. You left your office at the
 11 Central Ambulance Station?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And you made your way to your response car?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Did you put on, as we're going to see in some of the
 16 stills, your high-visibility jacket?
 17 A. I did, yes.
 18 Q. Did you get into your car which has the call sign QX354?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. I think you just told us that you spoke to the EOC over
 21 your Airwave radio?
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What you told us is you pressed the
 23 button to tell them you wanted to speak to them.
 24 A. Yes, my recollection is that I requested that I wanted
 25 to talk to them whilst I was still proceeding towards

43

1 the car and they answered me whilst I'd started to drive
 2 in the car.
 3 MR GREANEY: I see. Sorry, sir, you're quite right.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be not a material difference.
 5 MR GREANEY: At all events, they called you back and you had
 6 a short conversation with them; is that correct?
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.
 8 Q. Sir, for your note, the timing of that call by the EOC
 9 to Mr Ennis is 22.36.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 11 MR GREANEY: This gives us an idea of how quickly you
 12 mobilised. We know that the explosion was 22.31, and
 13 I think what you're saying to us is that by 22.36
 14 you were either in or on your way to your car?
 15 A. Yes, that's true.
 16 Q. Where do you think you were at the time they called you?
 17 A. I think I was in the car at the time they called me,
 18 from my recollection.
 19 Q. And I'm going to ask, please, that we play that very
 20 short recording. I hope we have this set up.
 21 Mr Lopez, the reference is {INQ015106/1}.
 22 (Pause)
 23 Sir, it may be an idea just to take our morning
 24 break now and give Mr Lopez a chance to set this up and
 25 we'll listen to this and the other recordings once we

44

1 return.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How long are we anticipating this
 3 witness's evidence will last on this occasion?
 4 MR GREANEY: Most of today, although I hope not all of
 5 today.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're going to be there for quite
 7 a long time. If you need longer breaks, you must tell
 8 me, all right?
 9 Quarter of an hour.
 10 (11.11 am)
 11 (A short break)
 12 (11.26 am)
 13 MR GREANEY: The delay before the break was my fault, not
 14 the fault of Mr Ennis. We don't in fact have that
 15 particular recording on the system, but what we do have
 16 is a transcript of it, which I'll ask to be put on the
 17 screen. It's {INQ015106T/1}.
 18 This is a call by the EOC to you, Mr Ennis, at
 19 22.36. 28354, do you know who that is?
 20 A. That's, I think, possibly a transcription error.
 21 I think that's QX354, which was my ambulance call sign.
 22 Q. Quite right. So QX354:
 23 "[QX354], just seen on the pager. What's going on
 24 in the city?"
 25 What does that mean?

1 A. So one of the things that I hadn't mentioned is that as
 2 well as being aware on the computer screen of multiple
 3 999 calls being made, advanced paramedics also carry
 4 a pager, which is designed to alert us to certain
 5 categories of incident. That's one of the means of
 6 alerting us to incidents that might not fall in the
 7 purple category at the top of the screen. This was
 8 obviously one of those. So my pager went off, which is
 9 probably one of the things that drew my attention to the
 10 screen.
 11 Q. The EOC's response is:
 12 "As at the minute we're just taking all the calls.
 13 We'll get back to you in a second when we know what's
 14 happening."
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. At that stage, as you told us, you think that you were
 17 in your response vehicle?
 18 A. I think so, yes.
 19 Q. At any rate, you then made your journey to the arena or
 20 towards the arena; is that correct?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. In your statement, and I'm at paragraph 13, you state:
 23 "I had already started to make my way to the
 24 incident prior to the EOC forwarding me the address and
 25 incident details."

1 What does that mean?
 2 A. It means I'd already started to drive towards the
 3 incident. Because I knew where it was from local
 4 knowledge, I didn't need to wait for the incident to be
 5 sent through to the screen within my car, which would
 6 then link to the satnav and begin giving me directions.
 7 If it had been at a location I wasn't familiar with,
 8 I might have had to wait for that to happen before
 9 I could start to drive for fear of driving in the wrong
 10 direction, but as I knew where I was going I was happy
 11 to start driving towards that area even before I'd been
 12 assigned to the incident.
 13 Q. So does this show that you were keen to get there as
 14 soon as possible?
 15 A. Yes. So to put it in context, it would be generally...
 16 The use of blue lights and sirens, for instance, is
 17 very, very sort of strictly monitored. So a paramedic
 18 would never use blue lights and sirens unless en route
 19 to an emergency. So in order to be able to claim
 20 exemptions and travel above road speed you'd have to be
 21 assigned to an incident. Such was the severity of this
 22 incident potentially that I began to respond using
 23 lights and sirens before I had the incident assigned to
 24 me.
 25 Q. So these are all signs of the fact that you recognised

1 that what you were going to was potentially a really
 2 very serious incident; is that correct?
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.
 4 Q. Do you recall that there came a time when you were in
 5 communication with Jackie Carney, an advanced paramedic?
 6 A. I recall that from statements. I think that I might
 7 have -- afterwards I don't think I did remember that
 8 until some time later when I was reminded of that
 9 communication, but yes.
 10 Q. Have you listened to that communication?
 11 A. I have, yes.
 12 Q. Sir, we're now turning to a schedule of radio
 13 communications and other communications which you have
 14 before you in A3 form. You also have a copy of this and
 15 it's entry 1 on page 2.
 16 The time of this call is 22.38 hours. Although your
 17 recollection of the call is far from perfect, do you
 18 recall where you were at the time that you had the
 19 conversation we're going to listen to in a moment?
 20 A. Not specifically, but my belief is that I was en route
 21 to Manchester Arena at that time.
 22 Q. Was Jackie Carney someone that was known to you?
 23 A. Yes, she was.
 24 Q. Am I right to describe her as an advanced paramedic?
 25 A. Yes, that's true.

1 Q. Where was she at the time at which she spoke to you?
 2 A. She was in the emergency operations centre in Broughton
 3 near Preston, which is where the Ambulance Service
 4 trauma cell was based.
 5 Q. What is the trauma cell?
 6 A. The trauma cell is one of the desks at the emergency
 7 operations centre in Preston in which an advanced
 8 paramedic, with the assistance of one of the control
 9 centre dispatchers, would monitor all of the traumatic
 10 incidents that were ongoing throughout the whole of the
 11 north-west in order to make sure that these incidents
 12 were rapidly identified and the correct resources
 13 assigned to those incidents.
 14 Q. Did she call you or did you call her?
 15 A. I can't honestly recall.
 16 Q. But there was a conversation. What was the purpose of
 17 that conversation that we're about to listen to?
 18 A. It was... Sorry, just to go back, looking at the
 19 transcription, it sounds very much as if I have
 20 contacted her rather than she contacted me.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does in a way in that you say -- it
 22 says, "Hello, trauma cell". But actually the first
 23 thing she says is, "I'm sorry to bother you".
 24 A. This is true, yes.
 25 MR GREANEY: It can be read in both ways, I would agree.

1 What was the purpose of this conversation?
 2 A. So twofold. I think one was to -- so from my side,
 3 contacting the trauma cell or speaking to the trauma
 4 cell was a means of seeing if there was any more
 5 information available and also looking at whether or not
 6 any sort of systems of potential major incident command
 7 had been set up yet.
 8 Q. So systems of potential incident command, what do you
 9 mean by that?
 10 A. So the... So for any large-scale incident, it would be
 11 expected that the Silver on call for that night would be
 12 notified so that they were aware in a timely fashion.
 13 That's one of the things that I have alluded to there,
 14 checking that Silver is aware.
 15 Q. We're going to hear that in a moment. As you were
 16 making your way towards the arena, did you have it in
 17 mind that you were going to perform yourself any
 18 particular role in the command structure?
 19 A. Well, not specifically. The initial requirement of me
 20 arriving potentially first on scene, it would be to
 21 gather information in order that the correct NWS
 22 response could occur behind me, but with the potential
 23 that I could take on an operational command role if
 24 required.
 25 Q. I'm going to ask you in a moment about that term

1 you have just used, the first on scene role. First I'm
 2 going to ask Mr Lopez to play this recording, please.
 3 This is on the list that he's been alerted to. It's
 4 {INQ015338/1}. Sir, we have heard this before.
 5 (Audio played to the inquiry)
 6 I will just pull out some of the details from that.
 7 First of all, Jackie Carney asked you if you wanted
 8 MERIT rocking and rolling as soon as you get there.
 9 What is MERIT?
 10 A. The MERIT team or MERIT role are medical doctors who
 11 provide a major incident role for the Ambulance Service,
 12 so whether that be a remote one or one on scene at
 13 a major incident. They generally work within, say, the
 14 casualty clearing station, providing additional clinical
 15 support to ambulance staff.
 16 Q. As we've just heard, you say in the course of that call:
 17 "Just see if anybody in Manchester has spoken to
 18 Silver. It seems like they are a little bit headless
 19 chickens up there at the moment, as I will be,
 20 of course, as soon as I arrive on the scene."
 21 When you refer to "up there", where are you
 22 referring to?
 23 A. To the emergency operations centre in Manchester.
 24 Q. When you said, "They are a little bit headless chickens
 25 up there", what did you mean?

1 A. I think what I meant was that prior to this
 2 conversation, I had, I believe, had a conversation with
 3 them. There was the transcript that we've just read
 4 where I've asked for information and they didn't have
 5 any.
 6 Q. So there's something between 22.36 and 22.38, do you
 7 think?
 8 A. Yes. So there's a conversation in which they have
 9 explained that they will assign me to whichever 999 call
 10 they are running on, so whichever of the various 999
 11 calls they've decided to assign all the resources to.
 12 That's prior to the conversation with Jackie Carney, as
 13 I recall. And actually, during the call there, you can
 14 hear the bleep as the call actually comes through to
 15 the -- as the incident comes through to my computer
 16 screen.
 17 Q. Can I just make sure I've understood this? To be fair
 18 to the point you've just made, you do refer in the 22.38
 19 conversation to, "They've put me on a job now".
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. So we've got 22.36, the transcript that we'll look at.
 22 There is then a further conversation, is this what
 23 you're saying, when they put you on a job and formally
 24 send that through, and then we have the call either from
 25 or to Jackie Carney in the trauma cell?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. I've interrupted you. Where does the headless chickens

3 comment come into this?

4 A. Obviously that's a comment which I perhaps regret and

5 was a very offhand comment. But usual practice,

6 usual -- would be that at the point that I was

7 wanting -- was explaining to the operations centre that

8 I intended to respond to an incident, usually they would

9 have more information than I had -- so the control

10 screen that I've looked at in the office has very, very

11 limited information. Actually, the screens in the

12 control centre give usually much more information and

13 what I imagine was that in the time that it had taken me

14 to get from my office towards the car and begin to

15 respond, they would have more information and they would

16 pass that to me. That would be usual practice.

17 So the fact that they've not been able to give me

18 any information and the fact that it had taken some time

19 to assign me to the actual emergency call suggested that

20 it was a little chaotic at the time.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We all appreciate that you never

22 anticipated that you were going to be listening to these

23 recordings and having to explain what you said but from

24 our point of view, it does give us some idea of your

25 completely spontaneous reaction.

53

1 A. Okay.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And for whatever reason, you did, it may

3 be an exaggeration, but you were indicating some degree

4 of -- well, something not quite right, as it were, at

5 that time, and you wanted her to sort it out. So we all

6 understand that, but it helps us. Please don't feel

7 you have to be apologetic.

8 A. Thank you, I appreciate that.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not going to spend a lot of time on

10 this, but if this call had come through as a purple

11 call, what are the consequences of that? Is it

12 immediately flagged up as being something really

13 serious?

14 A. Apart from the colour on the screen and its location on

15 the screen, I don't believe it would have made any

16 difference. So the potential with an amber incident

17 is that it isn't at the top of the screen, it doesn't

18 draw the attention of the ambulance dispatcher in the

19 same way as a purple call. But my understanding, having

20 worked for quite some time in the control centre,

21 is that they would have been immediately aware of this

22 incident and these incidents as soon as they arrive. So

23 the dispatchers, as in those that work in the control

24 centre and actually dispatch the ambulances, most of

25 them are very, very experienced and --

54

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they would realise the significance

2 of it even if it wasn't showing as purple?

3 A. Yes, the code immediately -- the fact that it had a

4 07 code, which means bomb or explosion, would in itself

5 have drawn their attention to it just as much as the

6 colour. So I don't believe that the colour would have

7 altered anything in this situation.

8 MR GREANEY: You by this stage had worked in the

9 Ambulance Service for approaching 12 years and you knew

10 how to interpret and understand these things, but I'm

11 certain you can understand the point the chairman is

12 making, that describing these events by reference to

13 amber sounds less than ideal.

14 A. Absolutely. I completely agree.

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it has the potential to mislead?

16 A. Yes. I would completely agree and I think it's well

17 understood within the Ambulance Service that this is

18 a failing on the part of the AMPDS system, hence the

19 reason for various layers which are there really to

20 protect against any incident that's potentially very

21 serious being missed. That's one of the reasons for,

22 for instance, the pagers going off to certain code sets

23 and alerting people and also the trauma cell monitoring

24 specifically for trauma, which would tend to sit in that

25 area of the code sets.

55

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

2 MR GREANEY: I will ask this question because the chairman

3 will need to know the answer in terms of any

4 recommendations he might make, but people will need to

5 keep an eye on the question and answer. Has the system

6 changed, the system we are looking at, in this regard

7 since May 2017 or does it remain the same?

8 A. As far as I'm aware, there have been certain changes to

9 the system, but as far as I'm aware fundamentally it

10 still uses the AMPDS system, which still does tend to

11 underemphasise the importance of certain incidents such

12 as this. I left the Ambulance Service a short while ago

13 so it potentially could have changed and I'm unaware of

14 that.

15 Q. That's something we can pick up with others. You've

16 given us your explanation, for which thanks, of the

17 reference to "a little bit headless chickens up there at

18 the moment", and you went on to say, and I know you'll

19 excuse us poring over the exact language at the moment:

20 "... as I will be, of course, as soon as I arrive on

21 the scene."

22 What were you seeking to convey in using those

23 words?

24 A. I suppose I was probably aware as soon as I'd said it

25 that this sounded potentially like a criticism of my

56

1 colleagues in the emergency operations centre. And
 2 although Jackie was a colleague and friend of mine,
 3 I probably wanted to just get across to her that
 4 I wasn't criticising our colleagues in the emergency
 5 operations centre, it was simply a comment on the fact
 6 that this was potentially quite a chaotic incident, both
 7 from a calls to the emergency operations centre and
 8 potentially on scene, and this might be difficult to
 9 immediately be able to categorise or deal with.
 10 Q. As you approached that scene in your car and were having
 11 this conversation, are you able to tell us how you were
 12 feeling?
 13 A. I was very much aware right from the beginning that
 14 potentially this was a very serious incident, so I was
 15 readying myself for responding to something that would
 16 be extremely serious. And of course there was a level
 17 of stress that was associated with that. I think in my
 18 statements at a few points, I've also talked about how
 19 I considered other possibilities, so I think it's fair
 20 to say that within emergency responding it's very common
 21 to respond to an incident which, on arrival there, is
 22 not as it was given.
 23 So a layperson, a member of the public, calling 999
 24 for an emergency isn't necessarily medically trained,
 25 doesn't necessarily -- isn't necessarily able to

1 necessarily judge when something is serious or not or
 2 what may appear to be very serious may not be to
 3 somebody who's trained to respond to serious
 4 emergencies. So I had at the back of my mind other
 5 possibilities that this could be, that would be as
 6 serious. That's not to say that I in any way assumed
 7 it would be less serious, but I just kept open the
 8 possibility that it might be and hopefully would be not
 9 as it was.
 10 Q. So can I summarise what was going through your mind in
 11 this way? Obviously, by this stage you'd seen on your
 12 screen a number of calls to 999, which were all
 13 consistent that this was a bomb or explosion.
 14 Jackie Carney had said to you that reports had been
 15 received of a bomb or explosion, so there was
 16 a consistency across the information you'd received.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. But you were really hoping that it was not going to be
 19 as bad as that?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. But you were preparing yourself for it being that bad?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. One of the other things that you said in the course of
 24 that conversation was -- I think you said it twice --
 25 that you were going to follow the police. Could you

1 explain to us what you meant by that, please?
 2 A. As I drove out of Central Manchester Ambulance Station
 3 and turned on to Plymouth Grove and began to drive up
 4 Upper Brook Street, I was aware of a police car driving
 5 up behind me rapidly. Usual practice in this situation
 6 would be that any ambulance resource would move to the
 7 side, still with emergency lights and sirens if needed,
 8 but move to the side, allow the police car to overtake
 9 and then follow them to scene, and that's what I did on
 10 this occasion, with the assumption that this police
 11 resource was likely going to the same location as me.
 12 Q. Was this a marked police vehicle?
 13 A. It was, yes.
 14 Q. You moved to the side and you then followed that car?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And indeed did that vehicle travel to the arena?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Did the vehicle travel up Hunts Bank from the
 19 Victoria Street direction?
 20 A. It travelled up Hunts Bank from -- so down Deansgate,
 21 a brief detour around the pedestrianised area on
 22 Deansgate around Manchester Cathedral, and then up the
 23 Hunts Bank approach to Victoria Station.
 24 Q. So would it be going up Hunts Bank with the Hunts Bank
 25 stairs on its left?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Where did that vehicle come to a halt?
 3 A. I can't recall where that police vehicle stopped, but
 4 when I arrived there, I was aware of quite a number of
 5 police vehicles, so it's possible that I lost that
 6 police car in the melee of them, but I found a location
 7 for me to pull my car up to or into and that's where
 8 I parked --
 9 Q. Sorry, I missed where you parked your vehicle.
 10 A. Part way, perhaps halfway, up Hunts Bank on the
 11 right-hand side, there was a natural gap in some of the
 12 police vehicles that were already there, so I parked
 13 in that location, with the -- what I didn't want to do
 14 was carry on further up Hunts Bank and find that
 15 I couldn't park and therefore block the road when
 16 potentially it could be accessed from both directions,
 17 therefore there could easily be vehicles travelling the
 18 opposite direction down there that could end up with
 19 a bottleneck.
 20 Q. We know very well where Hunts Bank is. Just tell us, as
 21 you drove up Hunts Bank, what was the situation that you
 22 were able to see?
 23 A. I was aware, as I said, of a number of police vehicles
 24 already there with their blue lights flashing. I was
 25 aware of a large group of people moving away from the

1 area.

2 Q. Do you mean members of the public?

3 A. So members of the public, yes. I'd already seen some of

4 these crowds of people moving away before I got to

5 Hunts Bank, but as I got up to Hunts Bank, I was aware

6 that there was a large police presence, lots of members

7 of the public moving away from the area, and I was

8 immediately aware of some -- what looked like

9 potentially injured people.

10 Q. We'll come to that in a moment. You are seeing a number

11 of police vehicles, you're seeing people injured or

12 potentially injured. Was this confirming what you had

13 been told, that something very serious was underway?

14 A. This was certainly confirming to me that this was

15 potentially very serious, yes.

16 Q. You maintain, do you not, a notebook or a logbook?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is that a book in which you record important events that

19 occur during the course of any shift?

20 A. What I had was a logbook which I would -- a blank

21 logbook which I would keep with me at all times. So

22 rather than record regularly, I would have that

23 available to me to use in this type of situation. So it

24 wasn't something that I used regularly, but it was

25 something I had used before in a different book.

61

1 Q. So the fact that you maintained a log on that particular

2 night, again is that something that indicates to us how

3 seriously or how serious you recognised the events were?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. At what stage did you start to maintain your log in that

6 book?

7 A. I didn't start the log until some hours later and not

8 until all of the casualties had been moved out of the

9 City Room.

10 Q. The log itself, and I'm not going to ask for this to go

11 on the screen because, even with my spectacles, it's

12 difficult to read, but the INQ reference is

13 {INQ023279/1}.

14 Your log records that you arrived at the scene at

15 22.42.

16 A. That sounds correct. I'd have to look at the log to

17 confirm.

18 Q. I have taken that from page 3 {INQ023279/3} of the log.

19 Bearing in mind that you made that record some time

20 later, how confident can we be, if confident, that 22.42

21 is the time that you arrived?

22 A. I believe that the next night -- I made some notes

23 in the City Room on that night and then I -- the

24 following night or perhaps it might have actually been

25 two nights later, on the third of my night shifts,

62

1 I actually looked at the control log for the incident in

2 order to be able to get my on-scene time from the log.

3 So I believe that was the time captured on the control

4 system.

5 Q. That's very helpful, thank you.

6 So as you've explained, you parked your response car

7 about halfway up Hunts Bank on the right-hand side?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What equipment did you have within that vehicle?

10 A. I had a variety of equipment in the vehicle. I had a

11 basic life support bag, which is a rucksack-type bag

12 with the majority of equipment that would be required

13 for most incidents that we would attend.

14 Q. Is that sometimes called a BLS bag?

15 A. That's correct. There's a defibrillator, or two

16 defibrillators. One was an automated defibrillator and

17 one is a large defibrillator which has the capacity to

18 do 12-lead ECGs and various things. There was what we

19 would call an advanced life support bag that would have

20 equipment for, for instance, intubation --

21 Q. Tell me again, that's the advanced life support --

22 A. The advanced life support or ALS bag.

23 Q. So we've got the basic life support bag and the advanced

24 life support bag?

25 A. Yes.

63

1 Q. And the ALS has within it what, over and above what

2 would be in the BLS?

3 A. So equipment that would be required to be able to

4 perform endotracheal intubation, so that is putting

5 a tube into somebody's lungs in order to be able to

6 ventilate, as well as other equipment for, as I recall,

7 surgical airways, if a patient has had an unmanageable

8 airway. A few other pieces of equipment like that,

9 possibly further cannulation equipment, so for

10 intravenous cannulation for the administration of drugs.

11 Q. Can I just ask you a very specific question, which may

12 be of more relevance when we come to hear your evidence

13 about the City Room. Was there within either bag, or

14 indeed within both bags, equipment that you might

15 describe as a tourniquet?

16 A. Yes, in the BLS bag.

17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The?

18 A. The BLS bag, the basic life support bag.

19 MR GREANEY: Within the ALS?

20 A. No.

21 Q. When you arrive at any incident, is the position that

22 you have to choose which bag you deploy with or might

23 you deploy with both bags?

24 A. For the majority of incidents, if arriving as the first

25 resource on scene, the expectation would be that the BLS

64

1 bag would be taken into every incident, so within
 2 that is oxygen, a variety of oxygen masks, basic
 3 dressings, a variety of equipment. Usually, the
 4 defibrillator , but this is bearing in mind that the
 5 majority of incidents we attend are probably medical
 6 rather than traumatic emergencies. And then potentially
 7 the ALS or advanced life support bag and potentially the
 8 medicines bag as well. There's a separate pouch that
 9 contains the majority of medicines we might need for,
 10 for instance, a cardiac arrest .
 11 Q. What about pain relief? Which bag would pain relief be
 12 in, if any?
 13 A. Simple pain relief such as oral paracetamol or ibuprofen
 14 would be in the BLS bag. Morphine would be locked in
 15 a safe because it's a controlled drug.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 A. So that wouldn't be easily accessible immediately. That
 18 wouldn't be considered something that would be taken out
 19 as the immediate response. That would be something that
 20 would be a subsequent trip back to the vehicle to get.
 21 We also carry an Entonox cylinder, which is a separate
 22 bag which has Entonox, which is a medical gas.
 23 Q. What I was just concerned to understand, I don't know
 24 the answer to this, you will, is: is it feasible to
 25 deploy to a scene with both the BLS and the ALS?

1 A. It is feasible , but it wouldn't be usual practice unless
 2 at an incident where advanced airway management was
 3 likely to be required.
 4 Q. I'm sure you're aware of what I'm concerned to
 5 understand. What you have made clear in your witness
 6 statements and what you made clear to Kerslake is that
 7 when you arrived at the arena, you'd deployed with the
 8 BLS basic life support bag?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And only the basic life support bag, did you not?
 11 A. I deployed with the basic life support bag and an extra
 12 pouch, which replicated some of the equipment in the BLS
 13 bag, which was some of the dressings and, I believe, an
 14 extra tourniquet.
 15 Q. As you have said a number of times now, you realised
 16 that you were attending an incident that was potentially
 17 extremely serious, didn't you?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. So the public watching might be wondering why, bearing
 20 in mind that you knew that you were attending something
 21 that was likely to have involved a bomb or an explosion,
 22 you did not deploy with your advanced life support bag.
 23 A. Of course, yes.
 24 Q. So I would like just to give you the opportunity to
 25 explain that.

1 A. Of course. Whilst the advanced life support bag might
 2 sound like something that would be required in this
 3 situation , it would be something that would not be
 4 appropriate to use until some way down the line. So for
 5 instance, if I were responding to a different incident
 6 that was a cardiac arrest , for instance, the actual
 7 process of advanced life support would not be possible
 8 to start until there were at least probably another two
 9 ambulance clinicians there. So the initial actions of
 10 a lone responder in an isolated incident involving one
 11 person would involve basic life support, which would
 12 potentially be chest compressions and airway, basic
 13 airway management, and the advanced airway management
 14 would come later down the line. So it's unlikely to be
 15 equipment that would be required as the first on scene
 16 at an incident.
 17 Q. Let me break that down to make sure that I've
 18 understood. We know that as a matter of fact you were
 19 the first paramedic on the scene, but as you have pulled
 20 up on Hunts Bank, were you proceeding on the assumption
 21 that you were the first at the scene?
 22 A. I was. Yes, I was.
 23 Q. Thank you for your explanation of why you didn't take
 24 the ALS bag. Did there come a time when you thought the
 25 ALS bag would be of assistance to you?

1 A. No, not within my role that night, no.
 2 Q. I'm sure you understand that a question some might pose
 3 is: do you think, looking back at the time, that you
 4 made a mistake in not deploying with both the BLS bag
 5 and the ALS bag?
 6 A. No, I don't, but what I haven't mentioned so far is that
 7 there is another bag in the car. This is a commander's
 8 pack and within this is the equipment required in order
 9 to perform a commander role or Bronze commander,
 10 operational commander role at an incident, at least for
 11 the interim stages. So my consideration at the time of
 12 leaving the car was that as this was potentially a very
 13 serious incident , I would either need the basic life
 14 support equipment in order to be able to render aid to
 15 a single or a small number of casualties or I may
 16 potentially require the commander's pack in order to be
 17 able to stay remote from any patient care but be able to
 18 provide an operational command response. What
 19 I decided, if I'm not jumping ahead too much, was that
 20 actually I didn't have the information there to say that
 21 the operational commander pack or bag would be required
 22 at this stage, and rather than walking to the incident
 23 without sufficient medical equipment, what I did was use
 24 the -- take the BLS bag with the additional dressings
 25 pouch.

1 Q. So I've misunderstood something that you said, both to
 2 the BBC and to Kerslake and that's my fault, not yours.
 3 So there is a commander pack within the vehicle?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. What is within the commander pack?
 6 A. I can't recall the specifics of that, but it's a large
 7 pouch which I believe has four separate pouches which
 8 contain the cruciform or the primary triage cards. It
 9 also has a whiteboard type or laminated sheet in there,
 10 with pens to be able to mark on for the purposes of,
 11 say, conducting a briefing for subsequent ambulance
 12 staff or for making notes. It also has a larger version
 13 of the logbook, so if a log was required as operational
 14 commander.
 15 Q. One of the things that that bag contained were the
 16 cruciform cards; is that correct?
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.
 18 Q. We are going to get into this in more detail when you
 19 return, but could you describe in a few sentences what
 20 the cruciform cards are, please?
 21 A. So it's a pack which, within it, contains a number of
 22 cards which act as a visual identifier of the triage
 23 category for that patient, so whether that be
 24 priority 1, 2 or 3. And then there are separate cards
 25 which have the word "dead" written on.

1 Q. I really don't want to get into too much detail in this
 2 phase of your evidence about this, but as it turned out,
 3 would those cards have been of assistance to you in what
 4 you were confronted with that night?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Did you take the commander pack containing those cards
 7 when you initially deployed at the arena or, if not, did
 8 you return to the car and get it?
 9 A. No, I didn't take them. I left the car with the
 10 intention of taking the minimum essential equipment and
 11 with the intention of potentially going back to the car
 12 for more appropriate equipment, were it required.
 13 Q. Once you realised that the cruciform cards might be of
 14 assistance, did you return to the vehicle to get them?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Why not?
 17 A. Because of the layout of the incident, by the time I was
 18 aware that these were potentially required and would be
 19 helpful I was some distance away from the car and I made
 20 a decision, which came later, so this was after my entry
 21 to the City Room, and then my subsequent leaving the
 22 City Room to speak to colleagues who'd arrived after me,
 23 it was at that point then that I made the decision that
 24 actually, walking back down to the car, the time delay
 25 of that to collect this equipment was not appropriate

1 and it was more appropriate to continue or to move back
 2 into the City Room without those cards.
 3 Q. Obviously, we've moved into the City Room in very
 4 general terms just for a moment and we'll return to this
 5 topic in due course. But let me just ask you a very
 6 straight question. Looking back now, do you think that
 7 you made a mistake in not returning to your vehicle in
 8 order to obtain the cruciform cards?
 9 A. Whilst it would have been helpful to have the cards,
 10 it is possible and is... They're a visual reminder and
 11 an aide-memoire, but they're not essential. So no,
 12 I don't feel it was a mistake, although to have them
 13 would have been beneficial. Does that answer your
 14 question?
 15 Q. It does, I think. I'm just going to press you a little
 16 further --
 17 A. Of course, yes.
 18 Q. -- and ask whether there was anything, whether the
 19 cruciform cards or anything else in that vehicle, that
 20 did not find their way into the City Room that would
 21 have made a difference, had it found its way into the
 22 City Room?
 23 A. I think within my role, I think the cruciform cards were
 24 the main piece of equipment that would have made my role
 25 that night easier. I don't think there was anything

1 else at that time within my role that I required.
 2 Q. I'm not going to press you any further because there is
 3 a risk that we then get into areas that you haven't been
 4 prepared to deal with and others in the room and
 5 elsewhere haven't been prepared to deal with. But we'll
 6 ask you some more questions about that when you return.
 7 Thank you for what you've said so far.
 8 You first feature, Mr Ennis, in the contemporaneous
 9 material that we have at 22.45.46. This is entry 2 on
 10 the A3 document that I hope you have in front of you.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. This is a recording from body-worn footage worn by a GMP
 13 officer, PC Scott Lakes. It's entry 2 and the officer
 14 says, I think to you:
 15 "Have you got any first aid equipment on you?"
 16 And you say:
 17 "Yeah, let me just grab it. Yeah, what do we need?
 18 I just want to get a bit."
 19 And then there is reference to an injured person,
 20 I'm not going to read that out. Can you recall that
 21 conversation, first of all?
 22 A. No, not specifically.
 23 Q. Can you help in any way with where you were at that
 24 stage?
 25 A. This was, I believe, just after my initial arrival after

1 parking the car, getting out of the car. I recall
 2 walking to a police officer who was with a small group
 3 of either two or three injured people. So my
 4 recollection is that this conversation or something like
 5 it happened around that time.
 6 Q. So there's no doubt, is there, that by this stage
 7 you are at the scene?
 8 A. Yes, this is after I've got out of the car on
 9 Hunts Bank.
 10 Q. As we see from entry 3, you made a call to control, so
 11 to EOC, at 22.46.00 hours.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. I'm going to ask Mr Lopez if he would play that call to
 14 us, please. It's {INQ015047/1}.
 15 (Audio played to the inquiry)
 16 As I indicated, that starts at precisely 22.46.00.
 17 Do you recall making that call to the EOC?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Do you recall where you were at that stage?
 20 A. My understanding is that having initially made contact
 21 with a police officer with two or three casualties very
 22 close to my car on Hunts Bank, I proceeded further up
 23 Hunts Bank towards Victoria Station, made contact with
 24 another police officer and another small group of
 25 injured people, and it was at that point then that

73

1 I passed that situation report based on the casualties
 2 that I'd so far encountered.
 3 Q. Situation report being, as you describe it in the call,
 4 your sitrep?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Along the way of your situation report, you said:
 7 "It's a major incident, so stand by."
 8 A. I think that's a slight transcription error. I think
 9 what I've said is that it's a major incident standby.
 10 Q. These were your words. Tell us what you were intending
 11 to communicate with that.
 12 A. The options in terms of passing a METHANE report or
 13 a major incident situation report are that this is
 14 either a major incident declared or a major incident
 15 standby. So what I have passed at this point is a major
 16 incident standby, which alerts the emergency operations
 17 centre that this is very well likely to be a major
 18 incident, but at that stage I haven't declared it's
 19 a major incident.
 20 Q. I see. So you're essentially alerting control to the
 21 fact that this may well turn out to be a major incident?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And in saying it's a major incident standby, what would
 24 you expect to have been the consequences of that?
 25 A. So the initial actions for the control centre are

74

1 identical regardless of whether this is a major incident
 2 declared or standby, which is that they start to follow
 3 their major incident action cards and procedures, which
 4 I... I couldn't tell you specifically, but they start
 5 to put in place those actions, which would be to begin
 6 to find ambulance resources to send, to notify
 7 operational commanders, Silver commanders, tactical and
 8 strategic commanders and — as well as specialist
 9 resources, so the HART team and potentially MERIT
 10 responders, although that might actually be a feature of
 11 the trauma cell's actions rather than the emergency
 12 operations centre.
 13 Q. So you're communicating something which ought to ensure
 14 that thereafter there are put in place the appropriate
 15 structures to manage a major incident if that is what is
 16 declared?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And you mentioned a METHANE report. What we're going to
 19 learn when you come back to give evidence is that you do
 20 pass a METHANE report, do you not?
 21 A. Yes. So this was — although I've described it as
 22 a situation report, this was my first attempt at passing
 23 a METHANE report.
 24 Q. I see.
 25 A. It was incomplete based on the fact that I had very

75

1 limited information at that time.
 2 Q. And you later provide a more detailed METHANE report
 3 once you've been into the City Room, do you not?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And we'll listen to that in due course.
 6 You also say during the course of that situation
 7 report, and this may be of interest and importance to
 8 some:
 9 "We had reports of a nail bomb, possibly with
 10 shooting."
 11 From where had you received the information that
 12 there may have been a nail bomb, possibly with shooting?
 13 A. From my recollection, this is what the first casualties
 14 that I met after I left the vehicles had said. Now,
 15 nail bomb is not a term I would use, so I presume that
 16 I passed that on because that's the direct term that one
 17 of the casualties had described. But certainly my
 18 recollection is that the first two patients I'd spoken
 19 to had said they thought they had been shot and their
 20 injuries appeared potentially to be consistent with
 21 that, albeit also consistent with a nail bomb or
 22 explosion.
 23 Q. So can I be clear, so long as you can be, that the
 24 information about a potential shooting was information
 25 that you obtained from injured members of the public?

76

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. As opposed to from the police officer that you spoke to
 3 at the scene?
 4 A. Yes, that's my recollection.
 5 Q. You are first captured on footage at the arena at
 6 22.49.43, which is about 4 minutes after that first
 7 conversation we know that you had with PC Lakes. So can
 8 I indicate to everyone that we are now going to look at,
 9 on the screen, some images from the night. We are
 10 obviously not going to be looking at any images from
 11 within the City Room, but self-evidently these are
 12 images that are capable of being distressing .
 13 I'm going to ask Mr Lopez, having given that
 14 warning, to put on the scene, only once he has checked
 15 that he is putting on the screen an image that has been
 16 redacted, the following reference and that is
 17 {INQ035612/1}. This is the emergency response sequence
 18 of events that Mr de la Poer took us through in January.
 19 {INQ035612/128}.
 20 Have you seen this, Mr Ennis, the sequence of
 21 events? I think you have.
 22 A. I think I have, yes.
 23 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Lopez, that's the page that
 24 I wanted.
 25 So there we have at 22.49.43:

77

1 "NWS paramedic [it should read 'advanced
 2 paramedic'] Patrick Ennis approaches the war memorial
 3 entrance to Victoria Station. He has walked from the
 4 direction of Hunts Bank."
 5 Does that accurately reflect your recollection of
 6 what happened?
 7 A. Yes, it does.
 8 Q. Next, Mr Lopez, we're going to go to {INQ035612/130}.
 9 It's now 22.50.02:
 10 "Paramedic Patrick Ennis is approached by GMP
 11 PC Grace Barker whilst he is stood at the entrance to
 12 Victoria Train Station."
 13 Do you recall that conversation with that officer ?
 14 A. Not specifically, no. I do recall a conversation with
 15 a police officer on arrival at the entrance to the
 16 station, but not the specific officer .
 17 Q. In fact, that officer's body-worn camera was operating
 18 so we have captured a conversation that you had with
 19 her. This is from entry 5 on the schedule that we were
 20 looking at, so 22.50.32. This is 30 seconds after the
 21 image we have on the screen. We can see that she says:
 22 "Every NWS. They want every NWS there."
 23 And you then ask:
 24 "Where?"
 25 And she states:

78

1 "At the booking office, which is just ... "
 2 And she asks:
 3 "Is the booking office upstairs?"
 4 Do you see that?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Do you remember a police officer, really at the very
 7 outset of your involvement that night, saying words to
 8 the effect of, "Every NWS, they want every NWS there"?
 9 A. Not the specifics of that. I do remember that there was
 10 a great deal of concern from the police officers on
 11 scene that they wanted ambulances and also of concern
 12 that I needed to proceed upstairs to the City Room.
 13 Q. What this seems to reveal is a desire on the part of
 14 that officer, we'll look at what other officers said in
 15 due course, that ambulance personnel should be there in
 16 numbers, "there" being the booking office, in other
 17 words the City Room?
 18 A. Yes, I ... I don't recall her using the term "booking
 19 office" and that wouldn't have meant anything to me
 20 at the time. But I definitely remember a conversation
 21 at that time of a police officer, whether it was
 22 PC Barker, directing me that I needed to be upstairs.
 23 Q. Looking at that, it's obvious that what she was meaning,
 24 even if it didn't register with you at the time, was
 25 that she wanted ambulance personnel in substantial

79

1 numbers within the City Room.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And indeed, as we're going to see when you return, I'm
 4 sorry to keep saying that, that was very much
 5 a sentiment that was expressed by other officers in the
 6 City Room, was it not?
 7 A. Yes, it was.
 8 Q. I'm not giving any secrets away by making plain to you,
 9 as you'll obviously appreciate, that one of the things
 10 we need your help with is why it was that ultimately it
 11 was three paramedics and not a greater number who
 12 treated casualties within that room.
 13 A. Yes, of course, yes.
 14 Q. But we'll get to that in due course.
 15 At 22.50.37, entry 6, we can see that there is
 16 a further aspect of the recording from PC Barker's
 17 body-worn footage. NWS Control:
 18 "Paddy, sorry, you were cut off then. Continue."
 19 And then a BTP officer, PC Martin says:
 20 "Booking office."
 21 PC Barker says:
 22 "That's where they want them all, all NWS."
 23 And you say:
 24 "We need NWS to be..."
 25 And PC Barker says:

80

1 "Can we get him there?"
 2 So it appears to be the case that at the same time
 3 two things are happening. First of all, there is
 4 a conversation in which PC Barker and PC Martin are
 5 involved, and also you are on the radio to your control.
 6 Is that how you understand it?
 7 A. Yes, that's certainly what it looks like, yes.
 8 Q. I think we can play that recording to control. It's
 9 {INQ032862/1}.
 10 (Pause)
 11 That's obviously an incorrect reference. We'll come
 12 back to that in due course. That's my fault, Mr Lopez,
 13 I can see that's not on the list that I gave you.
 14 At all events, we can see that there was
 15 a conversation with control while that was going on.
 16 Let's go back to the schedule. We can see at
 17 entry 7, the conversation is continuing, as recorded on
 18 the body-worn camera at 22.50.48. You are recorded as
 19 saying something inaudible and then:
 20 "That's what I'm asking you."
 21 Then an unknown male says:
 22 "Secondary devices haven't been looked at yet."
 23 Do you recall a reference at that early stage to
 24 secondary devices?
 25 A. No. I'm afraid I don't.

1 Q. Do you recall a reference at any stage to secondary
 2 devices?
 3 A. Yes, I do, and that was in conversation with a firearms
 4 police officer in the City Room.
 5 Q. So again, we'll get to that in due course.
 6 Looking at that now, what would be, to your mind,
 7 the relevance of secondary device and the fact that it
 8 had not been looked at yet?
 9 A. I suppose there's two things there. One is that the
 10 suggestion is that there is -- there was a primary
 11 device, which I think until ... Certainly I hadn't been
 12 given any specific information from a police officer, as
 13 I recall, until that point to give me more information
 14 about what they felt had happened. So that perhaps gave
 15 more information. But also the possibility of
 16 a secondary device meant that there was a potential that
 17 an area wasn't entirely safe.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What we do need to bear in mind, don't
 19 we, and help me if not, is that these conversations
 20 picked up in this way needn't be a conversation between
 21 the two people mentioned? Is that right, Mr Greaney?
 22 MR GREANEY: It is, sir, yes.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they could be two different
 24 conversations between two lots of different people?
 25 MR GREANEY: Exactly, sir. This is exactly the point

1 in relation to this, I quite agree. It may be sensible
 2 in due course, even if we don't play it publicly, that
 3 you should listen to that particular recording.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, thank you.
 5 MR GREANEY: We did explore whether it was possible just to
 6 play the audio of the body-worn footage and for
 7 technical reasons that wasn't possible.
 8 I'm going to return to the sequence of events.
 9 Mr Lopez, this is {INQ035612/132}.
 10 This is 22.50.22:
 11 "Paramedic Patrick Ennis enters Victoria Train
 12 Station. He is using his radio, which is attached to
 13 his coat on the left shoulder."
 14 So by this stage, you've entered the railway
 15 station. What did you know or believe that you knew?
 16 A. My recollection at this stage was that I had been told
 17 by one or more of the police officers as I arrived that
 18 there were casualties upstairs, but no more specific
 19 information. By that I mean no more specific
 20 information to assist me in being able to pass a METHANE
 21 report.
 22 Q. Can you just bear with me for one moment while I just
 23 process a message that I've been given?
 24 (Pause)
 25 Thank you very much indeed, Mr Suter.

1 We are going to turn next, please, to
 2 {INQ035612/133}, timed at 22.50.45:
 3 "Paramedic Patrick Ennis is inside Victoria Train
 4 Station and has a conversation with GMP officers
 5 PC Grace Barker, PC James Williams and BTP PC
 6 Matthew Martin. BTP PC Carl Roach is also present."
 7 And this is the conversation that we have picked up
 8 at least part of.
 9 Next, please, we'll go to {INQ035612/136}.
 10 22.51.28:
 11 "Paramedic Patrick Ennis walks up the stairs heading
 12 towards the City Room with BTP PC Matthew Martin.
 13 GMP PS McGowan has walked down the stairs and meets up
 14 with the GMP TAU officers who have gathered on the train
 15 station concourse on the bottom of the stairs."
 16 So what was your intention, Mr Ennis, at this stage
 17 as you walk up those stairs to the overbridge?
 18 A. My intention was to gain situational awareness about
 19 what had happened. My recollection is that I was still
 20 very much unsure of what precisely this incident was for
 21 the Ambulance Service. So to be able to gain more
 22 information in order to be able to pass that to the
 23 emergency operations centre in order to be able to
 24 better establish a response from the Ambulance Service.
 25 Q. There is a recording that we can play at this stage,

1 which I think is about this time, {INQ032873/1}.

2 Obviously everybody will bear in mind that we are

3 playing a recording now from a time which is very

4 sensitive, and this is therefore capable of being

5 upsetting.

6 (Audio played to the inquiry)

7 That isn't what I was expecting. Sir, I will make

8 sure that we have sorted out the exact chronology of

9 these calls over lunch.

10 Let's turn to the SoE again, please,

11 {INQ035612/140}. It's now 22.52.02:

12 "Paramedic Patrick Ennis continues to walk with BTP

13 PC Martin as they make their way along the footbridge,

14 heading towards the City Room."

15 Then you briefly stop to check on the welfare of

16 some injured persons who are on the overbridge, do you

17 not?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Who I will not identify. Then the next page,

20 {INQ035612/141}, please.

21 We can see that at this stage, 22.52.45, you are

22 just outside the doors on the footbridge, about to enter

23 the City Room. That's the point at which, as I have

24 indicated, we are going to pause your evidence today.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The person circled there is

85

1 Inspector Smith; is that right?

2 MR GREANEY: That's right, yes.

3 You're just outside the doors. It's quite difficult

4 to see. I think we can just pick out your fluorescent

5 or hi-vis jacket.

6 At that stage, as you were just about to enter the

7 City Room, in your mind, at that time, what role were

8 you performing?

9 A. At that time I still don't feel I was performing any

10 specific role. I was aware that I was likely first

11 ambulance on scene, but I was still at the stage of

12 gathering as much information and as much relevant

13 information as possible in order to be able to, firstly,

14 decide whether or not this was, as it seemed, a major

15 incident, and also to be able to provide the remainder

16 of the information that was required of me, ie a METHANE

17 report to control.

18 Q. You mentioned earlier the position of first person on

19 the scene. Is that a role that is recognised within the

20 Ambulance Service?

21 A. Yes, within major incident management there is an action

22 card for first person on scene, first ambulance on

23 scene.

24 Q. It is another thing that we are going to come back to in

25 due course, but am I right to suggest that you were the

86

1 first person on the scene so far as the Ambulance

2 Service was concerned?

3 A. From the Ambulance Service, yes.

4 Q. When you spoke to Lord Kerslake's team, you said that

5 you didn't stick to the role of first person on scene.

6 What did you mean by that?

7 A. What I meant by that is that the first ambulance on

8 scene action card for a major incident assumes primarily

9 that it's apparent immediately that this is a major

10 incident. Now, that might seem obvious and certainly in

11 hindsight this was -- it may be very apparent that this

12 was a major incident. But one of the assumptions

13 is that there is sufficient information when you arrive

14 to make that decision and I didn't feel that I had that

15 information.

16 Then the next thing is to have the situational

17 awareness of the incident in order to be able to pass

18 relevant information back to the emergency operations

19 centre.

20 Q. Just as you were about to enter the City Room, what

21 situational awareness did you have?

22 A. By that time I was aware that this was likely an

23 explosion, but still potentially some type of shooting

24 incident. I was aware that there were a number of

25 casualties and I would say that probably by that point

87

1 I had encountered perhaps 12. That's pure estimation.

2 But it wasn't until entering the City Room that I had

3 any idea of the true scale of the incident.

4 Q. So is what you're saying that it was not until you

5 actually got into the City Room that you had situational

6 awareness or true situational awareness?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Once you entered the City Room, did you then have

9 situational awareness?

10 A. So to a degree, yes, but my actions on entering the

11 City Room I think demonstrate the fact that I still felt

12 like I needed more information. So one of the things

13 that was very apparent is that there were a number of

14 casualties, including very, very serious casualties, but

15 actually being able to estimate initial numbers was

16 quite difficult. That's why I did the initial sweep of

17 the room before passing further information...

18 Q. We'll get to that in due course. Let me just return to

19 a question I posed to make sure that I've understood

20 your answer. As I've said, you said to Kerslake that

21 you didn't stick to the role of first person on scene.

22 In saying that, are you acknowledging that there is

23 something that you should have done that you didn't do

24 or something that you did and shouldn't have done?

25 A. If I was to have followed the action card for the first

88

1 ambulance on scene from arrival, I wouldn't have
 2 proceeded into the City Room. What that would have
 3 meant was remaining in the best location for taking the
 4 initial operational command of that incident, which
 5 would most likely have been around the war memorial
 6 entrance to Victoria Station. So at that point,
 7 co-locating with the police, passing the information
 8 that I had at that time back to the control centre, but
 9 continuing to follow that action card would mean not
 10 proceeding into the City Room and waiting there for
 11 subsequent ambulances to respond.
 12 Q. So if you'd followed that action card, we'll look at it
 13 in more detail when you return, you would not have gone
 14 into the City Room, certainly at the stage at which we
 15 see you went in at 22.52?
 16 A. Yes, if I'd followed that from arrival, then yes,
 17 I think I probably wouldn't have gone in -- I probably
 18 shouldn't, rather, have gone into the City Room.
 19 Q. Much earlier in your evidence, you referred to training
 20 that you'd received in zones during the course of
 21 a major incident.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you just mind if I...
 23 MR GREANEY: Of course not, sir.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm interested in the information you
 25 had just before you went into the City Room which you

1 have told us about. You had had some conversations with
 2 police officers?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the general effect of what they said
 5 to you was?
 6 A. I don't recall the specific conversations and certainly
 7 until seeing the sequence of events over the past few
 8 days, I hadn't been aware of the number of police
 9 officers that I'd encountered before I entered the
 10 City Room. My recollection was of having a conversation
 11 with a police officer, who told me that I needed to be
 12 upstairs. Now, one of the statements that I gave in the
 13 time period afterwards, I remember alluding to not
 14 really being given any further information. So whether
 15 I wasn't offered any further information or perhaps
 16 whether I didn't absorb any further information at that
 17 time, I certainly felt that I didn't know any more
 18 specifically about what had happened or the number of
 19 casualties or even the types of injuries until I entered
 20 the City Room.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What you believed was going to happen as
 22 a result of what you'd already fed back was you were
 23 expecting four ambulances to turn up?
 24 A. By declaring -- by stating that this was a major
 25 incident standby --

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry to stop for a minute. I think you
 2 actually told them you wanted four ambulances, didn't
 3 you?
 4 A. Yes, I did. That was obviously a wholly inadequate
 5 number, but based on the initial number of casualties
 6 that I'd met at that point.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In any event you'd expect four to turn
 8 up?
 9 A. In any event, the action of a major incident standby
 10 would involve the control centre looking for a great
 11 number more than four ambulances. Even if I'd asked
 12 specifically for four, they would still follow their
 13 predetermined attendance action cards and they would
 14 start to identify all available ambulances, regardless
 15 of the number that I'd asked for.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I do understand that, but disregarding
 17 that for a moment, you've asked for four on the basis of
 18 the casualties you've already seen?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you would expect four to come
 21 whatever?
 22 A. I would expect them to, yes, start to -- yes, try and
 23 get at least four ambulances to come to scene and
 24 assist, yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You've said, "We need four ambulances";

1 would you just expect four ambulances to come?
 2 A. No. I mean -- what I would expect is that they would --
 3 the emergency operations centre would start looking at
 4 ambulances to send. Now, one of the things which
 5 I haven't mentioned is that that night was already
 6 a busy evening for the Ambulance Service. So at that
 7 time, going back to before the explosion, there were
 8 already somewhere in the region of sixty 999 calls that
 9 were waiting for an ambulance response still. So there
 10 weren't physically ambulances waiting to respond. As
 11 far as I was aware, all the ambulances within
 12 Greater Manchester had likely already been tasked to an
 13 emergency, so were either en route to another emergency,
 14 in which case they could potentially be redeployed to
 15 here, or they would already be with a patient or would
 16 already be at hospital.
 17 I didn't expect in asking for four ambulances that
 18 there would be --
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: As soon as there were four available,
 20 they would come, irrespective of whether you'd declared
 21 it to be a major incident or not?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's independent of that?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then otherwise, because you would

1 expect them to start alerting people like the HART team
 2 to have them ready to come immediately you say it's a
 3 major incident. I just wonder -- obviously you realised
 4 it may be a major incident before you went into the
 5 City Room.
 6 A. Mm--hm.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You might even have thought it was
 8 likely to be a major incident?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So what's the problem about just
 11 declaring it a major incident?
 12 A. That's a fair question.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I try to make them all fair.
 14 A. Thank you. In hindsight, it may seem very obvious that
 15 it should have been declared a major incident right from
 16 the beginning. My understanding is that although -- if
 17 in doubt, it should be declared a major incident and it
 18 can be stood down, and that actually the initial actions
 19 on stating it's a major incident standby are the same.
 20 So I wasn't delaying anything by keeping an open mind
 21 that this was potentially a major incident, but might
 22 not be. And although, as I said, I wanted four
 23 ambulances initially to scene, I was aware that the
 24 major incident standby did mean trying to gather all
 25 resources in the same way as if it had been a major

1 incident declared right from the beginning.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So what you're telling me is that
 3 actually -- first, you're saying the instruction is: if
 4 in doubt, declare it to be a major incident?
 5 A. I believe that's the wording in the major incident ...
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You say it makes no difference, but if
 7 you've declared it to be a major incident, even if in
 8 doubt, doesn't that actually mean that people are going
 9 to start responding to the scene and working out the
 10 best way of responding and get there?
 11 A. I think the easiest way to explain it is the initial
 12 actions for the Ambulance Service are the same
 13 regardless of whether or not this is a major incident
 14 standby or declared. The actions on declaring it
 15 a major incident are more wide reaching in terms of the
 16 notification of other resources outside of the
 17 Ambulance Service, so by that I mean the hospitals and
 18 potentially Public Health England and various other
 19 agencies. But the actual Ambulance Service response, as
 20 I understand it, is the same regardless of whether it
 21 was a major incident standby or declared.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 MR GREANEY: So let's just pull these strands together so we
 24 understand the chronology. I'll see if we can put the
 25 schedule we've been looking at on the screen. I can't

1 immediately see the reference, but we can give the
 2 times.
 3 The chairman has been asking you about the call that
 4 you make, your sitrep, at 22.46.00. This is entry 3 on
 5 our schedule. This is the call in which you say:
 6 "It's major incident so stand by."
 7 So you haven't declared it but you've alerted
 8 everyone to the fact that this is likely to be a major
 9 incident; is that correct?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. You say that at that stage there are between six and
 12 eight casualties, all appear to be walking wounded
 13 currently, so were you describing the people that you
 14 had actually seen outside the railway station?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And you were indicating that you could do with at least
 17 four emergency ambulances at that stage?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Is the chairman right, were you seeking those ambulances
 20 in relation to those casualties that you had seen,
 21 namely six to eight who were walking wounded?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Whose decision would it be at that point in time as to
 24 how many ambulances actually were deployed to the scene?
 25 A. At that time it would be my decision as to how many were

1 required because I was the ambulance clinician on scene.
 2 It would be up to the -- it would be down to the
 3 emergency operations centre control manager to try and
 4 ensure that those ambulances were located and also in
 5 the background to follow the rest of the major incident
 6 plan.
 7 Q. So you knew at that stage that upstairs, as we all now
 8 know, the City Room, there was an issue that needed to
 9 be assessed. When you sought at least four ambulances,
 10 that was nothing to do with what you might encounter
 11 there, it was to do with those who were outside?
 12 A. Yes, by that time I didn't know where this incident had
 13 taken place. All I knew was that I had seen so far six
 14 or eight casualties and felt that this was potentially
 15 a major incident and that we needed a minimum of four
 16 ambulances to start with and then I had the intention
 17 then of gaining full situational awareness and passing
 18 more information in order to be able to better sort of
 19 form that response.
 20 Q. And full situational awareness required you to, as you
 21 understood it at that stage, go into the City Room?
 22 A. I certainly felt that was the case, yes.
 23 Q. And when you went into the City Room, was it to obtain
 24 further information, to treat any casualties who might
 25 be there, or a combination of the two or something else?

1 A. It was to... It wasn't to treat casualties because that
 2 wouldn't have been appropriate at that stage based on my
 3 role, but it was to gain situational awareness in order
 4 to be able to pass that information back and then to
 5 potentially then take one of the strategic roles, ie
 6 operational commander, until I was relieved of that
 7 role.
 8 Q. So you'll appreciate the answer you've given will be one
 9 that others would expect me to press you upon. Why at
 10 that stage would it have been, to use your word,
 11 inappropriate to treat casualties?
 12 A. Because to be distracted, for want of a better word, by
 13 individual patient care at that time would have been to
 14 the detriment of the overall management of the greater
 15 number of casualties, but also of the overall management
 16 of the major incident. So to be able to take on the
 17 operational command role, it is necessary to be removed
 18 from scene and necessary to not treat casualties at that
 19 stage.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's part of your training?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 MR GREANEY: We are jumping ahead just a little bit, but
 23 it's important to do so just to give context. You do
 24 then enter the City Room, as we know, and then this is
 25 entry 12 on our schedule, sir.

1 At 22.54, you then pass another message, do you not,
 2 to control? This is entry 12 on the schedule. We'll
 3 play this when we come back and ascertain where you were
 4 at this time when we come back. But this is at a point
 5 at which you had been into the City Room and made an
 6 assessment; is that correct?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. You say:
 9 "This is confirmed major incident."
 10 Do you not?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. "We've got at least 40 casualties."
 13 I began to ask you about one aspect of your entry
 14 into the City Room prior to the chairman's helpful
 15 intervention, which related to the fact that you told us
 16 earlier that you'd had training in hot, warm and cold
 17 zones. You're nodding your head.
 18 A. Sorry, yes.
 19 Q. At the time at which you went into the City Room, had
 20 anyone said anything to you about zones in relation to
 21 this incident?
 22 A. No, not that I recall, no.
 23 Q. Did you have any thought yourself about what type of
 24 zone you were entering when you walked into the
 25 City Room?

1 A. No, not at that stage.
 2 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm almost at the end of my questioning of
 3 Mr Ennis. I'm entirely in your hands, and indeed his,
 4 as to whether I complete my questioning in about
 5 10 minutes — and the shorthand writers as well — or
 6 whether we break now and I conclude after lunch.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you happy to go for another
 8 10 minutes and then we'll have lunch?
 9 A. Of course, yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It probably makes more logical sense.
 11 MR GREANEY: I hope that I have been disciplined, at least
 12 relatively so, in stopping your evidence at the doors to
 13 the City Room, save where necessary to go further to
 14 provide context.
 15 Finally, I just want to ask you a series of general
 16 points relating to some things that you've said in the
 17 past.
 18 To the BBC you said that you were not prepared for
 19 the scale of the incident that unfolded. Obviously,
 20 this is something you were saying following the attack.
 21 What did you mean by that?
 22 A. I think what I meant by that was not that I didn't have
 23 the training to deal with that, although as I've said,
 24 I don't think any level of training could truly prepare
 25 you for that, but just that the information I had been

1 given hadn't prepared me for the scale of the incident.
 2 So until I saw it for myself, saw the City Room,
 3 I hadn't realised just the scale of the incident. So
 4 nothing that anybody had said to me before that had
 5 really prepared me for what a large scale and awful
 6 incident it was.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking at what you did know, you
 8 knew there had been a bomb. By the time you got there,
 9 you saw a lot of people around. Did you understand that
 10 this had happened at a concert or as the concert was
 11 coming out?
 12 A. Yes, just the crowds afterwards, the direction they were
 13 moving from, did suggest that it was a concert.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So a bomb had gone off when
 15 a lot of people had been leaving a concert. I just
 16 wonder why you were not prepared — obviously it was
 17 a horrific scene, I'm not minimising that at all, but
 18 I just wonder why you hadn't at least considered that
 19 would be a possibility? Or was it just so horrific you
 20 just couldn't contemplate it?
 21 A. I think whilst I'd considered that there could be from
 22 the information the police had said and from what I'd
 23 seen so far that there could be a large number of more
 24 injured people, I think until I saw it, I hadn't been
 25 able to really visualise it. And then I think

1 without... It's difficult to say. One of the things
 2 that became very apparent on entry to the City Room,
 3 which I hadn't been --
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Don't say anything which you think is
 5 going to cause great upset to people about what was in
 6 the City Room.
 7 A. I wasn't going to go into any specifics, but if it's
 8 okay to say ...
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The nature of the injuries you saw?
 10 A. No, it was more the age of those that were injured that
 11 I hadn't prepared myself for.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 13 MR GREANEY: The final topic that I want to, at least
 14 I think so, relates to a debrief that was undertaken by
 15 the North West Ambulance Service. Do you recall that in
 16 June 2017 you took part in such a debrief at the Etihad
 17 Stadium?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. I'm going to ask that we put on the screen a document
 20 which I think is in your handwriting, but you'll tell me
 21 if I've got that right. {INQ022370/1}. Don't put it on
 22 the screen yet, Mr Lopez, because it's just a particular
 23 page of this: {INQ022370/41} first and then
 24 {INQ022370/42}.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's 15 June on the top.

101

1 MR GREANEY: I'm just going to get Mr Lopez to let us see
 2 the top. You're right, sir. Good spot:
 3 "North West Ambulance Service. Venue Etihad
 4 Stadium, Manchester, 15 June. Debrief: Manchester Arena
 5 incident, 22 May.
 6 "The aim of the structured debrief is to provide
 7 NWAS with a means by which it can review the response to
 8 enable areas of improvement and good practice to be
 9 highlighted to enhance any future response to this type
 10 of event."
 11 Question 1:
 12 "Thinking of how well prepared you were for this
 13 incident, using CSCATT..."
 14 What is that, please?
 15 A. It's a mnemonic that is designed to provide a structure
 16 for your initial actions at a major incident. So it
 17 starts with command and control, then safety, and
 18 communication, then assessment, followed by triage, then
 19 treatment, then transport.
 20 Q. "... using CSCATT as a framework, discuss on your tables
 21 and record on the document provided how well prepared
 22 you, your team and/or department were, aligned to your
 23 role, eg command, operational, control and support."
 24 Have I correctly understood that at the Etihad there
 25 were a number of those who had responded on the night

102

1 from NWAS?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. You were on tables?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. You discussed the issue that I have just identified?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. And then you completed a form?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Is this form in your handwriting?
 10 A. It is, yes. I apologise, it's terrible handwriting.
 11 Q. No, it's not good handwriting, but I think we can just
 12 about read it:
 13 "Role: operational, first responder/triage."
 14 What did you mean by that?
 15 A. That there were members of staff who were based in the
 16 emergency operations centre and who were more strategic.
 17 So first of all explaining that my role was one of the
 18 operational roles that night and that my -- to sort of
 19 categorise my role it was either as first responder
 20 and/or triage.
 21 Q. And then we have a series of boxes arranged in
 22 accordance with the mnemonic that you have explained to
 23 us. First of all, command and control. Does that read:
 24 "Previous attendance at interim Bronze commander,
 25 JESIP and MTFA courses"?

103

1 A. Yes, it does.
 2 Q. Then it says this, I think:
 3 "Limited knowledge of major incident operational
 4 command role."
 5 A. Yes, that's true.
 6 Q. What did you mean by that?
 7 A. I just meant that within my role I had had very limited
 8 previous experience of any kind of operational command
 9 role at a major incident.
 10 Q. Did that hamper you in any way on the night of the 22nd?
 11 A. No, I don't believe it did.
 12 Q. Safety. To whose safety is that a reference as you
 13 understood it?
 14 A. I'm not sure it's clear, but I think it's probably
 15 in relation to my understanding of safety as it ...
 16 Well, I don't think it's very clear, but I think
 17 I interpret that as how well I was aware of the overall
 18 safety management of that incident, potentially for
 19 colleagues and co-responders.
 20 Q. And that most certainly is an issue we are going to come
 21 to when you return because I know that was a prominent
 22 thought that you were having.
 23 Does that read:
 24 "Good knowledge of dynamic risk assessment when
 25 arriving at smaller-scale clinical incidents."

104

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. "On reflection, limited evidence of safety in terms of
 3 large—scale incident with potential ongoing risk."
 4 What did you mean by that?
 5 A. I think I just meant that I'd never been in a position
 6 of having to dynamically risk assess something of the
 7 scale of this incident.
 8 Q. Communication we'll come back to when you return.
 9 Assessment:
 10 "Lack of overall knowledge of major incident
 11 assessment and classification."
 12 Was that a description of yourself or a general
 13 description?
 14 A. I think this was... I was quite self—critical at the
 15 time and felt that by not being more aware from the
 16 outset that this was a major incident and being keen to
 17 gather more information before making the decision,
 18 potentially this could have delayed things. I have
 19 since been made aware that it didn't delay any
 20 treatment, but that was certainly the way that I... It
 21 was certainly one of the things that I was worrying
 22 about at the time.
 23 Q. I understood that you were being self—critical. Now
 24 that you look back, do you think it is still accurate to
 25 say that you had a lack of overall knowledge of major

1 incident assessment and classification?
 2 A. No, I don't think so, but I think one of the things
 3 that's very much assumed is that it's very clear on
 4 arrival at a major incident that it is a major incident.
 5 I think things are not necessarily quite as obvious in
 6 reality, particularly with an incident such as this.
 7 Q. Then Mr Lopez, can we go to {INQ022370/42}, the next
 8 page, please.
 9 Resources we'll deal with when you return.
 10 Triage, a word I sometimes have difficulties with.
 11 It reads:
 12 "Good knowledge of major trauma primary triage
 13 process. Limited knowledge about practical use of
 14 cruciform cards and triage sought."
 15 What were you describing in that second sentence,
 16 please?
 17 A. The second sentence, I'm describing the fact that
 18 although I was very aware of cruciform cards and what
 19 they were and how they worked, actually the practical
 20 application of that — so in my personal use but also
 21 throughout the incident was that it was difficult. So
 22 for instance, the folding of the cards and being able to
 23 replace them back in the plastic wallet was sometimes
 24 more difficult than you might imagine.
 25 Some people were used, this is not myself, on where

1 on a person they should be attached because it comes
 2 with an elastic band designed to go round the wrist.
 3 When patients were covered in blankets to keep them
 4 warm, it hid the tag, so it was difficult to use. So
 5 there were quite a few learning points generally that
 6 came out of the use of these because these were
 7 something which had been very much used in theory
 8 usually and hadn't actually been practically used.
 9 MR GREANEY: That's something we can ask you more about when
 10 you return to deal with events in the City Room.
 11 Mr Ennis, subject to anything else that I think of
 12 during the course of lunch, those are my questions.
 13 Could I indicate the order in which I propose to
 14 invite questions when we return, sir? If anyone doesn't
 15 have questions, could they communicate with me over
 16 lunch, please? First of all I will invite Mr Warnock to
 17 ask his questions, if any, on behalf of GMFRS. Then
 18 Mr Smith on behalf of North West Fire Control.
 19 Mr Davies who represents Inspector Sexton, the police
 20 FDO, has indicated that he may have some questions, so
 21 we'll call upon him after Mr Smith. Then Mr Horwell
 22 will ask his questions on behalf of Greater Manchester
 23 Police, of course, and then Mr Welch on behalf of the
 24 bereaved families and, finally, subject to any more
 25 questions we have, Ms Roberts on behalf of NWAS.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll break for an hour: 2.10.
 2 Thank you.
 3 (1.11 pm)
 4 (The lunch adjournment)
 5 (2.10 pm)
 6 MR GREANEY: Sir, can I say that I'm very grateful to all of
 7 the advocates who have been in contact with me and/or
 8 Mr Suter over the course of lunch. We can go
 9 straightaway to the questions that Mr Welch has on
 10 behalf of the bereaved families.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 Questions from MR WELCH
 13 MR WELCH: Thank you, sir. Can you hear me?
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can see and hear you now, Mr Welch.
 15 MR WELCH: Mr Ennis, my name is Austin Welch. I ask
 16 questions on behalf of some of the bereaved families.
 17 There are a few topics I want to ask about and the first
 18 is training, if I may. There are three elements to this
 19 that I would like to ask you about. The first is
 20 in relation to your JESIP training, please, and the
 21 mandatory training in 2016.
 22 That was a one—day training session, wasn't it?
 23 A. Yes. The JESIP training was multi—agency training and,
 24 as I understand it, it was shortly after the roll—out of
 25 JESIP that all senior paramedics, which was my role

1 at the time, and levels above, along with equivalents
 2 from the Fire Service and police, would receive this
 3 training. It was at one of the police headquarters in
 4 North Manchester, along with members of the police,
 5 Greater Manchester Police, and Greater Manchester Fire
 6 and Rescue Service.
 7 Q. On that day in October 2016, on the document that
 8 Mr Greaney brought up, was that when you had the JESIP
 9 training?
 10 A. I don't think it's on any of that training record. The
 11 training records which pertain specifically to major
 12 incident training, I believe, are held by the NWS
 13 resilience department. I don't think we've seen those.
 14 It was based on my recollection of when that was likely
 15 to be in 2013 or 2014 because that's when it was. It
 16 was shortly after I started in my role as a senior
 17 paramedic that I received that training.
 18 Q. And how long did that training last for on that
 19 occasion?
 20 A. As I understood it, it was a one-off training, so
 21 I don't think there was a time limit put on it, but it
 22 was something to bring the JESIP principles into our
 23 major incident training and management and also into the
 24 management of various incidents.
 25 Q. So it was a one-day course, half day, how long?

109

1 A. It was a one-day course, yes.
 2 Q. We've seen the record that you received JESIP training,
 3 JESIP awareness, on 31 July 2017, so after the incident.
 4 Can you assist us with why that JESIP awareness as
 5 a specific topic was introduced after the attack at the
 6 Manchester Arena? Do you have any knowledge of that?
 7 A. As I understand it, that forms part of the annual
 8 mandatory training programme. Is that the bit that
 9 you're referring to?
 10 Q. Yes, it is.
 11 A. As part of that -- sorry.
 12 Q. Sorry, I interrupted you. It's document {INQ040292/1}
 13 and we can see it's the third entry up from the bottom,
 14 "JESIP awareness".
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's going to come up on the screen so
 16 we can all see it and you can see it as well.
 17 A. Thank you.
 18 MR WELCH: Thank you.
 19 Third up, "JESIP awareness, 31 July". Do you know
 20 if there was any particular reason why, a couple of
 21 months after the attack, there was training specifically
 22 on JESIP awareness?
 23 A. I have not seen this particular format before until the
 24 last couple of days, so what I can assume from the
 25 layout of it is that this is information gained from

110

1 a system called ESR, which is a system that is used
 2 throughout the NHS to register training and it also
 3 manages payslips and various other information. So this
 4 appears to be something that was available to me and
 5 likely to all ambulance staff as of the date 31 July.
 6 It may well have been a reaction to the incident. But
 7 looking at that, it wasn't something that I undertook.
 8 Looking at the end date and completion date on there
 9 it's likely something that would have been available to
 10 me along with a variety of other training modules of
 11 e-learning.
 12 Q. Yes, and in fairness it says "confirmed" and "not
 13 attempted", doesn't it?
 14 A. Mm. Yes.
 15 Q. Second matter in relation to training, if I can. Had
 16 you had any training in relation to the role of
 17 a Bronze commander, operational commander?
 18 A. Yes. So around the same time, and I can't be sure of
 19 when that was, but when I had been a senior paramedic
 20 for a short period of time, so likely around 2013/2014,
 21 I received a one-day training in what was called interim
 22 Bronze commander, and that was for ambulance -- well,
 23 ambulance managers, such as my role at the time, who
 24 weren't necessarily expected to fulfil the role of
 25 Bronze commander but may have to act in that role in the

111

1 initial part of an incident.
 2 Q. Had you had any training in relation to action card 1
 3 then of the major incident plan?
 4 A. That was included, as far as I'm aware, in all of the
 5 major incident training, yes.
 6 Q. The third matter in relation to training is in relation
 7 to the major exercises that were undertaken. Your
 8 evidence this morning was that you hadn't actually
 9 yourself been involved in any of the major incident
 10 exercises, had you?
 11 A. No, I hadn't.
 12 Q. There were three advanced paramedics in
 13 Greater Manchester at this time and you've given the
 14 reasons why you didn't go. Was there any system whereby
 15 information in relation to those exercises and the
 16 learning that was taken from those exercises, the
 17 learning of lessons, was passed on to you and the other
 18 advanced paramedics who didn't attend?
 19 A. Sorry, just to pick up on your point of the three
 20 advanced paramedics, that was three advanced paramedics
 21 for the central Manchester sector. There would be
 22 between ten or 12 advanced paramedics throughout
 23 Greater Manchester.
 24 Q. Thank you.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The question now is: was the learning

112

1 from any of those exercises passed on to you?
 2 A. As far as I'm aware, the learning from any of these
 3 incidents was made available to us. I believe there was
 4 a report from each of these, which was made available to
 5 us through the resilience team, for us to read and
 6 digest.
 7 MR WELCH: Well, had you actually seen --
 8 MR GREANEY: I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm just going to ask
 9 Mr Lopez to take this document off the screen because at
 10 the moment you're in a tiny rectangle.
 11 MR WELCH: Thank you.
 12 Had you seen any of those reports, Mr Ennis?
 13 A. I had seen some of those reports. I can't recall from
 14 memory now which specific ones, but I had seen some of
 15 these, yes.
 16 Q. Was there any discussion with the advanced paramedic who
 17 had attended the exercises as to what went wrong and
 18 what could be achieved in the future and what should
 19 have been -- what could be done better in the future in
 20 light of those exercises?
 21 A. I can't recall specifically any sort of conversation
 22 with any of my colleagues who did attend, I'm afraid.
 23 Q. The next topic I want to ask you about is in relation to
 24 your deployment. In your interview for the
 25 Kerslake Inquiry, you said that you were the only

113

1 advanced paramedic on duty that evening and you also
 2 said:
 3 "There would be normally two of us until midnight
 4 but that evening there was only [you]."
 5 Do you recall saying that?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Could you assist us as to why you were the only advanced
 8 paramedic on duty that night?
 9 A. I can't remember the specific circumstances, but just
 10 that my colleague, who I worked alongside, in that we
 11 worked the same shift pattern, but where one of us was
 12 on a night, the other was on a late shift, that he had
 13 altered his shift slightly in order that he could start
 14 and finish early, which I would imagine would be
 15 in relation to requiring to attend perhaps a meeting
 16 earlier on in the day that meant that he needed to move
 17 his shift forward. This was not an unusual situation.
 18 Q. Because it did lead to the situation where, instead of
 19 there being two of you, there was only you available
 20 at the time the attack took place at the arena, correct?
 21 A. Yes, this is correct.
 22 Q. One of the other things you said shortly after, during
 23 the course of your interview with Kerslake, was that:
 24 "NWAS were a little bit in flux with senior
 25 paramedics. We're about 14 at the moment. We should

114

1 have had 24 senior paramedic team leaders, we've got
 2 about 14".
 3 That interview took place in October. Was that the
 4 same issue in May of 2017?
 5 A. I can't say specifically, but I would imagine that that
 6 was probably a similar picture in May, yes.
 7 Q. Could you assist us as to what you meant by "NWAS were
 8 a little bit in flux with senior paramedics"?
 9 A. There'd been quite a lot of changes in the role, so the
 10 number of senior paramedics around that time, as
 11 I recall, had expanded, as in the number of roles, they
 12 created extra roles, but it took some time to fill those
 13 roles with paramedics who were being promoted.
 14 Q. And that led to a situation -- sorry?
 15 A. I was going to say, as well as that, presumably some
 16 people changed roles, left their role and moved on to
 17 other roles as well potentially around that time.
 18 Q. Do you have any idea, and can you assist us, as to how
 19 many senior paramedics there were on duty that evening?
 20 If you can't, please say. The evening of the attack.
 21 A. I'm afraid, no, sorry.
 22 Q. When you were at the station, we've heard some evidence
 23 about the messages that came through. Can I just be
 24 clear as to what it was you actually saw? Your evidence
 25 was that:

115

1 "The message said bomb or explosion."
 2 Is it that the message said bomb, or it said
 3 explosion, or did it say literally "bomb or explosion"?
 4 A. The card that the call-takers on receiving the 999 call
 5 clicked on which best fit the information they were
 6 being given, was that this was a bomb or explosion. So
 7 the card, the 07 card, which is for a bomb or explosion,
 8 says "bomb/explosion". So that was why the information
 9 was populated in that way.
 10 Q. Thank you. You've given some evidence about the
 11 different colours in relation to different categories
 12 and I don't want to ask you too much about that. But
 13 what I would like to ask you about is the pager message
 14 you received. You said that you received communication
 15 from a pager. Who had sent you that message on the
 16 pager?
 17 A. The pager is linked directly to the control system, so
 18 it automatically sends a pager message when certain 999
 19 calls are taken, one of which would be any 07 call or
 20 any bomb or explosion. That comes directly through to
 21 the pager.
 22 Q. Thank you. In relation to the actual messages relating
 23 to the arena, is it fair to say that it was the number
 24 of messages as opposed to the colour coding that caught
 25 your attention?

116

1 A. Yes, it wasn't the colour coding because the amber
 2 wasn't in itself any marker of severity, although it
 3 wasn't also an indication that it wouldn't be a serious
 4 incident, but the number was one of the factors. When
 5 it got to, I think, six 999 calls, that suggested to me
 6 that this was a serious incident, yes. I'm not
 7 suggesting that I waited for six 999 calls, but the fact
 8 that they appeared in rapid succession and I was aware
 9 of six meant that this potentially was very serious.

10 Q. The method by which it's the number of calls is far from
 11 perfect, isn't it, Mr Ennis? And I say that because,
 12 again, in your interview with Kerslake, you said that
 13 you could have six if there was a road traffic collision
 14 on the M60.

15 A. It's purely down to how many members of the public
 16 decide to ring for an incident. So a small-scale
 17 medical incident, it would be very unlikely to receive
 18 multiple calls for because it's likely that people who
 19 are on scene would be aware of somebody else calling
 20 999. So the fact that there were six 999 calls would
 21 suggest that this was an incident of a reasonable scale
 22 that meant that at least six people had decided to call
 23 999. But the example that I used there of a road
 24 traffic collision, it's not unusual if there was a road
 25 traffic collision on, for instance, a motorway, for

1 several people passing in the opposite direction to call
 2 999 at the same time, being unaware that anybody else
 3 had already called. The system is purely based on how
 4 many people ring 999.

5 Q. This system really doesn't tell you much at all as to
 6 the severity of an incident and can be misleading, can't
 7 it?

8 A. The information that I have sort of alluded to so far is
 9 based on the fact that this was only in the first few
 10 minutes after the incident. So had I waited for
 11 a period of time, there would have been much more
 12 information available within each of those 999 calls in
 13 order to make more -- there is a section that records
 14 all of the information in there that the call-taker who
 15 is on the phone to the member of the public ringing
 16 999 -- everything that they record, so all of the
 17 pertinent information that they type. However, at the
 18 time that I looked at the 999 call, that wasn't yet
 19 populated, so likely there would have been more
 20 information had I waited. Does that make sense?

21 Q. It does, thank you, Mr Ennis. On the basis of that
 22 information, you did deploy. Can I ask you this: was
 23 there anyone else within the office at that time?

24 A. No. The advanced paramedics for central Manchester and
 25 the operations managers share an office. One of my

1 colleagues, who's the operations manager, had been
 2 sharing the office with me until probably 45 minutes
 3 earlier, but he had been tasked to one of the local
 4 hospitals to deal with some delays with ambulances
 5 offloading patients there and he did later, from that
 6 hospital, attend the scene. But at that time I don't
 7 recall seeing anybody else. There wasn't anybody else
 8 in the office. I don't recall anybody else in the
 9 ambulance station at all.

10 Q. Do you think if you'd had any further information it
 11 might have influenced what equipment you took with you?

12 A. Potentially if I knew that there was a likelihood that
 13 I would need to undertake an operational command role or
 14 indeed a triage role, then the operational commander,
 15 the pack, the kit, including the cruciform cards,
 16 probably would have been something I would have chosen.
 17 As I said, my intention was to take the immediately
 18 important, or what seemed to be immediately important,
 19 equipment and return to pick up anything else that was
 20 required, dependent on what the incident turned out to
 21 be.

22 Q. Forgive me, Mr Ennis, it's my fault. I'm talking about
 23 when you first are leaving the office. Had you had
 24 a bit more information in relation to what was happening
 25 at that time, might that have influenced you in terms of

1 what you decided to take with you or not?

2 A. Apologies.

3 Q. My fault, it's not yours.

4 A. I don't think it would have... It's difficult to...
 5 I think if there'd been information of, say, the number
 6 of casualties, if I'd been aware of that before leaving
 7 the office, or indeed at any point before arriving on
 8 scene, that may have slightly altered my equipment
 9 choices on leaving the car, potentially.

10 Q. We'll come to that. In terms of when you do leave the
 11 office and get into your car and go to the arena,
 12 you have the information it's an explosion or bomb in
 13 what is a well-known public entertainment location, the
 14 Manchester Arena, and you were well aware of what kind
 15 of events went on at the arena, weren't you?

16 A. I was aware that there were large, yes, concerts
 17 involving lots of people, yes.

18 Q. If it was right, and there was no reason to doubt that
 19 it wasn't right then, that there was a bomb or explosion
 20 at this large concert venue, there was a very real
 21 possibility, wasn't there, even at that stage, that this
 22 could become a major incident?

23 A. There was. I think it's possibly important to clarify
 24 that the location of the Manchester Arena is very much
 25 a generic one, potentially, within the control system.

1 So that doesn't necessarily indicate that it was, say,
 2 within the concert arena itself or indeed any particular
 3 specific part. It's very much sort of local knowledge
 4 to be able to know where the access to the arena is and
 5 it isn't necessarily exact. So although the fact that
 6 it was in relation to the arena suggests that there
 7 potentially could be a lot of people, it didn't
 8 immediately follow that that gave any specific idea of
 9 how many or exactly whereabouts that would be
 10 in relation to the crowds of people that could
 11 potentially be there.
 12 Q. No, of course, you have limited information at that
 13 time. But just applying the very limited information
 14 that you had then, a concert venue, information of
 15 a bomb, it's quite obvious, wasn't it, that there was
 16 a very real potential that this could become a major
 17 incident?
 18 A. Yes, it was, and that was why I made the decision to
 19 self-deploy without any further information and also why
 20 I had the conversation that I did with the trauma cell,
 21 with my advanced paramedic colleague there, talking
 22 about alerting Silver and setting up major incident
 23 command. So yes, that was very much a possibility right
 24 from the beginning, from the information I had.
 25 Q. Whilst you were driving from the office to the arena, on

121

1 the information that you had, did it cross your mind
 2 that this might be a terrorist attack?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. The inquiry, during the course of chapter 7, heard a lot
 5 of information about the fact that the terrorist threat
 6 level was severe, meaning that an attack was highly
 7 likely. Did you know that at the time?
 8 A. I honestly can't recall if I was aware of that at the
 9 time, apart from what would have been in the news or...
 10 I can't say that I was aware.
 11 Q. So are we to take it from that answer that there had
 12 been no information provided throughout NWAS in relation
 13 to the terrorist threat level and the possibility of
 14 a terrorist attack being severe?
 15 A. I certainly don't recall that, no.
 16 Q. Whilst you were driving to the arena, being aware that
 17 this has the potential to become a major incident, were
 18 you giving consideration as to what your role could be
 19 as what may well be the first responder, the first
 20 ambulance?
 21 A. I was aware that the most important thing in an incident
 22 like this is to gather information and pass that on, so
 23 to gain that situational awareness from the scene in
 24 order that we can formulate the correct response. So
 25 that was my primary aim with the possibility of taking

122

1 on the operational command role if required, if this did
 2 turn out to be a major incident.
 3 Q. As an advanced paramedic, and given what you said about
 4 your role and deployment, it's quite possible, isn't it,
 5 if not likely, that you will be the first on scene at
 6 a major incident?
 7 A. Sorry, are you saying just generally within my role?
 8 Q. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The first person from NWAS to get there,
 10 you could well be that person; is that right?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 MR WELCH: And if that's a major incident and you're the
 13 first person to get there, you will become the
 14 Bronze commander until relieved, won't you?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Just for confirmation of that, I'm sure you have seen
 17 it, could we have {INQ013163/1} on screen, please,
 18 Mr Lopez.
 19 {INQ013163/8}, please -- sorry, my apologies, it's
 20 {INQ013163/18}, "Overall management":
 21 "If you are the first on scene, you are the
 22 ambulance Bronze commander until relieved. Consider and
 23 follow these principles: CSATTT."
 24 You were well aware of that at the time, weren't
 25 you, Mr Ennis?

123

1 A. I was, yes.
 2 Q. Just so we're clear, that is the major incident pocket
 3 guide. Were you familiar with that as well at the time?
 4 A. I was. I had that in my pocket at the time.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mean you always have it or you
 6 picked it up especially?
 7 A. No, I always have it in the pocket of my high-visibility
 8 jacket.
 9 MR WELCH: Being conscious of that principle and conscious
 10 that you may well be the first on scene, were you
 11 preparing yourself mentally while driving as to what you
 12 would need to do in terms of organisation, coordination,
 13 and following the JESIP principles?
 14 A. I was mentally preparing myself. I wasn't obviously
 15 able to look through this particular book whilst driving
 16 and remind myself of the principles. But the general
 17 principles were something that I thought about en route,
 18 yes.
 19 Q. As part of that, may I just ask Mr Lopez, please, to
 20 bring up {INQ013422/2}.
 21 This is action card 1 from the major incident
 22 response plan for NWAS. This sets out, effectively,
 23 what happens with the first person to respond. They
 24 become the Bronze commander. You were familiar with
 25 this, I take it, at the time, Mr Ennis?

124

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. So just running through it, and I'm going to do it as
 3 briefly as I can at this time, but will return to it if
 4 I can. Box 3 in red type:
 5 "Stay focused on your role. Do not attempt rescue
 6 or treatment of casualties."
 7 Box 4:
 8 "Senior crew member to take on the role of acting
 9 operational commander."
 10 Of course you were the only person being deployed
 11 then, so it's not a case of the senior crew member, it
 12 was you that was going to do that, wasn't it? And we
 13 see at (a):
 14 "Liaise with police and Fire and Rescue Services and
 15 establish, if possible, the nature of the incident and
 16 possible hazards."
 17 Then at (b):
 18 "METHANE."
 19 If we go over the page, quickly, please, to
 20 {INQ013422/3}. At (c):
 21 "Ascertain the requirement for specialist teams, eg
 22 SORT, MERIT, HART, BASICS..."
 23 Then 5:
 24 "In liaison with the other emergency services,
 25 initially identify ..."

125

1 A number of different matters. There's a lot to
 2 take on board, of course, and you're not going to be
 3 going through that as you're driving, but would it be
 4 fair to say that whilst you're driving you were
 5 thinking, "I need to be disciplined here, I'm going to
 6 have to think what I'm doing and liaise with the other
 7 emergency services straightaway"? Is that what you were
 8 thinking on the way?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I go back to the page before?
 11 {INQ013422/2}.
 12 We know, Mr Welch has just told us, that this comes
 13 from the major incident pocket guidebook.
 14 MR WELCH: No, sir, I'm sorry to interrupt, it is action
 15 card 1.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Does this relate to any incident of any
 17 kind or does it only relate to what either is or may be
 18 a major incident?
 19 A. Yes, it's in relation to a major incident.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you follow that, does it have to
 21 have been declared a major incident, so do you have to
 22 make your mind up first before you follow all those
 23 actions, or do you assume it is one?
 24 A. Whilst some of the principles of being an operational
 25 commander could apply to a critical rather than major

126

1 incident, this particular action card and the subsequent
 2 ones are assuming that this is a major incident.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So do you make that assumption on your
 4 way there or when you first arrived or do you not really
 5 follow it until you have decided it is a major incident?
 6 A. I think that's the assumption with this card, that you
 7 arrive at what is obvious as -- that it is a major
 8 incident. Whereas what I found was that it wasn't
 9 immediately apparent to me that this was -- although it
 10 was very apparent right from the offset that this could
 11 be a major incident, actually what I needed to do was to
 12 ascertain whether or not this was and to gain some of
 13 the information which the action card suggests is
 14 required in the early parts.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So did you actually follow what's on the
 16 action card?
 17 A. I didn't utilise the card specifically in the sense of
 18 removing it from my pocket to check I'd been through
 19 everything. But what I did was to try and establish
 20 whether or not this was a major incident or not, to
 21 gather the information that I could from those on scene,
 22 and gain that situational awareness and then pass back
 23 what was as much of a METHANE report as I was able to
 24 deliver at that time. So as far as I am aware,
 25 I followed as many of the principles of the first on

127

1 scene card as I was able.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Welch, I'm sorry to have taken it
 3 like that, but it was a matter I was concerned about.
 4 Do you want us to go back to page 3 now?
 5 MR WELCH: Sir, I have finished with page 3 now, thank you.
 6 This can be taken down for the time being; I may return
 7 to it later in my questions.
 8 Mr Ennis, when you arrived there, you'd been
 9 following a police car, hadn't you, down Deansgate,
 10 I believe?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You knew, because you're from Manchester, the
 13 basic layout of the arena, didn't you?
 14 A. Yes, I did.
 15 Q. But how did you know where to go in relation to this
 16 explosion/bomb at the arena? Was it simply through
 17 following the police car?
 18 A. No, my knowledge of the area was that the best access to
 19 the Manchester Arena was going to be via
 20 Victoria Station. It would either be by travelling down
 21 Victoria Station Approach or Hunts Bank, but either way,
 22 at the point those two roads meet, the station entrance
 23 there, that was my intended destination regardless of
 24 the police car.
 25 Q. I'm not being in any way critical here, it's just trying

128

1 to understand what information you had and what
 2 knowledge you had because there was no NWSA
 3 site-specific plan in relation to the arena. The
 4 chairman may hear that. Were you aware of that?
 5 A. I wasn't aware that there wasn't a specific plan. My
 6 recollection is that from previous incidents at both
 7 Victoria Station and in or around the foyer and the
 8 office building next to that, the location that the
 9 control centre usually gave was the Victoria Station
 10 Approach/Hunts Bank junction. I can't recall on this
 11 occasion whether that was the specific location that was
 12 given because I used local knowledge to make sure I was
 13 going to where I felt would be the best access and also
 14 followed the police car so that I was arriving at or
 15 with the police.
 16 Q. Did you have any knowledge in relation to -- I don't
 17 want to just go over the questions that Mr Greaney
 18 asked, but in relation to Emergency Training, for
 19 example, who were the organisation that provided
 20 first aid within the arena, did you know of their
 21 existence even?
 22 A. No. I can't recall having specifically ... I'm just
 23 trying to remember some of the incidents that I had
 24 previously been to around that area. The times where
 25 I'd responded within Victoria Station or to the

129

1 City Room or around were occasions where there weren't
 2 concerts on. I had previously attended to patients that
 3 had become unwell at concerts, but that tended to be
 4 a different access, off Deansgate, near Trinity Way, and
 5 at that point I would have no doubt come into contact
 6 with some of their medical teams, but I couldn't recall
 7 specifically who was providing that and whether that was
 8 a consistent thing at all concerts or whether it
 9 changed. I have not had any direct dealings with them
 10 that I recall.
 11 Q. Did you know which police force had primacy for the
 12 arena?
 13 A. Having attended incidents at Victoria Station and also
 14 the other Manchester stations before, I was aware that
 15 there would be British Transport Police as well as
 16 Greater Manchester Police. I couldn't have said who
 17 would have primacy, but I would have assumed that
 18 it would be the British Transport Police because that
 19 was on their area.
 20 Q. When you parked up, you took the basic response bag, and
 21 I'm not going to ask you many questions at all on that,
 22 save for this: at that time, looking back in hindsight,
 23 do you think it would have been appropriate to contact
 24 the control room EOC to try and get an update from them
 25 as to what they knew that could have informed your

130

1 choice as to which of the bags to take?
 2 A. Potentially. What I didn't want to do after I'd arrived
 3 on scene was cause any delay. Usual practice in any
 4 incident that I was attending is that the control centre
 5 would endeavour to get more information to me before
 6 I arrived on scene. I would say it was highly unusual
 7 for me to arrive on scene at an incident of any level of
 8 severity without being given more information. The fact
 9 that they had not passed that suggested to me that they
 10 were busy or perhaps did not have that information,
 11 which was why I felt that rather than potentially delay
 12 my exit from the vehicle in order to get more
 13 information from them, I'd be better placed trying to
 14 get that information from scene and pass that back to
 15 them.
 16 Q. Looking back now, do you think that you were provided
 17 with not enough information, a paucity of information,
 18 from the control room by the time you got there and
 19 parked up? Do you think you should have had more?
 20 A. As I say, usual practice would have been to have been
 21 given more information. I appreciate that they were
 22 extremely busy there and, whilst I was en route to that
 23 incident, they were trying to get multiple ambulances to
 24 try and respond to the incident. So I don't think
 25 I have any criticism of them for not being able to

131

1 provide that information or any more information,
 2 although it would have been useful, sure.
 3 Q. When you got out of the car, at that time did you think
 4 you were the first resource on scene?
 5 A. I assumed I was the first ambulance resource on scene,
 6 yes.
 7 Q. You then proceed up towards Victoria Station, having
 8 parked up, and as you were going up Victoria Station,
 9 you are developing your own situational awareness,
 10 aren't you?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You're talking to a number of people who are coming away
 13 from the station and a number of police officers as
 14 well, aren't you?
 15 A. Before I reached the station, I recall speaking to two
 16 police officers with two small groups of injured people,
 17 yes.
 18 Q. And it was that that enabled you to make the
 19 communication to the control centre, saying, "Major
 20 incident standby", on the basis that you had seen six to
 21 eight walking wounded and there was also information
 22 in relation to it by that time being a nail bomb, wasn't
 23 there?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. You get to the station at about 22.50.22 and provide

132

1 another situation report. By that time it says:
 2 "Detonation of an actual bomb within the arena
 3 itself. Three confirmed fatalities on scene."
 4 That's the information you passed to the control
 5 centre?
 6 A. Is that?
 7 Q. {INQ015047T/1}. That's the transcript:
 8 "We've had reports of a nail bomb, possibly with
 9 shooting. All appear to be walking wounded."
 10 That's the major incident standby at 22.46. You
 11 recall that, don't you?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Then if we move on to -- if we can take that down and
 14 bring up {INQ032872T/1}. This is the further update
 15 from you:
 16 "... actual (sic) this is a bomb detonated within
 17 the MEN itself. We've apparently got confirmed three
 18 fatalities on scene. I've not been able to make my way
 19 to them yet."
 20 This is whilst you were outside the war memorial
 21 within Victoria Station. You are there with a number of
 22 police officers. Given that you have information that
 23 there are three fatalities, that there are six to eight
 24 people you yourself had seen that are walking wounded,
 25 and also that this is a nail bomb and there's also

1 information in relation to a potential shooter, it would
 2 have been open to you at this time, would it not, to
 3 declare a major incident?
 4 A. Yes, I think that's a fair assumption. I hadn't
 5 recalled this particular telephone or radio
 6 communication at that time. My recollection was of the
 7 next communication being from within the City Room.
 8 I've obviously passed further information that I have
 9 received from the police officers that I met. Whilst
 10 it would seem appropriate to at this point -- clearly
 11 the incident has met the threshold for declaring a major
 12 incident. As I'd said, the impetus or my intention
 13 at the time was to gather more information in order to
 14 be able to fully populate the METHANE report that was
 15 required. And my initial major incident standby
 16 wouldn't have delayed any actions from the control
 17 centre.
 18 So whilst this would have been an appropriate time
 19 to declare the major incident, I don't believe that this
 20 delayed any actions on the part of the
 21 Ambulance Service.
 22 Q. I just want to --
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It sounds like you haven't been shown
 24 this document in preparing yourself for --
 25 A. I think it is in my --

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 2 A. Some of it was slightly out of order, so I'd perhaps
 3 thought I was further into the incident before passing
 4 that than I was.
 5 MR GREANEY: Sir, this was the recording that I tried to
 6 find earlier today but failed to do so. In fact, we do
 7 know when in the chronology this call was made, not just
 8 by reference to time, but by reference to events. I'm
 9 sorry to interrupt, Mr Welch, I hope I'm not diverting
 10 you from your course. We looked at a page from the
 11 sequence of events, it was {INQ035612/132}, it was timed
 12 at 22.50.22, and we see, as you may recall, sir,
 13 Mr Ennis just walking into the station by the war
 14 memorial entrance and he's on his radio at the time. So
 15 this is when he has just left the officers.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you very much.
 17 MR WELCH: To be fair to you, Mr Ennis, you seem to be
 18 accepting that it would have been appropriate to declare
 19 a major incident here and I think it's only right that
 20 now we refer to the definition of a major incident to
 21 confirm that being correct.
 22 Could I ask Mr Lopez to put on screen {INQ013163/6}.
 23 This again is from the major incident pocket book. You
 24 can read it there:
 25 "Any occurrence that presents serious threat to the

1 health of the community or causes (or is likely to
 2 cause) such numbers or types of casualties as to require
 3 specialist arrangements to be implemented."
 4 And of course, as you'll be aware, underlined:
 5 "Remember: if in doubt, declare a major incident."
 6 What's important, isn't it, is that there's no set
 7 number of casualties that is required for a major
 8 incident, is there?
 9 A. No, no, there isn't.
 10 Q. And you yourself do not need to see, do you -- for there
 11 to be people who will require treatment for there to be
 12 a major incident, you could declare it on the basis of
 13 the information that you have and the information that
 14 you've received?
 15 A. Yes, indeed, and equally it doesn't land entirely on the
 16 ambulance clinicians on scene to declare the major
 17 incident. Equally, I wasn't aware of this, but it was
 18 declared by the Ambulance Service a major incident based
 19 on the information that they had been receiving from
 20 further 999 calls after I had responded. But yes
 21 (overspeaking).
 22 Q. I interrupted, please continue, Mr Ennis.
 23 A. No, it's fine.
 24 Q. Just focusing on what you did and your actions. At
 25 22.50, if you have declared a major incident, and

1 picking up on the point that the chair raised, if you
 2 have -- a major incident is declared, knowing that you
 3 are the first NAWAS resource on scene at that stage,
 4 there's no doubt, is there, at that time, if that had
 5 been done, that you should follow action card 1?
 6 A. I don't know that it's fair to say that there's no
 7 doubt. There's obviously a number of people who were
 8 injured and potentially people who have died. This very
 9 much sounds like a major incident, and I know I keep
 10 going back to the point that the major incident standby
 11 that I passed starts the process of -- puts the process
 12 in place of responding to a major incident, so at some
 13 point this needs to be declared. But as I said, the
 14 fact that this was still -- from my information passed
 15 still a standby didn't or doesn't delay the initial
 16 ambulance actions.
 17 Q. In terms of the actions and your actions at 22.50,
 18 outside the war memorial, if this is declared as a major
 19 incident and if you are therefore fulfilling the role
 20 under action card 1, one of the principal things you're
 21 going to need to do, isn't it, is to liaise with the
 22 other emergency services that are there, which at that
 23 time is BTP?
 24 A. Yes, and I believe GMP officers as well. Now, they made
 25 it abundantly clear that I needed to be up in the

137

1 City Room. I felt very much that I hadn't been given
 2 sufficient information to be able to stand back from the
 3 scene and to manage that without really knowing still
 4 what this incident was, what it entailed. So the JESIP
 5 principles of co-location for one, and then the CSCATTT
 6 mnemonic about command and control and safety were
 7 things that I was considering. But I did need to be
 8 where the police were, which was clearly in the
 9 City Room -- although there were police outside around
 10 the station, they were in the City Room.
 11 Again, the information to populate the METHANE
 12 report does involve having information about the exact
 13 location of the incident, the number of casualties, and
 14 this wasn't information that I had at the time. So it
 15 did feel like --
 16 Q. (Overspeaking). I interrupted you again, Mr Ennis, I'm
 17 very sorry. Carry on.
 18 A. This wasn't information that I had at the time, so it
 19 did feel that I needed to -- in order to follow the
 20 first clinician on scene action cards, I did need to
 21 proceed to the City Room with the police in order to
 22 gain the information that they clearly had.
 23 Q. At the scene, outside the war memorial at 22.50, you're
 24 having officers like PC Barker saying to you, "Every
 25 NAWAS, they want every NAWAS there at the booking office

138

1 which is just upstairs". Obviously you're trying to
 2 develop your understanding of what is happening. But
 3 you could have asked those officers, couldn't you: why
 4 do you need every NAWAS up there, what is it that's going
 5 on in the City Room, how many people are there that are
 6 injured up there?
 7 A. Yes, and as I recall, the first question that I asked of
 8 each of the police officers that I encountered was,
 9 "What's happened?" And none of them, as I recall, was
 10 able to give me much information, which was why my
 11 desire was to -- and equally the police clearly were
 12 wanting this as well -- was for me to enter the
 13 City Room and see what had occurred. Equally -- sorry,
 14 if you want to ask a question.
 15 Q. No, I don't, Mr Ennis, please finish your answer.
 16 A. The other thing as well is that there are other
 17 entrances and exits from the City Room, so there was
 18 a possibility, although Victoria Station appeared to be
 19 most likely the appropriate location, it was entirely
 20 possible that actually if the seat of the incident was
 21 somewhere else, actually there would have been a better
 22 way in. So for instance, there are other ways into the
 23 Manchester Arena, and if the location had been somewhere
 24 else, it may have been necessary to take a different
 25 route than up the stairs and along the link bridge into

139

1 the City Room, for instance. So these are some of the
 2 things that I wanted to clarify in order to -- by seeing
 3 myself before I tried to further populate the METHANE
 4 message for the emergency operations centre.
 5 Q. You said there that you felt that the BTP officers
 6 wanted you up in the City Room to understand what was
 7 going on. One of the entries on the sequence of events
 8 is, I believe, PC Barker saying, "We need to get him up
 9 there", which is you, being the sole NAWAS representative
 10 at the time. Did you feel that what was happening was
 11 that the police wanted to get you up there, not to
 12 assess what was happening but as the first paramedic to
 13 start treating people?
 14 A. I couldn't say what their plan was for me on arrival in
 15 there, but I was very much aware that they felt that
 16 I needed to be up there and, as I say, that was also my
 17 intention. Had they not passed that information on,
 18 I would suggest I would have proceeded up there anyway.
 19 Yes, they certainly impressed upon me that they wanted
 20 me to proceed upstairs, but I don't know what
 21 specifically they had in mind.
 22 Q. Because it was only about a minute that you were outside
 23 the war memorial before starting up the stairs towards
 24 the City Room. Putting it another way, did you feel
 25 that there was pressure being applied to you to go up to

140

1 the City Room and start treating, effectively , as
 2 opposed to taking a step back, trying to assess what
 3 information others had, try and establish command and
 4 start to implement the JESIP principles?
 5 A. I don't know if pressure is the right word. I don't
 6 think that the --- but I do think that the information
 7 that I had and that the other police officers around the
 8 station had was inadequate to be able to at that point
 9 make a decision to stand back from scene. So yes, I did
 10 feel that I needed to proceed upstairs into the
 11 City Room and that was something that the police wanted,
 12 yes.
 13 Q. This period, 22.50, obviously is nearly 20 minutes after
 14 the detonation within the City Room. Did you have any
 15 sense of who was in charge of the police or who was
 16 coordinating matters outside the war memorial, for
 17 example, or generally?
 18 A. I don't recall being aware of anybody, any police
 19 officer , whether BTP or GMP, being in charge until entry
 20 to the City Room.
 21 Q. So nobody outside was coordinating matters before entry
 22 into the City Room; is that fair?
 23 A. Not as I recall , yes.
 24 Q. Just looking at some of the JESIP principles and trying
 25 to apply them as best possible to what was happening

141

1 when you entered Victoria, so at 22.50 in that short
 2 time. Firstly , communication. Was there any
 3 communication in relation to whether BTP had declared
 4 a major incident between you and the other officers?
 5 A. I don't recall being told anything about any other
 6 agency declaring a major incident, no.
 7 Q. So no communication about matters such as
 8 Operation Plato? Were you aware of what Operation Plato
 9 was?
 10 A. No, I wasn't, but I don't recall anybody using that term
 11 that night. I didn't know what it meant at the time.
 12 It was only retrospectively .
 13 Q. No communication about zones, hot zones, warm zones,
 14 cold zones, before you went in?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. And no communication at that time, save for getting you
 17 in there, as to how the emergency services were going to
 18 respond to this incident that had started nearly
 19 20 minutes before?
 20 A. No, apart from that they wanted all available ambulance
 21 services to respond, as you can see in the transcript .
 22 Q. On that point, and I'm sorry to jump around slightly, by
 23 then you had made a request for at least four ambulances
 24 to deal with six to eight walking wounded, hadn't you?
 25 That was the earlier communication?

142

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Given that by 22.50 you are aware that there are at
 3 least three fatalities and, one must have assumed,
 4 potentially more casualties, do you think now in
 5 hindsight, without being critical , it would have been
 6 appropriate during the course of that call at 22.50 to
 7 say, "We're going to need a significant number of more
 8 ambulances than just the four I had previously
 9 requested"?
 10 A. Yes ---
 11 Q. In a similar vein --- sorry, please finish .
 12 A. As I have said, although I had requested a specific
 13 number initially to respond, the fact that this is
 14 a major incident standby does involve the process of
 15 trying to get all available ambulances free and
 16 available to respond.
 17 Q. At that time, though, the request had still remained for
 18 four as opposed to you, given your role, asking for
 19 more?
 20 A. Yes. I think the fact that I've used a specific number
 21 suggests that that was the limited number that
 22 I expected the Ambulance Service to send and that
 23 therefore, had they had a fifth ambulance, they would
 24 assign that to usual business. That's not the case.
 25 That was my initial request for ambulances to assist,

143

1 but based on it being a major incident standby, the
 2 emergency operations centre followed their plan, which
 3 was to try to get all available ambulances available to
 4 respond. So whilst they were trying to get those, I was
 5 obviously trying to get more information. So because
 6 I asked for four ambulances initially , that doesn't mean
 7 that --- less ambulances than were overall required were
 8 looked for. Does that make sense? I know that sounds
 9 confusing.
 10 Q. It makes some. But just taking the sequence of events,
 11 what you actually asked for wasn't four ambulances, you
 12 asked for "at least four ambulances", suggesting that
 13 you might have wanted more to deal with the six to eight
 14 walking wounded. Given that you are the person there
 15 and you were developing situational awareness and have
 16 a greater understanding than anyone else within NWS as
 17 to what's presenting, would it not have been appropriate
 18 to say, "We're going to need far more than four", even
 19 if it's just to avoid any confusion, "We are going to
 20 need a large number of ambulances, as many as you've
 21 got", even? Would that not have been the better route?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. In relation to that time as well , on the information
 24 that you had, do you now, looking back, think it would
 25 have been appropriate to make a request specifically for

144

1 the HART team to attend?
 2 A. Part of the predetermined attendance for a major
 3 incident, so whether that is declared or standby,
 4 is that specialist resources, such as the HART team,
 5 would be tasked to that incident. So I was confident
 6 that in following the major incident plan, the control
 7 centre and the trauma cell would be looking to allocate
 8 a HART team and a MERIT team. That's not to say that
 9 I couldn't have specifically requested it, but that was
 10 happening in the background.
 11 Q. What about SORT, the SORT team?
 12 A. The SORT team are trained for dealing with chemical,
 13 biological, radiological and nuclear type incidents,
 14 where some decontamination is required, which wouldn't
 15 have been appropriate at this incident.
 16 Q. That's part of what they do, but they also provide some
 17 logistical support, don't they?
 18 A. In a similar way to the AIT training, there are a number
 19 of staff who have attended the AIT training, which would
 20 then mean that they are provided with PPE and training
 21 to work within certain zones of an MTFA or marauding
 22 terrorist incident. Equally, there are certain staff of
 23 a variety of grades who are trained as SORT clinicians,
 24 who are trained to wear the PPE required to undertake
 25 decontamination. So the role is quite specific to that

145

1 and wouldn't have been something that was beneficial in
 2 this incident.
 3 Q. Well, again, without meaning to labour a point that
 4 others might address, can we just have {INQ012913/43},
 5 which is the major incident response plan.
 6 If we highlight the middle of the page, we can see
 7 what SORT provide there, and it will be relevant
 8 potentially to what other witnesses have to say. Whilst
 9 you're right, Mr Ennis, the first of those bullet points
 10 does mention the erection and operation of the trust's
 11 decontamination equipment, that's clearly not the only
 12 thing they do, is it? Because, as the chair will see,
 13 the other things that they can contribute, including, it
 14 might be thought relevant, the setting-up and running of
 15 casualty clearing stations. So that's something else
 16 that could have been requested at that time on the
 17 information that you had, wasn't it?
 18 A. It could. As I say, my understanding of the role
 19 is that it's about primarily --
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can we just short circuit this a bit?
 21 Once you have declared a major incident, presumably it
 22 is up to control what resources they send after you have
 23 set out on a METHANE message what's actually going on
 24 and they will send, presumably, the appropriate
 25 resources to deal with it.

146

1 A. Yes, that's correct, unless there were specific
 2 resources that I identified would be beneficial and --
 3 but yes, as part of the predetermined attendance they
 4 would allocate the resources they felt were needed.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it wouldn't have occurred to you to
 6 get the SORT team there, but it may have occurred to
 7 control?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 MR WELCH: Just picking up on one point, sir, and this is
 10 the final matter on that issue, under action card 1,
 11 4(c), one of the roles is to ascertain the requirement
 12 for specialist teams, eg SORT, MERIT, HART, BASICS, and
 13 specialist equipment. So it would have been the role,
 14 wouldn't it, to determine: do we need these specialist
 15 teams and make the request for them?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Can we turn back to the JESIP principles? I realise I'm
 18 going over, so I'm going to try and be as quick as I can
 19 now. Turning to those principles, coordination. When
 20 you arrived, given that there was no one actually in
 21 a command position there, there was no real coordination
 22 that you could see between GMP, BTP and anyone else, was
 23 there?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. Another one of the JESIP principles, joint understanding

147

1 of risk. You were effectively being encouraged to go to
 2 the City Room as quickly as possible. Was there any
 3 real discussion between you and the police officers who
 4 were encouraging you to go there about the potential
 5 risks within the City Room?
 6 A. No, not as I recall.
 7 Q. Also, during that period of time, there was discussion,
 8 wasn't there, about where the ambulances should locate
 9 and you said, "Hunts Bank is the safest". Had there
 10 been any real discussion about any risk of having the
 11 ambulances go there, including secondary devices that
 12 you remember?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Finally in relation to the JESIP principles, shared
 15 situational awareness. You were given some information
 16 from the police and of course it's an extremely
 17 difficult situation, but do you now, without being
 18 critical, but of course it was a very short period of
 19 time, think that it would have been appropriate to try
 20 and develop that situational awareness that they had,
 21 having been there for longer, by asking them questions
 22 about what was happening, what they'd seen and what
 23 their colleagues in the City Room were doing and what
 24 they needed?
 25 A. Potentially. But as I said, my overwhelming -- my

148

1 understanding when I arrived was that there was some
 2 confusion about specifically what had happened and
 3 certainly the scale of it, and without being in any
 4 way... I don't feel that any of the police officers
 5 were able to give me the information I needed. That's
 6 no criticism of them, but I don't think the police
 7 officers that I encountered had the information there
 8 that they could provide. Whilst it might have been
 9 possible to ask more questions of them that they could
 10 have got from their colleagues, I think it was very
 11 clear that they wanted me to see and that that felt like
 12 a more appropriate way of getting the information that
 13 I would need as a paramedic that may potentially be
 14 slightly different to what they would need as a police
 15 officer.
 16 Q. Final question: did you ever explain that that's what
 17 you were going to do when you went up, just to see
 18 what was happening, or was it left that you were just
 19 going up as a paramedic and they may have assumed that
 20 you were going up to treat?
 21 A. I don't believe that I explained what my purpose of
 22 going upstairs was, so they may well have assumed I was
 23 going up to treat, I don't know.
 24 MR WELCH: Mr Ennis, thank you very much. Thank you, sir,
 25 I'm sorry, I went over my allotted time.

149

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 2 Can I just ask you something. We know from
 3 Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service that when
 4 they are deciding whether to send appliances to the
 5 scene, they distinguish between when they are going to
 6 deal with a bomb and when they are going to deal with an
 7 explosion. It appears that the Ambulance Service do not
 8 because you saw, if you remember, you said
 9 "bomb/explosion".
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If what you were attending was an
 12 unexploded bomb, it might be sensible, I don't know,
 13 we'll have to hear the evidence, not to approach too
 14 closely until someone's had a look at it. Do the
 15 Ambulance Service have something like that?
 16 A. I think obviously there's a potential there that this
 17 explosion could have been caused by something like a gas
 18 leak or something that wasn't a deliberate attempt.
 19 I think although... Although the potential for any kind
 20 of secondary explosion --
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not really thinking about that. As
 22 you set off, all you knew was that it was
 23 a bomb/explosion, you didn't know which.
 24 A. No.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it could have been an unexploded

150

1 bomb, could it?
 2 A. It could.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or are they unlikely to get 999 calls?
 4 I don't know.
 5 A. I think you're correct. I think potentially had
 6 somebody, for instance, called 999 to state that there
 7 was an unexploded bomb, that would still come through on
 8 the same card, but obviously the implications for the
 9 number of casualties would be entirely different.
 10 Indeed there may not be any. So I think it wasn't
 11 something that I considered. I think as a paramedic,
 12 probably my mind tended to move towards casualties and
 13 injuries rather than in any kind of perhaps a police
 14 sense of worrying more about how this had been caused or
 15 what the...
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you.
 17 MR GREANEY: Mr Atkinson has some questions. He's promised
 18 me that he will be "very short". But before he asks his
 19 questions, could I just confirm something? Mr Ennis has
 20 drawn our attention to the fact that he believed that
 21 there were training records over and above those that we
 22 had hitherto seen. I'm very grateful to Mr English, who
 23 is the solicitor for NNAS, for taking really very swift
 24 steps to confirm the position.
 25 The position is that Mr Ennis attended NNAS

151

1 (inaudible: distorted) commander training on the
 2 following occasions before the arena attack:
 3 31 July 2015 and 10 March 2016. It was 31 July 2015
 4 that the records indicate that an MTTFA scenario was gone
 5 through.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 7 MR GREANEY: Yes, Mr Atkinson.
 8 Questions from MR ATKINSON
 9 MR ATKINSON: Good afternoon, Mr Ennis. I hope you can hear
 10 me.
 11 A. I can, yes.
 12 Q. Just two very short points. The first in relation to
 13 training. You told us a little earlier today that you
 14 had received some interim Bronze training in relation to
 15 attendance at an incident, I think in 2013/2014, you
 16 told us.
 17 A. Yes, around that time.
 18 Q. What more specifically did that bit of your training
 19 involve, please?
 20 A. As I recall, it was a one-day training session,
 21 delivered by the resilience team, which involved
 22 increased major incident awareness over and above that
 23 of paramedics and emergency medical technicians, and
 24 particularly being prepared for taking on the role of
 25 the operational commander or Bronze commander until such

152

1 time as somebody who was specifically trained in that
 2 role arrived to take that role on.
 3 Q. So what aspects of the role did that emphasise that you
 4 as an interim Bronze commander might have to do?
 5 A. I can't recall whether this training occurred before or
 6 after the JESIP training. I believe JESIP sort of came
 7 into being in 2013, so it's possible that it was before
 8 that, but it definitely incorporated aspects of working
 9 together with other emergency services and coordinating
 10 the medical management of a major incident scene,
 11 assigning other strategic roles, such as parking officer
 12 or ambulance loading officer or any of those roles, and
 13 ensuring that we were working together with the other
 14 agencies on scene.
 15 Q. Given your job, not on that night but more generally,
 16 would it have helped you, do you think, to have had
 17 training as to that interim Bronze role more often than
 18 just that once?
 19 A. Potentially, although the operations managers who were
 20 the equivalent level to advanced paramedics but rather
 21 than being clinical managers were operational
 22 managers — they were the ones who were deemed to be
 23 able to provide that role, and as such there was
 24 24 hours a day a Bronze, or it might actually be two
 25 Bronze commanders, available to NWAS within each area.

153

1 So although — to answer your question, the additional
 2 training may have been useful more often, but there were
 3 people specifically trained to perform that role
 4 available 24 hours a day.
 5 MR ATKINSON: Thank you, sir, that's all I ask.
 6 MR GREANEY: Ms Roberts, who, sir, as you know, represents
 7 NWAS, has indicated that she has no questions. Nor do
 8 I. So subject to any questions that you have, sir,
 9 that's the end of Mr Ennis' evidence.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you very much, Mr Ennis.
 11 Is the idea that we now break before the next
 12 witness?
 13 MR GREANEY: Yes, sir. The plan now is that we take the
 14 break so that the area can be sanitised. When we
 15 return, Mr de la Poer will call Simon Beswick, who is
 16 the NWAS Hazardous Area Response Team leader and we'll
 17 do as much of his evidence as we can today, although
 18 plainly we will not complete it.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How long do we need?
 20 MR GREANEY: Ten minutes, sir. Perhaps 20 to.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. Thank you very much for your help.
 22 (3.30 pm)
 23 (A short break)
 24 (3.40 pm)
 25 MR DE LA POER: Sir, as Mr Greaney indicated before the

154

1 break, the next witness is Simon Beswick and I wonder if
 2 he may be sworn, please.
 3 MR SIMON BESWICK (affirmed)
 4 Questions from MR DE LA POER
 5 MR DE LA POER: Sir, for your assistance and everyone
 6 listening, if I may, I'll just indicate the shape of the
 7 rest of today. Mr Beswick is, unlike the previous
 8 witness, going to cover all of his involvement on the
 9 night of the 22nd, but we will not today be dealing with
 10 any event after 10.30 on the 22nd. So Mr Beswick's
 11 evidence will be introducing the Hazardous Area Response
 12 Team, his background and training, and if we have time,
 13 and we may not, dealing with his movements before 10.30
 14 on the 22nd.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then we're coming back tomorrow when
 16 we do the rest of it?
 17 MR DE LA POER: Yes.
 18 Can you state your full name, please?
 19 A. Simon David Beswick.
 20 Q. Mr Beswick, am I right in understanding from your
 21 statement that you joined NWAS some time around 2004?
 22 A. That's correct, yes.
 23 Q. In 2006 you qualified as a paramedic and so do we
 24 conclude that there wasn't a medical aspect to your
 25 role, were you in some other role for the preceding

155

1 2 years?
 2 A. No, sir. Prior to me being a paramedic, I was a student
 3 paramedic or an ambulance technician.
 4 Q. I understand. Nonetheless, in 2006 you qualified as
 5 a paramedic. And then in 2015, you joined the Hazardous
 6 Area Response Team?
 7 A. Yes, sir.
 8 Q. I hope the two of us will do our best to avoid acronyms,
 9 so that everybody has clarity about what we are talking
 10 about, and in particular I shall try to remember to call
 11 it the Hazardous Area Response Team just so we achieve
 12 that.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think after a while, we'll get used to
 14 that particular one. It's combinations of acronym upon
 15 acronym or lots of sequences of acronyms which tend to
 16 get a bit confusing.
 17 MR DE LA POER: I'm afraid there are going to be a few of
 18 them and we will do our best. The responsibility is
 19 mine, Mr Beswick.
 20 Am I right in understanding that after the events of
 21 the arena in 2017, you have since qualified as
 22 a specialist paramedic?
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. That was in 2018?
 25 A. Yes.

156

1 Q. Having given that very brief introduction to you, we are
 2 going to just introduce the Hazardous Area Response
 3 Team.
 4 In your first statement — and you made two
 5 statements, is that right? Do you have those with you?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. In your first statement, you make clear that that team,
 8 nationally, was created as a response to the 7/7
 9 terrorist attack; is that right?
 10 A. In part, yes.
 11 Q. So that was one of the drivers at least for the creation
 12 of that team?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. We should understand, shouldn't we, that hazardous areas
 15 covers a wide range of potential scenarios? I'm going
 16 to review those briefly so that we can understand those.
 17 Firstly, it may involve working at height; is that
 18 right?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. It may involve working in confined spaces. It may
 21 involve working on inland areas of water. It may
 22 involve responding to a chemical, biological,
 23 radiological or nuclear event which itself may or may
 24 not be terrorist related.
 25 A. Yes.

157

1 Q. There's one further element which I've taken from
 2 a presentation that NWAS did about the Hazardous Area
 3 Response Team, which is labelled "Tactical medicine
 4 operations". Can you help us with what that is, if
 5 that's different in any way to the areas that I have
 6 identified?
 7 A. Yes, sir, I can elaborate if you want.
 8 Q. Yes, please.
 9 A. Tactical medical operations is an umbrella term given to
 10 MTFA, as it was known then, and support special
 11 services. This might be assisting other agencies and
 12 tactical medical options in regards to terrorism attacks
 13 and marauding terrorists.
 14 Q. So a reference to tactical medicine operations relevant
 15 to a terrorist attack then?
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. There are other specialist teams, is that right, within
 18 NWAS?
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 Q. So for example, in your witness statement, you mention
 21 the Special Operations Response Team, shortened to SORT?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. How is that team, if at all, different to the Hazardous
 24 Area Response Team?
 25 A. The Special Operations Response Team is made up of an

158

1 uplift staff, if you will, of operational paramedics and
 2 emergency medical technicians who then perform a role at
 3 decontamination and chemical events and also play a part
 4 in mass casualty events as well.
 5 Q. They have a part to play at mass casualty events?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So just so that we understand it, might an NWAS employee
 8 be a member of the Hazardous Area Response Team and the
 9 Special Operations Response Team or do they draw from
 10 different groups of people?
 11 A. No, they draw from different groups of people.
 12 Initially, when I was a paramedic operationally I was
 13 a member of the Special Operations Response Team and
 14 then as I got promoted into HART, the Hazardous Area
 15 Response Team, I no longer was an active member of the
 16 Special Operations Response Team.
 17 Q. Another specialist team that we see mention of in the
 18 papers is the Ambulance Intervention Team, AIT.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Did NWAS have that capability?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 Q. Again, just help us to understand what their specialism
 23 is as a team.
 24 A. The Ambulance Intervention Team is based around the
 25 marauding terrorist threat, so they've got an upscale in

159

1 PPE, so ballistic body protection, ballistic helmets.
 2 They also do special training every — I can't recall
 3 how often they do the training, but it is set against a
 4 national syllabus, if you will, to respond to certain
 5 incidents.
 6 Q. As with my previous question, would members of the
 7 Hazardous Area Response Team also be a member of that
 8 team or would it draw from different personnel?
 9 A. It would draw from different personnel. Previously as
 10 I have mentioned about the Special Operations Response
 11 Team, I was also a member of the Ambulance Intervention
 12 Team prior to me joining the Hazardous Area Response
 13 Team.
 14 Q. Bearing in mind that the Hazardous Area Response Team,
 15 which you were a member of in 2017, had a capability or
 16 a role in a terrorist response, in the event that it was
 17 a marauding terrorist firearms attack, as it was termed
 18 back then, would it be both the Ambulance Intervention
 19 Team and the Hazardous Area Response Team that would be
 20 expected to respond or just one of them?
 21 A. It would be both.
 22 Q. Both?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So they would both attend events such as that?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

160

1 Q. As we have mentioned the concept of marauding terrorist
 2 firearms attacks and that that is within the remit of
 3 the Hazardous Area Response Team, I would just like to
 4 ask you some questions about your knowledge of that and
 5 here I want to make it clear that I'm asking about 2017.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. This isn't meant as any sort of criticism of you at all,
 8 Mr Beswick, but I have been asked to invite you to speak
 9 up a little if you can. It's very important that what
 10 you say is heard by everyone, including the
 11 stenographer, who is preparing a real time transcript.
 12 All right?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sitting closer does help, but do bear
 15 with us if you can. Thank you.
 16 MR DE LA POER: Marauding terrorist firearms attacks. In
 17 2017, did you know what Operation Plato was?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. Did you understand that it involved the police
 20 designating various areas in and around such an attack
 21 by reference to hot, warm and cold zones?
 22 A. Yes, sir.
 23 Q. We'll come to the detail of this in a moment, but in
 24 2017 did you have a clear understanding in your own mind
 25 about what each of those zones meant?

161

1 A. Yes, sir.
 2 Q. In your first statement -- and there are a number of
 3 sources that we'll look at -- at page 2 -- can I invite
 4 you to just open your first statement in front of you
 5 and have a look at page 2?
 6 We can see in the second paragraph, when you speak
 7 about what the Hazardous Area Response Team responds to,
 8 in the third line, what you say is:
 9 "Traditionally, the hot zone of an inner cordon was
 10 dealt with by the Fire Service and it would be a case of
 11 dragging people out and they wouldn't get medical
 12 intervention until clear of it, so it was brought in to
 13 enable medically trained staff to enter into the hot
 14 zone and be able to treat patients at the scene."
 15 As I have understood that, and we're going to have
 16 a look at another document in a moment, that is not
 17 a reference to a Plato hot zone, that is a hot zone
 18 being used in a different context; is that correct?
 19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
 20 Q. Let's have a look at a presentation which was prepared
 21 on the Hazardous Area Response Team by personnel within
 22 NWAS in 2016, as I understand it. Mr Lopez, the INQ
 23 reference is INQ021481/3.
 24 This is a slide show, as we understand it, part of
 25 a presentation, which I understand you've had the

162

1 opportunity to familiarise yourself with before today,
 2 so this isn't coming new to you. What it indicates
 3 in that first bullet, and I'll read it into the record:
 4 "We have a duty of care not only to the casualties
 5 but to all the other emergency responders working in the
 6 inner cordon/hot zone. We are there to ensure that if
 7 anybody has a clinical need within the hot zone the
 8 ambulance HART can move in and stabilise, maximising
 9 patient outcome, which is what we are there for."
 10 We can see another reference to the hot zone under
 11 the bullet point "January 2005":
 12 "Experts in mainstream ambulance, clinicians and
 13 CBRN specialists meet to discuss ambulance staff working
 14 inside the hot zone."
 15 Is that a Hazardous Area Response Team use of hot
 16 zone rather than a Plato use of hot zone?
 17 A. Yes, that's correct. The hot zone in Plato is
 18 different.
 19 Q. Is different?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Is there, dealing with it at a very general level here,
 22 any risk of confusion within operatives working within
 23 the Hazardous Area Response Team back in 2017 that there
 24 were two uses of the term hot zone?
 25 A. Yes, I think there could have been some confusion, but

163

1 with Operation Plato it gives more distinct boundaries
 2 and a limit of exploitation.
 3 Q. We'll come to the joint operating principles in a moment
 4 and understand a little more about that, although the
 5 inquiry has received a good deal of evidence about
 6 Operation Plato already.
 7 But I suppose, do you agree or disagree with this,
 8 that if you have the term hot zone being used to mean
 9 two different things, there is a risk that on scene, in
 10 a difficult moment, if somebody says, "That's the hot
 11 zone", there may be a misunderstanding about what type
 12 of hot zone it is?
 13 A. Yes, I agree with that.
 14 Q. You agree with that?
 15 A. Yes, sir.
 16 Q. Because a colleague of yours, Lea Vaughan, gave
 17 a presentation following the attack in May 2017, and I'm
 18 just going to ask for a couple of the slides to be put
 19 on there, again to understand this concept a little bit
 20 more from the Hazardous Area Response Team point of
 21 view.
 22 Mr Lopez, {INQ022850/6}.
 23 As I say, this was a presentation given by your
 24 colleague. Did you attend the presentation?
 25 A. No, sir.

164

1 Q. But you have before today had an opportunity to see
2 this?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Clearly, and Ms Vaughan will come and give evidence,
5 although I don't expect her to be asked about this when
6 she gives evidence at the beginning of next week, but
7 later in chapter 10, but here, no doubt to communicate
8 what she was trying to speak about at the scene, we can
9 see that three zones have been designated, including
10 a hot zone. Just help us so far as you can, and bearing
11 in mind she created it, you may not be able to, do you
12 understand that to be indicating where the Hazardous
13 Area Response Team would be describing hot, warm and
14 cold zones, or a reference to Plato or just not able to
15 say?
16 A. I believe that is what Lea was referring to of the
17 incident, not a Plato-specific incident.
18 Q. Not a Plato-specific incident?
19 A. Not a Plato-specific incident.
20 Q. So where the hot zone is marked, as we've seen has been
21 referred to in those earlier documents we looked at
22 a couple of minutes ago, that is an area in which the
23 Hazardous Area Response Team can operate?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And that, I suppose, is perhaps the most important

165

1 distinction, would you agree, that in a Plato hot zone,
2 under the joint operating principles in force in
3 January 2016 and onwards, the Hazardous Area Response
4 Team would not go in the hot zone?
5 A. That's correct, sir.
6 Q. Whereas under the Hazardous Area Response Team's
7 definition they would?
8 A. Yes. I'd describe that as the inner cordon.
9 Q. The inner cordon?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr Lopez, you can take that down.
12 So perhaps you can help me when we get to it, that
13 if we are talking about hot zones in relation to the
14 events there, which type of hot zone we're talking
15 about.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I'm going to turn from that very general introduction to
18 the Hazardous Area Response Team and that key concept of
19 the inner cordon hot zone and just look at some training
20 issues because there is specialist training, isn't
21 there, for those members of NNAS who join the Hazardous
22 Area Response Team?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And you undertook that training in order for you to join
25 when you did. We have been provided with by NNAS

166

1 a number of spreadsheets, which I think you have had an
2 opportunity to familiarise yourself with. You and I are
3 not going to look at those because instead we're going
4 to try and introduce your training in a slightly
5 different way.
6 We'll start, please, if you can take up your second
7 statement, and just have a look at the third paragraph.
8 Do you have that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. What you say is:
11 "As a member of the Hazardous Area Response Team
12 I am expected to engage with a continuous training
13 curriculum designed to maintain the core competencies as
14 set out by the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, often
15 shortened to NARU."
16 What we understand that course to include has been
17 reduced to a summary, which I think you have had
18 a chance to consider ahead of today; is that right?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. So what I would like us to do is just have a look at
21 that summary and, of course, what you're going to tell
22 us now, I hope, will apply equally to others from your
23 team who will follow and in relation to whom we won't
24 need to take quite so much time.
25 Mr Lopez, can I invite you, please, to bring up

167

1 {INQ040671/1}.
2 There's a lot of information on here, but if you
3 could please just crop into the centre of the document
4 under the heading "Incident Response Unit".
5 We can see that the second paragraph after the
6 introduction, which indicates there's both theory and
7 practical sessions, says this:
8 "The course involves being able to carry out dynamic
9 risk assessments and then deployments into a scene as
10 well as the ability to carry out a clinical role whilst
11 wearing the PPE."
12 That's personal protective equipment?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. "The course culminates in a final exercise, which
15 involves mass casualties and amputee role players who
16 are made-up with simulated injuries. In the original
17 iterations of the HART course this was a bomb/blast
18 scenario involving a chemical release, but more latterly
19 MTA has been taught on the course and the final exercise
20 has been a large MTA incident."
21 When you did the training, did your course culminate
22 in a large MTA incident?
23 A. My initial response unit, yes, it did.
24 Q. Then if we go to {INQ040671/2}, please, and just crop in
25 to the top, Mr Lopez. We'll see a reference to the

168

1 continuation training, which indicates that:
 2 "All HART teams have a training week which is used
 3 to complete continuation training and maintain skills.
 4 Continuation training covers theory and practical
 5 aspects of carrying out the HART role as well as safety,
 6 such as entry control and operating ancillary equipment.
 7 Continuation training covers the following
 8 competencies..."
 9 And it gives a long list that we don't need to look
 10 at. Thank you very much indeed, you can take that down,
 11 Mr Lopez.
 12 So do we understand that the training that you
 13 received when you joined the team and to maintain your
 14 skills gave you a substantial introduction to how to
 15 deal with a marauding terrorist attack?
 16 A. Yes, sir, it helped me prepare.
 17 Q. Whether that was adequate or not is a different matter
 18 and I chose my word carefully that it was a substantial
 19 introduction and certainly that appears to be the case
 20 from the summary and I'm seeking to see whether you
 21 agree with that or not.
 22 A. Yes, sir, I agree.
 23 Q. You undertook a number of live training exercises,
 24 didn't you?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

169

1 Q. And you deal with those in your second witness
 2 statement. Was this in addition to the training that
 3 we've just had a look at in that summary?
 4 A. Yes, sir.
 5 Q. So you deal with these at paragraph 4 of your second
 6 statement?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And here we are dealing with training before
 9 22 May 2017. You say:
 10 "I participated in several live large-scale
 11 multi-agency exercises, including but not limited to an
 12 MTFA exercise at the Arndale shopping centre on
 13 7 May 2015, a residential MTFA course orchestrated by
 14 NARU on 4 August 2015, and a marauding terrorist
 15 firearms exercise on 9 August 2016, and
 16 Operation Winchester on 27 September 2016."
 17 I think we know that as Operation Winchester Accord
 18 or is that a different exercise?
 19 A. I'm not sure, sir.
 20 Q. Certainly you understood that you were participating in
 21 something termed Operation Winchester on
 22 27 September 2016?
 23 A. Yes, sir.
 24 Q. Over what sort of time period would these live
 25 large-scale multi-agency exercises take?

170

1 A. Do you mean the duration of the exercise?
 2 Q. Yes.
 3 A. Generally, a couple of hours.
 4 Q. Again, did they provide you with a substantial
 5 introduction to how to deal with a marauding terrorist
 6 attack?
 7 A. I believe so, yes, sir.
 8 Q. During at least some of those exercises, did you have
 9 the opportunity to act as a team leader for the
 10 Hazardous Area Response Team?
 11 A. Yes, sir.
 12 Q. Was that the case in all of those exercises that we've
 13 just seen mentioned or fewer than that?
 14 A. A fewer number. I acted as team leader on 27 September
 15 at the Barton City Airport.
 16 Q. 2016?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 Q. And just help us to the best of your recollection, what
 19 was the scenario on 27 September?
 20 A. That was a multi-agency response to a helicopter crash
 21 at the City Airport, involving -- it wasn't
 22 MTA-specific, but it was a multi-agency one.
 23 Q. I think we can be very clear then that that isn't
 24 Exercise Winchester Accord, but a different exercise?
 25 A. Right, sir.

171

1 Q. In addition to those large-scale multi-agency exercises,
 2 did you have the opportunity to conduct training
 3 sessions with any team within the Fire and Rescue
 4 Service?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 Q. We heard evidence from a member of the Specialist
 7 Response team within the Fire and Rescue Service about
 8 joint training events with the Hazardous Area Response
 9 Team. Was that your experience?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. As a result of those joint training exercises did you
 12 develop an understanding of the capabilities of the
 13 Specialist Response Team within the Fire and Rescue
 14 Service?
 15 A. Yes, sir.
 16 Q. Before 2017, approximately how frequent were those
 17 training exercises?
 18 A. In regards to marauding terrorists, probably twice
 19 a year.
 20 Q. Did you have other occasions when you trained with the
 21 specialist response team?
 22 A. In other disciplines, yes.
 23 Q. In other disciplines?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. So there were opportunities, beyond seeing how they

172

1 would respond to a terrorist incident, in terms of
 2 understanding their capability?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 Q. This will become important tomorrow, but I would like
 5 you, please, to have a look at paragraph 25 of your
 6 second statement, as we are on the subject of training.
 7 You begin that paragraph by referring back to an earlier
 8 paragraph, but you say this:
 9 "Part of our HART training teaches us not to
 10 overcommit HART resources into the scene of
 11 a potentially dangerous incident, as in the event of a
 12 multi-sited attack. It is important that HART personnel
 13 are available to be redeployed as and when required
 14 given their specialist skills and training."
 15 Can you help us to identify where in your training
 16 you were taught that?
 17 A. I can't get a specific identification on that, but
 18 we were told to always maintain a rescue team, so if
 19 something happens within that inner cordon, we've then
 20 got resources to redeploy and go in, or say if it's
 21 a multi-sited incident, we've got specialist resources
 22 to move on to the next site.
 23 Q. Two parts: one, to hold a team back in case they need to
 24 be deployed at the scene that they're being held back at
 25 to help those who have gone into that inner cordon?

173

1 A. Sir.
 2 Q. Second possibility, that if there is a separate scene
 3 that develops, that team that is held back can go to
 4 that second scene?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 Q. When you received that training, were you given any
 7 guidance or instruction about how to approach that
 8 decision-making process?
 9 A. I believe that would be based on the risk assessment
 10 that you made, the challenges you faced, the resources
 11 you needed and obviously the number of casualties that
 12 needed help.
 13 Q. So let me give you a couple of specific examples for you
 14 to consider whether this formed part of the factors that
 15 you might take into account. For example, we know on
 16 22 May that a Hazardous Area Response Team from out of
 17 the area was deployed to support your team's work.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And therefore, on the facts as they were on 22 May,
 20 there were additional resources coming in who might
 21 perform the function of the team that you were holding
 22 back?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So were you given training on how to think about those
 25 incoming resources and manage what you had at the scene

174

1 to balance the need to have that holdback team as
 2 against the fact that they might be able to go into
 3 a hazardous area and provide assistance to people within
 4 it?
 5 A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. I didn't receive specific
 6 training on that.
 7 Q. Similarly, taking into account the fact that you had
 8 another team coming in who might go to a second scene,
 9 meaning that you don't need to hold back at your first
 10 scene your resources, do you see the point I'm making?
 11 A. Yes, sir, I see the point.
 12 Q. As I have just articulated that to you now, do you
 13 think, thinking about it, that that would have been
 14 useful training for you to have so you could make the
 15 best decisions when confronted with that particular
 16 issue?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is it a decision that you would be
 19 making, being at the scene, or would it be a decision
 20 made at a higher level by someone who can see the whole
 21 scenario and whether you're likely to need people at
 22 other areas?
 23 A. Yes, sir, you're correct. The decision to deploy HART
 24 or the second HART team would be a tactical decision and
 25 the decision to commit more members in would be an

175

1 operational decision made by the operational commander.
 2 I could maybe offer information and support to the
 3 operational commander, but it will be a command
 4 decision.
 5 MR DE LA POER: I don't want to get substantially into the
 6 facts of the 22nd, not least because I have made clear
 7 to everyone that we're not going to. But I think what
 8 you say when we come to it was that as team leader that
 9 night, you were at least involved in the decision about
 10 where those Hazardous Area Response Team members who
 11 were there at Manchester Victoria went?
 12 A. Yes, sir.
 13 Q. So although you described it as a decision for the
 14 operational commander, on 22 May that was a decision
 15 that you participated in?
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. As I say, we will come to the detail of how that
 18 decision was made and who, if anyone, you spoke to
 19 tomorrow.
 20 We're on the subject of team leader training. What
 21 you say in your witness statement is that on the night
 22 of 22 May, you were, and I'm quoting you here, acting up
 23 as team leader.
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 Q. The circumstances of how that came to be is for

176

1 tomorrow, or the very end of today, but had you received
 2 specific training in how to be a team leader?
 3 A. As part of the initial response unit course, NARU, the
 4 training is key around everyone having an experience of
 5 being a team leader. In regards to my experience in
 6 NWAS, I'd previously done a little bit, but there's no
 7 set qualification to be a team leader at that moment.
 8 Q. That was what I was coming to, so let's look at it now.
 9 We're going to go back to that presentation, which as
 10 I understand it is 2016.
 11 Mr Lopez, {INQ021481/8}, please.
 12 There's a previous slide indicating training, but
 13 this slide deals with team leaders and talks about
 14 a four-day team leader radiation protection course.
 15 Obviously not directly relevant to this, although no
 16 doubt instilling leadership skills. And similarly
 17 a four-day team leader's CBRNE. What is the E?
 18 A. Explosions.
 19 Q. So potentially, I suppose, relevant, given that E, a
 20 Bronze commander's course and a team leader ambulance
 21 Bronze commander's course.
 22 So given what you have told us about the fact that
 23 in a sense the initial induction into the team gives you
 24 the opportunity to try out being a team leader, do we
 25 understand these are additional qualifications that

177

1 a person might do?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Had you done any of those additional qualifications?
 4 A. No, sir.
 5 Q. Do you think the training that you had received as
 6 a team leader was adequate for you in that role on
 7 22 May?
 8 A. No, sir.
 9 Q. We'll come back to why, once we've been through that.
 10 Thank you very much, Mr Lopez, please can you take
 11 that down.
 12 Major incident training. Were you familiar
 13 in May 2017 with NWAS's major incident response plan?
 14 A. I am aware of it, yes, sir.
 15 Q. You knew one existed?
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. Do you recall whether before May 2017 you'd had any
 18 specific training on its content?
 19 A. I believe I did it as part of the mandatory training
 20 package delivered to NWAS employees.
 21 Q. To all of their employees?
 22 A. Sorry, all operational employees.
 23 Q. Sorry, I cut across you, which didn't help the clarity
 24 of your answer there. So this isn't specific to the
 25 Hazardous Area Response Team, this is all operational

178

1 employees?
 2 A. I believe it was done on a mandatory training.
 3 Q. Was there any uplift in that training by reason of you
 4 joining the Hazardous Area Response Team?
 5 A. I'm trying to articulate my answers. I believe
 6 a greater understanding of the major incident plan was
 7 obtained, but I don't recall any specific teaching or
 8 training on the major incident plan itself.
 9 Q. Would you agree with this: as an operative within NWAS,
 10 you may or may not go to a major incident in the course
 11 of your career?
 12 A. Agreed, yes, sir.
 13 Q. Whereas as a member of the Hazardous Area Response Team,
 14 it is highly likely that you will be required to go to
 15 a major incident?
 16 A. Yes, sir, I agree.
 17 Q. That's the nature of the team and the sort of work it
 18 does?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Did you receive training in the use of major incident
 21 action cards?
 22 A. Yes, sir.
 23 Q. And in particular, did you receive training in the use
 24 of the major incident action card for the team leader of
 25 the Hazardous Area Response Team?

179

1 A. I was made aware of the action card and we had in-house
 2 training, if you will, on action cards and the
 3 importance of them, but I didn't have specific training
 4 just on that action card.
 5 Q. Operation Winchester, September 2016, the helicopter
 6 incident where you were the team leader --
 7 A. Yes, sir.
 8 Q. -- do you have a recollection of whether or not, as part
 9 of that incident, you went through in that scenario the
 10 team leader major incident action card?
 11 A. I did not, no, sir.
 12 Q. You didn't?
 13 A. I did not go through the card.
 14 Q. Having not gone through that card, did you receive any
 15 feedback about whether that was something that you
 16 should or should not have done?
 17 A. No, sir. I did not receive any feedback.
 18 Q. So as far as you are aware, it wasn't identified that
 19 you didn't use that action card when you were acting
 20 in that capacity?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 Q. So by the time we get to 22 May 2017, had you, whether
 23 in a training exercise or in an actual incident, ever
 24 used the major incident action card for team leader?
 25 A. No, sir.

180

1 Q. We're going to have a look at a specific part of the
 2 major incident response plan. Can I just give this
 3 warning, please. What we are going to see on screen is
 4 a line drawing, can you agree, Mr Beswick, of the way in
 5 which an incident may be laid out in terms of particular
 6 areas which are designated as having a particular
 7 function; is that right?
 8 A. Yes, sir.
 9 Q. Can I give this warning, that as part of that, there is
 10 an indication of the way in which those who are deceased
 11 at that incident will be dealt with; is that right?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. So bearing that in mind, can I just give everybody who
 14 does not wish to see that line drawing a moment to turn
 15 off their feed or turn away or step away. I anticipate
 16 we will have it on screen for no more than 2 or
 17 3 minutes.
 18 (Pause)
 19 Mr Lopez, {INQ012913/41}. If you could crop into
 20 the diagram that appears in the centre of that page,
 21 please.
 22 It is headed, as we can see there, "Casualty triage
 23 and treatment". We can see the incident marked by that
 24 jagged line box on the left—hand side. Out of that,
 25 coming immediately out of the centre of it, we have

181

1 something called the triage sieve, which then either
 2 leads down and right via the indicator P3 — is that an
 3 indicator of a casualty with a certain level of injury?
 4 A. Yes, sir, that is a priority 3, walking wounded.
 5 Q. Walking wounded as it's referred to informally. Or from
 6 the triage sieve to the CCP.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. CCP stands for the casualty collection point?
 9 A. Yes, sir, it does.
 10 Q. From the CCP, does it indicate that you move to the box
 11 which is indicated CCS, which stands for casualty
 12 clearing station?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. And we can see that that relates to P1 and P2 level
 15 injuries.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Again, can you just define for us, please, P1 and P2?
 18 A. P1, catastrophically injured, highest priority patients.
 19 P2 would be immobile patients who are injured.
 20 Q. We can see under there, "Triage, sort and treatment",
 21 within that box of the CCS.
 22 From there, continuing right, those patients
 23 progress on to the ambulance loading point, the ALP,
 24 which is the point at which, as the name would suggest,
 25 they are placed in an ambulance and transported to

182

1 hospital?
 2 A. Yes, sir.
 3 Q. So this shows diagrammatically how a major incident is
 4 structured in particular areas for NWAS; is that right?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. What we're going to do, please, Mr Lopez, is scroll down
 7 that page and see a little bit more about the CCP, the
 8 casualty collection point, and then the casualty
 9 clearing station. So could you please scroll down so
 10 that we no longer have that on the screen? And instead
 11 we have 9.2, the casualty collection point.
 12 It's on screen now and therefore it'll be published
 13 on the inquiry website, so I don't need to read it all
 14 out. What is your understanding of the casualty
 15 collection point?
 16 A. The casualty collection point will be basically a muster
 17 point for the patients who have just had the initial
 18 triage, from there they can be redirected into more
 19 safer environments for further intervention to be
 20 undertaken.
 21 Q. So it's an interim point between triage and the casualty
 22 clearing station?
 23 A. That's correct, yes.
 24 Q. That's what we see there:
 25 "Following triage sieve, casualties will be

183

1 evacuated in priority order to either a casualty
 2 collection point or directly to the casualty clearing
 3 station for treatment."
 4 So are we right to understand that it isn't
 5 necessarily the case that a casualty collection point
 6 will always be used?
 7 A. That's correct, sir. There may be multiple casualty
 8 collection points set up.
 9 Q. So more than one?
 10 A. Potentially.
 11 Q. Equally, what that sentence appears to envisage is
 12 people might go straight from triage to the casualty
 13 clearing station?
 14 A. Potentially, yes, sir.
 15 Q. In May 2017, why did you think a casualty collection
 16 point might be required at a scene? What would the
 17 features be of a scene that requires one?
 18 A. A casualty collection point would be utilised if the
 19 resources were becoming overwhelmed or the amount of
 20 casualties overwhelmed the resources that were there to
 21 treat them. Also a casualty collection point can be
 22 placed in an area closer to the incident site and
 23 therefore responders could be limited getting there.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it depends on the number of
 25 casualties and space?

184

1 A. Yes, sir. Location is a big part of it as well.
 2 MR DE LA POER: If there was a delay because of the layout
 3 or geography between the triage site, so the scene of
 4 the incident, and the casualty clearing station, might
 5 that be a justification for the use of a casualty
 6 collection point.
 7 A. Yes, sir, as an interim measure.
 8 Q. So I'm sure you know what I'm getting at here. We know
 9 that the layout of the Manchester Victoria Railway
 10 Station involved an obstacle for those who were injured
 11 in the form of a substantial staircase.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Which, as we know, did in fact cause a delay. Is that
 14 sort of obstacle something which might be taken into
 15 account when assessing whether a casualty collection
 16 point is required?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 Q. Would the positioning of a casualty collection point be
 19 on the incident side of the obstacle or on the casualty
 20 clearing station side of the obstacle?
 21 A. Ideally you'd get the casualty collection point in
 22 a safe area or as close to the incident as possible, as
 23 practicable. But in this case, specialist responders
 24 might set up a casualty collection point at the top of
 25 the stairs and then the patient can be cascaded down to

185

1 the receiving area.
 2 Q. We'll come to how the scene was in fact designated, but
 3 here we're just trying to understand these terms and how
 4 they might work. Is the casualty collection point
 5 a potentially important area because it is an area where
 6 patients can receive treatment?
 7 A. They can receive basic interventions. Treatment is more
 8 reserved for later on down the order, if you will, sir.
 9 Q. I understand. That's my bad phraseology. Would a basic
 10 intervention include, for example, the application of
 11 a tourniquet?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. So when we talk about basic interventions, it's
 14 a response such as that?
 15 A. Yes. Managing catastrophic haemorrhage, yes.
 16 Q. Or perhaps, to take a different example, the use of an
 17 airway?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. That is an introduction to casualty collection points,
 20 as you understood it, and we can see what the NNAS major
 21 incident response plan records against it. If we go
 22 down to the next page, please, Mr Lopez, we'll look at
 23 9.3, the casualty clearing station, {INQ012913/42}.
 24 Again, the text is there to be seen. Perhaps we can
 25 have it on up screen and you can tell us what you

186

1 understood the function of a casualty clearing station
 2 is insofar as we haven't covered it already.
 3 A. Yes, sir. A casualty clearing station is a more
 4 structured environment for the patients then to be
 5 re-triaged after the initial triage. There's one point
 6 you mentioned I'd like to go back to ---
 7 Q. Of course.
 8 A. --- regarding a casualty collection point and the use of
 9 an airway. You would not use an airway. It's very
 10 basic interventions, catastrophic haemorrhage, wound
 11 management, and then down. Very, very basic. The
 12 airway management would take place further down at
 13 a CCS.
 14 Q. That's perhaps a good example of the different sort of
 15 care that's being given in the different areas?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Just to continue with the casualty clearing station, any
 18 other features of that that we should have in our mind
 19 as you understood it to be in May 2017?
 20 A. Yes. A casualty clearing station would ideally be in
 21 a cold zone, so non-specialist responders could work in
 22 there.
 23 Q. Can I just stop you there before you continue: is that
 24 a Plato cold zone or a Hazardous Area Response Team cold
 25 zone or are they the same thing?

187

1 A. In this context it would be a HART --- sorry, a major
 2 incident cold zone.
 3 Q. Which would be defined as what?
 4 A. An area that's safe for non-specialist responders to be
 5 working in with no perceived threat to the responders or
 6 the patients.
 7 Q. So a major incident cold zone, would it need to have
 8 good access to the ambulance loading point?
 9 A. Yes, sir. And ideally in line of sight of the
 10 forwarding operating commanders.
 11 Q. We need to come to that, don't we? The forward control
 12 point or forward operating commanders.
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. Were you familiar with the concept of a forward command
 15 point or a forward control point at a major incident?
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. Can I just ask Mr Lopez to take that down for now as
 18 we've just moved on to a slightly different topic.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we move on, you'll tell me
 20 whether I'm right or wrong, am I not right in thinking
 21 that actually a Plato cold zone is identical to a major
 22 incident cold zone?
 23 MR DE LA POER: It does not sound like there's any
 24 distinction between them.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wonder how much familiarity you

188

1 have with the Plato zones, because you were obviously
 2 referring to the major incident zones.
 3 A. Yes, sir. I'm familiar with the Plato zoning.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it would be the same, a cold zone?
 5 A. Yes, sir, there'd be no threat to the responders or
 6 threat to the patients.
 7 MR DE LA POER: This might be a convenient moment to try and
 8 tease out the differences, if at all, between them.
 9 The Plato cold zone and a major incident cold zone,
 10 they're the same, no threat?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Under Plato as we understand it, a warm zone is an area
 13 in which there are no active terrorists but there is
 14 a threat that the terrorists may return to that zone?
 15 A. That's correct, sir, there's a potential for threat
 16 in that area.
 17 Q. In a major incident warm zone, how is that defined?
 18 A. I'm not sure on that one, sir. I couldn't answer.
 19 I couldn't give it the justice it needed there.
 20 Q. When it comes to a hot zone, as I think we've already
 21 established, under Plato was your understanding that
 22 that is an area of active terrorist activity?
 23 A. Yes, sir, in a Plato.
 24 Q. Whereas in a major incident, a hot zone is what, the
 25 inner cordon?

189

1 A. The inner cordon, the site of the incident.
 2 Q. So an area of hazard but not a hazard of the type
 3 involving a terrorist with a firearm?
 4 A. Yes, sir.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in practical terms it means you can
 6 work there provided you've got the right equipment.
 7 A. Yes, as long as you meet all risk assessments.
 8 MR DE LA POER: So might it have the same characteristics as
 9 a Plato warm zone?
 10 A. Yes, sir, if you will.
 11 Q. So there exists a risk in that area, but it is not
 12 a risk as acute as an active terrorist with a firearm?
 13 A. Yes, I agree with that.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In a major incident there is no area
 15 where you can't work at all? Or that depends on the
 16 risk assessment, I suppose.
 17 A. In general terms, there's no off limits.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No automatic ban working there?
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 MR DE LA POER: Forward control points or forward command
 21 points. Was that acronym FCP something that you were
 22 familiar with in May 2017?
 23 A. Yes, sir.
 24 Q. What did you understand it to be?
 25 A. That would be a muster point for the operational

190

1 commanders to hold meetings and other agencies and
 2 coordinate the response.
 3 Q. And the muster point for which agencies?
 4 A. It would be the three emergency response, the Fire
 5 Service, the police and the Ambulance Service.
 6 Q. So a place that operational commanders determine --
 7 might it also be referred to as the Bronze commander if
 8 that's the appropriate designation within that service?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And in a major incident, where in relation to your zones
 11 would you expect the forward control or forward command
 12 point to be?
 13 A. I'd expect that to be in the cold zone, if you will,
 14 safety, but ideally within line of sight of the
 15 incident.
 16 Q. So might the forward control point be in or around the
 17 area of the casualty clearing station?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. Should it be segregated from that?
 20 A. Yes, because that is a command role and you don't
 21 want -- that's very specific to the response.
 22 Q. But because each is supposed to be in the cold zone,
 23 they could be close to each other?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. JESIP. Had you received training before May 2017

191

1 in relation to the JESIP principles?
 2 A. I believe so, yes.
 3 Q. Sitting there now, do you think you had a clear
 4 understanding of what they were and what was required of
 5 you?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. One of the particular features of the Hazardous Area
 8 Response Team's training was the joint training with the
 9 Fire and Rescue Service team.
 10 A. Yes, sir.
 11 Q. So under JESIP, where emergency services must co-locate,
 12 they must communicate, they must coordinate, they must
 13 share their risk assessment and share the situational
 14 awareness, would the Hazardous Area Response Team have
 15 a particular eye out for the Fire and Rescue Service's
 16 equivalent team?
 17 A. I wouldn't say we had to keep an eye out for them, but
 18 we were aware of their capabilities.
 19 Q. You'd expect to work in very close coordination with
 20 them?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 Q. Of all the other teams who are present, they're the team
 23 you train with from a different emergency service on
 24 a regular basis. You have a good understanding, as
 25 you have told us, of their capability. So would they be

192

1 a team you'd be particularly looking for in order to
 2 communicate about a joint plan?
 3 A. Yes, sir .
 4 Q. Before we turn away from major incidents, you
 5 participated in a debrief on 30 May 2017. I can bring
 6 the document up, but I think you will have familiarised
 7 yourself beforehand with it. On page 6, I'm not going
 8 to bring it up because there are some matters that
 9 I simply don't want to put on screen contained within
 10 that, but the feedback of everybody who participated,
 11 including you, is recorded as being:
 12 "Want back to basics training in major incident."
 13 Do you remember giving that feedback?
 14 A. Just repeat it again, sir, sorry.
 15 Q. "Want back to basics training in major incident."
 16 In other words, in the course of that debrief what
 17 appears to have happened is that at least one person, or
 18 as I understand it, it was the feedback of everyone, if
 19 I've interpreted the form correctly, there was a general
 20 wish to have back to basics training on major incidents
 21 as a result of the experience of 22 May 2017.
 22 A. Yes, sir .
 23 Q. Does that accord with your recollection about how you
 24 felt afterwards?
 25 A. Yes. I felt after the incident, we could, at an

193

1 operational level, do with more impetus on the actual
 2 major incident training. It only happens maybe once in
 3 a career, but it is significant and we need to be, in my
 4 opinion, more active on the training side of it.
 5 Q. Again, when we have reviewed the incident tomorrow,
 6 we will come back to that.
 7 Sir, I note the time, but if you and others can bear
 8 with me, it might be convenient just to finish this
 9 training section, which I would hope to do before
 10 5 o'clock if that's all right.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll all stay here.
 12 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed. That will give
 13 this advantage, that we'll be able just to deal with
 14 22 May tomorrow. We've already spoken about
 15 Operation Plato, a marauding terrorist firearms attack.
 16 I'd like to focus upon the joint operating principles as
 17 you understood them to be in May 2017. You, I am sure,
 18 can accept from me that we have had these introduced
 19 already, but what I would like to do is, through you,
 20 just introduce them as they relate to the
 21 Ambulance Service.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. The first question is: had you received training on the
 24 joint operating principles that came into force in
 25 January 2016?

194

1 A. Yes, sir .
 2 Q. We don't need to bring it up on screen, but you can
 3 confirm that the terms casualty collection point and
 4 casualty clearing station were defined within that
 5 document?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Perhaps not as extensively as we've seen within the
 8 major incident plan, but nonetheless an identical
 9 definition in practical terms?
 10 A. Yes, sir .
 11 Q. Mr Lopez, can we bring up {INQ008372/22}, please.
 12 This is headed "Casualty management". This was, so
 13 far as you were aware, not a marauding terrorist
 14 firearms attack? Is that right?
 15 A. That's correct, sir, on the evening of the 22nd, yes.
 16 Q. But would you agree, given the situation that you were
 17 facing in terms of the type of injuries and the concern
 18 which you yourself have expressed in your witness
 19 statements about the possibility of a secondary device
 20 and the fact that this was a terrorist attack that there
 21 are important principles within JOPs that applied just
 22 as much to this incident, even though it wasn't strictly
 23 within its terms?
 24 A. Yes, sir .
 25 Q. What we can see under section 6 under the section which

195

1 has been redacted is:
 2 "The nature of injuries sustained during an MTFA
 3 will be very different to those commonly encountered by
 4 emergency service staff. Consequently, a different
 5 approach to clinical care than that employed at normal
 6 major incidents is required, giving consideration to
 7 options for maximising the effect that a limited number
 8 of specialists can achieve in dealing with a high number
 9 of casualties ."
 10 Would you agree that that is one of the principles
 11 that translates to what you were presented with on
 12 22 May?
 13 A. Yes, sir .
 14 Q. In the next paragraph it talks about tactical options
 15 and at the end of the fourth line it says:
 16 "The plan should include the tactical options to be
 17 conducted (treat and leave or treat and extricate), the
 18 composition of teams delivering casualty care, and the
 19 initial locations for casualty collection points and
 20 casualty clearing stations."
 21 I'm sure it is absolutely obvious to everybody
 22 listening, but the description of treat and leave, what
 23 is that, please?
 24 A. During triage if the number of patients overwhelms the
 25 number of resources then it would be appropriate for

196

1 that paramedic to maybe apply a tourniquet, categorise
 2 that patient as a priority 1, and then move on to the
 3 next patient. It's a very quick process, if you will,
 4 trying to stem any catastrophic haemorrhage.
 5 Q. It does involve some level of treatment?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So it is not the same as a triage which simply involves
 8 the assessment of the level of injuries and the priority
 9 of the casualty; is that right?
 10 A. It is basically triage, isn't it? So your primary
 11 triage would be catastrophic haemorrhage, any sort of
 12 basic wound management, and then move on to the next
 13 patient. So this is maybe where the scene is protracted
 14 over several different sites and you're having to move
 15 through several different avenues, if you will.
 16 Q. It's my fault, I obviously thought I'd mistakenly
 17 understood the term. Triage, and we've seen the triage
 18 sieve as part of that set-up at a major incident, does
 19 that involve treatment?
 20 A. Well, yes, if you have a catastrophic haemorrhage,
 21 tourniquets, that sort of thing, yes.
 22 Q. So a person conducting the triage in your understanding
 23 would provide that basic level of intervention before
 24 they moved on?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

197

1 Q. Would that apply if they were the only paramedic there
 2 in that incident scene?
 3 A. Yes, sir. They still have to prioritise patients the
 4 best they can.
 5 Q. I'm not going to read it out, but it's there for
 6 everybody to see what the final line says.
 7 Mr Lopez, can you please go over to the next page.
 8 {INQ008372/23}. Here we must remember, mustn't we,
 9 Mr Beswick, that we are talking about Plato zones?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Which equate to, as I think we've established, or may
 12 equate, subject to the risk assessment, to the hot zone,
 13 the term that HART use. In other words the inner cordon
 14 zone?
 15 A. In response to Plato, yes, the hot zone would be the
 16 inner cordon.
 17 Q. What it says here is:
 18 "The initial priority of the casualty management
 19 process is to provide immediate life-saving
 20 interventions within warm zones to as many casualties as
 21 possible within the shortest possible time frame. This
 22 is in order to maximise survival time until definitive
 23 care can be provided."
 24 It speaks for itself?
 25 A. Yes.

198

1 Q. Applicable to the nature of the event that you were
 2 confronted with on 22 May?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Do you think?
 5 6.2 ---
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you go on and just in passing,
 7 and I'm not asking anyone to comment on this at the
 8 moment, but it seemed quite an interesting definition of
 9 Article 2 as being a qualified rather than an absolute
 10 right. That wasn't my understanding of Article 2.
 11 MR DE LA POER: No, nor mine either, but certainly we can
 12 see what it says following there, which I am sure there
 13 will be no disagreement with, namely that:
 14 "Early intervention based on an assessment of the
 15 risks and benefits is therefore required to maximise
 16 survival rates."
 17 6.2:
 18 "The Ambulance Service retains lead responsibility
 19 for the management of casualties during an MTFA.
 20 However, decisions on whether to deploy staff into warm
 21 zones will be made as part of a joint assessment of risk
 22 process conducted by the police, the Fire and Rescue
 23 Service and ambulance on scene commanders."
 24 And a reiteration of the JESIP principles, but as
 25 they apply to deployments to the warm zone?

199

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. 6.3:
 3 "The focus of deployments into warm zones is
 4 primarily to administer clinical care. In practical
 5 terms this is an assessment of a casualty rapid
 6 intervention and then moving on to the next casualty.
 7 Personnel deployed into warm zones may therefore be
 8 providing limited clinical intervention as appropriate
 9 to stop major haemorrhage (bleeding) and to use basic
 10 airway control techniques (airway adjuncts/positioning)
 11 to allow casualties to breathe unassisted."
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. It speaks for itself. As a principle, to your mind,
 14 applicable to the circumstances of 22 May?
 15 A. Yes, sir.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the major incident plan, which you
 17 were following, which allows for hot zones and warm
 18 zones, would you say again that the decision as to which
 19 was which was a joint decision in the same way as Plato
 20 zones were?
 21 A. To my understanding, only the police can call a Plato
 22 incident. So in ---
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But that didn't happen so far as you
 24 were concerned?
 25 A. No, sir, I did not get ---

200

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you were in a major incident
 2 situation?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So again, would the decision as to what
 5 was a warm zone and what was a hot zone be made jointly
 6 or would you be making that unilaterally?
 7 A. I believe that would be a joint decision made initially
 8 by the commanders and then obviously the responders
 9 going forward, if they felt it was unsafe or it was too
 10 dangerous to enter.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 MR DE LA POER: Over the page, we don't need to look at the
 13 detail, {INQ008372/24}, these will be published as
 14 evidence in the inquiry and no doubt if anyone wants to
 15 ask you or anyone else a question, they are there. 6.4:
 16 "Where ambulance personnel are present with other
 17 emergency service personnel in a warm zone, they will
 18 direct and coordinate the casualty management process,
 19 including the use of non-ambulance emergency responders
 20 to deliver life-saving care. Teams of staff will be
 21 created from those present and available from the
 22 emergency services working under the clinical guidance
 23 and supervision of an ambulance clinician. It is
 24 acknowledged that officers from the three services will
 25 have received different levels of training in respect of

201

1 the provision of first aid, and will therefore be tasked
 2 appropriately."
 3 Again, a principle applicable to 22 May so far as
 4 you were concerned?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 Q. 6.5, attacks(?). On the facts of what occurred on
 7 22 May, an important principle:
 8 "The decision to deploy emergency responders for the
 9 treatment and extrication of casualties situated in warm
 10 zones should not be delayed by the absence of one of the
 11 three emergency services."
 12 The penultimate page to look at, and we're not going
 13 to linger on this, but it is an important document that
 14 goes into the record. Can we go to {INQ008372/25},
 15 please. Here we see the first principle, which I'm not
 16 going to read out, which relates to civilians who may
 17 not wish to leave the warm zone and how that should be
 18 approached by those in charge of casualties.
 19 6.8, however:
 20 "Once a casualty has been assessed and has received
 21 initial treatment, they should be removed for further
 22 treatment at the earliest possible opportunity.
 23 Depending on circumstances, injuries (such as
 24 non-compressible penetrating torso trauma) and
 25 availability of resources, P1 casualties should be

202

1 considered for movement directly to an ALP. Retrieval
 2 of casualties to either a CCP or to a CCS will commence
 3 on the instruction of the ambulance on-scene commander;
 4 a decision taken as part of an ongoing joint assessment
 5 of risk."
 6 Again, it speaks for itself, I don't need to examine
 7 its terms with you, but do you regard that principle as
 8 being applicable to what you were presented with?
 9 A. Yes, sir.
 10 Q. Finally, {INQ008372/26}, which is over the page. We can
 11 see at 6.9:
 12 "A casualty collection point should ideally be
 13 established within a cold zone and by exception within
 14 a warm zone. The location will need to be jointly
 15 agreed following the joint assessment of risks, however
 16 it may be some distance from the more heavily resourced
 17 CCS and associated ambulance loading point."
 18 Again, we remind ourselves, although it doesn't in
 19 fact make a difference so far as the cold zone is
 20 concerned, these are Plato zones, aren't they, given
 21 these are the joint operating principles, but the warm
 22 zones includes or may include that inner cordon that
 23 you've spoken about for a major incident?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 Q. So having introduced those to you, thank you very much,

203

1 Mr Beswick.
 2 There is just one final topic area in relation to
 3 training and resources. This is to introduce the
 4 vehicles that were available so that we can understand
 5 what vehicle you were in and your colleagues as well.
 6 Mr Lopez, {INQ021481/9}, please.
 7 This perhaps gives us a pictorial depiction of the
 8 sort of vehicles you had available to you. I'm not
 9 interested in establishing the full extent of the fleet
 10 available in 2017. I'm absolutely not asking you any
 11 questions about the fleet as it is now. But there were
 12 a number of vehicles that your team used, is that right,
 13 on the night?
 14 A. Yes, sir.
 15 Q. Let's start with your vehicle. On the night you were
 16 paired with Christopher Hargreaves, is that right,
 17 together in a vehicle?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. What sort of vehicle were you driving?
 20 A. I was been driven, Chris was the driver. Top right, the
 21 Land Rover Discovery.
 22 Q. So top right, Land Rover Discovery.
 23 A. Are call signs sensitive or can we say call signs?
 24 Q. They are not in fact, so I'm happy for you to give that
 25 designation.

204

1 A. Zulu 304.
 2 Q. Your colleague, Lea Vaughan, was single—crewed, is that
 3 right?
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. Which vehicle was she in?
 6 A. Bottom left, the Nissan Navara. That is Zulu 305.
 7 Q. Initially, I think your colleagues Mr English and
 8 Mr Priest were paired together, but they changed their
 9 vehicle. Have I understood that correctly?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. From 10.30?
 12 A. The vehicle that we should have been running was broken
 13 down, it was in the workshop, so we were using the
 14 bottom vehicle, if you will.
 15 Q. The one that looks like a conventional ambulance?
 16 A. Yes, an adapted version of that. So it was the public
 17 support vehicle in replacement to the top vehicle.
 18 Q. What I'm interested in is the vehicle that they attended
 19 the scene in. Was that that vehicle or had they changed
 20 from that vehicle to another vehicle?
 21 A. They went back to station and got the middle vehicle,
 22 which is Zulu 303.
 23 Q. So that's the one that we need to think about in terms
 24 of the resources that were available at the scene. So
 25 that's the middle vehicle and that was Zulu?

205

1 A. 303.
 2 Q. How would you describe that vehicle?
 3 A. The equipment vehicle.
 4 Q. And I think, as we will discover in more detail
 5 tomorrow, that was a vehicle that you dispatched them to
 6 get before they came to the scene?
 7 A. Yes, sir.
 8 Q. And finally, Mr Devine, a colleague who in fact worked
 9 for a different Hazardous Area Response Team, but was
 10 part of your team on the night, is that right?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Which vehicle did he attend the scene in?
 13 A. He was in the Volvo, so middle right. The Volvo
 14 response car.
 15 Q. Call sign?
 16 A. Zulu 307.
 17 Q. If we go over to the next page {INQ021481/10}, we can
 18 see the command unit. As I've understood you, this
 19 isn't a vehicle that was deployed on the night; is that
 20 right?
 21 A. That's correct. It wasn't deployed.
 22 Q. Okay. Next then {INQ021481/11}. The next page, please.
 23 {INQ021481/12}. Nor was that vehicle deployed, as
 24 I understand it?
 25 A. No, sir, that was unoperational at the time.

206

1 Q. Next vehicle, please. Is that the vehicle that was
 2 collected that you've described as the equipment
 3 vehicle?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And indeed that's how it's labelled at the top. I just
 6 want to focus briefly upon what was available on that.
 7 I do not want a full inventory. I certainly don't want
 8 an inventory of what it contains now, if indeed that
 9 vehicle is still used, but would there have been
 10 stretchers of any type within that vehicle?
 11 A. Yes, sir.
 12 Q. And what sort of stretchers were there? Is that what
 13 we can see under the second bullet point, the spinal
 14 boards?
 15 A. Yes, spinal boards and the NATO stretchers as well,
 16 which is like a fabric army stretcher.
 17 Q. How many stretchers?
 18 A. I'm not sure.
 19 Q. Certainly more than one of each type though?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Would there have been tourniquets within that?
 22 A. There would have been some medical equipment, yes, sir.
 23 I expect tourniquets to be part of that.
 24 Q. Thank you. Next page, please. {INQ021481/13}.
 25 I think the vehicle on the left is the vehicle of

207

1 the type that you and Mr Hargreaves were driving?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. And the vehicle on the right is the vehicle of a type
 4 that your colleague, Ms Vaughan, was driving?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. The top entry under the discovery, MIBS stretchers.
 7 What is a MIBS stretcher?
 8 A. Multi—integrated body splint. It's a flexible stretcher
 9 that can be adapted. It was designed to manoeuvre
 10 people from submarines, I believe, so it's quite
 11 flexible and movable.
 12 Q. And we can see from the use of the plural, more than
 13 one?
 14 A. Yes, I believe we had two.
 15 Q. Again, just focusing upon stretchers, the vehicle that
 16 Ms Vaughan was driving, did that have any form of
 17 stretcher in it?
 18 A. I believe it had a scoop stretcher, which is the yellow
 19 plastic boards.
 20 Q. And again, more than one or just one?
 21 A. Just the one on that vehicle.
 22 Q. So we have dealt with all but the Volvo, I think.
 23 Over the page, please, Mr Lopez. {INQ021481/14}.
 24 Here we have it. This is Mr Devine's vehicle on the
 25 night, or one like it. Did that contain any stretchers?

208

1 A. I believe it had a MIBS stretcher, yes.
 2 Q. We will leave for tomorrow the detail of those
 3 stretchers and how they might be used, whether by
 4 members of your team, other ambulance personnel, or
 5 other emergency responders.
 6 Sir, unless you have any questions about this,
 7 I propose ---
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. They all had medical bags
 9 presumably?
 10 A. Yes, sir.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking at the Discovery, it didn't
 12 appear to on the list, but I'm sure it would have.
 13 A. Yes, it had an ambulance response bag.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 15 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we have a full day tomorrow, but
 16 I don't think I need to ask you to sit at 9.30. I hope
 17 very much that we will be able to accommodate all the
 18 evidence, given the progress we've made tonight.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. And you can be back at
 20 10 o'clock, can you?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 23 (4.58 pm)
 24 (The inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am
 25 on Thursday, 18 March 2021)

I N D E X

1
 2
 3 MR PATRICK ENNIS (affirmed)1
 4 Questions from MR GREANEY1
 5 Questions from MR WELCH108
 6 Questions from MR ATKINSON152
 7
 8 MR SIMON BESWICK (affirmed)155
 9 Questions from MR DE LA POER155
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|
| <p>A</p> <p>a3 (2) 48:14 72:10</p> <p>abbreviation (1) 26:10</p> <p>ability (1) 168:10</p> <p>able (64) 7:22 8:2,20 9:17,21,23 10:1 13:19 15:2,11 20:13,15 26:14,17 27:1,7 28:11,11 34:10 47:19 53:17 57:9,11,25 60:22 63:2 64:3,5 68:14,17,17 69:10 83:20 84:21,22,23 86:13,15 87:17 88:15 96:18 97:4,16 100:25 106:22 121:4 124:15 127:23 128:1 131:25 133:18 134:14 138:2 139:10 141:8 149:5 153:23 162:14 165:11,14 168:8 175:2 194:13 209:17</p> <p>above (7) 7:17 17:12 47:20 64:1 109:1 151:21 152:22</p> <p>absence (1) 202:10</p> <p>absolute (1) 199:9</p> <p>absolutely (3) 55:14 196:21 204:10</p> <p>absorb (1) 90:16</p> <p>abundantly (1) 137:25</p> <p>accept (1) 194:18</p> <p>accepting (1) 135:18</p> <p>access (7) 33:24 37:20 121:4 128:18 129:13 130:4 188:8</p> <p>accessed (1) 60:16</p> <p>accessible (1) 65:17</p> <p>accommodate (1) 209:17</p> <p>accord (3) 170:17 171:24 193:23</p> <p>accordance (1) 103:22</p> <p>accounting (4) 4:20 25:12 35:21 36:20</p> <p>account (7) 4:11,14,17 31:17 174:15 175:7 185:15</p> <p>accounts (3) 4:7,9 42:9</p> <p>accumulated (1) 7:5</p> <p>accurate (1) 105:24</p> <p>accurately (1) 78:5</p> <p>achieve (2) 156:11 196:8</p> <p>achieved (1) 113:18</p> <p>acknowledged (1) 201:24</p> <p>acknowledging (1) 88:22</p> <p>acronym (3) 156:14,15 190:21</p> <p>acronyms (2) 156:8,15</p> <p>across (6) 12:16 26:20 32:16 57:3 58:16 178:23</p> <p>acted (1) 171:14</p> <p>acting (3) 125:8 176:22 180:19</p> <p>action (26) 75:3 86:21 87:8 88:25 89:9,12 91:9,13 112:2 124:21 126:14 127:1,13,16 137:5,20 138:20 147:10 179:21,24 180:1,2,4,10,19,24</p> <p>actions (17) 25:9 67:9 74:25 75:5,11 88:10 93:18 94:12,14 102:16 126:23 134:16,20 136:24 137:16,17,17</p> <p>active (5) 159:15 189:13,22 190:12 194:4</p> <p>activity (1) 189:22</p> <p>actual (8) 53:19 67:6 94:19 116:22 133:2,16 180:23 194:1</p> <p>actually (36) 30:22 36:12 37:9 40:23 49:22 52:13,14 53:11 54:24 62:24 63:1 68:20 70:24 75:10 88:5,15 91:2 93:18 94:3 95:14,24 106:19 107:8 112:8 113:7 115:24 127:11,15 139:20,21 144:11 146:23 147:20 153:24 188:21</p> <p>acute (1) 190:12</p> <p>adapted (2) 205:16 208:9</p> | <p>add (1) 14:11</p> <p>addition (2) 170:2 172:1</p> <p>additional (9) 9:22 15:13 26:15 51:14 68:24 154:1 174:20 177:25 178:3</p> <p>address (3) 6:5 46:24 146:4</p> <p>adequate (3) 28:10 169:17 178:6</p> <p>adequately (2) 28:5,8</p> <p>adhered (2) 19:25 20:20</p> <p>adjourned (1) 209:24</p> <p>adjournment (1) 108:4</p> <p>adjunctpositioning (1) 200:10</p> <p>administer (3) 8:2 9:23 200:4</p> <p>administration (2) 7:20 64:10</p> <p>administrative (2) 9:7 35:6</p> <p>adopt (1) 26:7</p> <p>advanced (53) 1:14,16,17,21,24 2:3,6 9:9,15,17,22,25 10:7,9 17:2 30:3,17 32:2,15,20 33:1,17 38:4,10 41:20 42:14 46:3 48:5,24 49:7 63:19,21,22,23 65:7 66:2,22 67:1,7,13 78:1 112:12,18,20,20,22 113:16 114:1,7 118:24 121:21 123:3 153:20</p> <p>advantage (1) 194:13</p> <p>advocates (1) 108:7</p> <p>affirmed (4) 1:6 155:3 210:3,8</p> <p>afraid (7) 26:4 33:7 39:11 81:25 113:22 115:21 156:17</p> <p>after (33) 4:21,24 8:23 35:12,25 70:20,22 72:25,25 73:8 76:14 77:6 78:20 99:6 107:21 108:24 109:16 110:3,5,21 114:22 118:10 131:2 136:20 141:13 146:22 153:6 155:10 156:13,20 168:5 187:5 193:25</p> <p>aftermath (1) 14:20</p> <p>afternoon (1) 152:9</p> <p>afterwards (7) 5:19 8:11 14:15 48:7 90:13 100:12 193:24</p> <p>again (31) 3:4 8:17 9:8 21:19 22:5 24:4,22 32:14 62:2 63:21 82:5 85:10 117:12 135:23 138:11,16 146:3 159:22 164:19 171:4 182:17 186:24 193:14 194:5 200:18 201:4 202:3 203:6 188 208:15,20</p> <p>against (4) 55:20 160:3 175:2 186:21</p> <p>age (1) 101:10</p> <p>agencies (5) 94:19 153:14 158:11 191:1,3</p> <p>agency (2) 29:8 142:6</p> <p>ago (3) 17:7 56:12 165:22</p> <p>agree (19) 31:3,11,12 49:25 55:14,16 83:1 164:7,13,14 166:1 169:21,22 179:9,16 181:4 190:13 195:16 196:10</p> <p>agreed (2) 179:12 203:15</p> <p>ahead (4) 31:10 68:19 97:22 167:18</p> <p>aid (6) 15:2,14 68:14 72:15 129:20 202:1</p> <p>aideemoire (1) 71:11</p> <p>aim (2) 102:6 122:25</p> <p>air (1) 12:5</p> <p>airport (3) 12:6 171:15,21</p> <p>airwave (2) 43:7,21</p> <p>airway (11) 64:8 66:2 67:12,13,13 186:17 187:9,9,12 200:10,10</p> <p>airways (1) 64:7</p> | <p>ait (11) 26:10,15,22,23 27:5,15,22,24 145:18,19 159:18</p> <p>aits (1) 26:8</p> <p>attrained (1) 26:10</p> <p>albeit (1) 76:21</p> <p>alert (1) 46:4</p> <p>alerted (2) 51:3 95:7</p> <p>alerting (5) 46:6 55:23 74:20 93:1 121:22</p> <p>alerts (2) 43:8 74:16</p> <p>aligned (1) 102:22</p> <p>allocate (2) 145:7 147:4</p> <p>allocated (1) 42:21</p> <p>allotted (1) 149:25</p> <p>allow (3) 1:25 59:8 200:11</p> <p>allows (4) 7:20 200:17</p> <p>alluded (2) 50:13 118:8</p> <p>alluding (1) 90:13</p> <p>almost (2) 21:7 99:2</p> <p>along (6) 74:6 85:13 109:1,4 111:10 139:25</p> <p>alongside (2) 27:3 114:10 102:2 182:23 203:1</p> <p>already (21) 7:5 17:1 32:4 46:23 47:2 60:12,24 61:3 90:22 91:18 92:5,8,12,15,16 118:3 164:6 187:2 189:20 194:14,19</p> <p>als (8) 63:22 64:1,19 65:7,25 67:24,25 68:5</p> <p>also (58) 4:14 8:25 9:6,19,21 10:2,5,11 23:19 24:20 25:2,17 26:12 27:3,15 30:25 33:24 34:10,15 35:4,7 46:3 48:14 50:5 55:23 57:18 65:21 69:9,12 76:6,21 79:11 81:5 82:15 84:6 86:15 96:4 97:15 106:20 109:23 111:2 114:1 117:3 121:19 129:13 130:13 132:21 133:25,25 140:16 145:16 148:7 159:3 160:2,7,11 184:21 191:7</p> <p>altered (3) 55:7 114:13 120:8</p> <p>although (31) 17:6 30:21 39:25 41:16 45:4 48:16 57:2 71:12 75:10,21 93:16,22 99:23 106:18 117:2 121:5 127:9 132:2 138:9 139:18 143:12 150:19,19 153:19 154:1,17 164:4 165:5 176:13 177:15 203:18</p> <p>always (5) 14:23 124:5,7 173:18 184:6</p> <p>amber (6) 36:3,6 40:22 54:16 55:13 117:1</p> <p>ambulance (142) 1:15,17 5:4,6,20 6:17,20,21,22,24 7:2,5,6,14,17,22 8:21 9:4,5,18,20 11:3,4 12:5,22 13:1,8,9,10,23 14:8,12,13,19 15:6,10,20,22 16:5,6,21 20:21 21:4 25:10,25 26:7,8,9,25 30:13,20,23 32:20,22,25 33:2,4,11 34:11,20 35:9 36:14 38:3,9 41:10,19,22 43:4,11 45:21 49:3 51:11,15 54:18 55:9,17 56:12 59:2,6 67:9 69:11 75:6 79:15,25 84:21,24 86:11,20,22 87:1,3,7 89:1 92:6,9 94:12,17,19 96:1 101:15 102:3 111:5,22,23 119:9 122:20 123:22 132:5 134:21 136:16,18 137:16 142:20 143:22,23 150:7,15 153:12 156:3 159:18,24 160:11,18 163:8,12,13 167:14 177:20 182:23,25 188:8 191:5 194:21</p> | <p>199:18,23 201:16,23 203:3,17 205:15 209:4,13</p> <p>ambulances (38) 13:15 14:5,7 54:24 79:11 89:11 90:23 91:2 11:14,23,25 92:1,4,10,11,17 93:23 95:17,19,24 96:4,9,16 119:4 131:23 142:23 143:8,15,25 144:3,6,7,11,12,20 148:8,11</p> <p>american (1) 41:4</p> <p>amount (3) 6:8 28:7 184:19</p> <p>ampds (5) 35:22 36:14 41:2 55:18 56:10</p> <p>amputee (1) 168:15</p> <p>analog (1) 15:5</p> <p>ancillary (1) 169:6</p> <p>andor (4) 21:4 102:22 103:20 108:7</p> <p>annual (4) 16:24 19:9 24:18 110:7</p> <p>another (17) 35:1 67:8 68:7 73:24,24 86:24 92:13 98:1 99:7 133:1 140:24 147:25 159:17 162:16 163:10 175:8 205:20</p> <p>answer (21) 6:11 15:25 20:8,18 22:1,5,11 27:10 28:2 43:1 56:3,5 65:24 71:13 88:20 97:8 122:11 139:15 154:1 178:24 189:18</p> <p>answered (1) 44:1</p> <p>answering (1) 35:2</p> <p>answers (1) 179:5</p> <p>anticipate (1) 181:15</p> <p>anticipated (1) 53:22</p> <p>anticipating (1) 45:2</p> <p>anybody (10) 5:24 51:17 100:4 118:2 119:7,7 141:18 142:10 163:7</p> <p>anyone (10) 38:17 98:20 107:14 118:23 144:16 147:22 176:18 199:7 201:14,15</p> <p>anything (18) 12:11 16:2 34:13 39:2,5,11 55:7 71:18,19,25 79:19 93:20 98:20 101:4 107:11 119:19 142:5</p> <p>anyway (1) 140:18</p> <p>apart (3) 54:14 122:9 142:20</p> <p>apologetic (1) 54:7</p> <p>apologies (3) 32:7 120:2 123:19</p> <p>apologise (1) 103:10</p> <p>apparent (6) 87:9,11 88:13 101:2 127:9,10</p> <p>apparently (1) 133:17</p> <p>appear (5) 35:19 58:2 95:12 133:9 209:12</p> <p>appeared (3) 76:20 175:8 139:18</p> <p>appearing (1) 35:14</p> <p>appears (7) 81:2 111:4 150:7 169:19 181:20 184:11 193:17</p> <p>appliances (1) 150:4</p> <p>applicable (4) 199:1 200:14 202:3 203:8</p> <p>application (3) 25:17 106:20 186:10</p> <p>applied (2) 140:25 195:21</p> <p>applies (1) 29:18</p> <p>apply (7) 24:4 126:25 141:25 167:22 197:1 198:1 199:25</p> <p>applying (1) 121:13</p> <p>appreciate (7) 16:1,9 53:21 54:8 80:9 97:8 131:21</p> <p>approach (7) 15:17 26:6 59:23 128:21 150:13 174:7 196:5</p> <p>approached (4) 5:18 57:10 78:10 202:18</p> <p>approaches (1) 78:2</p> | <p>approachhunts (1) 129:10</p> <p>approaching (1) 55:9</p> <p>appropriate (25) 5:17,22 15:17 33:25 67:4 70:12,25 71:1 75:14 97:2 130:23 134:10,18 135:18 139:19 143:6 144:17,25 145:15 146:24 148:19 149:12 191:8 196:25 200:8</p> <p>appropriately (2) 21:1 202:2</p> <p>approximately (1) 172:16</p> <p>april (2) 9:8 32:6</p> <p>area (79) 7:7 10:12 13:10,11,12,16,19 14:4,5 26:12,14 27:14 36:9 47:11 55:25 59:21 61:1,7 82:17 128:18 129:24 130:19 153:25 154:14,16 155:11 156:6,11 157:2 158:2,24 159:8,14 160:7,12,14,19 161:3 162:7,21 163:15,23 164:20 165:13,22,23 166:3,6,18,22 167:11 171:10 172:8 174:16,17 175:3 176:10 178:25 179:4,13,25 184:22 185:22 186:1,5,5 187:24 188:4 189:12,16,22 190:2,11,14 191:17 192:7,14 204:2 206:9</p> <p>areas (14) 16:7 37:10,16 38:9 72:3 102:8 157:14,21 158:5 161:20 175:22 181:6 183:4 187:15</p> <p>arena (57) 2:9 10:12 17:23 18:10,12,22 33:5,12 35:18 36:1 37:5,6,9,16,20,22 39:3,6,10,14,18,22 40:6,19 41:18 42:7 46:19,20 48:21 50:16 59:16 66:7 70:7 77:5 102:4 110:6 114:20 116:23 120:11,14,15,24 121:2,4,6,25 122:16 128:13,16,19 129:3,20 130:12 133:2 139:23 152:2 156:21</p> <p>are (4) 41:13 132:10,14 203:20</p> <p>arising (1) 22:3</p> <p>army (1) 207:16</p> <p>arndale (1) 170:12</p> <p>around (31) 8:14 23:11 24:20,21,22 37:7,10,16,18 40:12 59:21,22 73:5 89:5 100:9 111:18,20 115:10,17 129:7,24 130:1 138:9 141:7 142:22 152:17 155:21 159:24 161:20 177:4 191:16</p> <p>arranged (1) 103:21</p> <p>arrangement (1) 30:8</p> <p>arrangements (1) 136:3</p> <p>arrest (2) 65:10 67:6</p> <p>arrests (1) 11:6</p> <p>arrival (7) 57:21 72:25 78:15 89:1,16 106:4 140:14</p> <p>arrive (8) 2:9 51:20 54:22 56:20 64:21 87:13 127:7 131:7 131:15 119:6 145:1 160:24</p> <p>arrived (13) 60:4 62:14,21 66:7 70:22 83:17 127:4 128:8 131:2,6 147:20 149:1 153:2</p> <p>arriving (6) 21:5 50:20 64:24 104:25 120:7 129:14</p> <p>article (3) 4:23 199:9,10</p> <p>articulate (1) 179:5</p> <p>articulated (1) 175:12</p> <p>ascertain (4) 98:3 125:21 127:12 147:11</p> <p>ask (55) 1:5 3:7,10 11:17 14:21 15:25 17:5 22:2 27:9 28:1,1 31:18 34:18 36:19 37:3,5 44:19 45:16 50:25 51:2 56:2 62:10 64:11 71:5,18 72:6 73:13 77:13</p> | <p>78:23 98:13 99:15 101:19 107:9,17,22 108:15,17,19 113:8,23 116:12,13 118:22 124:19 130:21 135:22 139:14 149:10 150:2 154:5 161:4 164:18 188:17 201:15 209:16</p> <p>asked (16) 6:5 21:22 36:21 51:7 52:4 91:11,15,17 129:18 139:3,7 144:6,11,12 161:8 165:5</p> <p>asking (11) 5:2 27:11,13 81:20 92:17 95:3 143:18 148:21 161:5 199:7 204:10</p> <p>asks (2) 79:2 151:18</p> <p>aspect (3) 80:16 98:13 155:24</p> <p>aspects (3) 153:3,8 169:5</p> <p>assess (3) 105:6 140:12 141:2</p> <p>assessed (2) 96:9 202:20</p> <p>assessing (1) 185:15</p> <p>assessment (16) 9:6 102:18 104:24 105:9,11 106:1 174:9 190:16 192:13 197:8 198:12 199:14,21 200:5 203:4,15</p> <p>assessments (2) 168:9 190:7</p> <p>assign (5) 42:20 52:9,11 53:19 143:24</p> <p>assigned (4) 47:12,21,23 49:13</p> <p>assigning (1) 153:11</p> <p>assist (8) 9:20 83:20 91:24 143:25</p> <p>assistance (9) 4:3 24:25 34:14 49:8 67:25 70:3,14 155:5 175:3</p> <p>assisting (1) 158:11</p> <p>associated (2) 57:17 203:17</p> <p>assume (2) 110:24 126:23</p> <p>assumed (7) 58:6 106:3 130:17 132:5 143:3 149:19,22</p> <p>assumes (2) 9:1 87:8</p> <p>assuming (1) 127:2</p> <p>assumption (5) 59:10 67:20 127:3,6 134:4</p> <p>assumptions (1) 87:12</p> <p>atkinson (6) 151:17 152:7,8,9 154:5 210:6</p> <p>attached (2) 83:12 107:1</p> <p>attack (31) 2:10 4:21,24 17:23,25 18:10,12,22 25:2 26:1 29:1 99:20 110:5,21 114:20 115:20 122:2,6,14 152:2 157:9 158:15 160:17 161:20 164:17 169:15 171:6 173:12 194:15 195:14,20</p> <p>attacks (4) 158:12 161:2,16 202:6</p> <p>attempt (3) 75:22 125:5 150:18</p> <p>attempted (1) 111:13</p> <p>attend (13) 14:13 30:19 42:4 63:13 65:5 112:18 113:22 114:15 119:6 145:1 160:24 164:24 206:12</p> <p>attendance (7) 33:22 34:1 91:13 103:24 145:2 147:3 152:15</p> <p>attended (7) 29:11 113:17 130:2,13 145:19 151:25 205:18</p> <p>attending (5) 38:23 66:10,20 131:4 150:11</p> <p>attention (9) 35:11 36:24 38:6 41:1 46:9 54:18 55:5 116:25 151:9</p> <p>audio (4) 51:5 73:15 83:6 85:6</p> <p>audit (1) 10:22</p> <p>august (2) 170:14,15</p> <p>austin (1) 108:15</p> | <p>automated (1) 63:16</p> <p>automatic (2) 21:7 190:18</p> <p>automatically (1) 116:18</p> <p>availability (1) 202:25</p> <p>available (25) 35:7 50:5 61:23 91:14 92:19 111:4,9 113:3,4 114:19 118:12 142:20 143:15,16 144:3,3 153:25 154:4 173:13 201:21 204:4,8,10 205:24 207:6</p> <p></p> |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| <p>basic (21) 24:16 63:11,23 64:18 65:2 66:8,10,11 67:11,12 68:13 128:13 130:20 186:7,9,13 187:10,11 197:12,23 200:9</p> <p>basically (2) 183:16 197:10</p> <p>basics (5) 125:22 147:12 193:12,15,20</p> <p>basis (6) 21:4 91:17 118:21 132:20 136:12 192:24</p> <p>bbc (5) 4:14,20 5:11 69:2 99:18</p> <p>bear (6) 3:16 82:18 83:22 85:2 161:14 194:7</p> <p>bearing (6) 62:19 65:4 66:19 160:14 165:10 181:13</p> <p>became (2) 35:13 101:2</p> <p>become (7) 120:22 121:16 122:17 123:13 124:24 130:3 173:4</p> <p>becoming (3) 6:24 14:19 184:19</p> <p>before (59) 2:15 13:9,13,15 18:9 26:20 37:6 40:13 42:10 45:13 47:8,11,23 48:14 51:4 61:4,25 88:17 89:25 90:9 92:7 93:4 100:4 105:17 110:23 120:6,7 126:10,20,22 130:14 131:5 132:15 135:3 140:3,23 141:21 142:14,19 151:18 152:2 153:5,7 154:11,25 155:13 163:1 165:1 170:8 172:16 178:17 187:23 188:19 191:25 193:4 194:9 197:23 199:6 206:6</p> <p>beforehand (1) 193:7</p> <p>begin (3) 47:22 59:3 98:13</p> <p>begin (6) 1:8 5:2 47:6 53:14 75:5 173:7</p> <p>beginning (5) 57:13 93:16 94:1 121:24 165:6</p> <p>behalf (7) 107:17,18,22,23,25 108:10,16</p> <p>behind (2) 50:22 59:5</p> <p>being (7) 3:15 6:2,5,10 9:20 12:18 14:8 17:1 21:21 32:5 33:19 35:17,18 40:9 46:3 54:12 55:21 58:21 74:3 77:12 79:16 83:20 85:4 88:15 90:14 105:15,16,23 106:22 114:19 115:13 116:6 118:2 122:14,16 124:9 125:10 126:24 128:6,25 131:8,25 132:22 134:7 135:21 140:9,25 141:18,19 142:5 143:5 144:1 148:1,7 149:3 152:24 153:7,21 156:2 162:18 164:8 168:8 173:24 175:19 177:5,24 187:15 193:11 199:9 203:8</p> <p>belief (1) 48:20</p> <p>believe (41) 4:3,8 17:1 19:7 20:11,18,19 36:13 40:12 41:5 52:2 54:15 55:6 62:22 63:3 66:13 69:7 72:25 83:15 94:5 104:11 109:12 113:3 128:10 134:19 137:24 140:8 149:21 153:6 165:16 171:7 174:9 178:19 179:2,5 192:2 201:7 208:10,14,18 209:1</p> <p>believed (2) 90:21 151:20</p> <p>beneficial (4) 42:19 71:13 146:1 147:2</p> <p>benefit (1) 15:15</p> <p>benefits (1) 199:15</p> <p>bereaved (3) 107:24 108:10,16</p> <p>best (13) 19:22 39:24 89:3 94:10 116:5 128:18 129:13 141:25 156:8,18 171:18 175:15 198:4</p> <p>bestplaced (1) 22:5</p> | <p>beswick (12) 154:15 155:1 3:7,19,20 156:19 161:8 181:4 198:9 204:1 210:8</p> <p>bestwicks (1) 155:10</p> <p>better (7) 84:24 96:18 97:12 113:19 131:13 139:21 144:21</p> <p>between (20) 1:20 7:14 8:18 9:15 12:18 20:17 26:22 52:6 82:20,24 95:11 112:22 142:4 147:22 148:3 150:5 183:21 185:3 188:24 189:8</p> <p>beyond (1) 172:25</p> <p>big (2) 12:13 185:1</p> <p>biological (4) 25:1,22 145:13 157:22</p> <p>bit (15) 51:18,24 56:17 72:18 97:22 110:8 114:24 115:8 119:24 126:20 152:18 156:16 164:19 177:6 183:7</p> <p>blackpool (1) 12:6 18:9 81:18 83:6</p> <p>blankets (1) 107:3</p> <p>bleeding (1) 200:9</p> <p>bleep (1) 52:14</p> <p>block (1) 60:15</p> <p>bls (11) 63:14 64:2,16,18,25 65:14,25 66:8,12 68:4,24</p> <p>blue (3) 47:16,18 60:24</p> <p>board (1) 126:2</p> <p>boards (3) 207:14,15 208:19</p> <p>body (2) 160:1 208:8</p> <p>bodyworm (5) 72:12 78:17 80:17 81:18 83:6</p> <p>bomb (31) 39:25 40:9,16 55:4 58:13,15 66:21 76:9,12,15,21 100:8,14 116:1,2,3,6,7,20 120:12,19 121:15 132:22 133:2,8,16,25 150:6,12 151:1,7</p> <p>bombblast (1) 168:17</p> <p>bombexplosion (3) 116:8 150:9,23</p> <p>bombing (1) 40:24</p> <p>book (5) 61:18,25 62:6 124:15 135:23</p> <p>booking (6) 79:1,3,16,18 80:20 138:25</p> <p>both (19) 1:11 2:17 3:6 9:18 15:16 49:25 57:6 60:16 64:14,23 65:25 68:4 69:1 129:6 160:18,21,22,24 168:6</p> <p>both (1) 49:23</p> <p>bottleneck (1) 60:19</p> <p>bottom (5) 17:22 84:15 110:13 205:6,14</p> <p>boundaries (1) 164:1</p> <p>box (10) 1:4 125:4,7 181:24 182:10,21</p> <p>boxes (1) 103:21</p> <p>break (13) 42:11,11 43:10 44:24 45:11,13 67:17 99:6 108:1 154:11,14,23 155:1</p> <p>breaks (1) 45:7</p> <p>breathes (1) 200:11</p> <p>breathing (1) 36:18</p> <p>bridge (1) 139:25</p> <p>brief (2) 59:21 157:1</p> <p>briefing (2) 38:16 69:11</p> <p>briefly (4) 85:15 125:3 157:16 207:6</p> <p>bring (8) 109:22 124:20 133:14 167:25 193:5,8 195:2,11</p> <p>british (2) 130:15,18</p> <p>broadcast (1) 4:21</p> <p>broaden (1) 14:21</p> <p>broader (2) 20:23 24:1</p> <p>broken (1) 205:12</p> <p>bronze (19) 24:22 30:14 68:9 103:24 111:17,22,25 123:14,22 124:24</p> | <p>152:14,25 153:4,17,24,25 177:20,21 191:7</p> <p>brook (1) 59:4</p> <p>brought (2) 109:8 162:12</p> <p>broughton (1) 49:2</p> <p>bsc (1) 9:11</p> <p>btp (10) 80:19 84:5,6,12 85:12 137:23 140:5 141:19 142:3 147:22</p> <p>building (1) 129:8</p> <p>bullet (4) 146:9 163:3,11 207:13</p> <p>business (1) 143:24</p> <p>bus (3) 92:6 131:10,22</p> <p>button (2) 43:8,23</p> | <p>196:5,18 198:23 200:4 201:20</p> <p>career (3) 16:20 179:11 194:3</p> <p>carefully (3) 27:11 31:15 169:18</p> <p>carl (1) 84:6</p> <p>carney (6) 48:5,22 51:7 52:12,25 58:14</p> <p>carry (7) 13:4 46:3 60:14 65:21 138:17 168:8,10</p> <p>carrying (1) 169:5</p> <p>cars (1) 9:5</p> <p>casaded (1) 185:25</p> <p>cases (2) 15:19,21</p> <p>casualties (45) 62:8 68:15 73:21 74:1 76:13,17 80:12 83:18 87:25 88:14,14 90:19 91:5,18 95:12,20 96:14,24 97:1,11,15,18 98:12 120:6 125:6 136:2,7 138:13 143:4 151:9,12 163:4 168:15 174:11 183:25 184:20,25 196:9 198:20 199:19 200:11 202:9,18,25 203:2</p> <p>casualty (54) 15:12,13 25:19 51:14 146:15 159:4,5 181:22 182:3,8,11 183:8,11,14,16,21 184:1,2,5,7,12,15,18,21 185:4,5,15,18,19,21,24 186:4,19,23 187:1,3,8,17,20 191:17 195:3,4,12 196:18,19,20 197:9 198:18 200:5,6 201:18 202:20 203:12</p> <p>catastrophic (5) 186:15 187:10 197:4,11,20</p> <p>catastrophically (1) 182:18</p> <p>categories (2) 46:5 116:11</p> <p>category (3) 57:9 103:19 197:1</p> <p>category (2) 46:7 69:23</p> <p>cathedral (1) 59:22</p> <p>caught (2) 36:23 116:24</p> <p>cause (4) 101:5 131:3 136:2 185:13</p> <p>caused (2) 150:17 151:14</p> <p>causes (1) 136:1</p> <p>cbm (2) 29:13 163:13</p> <p>cbme (1) 177:17</p> <p>ccp (5) 182:6,8,10 183:7 203:2</p> <p>ccs (5) 182:11,21 187:13 203:2,17</p> <p>cctv (1) 31:19</p> <p>cell (12) 41:11,21 49:4,5,6,22 50:3,4 52:25 55:23 120:14 145:7</p> <p>cells (1) 75:11</p> <p>central (11) 10:8,11 32:22 33:2,4,11 34:20 43:11 59:2 112:21 118:24</p> <p>centrality (1) 3:14</p> <p>centre (43) 15:6 33:21 34:17 35:23 37:18 41:23 42:17,20 43:7,8 49:2,7,9 51:23 53:7,12 54:20,24 57:1,5,7 74:17,25 75:12 84:23 87:19 89:8 91:10 92:3 96:3 103:16 129:9 131:4 132:19 133:5 134:17 140:4 144:2 145:7 168:3 170:12 181:20,25</p> <p>centres (1) 12:22</p> <p>certain (15) 16:7 25:21 27:2 30:12 31:2 46:4 55:11 22:2 56:8,11 116:18 145:21,22 160:4 182:3</p> <p>chair (2) 137:1 146:12</p> <p>chairman (6) 23:6 55:11 56:2 95:3,19 129:4</p> <p>chairmans (1) 98:14</p> <p>challenges (1) 174:10</p> <p>chance (4) 17:18 30:10</p> | <p>44:24 167:18</p> <p>changed (6) 56:6,13 115:16 130:9 205:8,19</p> <p>changes (3) 25:20 56:8 115:9</p> <p>changing (1) 41:6</p> <p>chaotic (2) 53:20 57:6</p> <p>chapter (5) 2:25 3:1,4 122:4 165:7</p> <p>characteristics (1) 190:8</p> <p>charge (3) 141:15,19 202:18</p> <p>check (2) 85:15 127:18</p> <p>checked (1) 77:14</p> <p>checking (1) 50:14</p> <p>chemical (6) 25:1,22 145:12 157:22 159:3 168:18</p> <p>chest (1) 67:12</p> <p>chickens (4) 51:19,24 53:2 56:17</p> <p>childcare (1) 30:7</p> <p>choice (1) 130:1</p> <p>choices (1) 121:9</p> <p>choose (1) 64:22</p> <p>chose (1) 169:18</p> <p>chosen (1) 119:16</p> <p>chris (1) 204:20</p> <p>chronopher (1) 204:16</p> <p>chronology (3) 85:8 94:24 135:7</p> <p>circled (1) 85:25</p> <p>circuit (1) 146:20</p> <p>circumstances (5) 31:3 114:9 176:25 200:14 202:23</p> <p>city (86) 2:13,21,22 3:8 15:6 16:15 20:5,6,19,24 21:1,19 23:8,22 37:11,13,18 45:24 62:9,23 64:13 70:21,22 71:2,3,20,22 76:3 77:11 79:12,17 80:1,6 82:4 84:12 85:14,23 86:7 87:20 88:2,5,8,11 89:2,10,14,18,25 90:10,20 93:5 96:8,21,23 97:24 98:5,14,19,25 99:13 100:2 101:2,6 107:10 130:1 134:7 138:1,9,10,21 139:5,13,17 140:1,6,24 141:1,11,14,20,22 148:2,5,23 171:15,21</p> <p>civilians (1) 202:16</p> <p>clarify (2) 120:23 140:2</p> <p>clarity (2) 156:9 178:23</p> <p>classification (2) 105:11 106:1</p> <p>clear (19) 3:6 20:18 66:5,6 76:23 104:14,16 106:3 115:24 124:2 137:25 149:11 157:7 161:5,24 162:12 171:23 176:6 192:3</p> <p>clearing (18) 25:19 51:14 146:15 182:12 183:9,22 184:2,13 185:4,20 186:23 187:1,3,17,20 191:17 195:4 196:20</p> <p>clearly (8) 22:22 29:21 134:10 138:8,22 139:11 146:11 165:4</p> <p>click (2) 36:17,18</p> <p>clicked (2) 37:4 116:5</p> <p>clicking (1) 39:17</p> <p>clinical (24) 1:17 7:21 8:21,22,25 9:3,18,25 10:4,8,17,22 11:2 34:25 42:16 51:14 104:25 153:21 163:7 168:10 196:5 200:4,8 201:22</p> <p>clinician (4) 9:17 96:1 138:20 201:23</p> <p>clinicians (9) 8:22 9:18,20 12:22 16:6 67:9 136:16 145:23 163:12</p> <p>close (6) 42:7,8 73:22 185:22 191:23 192:19</p> <p>closely (2) 16:16 150:14</p> <p>closer (2) 161:14 184:22</p> <p>coat (1) 83:13</p> <p>code (6) 39:24 40:16</p> | <p>55:3,4,22,25</p> <p>coded (1) 35:21</p> <p>coding (6) 39:23 40:24,25 41:1 116:24 117:1</p> <p>cold (19) 25:14 98:16 142:14 161:21 165:14 187:21,24,24 188:2,7,21,22 189:4,9,9 191:13,22 203:13,19</p> <p>colleague (8) 57:2 114:10 121:21 164:16,24 205:2 206:8 208:4</p> <p>colleagues (10) 57:1,4 70:22 104:19 113:22 119:1 148:23 149:10 204:5 205:7</p> <p>collect (1) 70:25</p> <p>collected (1) 207:2</p> <p>collection (22) 82:8 183:8,11,15,16 184:2,5,8,15,18,21 185:6,15,18,21,24 186:4,19 187:8 195:3 196:19 203:12</p> <p>collision (3) 117:13,24,25</p> <p>colocate (3) 23:14,19 192:11</p> <p>colocated (1) 20:9</p> <p>colocating (1) 89:7</p> <p>colocation (7) 19:15 22:16,17,18,19 23:5 138:5</p> <p>colour (9) 35:21 36:1,3 41:14 54:14 55:6,6 116:24 117:1</p> <p>colours (1) 116:11</p> <p>combination (1) 96:25</p> <p>combinations (1) 156:14</p> <p>come (35) 15:11 26:20 35:11 53:3 54:10 60:2 61:10 64:12 67:14,24 75:19 81:11 86:24 91:20,23 92:1,20 93:2 98:3,4 104:20 105:8 110:15 120:10 130:5 151:7 161:23 164:3 165:4 176:8,17 178:9 186:2 188:11 194:6</p> <p>comes (6) 52:14,15 107:1 116:20 126:12 189:20</p> <p>coming (10) 35:25 40:5 100:11 132:12 155:15 163:2 174:20 175:8 177:8 181:25</p> <p>command (28) 20:25 22:19,20 23:10 50:6,8,18,23 68:18 89:4 97:17 102:17,23 103:23 104:4,8 119:13 121:23 123:1 138:6 141:3 147:21 176:3 188:14 190:20 191:11,20 206:18</p> <p>commander (32) 24:22 25:11 27:7 68:9,10,21 69:3,5,14 70:6 97:6 103:24 111:17,17,22,25 119:14 123:14,22 124:24 125:9 126:25 152:1,25,25 153:4 176:1,3,14 191:7 203:3</p> <p>commanders (15) 30:15 68:7,16 75:7,8 153:25 177:20,21 188:10,12 191:1,6 199:23 201:8</p> <p>commence (1) 203:2</p> <p>comment (7) 20:1,13 53:3,4,5 57:5 199:7</p> <p>commit (1) 175:25</p> <p>common (2) 31:4 57:20</p> <p>commonly (1) 196:3</p> <p>communicate (8) 20:11 23:9,14 74:11 107:15 165:7 192:12 193:2</p> <p>communication (18) 19:17 20:17 30:24 48:5,9,10 102:18 105:8 116:14 132:19 134:6,7 142:2,3,7,13,16,25 156:3,13,13,16,25 48:13,13</p> <p>community (1) 136:1</p> | <p>competencies (2) 167:13 169:8</p> <p>complete (5) 8:8 9:11 99:4 154:18 169:3</p> <p>completed (3) 1:23 8:15 103:7</p> <p>completely (3) 53:25 55:14,16</p> <p>completing (1) 8:14</p> <p>completion (1) 111:8</p> <p>complex (1) 7:22</p> <p>complicated (1) 30:1</p> <p>composition (1) 196:18</p> <p>compressions (1) 67:12</p> <p>computer (3) 36:17 46:2 52:15</p> <p>concept (4) 161:1 164:19 166:18 188:14</p> <p>concern (5) 14:1,24 79:10,11 195:17</p> <p>concerned (11) 11:14 20:21 22:12 35:9 65:23 66:4 87:2 128:3 200:24 202:4 203:20</p> <p>concerns (1) 6:4</p> <p>concert (9) 37:24 38:14 100:10,10,13,15 120:20 121:2,14</p> <p>concerts (5) 38:12 120:16 130:2,3,8</p> <p>conclude (2) 99:6 155:24</p> <p>concourse (2) 23:12 84:15</p> <p>conduct (2) 6:1 172:2</p> <p>conducted (3) 17:8 196:17 199:22</p> <p>conducting (2) 69:11 197:22</p> <p>confident (4) 19:7 62:20,20 145:5</p> <p>confirmed (1) 157:20</p> <p>confirmation (8) 13:11,13,14 62:17 135:21 151:19,24 195:3</p> <p>confirmation (1) 123:16</p> <p>confirmed (4) 98:9 111:12 133:3,17</p> <p>confirming (2) 61:12,14</p> <p>confronted (4) 28:6 70:4 175:15 199:2</p> <p>confusing (2) 144:9 156:16</p> <p>confusion (4) 144:19 149:2 163:22,25</p> <p>conscious (2) 124:9,9</p> <p>consequence (2) 28:19 40:25</p> <p>consequences (2) 54:11 74:24</p> <p>consequently (1) 196:4</p> <p>consider (5) 15:3,17 123:22 167:18 174:14</p> <p>considerable (1) 13:14</p> <p>consideration (3) 68:11 122:18 196:6</p> <p>considered (6) 57:19 65:18 100:18,21 151:11 203:1</p> <p>considering (1) 138:7</p> <p>consistency (1) 58:16</p> <p>consistent (4) 58:13 76:20,21 130:8</p> <p>contact (7) 12:19 18:2 73:20,23 108:7 130:5,23</p> <p>contacted (2) 49:20,20</p> <p>contacting (1) 50:3</p> <p>contain (2) 69:8 208:25</p> <p>contained (2) 69:15 193:9</p> <p>containing (1) 70:6</p> <p>contains (3) 65:9 69:21 207:8</p> <p>contemplate (1) 100:20</p> <p>contemporaneous (1) 72:8</p> <p>content (1) 178:18</p> <p>context (6) 11:24 47:15 97:23 99:14 162:18 188:1</p> <p>continuation (4) 169:13,4,7</p> <p>continue (5) 71:1 80:18 136:22 187:17,23</p> <p>continuing (1) 85:12</p> <p>continuing (3) 81:17 89:9 182:22</p> |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|

continuous (1) 167:12
contribute (1) 146:13
control (52) 6:1 12:21
 33:20,24 34:17 35:23
 41:20,22 43:8 49:8 53:9,12
 54:20,23 63:1,3 73:10
 74:20,25 80:17 81:5,8,15
 86:17 89:8 91:10 96:3 98:2
 102:17,23 103:23 107:18
 116:17 120:25 129:9
 130:24 131:4,18 132:19
 133:4 134:16 138:6 145:6
 146:22 147:7 169:6
 188:11,15 190:20
 191:11,16 200:10
controlled (1) 65:15
convenient (2) 189:7 194:8
conventional (1) 205:15
conversation (30) 44:6 48:19
 49:16,17 50:1
 52:2,2,8,12,19,22 57:11
 58:24 72:21 73:4 77:7
 78:13,14,18 79:20
 81:4,15,17 82:3,20 84:4,7
 90:10 113:21 121:20
conversations (6) 31:21,22
 82:19,24 90:1,6
convey (1) 56:22
coordinate (4) 20:10 191:2
 192:12 201:18
coordinating (3) 141:16,21
 153:9
coordination (5) 19:17
 124:12 147:19,21 192:19
copy (1) 48:14
cordon (11) 162:9 166:8,9,19
 173:19,25 189:25 190:1
 198:13,16 203:22
cordoning (1) 163:6
core (1) 167:13
corresponders (1) 104:19
correct (55) 1:13 3:23,24
 4:4,22 6:19,23 8:10 10:9
 14:25 17:24 18:3 19:9,10
 33:3 35:10 37:2 38:25
 42:24,25 44:6,7 46:20
 48:2,3 49:12 50:21 53:1
 62:16 63:15 69:16,17 95:9
 98:6 114:20,21 122:24
 135:21 147:1 151:5 155:22
 156:23 162:18,19 163:17
 166:5 175:23 178:2 183:23
 184:7 189:15 195:15 205:4
 206:21 208:2
correctly (4) 10:2 102:24
 193:19 205:9
couldnt (11) 27:17 60:15
 75:4 100:20 130:6,16
 139:3 140:14 145:9
 189:18,19
count (1) 18:2
couple (6) 110:20,24 164:18
 165:22 171:3 174:13
course (60) 2:24 7:9,19 8:14
 11:19 16:18,20 51:16,20
 56:20 57:16 58:23 61:19
 66:23 67:1 71:5,17 76:5,6
 79:15 80:13,14 81:12 82:5
 83:2 86:25 88:18 89:20,23
 99:9 107:12,23 108:8
 109:25 110:1 114:23
 121:12 122:4 125:10 126:2
 135:10 136:4 143:6
 148:16,18 167:16,21
 168:8,14,17,19,21 170:13
 177:3,14,20,21 179:10
 187:7 193:16
courses (2) 17:25 103:25
cover (2) 30:20 155:8
covered (2) 107:3 187:2
covers (4) 10:11 157:15
 169:4,7
crash (1) 171:20
created (4) 115:12 157:8
 165:11 201:21
creation (1) 157:11

credible (1) 5:17
crew (6) 14:12,13 15:6,10
 125:8,11
crews (1) 14:23
critical (4) 162:25 128:25
 143:5 148:18
criticising (2) 5:24 57:4
criticism (4) 56:25 131:25
 149:6 161:7
crop (3) 168:3,24 181:19
cross (1) 122:1
crowds (3) 61:4 100:12
 121:10
cruciform (10) 69:8,16,20
 70:13 71:8,19,23
 106:14,18 119:15
csattt (1) 123:23
csattt (2) 102:13,20
csattt (1) 138:5
culminate (1) 168:21
culminates (1) 168:14
cumbria (9) 6:21 7:1,5,7
 11:22 12:2,25 14:18 15:16
currently (2) 1:17 95:13
curriculum (1) 167:13
cut (2) 80:18 178:23
cylinder (1) 65:21

D

d (1) 210:1
daily (1) 21:3
dangerous (2) 173:11 201:10
date (5) 26:5 27:14 111:5,8,8
dated (2) 3:21 4:2
dates (2) 18:7 19:5
dauid (1) 155:19
davies (1) 107:19
day (6) 109:7,25 114:16
 153:24 154:4 209:15
days (4) 4:24 29:11 90:8
 110:24
de (19) 77:18 154:15,25
 155:4,5,17 156:17 161:16
 176:5 185:2 188:23 189:7
 190:8,20 194:12 199:11
 201:12 209:15 210:9
dead (1) 69:25
deal (28) 2:18,19 3:4 6:13
 18:10 28:9,25 31:25 37:3
 57:9 72:4,5 79:10 99:23
 106:9 107:10 119:4 142:24
 144:13 146:25 150:6,6
 164:5 169:15 170:1,5
 171:5 194:13
dealing (11) 2:21 24:6 32:14
 35:6 40:3 145:12 155:9,13
 163:21 170:8 196:8
dealings (1) 130:9
deals (1) 177:13
death (4) 3:5 162:10 181:11
 208:22
deansgate (4) 59:20,22
 128:9 130:4
debrief (7) 14:15 101:14,16
 102:4,6 193:5,16
deceased (2) 3:11 181:10
december (1) 7:11
decide (5) 41:25 42:3,22
 86:14 117:16
decided (6) 15:9 52:11 68:19
 117:22 120:1 127:5
deciding (1) 150:4
decision (26) 43:3 70:20,23
 87:14 95:23,25 105:17
 121:18 141:9
 175:18,19,23,24,25
 176:1,4,9,13,14,18
 200:18,19 201:4,7 202:8
 203:4
decisionmaking (1) 174:8
decisions (3) 34:15 175:15
 199:20
declare (8) 25:8 94:4
 134:3,19 135:18
 136:5,12,16

declared (21) 74:14,18
 75:2,16 92:20 93:15,17
 94:1,7,14,21 95:7 126:21
 136:18,25 137:2,13,18
 142:3 145:3 146:21
declaring (5) 90:24 93:11
 94:14 134:11 142:6
decontamination (4)
 145:14,25 146:11 159:3
deemed (1) 153:22
defibrillator (4) 63:15,16,17
 65:4
defibrillators (1) 63:16
define (1) 182:17
defined (3) 188:3 189:17
 195:4
definite (2) 23:1,1
definitely (2) 79:20 153:8
definition (5) 25:7 135:20
 166:7 195:9 199:8
definitive (1) 198:22
degree (7) 1:24 7:19 9:11
 25:7 30:25 54:3 88:10
delay (12) 13:15 14:6 15:21
 16:14 45:13 70:24 105:19
 131:3,11 137:15 185:2,13
 148:8 16:4 105:18
 134:16,20 202:10
delaying (1) 93:20
delays (2) 15:20 119:4
deliberate (1) 150:18
deliver (2) 127:24 201:20
delivered (2) 152:21 178:20
delivering (1) 196:18
delve (1) 2:15
demonstrate (1) 88:11
department (2) 102:22
 109:13
dependent (1) 119:20
depending (3) 33:13,15
 202:23
depends (3) 33:6 184:24
 190:15
depiction (1) 204:7
deploy (10) 14:23 42:24
 64:22,23 65:25 66:22
 118:22 175:23 199:20
 202:8
deployed (11) 66:7,11 70:7
 95:24 125:10 173:24
 174:17 200:7 206:19,21,23
deploying (1) 68:4
deployment (5) 16:6,14
 34:16 113:24 123:4
deployments (3) 168:9
 199:25 200:3
describe (10) 8:17 18:16
 37:15,17 48:24 64:15
 69:19 74:3 166:8 206:2
described (5) 14:22 75:21
 76:17 176:13 207:2
describing (6) 13:22 55:12
 95:13 106:15,17 165:13
description (4) 40:9
 105:12,13 196:22
designated (3) 165:9 181:6
 186:2
designating (1) 161:20
designation (2) 191:8 204:25
designed (5) 46:4 102:15
 107:2 167:13 208:9
desire (4) 5:12,25 79:13
 139:11
desks (1) 49:6
destination (1) 128:23
detail (11) 13:22 17:11 24:10
 69:18 70:1 89:13 161:23
 176:17 201:13 206:4 209:2
detailed (1) 76:2
details (2) 46:25 51:6
determine (2) 147:14 191:6
detonated (1) 133:16
detonation (2) 133:2 141:14
detour (1) 59:21
detrimet (1) 97:14
develop (4) 15:25 139:2

148:20 172:12
developing (2) 132:9 144:15
develops (1) 174:3
device (4) 82:7,11,16 195:19
devices (4) 81:22,24 82:2
 148:11
devine (1) 206:8
devines (1) 208:24
diagram (1) 181:20
diagrammatically (1) 183:3
didnt (47) 6:3 22:24 29:24
 30:4,6 38:1 39:4,8,11
 40:15 47:4 52:4 60:13 62:7
 66:17 67:23 68:20 70:9
 79:24 87:5,14 88:21,23
 90:16,17 91:2 92:17 96:12
 99:22 105:19 112:14,18
 121:7 127:17 128:13 131:2
 137:15 142:11 150:23
 169:24 175:5 178:23
 180:3,12,19 200:23 209:11
died (1) 137:8
difference (10) 1:20 7:14
 8:17 9:14 26:21 44:4 54:16
 71:21 94:6 203:19
differences (1) 189:8
different (44) 5:19 15:4
 22:22,23 23:20 24:1 27:12
 30:21 61:25 67:5 82:23,24
 116:11,11 126:1 130:4
 139:24 149:14 151:9
 158:5,23 159:10,11
 160:8,9 162:18 163:18,19
 164:9 167:5 169:17 170:18
 171:24 186:16 187:14,15
 188:18 192:23 196:3,4
 197:14,15 201:25 206:9
differently (1) 28:17
difficult (18) 8:20 11:4
 12:15,19 20:1 21:20 28:2
 57:8 62:12 86:3 88:16
 101:1 106:21,24 107:4
 120:4 148:17 164:10
difficulties (1) 106:10
digest (1) 113:6
dimension (1) 29:18
diploma (3) 7:19 8:9,14
direct (3) 76:16 130:9 201:18
directing (1) 79:22
direction (6) 47:10 59:19
 60:18 78:4 102:12 118:1
directions (2) 47:6 60:16
directly (7) 13:8 43:4
 116:17,20 177:15 184:2
 203:1
disagree (1) 164:7
disagreement (1) 199:13
discipline (1) 24:4
disciplined (3) 16:11 99:11
 126:5
disciplines (2) 172:22,23
discover (1) 206:4
discovery (4) 204:21,22
 208:6 209:11
discretion (1) 42:22
discuss (3) 20:5 102:20
 163:13
discussed (1) 103:5
discussion (4) 113:16
 148:3,7,10
dispatch (2) 36:15 54:24
dispatched (1) 206:5
dispatcher (1) 54:18
dispatchers (2) 49:9 54:23
disregarding (1) 91:16
distance (3) 33:8 70:19
 203:16
distinct (2) 27:21 164:1
distinction (2) 166:1 188:24
distinguish (1) 150:5
distorted (1) 152:1
distracted (1) 97:12
distressing (2) 3:16 77:12
diverting (1) 135:9
doctors (1) 51:10
document (14) 18:19,20

72:10 101:19 102:21 109:7
 110:12 113:9 134:24
 162:16 168:3 193:6 195:5
 202:13
documents (3) 17:19 18:18
 165:21
does (37) 4:24 30:22 31:22
 36:25 45:25 47:1,13 49:21
 53:2,24 56:7,10 71:13,15
 78:5,7 103:23 104:1,23
 118:20,21 126:16,17,20
 138:12 143:14 144:8
 146:10 161:14 179:18
 181:14 182:9,10 188:23
 193:23 197:5,18
doesnt (12) 40:21 54:17
 57:25 94:8 107:14 111:13
 118:5 121:1 136:15 137:15
 144:6 203:18
doing (7) 22:12 30:6
 34:22,23 35:3 126:6
 148:23
done (11) 28:17,18 29:6
 88:23,24 113:19 137:5
 177:6 178:3 179:2 180:16
dont (73) 11:25 14:23 16:4
 23:14 26:20 27:18 31:6
 34:23 37:8 39:15 45:14
 48:7 54:6,15 55:6 65:23
 68:6 70:1 71:12,25 79:18
 81:25 82:18 83:2 86:9 90:6
 99:24 101:4,21 104:11,16
 106:2 109:10,13,21 116:12
 119:6,8 120:4 122:15
 129:16 131:24 133:11
 134:19 137:6 139:15
 140:20 141:5,5,18
 142:5,10 145:17
 149:4,6,21,23 150:12
 151:4 165:5 169:9 175:9
 176:5 179:7 183:13 188:11
 191:20 193:9 195:2 201:12
 203:6 207:7 209:16
doors (3) 85:22 86:3 99:12
doublemanned (1) 9:5
doubt (12) 73:6 93:17 94:4,8
 120:18 130:5 136:5
 137:4,7 165:7 177:16
 201:14
drawn (28) 43:10 59:20 60:18
 67:4,14,17 70:24 84:13
 93:18 96:2 117:15
 128:6,9,20 133:13 166:11
 169:10 178:11 182:2
 183:6,9 185:25 186:8,22
 187:11,12 188:17 205:13
dragging (1) 162:11
draw (5) 54:18 159:9,11
 160:8,9
drawing (2) 181:4,14
drawn (2) 55:5 151:20
dressings (3) 65:3 66:13
 68:24
drew (1) 46:9
drive (5) 33:10 44:1 47:2,9
 59:3
driven (2) 33:1 204:20
drivers (1) 204:20
driver (1) 157:11
driving (13) 47:9,11 59:4
 121:25 122:16 124:11,15
 126:3,4 204:19 208:1,4,16
drove (2) 59:2 60:21
drug (1) 65:15
drugs (3) 7:21 9:23 64:10
due (9) 71:5 76:5 79:15
 80:14 81:12 82:5 83:2
 86:25 88:18
duration (1) 171:1
during (15) 11:19 33:8 52:13
 61:19 76:6 89:20 107:12
 114:22 122:4 143:6 148:7
 171:8 196:2,24 199:19
duties (2) 9:7 10:21
duty (10) 32:16 33:17 34:2
 38:4,16 39:1 114:1,8

115:19 163:4
dynamic (2) 104:24 168:8
dynamically (1) 105:6

E

e (3) 177:17,19 210:1
earlier (11) 39:12 86:18
 89:19 98:16 114:16 119:3
 135:6 142:25 152:13
 165:21 173:7
earliest (1) 202:22
early (6) 40:3,17 81:23
 114:14 127:14 199:14
 171:25
easier (1) 94:11
easily (2) 60:17 65:17
eggs (1) 63:18
education (2) 7:20 8:9
effect (3) 79:8 90:4 196:7
effectively (5) 2:2 6:10
 124:22 141:1 148:1
eg (3) 102:23 125:21 147:12
eight (7) 95:12,21 96:14
 132:21 133:23 142:24
 144:13
either (16) 9:4 44:14 52:24
 64:13 68:13 73:3 74:14
 92:13 103:19 126:17
 128:20,21 182:1 184:1
 199:11 203:2
elaborate (2) 16:8 158:7
elastic (1) 107:2
elearning (1) 111:11
element (1) 158:1
elements (3) 19:5 24:15
 108:18
else (18) 3:7 7:19 72:1
 96:25 107:11 117:19
 118:2,23 119:7,7,8,19
 139:21,24 144:16 146:15
 147:22 201:15
elsewhere (2) 40:1 72:5
emails (1) 35:2
emergencies (3) 11:8 58:4
 65:6
emergency (67) 8:4,24
 10:6 18 13:18 15:1 19:21
 20:17 23:2,9,13,18 26:13
 31:5 33:11,18 34:11 36:12
 37:7 39:24 41:23 42:17,20
 43:6 47:19 49:2,6 51:23
 53:19 57:1,4,7,20,24 59:7
 74:16 75:11 77:17 84:23
 87:18 92:3,13,13 95:17
 96:3 103:16 125:24 126:7
 129:18 137:22 140:4
 142:17 144:2 152:23 153:9
 159:2 163:5 191:4
 192:11,23 196:4
 201:17,19,22 202:8,11
 209:5
emphasis (1) 153:3
employed (1) 196:5
employee (1) 159:7
employees (4) 178:20,21,22
 179:1
en (6) 43:5 47:18 48:20
 92:13 124:17 131:22
enable (2) 102:8 162:13
enabled (1) 132:18
encounter (1) 96:10
encountered (7) 21:11 74:2
 88:1 90:9 139:8 149:7
 196:3
encouraged (3) 5:4,6 148:1
encouraging (1) 148:4
end (6) 60:18 99:2 111:8
 154:9 177:1 196:15
endeavour (1) 131:5
endotracheal (1) 64:4
engage (1) 167:12
england (1) 94:18
english (2) 151:22 205:7
enhance (1) 102:9
enhanced (2) 10:2 30:25

ennis (45) 1:4,5,6,10,12 2:15
 3:7,18 4:7 6:15 44:9
 45:14,18 72:8 77:20
 78:2,10 83:11 84:3,11,16
 85:12 99:3 107:11 108:15
 113:12 117:11 118:21
 119:22 123:25 124:25
 128:8 135:13,17 136:22
 138:16 139:15 146:9
 149:24 151:19,25 152:9
 154:9,10 210:3
enough (3) 13:17 17:6
 131:17
enrol (1) 7:9
ensure (6) 13:9 19:21 30:9
 75:13 96:4 163:6
ensuring (2) 22:5 153:13
entailed (1) 138:4
enter (8) 2:12 85:22 86:6
 87:20 97:

91:7-9 102:10 155:10
 157:23 160:16 173:11
 199:1
events (40) 2:20,22 3:2,8
 5:13 12:4,11 14:20 15:22
 17:15 21:24 22:4 28:25
 30:19 31:13,17 38:13
 39:14 44:5 55:12 61:18
 62:3 77:18,21 81:14 83:8
 90:7 107:10 120:15
 135:8,11 140:7 144:10
 156:20 159:3,4,5 160:24
 166:14 172:8
ever (5) 37:6,9 39:12 149:16
 180:23
every (13) 17:18 18:2 22:16
 30:2 65:1 78:22,22 79:8,8
 138:24,25 139:4 160:2
everybody (6) 85:2 156:9
 181:13 193:10 196:21
 198:6
everyone (9) 3:7,16 77:8
 95:8 155:5 161:10 176:7
 177:4 193:18
everything (2) 118:16 127:19
evidence (28) 2:15
 3:1,13,15,18 13:5 45:3
 64:12 70:2 75:19 85:24
 89:19 99:12 105:2 112:8
 115:22,24 116:10 150:13
 154:9,17 155:11 164:5
 165:4,6 172:6 201:14
 209:18
exact (5) 33:8 56:19 85:8
 121:5 138:12
exactly (5) 22:13 33:7
 82:25,25 121:9
exaggeration (1) 54:3
examine (1) 203:6
example (10) 11:6 38:20
 117:23 129:19 141:17
 158:20 174:15 186:10,16
 187:14
examples (1) 174:13
excel (1) 18:20
exception (1) 203:13
excuse (1) 56:19
exemptions (1) 47:20
exercise (12) 29:6,16,18
 168:14,19 170:12,15,18
 171:1,24,24 180:23
exercises (20) 28:23
 29:7,8,14 30:11
 112:7,10,15,16
 203:19
fashion (1) 50:12
fastresponse (3) 9:4 26:24
 32:21
fatalities (4) 133:3,18,23
 143:3
fault (8) 26:21 45:13,14 69:2
 81:12 119:22 120:3 197:16
fcf (1) 190:21
fdo (1) 107:20
fear (1) 47:9
fears (1) 14:9
feasible (2) 65:24 66:1
feature (2) 72:8 75:10
features (3) 184:17 187:18
 192:7
fed (1) 90:22
feed (1) 181:15
feedback (5) 180:15,17
 193:10,13,18
feel (15) 6:3 20:8 28:10,13
 42:18 54:6 71:12 86:9
 87:14 138:15,19 140:10,24
 141:10 149:4
feeling (1) 57:12
felt (20) 5:22 13:17 33:21,25
 82:14 88:11 90:17
 96:14,22 105:15 129:13
 131:11 138:1 140:5,15
 147:4 149:11 193:24,25
 201:9
few (15) 7:13 9:16 14:5,7
 30:19 33:7 37:18 57:18

explanation (2) 56:16 67:23
exploitation (1) 164:2
explore (2) 16:10 83:5
explosion (23) 39:25
 40:2,10,16 44:12 55:4
 58:13,15 66:21 76:22
 87:23 92:7
 116:1,3,3,6,7,20 120:12,19
 150:7,17,20
explosionbomb (1) 128:16
explosions (1) 177:18
expressed (2) 80:5 195:18
extensively (1) 195:7
extent (2) 16:14 204:9
extra (4) 29:18 66:11,14
 115:12
extremely (4) 57:16 66:17
 131:22 148:16
extricate (1) 196:17
extrication (1) 202:9
eye (5) 27:10 34:4 56:5
 192:15,17

F

64:8 69:19 90:7 107:5
 108:17 118:9 156:17
fewer (2) 171:13,14
fifth (1) 143:23
fill (1) 115:12
final (8) 28:22 101:13 147:10
 149:16 168:14,19 198:6
 204:2
finally (5) 99:15 107:24
 148:14 203:10 206:8
find (5) 33:8 60:14 71:20
 75:6 135:6
finding (1) 5:9
fine (1) 136:23
finish (5) 32:19 114:14
 139:15 143:11 194:8
finished (1) 128:5
finishing (1) 32:12
fire (15) 21:5 24:3 107:18
 109:2,5 125:14 150:3
 162:10 172:3,7,13 191:4
 192:9,15 199:22
firearm (2) 190:3,12
firearms (11) 25:22 26:1
 27:2,6 82:3 160:17
 161:2,16 170:15 194:15
 195:14
first (78) 2:9,12,20 3:21
 11:18 17:16 25:10 31:7,25
 37:5 39:17 49:22 50:20
 51:1,1,7 64:24 67:15,19,21
 72:8,15,21 75:22 76:13,18
 77:5,6 81:3 86:10,18,22,22
 87:1,5,7 88:21,25 94:3
 101:23 103:13,17,19,23
 107:16 108:17,19 118:9
 119:23 122:19,19
 123:5,9,13,21 124:10,23
 126:22 127:4,25 129:20
 132:4,5 137:3 138:20
 139:7 140:12 146:9 152:12
 157:4,7 162:2,4 163:3
 175:9 194:23 202:1,15
firstly (3) 86:13 142:2 157:17
fit (3) 30:6 39:24 116:5
flagged (1) 54:12
flashing (1) 60:24
fleet (2) 204:9,11
flexible (2) 208:8,11
fluorescent (1) 86:4
flux (2) 114:24 115:8
focus (3) 194:16 200:3 207:6
focused (1) 125:5
focusing (2) 136:24 208:15
folding (1) 106:22
follow (16) 36:16 58:25 59:9
 75:2 89:9 91:12 96:5 121:8
 123:23 126:20,22 127:5,15
 137:5 138:19 167:23
followed (11) 36:6,6,6 59:14
 88:25 89:12,16 102:18
 127:25 129:14 144:2
following (14) 62:24 77:16
 99:20 124:13 128:9,17
 145:6 152:2 164:17 169:7
 183:25 199:12 200:17
 203:15
footage (4) 72:12 77:5 80:17
 83:6
football (1) 38:21
footbridge (2) 85:13,22
force (3) 130:11 166:2
 194:24
forgive (1) 119:22
forgotten (1) 17:17
form (8) 27:21 48:14 96:19
 103:7,9 185:11 193:19
 208:16
format (2) 4:7 38:5
formally (2) 38:24 52:23
format (1) 110:23
formed (2) 26:11 174:14
formerly (1) 1:16
forms (1) 110:7
formulate (1) 122:24
forward (13) 5:10 6:10

114:17 188:11,12,14,15
 190:20,20 191:11,11,16
 201:9
forwarding (2) 46:24 188:10
found (3) 60:6 71:21 127:8
foundation (1) 1:18
four (24) 69:7 90:23
 91:2,7,11,12,17,20,23,25
 92:1,17,19 93:22 95:17
 96:9,15 142:23 143:8,18
 144:6,11,12,18
fourday (2) 177:14,17
fourth (1) 196:15
foyer (1) 129:7
frame (2) 27:11 198:21
framework (1) 102:20
free (1) 143:15
frequent (1) 172:16
frequently (1) 38:12
front (2) 72:10 162:4
fulfil (1) 111:24
fulfilling (1) 137:19
full (7) 1:9 96:17,20 155:18
 204:9 207:7 209:15
fully (2) 20:8 134:14
function (3) 174:21 181:7
 187:1
functional (1) 28:12
fundamentally (1) 56:9
funter (30) 14:8 15:14 16:3
 17:3,11 24:5 52:22 60:14
 64:9 71:16 72:2 73:22
 80:16 88:17 90:14,15,16
 96:24 99:13 119:10 121:19
 133:14 134:8 135:3 136:20
 140:3 158:1 183:19 187:12
 202:21
furthermore (1) 42:7
future (3) 102:9 113:18,19

G

gain (7) 84:18,21 97:3
 122:23 127:12,22 138:22
gained (1) 110:25
gaining (1) 96:17
gap (1) 60:11
gas (2) 65:22 150:17
gather (6) 50:21 93:24
 105:17 122:22 127:21
 134:13
gathered (1) 84:14
gathering (1) 86:12
gave (12) 4:11,14,17 5:3
 11:20 81:13 82:14 90:12
 121:8 129:9 164:16 169:14
general (11) 3:1 12:21 71:4
 90:4 99:15 105:12 124:16
 163:21 166:17 190:17
 193:19
generally (11) 1:4,11 12:13
 31:16 47:15 51:13 107:5
 123:7 141:17 153:15 171:3
generic (1) 120:25
gentleman (1) 1:3
genuinely (1) 23:14
geographical (1) 12:16
geography (2) 37:16 185:3
get (55) 3:18 5:13 12:21
 13:21,24,25 16:1 43:18
 46:13 47:13 51:8 53:14
 57:3 63:2 65:20 69:18
 70:1,8,14 72:3,18 80:14
 81:1 82:5 88:18 91:23
 94:10 102:1 120:11
 123:9,13 130:24
 131:5,12,14,23 132:25
 140:8,11 143:15 144:3,4,5
 147:6 151:3 156:13,16
 162:11 166:12 173:17
 176:5 180:22 185:21
 200:25 206:6
getting (6) 21:5 73:1 142:16
 149:12 184:23 185:8
give (28) 3:1,25 4:6 5:4,6
 17:11 18:16 20:8 33:9
 44:24 53:12,17,24 66:24

75:19 82:13 95:1 97:23
 139:10 149:5 165:4 174:13
 181:2,9,13 189:19 194:12
 204:24
given (43) 4:8,9 28:10,13
 35:22 36:11,15 42:9 56:16
 57:22 77:13 82:12 83:23
 90:14 97:8 100:1 112:13
 116:6,10 123:3 129:12
 131:8,21 133:22 138:1
 143:2,18 144:14 147:20
 148:15 153:15 157:1 158:9
 164:23 173:14 174:6,24
 177:19,22 187:15 195:16
 203:20 209:18
gives (6) 44:11 164:1 165:6
 169:9 177:23 204:7
giving (5) 47:6 80:8 122:18
 193:13 196:6
globally (1) 18:11
gmfrs (2) 23:24 107:17
gmp (8) 72:12 78:10
 84:4,13,14 137:24 141:19
 147:22
goes (1) 202:14
going (118) 2:18,19 6:13
 11:17 14:21 15:25 16:1,10
 17:5 18:16 21:16,20
 24:4,13 27:9,10 28:22
 31:14,16,24 34:18 37:3
 38:13 43:15 44:19 45:6,23
 47:10 48:1,19 50:15,17,25
 51:2 53:22 54:9 55:22
 58:10,18,25 59:11,24
 62:10 69:18 70:11 71:15
 72:2,20 73:13 75:18
 77:8,10,13 78:8 80:3 81:15
 83:8 84:1 85:24 86:24
 90:21 92:7 94:8 101:5,7,19
 102:1 104:20 110:15 113:8
 115:15 125:2,12 126:2,3,5
 128:19 129:13 130:21
 132:8 137:10,21 139:4
 140:7 142:17 143:7
 144:18,19 146:23
 147:18,18
 149:17,19,20,22,23
 150:5,6 155:8 156:17
 157:2,15 162:15 164:18
 166:17 167:3,3,21 176:7
 177:9 181:1,3 183:6 193:7
 198:5 201:9 202:12,16
gold (2) 23:19 30:15
gone (7) 89:13,17,18 100:14
 152:4 173:25 180:14
good (15) 1:3 17:6 21:25
 37:19 42:3 102:2,8 103:11
 104:24 106:12 152:9 164:5
 187:14 188:8 192:24
grab (1) 72:17
grace (2) 78:11 84:5
grades (1) 145:23
grading (3) 35:20 36:1,11
 192:7,14 206:9
grateful (2) 108:6 151:22
greaney (45) 1:3,7,8 3:10
 17:22 21:16 22:13 29:4
 31:2 36:23 41:16 44:3,5,11
 45:4,13 49:25 55:8 56:2
 64:19 82:21,22,25 83:5
 86:2 89:23 94:23 97:22
 99:2,11 101:13 102:1
 107:9 108:6 109:8 113:8
 129:17 135:5 151:17 152:7
 154:6,13,20,25 210:4
great (3) 79:10 91:10 101:5
greater (18) 3:22 7:8 27:14
 32:16 35:5 42:15 80:11
 92:12 97:14 107:22
 109:5,5 112:13,23 130:16
 144:16 150:3 179:6
green (1) 36:7
grounds (1) 28:16
group (3) 60:25 73:2,24
groups (3) 132:16 159:10,11
grove (1) 59:3
guess (1) 33:6

H

guidance (2) 174:7 201:22
guide (1) 124:3
guidebook (1) 126:13
gunman (1) 13:11

H

hadnt (18) 29:6,7 46:1 82:11
 90:8 100:1,3,18,24
 101:3,11 107:8 112:8,11
 128:9 134:4 138:1 142:24
haemorrhage (6) 186:15
 187:10 197:4,11,20 200:9
half (1) 109:25
halfway (2) 60:10 63:7
halt (1) 60:2
hamper (1) 104:10
hands (1) 99:3
handset (1) 43:7
handwriting (4) 101:20
 103:9,10,11
happen (4) 29:24 47:8 90:21
 200:23
happened (13) 6:9 13:21
 37:4 40:5 73:5 78:6 82:14
 84:19 90:18 100:10 139:9
 149:2 193:17
happening (14) 34:5 35:8
 37:21 39:3 46:14 81:3
 119:24 139:2 140:10,12
 141:25 145:10 148:22
 149:18
happens (3) 124:23 173:19
 194:2
happy (3) 47:10 99:7 204:24
hargeaves (2) 204:16 208:1
harm (1) 15:11
hart (26) 26:11,22,23
 27:15,21,22,24 75:9 93:1
 125:22 145:1,4,8 147:12
 159:14 163:8 168:17
 169:2,5 173:9,10,12
 175:23,24 188:1 198:13
havent (10) 27:5 68:6 72:3,5
 74:18 81:22 92:5 95:7
 134:23 187:2
having (25) 1:23 28:9 37:17
 43:3 53:23 54:19 57:10
 73:20 77:13 90:10 104:22
 105:6 129:22 130:13 132:7
 138:12,24 148:10,21 157:1
 177:4 180:14 181:6 197:14
 203:25
hazard (2) 190:2,2
hazardous (41) 26:12 154:16
 155:11 156:5,11 157:2,14
 158:2,23 159:8,14
 160:7,12,14,19 161:3
 162:7,21 163:15,23 164:20
 165:12,23 166:3,6,18,21
 167:11 171:10 172:8
 174:16 175:3 176:10
 178:25 179:4,13,25 187:24
 192:7,14 206:9
hazards (1) 125:16
head (1) 98:17
headed (2) 181:22 195:12
heading (3) 84:11 85:14
 168:4
headless (4) 51:18,24 53:2
 56:17
headquarters (1) 109:3
health (4) 11:10 18:1 94:18
 136:1
healthcare (1) 18:1
hear (8) 50:15 52:14 64:12
 108:13,14 129:4 150:13
 152:9
heard (6) 51:4,16 115:22
 122:4 161:10 172:6
heavily (1) 203:16
height (1) 157:17
held (5) 1:21 14:8 109:12
 173:24 174:3
helicopter (5) 12:5,23 14:17
 17:10 180:5
hello (1) 49:22

H

helmets (2) 26:16 160:1
help (14) 72:23 80:10 82:19
 154:21 158:4 159:22
 161:14 165:10 166:12
 171:18 173:15,25 174:12
 178:23
helped (3) 29:15 153:16
 169:16
helpful (6) 17:20 29:20 63:5
 70:19 71:9 98:14
helps (1) 54:6
hence (1) 55:18
here (17) 92:15 126:5 128:25
 135:19 161:5 163:21 165:7
 168:2 170:8 176:22 185:8
 186:3 194:11 198:8,17
 202:15 208:24
hes (3) 51:3 135:14 151:17
hid (1) 107:4
high (2) 9:21 196:8
higher (3) 8:8 22:9 175:20
highest (2) 36:5 182:18
highlight (1) 146:6
highlighted (1) 102:9
highly (5) 7:23,25 122:6
 131:6 179:14
highvisibility (2) 43:16 124:7
hill (1) 1:19
hindsight (4) 87:11 93:14
 130:22 143:5
hitherto (1) 151:22
hivis (1) 86:5
hold (4) 1:21 173:23 175:9
 191:1
holdback (1) 175:1
holding (1) 174:21
honestly (2) 49:15 122:8
hope (11) 31:15 44:20 45:4
 72:10 99:11 135:9 152:9
 156:8 167:22 194:9 209:16
hopefully (1) 58:8
hoping (1) 58:18
horrific (2) 100:17,19
horwell (1) 107:21
hospital (7) 1:19,25 24:25
 29:13 92:16 119:6 183:1
hospitals (2) 94:17 119:4
hour (2) 45:9 98:1
hours (6) 48:16 62:7 73:11
 153:24 154:4 171:3
however (6) 29:10 33:22
 118:17 199:20 202:19
 203:15
huge (1) 6:8
hunts (19) 59:18,20,23,24,24
 60:10,14,20,21 61:5,5 63:7
 67:20 73:9,22,23 78:4
 128:21 148:9

I

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|---|---|--|---|--|
| <p>im (119) 1:17 5:23 6:13,15 11:17 13:4 14:20 15:25 16:10 17:5 20:13 22:5,5 24:4,6,13,14 26:4 27:10,12 28:22 31:2,13,14,16,24,24 32:14 33:7,7 34:18 37:3 39:11 44:19 46:22 49:23 50:25 51:1 54:9 55:10 56:8,9,13 62:10 66:4,4 68:2,19 71:15 72:2,20 73:13 77:13 80:3,8 81:20,25 83:8 89:24 99:2,3 100:17 101:19 102:1 104:14 106:17 108:6 112:4 113:2,8,8,22 115:21 117:6 119:22 123:16 125:2 126:5,6,14 128:2,25 129:22 130:21 135:8,9 138:16 142:22 147:17,18 149:25 150:21 151:22 156:17 157:15 161:5 164:17 166:17 169:20 170:19 175:10 176:22 179:5 185:8,8 188:20 189:3,18 193:7 196:21 198:5 199:7 202:15 204:8,10,20,25,18 207:18 209:12</p> <p>image (2) 77:15 78:21</p> <p>images (4) 31:19 77:9,10,12</p> <p>imagine (5) 30:4 53:13 106:24 114:14 115:5</p> <p>immediate (2) 65:19 198:19</p> <p>immediately (14) 54:12,21 55:3 57:9 61:8 65:17 87:9 93:2 95:1 119:17,18 121:8 127:9 181:25</p> <p>immobile (1) 182:19</p> <p>impetus (2) 134:12 194:1</p> <p>implement (1) 141:4</p> <p>implemented (1) 136:3</p> <p>implications (1) 151:8</p> <p>importance (3) 56:11 76:7 180:3</p> <p>important (18) 15:3 16:10 31:11 61:18 97:23 119:18,18 120:23 122:21 136:16 161:9 165:25 173:4,12 186:5 195:21 202:7,13</p> <p>impressed (1) 140:19</p> <p>improvement (3) 22:21 23:1 102:8</p> <p>inadequacy (1) 28:19</p> <p>inadequate (2) 91:4 141:8</p> <p>inappropriate (1) 97:11</p> <p>inaudible (2) 81:19 152:1</p> <p>incident (296) 8:21 12:7,12,14,15,17 13:3 14:18 15:5 19:2,5,12,22 20:2,7,14 22:16,18 24:8,11,16,24 25:1,4,5,7,8,12,13,22,23 26:19 27:3,4,8,28,5,9 29:6,10,12 30:22 31:6,8 33:21 34:7 37:1 41:17,25 42:18,23 46:5,24,25 47:3,4,12,21,22,23 48:2 50:6,8,10 51:11,13 52:15 53:8 54:16,22 55:20 57:6,14,21 63:1 64:21 65:1 66:2,16 67:5,10,16 68:10,13,22 70:17 74:7,9,13,14,14,16,18,19,21,23 75:1,3,15 84:20 86:15,21 87:8,10,12,17,24 88:3 89:4,21 90:25 91:9 92:21 93:3,4,8,11,15,17,19,21,24 94:1,4,5,7,13,15,21 95:6,9 96:5,12,15 97:16 98:9,21 99:19 100:1,3,6 102:5,13,16 104:3,9,18 105:3,7,10,16 106:1,4,4,6,21 109:12,23 110:3 111:6 112:1,3,5,9 117:4,6,16,17,21 118:6,10</p> | <p>119:20 120:22 121:17,22 122:17,21 123:2,6,12 124:2,21 125:15 126:13,16,18,19,21 127:1,2,5,8,11,20 131:4,7,23,24 132:20 133:10 134:3,11,12,15,19 135:3,19,20,23 136:5,8,12,17,18,25 137:2,9,10,12,19 138:4,13 139:20 142:4,6,18 143:14 144:1 145:3,5,6,15,22 146:2,5,21 152:15,22 153:10 165:17,17,18,19 168:4,20,22 173:1,11,21 178:12,13 179:6,8,10,15,20,24 180:6,9,10,23,24 181:2,5,11,23 183:3 184:22 185:4,19,22 186:21 188:2,7,15,22 189:2,9,17,24 190:1,4 191:10,15 193:12,15,25 194:2,5 195:8,22 197:18 198:2 200:16,22 201:1 203:23</p> <p>incidents (39) 9:19 11:4,10,12,15,19 18:14 25:6,21 27:6 33:18,25 34:4 35:4,19 37:7 41:8,13 42:15 46:6 49:10,11,13 54:22 56:11 63:13 64:24 65:5 104:25 109:24 113:3 129:6,23 130:13 145:13 160:5 193:4,20 196:6</p> <p>include (5) 11:6 167:16 186:10 196:16 203:22</p> <p>included (3) 10:12 25:7 112:4</p> <p>includes (1) 203:22</p> <p>including (10) 37:11 88:14 119:15 146:13 148:11 161:10 165:9 170:11 193:11 201:19</p> <p>incoming (1) 174:25</p> <p>incomplete (1) 75:25</p> <p>incorporated (3) 19:5 29:11 153:8</p> <p>incorrect (1) 81:11</p> <p>increased (1) 152:22</p> <p>independent (1) 92:23</p> <p>indicate (7) 37:1 77:8 107:13 121:1 152:4 155:6 182:10</p> <p>indicated (8) 3:13 31:13 73:16 85:24 107:20 154:7,25 182:11</p> <p>indicates (4) 62:2 163:2 168:6 169:1</p> <p>indicating (4) 54:3 95:16 165:12 177:12</p> <p>indication (4) 18:12,25 117:3 181:10</p> <p>indicator (2) 182:2,3</p> <p>individual (5) 12:8,18 16:6 41:6 97:13</p> <p>induction (1) 177:23</p> <p>inevitably (1) 14:6</p> <p>influenced (2) 119:11,25</p> <p>informally (1) 182:5</p> <p>information (114) 5:9 6:1 12:20 14:14 20:12 21:11 25:9 39:23 40:1 50:5,21 52:4 53:9,11,12,15,18 58:16 68:20 76:1,11,24,24 82:12,13,15 83:19,20 84:22 86:12,13,16 87:13,15 88:12,17 89:7,24 90:14,15,16 96:18,24 97:4 99:25 100:22 105:17 110:25 111:3 112:15 116:5,8 118:8,12,14,17,20,22 119:10,24 120:5,12 121:12,13,14,19,24 122:1,5,12,22 127:13,21 129:1</p> | <p>131:5,8,10,13,14,17,17,21 132:1,1,21 133:4,22 134:1,8,13 136:13,13,19 137:14 138:2,11,12,14,18,22 139:10 140:17 141:3,6 144:5,23 146:17 148:15 149:5,7,12 168:2 176:2</p> <p>informed (3) 38:4,24 130:25</p> <p>inhouse (1) 180:1</p> <p>initial (23) 50:19 67:9 72:25 74:25 88:15,16 89:4 91:5 93:18 94:11 102:16 112:1 134:15 137:15 143:25 168:23 177:3,23 183:17 187:5 196:19 198:18 202:21</p> <p>initially (11) 6:21 24:15 70:7 73:20 93:23 125:25 143:13 144:6 159:12 201:7 205:7</p> <p>injured (19) 12:1,9 13:6 61:9,11,12 72:19 73:3,25 76:25 85:16 100:24 101:10 132:16 137:8 139:6 182:18,19 185:10</p> <p>injuries (10) 76:20 90:19 101:9 151:13 168:16 182:15 195:17 196:2 197:8 202:23</p> <p>injury (1) 182:3</p> <p>inland (1) 157:21</p> <p>inner (12) 162:9 163:6 166:8,9,19 173:19,25 189:25 190:1 198:13,16 203:22</p> <p>input (1) 42:5</p> <p>inq (3) 3:25 62:12 162:22</p> <p>inq00024731 (1) 21:24</p> <p>inq0067131 (1) 4:1</p> <p>inq00837222 (1) 195:11</p> <p>inq00837223 (1) 198:8</p> <p>inq00837224 (1) 201:13</p> <p>inq00837225 (1) 202:14</p> <p>inq00837226 (1) 203:10</p> <p>inq01291341 (1) 181:19</p> <p>inq01291342 (1) 186:23</p> <p>inq01291343 (1) 146:4</p> <p>inq0131631 (1) 123:17</p> <p>inq01316318 (1) 123:20</p> <p>inq0131636 (1) 135:22</p> <p>inq0131638 (1) 123:19</p> <p>inq0134222 (2) 124:20 126:11</p> <p>inq0134223 (1) 125:20</p> <p>inq0150471 (1) 73:14</p> <p>inq015047t1 (1) 133:7</p> <p>inq0151061 (1) 44:21</p> <p>inq015106t1 (1) 45:17</p> <p>inq0153381 (1) 51:4</p> <p>inq02148110 (1) 206:17</p> <p>inq02148111 (1) 206:22</p> <p>inq02148112 (1) 206:23</p> <p>inq02148113 (1) 207:24</p> <p>inq02148114 (1) 208:23</p> <p>inq0214813 (1) 162:23</p> <p>inq0214818 (1) 177:11</p> <p>inq0214819 (1) 204:6</p> <p>inq0223701 (1) 101:21</p> <p>inq02237041 (1) 101:23</p> <p>inq02237042 (2) 101:24 106:7</p> <p>inq0228506 (1) 164:22</p> <p>inq0232791 (1) 62:13</p> <p>inq0232793 (1) 62:18</p> <p>inq0257511 (2) 4:6 61:6</p> <p>inq0328621 (1) 81:9</p> <p>inq032872t1 (1) 133:14</p> <p>inq0328731 (1) 85:1</p> <p>inq0356121 (1) 77:17</p> <p>inq035612128 (1) 77:19</p> <p>inq035612130 (1) 78:8</p> <p>inq035612132 (2) 83:9 135:11</p> <p>inq035612133 (1) 84:2</p> <p>inq035612136 (1) 84:9</p> <p>inq035612140 (1) 85:11</p> | <p>inq035612141 (1) 85:20</p> <p>inq0402921 (2) 17:16 110:12</p> <p>inq0402931 (1) 18:5</p> <p>inq0406711 (1) 168:1</p> <p>inq0406712 (1) 168:24</p> <p>inq0406731 (1) 18:19</p> <p>inquiry (10) 19:14 51:5 73:15 85:6 113:25 122:4 164:5 183:13 201:14 209:24</p> <p>inside (2) 84:3 163:14</p> <p>insofar (2) 28:15 187:2</p> <p>inspector (2) 86:1 107:19</p> <p>instance (16) 25:21 29:12 30:13 41:11,14 47:16 55:22 63:20 65:10 67:5,6 106:22 117:25 139:22 140:1 151:6</p> <p>instead (4) 2:25 114:18 167:3 183:10</p> <p>instilling (1) 177:16</p> <p>instruction (3) 94:3 174:7 203:3</p> <p>intended (2) 53:8 128:23</p> <p>intending (1) 74:10</p> <p>intention (8) 70:10,11 84:16,18 96:16 119:17 134:12 140:17</p> <p>interactions (2) 21:14,17</p> <p>interest (3) 5:9 6:9 76:7</p> <p>interested (4) 30:6 89:24 204:9 205:18</p> <p>interesting (1) 199:8</p> <p>interim (9) 24:22 68:11 103:24 111:21 152:14 153:4,17 183:21 185:7</p> <p>intermediate (1) 36:9</p> <p>internationally (1) 36:13</p> <p>interpret (2) 55:10 104:17</p> <p>interpreted (1) 193:19</p> <p>interrupt (3) 113:8 126:14 135:9</p> <p>interrupted (4) 53:2 110:12 136:22 138:16</p> <p>intervention (13) 26:9 98:15 159:18,24 160:11,18 162:12 183:19 186:10 197:23 199:14 200:6,8 interventions (4) 186:7,13 187:10 198:20</p> <p>interview (6) 4:20 11:19 113:24 114:23 115:3 117:12</p> <p>interviews (3) 5:3,5,7</p> <p>into (73) 1:25 2:15,20 3:18 7:6 13:10,15 16:7,12,15 17:8 25:12 34:25 37:9,13 43:18 53:3 60:7 64:5 65:1 69:18 70:1 71:2,3,20,21 72:3 76:3 88:5 89:2,10,14,18,25 93:4 96:21,23 98:5,14,19,24 101:7 109:22,23 120:11 130:5 135:3,13 139:22,25 141:10,22 153:7 159:14 162:13 163:3 168:3,9 173:10,25 174:15 175:2,7 176:5 177:23 181:19 183:18 185:14 194:24 199:20 200:3,7 202:14</p> <p>intravenous (1) 64:10</p> <p>introduce (4) 157:2 167:4 194:20 204:3</p> <p>introduced (3) 110:5 194:18 203:25</p> <p>introducing (1) 155:11</p> <p>introduction (7) 157:1 166:17 168:6 169:14,19 171:5 186:19</p> <p>intubation (2) 63:20 64:4</p> <p>inventory (2) 207:7,8</p> <p>investigation (1) 34:25</p> <p>investigations (2) 11:1,2</p> <p>invite (6) 3:16 107:14,16 161:8 162:3 167:25</p> <p>involve (15) 10:21 19:15 29:14 32:10 67:11 91:10</p> | <p>138:12 143:14 152:19 157:17,20,21,22 197:5,19</p> <p>involved (9) 12:17 40:8 66:21 81:5 112:9 152:21 161:19 176:9 185:10</p> <p>involvement (3) 11:21 79:7 155:8</p> <p>involves (4) 7:18 168:8,15 197:7</p> <p>involving (5) 67:10 120:17 168:18 171:21 190:3</p> <p>irrespective (1) 92:20</p> <p>isnt (20) 18:21 41:6 54:17 57:24,25 85:7 117:11 121:5 123:4 136:6,9 137:21 161:7 163:2 166:20 171:23 178:24 184:4 197:10 206:19</p> <p>isolated (2) 15:5 67:10</p> <p>issues (1) 166:20</p> <p>iterations (1) 168:17</p> <p>itll (1) 183:12</p> <p>its (106) 1:10,23 2:4 4:8 5:13 6:1 9:3 15:1 19:7 20:1 28:7 31:2 34:2 36:13,24 41:7 42:14,19 45:17 48:15 51:5 54:14 55:16 57:19,20 59:25 60:5 62:11 65:15 64:16 69:6,21 71:21 72:13 73:14 74:7,9,18,23 78:9 79:23 81:8 85:11 86:3 87:9 82:23 93:2,19 95:6 97:23 101:1,7,22,25 102:15 103:10,11 104:14,14,16 106:3 109:10 110:12,13,15 111:9 117:10,15,18,24 119:22 120:3,4,12,23 121:3,15 123:4,19 125:11 126:19 128:25 135:19 136:23 137:6 144:19 146:19 148:16 153:7 156:14 161:9 173:20 178:18 182:5 183:12,21 186:13 187:9 195:23 197:3,16 198:5 203:7 207:5 208:8,10</p> <p>itself (13) 2:22 37:9 55:4 62:10 117:2 121:2 133:3,17 157:23 179:8 198:24 200:13 203:6</p> <p>ive (23) 26:20 34:2 52:4,17 53:2,10 57:18 67:17 69:1 78:8 74:9 75:21 83:23 88:10 89:20 99:23 101:21 133:18 134:8 143:20 158:1 193:19 206:18</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">J</p> <p>jacket (3) 43:16 86:5 124:8</p> <p>jackie (7) 48:5,22 51:7 52:12,25 57:2 58:14</p> <p>jagged (1) 181:24</p> <p>james (1) 84:5</p> <p>january (5) 3:21 77:18 163:11 166:3 194:25</p> <p>jesip (42) 18:14 19:1,6,11,14,24 20:19 21:6,13,23 22:3,9,15 23:2 24:9,20 31:3 103:25 108:20,23,25 109:8,22 110:2,3,4,14,19,22 124:13 138:4 141:4,24 147:17,25 148:14 153:6,6 191:25 192:1,11 199:24</p> <p>job (3) 52:19,23 153:15</p> <p>john (110) 3:9 17:20 21:3 22:7 29:2,5,15,21 30:8,18 31:1 36:11,22 40:21 41:15 43:22 44:4,10 45:2,6 49:21 53:21 54:2,9 55:1,15 56:1 64:17 82:18,23 83:4 85:25 89:22,24 90:4,21 91:1,7,16,20,25 92:19,23,25 93:7,10,13 94:2,6,22 97:20 99:7,10 100:7,14 101:4,9,12,25</p> | <p>108:1,11,14 110:15 112:25 123:9 124:5 126:10,16,20 127:3,15 128:2 134:23 135:1,16 146:20 147:5 150:1,11,21,25 151:3,16 152:6 154:10,19,21 155:15 156:13 161:14 175:18 184:24 188:19,25 189:4 190:5,14,18 194:11 199:6 200:16,23 201:1,4,11 209:8,11,14,19,22</p> <p>join (4) 6:20,22 166:21,24</p> <p>joined (4) 6:21 155:21 156:5 169:13</p> <p>joining (2) 160:12 179:4</p> <p>joint (19) 19:17,20 22:21 29:8 147:26 164:3 166:2 172:8,11 192:8 193:2 194:16,24 199:21 200:19 201:7 203:4,15,21</p> <p>jointly (3) 21:5 201:5 203:14 152:3,3</p> <p>jops (1) 195:21</p> <p>journalists (2) 4:18 5:19</p> <p>journey (1) 46:19</p> <p>judge (1) 58:1</p> <p>judly (6) 18:23 110:3,19 111:5 152:3,3</p> <p>jump (1) 142:22</p> <p>jumping (2) 68:19 97:22</p> <p>junction (1) 129:10</p> <p>june (4) 11:25 101:16,25 102:4</p> <p>justification (1) 185:5</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">K</p> <p>keen (4) 13:4,9 47:13 105:16</p> <p>keep (7) 27:10 56:5 61:21 80:4 107:3 137:9 192:17</p> <p>keeping (2) 34:4 93:20</p> <p>kept (1) 58:7</p> <p>kerslake (9) 11:20 12:24 21:22 66:6 69:2 88:20 113:25 114:23 117:12</p> <p>kerslakes (2) 4:11 87:4</p> <p>kevin (1) 1:10</p> <p>key (3) 25:3 166:18 177:4</p> <p>kind (6) 36:8 104:8 120:14 126:17 150:19 151:13 100:8 119:12 128:12 130:25 150:22 178:15 56:12 59:25 70:9 76:14</p> <p>know (56) 5:15 18:14 20:4 21:19 23:14 27:14,18 31:16 37:21,24 38:23 39:5,8,11 44:12 45:19 46:13 56:3,18 60:20 65:23 67:18 77:7 83:15 90:17 96:8,12 97:24 100:7 104:21 110:19 121:4 122:7 126:12 128:15 129:20 130:11 135:7 137:6,9 140:20 141:5 142:11 144:8 149:23 150:2,12,23 151:4 154:6 161:17 170:17 174:15 185:8,13</p> <p>knowing (2) 137:2 138:3</p> <p>knowledge (19) 37:15,19,20 42:16 47:4 104:3,24 105:10,25 106:12,13 110:6 121:3 128:18 129:2,12,16 161:4 175:5</p> <p>known (4) 1:4,11 48:22 158:10</p> <p>knows (1) 19:14</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">L</p> <p>la (19) 77:18 154:15,25 155:4,5,17 156:17 161:16 176:5 185:2 188:23 189:7 190:8,20 194:12 199:11 201:12 209:15 210:9 201:25 208:13 207:5</p> <p>laboured (1) 146:3</p> | |
|---|--|--|---|--|---|---|--|---|--|

60:24
like (33) 29:25 43:9 51:18
 56:25 61:8 64:8 66:24 67:2
 73:4 81:7 88:12 93:1
 108:19 116:13 122:22
 128:3 134:23 137:9
 138:15,24 149:11
 150:15,17 161:3 167:20
 173:4 187:6 188:23
 194:16,19 205:15 207:16
 208:25
likelihood (1) 119:12
likely (24) 14:6 41:18 59:11
 66:3,21 74:17 86:10 87:22
 89:5 92:12 93:8 95:8
 109:14 111:5,9,20 117:18
 118:19 122:7 123:5 136:1
 139:19 175:21 179:14
limit (2) 109:21 164:2
limited (13) 53:11 76:1
 104:3,7 105:2 106:13
 121:12,13 143:21 170:11
 184:23 196:7 200:8
limits (2) 3:12 190:17
line (10) 67:4,14 162:8
 181:4,14,24 188:9 191:14
 196:15 198:6
linger (1) 202:13
link (2) 47:6 139:25
linked (1) 116:17
list (4) 51:3 81:13 169:9
 209:12
listen (6) 31:20 44:25 48:19
 49:17 76:5 83:3
listened (1) 48:10
listening (3) 53:22 155:6
 196:22
literally (1) 116:3
little (18) 17:7 24:10 40:1
 43:2 51:18,24 53:20 56:17
 71:15 97:22 114:24 115:8
 152:13 161:9 164:4,19
 177:6 183:7
live (7) 29:7,15,22 30:11
 169:23 170:10,24
loading (4) 153:12 182:23
 188:8 203:17
local (5) 37:19 47:3 119:3
 121:3 129:12
locate (1) 148:8
located (1) 96:4
location (23) 13:13 20:3,5
 35:15,17 36:25 37:8 39:22
 47:7 54:14 59:11 60:6,13
 89:3 120:13,24 129:8,11
 138:13 139:19,23 185:1
 203:14
locations (2) 12:16 196:19
locked (1) 65:14
log (10) 62:1,5,7,10,14,16,18
 63:1,2 69:13
logbook (4) 61:16,20,21
 69:13
logical (1) 99:10
logicalist (1) 145:17
logistics (1) 29:25
lone (1) 67:10
long (10) 12:20 33:10 45:2,7
 76:23 109:18,25 154:19
 169:9 190:7
longer (4) 45:7 148:21
 159:15 183:10
look (32) 16:16,19 17:15
 21:16,17 23:23 31:18,21
 52:21 62:16 77:8 79:14
 89:12 105:24 124:15
 150:14 162:3,5,16,20
 166:19 167:3,7,20 169:9
 170:3 173:5 177:8 181:1
 186:22 201:12 202:12
looked (10) 18:11 53:10 61:8
 63:1 81:22 82:8 118:18
 135:10 144:8 165:21
looking (23) 8:23 49:18 50:5
 56:6 68:3 71:6 77:10 78:20
 79:23 82:6 91:10 92:3

94:25 100:7 111:7,8
 130:22 131:16 141:24
 144:24 145:7 193:1 209:11
looks (2) 81:7 205:15
lopez (34) 18:6,20 44:21,24
 51:2 73:13 77:13,23 78:8
 81:12 83:9 101:22 102:1
 106:7 113:9 123:18 124:19
 135:22 162:22 164:22
 166:11 167:25 168:25
 169:11 177:11 178:10
 181:19 183:6 186:22
 188:17 195:11 198:7 204:6
 208:23
lost (1) 60:5
lot (9) 30:23 54:9 100:9,15
 115:9 121:7 122:4 126:1
 168:2
lots (5) 5:21 61:6 82:24
 120:17 156:15
lunch (7) 85:9 99:6,8
 107:12,16 108:4,8
lungs (1) 64:5

M

m60 (1) 117:14
madeup (1) 168:16
mail (3) 4:17,23 5:11
main (1) 71:24
mainstream (1) 163:12
maintain (6) 61:16 62:5
 167:13 169:3,13 173:18
maintained (1) 62:1
major (17) 12:12,14 18:13
 19:1,15,12 20:2,14
 24:8,11,15,24,25
 25:4,5,6,7,8 28:4
 29:6,10,12 30:21 31:6,8
 50:6 51:11,13
 74:7,9,13,14,14,15,17,19,21,23
 75:1,3,15 86:14,21
 87:8,9,12 89:21 90:24 91:9
 92:21
 93:3,4,8,11,15,17,19,21,24,25
 94:4,5,7,13,15,21 95:6,8
 96:5,15 97:16 98:9 102:16
 104:3,9 105:10,16,25
 106:4,12 109:11,23
 112:3,5,7,9 120:22
 121:16,22 122:17
 123:2,6,12 124:2,21
 126:13,18,19,21,25
 127:2,5,7,11,20 132:19
 133:10 134:3,11,15,19
 135:19,20,23
 136:5,7,12,16,18,25
 143:14 144:1 145:2,6
 146:5,21 152:22 153:10
 178:12,13
 179:6,8,10,15,20,24
 180:10,24 181:2 183:3
 186:20 188:1,7,15,21
 189:2,9,17,24 190:14
 191:10 193:4,12,15,20
 194:2 195:8 196:6 197:18
 200:9,16 201:1 203:23
majority (7) 20:6 26:11
 42:13 63:12 64:24 65:5,9
makes (3) 94:6 99:10 144:10
making (12) 18:2 34:15
 38:15 50:16 55:12 69:12
 73:17 80:8 105:17
 175:10,19 201:6
male (1) 81:21
man (1) 11:25
manage (5) 8:5 27:8 75:15
 138:3 174:25
managed (4) 20:15 21:1,2
 34:17
management (30)
 10:4,17,24 12:14 19:5
 20:2,12,14 25:2 29:12
 30:22 35:1 66:2 67:13,13
 86:21 97:14,15 104:18
 109:23,24 123:20 153:10

187:11,12 195:12 197:12
 198:18 199:19 201:18
manager (5) 8:22 19:4 24:18
 96:3 119:1
managerial (3) 2:1 9:1 10:1,3
managers (5) 111:23 118:25
 153:19,21,22
manages (1) 111:3
managing (2) 34:24 186:15
manchester (42) 3:22 7:8
 10:8,11,12 27:14 32:16,22
 33:5 34:20 35:5,18 38:6
 39:22 40:19 48:21
 51:17,23 59:2,22 92:12
 102:4,4 107:22 109:4,5,5
 110:6 112:13,21,23 118:24
 120:14,24 128:12,19
 130:14,16 139:23 150:3
 176:11 185:9
mandatory (7) 16:24 18:21
 19:8 108:21 110:8 178:19
 179:2
manoeuvre (1) 208:9
many (15) 12:17,18 29:10
 95:24,25 115:19 117:15
 118:4 121:9 127:25 130:21
 139:5 144:20 198:20
 207:17
marauding (17) 25:21
 26:1,18 27:2,6 145:21
 158:13 159:25 160:17
 161:1,16 169:15 170:14
 171:5 172:18 194:15
 195:13
march (3) 1:1 152:3 209:25
mark (1) 69:10
marked (3) 59:12 165:20
 181:23
marker (1) 117:2
martin (5) 80:19 81:4
 84:6,12 85:13
masks (1) 65:2
mass (3) 159:4,5 168:15
masters (1) 1:23
match (1) 38:22
material (2) 44:4 72:9
matter (6) 67:18 111:15
 112:6 128:3 147:10 169:17
matters (6) 19:3 126:1
 141:16,21 142:7 193:8
matthew (2) 84:6,12
maximise (2) 198:22 199:15
maximising (2) 163:8 196:7
maybe (4) 176:2 194:2
 197:1,13
mcgowan (1) 84:13
mean (25) 23:21,24 25:14
 37:24 45:25 47:1 50:9
 51:25 61:2 83:19 87:6 89:9
 92:2 93:24 94:8,17 99:21
 103:14 104:6 105:4 124:5
 144:6 145:20 164:8 171:1
meaning (6) 36:4,5 79:23
 122:6 146:3 175:9
means (10) 3:15 41:6
 42:12,13 46:5 47:2 50:4
 55:4 102:7 190:5
meant (16) 52:1 59:1 79:19
 82:16 87:7 89:3 99:22
 104:7 105:5 114:16 115:7
 117:9,22 142:11 161:7,25
measure (1) 185:7
media (2) 5:3,8
medical (26) 8:4 10:24 6:18
 25:18 26:13 30:20 34:11
 36:14 39:6,9,13 51:10
 65:5,22 68:23 117:17
 130:6 152:23 153:10
 155:24 158:9,12 159:2
 162:11 207:22 209:8
medically (2) 57:24 162:13
medicine (4) 10:24 34:25
 158:3,14
medicines (3) 9:24 65:8,9
meet (3) 128:22 163:13
 190:7

meeting (1) 114:15
meetings (1) 191:1
meets (1) 84:13
melee (1) 60:6
member (13) 57:23 118:15
 125:8,11 159:8,13,15
 160:7,11,15 167:11 172:6
 179:13
members (16) 13:7,16 26:10
 34:16 61:2,3,6 76:25
 103:15 109:4 117:15 160:6
 166:21 175:25 176:10
 209:4
memorial (8) 78:2 89:5
 133:20 135:14 137:18
 138:23 140:23 141:16
memory (1) 113:14
men (1) 133:17
mental (2) 11:10 17:25
mentally (2) 124:11,11
mention (3) 146:10 158:20
 159:17
mentioned (13) 11:18 12:24
 24:19 46:1 68:6 75:18
 82:21 86:18 92:5 160:10
 161:1 171:13 187:6
mentorship (1) 9:6
merit (8) 51:8,9,10,10 75:9
 125:22 145:8 147:12
message (9) 83:23 98:1
 116:1,2,13,15,18 140:4
 146:23
messages (3) 115:23
 116:22,24
met (4) 76:14 91:6 134:9,11
methane (14) 25:9 74:12
 75:18,20,23 76:2 83:20
 86:16 125:18 127:23
 134:14 138:11 140:3
 146:23
method (1) 117:10
methods (3) 208:6,7 209:1
middle (4) 146:6 205:21,25
 206:13
midnight (1) 114:3
might (60) 13:24,25 14:9
 25:25 28:15,16,17 38:6,23
 42:18 46:6 47:8 48:6 56:4
 57:8 58:8 62:24 64:14,22
 65:9 66:19 67:1 68:2 70:13
 75:10 87:10 93:7,21
 96:10,24 106:24 119:11,25
 122:2 144:13 146:4,14
 149:8 150:12 153:4,24
 158:11 159:7 174:15,20
 175:2,8 178:1 184:12,16
 185:4,14,24 186:4 189:7
 190:8 191:7,16 194:8
 209:3
miles (2) 12:18 33:7
mind (28) 3:17 15:15 19:24
 22:2 23:7 29:2 50:17
 58:4,10 62:19 65:4 66:20
 82:6,18 85:2 86:7 89:22
 93:20 122:1 126:22 140:21
 151:12 160:14 161:24
 165:11 181:13 187:18
 200:13
mine (3) 57:2 156:19 199:11
minimising (1) 100:17
minimum (2) 70:10 96:15
minute (3) 46:12 91:1
 140:22
minutes (11) 33:16 77:6
 99:5,8 118:10 119:2
 141:13 142:19 154:20
 165:22 181:17
mislead (1) 55:15
misleading (1) 118:6
misread (1) 17:19
missed (2) 55:21 60:9
mistake (4) 32:9 68:4
 71:7,12
mistakenly (1) 197:16
misunderstanding (1) 164:11
misunderstood (1) 69:1

mm (1) 111:14
mmhm (1) 93:6
mnemonic (3) 102:15 103:22
 138:6
mobilised (1) 44:12
modules (1) 111:10
moment (22) 11:17 37:3
 48:19 50:15,25 51:19
 56:18,19 61:10 71:4 83:22
 91:17 113:10 114:25
 161:23 162:16 164:3,10
 177:7 181:14 189:7 199:8
monday (1) 32:1
monitor (4) 33:18,24 34:12
 49:9
monitored (1) 47:17
monitoring (3) 35:4 41:11
 55:23
month (1) 32:5
months (1) 110:21
more (90) 1:25 5:9
 7:16,21,23,25 8:20 9:14,17
 13:22 22:10 23:5,16 24:10
 37:1 40:14 43:2 50:4
 53:9,12,15 64:12 69:18
 70:12 71:1 72:6 76:2
 82:13,15 83:17,18,19
 84:21 88:12 89:13 90:17
 111:11 94:15 96:18 99:10
 100:23 101:10 103:16
 105:15,17 106:24 107:9,24
 118:11,13,19 119:24
 131:5,8,12,19,21 132:1
 134:13 143:4,7,19
 144:5,13,18 149:9,12
 151:14 152:18 153:15,17
 154:2 164:1,4,20 168:18
 175:25 181:16 183:7,18
 184:9 186:7 187:3 194:1,4
 203:16 206:4 207:19
 208:12,20
moreover (1) 2:12
morning (5) 1:3 32:12 42:11
 44:23 112:8
morphine (1) 65:14
most (11) 11:14 20:3 40:22
 45:4 54:24 63:13 89:5
 104:20 122:21 139:19
 165:25
motorway (1) 117:25
movable (1) 208:11
move (16) 2:5 18:6 28:22
 59:6 71:1 114:16 133:13
 151:12 163:8 173:22
 182:10 188:19 197:2,12,14
moved (7) 1:25 59:14 62:8
 71:3 115:16 188:18 197:24
movement (1) 203:1
movements (1) 155:13
moving (6) 31:13 60:25
 61:4,7 100:13 200:6
ms (5) 107:25 154:6 165:4
 208:4,16
mta (3) 168:19,20,22
mtaspecific (1) 171:22
mtfa (10) 25:2 29:13 103:25
 145:21 152:4 158:10
 170:12,13 196:2 199:19
much (45) 5:14 33:14 40:25
 41:2,7 49:19 53:12 55:5
 57:13 68:19 70:1 77:23
 80:4 83:25 84:20 86:12,12
 89:19 106:3 107:7 116:12
 118:5,11 120:24 121:3,23
 127:23 135:16 137:9 138:1
 139:10 140:15 149:24
 154:10,17,21 167:24
 169:10 178:10 188:25
 194:12 195:22 203:25
 209:17,22
multiagency (6) 108:23
 170:11,25 171:20,22 172:1
multiintegrated (1) 208:8
multiple (6) 36:25 40:4 46:2
 117:18 131:23 184:7
multisited (2) 173:12,21

murdered (1) 12:1
music (2) 38:12,14
must (8) 27:5 45:7 143:3
 192:11,12,12,12 198:8
muster (3) 183:16 190:25
 191:3
mustnt (1) 198:8
myself (7) 57:15 100:2
 101:11 106:25 124:14,16
 140:3

N

n (1) 210:1
naïl (7) 76:9,12,15,21 132:22
 133:8,25
name (5) 1:9 12:1 108:15
 155:18 182:24
namely (2) 95:21 199:13
narrative (1) 31:17
naru (3) 167:15 170:14 177:3
national (2) 160:4 167:14
nationally (1) 157:8
nato (1) 207:15
natural (1) 60:11
nature (5) 101:9 125:15
 179:17 196:2 199:1
navara (1) 205:6
near (2) 49:3 130:4
neary (2) 141:13 142:18
necessarily (10) 41:13
 57:24,25,25 58:1 106:5
 111:24 121:1,5 184:5
necessary (4) 97:17,18 99:13
 139:24
need (52) 12:1 16:16 20:8
 23:8,12,12,23 27:10 45:7
 47:4 56:3,4 65:9 68:13
 72:17 80:10,24 82:18
 91:25 109:13 124:12 126:5
 136:10 137:21 138:7,20
 139:4 140:8 143:7
 144:18 149:10 147:14
 149:13,14 154:19 163:7
 167:24 169:9 173:23
 175:1,9,21 183:13
 188:7,11 194:3 195:2
 201:12 203:6,14 205:23
 209:16
needed (20) 21:19 59:7
 79:12,22 88:12 90:11
 96:8,15 114:16 127:11
 137:25 138:19 140:16
 141:10 147:4 148:24 149:5
 174:11,12 189:19
neednt (1) 82:20
needs (1) 137:13
neonatal (1) 1:24
never (4) 28:8 47:18 53:21
 105:5
news (2) 5:18 122:9
next (29) 6:13 7:16 27:9
 32:12 62:22 78:8 84:1,9
 85:19 87:16 106:7 113:23
 129:8 134:7 154:11 155:1
 165:6 173:22 186:22
 196:14 197:3,12 198:7
 200:6 206:17,22,22
 207:1,24
nhs (2) 1:18 111:2
night (52) 2:10,13,20 3:15
 6:10 13:21 19:24 21:9
 28:6,11,13,25 31:14
 32:1,15,18,23 33:8,17
 34:18 37:21,25 38:16 39:1
 41:21 50:11
 62:2,22,23,24,25 68:1 70:4
 71:25 77:9 79:7 92:5
 102:25 103:18 104:10
 114:8,12 142:11 153:15
 155:9 176:9,21 204:13,15
 206:10,19 208:25
nights (1) 62:25
nissan (1) 205:6
nobody (1) 141:21
nodding (1) 98:17
nonambulance (1) 201:19

nonclinicians (1) 42:16
noncompressible (1) 202:24
none (1) 139:9
nonetheless (2) 156:4 195:8
nonspecialist (2) 187:21
 188:4
nor (3) 154:7 199:11 206:23

october (4) 4:12 6:18 109:7
115:3
offer (2) 42:4 176:2
offered (2) 30:10 90:15
offhand (1) 53:5
office (21) 34:20 40:13
43:4,10 53:10,14
79:1,3,16,19 80:20
118:23,25 119:2,8,23
120:7,11 121:25 129:8
138:25
officebased (2) 9:6 10:21
officer (21) 3:22 72:13,13
73:2,21,24 77:2
78:13,15,16 79:6,14,21
80:19 82:4,12 90:11
141:19 149:15 153:11,12
officers (29) 20:10 21:11,18
23:22 78:17 79:10,14 80:5
83:17 84:4,14 90:2,9
132:13,16 133:22 134:9
135:15 137:24 138:24
139:3,8 140:5,14 147:1 142:4
148:3 149:4,7 201:24
offloading (1) 119:5
offset (1) 127:10
often (7) 29:24 30:1 36:25
153:17 154:2 160:3 167:14
okay (7) 24:13 54:1 101:8
135:1,16 151:16 206:22
old (1) 38:21
once (12) 9:14 16:12 44:25
70:13 76:7 77:14 88:8
146:21 153:18 178:9 194:2
202:20
oneday (6) 24:9 108:22
109:25 110:1 111:21
152:20
oneoff (1) 109:20
ones (6) 5:21 17:23 29:13
113:14 127:2 153:22
ongoing (3) 49:10 105:3
203:4
onscene (2) 63:2 203:3
onwards (1) 166:3
open (4) 58:7 93:20 134:2
162:4
operate (3) 27:1 31:5 165:23
operating (11) 12:6 21:6
78:17 164:3 166:2 169:6
188:10,12 194:16,24
203:21
operation (11) 142:8,8
146:10 161:17 164:1,6
170:16,17,21 180:5 194:15
operational (37) 20:25 22:19
23:10 25:11 30:15 50:23
68:10,18,21 69:13 75:7
89:4 97:6,17 102:23
103:13,18 104:3,8 111:17
119:13,14 123:1 125:9
126:24 152:25 153:21
159:1 176:1,1,3,14
178:22,25 190:25 191:6
194:1
operationally (1) 159:12
operations (32) 41:23
42:17,20 43:6 49:2,7 51:23
53:7 57:1,5,7 74:16 75:12
84:23 87:18 92:3 96:3
103:16 118:25 119:1 140:4
144:2 153:19
158:4,9,14,21,25
159:9,13,16 160:10
operative (2) 26:23 179:9
operatives (2) 27:22 163:22
opinion (1) 194:4
opportunities (1) 172:25
opportunity (9) 18:16 66:24
163:1 165:1 167:2 171:9
172:2 177:24 202:22
opposed (4) 77:2 116:24
141:2 143:18
opposite (2) 60:18 118:1
options (5) 74:12 158:12
196:7,14,16

oral (1) 65:13
orchestrated (1) 170:13
order (39) 9:20 15:2 24:14
26:14,17 27:1 34:7 41:10
42:4 47:19 49:11 50:21
63:2 64:5 68:8,14,16 71:8
84:22,23 86:13 87:17
96:18 97:3 107:13 114:13
118:13 122:24 131:12
134:13 135:2 138:19,21
140:2 166:24 184:1 186:8
193:1 198:22
organisation (2) 124:12
129:19
organise (1) 29:25
original (1) 168:16
others (10) 2:17 12:1 16:11
56:15 72:4 97:9 141:3
146:4 167:22 194:7
otherwise (2) 12:9 92:25
ought (1) 75:13
ourselves (1) 203:18
outcome (1) 163:9
outlets (1) 5:18
outset (2) 79:7 105:16
outside (14) 20:23 43:5
85:22 86:3 94:16 95:14
96:11 133:20 137:18
138:9,23 140:22 141:16,21
over (22) 17:12 18:6 43:20
56:19 64:1 85:9 90:7
107:15 108:8 125:19
129:17 147:18 149:25
151:21 152:22 170:24
197:14 198:7 201:12
203:10 206:17 208:23
overall (9) 20:2 23:2
97:14,15 104:17 105:10,25
123:20 144:7
overbridge (2) 84:17 85:16
overcommit (1) 173:10
override (1) 41:10
overspeaking (2) 136:21
138:16
overtake (1) 59:8
overwhelmed (2) 184:19,20
overwhelming (1) 148:25
overwhelms (1) 196:24
own (4) 14:1 17:8 132:9
161:24
oxygen (2) 65:2,2

P

p1 (4) 182:14,17,18 202:25
p2 (3) 182:14,17,19
p3 (1) 182:2
pack (8) 68:8,16,21
69:3,5,21 70:6 119:15
package (1) 178:20
paddy (3) 1:5,12 80:18
paediatric (1) 1:24
pager (9) 45:23 46:4,8
116:13,15,16,17,18,21
papers (1) 55:22
pain (3) 65:11,11,13
paired (2) 204:16 205:8
panel (2) 4:11 11:20
panorama (1) 4:14
papers (1) 159:18
paracetamol (1) 65:13
paragraph (10) 39:16 46:22
173:5,7,8 196:14
paragraphs (1) 31:25
paramedic (75) 1:14,16,22
2:3,6,9,12 7:9,15,16,23
8:6,9,12,16,18,19,19,25
9:9,12,15,15,17,25 10:7
16:21 17:2 24:17,21 26:24
30:3,17 32:2,16,21 33:1,17
38:4,10 41:20 42:14 47:17
48:5,24 49:8 67:19
78:1,2,10 83:11 84:3,11
85:12 109:17 111:19
113:16 114:1,8 115:1
121:21 123:3 140:12

149:13,19 151:11 155:23
156:2,3,5,22 159:12 197:1
198:1
paramedics (28) 8:24 9:2,22
10:5,6,10,18,18 23:22
26:13 34:11 46:3 80:11
108:25 112:12,18,20,20,22
114:25 115:8,10,13,19
118:24 152:23 153:20
159:1
parameters (1) 2:16
park (3) 16:13 21:21 60:15
parked (8) 43:5 60:8,9,12
63:6 130:20 131:19 132:8
parking (2) 73:1 153:11
part (47) 5:12,25 8:22 19:4
25:24 27:21 28:23
29:5,7,9,14,17 30:16,20
33:23 55:18 60:10 79:13
84:8 97:20 101:16
110:7,11 112:1 121:3
124:19 134:20 145:2,16
147:3 157:10 159:5,5
162:24 173:9 174:14 177:3
178:19 180:8 181:1,9
185:1 197:18 199:21 203:4
206:10 207:23
participated (5) 24:7 170:10
176:15 193:5,10
participating (1) 170:20
particular (34) 3:4,10 12:17
20:3 21:9 30:8 34:8
35:11,20 36:20 38:3,5
39:20 42:22 45:15 50:18
62:1 83:3 101:22
110:20,23 121:2 124:15
127:1 134:5 156:10,14
175:15 179:23 181:5,6
183:4 192:7,15
particularly (3) 106:6 152:24
193:1
parts (3) 41:6 127:14 173:23
pass (11) 25:8 53:16 75:20
83:20 84:22 87:17 97:4
98:1 122:22 127:22 131:14
passed (12) 22:1 74:1,15
76:16 112:17 113:1 131:9
133:4 134:8 137:11,14
140:17
passing (8) 74:12 75:22
88:17 89:7 96:17 118:1
135:3 199:6
past (2) 90:7 99:17
patient (12) 8:3 12:19 64:7
68:17 69:23 92:15 97:13
163:9 185:25 197:2,3,13
patientfacing (1) 2:1
patients (15) 76:18 107:3
119:5 130:2 162:14
182:18,19,22 183:17 186:6
187:4 188:6 189:6 196:24
198:3
patrick (10) 1:4,6,10 78:2,10
83:11 84:3,11 85:12 210:3
pattern (1) 114:11
paucity (1) 131:17
pause (6) 31:18 44:22 81:10
83:24 85:24 181:18
pay (1) 40:25
payslips (1) 111:3
pc (18) 73:13 77:7 78:11
79:22 80:16,19,21,25
81:4,4 84:5,5,5,16 12 85:13
138:24 140:8
pedestrianised (1) 59:21
penetrating (1) 202:24
pens (1) 69:10
penultimate (1) 202:12
people (56) 3:4
5:10,15,16,21 12:1 13:6
21:3 22:10 27:9 29:21,22
30:9 38:22 55:23 56:4
60:25 61:4,9,11 73:3,25
82:21,24 93:1 94:8 95:13
100:9,15,24 101:5 106:25
115:16 117:18,22 118:1,4

120:17 121:7,10 132:12,16
133:24 136:11 137:7,8
139:5 140:13 154:3
159:10,11 162:11 175:3,21
184:12 208:10
perceived (2) 5:25 188:5
perfect (2) 48:17 117:11
perform (7) 28:11 50:17 64:4
68:9 154:3 159:2 174:21
performing (2) 86:8,9
perhaps (23) 15:4 16:5,7
31:10 42:15 53:4 60:10
62:24 82:14 88:1 90:15
114:15 131:10 135:2
151:13 154:20 165:25
166:12 186:16,24 187:14
195:7 204:7
period (10) 8:13 18:9 40:4
90:13 111:20 118:11
141:13 148:7,18 170:24
person (20) 3:11 36:11 67:11
72:19 85:25 86:18,22
87:1,5 88:21 107:1
123:9,10,13 124:23 125:10
144:14 178:1 193:17
197:22
personal (3) 26:16 106:20
168:12
personally (2) 1:12 5:18
personnel (10) 79:15,25
160:8,9 162:21 173:12
200:7 201:16,17 209:4
persons (1) 85:16
perspective (3) 20:25 22:8
23:2
pertain (1) 109:11
pertinent (1) 118:17
pertinently (1) 11:14
phase (1) 70:2
phone (1) 118:15
physiology (1) 186:9
physically (3) 13:25 14:24
92:10
pick (4) 56:15 86:4 112:19
119:19
picked (3) 82:20 84:7 124:6
picking (2) 137:1 147:9
pictorial (1) 204:7
picture (1) 115:6
piece (1) 71:24
pieces (1) 64:8
place (12) 29:9 38:8,22
41:10 75:5,14 96:13
114:20 115:3 137:12
187:12 191:6
placed (4) 3:13 131:13
182:25 184:22
plain (2) 32:14 80:8
plainly (1) 154:18
plan (19) 96:6 112:3 124:22
129:3,5 140:14 144:2
145:6 146:5 154:13 178:13
179:6,8 181:2 186:21
193:2 195:8 196:16 200:16
196:16
plastic (2) 106:23 208:19
plato (25) 142:8 161:17
162:17 163:16,17 164:1,6
165:14 166:1 187:24
188:21 189:1,3,9,12,21,23
190:9 194:15 198:9,15
200:19,21 203:20
platospecific (3)
165:17,18,19
play (11) 25:25 44:19 51:2
73:13 81:8 83:2,6 84:25
98:3 159:3,5
played (3) 51:5 73:15 85:6
players (1) 168:15
playing (1) 85:3
please (59) 1:5,8 5:2 7:15
8:18 9:16 13:4 17:16 24:12
42:12 44:19 51:2 54:6 59:1
69:20 73:14 84:1,9
85:10 120:2 102:14 106:8,16
107:16 108:20 115:20
123:17,19 124:19 125:19

136:22 139:15 143:11
152:19 155:2,18 158:8
167:6,25 168:3,24 173:5
177:11 178:10 181:3,21
182:17 183:6,9 186:22
195:11 196:23 198:7
202:15 204:6 206:22
207:1,24 208:23
plural (1) 208:12
plymouth (1) 59:3
pm (6) 32:10 108:3,5
154:22,24 209:23
pocket (6) 124:2,4,7 126:13
127:18 135:23
poer (19) 77:18 154:15,25
155:4,5,17 156:17 161:16
176:5 185:2 188:23 189:7
190:8,20 194:12 199:11
201:12 209:15 210:9
points (11) 25:3 57:18 99:16
107:5 146:9 152:12 184:8
186:19 190:20,21 196:19
police (77) 3:22 15:8,9
20:10,21 21:4,10,18 23:21
58:25 59:4,8,10,12
60:3,5,6,12,23 61:6,11
73:2,21,24 77:2 78:15
79:6,10,21 82:4,12 83:17
89:7 90:2,8,11 100:22
107:19,23 109:2,3,4,5
125:14 128:9,17,24
129:14,15 130:11,15,16,18
132:13,16 133:22 134:9
138:8,9,21 139:8,11
140:11 141:7,11,15,18
148:3,16 149:4,6,14
151:13 161:19 191:5
199:22 200:21
populate (4) 36:19 134:14
138:11 140:3
populated (2) 116:9 118:19
populating (1) 40:14
poring (1) 56:19
pose (1) 68:2
posed (1) 88:19
position (21) 1:20,21 2:2,23
4:8 6:8 17:11 18:17 19:2,7
27:12,13 29:21 32:14
36:23 64:21 86:18 105:5
147:21 151:24,25
117:10
possibilities (2) 57:19 58:5
possibility (11) 14:19 58:8
82:15 100:19 200:21
121:23 122:13,25 139:18
174:2 195:19
possible (24) 13:24,25 14:24
19:22 33:23 47:14 60:5
67:7 71:10 83:5,7 86:13
123:4 125:15,16 139:20
141:4,24 147:17,19,25
148:14 164:3 166:2 192:1
194:16,24 195:21 196:10
199:24 203:21
possibly (7) 15:19 45:20 64:9
76:9,12 120:23 133:8
potential (17) 42:23
50:6,8,22 54:16 55:15
76:24 82:16 105:3 121:16
122:17 134:1 148:4
150:16,19 157:15 189:15
potentially (58) 14:7
22:17,20,24 27:7 29:17
47:22 48:1 50:20 55:20
56:13,25 57:6,8,14 60:16
61:9,12,15 65:6,7 66:16
67:12 68:12,16 70:11,18
75:9 76:20 87:23 92:14
93:21 94:18 96:14 97:5
104:18 105:18 115:17
117:9 119:12 120:9,25
121:7,11 131:2,11 137:8
143:4 146:8 148:25 149:13
151:5 153:19 173:11
177:19 184:10,14 186:5
pouch (4) 65:8 66:12 68:25
69:7
pouches (1) 69:7

ppe (5) 27:1 145:20,24 160:1
168:11
practicable (1) 185:23
practical (7) 106:13,19 168:7
169:4 190:5 195:9 200:4
practically (1) 107:8
practice (10) 1:24 8:9 9:12
53:5,16 59:5 66:1 102:8
131:3,20
practitioner (1) 1:18
preceding (1) 155:25
precisely (3) 23:6 73:16
84:20
predate (2) 17:23,25
predetermined (3) 91:13
145:2 147:3
predominantly (1) 32:22
prepare (2) 99:24 169:16
prepared (12) 28:9 72:4,5
99:18 100:1,5,16 101:11
102:12,21 152:24 162:20
preparedness (1) 30:25
preparing (5) 58:21
124:11,14 134:24 161:11
presence (3) 42:1,18 61:6
present (7) 21:13 23:9,13
84:6 192:22 201:16,21
presentation (7) 158:2
162:20,25 164:17,23,24
177:9
presented (2) 196:11 203:8
presenting (1) 144:17
presentations (1) 135:25
press (3) 71:15 72:2 97:9
pressed (2) 43:7,22
pressure (2) 140:25 141:5
151:13 161:19 191:5
199:22 200:21
presumably (5) 29:24 115:15
146:21,24 209:9
presume (2) 38:11 76:15
previous (6) 103:24 104:8
129:6 157:6 160:6 177:12
previously (5) 129:24 130:2
143:8 160:9 177:6
priest (1) 205:8
primacy (2) 130:11,17
primarily (4) 9:3 87:8 146:19
200:4
primary (7) 25:17 34:2 69:8
82:10 106:12 122:25
197:10
principal (1) 137:20
principle (6) 124:9 200:13
202:3,7,15 203:2
principles (33) 19:11,14,25
20:20 21:7,13 22:14
25:6,17 30:23 109:22
123:23 124:13,16,17
126:24 127:25 138:5
141:4,24 147:17,19,25
148:14 164:3 166:2 192:1
194:16,24 195:21 196:10
199:24 203:21
prior (8) 18:12,22 46:24
52:1,12 98:14 156:2
160:12
prioritise (1) 198:3
priority (12) 35:22
36:5,15,15 41:3 69:24
182:4,18 184:1 197:2,8
198:18
probably (23) 5:24 18:20
26:21 29:18,19 30:6 33:15
14:12,18 15:15,21,25
42:10 46:9 56:24 57:3 65:5
67:8 87:25 89:17 99:10
104:14 115:6 119:2,16
151:12 172:18
probe (1) 24:4
problem (1) 93:10
problems (2) 14:4 22:9
procedures (3) 7:21 9:24
7:3
proceed (5) 17:12 132:7
138:21 140:20 141:10
proceeded (3) 73:22 89:2
140:18

proceeding (3) 43:25 67:20
89:10
process (11) 67:7 83:23
106:13 137:11,11 143:14
174:8 197:3 198:19 199:22
201:18
professionally (1) 1:11
professionals (1) 18:1
programme (3) 4:15 24:18
110:8
progress (3) 43:2 182:23
209:18
prominent (1) 104:21
promoted (6) 8:11 9:8 17:1
32:6 115:13 159:14
promotion (2) 2:2,4
proper (1) 28:16
propose (2) 107:13 209:7
protect (1) 55:20
protected (1) 7:17
protection (2) 160:1 177:14
protective (2) 26:16 168:12
protracted (1) 197:13
provide (28) 7:22 8:21
9:18,21 10:1 11:24
15:2,4,12 26:15 30:20
51:11 68:18 76:2 86:15
94:14 102:6,15 132:1,25
145:16 146:7 149:8 153:23
171:4 175:3 197:23 198:19
provided (12) 3:19,21 4:3
39:13 102:21 122:12
129:19 131:16 145:20
166:25 190:6 198:23
providing (3) 51:14 130:7
200:8
provision (1) 202:1
ps (1) 84:13
public (19) 2:17 5:9 6:9,11
12:21 13:7,17,23 57:23
61:2,3,7 66:19 76:25 94:18
117:15 118:15 120:13
205:16
publicly (1) 83:2
published (3) 4:23 183:12
201:13
pull (3) 51:6 60:7 94:23
pulled (1) 67:19
pure (1) 88:1
purely (2) 117:15 118:3
purple (7) 36:6 41:14,16
46:7 54:10,19 55:2
purpose (3) 49:16 50:1
149:21
purposes (1) 69:10
puts (2) 23:6 137:11
putting (3) 64:4 77:15
140:24

Q

q (622) 1:11,14,20
2:2,6,9,12,15,25 3:4,21,25
4:6,11,14,17,20,23
5:2,6,12,23
6:4,7,13,20,22,24
10:7,12,14,16,21,24
11:1,3,6,8,10,12,14,17,24
12:4,8,11,24 13:4,20
14:12,18 15:15,21,25
16:9,19,24 17:1,5,11,15,25
18:4,16,25
19:7,11,14,17,20,24
20:8,18,23 23:4 20 24:4,14
25:3,14,16,24 26:3,6,20
27:9,18,21,24
28:1,15,22,25 31:10,13,24
32:4,8,12,14,18,24
33:1,4,8,17
34:2,7,15,18,22
35:6,11,15,17,19,25 36:4,8
37:3,15,21,24
38:2,15,19

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 39:1,5,8,12,16,20 40:3,8,17 41:22,24 42:3,7,9,22 43:1,10,13,15,18,20 44:8,16,19 45:22 46:11,16,19,22 47:13,25 48:4,10,12,22,24 49:1,5,14,16 50:8,15,25 51:16,24 52:6,17,21 53:2 56:15 57:10 58:10,18,21,23 59:12,14,16,18,24 60:2,9,20 61:2,10,16,18 62:1,5,10,18 63:5,9,14,21,23 64:1,11,21 65:11,16,23 66:4,15,19,24 67:17,23 68:2 69:1,5,15,18 70:1,6,13,16 71:3,15,18 72:2,12,23 73:6,10,13,19 74:3,6,10,20,23 75:13,18,24 76:2,5,23 77:2,5,23 78:8,17 79:6,13,23 80:3,8,14 81:8 82:1,5 83:22 84:25 85:19 86:18,24 87:4,20 88:4,8,18 89:12,19 90:11,16,19,23 96:7,20,23 97:8 98:8,12,19,23 101:19 102:20 103:3,5,7,9,11,21 104:2,6,10,12,20 105:2,8,23 106:7 109:7,18,25 110:2,10,12 111:12,15 112:2,6,12,24 113:16,23 114:7,18,22 115:7,14,18,22 116:10,22 117:10 118:5,21 119:10,22 120:3,10,18 121:12,25 122:4,11,16 123:3,8,16 124:2,19 125:2 128:12,15,25 129:16 130:11,20 131:16 132:3,7,12,18,25 133:7,13 134:22 136:10,22,24 137:17 138:16,23 139:15 140:5,22 141:13,21,24 142:7,13,16,22 143:2,11,17 144:10,23 145:11,16 146:3 147:17,25 148:7,14 149:16 152:12,18 153:3,15 155:20,23 156:4,8,24 157:1,7,11,14,20 158:1,8,14,17,20,23 159:5,7,17,20,22 160:6,14,22,24 161:1,7,19,23 162:2,20 163:19,21 164:3,14,16 165:1,4,18,20,25 166:6,9,11,17,24 167:10,20 168:14,24 169:17,23 170:1,5,8,20,24 171:2,4,8,12,16,18,23 172:1,6,11,16,20,23,25 173:4,23 174:2,6,13,19,24 175:7,12 176:13,17,25 177:8,19 178:3,5,9,15,17,21,23 179:3,9,13,17,20,23 180:5,8,12,14,18,22 181:1,9,13 182:5,8,10,14,17,20 183:3,6,21,24 184:9,11,15 185:8,13,18 186:2,9,13,16,19 187:7,14,17,23 188:3,7,11,14,17 189:12,17,20,24 190:2,11,24 191:3,6,10,16,19,22,25 192:3,11,19,22 193:4,15,23 194:5,23 195:2,7,11,16,25 196:14 197:5,7,16,22 198:1,5,11,17 199:1,4 200:2,13 202:6 203:10,25 | 204:15,19,22,24 205:2,5,7,11,15,18,23 206:2,4,8,12,15,17,22 207:1,5,12,17,19,21,24 208:3,6,12,15,20,22 209:2 qualification (1) 177:7 qualifications (2) 177:25 178:3 qualified (5) 7:23 155:23 156:4,21 199:9 qualifying (1) 7:11 quarter (1) 45:9 question (21) 21:25 22:2 27:9 28:1 56:2,5 64:11 68:2 71:6,14 88:19 93:12 102:11 112:25 139:7,14 149:16 154:1 160:6 194:23 201:15 questioners (1) 2:17 questioning (2) 99:2,4 questions (33) 1:7 6:11 36:19,20 72:6 107:12,14,15,17,20,22,25 108:9,12,16 128:7 129:17 130:21 148:21 149:9 151:17,19 152:8 154:7,8 155:4 161:4 204:11 209:6 210:4,5,6,9 quick (2) 147:18 197:3 quickly (3) 44:11 125:19 148:2 quite (27) 5:18 30:19 32:8 35:14 37:8,18 40:21 44:3 45:6,22 54:4,20 57:6 60:4 83:1 86:3 88:16 105:14 106:5 107:5 115:9 121:15 123:4 145:25 167:24 199:8 208:10 quote (1) 21:23 quoting (1) 176:22 qx354 (4) 43:18 45:21,22,23 <hr/> R <hr/> radiation (1) 177:14 radio (9) 9:20 30:24 43:7,21 48:12 81:5 83:12 134:5 135:14 radiological (4) 25:1,23 145:13 157:23 railway (4) 10:14 83:14 95:14 185:9 raised (1) 137:1 range (1) 157:15 rapid (3) 35:14 117:8 200:5 rapidly (2) 49:12 59:5 rate (1) 46:19 rates (1) 199:16 rather (15) 5:20 42:21 43:1 49:20 61:22 65:6 68:22 75:11 89:18 126:25 131:11 151:13 153:20 163:16 199:9 reached (1) 132:15 reaching (1) 94:15 reaction (2) 53:25 111:6 read (14) 49:25 52:3 62:12 72:20 78:1 103:12,23 104:23 113:5 135:24 163:3 183:13 198:5 202:16 reading (1) 14:14 reads (1) 106:11 ready (1) 93:2 reading (1) 57:15 real (6) 120:20 121:16 147:21 148:3,10 161:11 realise (3) 40:22 55:1 147:17 realised (5) 41:17 66:15 70:13 93:3 100:3 reality (1) 106:6 really (16) 15:3 28:3 48:1 54:12 55:19 58:18 70:1 79:6 90:14 100:5,25 118:5 127:4 138:3 150:21 151:23 197:5,7,16,22 reason (7) 5:14,15 54:2 55:19 110:20 120:18 179:3 reasonable (2) 37:17 117:21 | reasons (4) 28:2 55:21 83:7 112:14 recall (52) 34:23 39:17,25 43:6 48:4,6,18 49:15 52:13 60:3 64:6 69:6 72:10 73:1,17,19 78:13,14 79:18 81:23 82:1,13 90:6 98:22 101:15 113:13,21 114:5 115:11 119:7,8 122:8,15 129:10,22 130:6,10 132:15 133:11 135:12 139:7,9 141:18,23 142:5,10 148:6 152:20 153:5 160:2 178:17 179:7 recalled (1) 134:5 receive (12) 13:4 36:24 38:16 109:2 117:17 175:5 179:20,23 180:14,17 186:6,7 received (37) 16:22 17:12 18:13,22 19:1,3,11 24:11 25:16,24 26:3,25 27:5 28:3,8 33:19 58:15,16 76:11 89:20 109:17 110:2 111:21 116:14,14 134:9 136:14 152:14 164:5 169:13 174:6 177:1 178:5 191:25 194:23 201:25 202:20 receiving (3) 116:4 136:19 186:1 recognised (3) 47:25 62:3 86:19 recollection (18) 40:11 43:24 44:18 48:17 73:4 76:13,18 77:4 78:5 83:16 84:19 90:10 109:14 129:6 134:6 171:18 180:8 193:23 recommendations (1) 56:4 record (11) 18:4,15 61:18,22 62:19 102:21 109:10 110:2 118:16 163:3 202:14 recorded (4) 17:13 81:17,18 193:11 recording (10) 44:20 45:15 51:2 72:12 80:16 81:8 83:3 84:25 85:3 135:5 recordings (2) 44:25 53:23 records (11) 17:6,13,15 18:25 39:18 62:14 109:11 118:13 151:21 152:4 186:21 rectangle (1) 113:10 red (3) 36:6 41:16 125:4 redacted (2) 77:16 196:1 redeploy (1) 173:20 redeployed (2) 92:14 173:13 redirected (1) 183:18 reduced (1) 167:17 refer (4) 24:13 51:21 52:18 135:20 reference (25) 3:25 4:6 11:24 21:24 23:25 44:21 55:12 56:17 62:12 72:19 77:16 81:11,23 82:1 95:1 104:12 135:8,8 158:14 161:21 162:17,23 163:10 165:14 168:25 referred (5) 11:20 89:19 165:21 182:5 191:7 referring (6) 24:2 51:22 110:9 165:16 173:7 189:2 reflect (1) 78:5 reflection (1) 105:2 regard (2) 56:6 203:7 regarding (1) 187:8 regardless (6) 28:7 75:1 91:14 94:13,20 128:23 regards (3) 158:12 172:18 177:5 region (3) 24:23 33:16 92:8 register (2) 79:24 111:2 regret (1) 53:4 regular (1) 192:24 regularly (3) 38:12 61:22,24 reiterated (1) 25:6 | reiteration (1) 199:24 relate (4) 35:15 126:16,17 194:20 related (2) 98:15 157:24 relates (4) 18:21 101:14 182:14 202:16 relating (5) 18:9 36:1 39:18 99:16 116:22 relation (39) 12:4 24:11 29:3 83:1 95:20 98:20 104:15 relationships (1) 7:11 108:20 111:15,16 112:2,6,6,15 113:23 114:15 116:11,22 119:24 121:6,10 122:12 126:19 128:15 129:3,16,18 132:22 134:1 142:3 144:23 148:14 152:12,14 166:13 167:23 191:10 192:1 204:2 relatively (2) 42:8 99:12 release (1) 168:18 relevance (2) 64:12 82:7 relevant (9) 18:18 31:20 86:12 87:18 146:7,14 158:14 177:15,19 relief (3) 65:11,11,13 relieved (3) 97:6 123:14,22 remain (1) 56:7 remainder (1) 86:15 remained (1) 143:17 remaining (1) 89:3 remember (13) 48:7 79:6,9,20 90:13 114:9 129:23 136:5 148:12 150:8 156:10 193:13 198:8 remind (2) 124:16 203:18 reminded (1) 48:8 reminder (1) 71:10 remit (1) 161:2 remote (5) 22:10 23:5,15 51:12 68:17 remotely (1) 9:19 removed (2) 97:17 202:21 removing (1) 127:18 render (1) 68:14 rendezvous (1) 15:7 repeat (1) 193:14 replace (1) 106:23 replacement (1) 205:17 replicated (1) 66:12 report (19) 25:9 74:1,3,6,12,13 75:18,20,22,23 76:2,7 83:21 86:17 113:4 127:23 133:1 134:14 138:12 reports (6) 14:15 58:14 76:9 113:12,13 133:8 represent (1) 4:4 representative (1) 140:9 representatives (2) 23:18,24 represents (2) 107:19 154:6 request (6) 42:19 142:23 143:17,25 144:25 147:15 requested (6) 43:6,24 143:9,12 145:9 146:16 require (5) 15:13 38:6 68:16 136:2,11 required (36) 25:20 27:8 30:2 33:22 34:14 41:25 50:24 63:12 64:3 66:3 67:2,15 68:8,21 69:13 70:12,18 72:1 86:16 96:1,20 119:20 123:1 127:14 134:15 136:7 144:7 145:14,24 173:13 179:14 184:16 185:16 192:4 196:6 199:15 requirement (3) 50:19 125:21 147:11 requires (3) 31:4,4 184:17 requiring (1) 114:15 rescue (11) 109:6 125:5,14 150:3 172:3,7,13 173:18 192:9,15 199:22 rescuers (1) 15:18 research (1) 17:8 reserved (1) 186:8 | residential (1) 170:13 resilience (4) 109:13 113:5 152:21 167:14 resonates (1) 13:20 resource (6) 59:6,11 64:25 132:4,5 137:3 resourced (1) 203:16 resources (27) 12:7 25:10 49:12 52:11 75:6,9 93:25 94:16 106:9 145:4 146:22,25 147:2,4 173:10,20,21 174:10,20,25 175:10 184:19,20 196:25 202:25 204:3 205:24 respect (1) 201:25 respond (28) 8:4,20 12:7,19 13:19 15:7,7 22:25 25:4 26:18 40:13 47:22 53:8,15 57:21 58:3 89:11 92:10 124:23 131:24 142:18,21 143:13,16 144:4 160:4,20 173:1 responded (6) 21:14 22:24 37:7 102:25 129:25 136:20 responder (3) 67:10 103:19 122:19 responders (13) 13:18 75:10 163:5 184:23 185:23 187:21 188:4,5 189:5 201:8,19 202:8 209:5 respondertriage (1) 103:13 responding (15) 9:3 11:3 12:12 14:6 15:4,10 25:25 28:4 57:15,20 67:5 94:9,10 137:12 157:22 responses (1) 162:7 response (99) 6:5 11:21 12:15 15:1,20,22 16:3,5 18:13 19:12,22 20:10 23:3 24:8,12 26:12,15 36:20 43:13 46:11,17 50:22 63:6 65:19 68:18 77:17 84:24 92:9 94:19 96:19 102:7,9 122:24 124:22 130:20 146:5 154:16 155:11 156:6,11 157:2,8 158:3,21,24,25 159:8,9,13,15,16 160:7,10,12,14,16,19 161:3 162:7,21 163:15,23 164:20 165:13,23 166:3,6,18,22 167:11 168:4,23 171:10,20 172:7,8,13,21 174:16 176:10 177:3 178:13,25 179:4,13,25 181:2 186:14,21 187:24 191:2,4,21 192:8,14 198:15 206:9,14 209:13 responsibilities (2) 9:1 10:3 responsibility (5) 8:23 10:4,16 156:18 199:18 rest (3) 96:5 155:7,16 result (5) 41:24 42:3 90:22 172:11 193:21 retains (3) 8:25 9:25 199:18 retriaged (1) 187:5 retrieval (1) 203:1 retrospectively (1) 142:12 return (25) 2:25 13:22 16:2,13 21:16 45:1 69:19 70:8,14 71:4 72:6 80:3 83:8 88:18 89:13 104:21 105:8 106:9 107:10,14 119:19 125:3 128:6 154:15 189:14 returning (1) 71:7 reveal (1) 79:13 review (2) 102:7 157:16 reviewing (1) 194:5 riighthand (2) 60:11 63:7 ring (2) 117:16 118:4 ringing (2) 36:16 118:15 risk (24) 13:1 14:20 20:12 22:22,23 23:21 72:3 104:24 105:3,6 148:1,10 | 163:22 164:9 168:9 174:9 190:7,11,12,16 192:13 198:12 199:21 203:5 risks (4) 19:18 148:5 199:15 203:15 roach (1) 84:6 road (6) 11:12 47:20 60:15 117:13,23,24 roads (1) 128:22 robbed (2) 107:25 154:6 rocking (1) 51:8 role (89) 1:23 2:1,5 3:14 7:11 8:11,16,22,25 9:3,6,9,25 10:21 12:4 17:2,3 25:11 28:11 30:17 32:2,5,8 33:23 42:14,20 50:18,23 51:1,10,11 68:1,9,10 71:23,24 72:1 86:7,10,19 87:5 88:21 97:3,7,17 102:23 103:13,17,19 104:4,7,9 108:25 109:16 111:16,23,24,25 115:9,16 119:13,14 122:18 123:1,4,7 125:5,8 137:19 143:18 145:25 146:18 147:13 152:24 153:2,3,17,23 154:3 155:25,25 159:2 160:16 168:10,15 169:5 178:6 191:20 roles (12) 28:12 30:12 97:5 103:18 115:11,12,13,16,17 147:11 153:11,12 rolling (1) 51:8 rollout (1) 168:24 room (88) 2:13,21,22 3:8 16:15 20:5,6,19,24 21:1,19 22:20 23:18,22 37:11,13 62:9,23 64:13 70:21,22 71:2,3,20,22 72:4 76:3 77:11 79:12,17 80:1,6,12 82:4 84:12 85:14,23 86:7 87:20 88:2,5,8,11,17 89:2,10,14,18,25 90:10,20 93:5 96:8,21,23 97:24 98:5,14,19,25 99:13 100:2 101:2,6 107:10 130:1,24 131:18 134:7 138:1,9,10,21 139:5,13,17 140:1,6,24 141:1,11,14,20,22 148:2,5,23 rota (1) 30:15 rotation (1) 30:9 roughly (1) 35:3 round (1) 107:2 route (10) 33:6,15 43:5 47:18 48:20 92:13 124:17 131:22 139:25 144:21 rover (2) 204:21,22 rucksacktype (1) 63:11 running (4) 52:10 125:2 146:14 205:12 rural (2) 13:12 14:4 <hr/> S <hr/> safe (10) 13:17,17 14:10,12,13 15:9 65:15 82:17 185:22 188:4 safer (1) 183:19 safest (1) 148:9 safety (13) 14:1,25 15:2,18 102:17 104:12,12,15,18 105:2 138:6 169:5 191:14 salford (1) 10:11 same (26) 7:9 9:11 22:2 24:21 35:3 36:25 40:15 54:19 56:7 59:11 81:2 93:19,25 94:12,20 111:18 114:11 115:4 118:2 151:8 187:25 189:4,10 190:8 197:7 200:19 sanitised (1) 154:14 satnav (1) 47:6 | saunders (110) 3:9 17:20 21:3 22:7 29:2,5,15,21 30:8,18 31:1 36:11,22 40:21 41:15 43:22 44:4,10 45:2,6 49:21 53:21 54:2,9 55:1,15 56:1 64:17 82:18,23 83:4 85:25 89:22,24 90:4,21 91:1,7,16,20,25 92:19,23 93:7,10,13 94:2,6,22 97:20 99:7,10 100:7,14 101:4,9,12,25 108:1,11,14 110:15 112:25 123:9 124:5 126:10,16,20 127:3,15 128:2 134:23 135:1,16 146:20 147:5 150:1,11,21,25 151:3,16 152:6 154:10,19,21 155:15 156:13 161:14 175:18 184:24 188:19,25 189:4 190:5,14,18 194:11 199:6 200:16,23 201:1,4,11 209:8,11,14,19,22 save (3) 99:13 130:22 142:16 saw (9) 22:8 40:13 100:2,2,9,24 101:9 115:24 150:8 saying (18) 20:18 21:18 38:19 44:13 52:23 74:23 79:7 80:4 81:19 88:4,22 94:3 99:20 114:5 123:7 132:19 138:24 140:8 scale (8) 88:3 99:19 100:1,3,5 105:7 117:21 149:3 scenario (5) 152:4 168:18 171:19 175:21 180:9 scenarios (1) 157:15 scene (97) 9:19 13:24 14:9 15:9 20:14 21:5,6,6 22:18 23:16 24:3 25:10 42:1,10 50:20 51:1,2,20 56:21 57:8,10 59:9 62:14 64:25 65:25 67:15,19,21 73:7 77:3,14 79:11 86:11,19,22,23 87:1,5,8 88:21 89:1 91:23 93:23 94:9 95:14 96:1 97:18 100:17 117:19 119:6 120:8 122:23 123:5,21 124:10 127:21 128:1 131:3,6,7,14 132:4,5 133:3,18 136:16 137:3 138:3,20,23 141:9 150:5 153:10,14 162:14 164:9 165:8 168:9 173:10,24 174:2,4,25 175:8,10,19 184:16,17 185:3 186:2 197:13 198:2 199:23 205:19,24 206:6,12 schedule (7) 48:12 78:19 81:16 94:25 95:5 97:25 98:2 s |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|

secrets (1) 80:8
 section (4) 118:13 194:9
 195:25,25
 sections (1) 31:18
 sector (3) 10:8 10 112:21
 see (70) 17:22 18:7,8,21
 20:15 34:10,13 40:15
 43:15 44:3 51:17 60:22
 73:10 74:20 75:24 78:21
 79:4 80:3,15 81:13,14,16
 85:21 86:4 89:15 94:24
 95:1 102:1 108:14
 110:13,16,16 125:13
 135:12 136:10 139:13
 142:21 146:6,12 147:22
 149:11,17 159:17 162:6
 163:10 165:1,9 168:5,25
 169:20 175:10,11,20
 181:3,14,22,23 182:14,20
 183:7,24 186:20 195:25
 198:6 199:12 202:15
 203:11 206:18 207:13
 208:12
 seeing (8) 41:24 50:4
 61:10,11 90:7 119:7 140:2
 172:25
 seek (1) 31:17
 seeking (4) 28:18 56:22
 95:19 169:20
 seem (4) 87:10 93:14 134:10
 135:17
 seemed (3) 86:14 119:18
 199:8
 seems (3) 40:21 51:18 79:13
 seen (28) 4:20 40:12 45:23
 58:11 61:3 77:20 91:18
 95:14,20 96:13 100:23
 109:13 110:2,23
 113:7,12,13,14 123:16
 132:20 133:24 148:22
 151:22 165:20 171:13
 186:24 195:7 197:17
 segregated (1) 191:19
 selected (2) 29:23 39:24
 selfcritical (2) 105:14,23
 selfdeploy (1) 121:19
 selfdeploying (1) 42:10
 selfdeployment (1) 42:12
 selfevidently (1) 77:11
 send (7) 52:24 75:6 92:4
 143:22 146:22,24 150:4
 sends (1) 116:18
 senior (2) 82:12,15,18,19,25
 9:15,17 10:5,17 24:21
 42:1,4 108:25 109:16
 111:19 114:24
 115:1,8,10,19 125:8,11
 seniority (1) 34:8
 sense (15) 5:23 6:4 12:25
 13:23 14:22 31:4,22 33:20
 99:10 118:20 127:17
 141:15 144:8 151:14
 177:23
 sensible (2) 83:1 150:12
 sensitive (2) 85:4 204:23
 sent (5) 13:8,10,15 47:5
 116:15
 sentence (3) 106:15,17
 184:11
 sentences (3) 7:13 9:16
 69:19
 sentiment (1) 80:5
 separate (8) 3:19 25:12
 31:17 65:8,21 69:7,24
 174:2
 september (6) 7:1 170:16,22
 171:14,19 180:5
 sequence (7) 77:17,20 83:8
 90:7 135:11 140:7 144:10
 sequences (1) 156:15
 series (2) 99:15 103:21
 serious (24) 37:1 40:18
 41:7,12 48:2 54:13 55:21
 57:14,16 58:1,2,3,6,7
 61:13,15 62:3 66:17 68:13
 88:14 117:3,6,9 135:25

seriously (2) 13:6 62:3
 seriousness (2) 42:23,23
 service (65) 1:15,17 5:4,6,20
 6:17,20,21 7:2,5,6
 13:1,9,23 20:21 21:4 24:3
 25:25 26:7,8 30:13,20,23
 35:9 38:3,9 41:10 49:3
 51:11 55:9,17 56:12
 84:21,24 86:20 87:2,3 92:6
 94:12,17,19 101:15 102:3
 109:2,6 134:21 136:18
 143:22 150:3,7,15 162:10
 172:4,7,14 191:5,5,8
 192:9,23 194:21 196:4
 199:18,23 201:17
 services (23) 19:21 20:17
 22:23 23:3,9,13,18,20 27:4
 31:5 125:14,24 126:7
 137:22 142:17,21 153:9
 158:11 192:11,15
 201:22,24 202:11
 session (3) 24:9 108:22
 152:20
 sessions (4) 24:8 25:5 168:7
 172:3
 set (13) 2:16 15:8 44:20,24
 50:7 136:6 146:23 150:22
 160:3 167:14 177:7 184:8
 185:24
 sets (3) 55:22,25 124:22
 setting (1) 121:22
 setup (1) 146:14
 setup (1) 197:18
 several (7) 29:8 35:13 37:11
 118:1 170:10 197:14,15
 severe (2) 122:6,14
 severity (4) 47:21 117:2
 118:6 131:8
 sexton (1) 107:19
 shall (1) 156:10
 shape (1) 155:6
 share (4) 30:22 118:25
 192:13,13
 shared (4) 19:18 20:11 21:11
 148:14
 sharing (1) 119:2
 sharston (3) 32:19,24,25
 sheet (1) 69:9
 shift (8) 32:1,10,19 61:19
 114:11,12,13,17
 shifts (2) 30:7 62:25
 shooter (1) 134:1
 shooting (7) 12:2 15:5
 76:10,12,24 87:23 133:9
 shootings (2) 11:22 13:1
 shopping (1) 170:12
 short (11) 44:6,20 45:11
 56:12 111:20 142:1 146:20
 148:18 151:18 152:12
 154:23
 shortened (2) 158:21 167:15
 shorter (1) 43:1
 shortest (1) 198:21
 shorthand (1) 99:5
 shortly (8) 6:24 8:11,17
 35:12,25 108:24 109:16
 114:22
 shot (2) 12:8 76:19
 should (32) 3:7,10 13:18
 14:11 16:11 26:7 31:5
 42:24 78:1 79:15 83:3
 88:23 93:15,17 107:1
 113:18 114:25 131:19
 137:5 148:8 157:14
 180:3,9,24 187:18 191:19
 196:16 202:10,17,21,25
 203:12 205:12
 shoulder (1) 83:13
 shouldnt (3) 88:24 89:18
 157:14
 show (3) 18:25 47:13 162:24
 showing (3) 34:3 35:8 55:2
 shown (1) 134:23
 shows (1) 183:3
 sic (1) 133:16
 side (10) 50:2 59:7,8,14

60:11 63:7 181:24
 185:19,20 194:4
 sideways (1) 2:5
 sieve (4) 182:1,6 183:25
 197:18
 sight (2) 188:9 191:14
 sign (3) 43:18 45:21 206:15
 significance (1) 55:1
 significant (3) 41:17 143:7
 194:3
 signs (3) 47:25 204:23,23
 silver (7) 23:18 30:14
 50:11,14 51:18 75:7
 121:22
 similar (6) 1:23 20:16 21:8
 115:6 143:11 145:18
 similarly (2) 175:7 177:16
 simon (5) 154:15 155:1,3,19
 210:8
 simple (4) 19:20 28:1 40:17
 65:13
 simulated (1) 168:16
 since (5) 6:17 22:1 56:7
 105:19 156:21
 single (2) 35:15 68:15
 singlecrewed (1) 205:2
 sir (252) 1:3 3:6,9 6:15 11:24
 17:17,20 21:3 22:7,13
 29:2,4,5,15,21 30:8,18
 31:1,24 36:11,22 40:21
 41:15 43:22 44:3,4,8,10,23
 45:2,6 48:12 49:21 51:4
 53:21 54:2,9 55:1,15 56:1
 64:17 82:18,22,23,25 83:4
 85:7,25 89:22,23,24
 90:4,21 91:1,7,16,20,25
 92:19,23,25 93:7,10,13
 94:2,6,22 97:20,25
 99:2,7,10 100:7,14
 101:4,9,12,25 102:2
 107:14 108:1,6,11,13,14
 110:15 112:25 113:9 124:5
 126:10,14,16,20 127:3,15
 128:2,5 134:23
 135:1,5,12,16 146:20
 147:5,9 149:24
 150:1,11,21,25 151:3,16
 152:6
 154:5,6,8,10,13,19,20,21,25
 155:5,15 156:2,7,13
 158:7,16,19 159:21 160:25
 161:13,14,18,22 162:1,19
 164:15,25 165:24 166:5,23
 167:19 169:16,22,25
 170:4,19,23
 171:7,11,17,25 172:5,15
 173:3 174:1,5
 175:5,11,17,18,23
 176:12,16,24
 178:4,8,14,16
 179:12,16,22
 180:7,11,17,21,25 181:8
 182:4,9,13 183:2
 184:7,14,24 185:1,7,17
 186:8,18 187:3
 188:9,13,16,19,25
 189:3,4,5,15,18,23
 190:4,5,10,14,18,19,23
 191:18 192:10,21
 193:3,14,22 194:7,11
 195:1,10,15,24 196:13
 197:25 198:3 199:6
 200:15,16,23,25
 201:1,3,4,11 202:5
 203:9,24 204:14 206:7,25
 207:11,22
 209:6,8,10,11,14,15,19,21,22
 sires (4) 47:16,18,23 59:7
 sit (2) 55:24 209:16
 site (4) 173:22 184:22 185:3
 190:1
 sites (1) 197:14
 sitespecific (1) 129:3
 sitting (2) 74:4 95:4
 sitrep (3) 15:15 161:14
 192:3

situated (1) 202:9
 situation (22) 20:23 21:8
 26:7 33:11 55:7 59:5 60:21
 61:23 67:3 74:1,3,6,13
 75:22 76:6 114:17,18
 115:14 133:1 148:17
 195:16 201:2
 situational (17) 19:18 84:18
 87:16,21 88:5,6,9 96:17,20
 97:3 122:23 127:22 132:9
 144:15 148:15,20 192:13
 situations (1) 8:5
 six (14) 40:12 95:11,21 96:13
 117:5,7,9,13,20,22 132:20
 133:23 142:24 144:13
 sixty (1) 92:8
 skilled (1) 7:25
 skills (5) 42:18 169:3,14
 173:14 177:16
 slide (3) 162:24 177:12,13
 slides (1) 164:18
 slight (2) 2:4 74:8
 slightly (9) 14:21 18:6
 114:13 120:8 135:2 142:22
 149:14 167:4 188:18
 slowly (1) 31:14
 small (4) 68:15 73:2,24
 132:16
 smallerscale (1) 104:25
 smallscales (1) 117:16
 smith (3) 86:1 107:18,21
 soe (1) 85:10
 sole (1) 140:9
 solicitor (1) 151:23
 somebody (8) 8:19 36:16,17
 58:3 117:19 151:6 153:1
 164:10
 somebodies (1) 64:5
 someone (2) 48:22 175:20
 someones (1) 150:14
 something (61) 14:15
 16:7,15 25:16 29:25
 30:5,24 35:11 38:10
 40:5,18,23,24 41:17 52:6
 54:4,12 56:15 57:15 58:1
 61:13,24,25 62:2 65:18,19
 66:20 67:2,3 69:1 73:4
 75:13 81:19 88:23,24
 96:25 99:20 105:6 107:7,9
 109:22 111:4,7,9 119:16
 124:17 141:11 146:1,15
 150:2,15,17,18 151:11,19
 170:21 173:19 180:15
 182:1 185:14 190:21
 sometimes (7) 11:22 12:14
 13:11,15 63:14 106:10,23
 somewhere (7) 24:23 26:4
 33:15 37:6 92:8 139:21,23
 soon (10) 13:24,25 14:23
 47:14 51:8,20 54:22
 56:20,24 92:19
 sort (32) 2:4 9:5 29:22 47:17
 50:6 54:5 96:18 103:18
 (1) 198:21
 113:21 118:8 121:3 125:22
 145:11,11,12,23 146:7
 147:6,12 153:6 158:21
 161:7 170:24 179:17
 182:20 185:14 187:14
 197:11,21 204:8,19 207:12
 sorted (1) 85:8
 sought (4) 30:2,4 96:9
 106:14
 sound (3) 4:24 67:2 188:23
 sounded (1) 56:25
 sounds (10) 3:24 4:22 5:1
 30:21 49:19 55:13 62:16
 134:23 137:9 144:8
 sources (2) 1:17 162:3
 space (1) 184:25
 spaces (1) 157:20
 speak (9) 5:10 20:23 21:2
 43:9,23 70:22 161:8 162:6
 165:8
 speaking (5) 5:16,17,21 50:3
 132:15
 speaks (3) 198:24 200:13

203:6
 special (8) 158:10,21,25
 159:9,13,16 160:2,10
 specialism (1) 159:22
 specialist (17) 75:8 125:21
 136:3 145:4 147:12,13,14
 156:22 158:17 159:17
 166:20 172:6,13,21
 173:14,21 185:23
 specialists (2) 163:13 196:8
 specific (39) 7:18 17:3
 24:8,20,24 25:20,24
 26:5,25 27:1 38:9 64:11
 78:16 82:12 83:18,19
 86:10 90:6 110:5 113:14
 114:9 121:3,8 129:5,11
 143:12,20 145:25 147:1
 173:17 174:13 175:5 177:2
 178:18,24 179:7 180:3
 181:1 191:21
 specifically (28) 26:18 28:4
 30:14,16 34:23 38:14
 48:20 50:19 55:24 72:22
 75:4 78:14 90:18 91:12
 109:11 110:21 113:21
 115:5 127:17 129:22 130:7
 140:21 144:25 145:9 149:2
 152:18 153:1 154:3
 specifics (3) 69:6 79:9 101:7
 spectacles (2) 17:18 62:11
 speech (1) 43:6
 speed (1) 47:20
 spend (1) 54:9
 spinal (2) 207:13,15
 spine (1) 208:8
 spoke (7) 5:21 17:7 43:20
 49:1 77:2 87:4 176:18
 spoken (4) 51:17 76:18
 194:14 203:23
 spontaneous (1) 53:25
 sporting (2) 30:19 38:13
 spot (2) 21:25 102:2
 spread (1) 12:15
 spreadsheets (1) 167:1
 spirit (1) 12:2
 stabilise (1) 163:8
 stack (1) 41:14
 stadium (2) 101:17 102:4
 staff (17) 11:4 14:19 26:10
 27:17,18 51:15 69:12
 103:15 111:5 145:19,22
 159:1 162:13 163:13 196:4
 199:20 201:20
 stage (37) 16:1,12 24:5 32:5
 36:8 38:7 40:3,17 46:16
 55:8 58:11 62:5 68:22
 72:24 73:6,19 74:18 81:23
 82:1 83:14,16 84:16,25
 85:21 86:6,11 89:14
 95:11,17 96:7,21
 97:2,10,19 99:1 120:21
 137:3
 stairs (1) 68:11
 staircase (1) 185:11
 stairs (8) 59:25
 84:11,13,15,17 139:25
 140:23 185:25
 stand (4) 74:7 95:6 138:2
 141:9
 standby (19) 74:9,15,16,23
 75:2 90:25 91:9 93:19,24
 94:14,21 132:20 133:10
 134:15 137:10,15 143:14
 144:1 145:3
 stands (3) 36:14 182:8,11
 staring (1) 34:3
 start (20) 2:15 47:9,11
 62:5,7 67:8 75:2,4
 91:14,22 92:3 93:1 94:9
 96:16 114:13 140:13
 141:1,4 167:6 204:15
 started (7) 8:15 32:19 44:1
 46:23 47:2 109:16 142:18
 starting (2) 32:10 140:23
 starts (3) 73:16 102:17
 137:11

statement (18) 4:2 6:15 24:6
 31:24 35:1 39:16 46:22
 155:21 157:4,7 158:20
 162:2,4 167:7 170:2,6
 173:6 176:21
 statements (8) 3:19 34:24
 48:6 57:18 66:6 90:12
 157:5 195:19
 states (1) 78:25
 stating (2) 90:24 93:19
 station (60) 10:14 16:15
 23:11 32:20,22,25
 33:2,4,11 34:21 37:10
 43:11 51:14 59:2,23 73:23
 78:3,12,16 83:12,15
 84:4,15 89:6 95:14 115:22
 119:9 128:20,21,22
 129:7,9,25 130:13
 132:7,8,13,15,25 133:21
 135:13 138:10 139:18
 141:8 182:12 183:9,22
 184:3,13 185:4,10,20
 186:23 187:1,3,17,20
 191:17 195:4 205:21
 stations (4) 25:19 130:14
 146:15 196:20
 stay (3) 68:17 125:5 194:11
 stem (1) 197:4
 stenographer (1) 161:11
 step (2) 141:2 181:15
 stepping (1) 1:19
 steps (1) 151:24
 stick (2) 7:9,25 88:21
 still (20) 24:6 43:25 56:10,10
 59:7 84:19 86:9,11 87:23
 88:11 91:12 92:9 105:24
 137:14,15 138:3 143:17
 151:7 198:3 207:9
 stills (1) 43:26
 stockport (1) 1:18
 stood (2) 78:11 93:18
 stool (5) 43:1 85:15 91:1
 187:23 200:9
 stopped (1) 60:3
 stopping (1) 99:12
 straight (2) 71:6 184:12
 straightaway (2) 108:9 126:7
 strands (1) 94:23
 strategic (6) 22:20 23:16
 75:8 97:5 103:16 153:11
 street (2) 59:4,19
 stress (2) 27:5 57:17
 stretcher (6) 207:16
 208:7,8,17,18 209:1
 stretchers (8)
 207:10,12,15,17
 208:6,15,25 209:3
 strictly (2) 47:17 195:22
 structure (2) 50:18 102:15
 structured (3) 102:6 183:4
 187:4
 structures (1) 75:15
 student (1) 156:2
 subject (6) 107:11,24 154:8
 173:6 176:20 198:12
 subman (1) 208:10
 subsequent (6) 25:10 65:20
 69:11 70:21 89:11 127:1
 substantial (5) 79:25
 169:14,18 171:4 185:11
 substantially (1) 176:5
 succession (2) 35:14 117:8
 sufficient (3) 68:23 87:13
 138:2
 suggest (5) 86:25 100:13
 117:21 140:18 182:24
 suggested (5) 16:11 28:15
 53:19 117:5 131:9
 suggesting (2) 117:7 144:12
 suggestion (1) 82:10
 suggests (3) 121:6 127:13
 143:21
 summarise (1) 58:10
 summary (5) 6:7 167:17,21
 169:20 170:3
 sunday (3) 4:17,23 5:11

supervising (1) 22:10
 supervision (1) 201:23
 support (26) 8:21 9:18 11:3
 51:15
 61:11,19,21,22,23,24
 64:18 65:7 66:8,10,11,22
 67:1,7,11 68:14 102:23
 145:17 158:10 174:17
 176:2 205:17
 suppose (6) 56:24 190:9 164:7
 165:25 177:19 82:16
 supposed (1) 191:22
 sure (27) 5:16,20 8:13 18:17
 22:5 24:14 33:7 49:11
 52:17 66:4 67:17 68:2 85:8
 88:19 104:14 111:18
 123:16 129:12 132:2
 170:19 185:8 189:18
 194:17 196:21 199:12
 207:18 209:12
 surgical (1) 64:7
 surprising (1) 40:21
 survival (2) 198:22 199:16
 sustained (1) 196:2
 suter (2) 83:25 108:8
 sweep (1) 88:16
 swift (1) 151:23
 sworn (2) 1:5 155:2
 syllabus (1) 160:4
 system (24) 35:23 36:13,15
 38:2,3,20,24 41:3,4,8
 45:15 55:18 56:5,6,9,10
 63:4 111:1,1 112:14
 116:17 118:3,5 120:25
 systems (3) 38:8 50:6,8

T

tables (2) 102:20 103:3
 tabletop (2) 29:12,14
 tactical (10) 22:19 23:16
 75:7 158:3,9,12,14 175:24
 196:14
 tag (1) 107:4
 taken (19) 28:23 29:7,9,9
 33:10,15 53:13 18 62:18
 65:1,18 96:13 11

177:2,5,7,13,14,17,20,23,24
178:6,25
179:4,13,17,24,25
180:6,10,24 187:24
192:9,14,16,22 193:1
204:12 206:9,10 209:4
teams (12) 125:21 130:6
147:12,15 158:17 166:6
169:2 174:17 192:8,22
196:18 201:20
tease (1) 189:8
technical (1) 83:7
technician (7) 6:22,24
7:14,17,22 16:21 156:3
technicians (7) 8:24 10:6,19
26:13 34:12 152:23 159:2
techniques (1) 200:10
telephone (2) 9:19 134:5
telling (3) 1:8 39:8 94:2
ten (2) 112:22 154:20
tend (3) 55:24 56:10 156:15
tended (2) 130:3 151:12
tens (1) 38:22
term (11) 26:20 50:25
76:15,16 79:18 142:10
158:9 163:24 164:8 197:17
198:13
termed (2) 160:17 170:21
terms (32) 19:20 20:5
22:14,15,21,24 23:2,5,20
30:24 40:17 56:3 71:4
74:12 94:15 105:2 119:25
120:10 124:12 137:17
173:1 181:5 186:3
190:5,17 195:3,9,17,23
200:5 203:7 205:23
terrible (1) 103:10
terrorism (1) 158:12
terrorist (28) 25:21 26:1,18
27:2,6 122:2,5,13,14
145:22 157:9,24 158:15
159:25 160:16,17 161:1,16
169:15 170:14 171:5 173:1
189:22 190:3,12 194:15
195:13,20
terrorists (4) 158:13 172:18
189:13,14
testing (1) 31:7
text (1) 186:24
thank (52) 3:9 17:20 20:9
22:14 24:15 30:18 31:1
36:22 41:15 44:10 54:8
56:1 63:5 67:23 72:7 77:23
83:4,25 93:14 94:22
101:12 108:2,11,13
110:17,18 112:24 113:11
116:10,22 118:21 128:5
135:16 149:24,24 150:1
151:16 152:6 154:5,10,21
161:15 166:11 169:10
178:10 194:12 201:11
203:25 207:24
209:14,19,22
thanks (1) 56:16
thats (124) 1:13 2:23 4:16
5:14 6:19,23 7:10 8:10
10:9 14:3 15:21 16:9
17:20,24 18:25 19:10
20:18 21:10 22:13
24:13,14 26:21 28:1,19
31:10 32:9,20 33:3 34:10
35:10,22,23 37:2 38:25
41:5 42:25 44:7,15
45:20,21 46:5 48:3,25
50:13 52:12 53:1,4
55:20,21 56:15 58:6 59:9
60:7 63:5,15,21 69:2,17
74:8 76:16 77:4,23 80:22
81:7,11,12,13,20 85:23
86:2 88:1,16 93:12 94:5
97:20 104:5 106:3 107:9
109:15 123:12 127:6
133:4,7,10 134:4 139:4
143:24 145:8,16 146:11,15
147:1 149:5,16 154:5,9
155:22 156:23 158:5

162:19 163:17 164:10
166:5 168:12 178:2 179:17
183:23,24 184:7 186:9
187:14,15 188:4 189:15
191:8,21 194:10 195:15
205:4,23,25 206:21 207:5
208:2
theory (3) 107:7 168:6 169:4
thereabouts (1) 18:10
thereafter (2) 6:24 75:14
thered (4) 40:2 115:9 120:5
189:5
therefore (13) 10:16 13:18
60:15,17 85:4 137:19
143:23 174:19 183:12
184:23 199:15 200:7 202:1
theres (26) 17:18 23:1,4
38:21 52:6,8 63:15 65:8
73:6 82:9 126:1 133:25
136:6 137:4,6,7 150:16
158:1 168:2,6 177:6,12
187:5 188:23 189:15
190:17
theyd (2) 36:18 148:22
theyre (5) 71:10,11 173:24
189:10 192:22
theyve (5) 26:25 52:11,19
53:17 159:25
thing (10) 30:7 49:23 86:24
87:16 122:21 130:8 139:16
146:12 187:25 197:21
thinking (6) 102:12 126:5,8
150:21 175:13 188:20
third (7) 18:19 62:25
110:13,19 112:6 162:8
167:7
though (3) 143:17 195:22
207:19
thought (10) 21:19 67:24
76:19 93:7 98:23 104:22
124:17 135:3 146:14
197:16
thousands (1) 38:22
threat (10) 122:5,13 135:25
159:25 188:5
189:5,6,10,14,15
three (16) 10:9 73:3,21
80:11 108:18 112:12,19,20
133:3,17,23 143:3 165:9
191:4 201:24 202:11
threshold (1) 134:11
through (24) 12:21 47:5
52:14,15,24 54:10 58:10
77:18 113:5 115:23 116:20
124:15 125:2 126:3 127:18
128:16 151:7 152:5 178:9
180:9,13,14 194:19 197:15
throughout (10) 10:10 16:20
20:3 26:14 41:5 49:10
106:21 111:2 112:22
122:12
thursday (1) 209:25
time (134) 5:23 6:20 7:9,18
8:13,15 9:8 10:16 12:20
13:12,13 14:16,17 17:7
21:21 22:1 24:21 29:17
31:7 33:14 35:3 38:2
44:16,17 45:7
48:4,8,16,18,21 49:1
53:13,18,20 54:5,9,20
62:19,21 63:2,3 67:24
68:3,11 70:17,24 72:1 73:5
76:1 79:20,21,24 81:2
85:1,3 86:7,9 87:22 89:8
90:13,17 92:7 95:23,25
96:12 97:13 98:4,19 100:8
105:15,22 109:2,11
111:18,20,23 112:13
114:20 115:10,12,17
118:2,11,18,23 119:6,25
121:13 122:7,9 123:24
124:3,4,25 125:3 127:24
128:6 130:22 131:18
132:3,22 133:1
134:2,6,13,18 135:8,14
137:4,23 138:14,18 140:10

142:2,11,16 143:17 144:23
146:16 148:7,19 149:25
152:17 153:1 155:12,21
161:11 167:24 170:24
180:22 194:7 198:21,22
206:25
timed (2) 84:2 135:11
timely (1) 50:12
times (5) 21:13 61:21 66:15
95:2 129:24
timing (1) 44:8
tiny (1) 113:10
title (1) 7:17
today (16) 2:18 3:7,13 17:18
45:4,5 85:24 135:6 152:13
154:17 155:7,9 163:1
165:1 167:18 177:1
together (13) 21:8,12,15
23:10,13,19 31:5 39:12
94:23 153:9,13 204:17
205:8
told (18) 17:1 38:20
43:20,22 46:16 61:13
83:16 90:1,11 91:2 98:15
126:12 142:5 152:13,16
173:18 177:22 192:25
tomorrow (9) 155:15 173:4
176:19 177:1 194:5,14
206:5 209:2,15
tonight (2) 38:21 209:18
too (6) 40:25 68:19 70:1
116:12 150:13 201:9
took (9) 13:12,13 77:18
101:16 114:20 115:3,12
119:11 130:20
topic (6) 71:5 101:13 110:5
113:23 188:18 204:2
topics (1) 108:17
torso (1) 202:24
tourniquet (4) 64:15 66:14
186:11 197:1
tourniquets (3) 197:21
207:21,23
towards (13) 43:4,25 46:20
47:2,11 50:16 53:14 73:23
84:12 85:14 132:7 140:23
151:12
traditionally (1) 162:9
traffic (5) 11:12 33:13
117:13,24,25
trafford (1) 38:21
train (5) 78:12 83:11 84:3,14
192:23
trained (15) 8:4 26:14
27:3,23,24,24 57:24 58:3
145:12,23,24 153:1 154:3
162:13 172:20
trainee (1) 6:22
training (157) 7:16,19 9:22
11:17 16:19,22,24
17:3,5,8,12
18:4,9,13,15,21,22
19:1,2,3,4,8,11
24:7,8,9,10,16,16,17,18,20,22,24
25:2,4,5,16,24 26:3
27:1,5,6
28:3,4,8,10,14,20,22
29:3,5,11,22 89:19 97:20
98:16 99:23,24
108:18,20,21,22,23,23
109:3,9,10,11,12,17,18,20,23
110:2,8,21
111:2,10,15,16,21
112:2,5,6 129:18
145:18,19,20 151:21
152:1,13,14,18,20
153:5,6,17 154:2 155:12
160:2,3 166:19,20,24
167:4,12 168:21
169:1,2,3,4,7,12,23
170:2,8 172:2,8,11,17
173:6,9,14,15 174:6,24
175:6,14 176:20
177:2,4,12 178:5,12,18,19
179:2,3,8,20,23 180:2,3,23
191:25 192:8,8

193:12,15,20 194:2,4,9,23
201:25 204:3
transcript (8) 3:25 31:21
45:16 52:3,21 133:7
142:21 161:11
transcription (3) 45:20 49:19
74:8
transfer (2) 7:1,4
transferred (1) 7:7
translates (1) 196:11
transport (3) 102:19
130:15,18
transported (1) 182:25
trauma (16) 41:11,21
49:4,5,6,22 50:3,3 52:25
55:23,24 75:11 106:12
121:20 145:7 202:24
traumatic (5) 11:4 41:4,8
49:9 65:6
travel (3) 47:20 59:16,18
travelled (2) 12:18 59:20
travelling (2) 60:17 128:20
treat (12) 12:8 96:24
97:1,11,18 149:20,23
162:14 184:21
196:17,17,22
treated (1) 80:12
treating (2) 140:13 141:1
treatment (14) 102:19
105:20 125:6 136:11
181:23 182:20 184:3
186:6,7 197:5,19
202:9,21,22
treatments (2) 8:2 10:1
triage (27) 25:18 35:22
69:8,22 102:18 103:20
106:10,12,14 119:14
181:22 182:1,6,20
183:18,21,25 184:12 185:3
187:5 196:24
197:7,10,11,17,17,22
tried (2) 135:5 140:3
triggers (1) 36:21
trinity (1) 130:4
trip (1) 65:20
true (10) 4:16 7:10 21:10
34:10 44:15 48:25 49:24
88:3,6 104:5
truly (1) 99:24
trust (1) 1:18
trusts (1) 146:10
try (16) 16:10 41:12 91:22
93:13 96:3 127:19 130:24
131:24 141:3 144:3 147:18
148:19 156:10 167:4
177:24 189:7
trying (16) 29:25 93:24
128:25 129:23 131:13,23
139:1 141:2,24 143:15
144:4,5 165:8 179:5 186:3
197:4
tube (1) 64:5
turn (11) 74:21 84:1 85:10
90:23 91:7 123:2 147:17
166:17 181:14,15 193:4
turned (3) 59:3 70:2 119:20
turning (3) 28:25 48:12
147:19
twice (2) 58:24 172:18
twofold (1) 50:2
type (20) 25:12 28:9 30:7
37:1 61:23 69:9 87:23
98:23 102:9 118:17 125:4
145:13 164:11 166:14
190:2 195:17 207:10,13
208:1,3
types (2) 90:19 136:2

U

uk (1) 41:5
ultimately (2) 28:15 80:10
umbrella (1) 158:9
unassisted (1) 200:11
unaware (2) 56:13 118:2
uncommon (1) 36:24
underemphasise (1) 56:11

underemphases (1) 41:3
undergo (1) 17:2
undergone (1) 16:24
underlined (1) 136:4
understand (49) 2:16,18,23
3:2,14 9:14 22:7 26:6
27:22 38:15 54:6 55:10,11
65:23 66:5 68:2 81:6 91:16
94:20,24 100:9 108:24
110:7 129:1 140:6 156:4
157:14,16 159:7,22 161:19
162:22,24,25 164:4,19
165:12 167:16 169:12
177:10,25 184:4 186:3,9
189:12 190:24 193:18
204:4 206:24
understandable (1) 14:23
understanding (29) 6:7
16:13 19:17 22:22 23:17
30:12 41:19 54:19 73:20
93:16 104:15 139:2 144:16
146:18 147:25 149:1
155:20 156:20 161:24
172:12 173:2 179:6 183:14
189:21 192:4,24 197:22
199:10 200:21
understandings (1) 22:23
understood (29) 5:8,12,14
10:2 15:1 33:22 34:2
41:2,7 42:14,19 52:17
55:17 67:18 88:19 96:21
102:24 104:13 105:23
109:20 162:15 170:20
186:20 187:1,19 194:17
197:17 205:9 206:18
undertake (3) 28:12 119:13
145:24
undertaken (3) 101:14 112:7
183:20
undertaking (1) 34:25
undertook (3) 111:7 166:24
169:23
undertriaged (1) 41:8
underway (2) 41:18 61:13
unexploded (3) 150:12,25
151:7
unfolded (1) 99:19
unilaterally (1) 201:6
unit (5) 167:14 168:4,23
177:3 206:18
unknown (1) 81:21
unless (5) 16:2 47:18 66:1
147:1 209:6
unlikely (1) 155:7
unlikely (3) 67:14 117:17
151:3
unmanageable (1) 64:7
unoperational (1) 206:25
unsafe (1) 201:9
unsure (1) 84:20
until (20) 2:20 8:6 48:8
62:7,8 67:4,8 82:11,13
88:2,4 90:7,19 97:6
100:2,24 110:23 114:3
119:2 123:14,22 127:5
141:19 150:14 152:25
162:12 198:22 209:24
unusual (3) 114:17 117:24
131:6
unwell (1) 130:3
update (2) 130:24 133:14
uplift (2) 159:1 179:3
upon (7) 97:9 107:21 140:19
156:14 194:16 207:6
208:15
upper (1) 59:4
upscale (1) 159:25
upset (1) 101:5
upsetting (1) 85:5
upstairs (10) 79:3,12,22
83:18 90:12 96:7 139:1
140:20 141:10 149:22
used (20) 36:13 51:1
61:24,25 106:25 107:7,8
111:1 117:23 129:12
143:20 156:13 162:18

164:8 169:2 180:24 184:6
204:12 207:9 209:3
useful (3) 132:2 154:2
175:14
uses (2) 56:10 163:24
using (8) 47:22 56:22 79:18
83:12 102:13,20 142:10
205:13
usual (8) 53:5,6,16 59:5 66:1
131:3,20 143:24
usually (8) 9:5 15:8 26:24
53:8,12 65:3 107:8 129:9
utilise (1) 127:17
utilised (1) 184:18
V
variety (10) 8:2,4 9:23 10:1
35:3 63:10 65:2,3 111:10
145:23
various (13) 7:20 19:21
25:19 37:10 41:9 42:9
52:10 55:19 63:18 94:18
109:24 111:3 161:20
vastly (1) 41:3
vaughan (5) 164:16 165:4
205:2 208:4,16
vehicle (50) 33:1 46:17
59:12,16,18 60:2,3,9
63:9,10 65:20 69:3 70:14
71:7,19 131:12
204:5,15,17,19
205:5,9,12,14,17,17,18,19,20,21,25
206:2,3,5,12,19,23
207:1,1,3,9,10,25,25
208:3,3,15,21,24
vehicles (9) 60:5,12,17,23
61:11 76:14 204:4,8,12
vein (1) 143:11
ventilate (1) 64:6
venue (3) 102:3 120:20
121:14
version (3) 5:13 69:12
205:16
vests (1) 26:17
via (3) 9:19 128:19 182:2
victoria (24) 10:14 23:11
37:10 59:19,23 73:23
78:3,12 83:11 84:3 89:6
128:20,21 129:7,9,25
130:13 132:7,8 133:21
139:18 142:1 176:11 185:9
visited (1) 37:6
visual (2) 69:22 71:10
visualise (1) 100:25
volunteers (2) 30:1,4
volvo (3) 206:13,13 208:22
W
wait (3) 42:21 47:4,8
waited (3) 117:7 118:10,20
waiting (3) 89:10 92:9,10
walk (2) 84:17 85:12
walked (4) 43:4 78:3 84:13
98:24
walking (13) 68:22 70:24
73:2 95:12,21 132:21
133:9,24 135:13 142:24
144:14 182:4,5
walks (1) 84:11
wallet (1) 106:23
wanting (2) 53:7 139:12
wants (1) 201:14
war (8) 78:2 89:5 133:20
135:13 137:18 138:23
140:23 141:16
warm (21) 25:14 98:16 107:4
142:13 161:21 165:13
189:12,17 190:9 198:20
199:20,25 200:3,7,17
201:5,17 202:9,17
203:14,21
warn (1) 17:17
warning (4) 40:22 77:14
181:3,9
warnock (1) 107:16

wasnt (48) 13:14 14:15
20:15 30:16 33:20 38:9
47:7 55:2 57:4 61:24 82:17
83:7 88:2 90:15 93:20 97:1
101:7 108:22 111:7
117:1,2,3 118:18 119:7
120:19,21 121:15 124:14
125:12 127:8 129:5,5
132:22 136:17 138:14,18
142:10 144:11 146:17
148:8 150:18 151:10
155:24 171:21 180:18
195:22 199:10 206:21
watching (1) 66:19
water (1) 157:21
way (44) 5:8,24 21:14 22:25
38:5 39:2 43:13 44:14
46:23 49:21 50:16 54:19
58:6,11 60:10 67:4
71:20,21 72:23 74:6 82:20
85:13 93:25 94:10,11
104:10 105:20 116:9 126:8
127:4 128:21,25 130:4
133:18 139:22 140:24
145:18 149:4,12 158:5
167:5 181:4,10 200:19
205:2 208:4,16
ways (3) 37:20 49:25 139:22
wear (1) 145:24
wearing (1) 168:11
website (1) 183:13
wed (1) 43:1
wednesday (1) 1:1
week (3) 4:21 165:6 169:2
welch (21) 107:23
108:9,12,13,14,15,15
110:18 113:7,11 123:12
124:9 126:12,14 128:2,5
135:9,17 147:9 149:24
210:5
welfare (2) 14:2 85:15
wellknown (1) 120:13
went (15) 46:8 56:18
89:15,25 93:4 96:23 98:19
113:17 120:15 142:14
149:17,25 176:11 180:9
205:21
werent (6) 24:3 92:10 111:24
120:15 123:24 130:1
west (6) 1:14,16 7:6 101:15
102:3 107:18
weve (29) 3:13 18:11 41:9
51:16 52:3,21 63:23 71:3
94:25 98:12 109:13 110:2
115:1,22 133:8,17 165:20
170:3 171:12 173:19,21
178:9 188:18 189:20
194:14 195:7 197:17
198:11 209:18
whatever (2) 54:2 91:21
whats (8) 45:23 46:13 93:10
127:15 136:6 139:9 144:17
146:23
whereabouts (1) 121:9
whereas (4) 127:8 166:6
179:13 189:24
whereby (3) 38:3,20 112:14
whichever (2) 52:9,10
whilst (21) 35:4 36:24 43:25
44:1 67:1 71:9 78:11
100:21 121:25 122:16
124:15 126:4,24 131:22
133:20 134:9,18 144:4
146:8 149:8 168:10
whiteboard (1) 69:9
whod (1) 70:22
whole (4) 8:4 20:14 49:10
175:20
wholly (1) 91:4
whom (2) 13:23 167:23
whos (3) 36:11 58:3 119:1
whose (2) 95:23 104:12
wide (2) 94:15 157:15
wider (3) 8:2 9:23 10:1
williams (1) 84:5
winchester (5) 170:16,17,21
171:24 180:5

wish (3) 181:14 193:20
202:17
witness (12) 1:4 3:6,19 24:6
66:5 154:12 155:1,8
158:20 170:1 176:21
195:18
witnesses (1) 146:8
witness (1) 45:3
wonder (5) 93:3 100:16,18
155:1 188:25
wondering (1) 66:19
wont (3) 16:12 123:14
167:23
wording (1) 94:5
work (18) 1:25 8:6
23:10,13,19 26:13 27:3
42:16 51:13 54:23 145:21
174:17 179:17 186:4
187:21 190:6,15 192:19
worked (12) 6:17 10:10
37:17 39:6,9,12 54:20 55:8
106:19 114:10,11 206:8
working (19) 1:18 19:21
30:14 32:1 33:9 37:19
41:21 94:9 153:8,13
157:17,20,21 163:5,13,22
188:5 190:18 201:22
works (2) 26:24,25
workshop (1) 205:13
worn (1) 72:12
worrying (2) 105:21 151:14
wouldnt (17) 33:14 38:13
65:17,18 66:1 79:19
89:1,17 97:2 117:3 134:16
145:14 146:1 147:5,14
162:11 192:17
wound (2) 187:10 197:12
wounded (9) 95:12,21
132:21 133:9,24 142:24
144:14 182:4,5
wrist (1) 107:2
writers (1) 99:5
written (1) 69:25
wrong (4) 40:24 47:9 113:17
188:20

X

x (1) 210:1

Y

yeah (2) 72:17,17
year (2) 9:11 172:19
years (4) 32:9 37:18 55:9
156:1
yellow (1) 208:18
yet (6) 50:7 81:22 82:8
101:22 118:18 133:19
youd (22) 32:4,8 33:1,10
34:4 38:24 47:20 58:11,16
66:7 89:12,20 90:22 91:7
92:20 98:16 119:10 128:8
178:17 185:21 192:19
193:1
youll (7) 16:1 56:18 80:9
97:8 101:20 136:4 188:19
youre (39) 14:18 17:11 20:18
21:7 32:8 35:6 38:15,19
44:3,13 45:6 52:23 61:11
66:4 74:20 75:13 86:3 88:4
94:2,3 98:17 102:2 110:9
113:10 123:12 126:2,3,4
128:12 132:12 137:20
138:23 139:1 146:9 151:5
167:21 175:21,23 197:14
yours (4) 32:9 69:2 120:3
164:16
yourself (15) 27:24 34:15
50:17 58:21 98:23 105:12
112:9 124:11 133:24
134:24 136:10 163:1 167:2
193:7 195:18
youve (27) 4:7 14:22 17:1,12
32:4 42:9 52:18 56:15 63:6
72:7 76:3 83:14
91:17,18,25 94:7 95:7 97:8

99:16 112:13 116:10
136:14 144:20 162:25
190:6 203:23 207:2

Z

zone (51) 98:24
162:9,14,17,17
163:6,7,10,14,16,16,17,24
164:8,11,12 165:10,20
166:1,4,14,19
187:21,24,25
188:2,7,21,22
189:4,9,9,12,14,17,20,24
190:9 191:13,22
198:12,14,15 199:25
201:5,5,17 202:17
203:13,14,19
zones (30) 25:12,14 27:2
89:20 98:17,20
142:13,13,13,14 145:21
161:21,25 165:9,14 166:13
189:1,2 191:10 198:9,20
199:21 200:3,7,17,18,20
202:10 203:20,22
zoning (1) 189:3
zulu (5) 205:1,6,22,25
206:16

0

07 (4) 39:24 55:4 116:7,19

1

1 (12) 48:15 69:24 102:11
112:2 124:21 126:15
137:5,20 147:10 197:2
210:3,4
10 (8) 3:1 31:25 39:16
99:5,8 152:3 165:7 209:20
1000 (2) 1:2 209:24
1030 (3) 155:10,13 205:11
1032 (1) 40:4
108 (1) 210:5
111 (1) 108:3
1111 (1) 45:10
1126 (1) 45:12
12 (8) 3:4 4:2 12:1 55:9 88:1
97:25 98:2 112:22
12lead (1) 63:18
13 (1) 46:22
14 (3) 18:9 114:25 115:2
15 (2) 101:25 102:4
152 (1) 210:6
155 (2) 210:8,9
17 (2) 1:1 4:12
18 (1) 209:25

2

2 (12) 11:25 32:9 48:15
69:24 72:9,13 156:1
162:3,5 181:16 199:9,10
20 (3) 141:13 142:19 154:20
2004 (1) 155:21
2005 (3) 6:18 24:16 163:11
2006 (2) 155:23 156:4
2008 (3) 7:1,11 24:17
2010 (2) 11:25 12:12
2012 (2) 8:6,8
2013 (3) 24:20 109:15 153:7
20132014 (3) 24:23 111:20
152:15
2014 (2) 24:21 109:15
2015 (10) 9:8 26:4 32:7,7,8
152:3,3 156:5 170:13,14
20152016 (1) 24:24
2016 (14) 18:23 26:4 108:21
109:7 152:3 162:22 166:3
170:15,16,22 171:16
177:10 180:5 194:25
2017 (31) 2:6 4:12,21,24
10:7 27:13 32:6 56:7
101:16 110:3 115:4 156:21
160:15 161:5,17,24 163:23
164:17 170:9 172:16

178:13,17 180:22 184:15
187:19 190:22 191:25
193:5,21 194:17 204:10
2018 (2) 3:21 156:24
2019 (1) 4:2
2021 (2) 1:1 209:25
210 (2) 108:1,5
22 (29) 2:6 13:21 15:16,22
19:24 21:24 22:4 27:13
28:6,23 31:14 32:1 37:6
39:5 102:5 170:9
174:16,19 176:14,22 178:7
180:22 193:21 194:14
196:12 199:2 200:14
202:3,7
2230 (6) 34:18,19 35:12,25
37:21 39:5
2231 (1) 44:12
2236 (5) 44:9,13 45:19
52:6,21
2238 (3) 48:16 52:6,18
2242 (2) 62:15,20
224546 (1) 72:9
2246 (1) 133:10
224600 (3) 73:11,16 95:4
224943 (2) 77:6,25
2250 (7) 136:25 137:17
138:23 141:13 142:1
143:2,6
225002 (1) 78:9
225022 (3) 83:10 132:25
135:12
225032 (1) 78:20
225037 (1) 80:15
225045 (1) 84:2
225048 (1) 81:18
225128 (1) 84:10
2252 (1) 89:15
225202 (1) 85:11
225245 (1) 85:21
2254 (1) 98:1
22nd (6) 104:10 155:9,10,14
176:6 195:15
24 (3) 115:1 153:24 154:4
25 (1) 173:5
27 (5) 4:24 170:16,22
171:14,19
28 (1) 18:23
28354 (1) 45:19
29 (2) 3:21 4:21

3

3 (9) 62:18 69:24 73:10 95:4
125:4 128:4,5 181:17
182:4
30 (2) 78:20 193:5
303 (2) 205:22 206:1
304 (1) 205:1
305 (1) 205:6
307 (1) 206:16
31 (5) 110:3,19 111:5
152:3,3
330 (1) 154:22
340 (1) 154:24

4

4 (4) 77:6 125:7 170:5,14
40 (1) 98:12
45 (1) 119:2
458 (1) 209:23
4c (1) 147:11

5

5 (5) 4:24 33:16 78:19
125:23 194:10

6

6 (3) 80:15 193:7 195:25
62 (2) 199:5,17
63 (1) 200:2
64 (1) 201:15
65 (1) 202:6
68 (1) 202:19
69 (1) 203:11

7

7 (6) 32:10,12 39:1 81:17
122:4 170:13
77 (1) 157:8

8

8 (2) 31:25 33:16

9

9 (1) 170:15
92 (1) 183:11
93 (1) 186:23
930 (1) 209:16
999 (24) 13:7 35:13 36:16
46:3 52:9,10 57:23 58:12
92:8 116:4,18
117:5,7,20,20,23
118:2,4,12,16,18 136:20
151:3,6