

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 84

March 30, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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Tuesday, 30 March 2021

(9.30 am)

CHIEF INSPECTOR MICHAEL BOOTH (continued)

Questions from MR GREANEY (continued)

MR GREANEY: Good morning, sir. Chief inspector, we have, as you'll appreciate, a lot to get through today, not just with you but also with retired Superintendent Giladi, so I'm going to try to get through the balance of my questions with you as efficiently as possible.

Yesterday, we left you in 2016 and we departed events in October of that year, when you, on the 4th of that month, emailed a version of the action cards to all FDOs. That's where we were.

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware that during 2016, the latter part of that year, HMICFRS was carrying out fieldwork in GMP as part of preparing one of its reports?

A. I was aware they were in force, yes, but I wasn't actively involved.

Q. Were you aware also, although you weren't actively involved, that the Inspectorate was undertaking focus group meetings?

A. Yes, I was aware. There had been occasions whilst I was in the OCB when I would facilitate those groups coming

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together at a request, but I wasn't present at any of those focus groups.

Q. Andrew Buchan of the Inspectorate gave evidence to the chairman on 8 February, Day 61 of the oral evidence hearings. Did you ever meet him whilst he was in force?

A. No, that's not a gentleman I've ever met.

Q. He explained that one of the focus groups to which the Inspectorate spoke was comprised of eight members of control room staff within the OCB. It sounds from what you have said already that that's no surprise to you.

A. No, it's not.

Q. What I'm going to ask is we look at the screen with you at two passages from the evidence he gave about that focus group meeting and what he subsequently did.

The focus group meeting that we are going to be seeing his evidence about was carried out, I believe, in October of 2016. So that is after the first version of your action cards, it is after Exercise Winchester Accord, and it's after indeed the second version of your action cards, which, as we know, were issued in June of 2016.

So Mr Lopez, this is one of the references on the note that I provided to you. It's the transcript of Day 61, pages 107 to 109 {Day61/107:1}. This is a set of questions that I posed to Mr Buchan. I can't pretend

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they're particularly stirring, but they do illustrate a point that I want to ask you about.

It starts very much towards the top. Mr Lopez, follow on with me, please. I'm going to have to read this out:

"Question: In some forces — should we understand from the evidence you have given already that in some forces specific roles had been given to particular individuals within the control room beyond the FIM or FDO?"

"Answer: Yes.

"Question: The FDO would be designated in the control room?"

"Answer: Yes.

"Question: But in some forces other individuals within that room had also been given designated roles?"

"Answer: Certainly once a Plato had been called by the FDO, they would be allocated particular roles invariably around the task cards that would follow.

"Question: Within GMP, so far as the focus group work revealed, had GMP designated specific roles to particular individuals beyond the FDO?"

"Answer: No.

"Question: So in the event of Operation Plato being declared, what would staff have to do in order to be

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allocated a task?

"Answer: They would have to access the documentation that would tell them what needed to be done and then between themselves organise that work, and when we pressed them they said they'd ask the FDO what to do.

"Question: So this is the FDO, who is under or capable of coming under extreme pressure, and the other staff felt that they would have to speak to that person to see what job was expected of them?"

"Answer: That's correct.

"Question: The simple way in which you express it in your statement at paragraph 100 is:

""Staff would have to rely on the FDO to allocate tasks, whereas in other forces a series of simple prompt cards had been developed'?"

"Answer: That's correct.

"Question: What view did the Inspectorate form of that state of affairs?"

"Answer: We believed that that's a gap in their ability to manage the incident at a very — under a huge pressure, certainly in those first few moments. This, we believed, was a gap in their abilities.

"Question: So where we have reached, and we're

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1 going to look at the FDO in a moment, is that the FDO  
 2 was capable of becoming overburdened in the event of  
 3 Operation Plato being declared?  
 4 "Answer: Yes, that's correct.  
 5 "Question: And here was, as you've put it, another  
 6 gap in the system whereby the staff would not know or  
 7 would not necessarily know what was expected of them  
 8 unless told by the FDO?  
 9 "Answer: That's correct.  
 10 "Question: Which might be thought to be a state of  
 11 affairs that was somewhat less than ideal?  
 12 "Answer: Yes, very much less than ideal."  
 13 Let's just pause for a moment before we look at the  
 14 second passage from the evidence of Mr Buchan.  
 15 As we identified a moment ago, that focus group  
 16 meeting, about which Mr Buchan was speaking, occurred in  
 17 October of 2016, so long after you had first prepared  
 18 your action cards.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Long after Exercise Winchester Accord and indeed months  
 21 after you had prepared the second, slightly different,  
 22 version of your action cards?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Do you agree that it seems from what the eight members  
 25 of the control room staff were saying during the focus

1 group meeting that what you intended to occur had not  
 2 filtered down to them?  
 3 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 4 Q. I want, as I said, to look at a second passage in  
 5 Mr Buchan's evidence on the same day.  
 6 Mr Lopez, this therefore is Day 61, pages 115 to 116  
 7 {Day61/115:9}. I'm very sorry, it's my questions again,  
 8 but it's a much shorter passage this time.  
 9 Line 9:  
 10 "Question: It's a very short point and it's just to  
 11 pull all of this together. In the work that was done by  
 12 the Inspectorate, shortcomings had been identified  
 13 in the way in which GMP might be expected to respond to  
 14 a terrorist attack?  
 15 "Answer: Some shortcomings, yes.  
 16 "Question: I'm not suggesting the picture was  
 17 universally bad, but among those shortcomings were the  
 18 risk of the FDO becoming overwhelmed?  
 19 "Answer: Correct.  
 20 "Question: And the extent to which those around him  
 21 within the control room would understand what they  
 22 needed to do to take a share of his burden or her  
 23 burden?  
 24 "Answer: Correct.  
 25 "Question: Should we understand from what you've

1 said to us earlier that when you conducted your debrief  
 2 of the GMP chief officer lead for counter-terrorism [we  
 3 know that was Assistant Chief Constable Hankinson] you  
 4 would have been explaining those shortcomings that you  
 5 had identified, including those that I have just  
 6 emphasised?  
 7 "Answer: Yes, that was the purpose of the hot  
 8 debrief, to do just that."  
 9 The hot debrief took place on a day early in  
 10 November 2016. I think it was either the 4th or the  
 11 5th, which may not matter greatly.  
 12 From what you said yesterday, was ACC Hankinson your  
 13 ultimate line manager, save of course for the  
 14 chief constable?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. You were the chief inspector in the OCB, were you not?  
 17 A. Yes, I was.  
 18 Q. And within your responsibilities came the FDO role?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Were you briefed by ACC Hankinson or her delegate about  
 21 what the Inspectorate had found in the regards that  
 22 we've just looked at?  
 23 A. No, I was not directly briefed.  
 24 Q. Again, as yesterday, that's a carefully expressed  
 25 answer. Were you ever told by anyone before 22 May 2017

1 that the Inspectorate had identified these problems  
 2 within the OCB?  
 3 A. The only reference I had was from Chief Superintendent  
 4 Ellison, who was the OCB commander at the time, which  
 5 was a group email referencing the generic findings, in  
 6 his own words, as opposed to a report of that HMI  
 7 inspection.  
 8 Q. We'll look at that in a moment. I generally understand  
 9 you're taking care in relation to your answer, but the  
 10 position seems to be that the Inspectorate had  
 11 identified that, even within the existing arrangements,  
 12 so not the proposed change to force headquarters, even  
 13 within the existing arrangements there was this real  
 14 risk that the FDO would become overwhelmed in the event  
 15 of an incident such as that that occurred on 22 May and  
 16 they'd also identified that on the occasion of such an  
 17 event, other staff within the control room wouldn't go  
 18 straight to their action cards and say, "Here is what  
 19 I'm required to do", they would say to the FDO, who's  
 20 trying to handle the firearms and everything else "Boss,  
 21 what's my job?"  
 22 The Inspectorate had identified those problems and  
 23 they'd told your line manager that it would seem from  
 24 the evidence.  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. In early November 2016, more than half a year before the  
 2 arena attack, did anyone ever tell you, bearing in mind  
 3 your responsibilities , that those had been the findings  
 4 of the Inspectorate?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. As we identified yesterday, in the aftermath of Exercise  
 7 Winchester Accord, you were given ownership of  
 8 recommendation 17:  
 9 "Additional support for the FDO would have helped  
 10 and would be necessary in the event of a real incident."  
 11 And you explained to us, and it may be that many can  
 12 understand, bearing in mind what you knew, you thought  
 13 that the FDO had failed in the proposed new environment,  
 14 but that in the real environment, the existing  
 15 environment, with your action cards, there was  
 16 a fighting chance it would work?  
 17 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 18 Q. If in November 2016, or at any time before May 2017, you  
 19 had been told that the Inspectorate thought differently ,  
 20 would you have also thought differently?  
 21 A. Certainly, yes. If I'd been aware of the lack of  
 22 knowledge from those focus groups around their  
 23 requirements in that situation , then obviously I could  
 24 have reflected on what other activity could have taken  
 25 place to bolster that knowledge.

1 Q. It might be an unfair question to ask you what you would  
 2 have done, but we can agree at least that you would have  
 3 done something?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What's identified, as I understand what  
 6 you're saying, by the Inspectorate is that they don't  
 7 know anything about your action cards and nor do the  
 8 people working in the OCB, so no one is using them.  
 9 A. That's how it appears. However, I do note from -- and  
 10 Mr Greaney will obviously come on to that email. It  
 11 does reference that they acknowledged the action cards  
 12 in their feedback. So as I understood it, there must  
 13 have been some acknowledgement of the work of the action  
 14 cards at that time.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In your view, do the action cards that  
 16 you designed meet the requirements of the Inspectorate  
 17 we're talking about?  
 18 A. Yes, they do.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So people know automatically, you do A,  
 20 B, C, D, if Operation Plato is --  
 21 A. Yes. It's role-specific and they are a set of very  
 22 simple tasks, which are not unusual. They are  
 23 day-to-day tasks they would perform in terms of the  
 24 management of staff, operations of Talk Groups and how  
 25 they would organise themselves in the rooms. So the

1 actual -- as it was intimated in Mr Buchan's transcript,  
 2 the set of simple task cards is what I perceive those  
 3 action cards to be.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 5 MR GREANEY: I quite understand what you mean and we will  
 6 look at the email out of fairness to you, the email of  
 7 1 November. There's no doubt your action cards did  
 8 exist , but there seemed to be a problem, would you  
 9 agree, at least in October of 2016, that at least  
 10 eight members of the control room staff, who knows how  
 11 many others, thought that in the event of an incident  
 12 such as occurred they would need to speak to the FDO to  
 13 identify what their responsibilities were?  
 14 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 15 Q. The very situation that your action cards were designed  
 16 to avoid?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And obviously we will need to wait to see what the  
 19 position in fact was on 22 May. As you have told us,  
 20 you did receive some feedback as a result of the HMIC  
 21 visit . This takes us to an email dated 1 November.  
 22 {INQ040625/1}. The bottom email on this page is  
 23 from Stuart Ellison to HMIC Liaison and  
 24 Catherine Hankinson. Who was Stuart Ellison?  
 25 A. At that time, the chief superintendent in the OCB.

1 Q. So he's a member of GMP staff?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. And he's sending this to the HMIC Liaison, a general  
 4 email address, and Catherine Hankinson, who was the ACC  
 5 with overall line manager of the OCB?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. We're going to be told by retired Superintendent Giladi  
 8 later on today that she came into post in about October  
 9 of 2016.  
 10 And cc'd in is Jason Unsworth who you told us about  
 11 yesterday. The subject is "CT2 feedback", that was the  
 12 name of the report that the Inspectorate was preparing  
 13 at that time:  
 14 "George [obviously someone within HMIC liaison],  
 15 HMIC turned up at CB2 in good time yesterday and we met  
 16 with the three reps together. Quite a detailed  
 17 discussion about the structure of the OCB, how calls  
 18 came into the force and become FWINS, then how FWINS are  
 19 managed as an MTFA takes shape. Lots of interest in  
 20 where a 999 goes if we can't take it , how the BT  
 21 telephony system works, and how the OCB resilience plan  
 22 would shape up and indeed how we've tested it."  
 23 So it seems that Mr Ellison is describing a visit  
 24 that he has had with HMIC on the last day of October.  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So this is before the hot debrief that I have told you  
 2 about:  
 3 "Some key points from the conversation included how  
 4 the FDO would immediately step in as ITFC, pending the  
 5 arrival of a cadre TFC at Silver, how and when Plato  
 6 would be declared, and when Gold and the SFC would be  
 7 contacted."  
 8 There are then a series of other points that are  
 9 made. We don't need to go through all of those, bearing  
 10 in mind my desire to be efficient .  
 11 Can we go to the second page, please, and I'll draw  
 12 attention to the very point you were making a point ago.  
 13 {INQ040625/2}, the antepenultimate paragraph:  
 14 "There was interest in how we liaise with NWAS and  
 15 GMFRS. The aide—memoire cards being produced here for  
 16 staff as prompts when they are under excessive pressure  
 17 were welcomed, and each week we (FDOs) test the  
 18 three—way GMP/NWAS/GMFRS Talk Group that gets opened  
 19 after Plato is declared to ensure that avenue is  
 20 genuinely open."  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. That's the very point you were making, that although  
 23 those eight members of the focus group didn't seem to  
 24 know anything about your action cards, HMIC, based upon  
 25 what you were being told by Chief Superintendent

1 Ellison , were aware of them?  
 2 A. Certainly that's how I interpreted that email, yes.  
 3 Q. Was this email the full extent of the information that  
 4 you were given prior to 22 May about HMIC's views?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. So would it be fair therefore to observe that although  
 7 it seemed the focus group were saying, "We don't know  
 8 anything about the action cards", you were being told  
 9 that HMIC were aware of them and that they were  
 10 welcomed?  
 11 A. Yes, that was my understanding from that email.  
 12 Q. I'm back, finally , on your witness statement. At  
 13 paragraph 44, you observe that you believe that the  
 14 visit of HMIC triggered a review of policies and  
 15 processes, including the action cards themselves;  
 16 is that right?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. So could you tell us just in a few sentences what  
 19 happened in the aftermath of the HMIC visit and before  
 20 22 May?  
 21 A. From my perspective, it was a review of the material  
 22 that was in there, ensuring they were circulated widely  
 23 in the OCB, and that also we were still continuing with  
 24 the testing of the three—way Talk Group as had been in  
 25 place at that time.

1 Q. Were the action cards that had been created in the April  
 2 changed in the June to a limited extent and then the  
 3 subject of a further review?  
 4 A. I don't think they physically changed, but certainly  
 5 I do remember going over them in light of the feedback,  
 6 saying, actually, this is — they were welcomed, nothing  
 7 had been highlighted to me in terms of any deficiencies  
 8 around them, so again it would just have been a refresh  
 9 in terms of if there was anything new, particularly from  
 10 a firearms perspective, leading into that.  
 11 Q. I may have misunderstood something that's in your  
 12 witness statement. Do you have your statement there?  
 13 A. I do.  
 14 Q. Depending on your answer, it may be possible to avoid  
 15 looking at the documents themselves. At paragraph 48,  
 16 you state — and you're dealing with the period after  
 17 the visit of HMIC:  
 18 "I exhibit the version of the action cards which  
 19 would have been found at the hyperlink as MB4."  
 20 And I had thought you were talking about the version  
 21 of the action cards that you sent to FDOs in December of  
 22 2016.  
 23 A. Yes, that would be correct.  
 24 Q. I think in fact, contrary to your recollection , and  
 25 I don't mean this in any way critically , there had been

1 some changes between June and December 2016.  
 2 Mr Lopez, we're going to try again and this time  
 3 I hope I've got the correct references, to look at two  
 4 versions of the action cards on the screen. First of  
 5 all the June 2016 version, so we'll have these alongside  
 6 each other. That I think is {INQ032734/1}, and  
 7 alongside it, the December 2016 version, {INQ040626/1}.  
 8 On the left—hand side, we have the December 2016  
 9 version and, on the right—hand side, we have the  
 10 June 2016 version. So we'll just look through the first  
 11 five pages and then I will seek your explanation insofar  
 12 as you can recall it at this stage.  
 13 The cover sheet obviously is identical .  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's not, actually, but... One says  
 15 "Op Plato" and the other says "Active shooter". It's  
 16 not important.  
 17 MR GREANEY: I should have spotted that, yes, there is  
 18 a difference on the first page. Thank you.  
 19 Can we go to the second page, where even I've  
 20 noticed there are differences .  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Don't feel too bad about it at all.  
 22 MR GREANEY: We can see on the right—hand side, which is the  
 23 December 2016 version, we have some additions.  
 24 "Switch on dictaphone" is new. "Within branch" has  
 25 disappeared and we have:

1 "Ensure FDS radio op and assist have action cards to  
 2 commence notifications. Contact TFC cadre and SFC.  
 3 Provide briefing."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Then can we go to the next pages, page 3, please.  
 6 Again, there are differences. By December, the line  
 7 "Close down PNC line", that was an addition between  
 8 April and June, has gone. We then have additional  
 9 responsibilities given to the FDS. First of all:  
 10 "Contact surrounding force FDO/FIMs. Contact  
 11 supervision to notify them of the incident."  
 12 And:  
 13 "Contact on-call press officer and provide update.  
 14 Direction to Silver control as appropriate."  
 15 Again, those are changes.  
 16 Over the page, pages 4, we can see that there has  
 17 been a significant difference. "Radio operator" in  
 18 December 2016 is the next page and there is an addition  
 19 from radio operator in the earlier version, which is:  
 20 "Establish three-way communications on TETRA  
 21 channel."  
 22 Mr Lopez has gone over to the next page in  
 23 December 2016. Mr Lopez, can you just move when I ask.  
 24 We then have "Radio assist". That is a new page in  
 25 December 2016 and the balance, I think, is the same.

1 So as between June, before the HMIC visit,  
 2 and December, when you are sending out to FDOs --  
 3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- a version of the action cards, there have been  
 5 changes. Can you now recall why those changes were  
 6 made?

7 A. Certainly reflecting on -- obviously, the comparison  
 8 there makes it a little clearer for me. Some of that is  
 9 obviously taking feedback from Winchester Accord. I'm  
 10 also aware that at the time, during the summer of 2016,  
 11 I was aware of some national changes in terms of  
 12 firearms provision from neighbouring mutual aid forces,  
 13 which changed... I'm trying to think -- to carefully  
 14 word this without giving things away. How those  
 15 resources would be mustered and provided and, as such,  
 16 that then changed the requirements on the FDO and FDS in  
 17 terms of contact and notification. So that's reflected  
 18 in the document there in terms of the requirements of  
 19 the FDO, which had changed in a firearms perspective.  
 20 On that basis it's then moved on.

21 Q. The way you put it in your witness statement at  
 22 paragraph 49, this may be a neat summary, is:  
 23 "This represented a shift from the earlier version  
 24 of the action cards where the responsibility for  
 25 contacting GMFRS and NWSA rested with the FDS."

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The point you're making is that you'd shifted that  
 3 responsibility to a radio operator:  
 4 "This change was because of developments in national  
 5 guidance, which had placed more responsibility on the  
 6 FDO and, by extension, the FDS."  
 7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "As can be seen from the action cards at MB9, the tasks  
 9 allocated to the FDO and FDS had increased, thus the  
 10 increased delegation to the radio operator."  
 11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You add:  
 13 "The radio operator is one of the most experienced  
 14 radio operators and sat very close to the FDO in the  
 15 OCR."  
 16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So your understanding seemed to be that, notwithstanding  
 18 the recognition that the FDO might become overburdened  
 19 in the event of a Plato incident, the responsibilities  
 20 on the FDO had increased?  
 21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Within the December 2016 iteration, there is reference  
 23 to the establishment by the radio operator of three-way  
 24 communications.  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What is that a reference to?

2 A. It's a reference from JESIP in terms of the joint  
 3 operating principles, in terms of establishing tri-party  
 4 communication in the event of a major incident.

5 Q. And tri-party meaning police, ambulance and fire?  
 6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In the months before the arena attack do you remember  
 8 there being discussion within the emergency service  
 9 community in Greater Manchester about tri-service  
 10 communication?  
 11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Laura Lewis has provided a statement. Can you tell us  
 13 who she is?  
 14 A. Laura Lewis is one of the Silver control managers  
 15 working from headquarters.

16 Q. In her account, she describes, and I'm going to just  
 17 summarise this very briefly, a seminar on  
 18 22 February 2017 at which it became clear, she says,  
 19 that there was a requirement for a tri-service  
 20 inter-control room Talk Group to facilitate the sharing  
 21 of information between the emergency services.  
 22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you remember that?  
 24 A. I wasn't privy at the meeting, but I was aware of the  
 25 conversations ongoing from discussions with Laura.

1 Q. She says that it was discussed with you and that a paper  
 2 was created, but that it was awaiting ratification  
 3 at the time of the attack.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. What I'd like you to do, and this is something Mr Cooper  
 6 asked about yesterday, is just to explain in your own  
 7 words what was happening around this time in relation to  
 8 this tri-service Talk Group. It might be of some  
 9 relevance to what happened on the night. Explain in  
 10 your own words what was happening and, if necessary, we  
 11 might look at an email that deals with it.  
 12 A. Okay. At that time, there was already established  
 13 across Greater Manchester, between fire and ambulance  
 14 and ourselves, three Talk Groups that were available and  
 15 were tested weekly for that tri-party communications.  
 16 However, given that the Fire Service operate from  
 17 a control room which covers the whole of the north-west,  
 18 covering various different police forces, there were  
 19 discussions that a repurposing of another Talk Group,  
 20 which could be agreed across the region for use of  
 21 interoperability between those three services, so rather  
 22 than just a GM agreement, there would be a regional  
 23 agreement about the use of that Talk Group. However,  
 24 I was aware that at the time that Talk Group was in use  
 25 by other police forces for other purposes, so there

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1 would need to be agreement by the Airwave user group for  
 2 the region that that Talk Group could be repurposed.  
 3 Q. If I'm oversimplifying it, tell me. It was recognised  
 4 that in the event of, for example, an Operation Plato  
 5 incident or any major incident requiring all emergency  
 6 services to respond, there would be a need for a clear  
 7 line of communication between all three services?  
 8 A. Yes, as established in JESIP.  
 9 Q. And there was discussion in the early part of 2017 about  
 10 how that was to be achieved?  
 11 A. Well, that was already in place with the existing three  
 12 Talk Groups, but that discussion had moved on to  
 13 repurposing and redefining that down to a single Talk  
 14 Group for use across the region.  
 15 Q. Repurposing? Is what you were trying to achieve, an  
 16 improvement on what was already in place?  
 17 A. Yes, in terms of interoperability yes.  
 18 Q. What was that improvement intended to be? How was it  
 19 going to be better?  
 20 A. Clarity across the region such that, should we have fire  
 21 resources from, say, Merseyside who may be used to  
 22 different operating principles or police support from  
 23 Lancashire, they would all understand there was a single  
 24 Talk Group through which communication with NWS and the  
 25 Fire Service could be obtained.

22

1 Q. That's very clear, thank you. Am I right that that had  
 2 not been achieved by 22 May?  
 3 A. No, the repurposing of that Talk Group had not been  
 4 achieved.  
 5 Q. We'll look at emails if necessary, but there are a tonne  
 6 of them. Are you able to summarise for us why that was  
 7 not achieved by 22 May?  
 8 A. I am not aware. However, I believe it had still yet to  
 9 be ratified and in the Airwave user group was where  
 10 those discussions were ongoing because that Talk Group  
 11 was already being operationally used elsewhere in the  
 12 region by other organisations that would have to refrain  
 13 from using it and it would have to be repurposed and  
 14 then circulated as such.  
 15 Q. We will just look at one email and see whether this  
 16 helps us to understand and, if not, I won't trouble you  
 17 further with it and I'll ask other witnesses about it.  
 18 {INQ017957/1}. This is an email from you to  
 19 Jo Hoyte. Perhaps we'll start with the email at the  
 20 bottom of that page or on the page before, please. So  
 21 this is an email from Jo Hoyte. Who is Jo Hoyte?  
 22 A. She would be the officer who worked within CTU, who  
 23 dealt with communications.  
 24 Q. It's to Neil Gaskell, David Whittle, from whom we've  
 25 heard, and Laura Lewis. You are copied in, as are

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1 others, including Inspector Simon Lear. Subject:  
 2 "Switch to Airwaves for JESIP communications."  
 3 So is this an email about the topic that we've just  
 4 been discussing?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. "Dave, apologies for not getting back to you sooner.  
 7 I was on leave over Easter and yesterday was my first  
 8 day back. The visit on 10 April to Ambulance and  
 9 Fire Control went really well and we established that  
 10 both ambulance and Fire Control have [redacted] in their  
 11 ICCS terminals (or equivalent) within their control  
 12 rooms and both services are happy with the proposal to  
 13 use [redacted] as a default Talk Group for initial  
 14 communication between the control rooms."  
 15 As you'll appreciate we're not, for operationally  
 16 sensitive reasons, identifying the precise descriptor:  
 17 "Fire and ambulance asked for a template to be  
 18 circulated with the shortcuts [and so on and so on].  
 19 The Sunday morning testing that Neil mentioned below was  
 20 also discussed and there is an appetite and probably  
 21 a need to expand on this..."  
 22 And could we go to {INQ017957/2}, please:  
 23 "All things considered, I think that 28 April might  
 24 be a bit ambitious but we are on with it. I'm thinking  
 25 that around the middle of May might be a bit more

24

1 realistic due to current workload and a four-day course  
 2 which I need to attend."  
 3 And then back to the top at {INQ017957/1}, please.  
 4 It seems that the date of 28 April had been identified  
 5 as a date for the establishment of this new Talk Group.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Jo Hoyte thought it was too ambitious. You replied on  
 8 21 April:  
 9 "Morning, Jo. Thanks for the summary update.  
 10 I agree with the suggestion to wait just a little longer  
 11 to coordinate all the inter-agency testing that could  
 12 usefully be undertaken with the control rooms. Can you  
 13 pull together a meeting when we are in a position to  
 14 instigate this and we can sign off any proposals?"  
 15 First of all, within GMP did you have any  
 16 responsibility for establishing this Talk Group?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. Secondly, why did you think, on 21 April, it was  
 19 a sensible suggestion to wait "a little longer"?  
 20 A. On the basis of -- because it required coordination  
 21 between the three agencies to ensure that their control  
 22 room staff were able to technically access that Talk  
 23 Group and also were aware of the repurposing of it  
 24 in that once we could confirm from each agency that  
 25 staff were aware and understood and could technically

25

1 access it, then we could integrate that into the  
 2 established testing regime, which would then allow us to  
 3 take that forward into operational use.  
 4 Q. Let's just reorientate ourselves. We were in  
 5 December 2016. You had sent to the FDOs the further  
 6 iteration of the action cards. They referred to  
 7 tripartite communication and you have now explained to  
 8 us what was happening the month before the arena attack  
 9 in relation to that.  
 10 Let's move on from December to March of 2017. I'm  
 11 now at paragraphs 53 to 55 of your witness statement.  
 12 On 24 March 2017, were you in email communication with  
 13 Superintendent Hill?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Did you send him a copy of the email of 23 December that  
 16 you had sent to the FDOs, which was accompanied by the  
 17 action cards?  
 18 A. Yes, I think it was... I'd struggle to remember the  
 19 circulation, but certainly it went to the FDOs, yes.  
 20 Q. What did you suggest to Superintendent Hill?  
 21 A. That it seemed timely for a further re-emphasis of the  
 22 requirements -- for the use of the cards for the JESIP  
 23 documentation to be made aware to staff and also the --  
 24 I think there was a hyperlink to the acronym list as  
 25 well for the information of staff.

26

1 Q. Was Superintendent Chris Hill your line manager by this  
 2 stage?  
 3 A. He was my direct line manager, yes.  
 4 Q. Did you suggest that he should draft something called  
 5 an HOTP?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. And what is an HOTP?  
 8 A. It's an acronym for hot off the press, which is  
 9 effectively a urgent bulletin that would go out to all  
 10 members of the OCB, all staff across the entire branch,  
 11 nigh on 1,000 people, to bring to their attention  
 12 operational information.  
 13 Q. Let's just be clear about it because this was something  
 14 that by this stage you'd been trying to achieve for  
 15 a year, namely that your action cards should be known by  
 16 the staff within the control rooms and used by them.  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. When you are doing this on 24 March, what is in your  
 19 mind? Do you think you were aware that there were  
 20 shortcomings, in the sense that staff weren't aware of  
 21 them or weren't using them, or was this just to your  
 22 mind a re-emphasis of something that they should already  
 23 know?  
 24 A. I was of a mind -- I'm trying to think when the  
 25 London Bridge attacks were, whether or not it was

27

1 pertinent timing-wise in relation to that, that actually  
 2 the kind of, how shall we say, the incidents elsewhere  
 3 in the world had prompted that, but also I was aware  
 4 that the latest Plato guidance from certainly the  
 5 firearms perspective was being refreshed and  
 6 republished, so it seemed timely to join the two up  
 7 together.  
 8 Q. In a separate email you sent the same day to  
 9 Superintendent Hill, did you provide links to the action  
 10 cards?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. To the JESIP guidance?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And to a glossary of acronyms that might be used during  
 15 an MTFA?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Did you also suggest some text that he might include  
 18 within the hot off the press?  
 19 A. Yes, I included a form of words.  
 20 Q. Which, among others things, invited supervisors to print  
 21 off copies of those documents and keep them in folders,  
 22 on desks and in daybooks so that they could be referred  
 23 to as hard copy in the event of an IT failure?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Are you able to recall whether Superintendent Hill ever

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1 sent out that hot off the press?  
 2 A. I don't recall receiving that email personally, but  
 3 I would not be able to comment whether it actually went  
 4 out at the time.  
 5 Q. That's maybe for someone else to answer for. But your  
 6 intention was, in late March 2017, that that message  
 7 should go out ---  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. --- to all staff, but in particular to the control room  
 10 staff?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. You don't having receive the HOTP?  
 13 A. No, given that I provided the form of words and had  
 14 almost written it for the superintendent just to send  
 15 out, if I had received it, since I was the author,  
 16 I probably would have just deleted it on the basis that  
 17 I would have had knowledge of it already.  
 18 Q. You were, as you told us yesterday, moving on in time,  
 19 not on duty on 22 May, were you?  
 20 A. No, I wasn't.  
 21 Q. You came on early the next morning, 23 May, at 5 am?  
 22 A. Yes, I did.  
 23 Q. In short, you tended to welfare issues relating to  
 24 staff?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. The position therefore in short, I think, is that you  
 2 would have hoped that the action cards you produced were  
 3 used by the OCB staff that night?  
 4 A. Yes, I would.  
 5 Q. But from your direct knowledge, you don't know one way  
 6 or the other?  
 7 A. No, I don't.  
 8 Q. I'm just going to ask you about two topics, finally, and  
 9 then my questioning will be finished.  
 10 The first is this, that as I indicated at the very  
 11 beginning of your evidence, in fact just before you gave  
 12 evidence yesterday, in July of 2017, so a few short  
 13 months after the attack, the Inspectorate attended GMP  
 14 again for the purposes of what was called, I think, an  
 15 assurance visit. Were you one of those who spoke to the  
 16 Inspectorate at that stage?  
 17 A. I recall going to --- was it to Lancs Police as opposed  
 18 to a visit to GMP? Is this the meeting with Mr Nutter?  
 19 Q. It is.  
 20 A. That took place in Lancashire.  
 21 Q. In fact, I'm mistaken, I think it's not the  
 22 Inspectorate, it's CTPHQ; is that correct?  
 23 A. Yes. I just wanted to clarify if it was another local  
 24 visit. I certainly went with Inspector Lear to  
 25 Lancashire for the purpose of that assurance visit.

1 Q. I may be getting myself confused about the precise  
 2 organisation; we'll clarify that in due course. I'm  
 3 sorry if I've confused you.  
 4 At any rate, what is recorded is that at that stage,  
 5 action cards were in development. Are you able to help  
 6 with that?  
 7 A. I certainly recall providing the latest version of that  
 8 to Mr Nutter as part of that inspection and I think he's  
 9 provided a copy of what was given to him on the day and  
 10 I think the development relates to how we would then  
 11 take those forward when the introduction of iOPS ---  
 12 which again, even though this was a year later, was  
 13 still on the horizon.  
 14 Q. The question I suppose is this: in the period after the  
 15 arena attack, were you tasked with making any changes to  
 16 the action cards?  
 17 A. Not specifically, no.  
 18 Q. And do you know whether anyone else was tasked with  
 19 making changes to the action cards?  
 20 A. Dale Sexton looked at that.  
 21 Q. That was the first topic, which I suspect I've dealt  
 22 with in a rather unclear way. We'll sort that out in  
 23 due course.  
 24 The second and final topic: were you involved in the  
 25 preparation of any version of the GMP MTFA plan which

1 was known as SOP 47?  
 2 A. No.  
 3 Q. As the chief inspector responsible for the OCB  
 4 between February 2016 and September 2018, were you  
 5 consulted by anyone who was involved in the preparation  
 6 of any version of SOP 47?  
 7 A. Not consulted but I was aware and briefed into the  
 8 various drafts of that.  
 9 Q. It's one thing, obviously, to be given a copy of  
 10 a draft; it's another thing to be asked for your views  
 11 before it is issued. Do you agree?  
 12 A. I would agree.  
 13 Q. Were your views sought before any version of the MTFA  
 14 plan was published?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. The MTFA plan, of course, was dealing with the duties,  
 17 amongst or things, of the FDO, was it not?  
 18 A. Yes, it did.  
 19 Q. And the role of the FDO was within your remit?  
 20 A. Yes, it was.  
 21 Q. We know that the MTFA plan actually increased the  
 22 responsibilities on the FDO over time.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Bearing in mind your area of responsibility, would it  
 25 have been rather better if those responsible for

1 preparing the MTFA plan had consulted you?  
 2 A. It certainly would have allowed more consideration of  
 3 the additional responsibilities, yes.  
 4 Q. Would it, do you think, be fair to say that there was  
 5 something at that stage, in the period before the  
 6 attack, of a disconnect between those responsible for  
 7 the policy, within the PCU, I think, and those actually  
 8 at the sharp end within the OCB?  
 9 A. I think that's a fair assessment, yes.  
 10 MR GREANEY: Chief Inspector Booth, thank you very much  
 11 indeed for answering my questions.  
 12 I'm next going to call upon the Greater Manchester  
 13 Combined Authority, who did make a Rule 10 request, to  
 14 ask whether they continue to wish to ask questions.  
 15 I can see Mr Warnock is there. Thank you, Mr Warnock.  
 16 Questions from MR WARNOCK  
 17 MR WARNOCK: I just have one area, chief inspector, I want  
 18 to ask you about. It's about (inaudible: distorted).  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, Mr Warnock, you froze for  
 20 a moment, unfortunately. Would you like to start the  
 21 question again, please?  
 22 MR WARNOCK: I was going to ask you, chief inspector, about  
 23 how the phone system in the OCR worked back in 2017 at  
 24 about the time of the attack. At the time of the  
 25 attack, when a line was busy in the OCR, did it ring out

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1 to other telephones in the control room?  
 2 A. Certainly — well, it depends. If it's a public call,  
 3 it comes in, obviously that's distributed by a call  
 4 distribution system to the next available operator. If  
 5 it's a dedicated phone line, say for the force duty  
 6 officer, that would ring at the force duty officer  
 7 position. If it was engaged, obviously it would just be  
 8 engaged and that's what you would receive and it isn't  
 9 diverted anywhere. However, both the force duty officer  
 10 line and the force duty supervisor line are available on  
 11 a number of other positions, probably about half  
 12 a dozen, within that specific control room such that  
 13 other people can answer that phone. If it's engaged,  
 14 it's engaged, but if it's ringing and ringing it's  
 15 available for other members of staff to be able to  
 16 answer that phone call.  
 17 Q. Right. So it's only if it's not been picked up that it  
 18 rings out to other telephones? It doesn't ring out to  
 19 them if it's engaged?  
 20 A. If it's engaged, it doesn't divert, no.  
 21 Q. Is that true also of the FDS line?  
 22 A. Yes, the FDS line, if that is engaged, it doesn't  
 23 divert. If it's unanswered in terms of it ringing,  
 24 it is available to be picked up elsewhere within the  
 25 control room.

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1 Q. You have just frozen on me. I can probably pick the  
 2 answer up from the transcript.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The answer was: if the line is engaged,  
 4 it doesn't divert, and that was also true of the FDS  
 5 line as well as the FDO line.  
 6 A. Yes, that was the technology as it was then.  
 7 MR WARNOCK: What we do know is that when Mr Berry did  
 8 eventually get through, which was just before  
 9 (inaudible: distorted). He phoned the FDO's line, but  
 10 it got picked up at that point by the FDS and I think  
 11 from what you're saying, that would happen if the FDO  
 12 line just hadn't been answered?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Obviously, I'm sure you'd agree, it is important, isn't  
 15 it, if the FDS is going to be responsible for  
 16 communicating with (inaudible: distorted) they should  
 17 actually be trained and in a position to provide  
 18 relevant information, do you agree?  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, Mr Warnock, I think we've got the  
 20 effect of your question, but we had another moment of  
 21 freezing. I think you were saying that if the FDS was  
 22 going to answer the FDO line, he needs to have  
 23 sufficient training in order to deal with those matters;  
 24 is that the question?  
 25 MR WARNOCK: That is the question, yes.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. And the answer?  
 2 A. Yes, I think that's a fair observation. The FDS would  
 3 sit literally 3 feet away from the FDO and, having sat  
 4 there myself, the force duty supervisors were generally  
 5 very experienced and, if they were unsure, they would  
 6 literally turn to their left and say, "What do you need  
 7 me to say? What needs to happen here?" with the FDO sat  
 8 to their side. Because certainly in those situations,  
 9 they are a police staff supervisor or a sergeant and  
 10 they would have training commensurate with their role.  
 11 However, it wouldn't have been possible to provide them  
 12 with any sort of dedicated firearms training because  
 13 it would have been outside of their job description  
 14 per se.  
 15 MR WARNOCK: Would you have expected them, for instance, to  
 16 know what a forward control point is?  
 17 A. Certainly, yes. In terms of JESIP principles, probably  
 18 during 2016, all the OCB staff would have been expected  
 19 to complete the NCALT JESIP package, which goes through  
 20 the basic principles of RVPs, FCPs, METHANE, et cetera.  
 21 Q. Thank you. Just on that point you made about how they  
 22 would be sitting next to the FDO and so could seek  
 23 assistance from the FDO, the reason, as I understood it,  
 24 why you would have the FDS dealing with these calls is  
 25 because the FDO is already busy. Is it really

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1 satisfactory , therefore , if the FDO is already busy to  
 2 have the FDS having to ask the FDO how to answer  
 3 questions?  
 4 A. Generally speaking, on a day-to-day basis, they were  
 5 experienced enough to be able to field the majority of  
 6 questions, and in incidents of this nature, as we're  
 7 discussing today, it would be very difficult to provide  
 8 that level of experience to a member of police staff  
 9 without the same level of training as an FDO to be able  
 10 to answer every single question. But having sat there  
 11 and been through a similar experience myself during  
 12 a major incident, we are talking seconds in terms of  
 13 a quick conversation to say, "I've got such-and-such  
 14 a body on the phone, what can I tell them, what do  
 15 I need to say?" and as you have said, if they turn round  
 16 and said, "Where's the FCP?" the FDO could have said,  
 17 "It's at the junction of this car park and the car  
 18 park", and it's over in a matter of seconds.  
 19 Q. Subject to whatever important call the FDO is taking  
 20 himself?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. You've told us that you were asked -- following up from  
 23 the Winchester Accord debrief, Inspector Roby sent an  
 24 email to you asking for the FDS number and that that was  
 25 to be added to plans. Do you know which plans it was

1 added to?  
 2 A. I don't know. That will have been Inspector Roby who  
 3 had responsibility for updating the overall contingency  
 4 plans.  
 5 MR WARNOCK: Thank you very much, chief inspector. That's  
 6 all I wanted to ask you.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Warnock.  
 8 MR GREANEY: Sir, next, Mr Smith on behalf of North West  
 9 Fire Control.  
 10 Questions from MR SMITH  
 11 MR SMITH: Chief inspector, could I begin by asking you just  
 12 a very brief question concerning Exercise  
 13 Winchester Accord. Was it obvious to you in the course  
 14 of the exercise that the notification provisions, the  
 15 declaration of Operation Plato, to the Fire Service and  
 16 Ambulance Service had failed in the course of that  
 17 exercise?  
 18 A. I was not aware during the course of the exercise. It  
 19 was only in the debrief afterwards and the material  
 20 provided that I was aware that it had not taken place.  
 21 Q. So does it follow that you had not been informed in  
 22 advance that the planning of the exercise required the  
 23 force duty officer to contact the Fire Service NILO and  
 24 the ambulance NILO by telephone within 9 minutes of the  
 25 exercise starting?

1 A. I personally wasn't aware of that, but that doesn't  
 2 sound an unreasonable element of the exercise.  
 3 Q. On 13 May 2016, and it's not necessary for you to look  
 4 at any document in this regard, I would just like to  
 5 inform you, the Fire and Rescue Service group manager,  
 6 Mr John Fletcher, sent an email to Superintendent Giladi  
 7 and to Mr Barrett at the Ambulance Service, asking for  
 8 ongoing MTFA training as a direct consequence of the  
 9 failure of multi-agency communications during Exercise  
 10 Winchester Accord. My question is: were you informed of  
 11 Group Manager Fletcher's concerns?  
 12 A. No, I was not aware of Mr Fletcher's concerns.  
 13 Q. I would like to take you, if I may, to the action cards  
 14 which were sent by email to Kelly Chilton on  
 15 13 May 2016.  
 16 If Mr Lopez could be invited to put on to the screen  
 17 {INQ032750/6}, I'd be grateful.  
 18 If we look on the left-hand side of this page of the  
 19 presentation, under the heading "Terrorist", and run  
 20 down the list of bullet points, you entered the words  
 21 "Explosion (likely)"; is that correct?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. What was your thinking when you entered that bullet  
 24 point into the list of MTFA active shooter indicators?  
 25 A. I'm not sure of the origin of this material, but it's

1 certainly not one I have personally written. I will  
 2 have taken it, likely, from probably one of the national  
 3 threat assessment documents in terms of identification  
 4 of incidents and how they could be separated by  
 5 a profile of what took place. So in terms of where  
 6 you've got things like "likely", "possible", "may shoot  
 7 a loved one", those kind of scenarios will have been  
 8 taken from guidance elsewhere.  
 9 Q. In using those two words there, "explosion (likely)",  
 10 were you trying to convey the fact that if an explosion  
 11 had occurred, the mere fact that an explosion had  
 12 occurred was likely to indicate terrorist activity?  
 13 A. Certainly at the time, if we look at the history -- and  
 14 again this comes back to some of the generic information  
 15 in the action cards -- the profile of the attacks had  
 16 changed from Mumbai to Paris, then vehicle-borne attacks  
 17 and then into lone actor knife-based attacks, and the  
 18 language comes from probably the JTAC threat  
 19 assessments, which were circulating, which I was privy  
 20 to, which actually defined the likelihood and assessment  
 21 nationally of particular types of attacks and how they  
 22 would be carried out. So in isolation, a simple  
 23 explosion wouldn't necessarily, but taken together with  
 24 some of the other elements that could possibly indicate  
 25 it.

1 Q. Was it your intention that control room staff should be  
 2 alerted to the possibility of terrorist activity as  
 3 a result of an explosion?  
 4 A. It was always the intention that I would never rely upon  
 5 call handlers, some of whom were both young in service  
 6 and also young in age, that they would be imposed upon  
 7 to make any decisions around whether or not this was  
 8 terrorist activity. Standing orders and standing  
 9 conditions in terms of anything of a serious nature, ie  
 10 an explosion, whether it was a gas explosion at a house  
 11 property through to an improvised explosive device,  
 12 would be -- any incident of that nature or call would be  
 13 directed towards the force duty officer to allow them to  
 14 make that more informed assessment based on their high  
 15 level of experience and training.  
 16 Q. But what was not included was an explosion caused by  
 17 a bomb; is that correct?  
 18 A. Certainly IEDs is the kind of terminology in terms of  
 19 bombs per se because it's an improvised explosive  
 20 device, because bomb per se would refer to potentially  
 21 military munitions, so that was certainly the phrasing  
 22 that was used in the national documentation at that time  
 23 in that it was not perceived that they would be using  
 24 military-based munitions in any form of attack and  
 25 it would be likely to be an improvised explosive device.

1 Q. So if one took the left-hand column and saw that  
 2 you have entered for one bullet point, "Explosion  
 3 (likely)", and further down, in another bullet point,  
 4 "IEDs", and took those two together, were you intending  
 5 to convey the fact that an explosion caused by an  
 6 improvised device was likely to involve terrorist  
 7 activity?  
 8 A. I think it was more for that overall assessment of these  
 9 are indicators of it but that you would have to consider  
 10 all the available information to you and couldn't really  
 11 say that simply an incident at a crowded iconic location  
 12 would be terrorist-related and that, equally, an  
 13 explosion could be very domestic related in terms of  
 14 a gas boiler exploding and causing multiple explosions  
 15 at the other end of the spectrum. So these were  
 16 indicators and considerations rather than a de facto  
 17 checklist.  
 18 Q. But nonetheless, important indicators, would you agree?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. You pointed out and accepted ownership in the GMP  
 21 debrief of recommendation 17, which was that -- that can  
 22 come off the screen, Mr Lopez, forgive me -- that  
 23 additional support for the FDO would have helped, and  
 24 I think you used these words or these words were  
 25 included in the debrief:

1 "Would be necessary in the event of a real-life  
 2 incident."  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Bearing in mind still the purpose of Exercise  
 5 Winchester Accord, when you took ownership of that  
 6 recommendation, what at that time did you contemplate  
 7 would be the consequence in a real-life incident if that  
 8 support was not provided?  
 9 A. That ultimately the role of the FDO and of the  
 10 communications branch would be compromised.  
 11 Q. Did you recognise, therefore, that plainly, what would  
 12 be compromised would be multi-agency communications?  
 13 A. That was one of the potential consequences, yes.  
 14 Q. Could I ask Mr Lopez to put on to the screen please  
 15 {INQ040626/4}.  
 16 There was a significant change, was there not, in  
 17 the drafting of the action cards in December 2016 so as  
 18 to move further management of such an incident to the  
 19 radio operator?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. What was your thinking behind that amendment?  
 22 A. This was as a consequence of the additional  
 23 responsibilities from a firearms perspective placed on  
 24 the FDO, so some responsibility shifted to the force  
 25 duty supervisor, who sat next to the force duty officer,

1 about 3 feet away. The dedicated radio operator that is  
 2 noted on this section sits facing the force duty  
 3 officer, about 6 feet away, so again it was somebody in  
 4 close proximity to both the force duty supervisor and  
 5 the force duty officer, who was an experienced radio  
 6 operator and who could take on this information.  
 7 Q. We can see, can we not, that your proposal was that the  
 8 radio operator would contact the Fire Service control  
 9 room on the declaration of Operation Plato having been  
 10 made and provide brief details, and similarly the  
 11 ambulance control room?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And, thirdly, the radio operator would be responsible  
 14 for establishing three-way communications and providing  
 15 a METHANE briefing?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. When you said in your statement that the radio operator  
 18 is one of the most experienced radio operators and sat  
 19 very close to the FDO in the OCR, what experience and  
 20 capability did you at that time expect of the radio  
 21 operator who would be delegated with this task?  
 22 A. Well, looking at the action card itself, there is  
 23 nothing outside of their core role which is being  
 24 expected of them in terms of contact with fire and  
 25 ambulance. That radio operator would have already dealt

1 with major incidents and also contacting fire and  
 2 ambulance on a daily basis in terms of informing them of  
 3 incidents and requesting support of various natures.  
 4 They would also have been well used to the use of  
 5 multi-agency Talk Groups because, again, they operate on  
 6 a force-wide basis, and will have been used to speaking  
 7 with, as another example, the motorway/Highways Agency  
 8 which covers the north-west of England.  
 9 So in terms of their responsibilities, there is  
 10 nothing unusual there for them to do and it's very  
 11 straightforward in terms of their role. Again, it's the  
 12 element of providing brief details. It is very  
 13 difficult to be prescriptive in an action card in terms  
 14 of what to say other than the METHANE format, but given  
 15 the fact that they are sat within a matter of feet from  
 16 the force duty officer, they can be situationally aware  
 17 by their proximity and would be able to access the  
 18 incident log and also additional information from either  
 19 a conversation or listening into the discussions from  
 20 the force duty officer with others to be able to provide  
 21 sufficient information to pass to fire and ambulance  
 22 control.  
 23 Q. Have you been made aware that the radio operator who was  
 24 tasked at the time of the attack with answering the  
 25 FDO's line wasn't able to fulfil any of those

1 requirements?  
 2 A. I'm not aware. Obviously I wasn't there on the night.  
 3 But clearly, from my perspective, certainly my knowledge  
 4 of those in the control room, I would have anticipated  
 5 that these tasks would not have been performed and they  
 6 weren't, they were capable of performing them.  
 7 Q. And certainly it would be far from your intention, do  
 8 you agree, that to have a situation in which a radio  
 9 control operator was tasked with answering the FDO's  
 10 line but was incapable, because of a lack of training,  
 11 incapable of dealing with this other than asking the FDO  
 12 for his advice?  
 13 A. I would have anticipated any radio operator,  
 14 specifically this dedicated radio operator and the team  
 15 they worked with, would have been more than capable of  
 16 answering those questions. The information would have,  
 17 if not available from the force duty officer, been  
 18 available from the main incident log, the FWIN, that was  
 19 running in relation to this for them to scan through and  
 20 obtain details at that time to provide a summary of what  
 21 had taken place at that time.  
 22 Q. Do you agree, therefore, looking at this history that  
 23 you've carefully taken the inquiry through, that over  
 24 the period of time since Winchester Accord you had tried  
 25 in a number of ways to ensure that the control room

1 adopted your proposals?  
 2 A. Yes, I have.  
 3 Q. By December 2016, when this provision was put in place  
 4 that's still on the screen, when this provision was put  
 5 in place did you consider that it was essential that  
 6 your proposal should be followed in order to ensure that  
 7 the FDO was not overwhelmed?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Can you tell the inquiry, and I'm not suggesting that  
 10 this was your responsibility, whether anything was done  
 11 by GMP to adopt your proposals and to ensure that they  
 12 were followed?  
 13 A. I'm not aware of anything above and beyond what I've  
 14 already provided in terms of circulation and  
 15 distribution in terms of embedding that within the OCB.  
 16 Q. So effectively, despite all of your efforts in drafting  
 17 these cards, nothing was done, is this correct, to  
 18 ensure that your proposals were followed?  
 19 A. No.  
 20 Q. I just have one matter to ask about finally, please,  
 21 chief inspector. I don't want this document to be put  
 22 on the screen even though it's in the evidence proposal.  
 23 The reason being that it contains material which makes  
 24 reference to individuals, which might be distressing, so  
 25 I will try to deal with it another way if I can.

1 I'm dealing with the GMP incident log, which for  
 2 reference purposes is {INQ007214/15}, timed at 22.48.01  
 3 on the GMP incident log, which is log 2,524. This is an  
 4 entry which reads:  
 5 "The force duty officer has declared  
 6 Operation Plato."  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Have you seen that entry?  
 9 A. I have, yes.  
 10 Q. At the time when that entry was made, a call was in  
 11 progress between Greater Manchester Police and North  
 12 West Fire Control, and that call remained in progress  
 13 until 23.01 that night. My question to you is: is there  
 14 any operational reason that you can think of why that  
 15 information should not have been passed to the  
 16 Fire Control room once it appeared on the GMP incident  
 17 log?  
 18 A. I would have anticipated in response to both the JESIP  
 19 principles and also in terms of the action cards and the  
 20 requirements of the FDO and what's in place that that  
 21 notification should have taken place.  
 22 Q. And do you agree that it was on screen, there to be seen  
 23 by the control room operators and therefore capable of  
 24 being passed?  
 25 A. Yes. As it's logged there, clearly it's a lengthy

1 incident log, but obviously it's in the first 15 pages,  
 2 so it would have only taken a matter of moments to  
 3 scroll through if that declaration had been made and get  
 4 to that point, yes.  
 5 MR SMITH: Chief inspector, thank you, those are all my  
 6 questions.  
 7 MR GREANEY: Sir, that would be a convenient moment for our  
 8 break.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. 11.05 by that clock. Thank you.  
 10 (10.52 am)  
 11 (A short break)  
 12 (11.07 am)  
 13 MR GREANEY: Sir, we are next going to welcome to the  
 14 inquiry Mr Davies, who represents Mr Dexter and  
 15 Mr Sexton.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 17 Questions from MR DAVIES  
 18 MR DAVIES: Good morning, sir.  
 19 Mr Booth, I'm going to question you about one  
 20 document and just raise two paragraphs from your witness  
 21 statement.  
 22 Mr Lopez, may I invite you to bring up document  
 23 {INQ032758/4} to start, please. It is the responses to  
 24 the Office of Security and Counter-terrorism survey of  
 25 27 February 2016. Simply to get our bearings,

1 inspector, you'll remember the questionnaire had the  
 2 premise of a scenario, as set out at page 4, really  
 3 a classic MTA with three different sites over a period  
 4 of about half an hour, as between the sports stadium,  
 5 firstly, restaurant, secondly, and incident 3 at a music  
 6 or entertainment venue. That's just for context.  
 7 {INQ032758/20}, please, Mr Lopez, in particular  
 8 paragraphs 97 to 102. Could those be highlighted?  
 9 Inspector, were these your answers in relation to  
 10 the questionnaire or someone else's?  
 11 A. I believe I worked on these answers with, it would have  
 12 been, Chief Inspector Mike Miskell, who at that time  
 13 worked within specialist operations.  
 14 Q. Can you just, really to yourself, very quickly scan  
 15 questions 97 to 102?  
 16 A. Yes, will do.  
 17 Q. And I'm going to ask you whether they reflect your  
 18 assessment at the time as to the cultural expectations,  
 19 both within GMP and by GMP of other emergency services  
 20 in relation to deployment in an MTA incident where there  
 21 are warm and hot zones. If any of these answers appear  
 22 not to reflect your view at the time, please say so, but  
 23 I'll assume they do unless corrected.  
 24 97:  
 25 "What non-specialists would be sent to each separate

1 incident ... "  
 2 And those are the three incidents we've referred to:  
 3 "... to support specialists, if any?"  
 4 The answer is:  
 5 "None at this stage except as cordons/RV points  
 6 until the firearms risk is addressed."  
 7 Does that reflect your understanding at the time?  
 8 A. Yes, certainly back in 2016, yes.  
 9 Q. Would it have been in each case any different in  
 10 May 2017 at the date of the Manchester Arena attack?  
 11 A. Not to my knowledge, no.  
 12 Q. So question 98:  
 13 "What role would they play?"  
 14 That is to say non-specialists. Answer:  
 15 "This list would be endless, including cordons,  
 16 search, investigation, scene preservation, evacuation,  
 17 et cetera."  
 18 So that again is a fair assessment, isn't it, as to  
 19 the reality in an incident like this, that the wider set  
 20 of responsibilities will be endless?  
 21 A. Indeed.  
 22 Q. And would you agree, the obligation of a TFC on the  
 23 ground is to concentrate on the firearms command  
 24 element?  
 25 A. Yes and managing the firearms risk.

1 Q. 99 attracts the same answer. Question 100:  
 2 "What activity would they undertake in the cold zone  
 3 while awaiting specialist responders?"  
 4 Answer:  
 5 "This would reflect a major incident deployment.  
 6 Including RV points would be identified. A cordon  
 7 around the warm zone would be instigated, traffic  
 8 management. Prep of NWAS and Fire ready for entry once  
 9 warm zone are (sic) removed. Bronze commanders for each  
 10 task/geographic location, et cetera."  
 11 Simply picking one feature of that out, it reflects,  
 12 doesn't it, a cultural expectation, professional  
 13 expectation, that NWAS and fire would not be going into  
 14 the warm zone, so to speak, until it was removed?  
 15 A. Certainly in terms of non-specialist responders, yes.  
 16 Q. Yes. Specialist responders might, and the inquiry has  
 17 heard all about that, but the non-specialists would not?  
 18 A. No.  
 19 Q. Question 101:  
 20 "What impact would declaration of an MTFA have on  
 21 deployment of non-specialists? Would they be deployed  
 22 or held back?"  
 23 Answer:  
 24 "At this early stage they would be held back until  
 25 the firearms threat is addressed."

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Anything to add to that?  
 3 A. No, that's a fair summation.  
 4 Q. 102:  
 5 "What are the limitations on non—specialists  
 6 operating in this environment?"  
 7 Answer:  
 8 "They are not armed so should not be used in the  
 9 warm/hot areas. There are still outstanding attackers  
 10 and other attacks may be developing."  
 11 So again, it might be said that speaks for itself ,  
 12 but non—specialists in the context of what is a context  
 13 where other attacks may be developing should not be used  
 14 in terms in the warm area?  
 15 A. No, I would agree in terms of deployments that would not  
 16 ordinarily be the case.  
 17 Q. Had you been performing the role of FDO ITFC in an  
 18 incident that would have been your professional  
 19 expectation based on your experience and training?  
 20 A. Yes, it would.  
 21 Q. Could we go to {INQ032758/30}, please, paragraph 156.  
 22 Just to put this in context, at paragraph 15 of your  
 23 witness statement, we needn't bring it up, you say this:  
 24 "In my view it is important that action cards are  
 25 not overly prescriptive . An MTFAs like any terrorist

1 attack can play out in a number of different ways.  
 2 It is vital to ensure officers and staff have sufficient  
 3 flexibility in order to respond to a dynamic incident."  
 4 A. Yes, I would agree at the time and would still agree  
 5 now.  
 6 Q. Yes. I won't analyse it further in my questioning, but  
 7 at question 156:  
 8 "What decisions would the on—scene commander be  
 9 expected to make for each separate incident?"  
 10 The scenario in the question there. Answer:  
 11 "Too vague a question as it would depend on the  
 12 threat. However, the NDM..."  
 13 That's the national decision—making model, which was  
 14 a risk assessment model; is that right?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. The dynamic risk assessment model, again familiar, I'm  
 17 sure, to anyone following the inquiry:  
 18 "The NDM would drive this supported by JESIP  
 19 principles and the need for clear briefings . The  
 20 overriding principle of the strategy would be to save  
 21 life ."  
 22 Obviously, the FDO in an incident like this is  
 23 performing the role of an ITFC, which by definition  
 24 requires a background of firearms training and command  
 25 and competence.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. So they will have to apply the NDM in the context of  
 3 their wider firearms command training?  
 4 A. That's correct.  
 5 Q. And it's intrinsic to that training, isn't it, that  
 6 firearms operations are directed in the end at  
 7 protecting life ?  
 8 A. That is always the overarching aim.  
 9 Q. And you receive training intrinsic to that role in terms  
 10 of obligations under Article 2 ?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. So whatever guidance, principles, whatever it might be,  
 13 may indicate, from the point of view of the firearms  
 14 command, essential to training and delivery of command  
 15 is that Article 2 obligation?  
 16 A. Yes. That is the emphatic overarching aim of every  
 17 firearms deployment and operation.  
 18 Q. And the application of principles and guidance and  
 19 policy is subject to that overriding obligation, isn't  
 20 it?  
 21 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 22 Q. Questions 168 and 169, please, page 31 {INQ032758/31}.  
 23 (Pause)  
 24 The overall context for the questions is from 167,  
 25 but I'm going to ask about 168 and 169. Question:

1 "What information would be gathered at the scene to  
 2 feed back to tactical and strategic levels?"  
 3 Answer:  
 4 "This list could be extensive, however the main  
 5 points would be casualties, number of offenders and  
 6 weaponry, officers deployed, hot/warm zones, tri—service  
 7 arrangements, HART teams, blue routes, RV points,  
 8 location of subject."  
 9 Question 169:  
 10 "Who would convey this information to the tactical  
 11 and strategic levels?"  
 12 Answer:  
 13 "The TFC for police; other services also by their  
 14 own networks."  
 15 Of those considerations in 168, do you agree with  
 16 this, that from the point of view of the police, that  
 17 information is really within the role of a TFC  
 18 performing as such?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. They're firearms command considerations, aren't they?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. But rather than encroaching into what you have earlier  
 23 described as a somewhat endless list of other secondary  
 24 considerations?  
 25 A. Yes, those would be the primary considerations I would

1 consider are appropriate for the TFC role at that time.  
 2 Q. And that would apply the TFC on the ground, the GATFC,  
 3 as well?  
 4 A. Yes, I was going to say I would interchange that.  
 5 Obviously at the start of the incident the force duty  
 6 officer would also be classed as the TFC.  
 7 Q. In reality, and you performed the role of TFC yourself,  
 8 in any firearms incident, the TFC on the ground is  
 9 likely to be wholly preoccupied with considerations  
 10 relating to the discharge of their firearms command,  
 11 aren't they --  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. -- in a dynamic situation? And that's their function on  
 14 the ground?  
 15 A. Yes, that is their core role.  
 16 Q. And that, would you agree, is likely to be particularly  
 17 true in a case involving uncertain MTA?  
 18 A. Undoubtedly.  
 19 Q. Just two paragraphs from your statement.  
 20 {INQ040631/11}, paragraph 50.  
 21 Mr Greaney took you through much of this. You were  
 22 giving evidence this morning that the repurposing of  
 23 a Talk Group had not been achieved for whatever reason  
 24 by 22 May 2017. As a fact, as you set out at  
 25 paragraph 50, the existing arrangements of the

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1 tri-service communication between tactical commanders  
 2 had not in fact, to your knowledge, ever been engaged  
 3 during a real incident?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. You say at the end of that paragraph that it was there  
 6 to be used. But in actual fact, in real operational  
 7 terms, the effectiveness of it had never been tested?  
 8 A. Not in a real-time operational incident, no, not to my  
 9 knowledge.  
 10 Q. And maybe it had or had not been used in exercises,  
 11 including Winchester Accord, and I won't cover that with  
 12 you, but in real terms, had it been engaged on this  
 13 night, it would have been the first time in a real world  
 14 situation?  
 15 A. Yes, to my knowledge.  
 16 Q. Paragraph 52, please, on the next page {INQ040631/12}.  
 17 Whatever your intention and expectations for the action  
 18 cards, inspector, paragraph 52 is unambiguous, isn't it,  
 19 that so far as you're aware, even if distributed, OCB  
 20 staff did not receive training on the cards and you have  
 21 set out reasons for that; correct?  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. And even in terms of ad hoc training, four lines from  
 24 the end:  
 25 "I do not know why there was no training on the

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1 action cards during these ad hoc sessions, but at the  
 2 time there was a lot of focus on vulnerability and risk  
 3 management..."  
 4 So, as Mr Greaney has developed, the action cards  
 5 were not only not used on the night by anybody, there  
 6 appears to have been, for reasons you can't explain, no  
 7 training of OCB staff following their distribution, if  
 8 they were distributed?  
 9 A. No, there was no formal training.  
 10 MR DAVIES: That's all I ask, thank you.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you go away, Mr Davies, let me  
 12 follow up on a couple of things and I'll allow you to  
 13 come back.  
 14 Was there a need for formal training, do you think,  
 15 before they could be used?  
 16 A. I don't believe there was a necessary need for formal  
 17 training because they are a simple set of instructions  
 18 which reflect the core role of the individuals and roles  
 19 mentioned in those cards. Clearly, on reflection,  
 20 I know formal training would have bolstered that level  
 21 of knowledge and understanding prior to any event.  
 22 However, I do believe they were written in such a way  
 23 that they were simple to understand, were generic, and  
 24 undertook certain activities which were already known to  
 25 the staff at the time.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But on the other hand, training would  
 2 have embedded within people the requirement to use it?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they would know the cards were there  
 5 to be used?  
 6 A. Undoubtedly, yes.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Secondly, this: the tri-service  
 8 communication you indicated that there was in existence,  
 9 ie not the one to come into existence but the one that  
 10 was in existence, had never been used in a real-life  
 11 context?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But am I right in saying that there was  
 14 guidance which indicated in strong terms that in an  
 15 incident like this, it should be used?  
 16 A. Yes. Clearly, JESIP, which is overarching principles  
 17 for each of the three organisations, indicates as such  
 18 and we had at that time embedded processes for weekly  
 19 testing of the three available Talk Groups, which are  
 20 noted.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Davies, do you want to come back on  
 22 any of that?  
 23 MR DAVIES: Sir, no thank you.  
 24 MR GREANEY: Next, Mr Weatherby who is taking the lead on  
 25 behalf of the bereaved families.

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1 Questions from MR WEATHERBY  
 2 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you. Mr Booth, can you see and hear  
 3 me?  
 4 A. Yes, I can, thank you.  
 5 Q. Thanks very much. You have just been asked some  
 6 questions about Article 2 and the Article 2 obligation,  
 7 which you indicated you were familiar with. Of course,  
 8 the Article 2 obligation encompasses the positive  
 9 obligation on the police to neutralise the terrorist  
 10 threat in a circumstance like this, doesn't it?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. But it also covers the mobilisation of resources to save  
 13 lives, for example, of members of the general public who  
 14 might be in the area?  
 15 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 16 Q. And unarmed officers who are very likely to be first on  
 17 scene?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And indeed, other responders, either members of the  
 20 public or other emergency responders, who might get to  
 21 the scene; yes?  
 22 A. Yes, that is an all-encompassing obligation.  
 23 Q. Absolutely. And also, it encompasses, doesn't it, the  
 24 getting of help to injured casualties?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. As soon as is practicably possible?  
 2 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 3 Q. That's why the Plato policies involve a multi-agency  
 4 response and not just a firearms response?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. I'll come back to that, if I may, in due course, but  
 7 I just wanted to establish those principles. Just  
 8 dealing with the tactical firearms commander role at the  
 9 scene, again you have just been asked some questions  
 10 about that. I'm not now talking about the FDO, not the  
 11 initial TFC, but a TFC at scene. Okay?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Is it right that that officer at scene will take  
 14 on-scene tactical command of the ongoing firearms  
 15 operation?  
 16 A. Yes, that's my understanding of that role.  
 17 Q. But also, and again if you don't know, please just say,  
 18 but is it also your understanding, because we will come  
 19 back to it with other witnesses, but is it also your  
 20 understanding that part of their role is to be at  
 21 a forward control post or forward command post engaging  
 22 with commanders of other agencies in order that they can  
 23 make joint risk decisions?  
 24 A. Yes. I would always envisage an initial briefing  
 25 between the three agencies, which would involve the

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1 ground assigned.  
 2 Q. Yes. So they have a direct firearms role, they have  
 3 a role in liaison with other emergency service  
 4 commanders on scene.  
 5 Thirdly, do they have a role in terms of tactically  
 6 commanding unarmed officers who have responded to the  
 7 scene?  
 8 A. Only in terms of defining their areas of operation.  
 9 I would surmise there would be too much for them to  
 10 command. However, they would have a responsibility to  
 11 ensure, under that general Article 2 consideration, that  
 12 unarmed staff were appropriately supported or protected  
 13 in terms of their knowledge of the wider threat.  
 14 Q. There might be, for example, Bronze unarmed commanders  
 15 organising unarmed police officers?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. But would they report to the TFC in terms of on-scene  
 18 line command?  
 19 A. In the initial stages, that is a potential. However,  
 20 they could take direction from the force duty officer  
 21 because when a ground assigned was available and  
 22 deployed, then that would have released the force duty  
 23 officer from that responsibility and obviously later on,  
 24 as other commanders stepped up within the SCG or Silver  
 25 control room, they may take direction, but that would

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1 have to be defined as the incident developed.  
 2 Q. That's very helpful, we'll come back to it with another  
 3 witness.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, can I just clarify one  
 5 thing that you've just asked for my benefit?  
 6 You told us that the tactical firearms commander on  
 7 the scene you would expect to be located at the forward  
 8 control point, the FCP?  
 9 A. To begin with, via an initial briefing, yes. However,  
 10 that may well change.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's what I wanted to know. Do you  
 12 expect him to stay there or always have a representative  
 13 there? How does it work in practice?  
 14 A. I think in practice this is the first time that we'd  
 15 actually done the kind of JESIP co-location in reality,  
 16 in real life. I would have anticipated an initial  
 17 briefing from a ground-assigned tactical firearms  
 18 commander.  
 19 However, should the seat of the attack move or  
 20 requirements move depending on the incident it may well  
 21 be that an additional commander would be brought forward  
 22 to manage the cold zone/warm zone areas, allowing the  
 23 TFC to concentrate on the dynamics of the actual  
 24 firearms attack itself.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You mean by that, being able to move

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1 around?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 4 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you.  
 5 I want to change topic now, Mr Booth, if I may, and  
 6 I want to pick up a point that Mr Greaney discussed with  
 7 you yesterday about Winchester Accord and indeed  
 8 Mr Smith picked up with you this morning.  
 9 You had a role in Winchester Accord, didn't you, and  
 10 that was a role as umpire?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. I want to just make sure that I've got this clear and,  
 13 of course, everybody else watching. As I understood  
 14 your evidence yesterday in discussing it with  
 15 Mr Greaney, part of your role as umpire was to interject  
 16 and assert that certain things had happened because they  
 17 had to be nominal on an exercise.  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Is that right?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. Just to put that into simpler English, just again to  
 22 make sure I've got it right, an example might be if  
 23 there was an exercise where a bomb was involved, then  
 24 presumably on an exercise you wouldn't in fact have  
 25 a device, but you as the umpire would say at

1 a particular time, "The bomb has gone off"?  
 2 A. Yes. That is a good explanation, yes.  
 3 Q. Thank you. So that fits the nominal. So when you use  
 4 the word "nominal" it's where you as umpire are  
 5 asserting that something's happened which, in the course  
 6 of an exercise, it would be unrealistic to do?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Another of your roles as umpire, as I understand it, was  
 9 to make sure that the exercise does not go awry, doesn't  
 10 break down, because a key decision has failed; is that  
 11 right?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. I think that there was an example, not you, but another  
 14 officer had to interject because somebody had pressed  
 15 the wrong button on a radio, which meant that radio  
 16 communications couldn't be heard; is that right?  
 17 A. I believe so, yes. I was aware of that feedback.  
 18 Q. That's one of the things that support  
 19 officers /umpires -- their role is not to allow all that  
 20 planning that's gone into it to go awry because of  
 21 a simple error?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. If an error is made, which has to be corrected, that can  
 24 be dealt with later through feedback and learning; yes?  
 25 A. Indeed, yes.

1 Q. But correcting it in real time is sometimes necessary in  
 2 order to keep the rest of the exercise on track?  
 3 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 4 Q. On Winchester Accord, you were the FDO umpire, weren't  
 5 you?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. As I understand the position, and as Mr Greaney put to  
 8 you yesterday, there was a catastrophic failure in that  
 9 there was a failure to declare Plato to the other two  
 10 main services and a failure therefore to call them  
 11 forward, resulting in a 2-hour and 20-minute delay; yes?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And catastrophic because those services later reported  
 14 that if it had been a real incident, a real attack, the  
 15 delay would have been likely to contribute to loss of  
 16 life; yes?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. So as the FDO umpire, was there a reason why you didn't  
 19 step in and prompt the FDO, Mr Williams, when there was  
 20 a failure to declare Plato to NWS or the FRS or to call  
 21 them forward?  
 22 A. I can't recall the specific events of the night, but  
 23 clearly for the purpose of the exercise, if I had failed  
 24 to make that notionally -- ensure that activity had  
 25 taken place, obviously the overall exercise

1 coordinators, I felt, would have stepped in as well. So  
 2 I don't recall in my memory that any issue was raised in  
 3 terms of, "It's now 2.5 hours after we expected to be  
 4 notified, we've not been notified, what's going on?"  
 5 because clearly by that point, the exercise would have  
 6 pretty much come to a grinding halt.  
 7 So until that feedback came from the end of the  
 8 exercise, I wasn't aware of what is clearly a huge  
 9 delay.  
 10 Q. Yes. The effect of that was essentially to negate the  
 11 involvement of NWS and FRS in the whole exercise,  
 12 wasn't it?  
 13 A. Clearly, that impact of bringing them in 2 hours after  
 14 the exercise had begun would clearly impact on any  
 15 learning and usefulness of the exercise, which brings me  
 16 back to the point that I would have been anticipating  
 17 that the overall exercise coordinators would have  
 18 stepped in at that point to correct it and bring it back  
 19 on track.  
 20 Q. Okay. I'm not wanting to personalise this, I'm wanting  
 21 to drill down into why it didn't happen. There you  
 22 were, in real life the head of the OCB, and the line  
 23 manager of the FDO.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And here you were on an exercise, being the real-time

1 line manager, if you like, of the FDO on the exercise.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. So can you help us why you didn't notice, if that's the  
 4 case, that the FDO hadn't declared Plato to NNAS and the  
 5 FRS?  
 6 A. I can't recall any conversation at the time or any need  
 7 for me to step in and provide that feedback.  
 8 Unfortunately, that's my recollection.  
 9 Q. Okay. Again, I don't want to spend too much time on  
 10 this, but I'm not quite understanding. Are you saying  
 11 that it just didn't occur to you during the exercise  
 12 that the FDO hadn't followed the policy?  
 13 A. I was unaware -- as I say, at that time the standing  
 14 aide--memoires and instructions all amounted to that  
 15 requirement for tri--service communication. So I would  
 16 have anticipated it would have taken place. I wasn't  
 17 aware during the exercise that it hadn't taken place and  
 18 certainly to the extent that it caused such a massive  
 19 delay, and as I say, I would have anticipated that  
 20 oversight from myself would have been corrected by the  
 21 exercise coordinators to ensure the exercise continued.  
 22 Q. Would you accept it was an error by you in not having  
 23 noticed and corrected that?  
 24 A. Yes, certainly.  
 25 Q. And then, the point is an entirely fair one, that those

1 coordinating the whole exercise didn't seem to have  
 2 noticed either, so it's their failure too?  
 3 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 4 Q. Okay. You told us about -- you have answered quite  
 5 a lot of questions about the overloading of the FDO on  
 6 the exercise and the reasons for it, including,  
 7 of course, the proposal and the testing that was going  
 8 on at that time because of the proposed move to HQ. I'm  
 9 not going to go over those issues because all the  
 10 questions that are necessary have been asked on it. But  
 11 it's a fact, isn't it, that on 22 May those proposals  
 12 hadn't come into place and you had your regular OCB  
 13 arrangements in place on the night?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Yet very similar issues to Winchester Accord arose?  
 16 A. That's correct, yes.  
 17 Q. And just for clarity, Plato not declared, not  
 18 communicated to the other emergency services, and  
 19 a failure to communicate and establish any joint RVP or  
 20 any kind of joint FCP, forward command post, for at  
 21 least a considerable extent of time; yes?  
 22 A. I would agree.  
 23 Q. I fully understand that you weren't on duty on the  
 24 night, you came on duty the next day, but again, as the  
 25 head of the OCB, are you able to offer any explanation

1 for why similar problems appear to have arisen on  
 2 Winchester Accord and on the night in those key  
 3 respects?  
 4 A. In terms of my personal insight, I would have hoped that  
 5 staff would have been aware of the responsibilities, the  
 6 action cards to assist them in terms of their tasks and  
 7 roles. Clearly, with hindsight, some further embedding  
 8 of that would have been extremely useful. I maintain  
 9 that at the time I believed the additional support that  
 10 was available to them would have been sufficient, but  
 11 clearly, as it's played out in a real-life incident --  
 12 and I think this was probably the first time an incident  
 13 of this scale and involvement from all the agencies had  
 14 taken place -- that clearly my original assumption was  
 15 proved to be incorrect.  
 16 Q. I'm not in any way going to belittle your efforts  
 17 through the action cards, I'm going to come to those in  
 18 a few minutes, but you had identified many of the  
 19 problems and you'd identified a way of dealing with  
 20 them, but in reality, for reasons that I'll ask you  
 21 about in due course, those efforts weren't enough to  
 22 ensure that the problems that had been identified were  
 23 rectified, were they?  
 24 A. No, clearly the mitigation was insufficient.  
 25 Q. Thank you very much for that.

1 Mr Greaney put to you the feedback from  
 2 Marcus Williams, the FDO, of Winchester Accord  
 3 yesterday.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. I'm happy to put it on screen, but in the interests of  
 6 time, I think we can deal with the questions that I've  
 7 got without having to do so. You'll recall that  
 8 feedback?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. No mention of action cards in it, but there was some  
 11 mention of overloading and some mention of the  
 12 prioritisation of FDO tasks; yes?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14 Q. And Mr Williams raising the need for other supervisors,  
 15 the possibility of a second FDO --  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. -- in the context, of course, of the new proposed  
 18 arrangements that we don't need to concern about? But  
 19 that was the context in which that feedback was made?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. You went on to say, and again Mr Greaney read this out,  
 22 so I don't think we need it on screen, but there's  
 23 a sentence I want to quote to you and ask you about.  
 24 Mr Williams then went on to say:  
 25 "A lot of people will no doubt think they are the

1 most important unit/department and should be called  
 2 first , but the truth is , it 's all about getting our guns  
 3 down there..."  
 4 Yes?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Did that part of his feedback raise any concerns with  
 7 you?  
 8 A. Not specifically . My own experience as an FDO indicated  
 9 that that is more of a reference to internal  
 10 communications within GMP in that during a major  
 11 incident there would often be lots of phone calls in to  
 12 the FDO from officers, senior officers , junior officers ,  
 13 in terms of what was going on, and that was fairly  
 14 commonplace within GMP at the time.  
 15 Q. Let me approach it this way. Of course it 's obvious  
 16 that one key aspect, a vital aspect, of Plato policy is  
 17 to get firearms officers to the scene to neutralise the  
 18 threat ASAP, isn't it? That's obvious.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. But as we discussed when I started my questioning, Plato  
 21 policy also involves a multi-agency response for the  
 22 reasons that I have already asked you about?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. So the plan or the plans variously require situational  
 25 awareness to be gained, guidance and command of unarmed

1 officers who are likely to be first on scene for the  
 2 reasons we discussed earlier ; yes?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And also, the plans include the imperative of getting  
 5 other services to the scene or perhaps, more accurately,  
 6 to an RVP near the scene in order that they're able to  
 7 be deployed just as soon as reasonably practicable, ie  
 8 when safe? So all of those tasks are important as well  
 9 as getting the guns there; yes?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Do you think that the overloading of the FDO role,  
 12 coupled with the mentality that the truth is it 's all  
 13 about getting the guns down there, meant that the  
 14 importance of JOPs and JESIP and the triggering of other  
 15 vital emergency services' responses fell off the radar,  
 16 both at Winchester Accord and on 22 May?  
 17 A. Personally speaking, I would say no, on the basis that  
 18 clearly in an incident of this kind of nature, the  
 19 support, particularly from NWS and fire in terms of  
 20 casualty treatment, clearly the police officer kind of  
 21 first aid skills are limited compared to those available  
 22 with the fire and Ambulance Service, so certainly they  
 23 were and remain a key element of responding to a major  
 24 incident because, clearly , in times of austerity and  
 25 resources, actually we realise , we can't do it all

1 ourselves . So personally speaking I would consider fire  
 2 and ambulance to be up there in terms of the  
 3 requirements under JESIP to ensure they are deployed and  
 4 engaged as soon as able.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What Mr Weatherby is putting, that  
 6 chimes to some extent with some of things we've heard  
 7 from people in fire and ambulance, particularly on  
 8 exercises , that GMP were concerned with getting their  
 9 bit done, the guns, and after that, really nothing else  
 10 mattered very much.  
 11 A. I personally wouldn't share that opinion, but clearly  
 12 I can't account for the officers and the commanders that  
 13 were available on the night or during the time there.  
 14 But certainly I would hope that wasn't the case.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 16 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. You very properly agreed with me that  
 17 the plans are two sided, multi-faceted. There is the  
 18 armed response on the one hand and there is the unarmed  
 19 multi-agency response on the other, and you very  
 20 properly agreed that both sides are vital in a response  
 21 to a lethal attack.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. The question is: at Winchester Accord and on 22 May,  
 24 it 'll be a matter for the chair ultimately, but on one  
 25 view the deployment of the armed officers went well and

1 the deployment — management of the deployment of  
 2 everybody else didn't. Is that a problem that there was  
 3 a preoccupation with one to the detriment of the other  
 4 on both of those occasions?  
 5 A. It certainly appears that way, yes.  
 6 Q. Thank you. In terms of your involvement, do you think  
 7 that when you were umpiring on Winchester Accord, the  
 8 problem that you had identified, no doubt correctly, of  
 9 the FDO being moved to HQ, do you think that that  
 10 problem had to some extent impeded your view of  
 11 the bigger picture from Winchester Accord, you took your  
 12 eye off the ball?  
 13 A. I wouldn't necessarily agree with taking my eye off the  
 14 ball , but certainly I think one of my overarching  
 15 concerns was being able to demonstrate, as I saw it,  
 16 that wider risk at the time in terms of the proposal.  
 17 That's correct.  
 18 Q. It was an unwelcome diversion in an area which was very  
 19 difficult , related to threat to life and limb, and for  
 20 which you had very limited resources? Would that be  
 21 a fair way of putting it?  
 22 A. Yes, it would.  
 23 Q. You were asked about the recommendation 17 and it was  
 24 put to you that there was a fighting chance that the  
 25 current arrangements would work with the tweak, if I can

1 put it that way, of adding in the full contact details,  
 2 including the numbers of the FDS. It wasn't your term,  
 3 fighting chance, that's what was put to you. Would you  
 4 agree with me that in relation to the response to  
 5 a terrorist attack, the mindset should not be a fighting  
 6 chance that the plans would work, there has to be  
 7 a reality that they will work?  
 8 A. Yes. There would certainly need to be confidence in  
 9 both the resilience and capability of any provision.  
 10 Q. I'm going to move on to action cards in a little while,  
 11 but your attempts were to spread the load, the overload  
 12 if you like, on the FDO. The reality was that, in the  
 13 event, they weren't properly adopted and didn't make the  
 14 difference that you intended. Is that the reality?  
 15 A. That is the reality, yes.  
 16 Q. I'm going to come back to that and just drill down into  
 17 what the reasons for that might be. But before I do,  
 18 can I just ask for your help about training. You have  
 19 given some evidence about this, but I'm not entirely  
 20 clear about it. I want to ask you about training for  
 21 FDOs. You very helpfully provided a training document  
 22 from February of 2016, which amounts perhaps to  
 23 a checklist of things that an FDO needs to be familiar  
 24 with.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Is that a fair way of characterising it?  
 2 A. Yes, it is.  
 3 Q. Is that list a document that's used when an inspector is  
 4 being trained to be an FDO?  
 5 A. Yes, it is.  
 6 Q. That is a document that guides the mentoring?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. I'm going to deal with firearms command training  
 9 separately, so putting that on the shelf just for  
 10 a moment, apart from firearms command training, is there  
 11 any actual training beyond the mentoring for an  
 12 inspector to become an FDO?  
 13 A. No, there isn't.  
 14 Q. So the process is to effectively sit with another FDO or  
 15 more than one, no doubt, FDOs over a period of 3 months,  
 16 ensuring that all of the matters on your checklist have  
 17 been considered during that mentoring period, and then  
 18 you're signed off to be an FDO?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Is there a case for having more formal training for FDOs  
 21 in your view?  
 22 A. I don't believe there is a training course in existence  
 23 anywhere in the UK and I think, from my experience,  
 24 it would be incredibly difficult to purpose such  
 25 a course because of the need to experience the reality

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1 of the role and the intention with a — it's effectively  
 2 a three-month training course because every day was  
 3 a learning day, a school day as they say, but the  
 4 emphasis being that the experienced FDO would be there  
 5 to guide you through, so should anything critical happen  
 6 that you are insufficiently trained or experienced to  
 7 deal with, actually they can step in, deal with it, or  
 8 can guide you through that. So it's considered the best  
 9 means with which to achieve that training and skills and  
 10 experience for an FDO.  
 11 Q. So effectively, you've got experienced inspectors who  
 12 are then adding to their ordinary skills as inspectors  
 13 to become — in this particular role?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. So on-the-job training rather than classroom or other  
 16 forms of training is, in your view, the best?  
 17 A. Certainly, yes.  
 18 Q. With respect to the firearms commander training —  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, before you move on, there was  
 20 something I wanted to take up about that, Mr Weatherby.  
 21 Clearly, on-the-job training, which we are calling  
 22 it, works perfectly well where you are dealing with  
 23 events which recur. So while you're being mentored  
 24 you will have seen that actually happen?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The sort of thing that happened on  
 2 22 May, or to any scale at all, hopefully you would be  
 3 unlikely to have seen it during your period of  
 4 mentoring?  
 5 A. Yes, that's true.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is there some case for training for  
 7 those sort of unlikely events, really for everybody?  
 8 A. Certainly part of the mentoring period is that  
 9 consideration of, does the officer have the resilience  
 10 and capability to step up to a bigger scale incident?  
 11 But clearly, we would rely upon — it's incredibly  
 12 difficult to re-enact situations of this nature in  
 13 a true to life form, so unless there are such exercises  
 14 as Winchester Accord, which force duty officers can  
 15 undertake, there is little in the way of formal training  
 16 for such extreme circumstance.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 18 MR WEATHERBY: That's very helpful. Just on that, would  
 19 there be therefore a role, where you have exercises like  
 20 Winchester Accord, whereby obviously you would have your  
 21 FDO in role, but would it be a good way forward for  
 22 other available FDOs to be in an observer status in  
 23 respect of seeing how that would work in practice?  
 24 A. Certainly, but I think the vicarious learning would be  
 25 limited because you would physically need to see and

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1 experience that yourself to understand the dynamics of  
 2 juggling the information, juggling the threat assessment  
 3 of risk and actually prioritising in your mind what the  
 4 requirements were in that specific incident. You could  
 5 obviously observe, but I think the vicarious learning  
 6 would be limited.

7 Q. Would there then be a role, for example, with desktop  
 8 exercises for FDOs on those matters, as the chair says,  
 9 which are unlikely to arise in your 3 months of  
 10 training?

11 A. Yes, certainly, and that did happen and does happen.  
 12 The FDOs are invited generally from — it would have  
 13 been June Roby's unit at the time, but continues now  
 14 with the Civil Contingencies and Resilience Unit in  
 15 terms of our response to flooding incidents, to COMAH  
 16 chemical issues and things like that, and we also put  
 17 forward force duty officers for further JESIP scenarios.  
 18 I undertook one myself last weekend with the fire and  
 19 the Ambulance Service. So that sort of situation does  
 20 happen but because they take such a large degree of  
 21 planning, time, efforts and resources, there's only  
 22 a limited number of those available throughout the year.

23 Q. To your knowledge, between February 2016 and  
 24 22 May 2017, did your FDOs go on tabletop exercises  
 25 dealing with Plato scenarios?

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1 A. To my knowledge, no, although I couldn't comment on —  
 2 I know there's some training that Simon Lear and  
 3 Dave Whittle did in the early part of 2017. Some of the  
 4 FDOs may well have attended those sessions but  
 5 I couldn't comment specifically.

6 Q. We can ask another witness about that, but that's very  
 7 helpful. Can I move on swiftly to firearms commander  
 8 training. So beyond the mentoring, there was more  
 9 formal training, as I understand it, of FDOs to become  
 10 initial TFCs; is that right?

11 A. That's correct, yes. It's a nationally accredited and  
 12 assigned course.

13 Q. And that would be because FDOs generally, because  
 14 they're FDOs, are unlikely to have been TFCs; is that  
 15 right?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. So they are trained up to deal with how to be a TFC in  
 18 the initial stages of a Plato-type incident?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So there's a specific course for ITFCs, which, as you  
 21 say, is nationally accredited. That is run through or  
 22 organised via the GMP firearms training department;  
 23 is that right?

24 A. It's organised — it's part of the regional  
 25 collaboration, which I think has already been discussed.

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1 Q. So that's not through the OCB?

2 A. It's not an OCB course, no.

3 Q. You did do this course because you're an FDO?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Could you help us in very short order, this ITFC  
 6 training course for FDOs, how long is it, first of all?

7 A. I believe it's changed, but from recollection — it's  
 8 a number of years ago and I've done the re-accreditation  
 9 course — a week long. I believe it's now 10 days.

10 Q. Mr Greaney has already taken you to the Home Office  
 11 questionnaire from February 2016. He referred you to  
 12 one part of it regarding FDO firearms training and you'd  
 13 carefully, properly used the terminology "limited  
 14 training" as part of firearms accreditation?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Is that you making the point that FDOs aren't firearms  
 17 officers but they, as is necessary, have this firearms  
 18 commander training so they can do this specific role?

19 A. Yes, and I think it's to the extent of — the training  
 20 is limited in that you can't experience, without an  
 21 exercise of that scale or a real-life incident, what the  
 22 demands and requirements would be of you in that role.  
 23 Again, that was reflecting on my own experience of being  
 24 an FDO during the time when Dale Cregan was arrested.

25 Q. Yes, indeed. And a very challenging scenario no doubt.

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1 But were you reflecting that the training ought really  
 2 to be more in-depth?

3 A. Certainly on reflection, now looking at what was  
 4 happening in the world and the potential for attacks of  
 5 that scale that had happened elsewhere in the world and  
 6 certainly in Europe, then certainly I felt that the  
 7 training provided a basis of firearms command, but  
 8 potentially the requirements in an MTFFA scenario weren't  
 9 necessarily covered in any depth.

10 Q. So you thought further formal training would have been  
 11 preferable?

12 A. It certainly would be very, very helpful in terms of  
 13 assisting them in managing that initial situation.

14 Q. And did you express those concerns up the line?

15 A. No. That was just (overspeaking) — it was a personally  
 16 held opinion and again, with it being a national course,  
 17 I would have anticipated that the kind of overall  
 18 national threat level and response to that would be  
 19 driven through the College of Policing and they would  
 20 redefine the course requirements. If it had been a more  
 21 locally based course, maybe I would have had a little  
 22 more influence.

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know you weren't there on the night,  
 24 22 May, but you have a great deal of knowledge of what  
 25 went on subsequently and no doubt looked into the matter

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1 quite carefully . To your knowledge, did anything seem  
 2 to go wrong in what happened with the FDO in his role as  
 3 interim tactical firearms commander?  
 4 A. No, not to my knowledge.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 6 MR WEATHERBY: That's very helpful, so I'll move on from  
 7 that.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I wasn't meaning to indicate that, but  
 9 I think it was just for my benefit and whether there was  
 10 anything I should be looking up.  
 11 MR WEATHERBY: Okay. Just finishing on that point, with the  
 12 benefit of hindsight, you were the head of the OCB  
 13 at the time and therefore the line manager of the FDOs.  
 14 It appears that it was in your mind from early 2016 that  
 15 the firearms training for the FDOs could have been  
 16 better. Reflecting on that now, do you think it would  
 17 have been helpful to the College of Policing or to the  
 18 senior management team if you had been expressing that  
 19 view and saying, "I'm managing these men and women doing  
 20 this very difficult job, and I think they should have  
 21 more in-depth firearms commander training"?  
 22 A. On reflection, undoubtedly that would have been  
 23 beneficial to them in their role, yes.  
 24 Q. Not to put too fine a point on it, the FDO is absolutely  
 25 in the centre of the GMP response to Plato, so if he or

1 she makes an error or delays, then that can be extremely  
 2 serious, can't it?  
 3 A. I would agree, yes.  
 4 Q. So everybody involved, you as the line manager, the  
 5 firearms unit no doubt, and the senior management,  
 6 needed to reflect and continually reflect on how to make  
 7 that position as robust as possible?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. In other staff training -- I can deal with this very  
 10 briefly, I think -- I think it's right, isn't it, that  
 11 the other staff in the OCB did not have any training on  
 12 Plato or MTFA incidents? They would have general  
 13 training which would be relevant, situational awareness  
 14 generally, and they would know about Run, Hide, Tell,  
 15 but beyond that, they had no training on Plato or MTFA  
 16 incidents?  
 17 A. No specific training, that's correct.  
 18 Q. And that would be everybody including the FDS, the force  
 19 duty supervisors, yes?  
 20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 21 Q. I keep saying I'm going to come on to action cards and  
 22 I am in a minute, but whatever the position with them  
 23 being available, which I am going to return to, it's  
 24 right -- I think Mr Davies put the point to you very  
 25 recently -- that there was no training at all on the

1 action cards, was there?  
 2 A. No, there wasn't.  
 3 Q. You mentioned that being prompt cards, perhaps it's  
 4 a matter that doesn't need any great training, but  
 5 unless there is some training, unless the staff are sat  
 6 down and concentrate on those action cards, then they  
 7 are simply not going to get embedded into their role,  
 8 are they?  
 9 A. I would agree.  
 10 Q. And sat in the uncomfortable position of giving evidence  
 11 to this inquiry, actually at the moment you're unable to  
 12 tell us whether any of your staff used those action  
 13 cards on 22 May, aren't you?  
 14 A. No, I'm not.  
 15 Q. So again, on reflection, there was a clear need for them  
 16 to be rolled out so that you, as the manager, knew that  
 17 everybody had them and for them to be properly embedded  
 18 and for there to be some training; is that right?  
 19 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 20 Q. Action cards, finally. I'll deal with this quickly  
 21 because Mr Greaney has asked you a lot of questions  
 22 about them.  
 23 The discussion about action cards started around the  
 24 questionnaire in February 2016. Prior to that point,  
 25 there were some other documents which were relevant to

1 this subject, but there were no action cards relating to  
 2 Plato or MTFA in the OCB, were there?  
 3 A. No, there weren't.  
 4 Q. So the other documents that there were were some  
 5 aide-memoires and what you have referred in your  
 6 statement to as crib sheets --  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. -- available on Sherlock; is that right?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Am I right that Sherlock is an intranet or part of an  
 11 intranet?  
 12 A. Yes, it is, it's an intranet-based site.  
 13 Q. So it's a resource for GMP officers, but only GMP  
 14 officers?  
 15 A. Yes. It's generally -- it is available to all officers,  
 16 but it is the de facto OCB repository.  
 17 Q. Right. Up to the point where you started to develop the  
 18 action cards, therefore there were these aide-memoires  
 19 and crib sheets, but help me with the process for that.  
 20 Am I right that these crib sheets and aide-memoires were  
 21 simply ad hoc lists and prompts?  
 22 A. It would depend on -- Sherlock itself is built around  
 23 the general role of the OCB and the incidents they're  
 24 likely to deal with and to assist call handlers and  
 25 radio operators with the requirements of that specific

1 incident. So the majority of them are short bullet  
 2 pointed lists .  
 3 The incident I normally give is around a kidnap  
 4 scenario, if a call handler should take a call  
 5 in relation to kidnap, there is a specific set of  
 6 actions they need to undertake and inform a certain  
 7 number of people to ensure it's dealt with correctly .  
 8 So they would simply go on Sherlock, type the word  
 9 "kidnap" in, and they would be presented on their screen  
 10 during that initial phone call with a set of actions  
 11 they needed to complete, and that was embedded with them  
 12 from their initial training when they came to GMP and  
 13 undertook their initial training .  
 14 Q. Right, I see. But the genesis, if you like, of these  
 15 documents would be a staff member saying, "We need  
 16 a prompt list or crib sheet for kidnapping", or  
 17 whatever?  
 18 A. Yes, it would be distilled from operational requirements  
 19 or a change in policy or another technical change in  
 20 terms of: actually, we now need to notify X, Y or Z so  
 21 you needed to include them on the incident log to ensure  
 22 they were notified. So it was that kind of repository  
 23 of information as a refresher to staff during their  
 24 working day.  
 25 Q. And as discussed before, the utility of action cards or

1 prompt lists, or whatever we want to call these  
 2 documents, is that in real time, they are necessary to  
 3 prompt recollection of the actual policies and plans --  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. -- instead of having the 100--page plan or policy in  
 6 front of you or the eight--page plan or policy in front  
 7 of you, these prompts are bullet points which raise in  
 8 your memory what you have hopefully been trained on in  
 9 terms of the plans or the policies ?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. In terms of the pre--February 2016 position, the  
 12 pre--action cards position, these were documents which  
 13 had been created by members of your staff as and when  
 14 the need arose; is that right?  
 15 A. Yes, that would be correct.  
 16 Q. You might have a kidnap scenario, which perhaps one of  
 17 your staff realised that an error had been made in the  
 18 response to it, and so might come to you the next day or  
 19 a week later and say, "Boss, I've created this crib  
 20 sheet", and then it would go up on Sherlock. Would that  
 21 be the sort of way it would happen?  
 22 A. There was at the time a number of staff responsible for  
 23 Sherlock and there was a quality assurance unit that  
 24 would oversee the material that went on to Sherlock to  
 25 make sure that it was relevant, current and up to date,

1 and that obviously any changes in kind of local force or  
 2 national policy would be reflected in the documentation  
 3 held on Sherlock.  
 4 Q. Right. You're ahead of me now. I was going to come to  
 5 the quality assurance part of it. Because it would be  
 6 vital, where carefully crafted plans and policies were  
 7 distilled down into practical prompt lists, it would be  
 8 vital, wouldn't it, that those prompt lists reflected  
 9 what was in those approved plans?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Therefore there had to be an approval process. So in  
 12 terms of the kidnap scenario which you raised, if  
 13 somebody produced a crib sheet, who would in fact  
 14 approve it?  
 15 A. That ordinarily would actually come from probably the  
 16 Serious Crime Division in terms of: this is how we're  
 17 now dealing with kidnap scenarios, could you provide  
 18 your call handlers with these instructions to ensure we  
 19 get the relevant details documented as part of the  
 20 initial call in that scenario. Or alternatively, other  
 21 documents would go through potentially the training  
 22 department, Kelly Chilton, Alison Hadley, or the quality  
 23 assurance unit within the branch itself .  
 24 Q. So all aide--memoires and crib sheets that went up on  
 25 Sherlock went through an approval process?

1 A. To my knowledge, yes.  
 2 Q. Is that documented?  
 3 A. I would suspect unlikely. I think it was more of  
 4 a gatekeeping role rather than a formal documented  
 5 approval and auditable process.  
 6 Q. Your process of action cards introduced into the OCB  
 7 a better process, would that be fair? It would be  
 8 a formal process through the head of the OCB, you, of  
 9 prompts that had been created and then put out for  
 10 feedback; yes?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. And then perhaps, if they had been approved with  
 13 a document trail and trained on, then that would have  
 14 completed a proper process which would have been  
 15 transparent and would avoid errors; would that be fair?  
 16 A. I would agree. That's fair .  
 17 Q. Is there such a system now generally or do you still in  
 18 GMP -- you may not know because you have moved on, but  
 19 certainly up until the point when you left the OCB, had  
 20 you moved on from aide--memoires and crib sheets and did  
 21 you have such an approved system of action cards,  
 22 approved and trained on, documented?  
 23 A. I know there was a lot of development post me leaving  
 24 the branch. I can't comment on the process for approval  
 25 or otherwise of that. I know the force has a process



1 for approval of policy, but within the branch I couldn't  
 2 comment on.  
 3 Q. That's very fair and we'll ask somebody else.  
 4 In terms of that, would you agree that having  
 5 properly documented approval process with action cards  
 6 rather than crib sheets and embedding and training,  
 7 having a proper documented process, would be preferable  
 8 to the rather ad hoc way it has been done in the past?  
 9 A. Undoubtedly, I can't disagree with that comment.  
 10 Q. Thank you.  
 11 Mr Greaney took you through the documentation  
 12 regarding the action cards that you created.  
 13 Ultimately, of course it'll be a matter for the chair,  
 14 but there may be an impression that you were entirely  
 15 properly creating these documents having been tasked to  
 16 do them, entirely properly asking for feedback multiple  
 17 times, but very little was forthcoming on that score  
 18 from any quarter. Before we go into a little more  
 19 detail, would that be a fair overview?  
 20 A. That would be a fair assessment, yes.  
 21 Q. For whatever reason, would it be right that through this  
 22 process that would have been frustrating for you? You  
 23 saw that this was an important way of improving a flawed  
 24 system and, for whatever reasons, possibly entirely  
 25 understandable reasons, resourcing for example, you

1 simply weren't getting the support from elsewhere?  
 2 A. I would agree. On reflection, a lot more could have  
 3 been done in terms of embedding them, formalising them,  
 4 and I have reflected on that considerably.  
 5 Q. Mr Greaney took you through the various points, so I'll  
 6 do it swiftly. 12 April 2016, the first draft went to  
 7 the OCB lead for call handlers.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. As far as you can recall, no feedback at all?  
 10 A. No.  
 11 Q. 22 April, you emailed your senior leadership team,  
 12 inviting feedback, providing a training presentation?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Which apparently was never used because, as you've  
 15 agreed, there wasn't any training given?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Again, from the 22 April email, no feedback resulted?  
 18 A. That's correct.  
 19 Q. You then, on 3 May, emailed an officer you had  
 20 identified in the planning or coordination for  
 21 Winchester Accord, requesting that the action cards were  
 22 used in Winchester Accord?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And you copied Laura Lewis, who was the Silver room  
 25 manager, asking for feedback when those action cards had

1 been used?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Again, I think you agreed with Mr Greaney that it's  
 4 apparent the action cards weren't used on  
 5 Winchester Accord and thereby that email hadn't achieved  
 6 its object, and although you did get feedback on other  
 7 matters, you didn't get any feedback on the action cards  
 8 because they hadn't been used?  
 9 A. That would appear to be the case, yes.  
 10 Q. On 13 May you received some detailed feedback from  
 11 Kelly Chilton about Winchester Accord, which included  
 12 a suggestion that call handlers needed to have "a clear  
 13 Sherlock document" dealing with a number of things  
 14 arising such as advice to callers, how to record an  
 15 incident on a computer; yes?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Obviously it appears that Ms Chilton wasn't giving you  
 18 feedback on action cards because they hadn't been used,  
 19 but she was coming up with a concurrent suggestion.  
 20 A. Yes. I was a little surprised given the fact that I'd  
 21 circulated the action cards through the training wing  
 22 prior to the event, so I was surprised she was unaware  
 23 of them.  
 24 Q. Indeed. She had concurrently, independently, apparently  
 25 identified the need for something like action cards?

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. In June, you had amended or slightly amended the first  
 3 iteration of the action cards and you sent them round by  
 4 email, at least by 4 October, and I think you referred  
 5 to them as an interim measure?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. What did that actually mean? What was your intention?  
 8 A. Again, this reflects back on the comments from yesterday  
 9 in terms of, at that time, both the potential move to  
 10 headquarters of the force duty officer and the  
 11 restructure within the branch in terms of the closure of  
 12 the call-handling room and also the move to iOPS were  
 13 all on the horizon, within weeks or months, so as  
 14 a consequence I anticipated a root and branch  
 15 requirement to rewrite a lot of our material policies  
 16 and processes with any of those three elements in mind.  
 17 So this was a stopgap, as I envisaged it, at the time to  
 18 tide us over until such point that our working practices  
 19 would need to be revised.  
 20 Q. So the purpose of you putting them out at that point was  
 21 to have them used?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. But understanding that they may well have to be  
 24 revisited in due course in the fairly near future?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. In fact, I think it's right, isn't it, that you're not  
 2 in fact aware whether the control staff even got to know  
 3 about them at that stage?  
 4 A. That's correct, yes.  
 5 Q. We then move on to the 23 December email. If you want  
 6 to have another look at this it is {INQ032745/2},  
 7 please. It's the middle section:  
 8 "Attached is some draft guidance based around advice  
 9 for specific roles which also provides information which  
 10 we can give to the public."  
 11 That's the reference, is it, to the iteration of the  
 12 action cards as at 23 December?  
 13 A. Yes. It's obviously a reference there to both the draft  
 14 guidance, the JESIP material, to remind staff obviously  
 15 of the training they've had in that, and also the  
 16 glossary of terminology given the overwhelming use of  
 17 acronyms.  
 18 Q. Yes. I don't want to quibble words here, but would you  
 19 agree with me that referring to something as draft does  
 20 rather suggest that it's a work in progress rather than  
 21 a document that should be actioned?  
 22 A. Yes. The terminology is misleading. The use of the  
 23 word "current" would have been better, but it reflected  
 24 my ongoing thoughts about the three elements I have  
 25 talked about in terms of move, restructures and the new

1 IT system.  
 2 Q. Yes. And referring further down two paragraphs down:  
 3 "Whilst we finalise our in-house OCB advice ...  
 4 please see the links below which provide guidance for  
 5 roles."  
 6 So it does very much, whether the intention was to  
 7 put them into process, into use --- you are signalling  
 8 that these are drafts and they require completion or  
 9 finalisation, yes?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. You referred this morning to an email on 24 March, which  
 12 was after one of the London attacks. So presumably that  
 13 prompted you to send that email to Mr Hill?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. That email, just so everyone knows what I'm talking  
 16 about, was your email to your immediate line manager,  
 17 Superintendent Hill?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. You were asking him to basically make sure that the  
 20 action cards were being used; is that a fair summary?  
 21 A. Yes, it's to reaffirm with our staff on the back of the  
 22 London attacks that actually this is --- the threat level  
 23 is severe, it's highly likely, we need to be aware of  
 24 what provisions and advice we have available to you.  
 25 Q. So this is you trying to put into force, if not already

1 done, the action cards that you'd already provided and  
 2 you were asking your line manager, perfectly reasonably,  
 3 to send out a wide readership bulletin, highlighting  
 4 that these action cards should be used; is that right?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. And also including other sensible contingency measures  
 7 such as having hard copies in case the computer system  
 8 went down?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Your evidence earlier was that you have no recollection  
 11 of receiving that bulletin, although you caveat that by  
 12 saying that if you had received it, you might simply  
 13 have deleted it because you effectively wrote it?  
 14 A. Yes. As I say, I can't specifically remember recalling  
 15 it, but that's probably tainted by the fact that I wrote  
 16 it in the first place.  
 17 Q. That's, if I may say so, very fairly put. In your  
 18 statement, you go on to say that in fact Mr Hill doesn't  
 19 know whether he sent it out either; yes?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. So again, perfectly reasonably and helpfully, in  
 22 preparing for this inquiry you've not only given us your  
 23 narrative but you've reached a point that you simply  
 24 can't recall, and presumably you can't find it on your  
 25 part of the IT system, and therefore you have asked the

1 recipient of your email what in fact happened with it;  
 2 yes?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And Mr Hill doesn't know, and of course we can ask him,  
 5 but, on the face of it, it would appear that the email  
 6 that you sent to him wasn't in fact actioned, I'll be  
 7 corrected if I'm wrong, but there doesn't appear to be  
 8 any electronic or any kind of audit trail that it was  
 9 actioned?  
 10 A. To my knowledge, no, there is no record.  
 11 Q. So we're left with a position, 15 months later, when  
 12 this atrocity happens, that you're doing your level  
 13 best, you're unable to say whether the staff under your  
 14 management at the OCB had seen or been asked to use or  
 15 in any way had been trained upon these action cards or  
 16 indeed used them on the night?  
 17 A. That is correct. In the absence of training to embed  
 18 them, I can only ascertain that they were aware via the  
 19 circulations and would have known that advice would be  
 20 available to them, as with every other incident, on  
 21 Sherlock.  
 22 Q. Yes. Can I just turn to the communications issues and  
 23 back to the Home Office questionnaire as a starting  
 24 point, and again I think we'll have this up. It's  
 25 {INQ032758/1}.

1 It's the questionnaire. {INQ032758/12}, Mr Lopez.  
 2 It may just be me, but I can't quite understand what  
 3 the position with communications was by the time of  
 4 22 May, so I'm just going to ask you to help me and,  
 5 I hope, everybody else. Starting point, February 2016.  
 6 These are your answers; is that right?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. I'm just going to ask you to look at paragraphs 35 and  
 9 39. Are you familiar with those? I think you've been  
 10 asked to look at them in advance of giving evidence.  
 11 A. I have, yes. I am aware.  
 12 Q. So is it right that in February 2016, there were  
 13 dedicated lines with fire and ambulance from the OCB?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. You assert that they would deal with call volumes and  
 16 that there would be a fallback position of dedicated  
 17 Sharers Talk Groups?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Can I ask you to help me understand what's being said  
 20 here? Am I right that, in February 2016, the OCB had  
 21 a dedicated line that could be used on a Plato which  
 22 would connect the three control rooms?  
 23 A. No. In terms of -- this is actually outlining that from  
 24 the force duty officer position they had a speed dial  
 25 button on their telephony system for both ambulance and

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1 Fire Control rooms to get them through to a supervisor  
 2 line direct as opposed to having to go through  
 3 a switchboard.  
 4 Q. I see. What is meant here is that the FDO -- the  
 5 landline the FDO had was capable of getting through  
 6 because it had a speed dial, without going through  
 7 a switchboard, was capable of getting through to an  
 8 appropriate person at the ambulance or the Fire and  
 9 Rescue?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Was it capable of getting through to both of them at the  
 12 same time?  
 13 A. No, it was literally a speed dial. So it would just  
 14 establish a single -- it wasn't a conference call.  
 15 Q. That's clarified it very helpfully and I'm sorry if  
 16 everybody else understood it and I didn't. But there  
 17 was no landline facility to connect the three services  
 18 together and the landline facility that was available  
 19 was simply a direct line which had speed dial facilities  
 20 for the two other emergency services?  
 21 A. That's correct, yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that the normal meaning of  
 23 a dedicated line as you'd understand it?  
 24 A. In terms of the technology available in the control room  
 25 at the time, then yes, a dedicated line was literally

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1 straight through without going through the switchboard.  
 2 Ordinarily, we would go through the switchboard for both  
 3 organisations so as to not necessarily take priority  
 4 over an emergency call from a member of the public.  
 5 However, those lines were provided on the basis of need  
 6 in terms of peer to peer, FDO to fire equivalent or  
 7 control room in terms of being able to ascertain  
 8 situations and deploy resources from each organisation.  
 9 MR WEATHERBY: I'm well aware you're not  
 10 a telecommunications expert, but would it have been  
 11 a difficulty for GMP to have established a dedicated  
 12 landline which would have been capable of having  
 13 a conference facility?  
 14 A. Certainly within the control room, its capability at  
 15 that time, I don't believe, had a conference call  
 16 facility with external lines. Certainly I think it was  
 17 capable internally, but at that time conference call  
 18 facilities weren't the norm within the control room.  
 19 Q. Right. So the reference in answer to question 39:  
 20 "The fallback position to this would be to utilise  
 21 the dedicated Sharers Talk Groups."  
 22 Is that a reference to the radio system?  
 23 A. Yes. As I say, there were at the time three available  
 24 Airwave Talk Groups, which were tested each Sunday,  
 25 within the control rooms to establish that three-way

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1 communication link.  
 2 Q. Right. So at the time, February 2016, there wasn't  
 3 a facility of having a conference between the three  
 4 services in the immediate response or declaration of  
 5 a Plato, but there was the ability to establish a Talk  
 6 Group between the three services?  
 7 A. That's correct, yes.  
 8 Q. We can take that down, thank you, Mr Lopez.  
 9 In your statement, paragraph 43 to 44, you refer to  
 10 feedback from the HMIC visit, which included a reference  
 11 to FDOs testing the tri-service Talk Group.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And you indicate in the statement that you're not clear  
 14 what that refers to. Given your evidence about  
 15 question 39 that we just looked at, would there have  
 16 been any necessity for the testing of the tri-service  
 17 Talk Group?  
 18 A. In terms of chronology, when I gave my statement  
 19 I wasn't aware or had neglected to recall the fact that  
 20 that testing was ongoing at the time. Obviously, having  
 21 now seen my full evidence proposal, I have seen the flow  
 22 chart, which is documented about the move from the three  
 23 Talk Groups to the identified one Talk Group, which was  
 24 still in discussion at the time of the attack.  
 25 Q. Yes.

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1 A. That prompted my knowledge around that.  
 2 Q. Again it may just be me, but I'm struggling to follow  
 3 what this means. From February 2016, there was  
 4 a facility on Airwave for the three services to talk  
 5 together in the event of a Plato being declared?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. By October/November 2016, would it be right that the  
 8 testing that's being considered there would simply be  
 9 a weekly test to ensure that everything was working  
 10 properly?  
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 12 Q. What part of that system of communications needed  
 13 changing by 22 May?  
 14 A. As far as I'm aware, the testing involved all three  
 15 agencies in ensuring that a response was received from  
 16 all three agencies on those Talk Groups to ensure they  
 17 were being actively monitored and actively listened to  
 18 so that in a no-notice scenario they could be activated  
 19 swiftly.  
 20 In terms of the requirement to further test, clearly  
 21 control rooms have a subsets of available Talk Groups  
 22 available to them at certain positions, so to move to  
 23 the single dedicated Talk Group would not only require  
 24 agreement across the region, it would also require  
 25 technical updates to ensure that relevant dispatch of

1 radio operators, call handlers, within the three  
 2 agencies could access that from their terminal because  
 3 clearly there are hundreds, if not thousands, of  
 4 available Talk Groups and you would be limited in terms  
 5 of the numbers of Talk Groups you could monitor at  
 6 a particular position, so the work would go on to ensure  
 7 that was facilitated.  
 8 Q. Right. So from February 2016, there was a facility for  
 9 a Talk Group between the three services?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. On Airwave?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. By October/November, the email from  
 14 Superintendent Ellison that we looked at earlier,  
 15 there's reference to, I think, the weekly testing by  
 16 FDOs to make sure that system was working properly?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. So at that point, however one might want to change that,  
 19 there was a functional tri-service Airwave ability to  
 20 communicate in real time in the immediate aftermath of  
 21 a Plato?  
 22 A. Yes, and with it being a weekly test, it would have been  
 23 known of -- by virtue of rotational shift patterns that  
 24 would have been known to key staff throughout each  
 25 organisation.

1 Q. Whatever the changes were at the time between then and  
 2 22 May about the switch to a different Talk Group, was  
 3 it the position that that Talk Group, the one that had  
 4 been available from February and apparently through  
 5 2016, was that still available on 22 May 2017?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. So far as you're concerned as the head of the OCB, there  
 8 was an available tri-service Airwave means of  
 9 communication on 22 May, once Plato had been declared?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, help me. This presumably  
 12 is the Talk Group that North West Fire Control tried to  
 13 see whether anyone was listening to it?  
 14 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. I'm afraid it may be the blind leading  
 15 the partially sighted here because I'm struggling to  
 16 understand the problems here.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have certainly heard that evidence  
 18 in relation to North West Fire Control, that they did  
 19 switch on the system to see if anyone was listening and  
 20 they weren't.  
 21 MR WEATHERBY: Yes. Maybe we can pick it up with another  
 22 witness in time-honoured fashion.  
 23 Can I finally just touch on another issue, the Plato  
 24 plans. You would expect the FDOs to be familiar with  
 25 the Plato plans, would you?

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. And you were their line manager and responsible for  
 3 ensuring all your staff reacted appropriately to all  
 4 situations; is that right?  
 5 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 6 Q. So does it then follow that you should be appraised and  
 7 up to date with the Plato plans as well?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And were you on 22 May?  
 10 A. Yes, I will have seen it from two angles at that time.  
 11 I was a firearms commander as well, so I would have been  
 12 seeing the circulation of the latest version of the  
 13 document in terms of the Plato plan, which I believe was  
 14 very early May 2017.  
 15 Q. Yes. Well, I think the evidence we heard was that the  
 16 updated plan was circulated on an email dated 12 May.  
 17 Is that the circulation you're referring to?  
 18 A. That would accord with my recollection, yes.  
 19 Q. So far as you were concerned, was the plan that was  
 20 appended to that email the one that was applicable on  
 21 22 May?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. We have heard that in fact that quite significantly  
 24 changed plan had not been trained by anybody. Were you  
 25 aware that your FDOs had not been trained on that new

1 policy by 22 May?  
 2 A. In terms of formal training, yes, although they would  
 3 have understood their key role in terms of  
 4 notifications, and as I understand it, that Plato  
 5 document reflected updates primarily in terms of  
 6 notifications and requirements from national learning as  
 7 opposed to the requirement that it fundamentally changed  
 8 their responsibilities.  
 9 Q. Well, I don't want to take up time here, the chair has  
 10 heard the evidence and will make a judgment. But on one  
 11 view, there was a ratcheting up of the number of  
 12 responsibilities on the FDO. Was that something that  
 13 accords with your recollection of the changes in policy?  
 14 A. Yes, certainly there was.  
 15 Q. Was that a concern to you given the work that you'd been  
 16 doing on the action cards?  
 17 A. Not overly so, but clearly that is very much a personal  
 18 opinion rather than one borne out in any sort of  
 19 evidential way.  
 20 Q. And with respect to the changes to Plato plans, given  
 21 that they did involve the tasks for the FDO and the fact  
 22 that the OCB would be very much in the driving seat on  
 23 a Plato incident and declaration, do you think, looking  
 24 back, reflecting on it, there should have been joined-up  
 25 working on the Plato policies between the policy and

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1 compliance unit of the firearms section and the OCB?  
 2 A. Undoubtedly greater engagement would have created a more  
 3 refined, robust and appropriate plan, I would agree.  
 4 Q. And if that had happened, presumably you would have  
 5 encouraged them to either split the tasks of the FDO on  
 6 the plan or to make it clear that there were action  
 7 cards for those tasks to be delegated to other of your  
 8 staff?  
 9 A. Yes, that opportunity would have been available and  
 10 that's something I would have taken.  
 11 MR WEATHERBY: Mr Booth, thank you very much, those are all  
 12 of my questions.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Sir, that leaves Mr Horwell, but his questions  
 15 can most conveniently be dealt with after lunch.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We'll break for an hour.  
 17 Thank you very much for your evidence so far.  
 18 MR COOPER: Sir, before you rise, can I just apologise for  
 19 my inadvertent intervention a little earlier on in  
 20 proceedings? I hope it didn't distract from the  
 21 evidence.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It was entertainment, Mr Cooper, for us  
 23 all, so thank you for the entertaining interruption.  
 24 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.  
 25 (12.48 pm)

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1 (The lunch adjournment)  
 2 (1.50 pm)  
 3 MR GREANEY: Sir, as I indicated before lunch, finally so  
 4 far as the chief inspector is concerned, Mr Horwell will  
 5 ask questions on behalf of Greater Manchester Police.  
 6 Questions from MR HORWELL  
 7 MR HORWELL: Mr Booth, you were shown an email that was not  
 8 on your list of documents in the EP, and I have no  
 9 complaint about that, but like all the emails, they can  
 10 sometimes be rather irritating because various chains  
 11 can find the same email in it.  
 12 I want to refer to such a chain. You are concerned  
 13 with every email. Sir, I'm obviously going to give the  
 14 INQ reference, but I noticed over lunch that there is  
 15 some information in it that is regarded as operationally  
 16 sensitive. It is redacted from all other copies, but  
 17 for this particular document the redacted information is  
 18 still apparent, so please don't put it up. The number  
 19 is {INQ017957/1}.  
 20 Mr Booth, let me put you at rest straightaway. It's  
 21 a very simple chain and the point that I seek to  
 22 establish is in itself very simple. It's to do with the  
 23 work that was being done in the spring of 2017 to  
 24 identify and use between all the services a dedicated  
 25 channel that could be used for an MTFA. I'm sure you

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1 remember those questions.  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. There was an email at the start of the chain,  
 4 in March 2017, 30 March, when it is hoped that there  
 5 could be a switchover date for 30 April of that year.  
 6 Then two emails along, it is asked, as it happens by  
 7 Dave Whittle, whether it is feasible for this new  
 8 channel to be used by 28 April.  
 9 Then on 20 April, there is an email from  
 10 Neil Gaskell of Manchester Fire, and in that email he  
 11 says:  
 12 "Hi Dave."  
 13 It's from him to Dave Whittle but you and others are  
 14 copied in:  
 15 "I think with timescales it may be worth postponing  
 16 slightly so we can agree everything and make sure we get  
 17 this right."  
 18 The simple point I seek to ask you about is that you  
 19 were asked about delay from a GMP perspective, but in  
 20 terms of setting up this new channel, there was at least  
 21 one other, and perhaps others, content with further  
 22 delay to ensure that once set up, it was set up properly  
 23 and effectively?  
 24 A. Yes, I would agree.  
 25 Q. In that same email, Mr Gaskell refers to the Airwave

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1 test that is carried out every Sunday morning at 10 am,  
 2 conducted by Manchester Airport Police. This test, it's  
 3 sometimes referred to as the Sunday morning test, and  
 4 sometimes as the Manchester Airport test; you obviously  
 5 know the one that I'm referring to.  
 6 A. Yes, I do.  
 7 Q. It's perhaps a little misleading to call it the  
 8 Manchester Airport test because at Manchester Airport,  
 9 the people testing the channel were GMP operatives.  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. So this is a test involving GMP and the other two main  
 12 emergency services?  
 13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 14 Q. What is your understanding -- I'm sure we'll hear about  
 15 this from others, but what is your understanding of the  
 16 Sunday morning test and the channels that were tested  
 17 during that test? Who was involved and what happened?  
 18 A. My understanding of the Sunday morning test was that  
 19 that was a tripartite, ie GMP, fire and ambulance,  
 20 testing of three separate Talk Groups, which also  
 21 involved duty commanders who were on duty on the Sunday  
 22 morning and a test message would go out over each of  
 23 those three Talk Groups, where it would be anticipated  
 24 that a response from both fire and ambulance and GMP was  
 25 received, confirming that the message was received and

1 understood, and would test each of those three Talk  
 2 Groups, both to embed that knowledge within operational  
 3 staff, also with control room staff, but also to ensure  
 4 that the operational officers had those Talk Groups  
 5 within their personally issued radios.  
 6 Q. Would you expect, perhaps you can only speak on behalf  
 7 of GMP and its control room, but would you expect people  
 8 in the OCR to be aware of the test and what was  
 9 involved?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Just to take this chain of emails to its final position,  
 12 on 21 April you emailed Jo Hoyte and you said that you  
 13 agreed with the suggestion to wait just a little longer  
 14 to coordinate all the inter-agency testing that could  
 15 usefully be undertaken with the control room. So it was  
 16 put back a little --  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. -- the new channel? And as we know, not approved for  
 19 use, not signed off for use by the night of this attack?  
 20 A. That's correct, yes.  
 21 Q. But the Sunday morning channels were available for use?  
 22 A. Yes, they were.  
 23 Q. You've been asked on a number of occasions about an  
 24 email you sent on 23 December 2016. If this can be put  
 25 on the screen, please. This is {INQ032745/2}, the

1 bottom half of that page.  
 2 Mr Booth, in this email, not the section that we're  
 3 looking at, but in this email you refer to recent terror  
 4 attacks in Germany and in Malta and you remind everyone  
 5 and we'll come in a moment to see to whom this email was  
 6 sent, you remind everyone of the fact that the UK threat  
 7 level was still at severe.  
 8 In the paragraph that we can see at the top of the  
 9 screen, this is one that's been referred to on a number  
 10 of occasions, you there set out that in the email is  
 11 attached some draft guidance. As you say in the  
 12 paragraph below:  
 13 "Any incidents involving NWS, GMFRS and our wider  
 14 partners would utilise the JESIP principles, details of  
 15 which are also attached."  
 16 In the paragraph below that you refer to Sherlock.  
 17 Then in bold type:  
 18 "NB: when opening the links I would suggest you save  
 19 a copy as opposed to opening the document direct."  
 20 And there, in blue, as we look at the screen, are  
 21 three hyperlinks; is that right?  
 22 A. That's correct, yes.  
 23 Q. By pressing the first hyperlink, the reference being to  
 24 draft OCB guidance, would that take the reader of this  
 25 email to the latest action cards?

1 A. Yes, it would.  
 2 Q. And those were the action cards that were available for  
 3 use on the night of this attack?  
 4 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 5 Q. Then a hyperlink for latest JESIP guidance and then  
 6 a hyperlink for a glossary of terrorist incident  
 7 terminology?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. If we go to the first page of this document, and to the  
 10 bottom of it, please, {INQ032745/1}, we can see from the  
 11 six lines at the bottom of the page that this is your  
 12 email, sent on 23 December 2016, and we can see the  
 13 groups of people to whom it was sent: OCB SW supervisors  
 14 and so on. In reality, so that we can understand,  
 15 Mr Booth, to whom was this email dispatched?  
 16 A. Effectively those groups there are all the supervisory  
 17 roles and ranks within the OCB.  
 18 Q. And the final group, OCR duty inspectors, did that  
 19 include FDOs?  
 20 A. Yes, that is the FDO group mailing list.  
 21 Q. In addition to these documents being accessible through  
 22 the hyperlink, were they also on Sherlock?  
 23 A. Yes, they were.  
 24 Q. Each of the three on Sherlock; is that right?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did every member of staff, whatever their role in the  
 2 operations room, have access to Sherlock?  
 3 A. Yes, they did, and it's in fact in the OCB hardwired to  
 4 a function key on the keyboard, so it's literally one  
 5 key press to open up Sherlock.  
 6 Q. One further topic on the OCB and the operations room  
 7 itself. We've heard about austerity cuts and their  
 8 effects and I'm sure we'll hear more to come. But  
 9 Mr Booth, the effect of austerity cuts on the OCB and  
 10 the operations room, can you summarise those effects for  
 11 the chairman, please?  
 12 A. From my personal knowledge in the number of years,  
 13 probably from 2010 onwards, GMP went through several  
 14 iterations of what was called red-land, blue-land,  
 15 green-land, which was around police staff cuts and  
 16 police officer cuts in the organisation. I'm led to  
 17 believe that at that time, I wasn't present in the  
 18 branch, but I'm led to believe that the actual  
 19 establishment of the branch was reduced at that time.  
 20 Q. Staff numbers?  
 21 A. Yes, staff numbers.  
 22 Q. What effect, if any, on morale, Mr Booth?  
 23 A. Not being present in the branch beforehand, I couldn't  
 24 comment on the previous level of morale, but at the time  
 25 I was in branch, it was a very demanding time and staff

1 did feel that there was a lot of pressure on them in  
 2 their day-to-day role.  
 3 Q. Because their numbers had been cut; is that right?  
 4 A. That's quite correct, yes.  
 5 Q. I'm going to ask you about your witness statement.  
 6 Do you have a copy in front of you?  
 7 A. I do, yes.  
 8 Q. There's no need to put it on the screen for the moment.  
 9 Could you turn to page 8, please? Between paragraphs 33  
 10 to 37, I'm not going to read them all out, we can all  
 11 see the content, but on that page you set out what in  
 12 your view were the strengths of the OCR and you  
 13 (inaudible: distorted) the number of operatives in the  
 14 OCR that you would normally expect to be present. You  
 15 estimate that at least 35 people should be in the OCR  
 16 with the FDO and that number no doubt can change on  
 17 occasions. But at least 35 was your best estimate?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Those that were there to support the FDO included the  
 20 FDS. How important to the role of the FDO in your view  
 21 is the FDS?  
 22 A. I would describe it, for want of a better phrase, as  
 23 their right-hand person and critical to the smooth  
 24 operation of the role of force duty officer.  
 25 Q. There's reference in your statement to "at least two

1 other supervisors" in the OCR. How well-trained, how  
 2 well-experienced, would you expect those two other  
 3 supervisors to be?  
 4 A. Those two supervisors would be trained and able, as was  
 5 often the case, to provide relief cover for the force  
 6 duty supervisor role on the basis that some of the force  
 7 duty supervisors were members of police staff so were  
 8 entitled to a work break away from their desk and, as  
 9 such, other supervisors in the room during the course of  
 10 a tour of duty would rotate around the force duty  
 11 supervisor position to provide cover for refreshment  
 12 breaks, also for annual leave and courses, et cetera.  
 13 So whilst it wouldn't necessarily be their key role  
 14 there was an expectation and understanding that they'd  
 15 be able to perform the role of force duty supervisor as  
 16 well.  
 17 Q. Yesterday and today, you gave evidence about (inaudible:  
 18 distorted) if training is the right word, and I'll  
 19 explain what I mean in a moment, but you gave evidence  
 20 about the intensive training that is required before  
 21 somebody can become an FDO, and by training I mean what  
 22 you've said, obviously, the fact that a trainee FDO is  
 23 mentored for 3 months.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Mr Booth, the value you bring to this inquiry is that

1 you have been an FDO and you have been mentored yourself  
 2 and you have done mentoring in your time.  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. How effective, how successful is that training and  
 5 preparation process in your view?  
 6 A. I think it is both appropriate and successful. I have  
 7 in my time mentoring others failed people at various  
 8 points during that process if they weren't -- if they  
 9 weren't meeting the required standard, if I didn't think  
 10 they would be able to, as we used to say, fly solo,  
 11 which was the phrase used, so certainly I thought  
 12 it would be effective.  
 13 Q. Perhaps what we haven't spent very much time on is the  
 14 training and experience of everyone else in the  
 15 operations room. Can you summarise that for the  
 16 chairman, please, their capabilities, their  
 17 effectiveness?  
 18 A. Certainly any of the radio operators in the control room  
 19 in support of the FDO would have had probably a minimum  
 20 of about 10 weeks' classroom-based training and, again,  
 21 the supervisor themselves would have had additional  
 22 supervisory skills, whether they be uniformed officers  
 23 or police staff. Historically, the branch had a lot of  
 24 staff within it that were time-served and had spent, you  
 25 know, years upon years upon years working in the branch,

1 initially starting as at a call handler, working up to  
 2 radio operators, then up to supervisors, and certainly  
 3 the member of staff that was my force duty supervisor  
 4 at the time had worked in the branch for nearly  
 5 20 years.  
 6 Q. So how proficient in your opinion, Mr Booth, and  
 7 effective was the OCR in 2017?  
 8 A. I would think it was very proficient . The policy and  
 9 process was very well—embedded. Staff were routinely  
 10 for 10, 12 hours a day performing the same functions,  
 11 same role, in terms of their communication skills, and  
 12 at that time the IT system we had in place had been in  
 13 place there for decades. So in terms of their skill set  
 14 around that and knowledge of how to use the system, it  
 15 was very, very well—embedded.  
 16 Q. In your witness statement at paragraph 34, having  
 17 summarised the support for the FDO, you wrote this  
 18 sentence:  
 19 "I believe that this was sufficient support provided  
 20 staff were utilised effectively ."  
 21 Perhaps the most important word in that sentence,  
 22 Mr Booth, is "effectively". What did you mean by that?  
 23 A. Again, in line with the action cards in terms of  
 24 apportioning out their responsibilities and ensuring  
 25 that there was direction from both the FDO, FDS and

1 other supervisors in there to ensure those tasks were  
 2 carried out and that they weren't tied up unnecessarily  
 3 with extraneous work when we needed to focus on dealing  
 4 with a major incident.  
 5 Q. How important is the principle of delegation when  
 6 looking at the FDO's and the FDS's role?  
 7 A. I think it 's a key part of the skills and experience of  
 8 the force duty officer in terms of understanding what  
 9 key elements they should personally undertake and what  
 10 is appropriate to be delegated.  
 11 Q. Would it be commonplace in the operations room,  
 12 delegation?  
 13 A. Yes, very much.  
 14 Q. Mr Booth, everyone accepts that an MTFA is going to  
 15 provide a severe test for any policing system, whether  
 16 it 's the operations room or otherwise. In connection  
 17 with an MTFA, some of the actions are unique, certain  
 18 telephone calls that have to be made, I won't go through  
 19 them in detail, but you will know exactly what I mean.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Would that be expected to be done by the FDO?  
 22 A. A large proportion of them, yes. However, depending  
 23 upon the circumstances and the extent of the incident,  
 24 that could be delegated, certainly the majority of radio  
 25 operators and supervisors would have had daily and

1 regular contact with fire and ambulance services to  
 2 request updates, provide their services and resources  
 3 and updates. But again, some professional discretion  
 4 would be required in terms of the complexity and level  
 5 of information to be passed.  
 6 Q. But in terms of the operations room itself, how  
 7 different would you have expected an MTFA to be  
 8 different from the core tasks and responsibilities of  
 9 the operations room?  
 10 A. Not in their core tasks and responsibilities , no. The  
 11 intensity and volume, then yes.  
 12 Q. Amongst those core tasks and responsibilities would be  
 13 communications between the operations room and the fire  
 14 and ambulance services?  
 15 A. Yes, that was not uncommon.  
 16 Q. Identifying and communicating the RVP: is that  
 17 commonplace in a major incident?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And the FCP?  
 20 A. Possibly not, only on the basis that the FCP would  
 21 ordinarily be defined by the FDO in terms of  
 22 understanding where the level of threat was, but  
 23 certainly an RVP, no issue in terms of understanding the  
 24 requirements for simple things like the space available  
 25 to send a large volume of resources to, we'd have to

1 take cognisance of that.  
 2 Q. In paragraph 37 of your statement, you make a point of  
 3 showing that the OCR was tested on a frequent basis.  
 4 You say that:  
 5 "Shootings and stabbings are common in Manchester  
 6 and such incidents place the FDO under varying degrees  
 7 of pressure and often require him or her to act as the  
 8 ITFC."  
 9 Mr Booth, as you have said on a number of occasions,  
 10 you were the FDO during a particularly difficult major  
 11 incident, the one involving Dale Cregan.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. As I've said, what you bring to this inquiry is the fact  
 14 that you have been an FDO. On those occasions, when the  
 15 operations room has had to deal with major incidents  
 16 involving the emergency services, how well in your  
 17 opinion has it performed?  
 18 A. Going back to that specific incident, I obviously  
 19 remember it very vividly and I remember a great team  
 20 working with me as a force duty officer, responding,  
 21 communicating, and I do distinctly remember simply  
 22 standing up and shouting across the room and getting  
 23 responses by virtue of proximity from key staff in  
 24 there, asking them to make phone calls on my behalf, to  
 25 give me an update, to provide further instructions to



1 staff on the ground. I was immensely proud of the  
 2 response that the wider team gave to me on that day.  
 3 Q. You refer to that day in particular and we all  
 4 understand why, but generally, was that also your  
 5 experience?  
 6 A. Yes, certainly. The branch in itself by virtue of --  
 7 their role is somewhat repetitious in terms of you find  
 8 an incident, small or large, you allocate resources to  
 9 it, you make contact with other services, it can be  
 10 the council to come and clear away debris from a road  
 11 traffic collision, it could be to phone the Fire Service  
 12 to deal with a flooding issue, it could be to speak to  
 13 Motorways to deal with a closure of the motorway. So  
 14 the juggling of communication between agencies and the  
 15 management of resources was an incredibly repetitious  
 16 and inbuilt kind of function of all the staff that  
 17 worked in there.  
 18 Q. If I take you back again to that sentence in  
 19 paragraph 34:  
 20 "I believe that this was sufficient support provided  
 21 staff were utilised effectively."  
 22 You have been asked if with hindsight you would wish  
 23 to change that opinion or belief, and in being asked  
 24 that question you were being asked to compare and  
 25 contrast that belief with what happened on the night of

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1 the attack.  
 2 As you have mentioned on a number of occasions, you  
 3 were not in the OCR on the night of this attack.  
 4 A. No, I wasn't, no.  
 5 Q. Do you know in detail what happened that night? In  
 6 particular have you heard the recording of Dale Sexton's  
 7 dictaphone? Have you read witness statements from  
 8 people who were in the OCR that night?  
 9 A. No, I haven't, no.  
 10 Q. Do you know in detail what happened that night?  
 11 A. No, I don't.  
 12 Q. One further and, I hope, final document. We can have  
 13 this on the screen, please. It's the aide-memoire,  
 14 {INQ040955/1}.  
 15 This first page -- we can now see the top of the  
 16 first page. This first page, to the best of your  
 17 knowledge, Mr Booth, was written by?  
 18 A. Dale Sexton.  
 19 Q. We can see from the top in red "Remember":  
 20 "Declare as an Op Plato incident. Inform the duty  
 21 ACC and TFC at the earliest opportunity."  
 22 Then a reference to Airwaves and we'll see another  
 23 reference to Airwaves in a moment:  
 24 "Set up Silver in back room."  
 25 Then in large red letters:

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1 "JESIP. GMFRS/NWAS. In line with JESIP to manage  
 2 communication between each partner. One of the..."  
 3 This is one of the Sunday morning test channels,  
 4 Mr Booth, is that right?  
 5 A. That's correct, yes.  
 6 Q. "... will be nominated by the FDO when contacting each  
 7 ILO. Once nominated, a member of team 3 on a CK  
 8 position should be tasked to monitor this Talk Group and  
 9 relay information from the FDO and listen in for any  
 10 requests."  
 11 Is that what you expected to happen in the case of  
 12 an MTFA?  
 13 A. Yes, it is.  
 14 Q. And then a reference to the forward control point. Then  
 15 over the page, please --  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we go over the page, Mr Horwell,  
 17 I want to ask something.  
 18 The nominating of someone by the FDO to manage the  
 19 communications and perhaps in particular the radio  
 20 communication --  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- between all three. Why is that  
 23 something which the FDO would have to nominate on the  
 24 night rather than it being an automatic function of  
 25 somebody, which presumably -- what did your action card

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1 say?  
 2 A. Well, the CK on team 3 is a team of radio operators that  
 3 sits, as Mr Greaney is now approximately 6 feet away,  
 4 facing the force duty officer. The virtue of nominating  
 5 would effectively be because clearly if anything was  
 6 taking place, one of the three or four radio operators  
 7 would be actively engaged in another incident, that may  
 8 be occupying their time, so rather than going to  
 9 point A, you may go to point B --  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's tactically impossible to  
 11 predesignate that job?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because it is another thing the FDO has  
 14 to think about, remembering to do that?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you say that couldn't really be  
 17 included in action cards?  
 18 A. No, in terms of the responsibility falling to that group  
 19 of three or four people in front of them then, yes, it  
 20 was understood one of them would take up that  
 21 responsibility, but not effectively which one because  
 22 clearly they could be dealing with a pursuit or another  
 23 high-level incident. Again, it could be a completely  
 24 separate firearms incident they were assisting and  
 25 supporting with, so it would literally be a nomination

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1 there.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And did your cards nominate one of the

3 group or a particular individual or could it say one of

4 three or something like that?

5 A. It said one of the CK radio operators, so it's

6 understood it's a bank of three or four people.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But it still requires the intervention

8 of the FDO?

9 A. Yes, effectively, or, as I would hope, in the absence of

10 that understanding of the action cards, if my colleague

11 is busy, I would say, "Right, I'll monitor that Talk

12 Group, I'll pick that up, and I can start relaying that

13 to the force duty officer".

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So if the force duty officer is

15 so busy or just doesn't do it, you'd expect one of the

16 operators who's free to pick it up?

17 A. Yes, or again the force duty supervisor could direct

18 that or one of the supervisors in the room could direct

19 that if there was a lack of initiative, for want of

20 a better phrase, from those operators.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Horwell.

22 MR HORWELL: Thank you.

23 Over to the next page, please, {INQ040955/2}. The

24 second page of this aide-memoire, I am sure Mr Sexton

25 won't mind my describing it as effectively

1 Marcus Williams' page. Do you agree, Mr Booth?

2 A. I would agree. There are a great number of parallels

3 with Marcus' feedback.

4 Q. I'm not going to take the time now, but the

5 Marcus Williams email, and I don't want it on the

6 screen, simply for the note, is {INQ034457/1}, that long

7 email from Marcus Williams soon after the Winchester

8 Accord test, this is almost taken word for word from

9 that email, isn't it?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. You've been asked about two entries. The first bullet

12 point:

13 "You have to know your limits: what can you

14 realistically achieve before you become overloaded?"

15 And the sixth bullet point, second line:

16 "The reality is the FDO will be frazzled."

17 The aide-memoire makes it clear that this is from

18 Exercise Winchester Accord, and those two references,

19 Mr Booth, "You have to know your limits", "The reality

20 is the FDO will be frazzled", are they from real life or

21 from an exercise?

22 A. They are from the exercise.

23 Q. And for reasons that you have explained over the course

24 of the last 2 days, did that exercise, as far as the FDO

25 and the OCR were concerned, represent real life?

1 A. No, it did not.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I need to stop you there, I think, and

3 just ask you this: were you aware that Mr Sexton was

4 doing this, preparing this aide-memoire?

5 A. Yes.

6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were you aware it was being distributed

7 to all the FDOs?

8 A. Yes.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it contained, "You have to know your

10 own limits", "You will get frazzled". If that's not

11 what you thought the whole thing was about and what

12 would happen, why did you allow it to go out like that?

13 A. I think it was reflecting upon Marcus' experience in

14 terms of the delegation required and to make sure that

15 tasks were apportioned out, and I read in his reference

16 to being frazzled was that at the end of the exercise

17 he was quite tired out by that rather than it being

18 in the course of the exercise he himself was unable to

19 cope, he was frazzled. It was simply a reference to an

20 after-the-event experience for him.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's concentrate on the first sentence

22 then:

23 "Know your limits. What can you realistically

24 achieve before you become overloaded?"

25 A. Yes.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If that realistically was wrong as far

2 as you were concerned, would you really be sending that,

3 allowing that message to go out to FDOs?

4 A. I wanted the FDOs to reflect upon the feedback because,

5 as I've explained, their exposure to incidents or

6 training exercises of this nature was very limited. So

7 actually reflecting upon somebody's experience might

8 just prompt somebody to think, "Actually, I'm getting

9 very, very busy now, I need to start delegating this

10 before I become overloaded", just to reflect on that

11 experience.

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

13 MR HORWELL: Can I ask you this question, Mr Booth: you

14 didn't think there was any harm in putting this in the

15 aide-memoire, did you?

16 A. No, not at all. I think given the lack of exposure to

17 this sort of environment, either in a real life or

18 exercise scenario, it provided some considerations that

19 they should be aware of.

20 MR HORWELL: Mr Booth, thank you. Those are all my

21 questions.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Horwell.

23 MR GREANEY: Sir, I don't have any further questions.

24 I don't know whether you do.

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No.

1 Thank you very much, I'm very grateful for your  
 2 assistance.  
 3 MR GREANEY: What I'm going to do now is to invite you to  
 4 rise for 10 minutes. That will allow Mr Booth to leave  
 5 the witness box and Mr Giladi to enter the witness box.  
 6 I know that you do not intend to sit beyond  
 7 4 o'clock today ---  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sorry if that's inconvenient to  
 9 Mr Giladi and please convey that to him if we haven't  
 10 already. I gather we are unlikely to have finished by  
 11 then but we are stopping today and quite a lot of people  
 12 have quite a long way to travel, and I don't think it's  
 13 fair for us to be sitting that late today.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Sir, we quite understand. I have warned  
 15 Mr Giladi of that. The reality is that there is a nil  
 16 prospect that there will be time for any CP questioning  
 17 to commence. The only issue is whether I'm able to  
 18 conclude my own questioning. There is a chance that  
 19 I will.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 21 (2.30 pm)  
 22 (A short break)  
 23 (2.40 pm)  
 24 MR GREANEY: Sir, before the witness is sworn, somehow some  
 25 people, no one in this room, have become confused as

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1 a result of what I said before we broke into thinking  
 2 that we may be sitting tomorrow. Sir, can I indicate  
 3 that we will not be sitting tomorrow, but instead  
 4 we will resume on Monday, 12 April.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. We decided to sit on Monday and  
 6 Tuesday because we believed that we would finish the two  
 7 witnesses, or three witnesses, for this week.  
 8 Unfortunately, it hasn't been as quick as we thought,  
 9 but everyone's made their arrangements on the basis that  
 10 we will not be here tomorrow and I'm afraid they can't  
 11 really be unscrambled. I'm sorry for the inconvenience  
 12 we'll be causing to you, Mr Giladi, and I do apologise.  
 13 MR GREANEY: Not at all, sir, and you are quite right: there  
 14 have been arrangements made that cannot be changed.  
 15 MR LEOR GILADI (sworn)  
 16 Questions from MR GREANEY  
 17 MR GREANEY: Tell us your full name, please?  
 18 A. Leor Giladi.  
 19 Q. Did you retire from Greater Manchester Police on  
 20 31 December 2017?  
 21 A. I did.  
 22 Q. At that stage had you served 30 years in the force?  
 23 A. I had, yes.  
 24 Q. And did you retire in the rank of superintendent?  
 25 A. I did.

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1 Q. The chairman knows that you have provided for his  
 2 benefit two witness statements. The first is dated  
 3 1 July of last year and runs to 5 pages; that is  
 4 {INQ034424/1}. The second is dated 19 March of this  
 5 year and runs to 27 pages; the reference is  
 6 {INQ040922/1}.  
 7 The full content of each statement is available to  
 8 the chairman along with the many exhibits to your  
 9 statements. So that you know and others know, I will  
 10 not be dealing with every line or anything like every  
 11 line of your witness statements, but instead will be  
 12 focusing upon a series of key issues that we hope will  
 13 assist the chairman.  
 14 A. Thank you.  
 15 Q. Before we get to those issues, your career background,  
 16 please. This is dealt with in detail at paragraphs 2 to  
 17 24 of your second statement and I'm not going to deal  
 18 with it in detail without in any way seeking to diminish  
 19 your achievements. Let's deal with it in summary.  
 20 Did you join Greater Manchester Police on  
 21 29 December 1987?  
 22 A. I did, yes.  
 23 Q. Were you promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1993?  
 24 A. I was.  
 25 Q. To the rank of inspector in 1997?

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1 A. That's correct.  
 2 Q. And then in 1998, were you appointed in the rank of  
 3 inspector to the Tactical Firearms Unit?  
 4 A. I was.  
 5 Q. Whilst there, did you qualify in a variety of firearms  
 6 roles?  
 7 A. I did.  
 8 Q. In 2002 were you promoted to the rank of  
 9 chief inspector?  
 10 A. I was.  
 11 Q. And then 3 years later, in 2005, to the rank of  
 12 superintendent?  
 13 A. That's correct.  
 14 Q. In 2009 in that rank, did you transfer to the specialist  
 15 operations branch of Greater Manchester Police?  
 16 A. I did.  
 17 Q. In a few sentences, what is the specialist operations  
 18 branch?  
 19 A. It's a branch of police officers and police staff that  
 20 in effect provide support for the rest of the force in  
 21 specialist areas, such as firearms, mounted officers,  
 22 dog officers, traffic officers, road policing. There's  
 23 a whole variety of expertise in the branch.  
 24 Q. In that role, once it had been invented in 2012, did you  
 25 have responsibility for GMP's Operation Plato policy and

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1 plans?  
 2 A. That's correct, yes.  
 3 Q. In your second statement at paragraph 10, you describe  
 4 yourself as a "hugely experienced tactical firearms  
 5 commander"?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. And that you have been responsible for many, indeed very  
 8 many, high-profile firearms operations?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. Furthermore at paragraph 16, you explain, do you not,  
 11 that you had a "wealth of experience working with  
 12 a multitude of partners and agencies"?  
 13 A. That's correct.  
 14 Q. At paragraph 17 you describe how you were a very  
 15 experienced Silver public order commander?  
 16 A. That's correct.  
 17 Q. Is it the position that although you retired formally in  
 18 December 2017, you began to, and this is my term, wind  
 19 down from June 2017?  
 20 A. That's correct. There was an agreement with my line  
 21 manager that, after the end of June, I wouldn't take any  
 22 more operational responsibilities, partly because I'd  
 23 accrued over 100 days that were owed to me because of  
 24 the duties I'd performed and I would be having  
 25 a significant period of annual leave.

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1 Q. In case these dates are important, they may be if anyone  
 2 wants to look at particular meetings that you didn't  
 3 attend, but you took leave between 10 and  
 4 28 August 2017?  
 5 A. That's correct.  
 6 Q. And then again a period of leave from 14 September until  
 7 27 December 2017?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. Having retired, did you take up different employment?  
 10 A. I did, I took up employment in January 2018 with  
 11 the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities Civil  
 12 Contingency Resilience Unit, for whom I still work.  
 13 Q. And what is and has been since the beginning of 2018  
 14 your role with AGMA?  
 15 A. I am a business partner.  
 16 Q. What does that involve you doing?  
 17 A. I have responsibility for liaison with two specific  
 18 local authorities, Tameside and Bolton, and I also have  
 19 thematic responsibilities such as counter-terrorism, so  
 20 linking in with the police and other agencies, COMAH,  
 21 which is the control of major accident hazards, and  
 22 other responsibilities such as that, so we have thematic  
 23 responsibilities and geographic responsibilities.  
 24 Q. And do you have what might be described as a liaison  
 25 role between, on the one hand, local authorities and, on

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1 the other hand, the police or is that to oversimplify  
 2 it?  
 3 A. It is to oversimplify it.  
 4 We are based at Greater Manchester Police  
 5 headquarters, so I work closely with the police and  
 6 clearly, because of my previous role, I have strong  
 7 relationships with the police, but it's not specifically  
 8 just to link in with the police. We are co-located  
 9 because it's such a close relationship.  
 10 Q. In all events, that's all I wanted to ask you about your  
 11 career history and we'll turn now to the issues.  
 12 First, have you been following the evidence within  
 13 the inquiry?  
 14 A. In part, yes.  
 15 Q. Are you aware -- indeed I know that you are -- of the  
 16 fact that we heard evidence from Inspector Simon Lear on  
 17 23 February, that being Day 66 of our proceedings?  
 18 A. I am aware of that, yes.  
 19 Q. You'll be able to confirm that he worked in a unit  
 20 called the Policy Compliance Unit?  
 21 A. That's correct.  
 22 Q. Which in turn formed part of the firearms unit?  
 23 A. That's correct. I don't want to go into too much  
 24 semantics, but there was a separation between the Policy  
 25 and Compliance Unit and the firearms unit, but it was

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1 within the firearms realm, if you like, yes.  
 2 Q. So what I have understood, and it's always possible I've  
 3 got it wrong, is that, on the one hand, you had the  
 4 people who were operational within the firearms unit  
 5 and, on the other hand, you had the people who dealt  
 6 with the policies and --  
 7 A. That's correct, yes.  
 8 Q. And the latter category would be the PCU, the Policy  
 9 Compliance Unit. Inspector Lear explained to us that  
 10 cuts within the firearms unit generally had placed him  
 11 under what he described as intolerable pressure and he  
 12 said that that had had an impact upon his health.  
 13 A. I'm aware of what he said, yes.  
 14 Q. Were you his line manager at the time that all of that  
 15 happened?  
 16 A. I was.  
 17 Q. Do you agree that there were cuts within that unit?  
 18 A. Absolutely.  
 19 Q. Were they significant in nature?  
 20 A. Absolutely.  
 21 Q. How would you in a few sentences describe where those  
 22 cuts were and what the impact of them was?  
 23 A. The main issue that probably affected Simon, and indeed  
 24 the unit, was the loss of a chief inspector. Going back  
 25 to 2008, the tragic incident where Ian Terry was killed

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1 in a training incident --  
 2 Q. Which would be before you joined?  
 3 A. Before I was in the specialist operations branch.  
 4 I think a coronial direction had been that we had some  
 5 form of policy and compliance which was subsequently put  
 6 into place. And I think a vital part of that was the  
 7 chief inspector lead, which acted as in effect  
 8 a second-in-command to the superintendent and then could  
 9 clearly delegate work appropriately. That post was lost  
 10 amongst the cuts despite protestations that it was too  
 11 important a role to lose.  
 12 Q. Who were the protestations by and to whom were they  
 13 made?  
 14 A. I know a previous witness has talked about red-land,  
 15 green-land and blue-land and about -- we had to present,  
 16 in effect, a range of possibilities with cuts, ie stay  
 17 the same, worst-case scenario, and some kind of middle  
 18 ground. I just thought the PCU was too important to  
 19 lose anybody. The panel that made the decision decided  
 20 that the chief inspector post could go, which left a gap  
 21 between Simon and myself, and there were a couple of  
 22 support staff posts that went from full-time to  
 23 part-time, which again would have an impact on the  
 24 overall efficiency of the unit. In effect that meant  
 25 Simon was taking on probably more of a role of

1 a chief inspector than an inspector.  
 2 Q. And I suppose also having to fulfil his own  
 3 responsibilities as an inspector?  
 4 A. That's correct -- I mean, he was an inspector, so that  
 5 was already a significant management role, but he  
 6 probably had more responsibilities than most inspectors.  
 7 Q. Did it become apparent to you that the pressure that  
 8 he was under was having an impact upon Inspector Lear's  
 9 health?  
 10 A. I'm not aware that it was having an impact on his  
 11 health. I spoke regularly with Simon and I knew that he  
 12 wore his heart on his sleeve, but I wouldn't say that  
 13 I was aware it was having an impact on his health.  
 14 Q. But you were aware, I think it's obvious from what  
 15 you have said, that it was creating a significant  
 16 pressure upon him?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. And so you had not wanted the chief inspector role to be  
 19 lost?  
 20 A. No.  
 21 Q. It was lost and now the very consequences you had feared  
 22 were occurring?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. So what steps, if any, did you take to address or, if  
 25 not address, manage that situation?

1 A. Unfortunately, we were operating in a wider review of  
 2 constant reviews and constant cuts. I don't remember  
 3 a specific occasion where I would have flagged up my  
 4 concerns, but no doubt I would have, not in a formal  
 5 meeting, but maybe with my line manager or others, but  
 6 it was beyond my capability to, unfortunately, provide  
 7 him with that extra support that was needed and the  
 8 reviews were just constant throughout the branch.  
 9 Throughout my time at the branch there was review after  
 10 review after review, reshuffle after reshuffle, so it  
 11 was very, very difficult environment in which to  
 12 operate.  
 13 Q. So in the period that we are concerned with, and indeed  
 14 in the years leading up to it, were you as a unit just  
 15 having to do the best you could with the limited  
 16 resources that you now had?  
 17 A. I think overall, the specialist operations branch was  
 18 well staffed at PC/sergeant level, et cetera. You  
 19 probably have heard the kind of expression back office,  
 20 looking at the back office function, because the  
 21 specialist operations branch were there to provide  
 22 support for the front line. Nevertheless, I think when  
 23 they could save money with ranks and posts, et cetera,  
 24 that's what they would do and we did -- we -- the  
 25 specialist operations branch did lose staff to go back

1 to divisions or they weren't replaced when they retired,  
 2 et cetera. So there were less and less officers but  
 3 I think in general it was manageable.  
 4 Q. Really, what I was wanting to know from you was whether  
 5 you felt that what was happening within the unit was  
 6 having an impact upon you.  
 7 A. I had a lot of responsibility and I would be taking on  
 8 probably more responsibility than had I had a chief  
 9 inspector. So, yes.  
 10 Q. Just to give an example, and I don't know whether this  
 11 is a good one or a bad one, we're going to hear that you  
 12 ended up personally having to prepare an updated version  
 13 of the GMP MTFA plan in --  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. -- October 2016. Was that really a job for the  
 16 superintendent?  
 17 A. No.  
 18 Q. That's all I wanted to ask you about Mr Lear and cuts,  
 19 although I'll add that you deal with cuts in further  
 20 detail at paragraphs 29 to 40 of your second statement.  
 21 Second issue, the Greater Manchester Resilience  
 22 Forum which you deal with in your first statement and at  
 23 paragraphs 25 to 28 of your second statement.  
 24 You are familiar, I think, with the Cabinet Office  
 25 document that deals in general terms with the role of

1 Local Resilience Forums.  
 2 A. I am, yes.  
 3 Q. Are you aware that it provides guidance as to the  
 4 seniority of the representatives of category 1 responder  
 5 organisations attending LRF meetings?  
 6 A. I am aware, yes.  
 7 Q. I'm going to just look at one particular page with you,  
 8 please. We've seen it before with a couple of  
 9 witnesses, including June Roby. The relevant page of  
 10 the Cabinet Office document is {INQ019376/12}.  
 11 The two particular passages I want to draw your  
 12 attention to are, first :  
 13 "The LRF itself is a strategic group and should  
 14 attract a sufficiently senior level of representation.  
 15 The Local Authority representative, for example, should  
 16 be the chief executive or deputy chief executive and the  
 17 police representative should be the area chief constable  
 18 or deputy chief constable."  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. I'll read out the passage immediately beneath that, then  
 21 I'll ask you some questions:  
 22 "The LRF should ensure that participants at its  
 23 routine meetings reflect the membership of the strategic  
 24 coordinating group (SCG) which would be called in  
 25 response to any emergency in the LRF area."

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1 So would it be reasonable of me to suggest that the  
 2 key points in terms of membership of the LRF are that  
 3 representation should be at a high level from within the  
 4 organisation concerned?  
 5 A. That's correct.  
 6 Q. And in particular, or most relevantly for us, so far as  
 7 the police were concerned, at a chief officer level?  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. And also membership should involve those who will  
 10 actually form part of the command team, so Gold, Silver,  
 11 Bronze, or strategic, tactical, operational in the event  
 12 of an emergency?  
 13 A. I disagree slightly with your latter statement, Gold,  
 14 Silver, Bronze. The silver and bronze wouldn't attend  
 15 at a strategic coordinating group, it would just be the  
 16 Gold in effect.  
 17 Q. This is what I wanted your help with and I quite  
 18 understand the point you have made.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I know, is there a distinction  
 20 between the first paragraph you took us to, the LRF  
 21 itself as a strategic group, and then participants at  
 22 its routine meetings? We know there are a lot of  
 23 sub-committees and I wonder if they are what we are  
 24 talking about when we talk about routine meetings?  
 25 MR GREANEY: Subcommittees, exactly. Shall I ask the

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1 witness and see what he ---  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What do you think?  
 3 A. That's a really good question. Because the... If  
 4 you're talking about the actual LRF itself, mirroring  
 5 a strategic coordinating group, that wouldn't be the  
 6 case. I have never --- COVID aside, I have never known  
 7 in my time a deputy chief constable or chief constable  
 8 being at the strategic coordinating group. That would  
 9 ordinarily be an assistant chief constable. So that  
 10 kind of contradicts itself. If you look at the word  
 11 "routine", I'm not 100% sure what that would mean,  
 12 whether it's a meeting that sits below it, perhaps the  
 13 Resilience Development Group. But certainly I wouldn't  
 14 expect the area chief constable or deputy  
 15 chief constable to be sitting on an SCG.  
 16 Q. I think what you said along the way of your answer was  
 17 that you'd expect someone at ACC level to be attending?  
 18 A. At an SCG? Yes.  
 19 Q. And also in terms of the meetings of the LRF on the face  
 20 of this Cabinet Office document, it's clear that the  
 21 police representative should be the chief constable or  
 22 deputy chief constable?  
 23 A. I was always told that where something says "should",  
 24 you need a good reason for it not to be a "must". So it  
 25 says "should be a chief constable or deputy

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1 chief constable" --- I don't know why they wouldn't have  
 2 attended.  
 3 Q. Okay. Let's see who did attend. I'm going to look with  
 4 you at a chart that I know you have seen. We've seen it  
 5 before. Once we've done that, I'm going to ask you  
 6 a couple of questions about what it may suggest about  
 7 commitment on the part of GMP.  
 8 The chart we're going to look at, I have taken it  
 9 from the report of the policing experts, so Mr Lopez,  
 10 this is a chart which features within {INQ035309/55}.  
 11 We're going to work through this chart quickly.  
 12 The meeting on 13 March 2015,  
 13 Superintendent Greenhalgh attended for GMP. On  
 14 19 June 2015, Chief Inspector Howard and Constable Mark  
 15 Murphy for one item. On 23 September of that year, we  
 16 do have an ACC there for the first time during that  
 17 period, ACC Ian Wiggett, together with Inspector Brown  
 18 and Inspector Percival.  
 19 On 11 December 2015, Acting Assistant  
 20 Chief Constable O'Hare, together with Inspector Roby and  
 21 PC Hudson for one item.  
 22 10 March 2016 --- and it was really only during 2016  
 23 that you might have been expected to attend these  
 24 meetings?  
 25 A. That's correct, yes.

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1 Q. On that occasion it's Inspector June Roby on her own for  
 2 GMP. Then on 21 July 2016 we see your first attendance,  
 3 Superintendent Giladi, Inspector Roby is with you, and  
 4 Inspector Percival is there for three items.  
 5 Over the page, please, {INQ035309/56}.  
 6 16 September 2016. You are there with Lee Parker. On  
 7 9 December, Acting Assistant Chief Constable O'Hare  
 8 together with Inspector Parker. And 27 March 2017,  
 9 Inspector Parker is there.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before we leave that, by looking at  
 11 the apology notes, do we gather that ACC Hankinson and  
 12 you were the regular members, as it were, the appointed  
 13 members to go there, and ACC John O'Hare and Inspector  
 14 Lee Parker were there as substitutes?  
 15 A. ACC John O'Hare was succeeded by ACC Catherine  
 16 Hankinson, so she took over from John O'Hare, who  
 17 ordinarily was the chief superintendent of the branch  
 18 and who was a temporary ACC. So she would have taken  
 19 over the role from him as attending — and Lee Parker  
 20 was part of the force event section.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.  
 22 MR GREANEY: Now that we've been through that exercise,  
 23 we can see, this is my mathematics, so no doubt someone  
 24 else can check it, there were certainly nine meetings  
 25 between 13 March 2015 and 27 March 2017. On only three

1 occasions, so a third of the total, did an ACC attend,  
 2 the deputy and the chief never attended. On two  
 3 occasions it was an inspector only. There was, it might  
 4 be suggested, little consistency of attendance, a total  
 5 of 11 people attended over that period. Six attended  
 6 only a single meeting and the highest attendance was  
 7 Inspector Roby and Inspector Parker, who attended three.  
 8 You will understand what the questions are that I'm  
 9 going to seek your help with. First of all, would it be  
 10 fair to conclude from those facts that GMP, at  
 11 a corporate level, lacked interest in the resilience  
 12 forum?  
 13 A. I wouldn't say that, no.  
 14 Q. Would it be fair to suggest that GMP at a corporate  
 15 level lacked commitment to the resilience forum?  
 16 A. No, I wouldn't say that either.  
 17 Q. Why then was there never attendance by the chief or the  
 18 deputy and attendance only three times by the ACC?  
 19 A. It's difficult for me to specifically say why the chief  
 20 or the dep or the ACCs weren't more consistent — well,  
 21 the chief or the dep at all and the ACCs more  
 22 consistently. I know that everybody had extremely busy  
 23 diaries and I know this is a really important meeting,  
 24 but it's very difficult for me to say exactly why, but  
 25 I never saw anything in my time within the branch that

1 indicated that there was anything but — any lack of  
 2 commitment to the GMRF, a working partnership, and  
 3 indeed the AGMA CCRU, who actually provide the  
 4 secretariat to the GMRF, are co-located within the  
 5 branch, so on a day-to-day basis — sorry, co-located on  
 6 the same floor. So on a day-to-day basis there would be  
 7 regular contact between us all anyway.  
 8 Q. Can we agree about this at least: it would have been  
 9 rather better if there had been consistent attendance,  
 10 by which I mean consistency of personnel, by GMP over  
 11 this period of time?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And it would have been rather better if the seniority of  
 14 the consistent attender had been consistently higher?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Did you see the evidence of Mr Fletcher or have you read  
 17 the evidence of Mr Fletcher?  
 18 A. I have read some of the evidence of Mr Fletcher.  
 19 Q. And this is my characterisation, but it may be that  
 20 there was a sense from him, and perhaps from other  
 21 witnesses, that the other emergency services had  
 22 a feeling that GMP thought that it knew best and so  
 23 wasn't terribly interested in joint working.  
 24 A. That's never anything that had been flagged up with me  
 25 as a concern, so that came as news to me.

1 Q. When you look back, and I appreciate it's some time ago  
 2 now, to your period within GMP, can you understand why  
 3 that view may have been formed?  
 4 A. If you are looking purely at attendance then yes, but if  
 5 you're looking at relationships then no, because  
 6 I thought the relationships were sound.  
 7 Q. That was issue 2. I am doing my best to make sure I get  
 8 through my questions so that the core participants can  
 9 consider your answers and perhaps narrow down their  
 10 questioning for you when you return.  
 11 A. Thank you.  
 12 Q. Issue 3 is Exercise Winchester Accord. You deal with  
 13 this issue in detail at paragraphs 41 to 61 of your  
 14 second statement. Were you involved in the planning of  
 15 Exercise Winchester Accord?  
 16 A. I wasn't, no.  
 17 Q. Were you involved in the execution of that exercise?  
 18 A. I wasn't.  
 19 Q. Were you involved in the debrief process?  
 20 A. Not in the actual process, no.  
 21 Q. And were you tasked with the implementation of any  
 22 recommendations from that process?  
 23 A. No specific recommendations, no.  
 24 Q. Is it acceptable that as head of the Specialist  
 25 Operations Unit, you had no or no real role in

1 an important exercise such as Winchester Accord?  
 2 A. If I could just correct you slightly. I wasn't head of  
 3 the Specialist Operations Unit, I was one of the  
 4 superintendents. There was a chief superintendent above  
 5 me.  
 6 Q. Quite right. Given your role, is it acceptable?  
 7 A. When Operation Winchester Accord took place on  
 8 9 May 2016, I was out of force, I'm not able to say  
 9 where, for a week. I was assessing and assisting to run  
 10 the --  
 11 Q. When you say you are not able to say (overspeaking) --  
 12 A. It's operationally sensitive. I was assessing on the  
 13 specialist firearms commander's course. I always  
 14 assessed on that -- well, from 2013 until 2017 I usually  
 15 assessed for 2 to 3 weeks on that course, which provides  
 16 officers to deal with high-end terrorist incidents or  
 17 other complex multiple firearms operations. So  
 18 unfortunately, I was aware that I was going to be out of  
 19 force when Winchester Accord was taking place, which is  
 20 why I wasn't involved.  
 21 Q. Do you mean that there was no point in you being  
 22 involved because you wouldn't be there when it happened?  
 23 A. That's correct.  
 24 Q. But would it be reasonable to suggest that it would be  
 25 of relevance to you to understand what the outcomes

1 were?  
 2 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 3 Q. I haven't left that topic, but I just want to find out  
 4 some further information before I press you on a few  
 5 things. Were you ever a force duty officer?  
 6 A. Never, no.  
 7 Q. Had you received any training at all in that role?  
 8 A. As a force duty officer?  
 9 Q. Yes.  
 10 A. No, but to be a cadre firearms commander you had to do  
 11 the initial tactical firearms commander's course. So  
 12 the only remote connection I had on an operational point  
 13 with an FDO was I was qualified as an ITFC.  
 14 Q. So if we think about two circles which join at part of  
 15 them -- I am sure there's a better way of describing  
 16 this -- the join would be the ITFC and that was what you  
 17 shared in common with training the (overspeaking)?  
 18 A. Yes. You can't be a TFC without qualifying as an ITFC.  
 19 Q. Before Exercise Winchester Accord, were you familiar  
 20 with what the FDO role involved?  
 21 A. Mainly from a firearms point of view, yes.  
 22 Q. And were you aware, before 22 May 2017, that it was  
 23 recognised that in the event of a major incident, such  
 24 as a Plato incident, the FDO was at least a possible  
 25 point of failure?

1 A. I don't remember anything specifically being pointed out  
 2 to me in that kind of phraseology, no.  
 3 Q. Do you think, whether it had been specifically pointed  
 4 out to you or you'd learned about it in some different  
 5 way, that you were aware before May 2017 that there was  
 6 a problem with the FDO role?  
 7 A. I don't know if I'd use the word problem, but certainly  
 8 we knew that we would have to provide support with an  
 9 additional tactical firearms commander, be it with them  
 10 in the OCB or as a ground assigned to take away some of  
 11 the pressure from them. But again that was purely from  
 12 a firearms command point of view.  
 13 Q. Were you informed after Exercise Winchester Accord that  
 14 the FDO had become overwhelmed in the circumstances that  
 15 were being tested?  
 16 A. I'd seen the debrief and I was aware that there were  
 17 issues with the FDO, yes, and I was aware that part of  
 18 that was because of the testing of the proposed move to  
 19 force headquarters of the FDO.  
 20 Q. Thinking back, did it occur to you at that stage that  
 21 that experience might be demonstrative of a wider  
 22 concern about the FDO role?  
 23 A. I think I probably looked at it as if they're going to  
 24 move the FDO, the FDO needs to be there with the full  
 25 support that they would have in their current location,

1 and it seemed to me that that hadn't been exercised, so  
 2 I probably didn't have the full grasp of what pressures  
 3 the FDO would be under even with the full support around  
 4 them.  
 5 Q. That's very clear. I have understood it.  
 6 At that stage, and we're talking about 2016, the  
 7 second half, you didn't fully grasp what the pressures  
 8 of the --  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. -- FDO were with the support that would be around the  
 11 FDO?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: (Inaudible: distorted) he's got to be  
 14 the interim tactical firearms commander. Bearing in  
 15 mind the sort of decisions the firearms commanders have  
 16 to make, the idea that a particular firearms commander  
 17 might be working under such pressure he might be  
 18 overwhelmed, would be a matter of considerable concern  
 19 to you in your job?  
 20 A. Yes, with hindsight, absolutely. Whenever I was on call  
 21 I always used to have my radio on and if there were  
 22 spontaneous firearms jobs, which in effect is what the  
 23 FDO was doing, I would always listen and I would always  
 24 offer a little bit of feedback in a kind of informal way  
 25 and, in general, the standards were very high of the



1 FDOs, I have to say. They're very experienced and very  
 2 good, they're just one-off -- and I don't mean to  
 3 belittle a spontaneous firearms incident because there  
 4 is a lot of pressure on one of those as well, but with  
 5 hindsight I can absolutely see how an FDO when multiple  
 6 issues are ongoing would definitely be overwhelmed or  
 7 could potentially be overwhelmed, yes.

8 MR GREANEY: That was what Winchester Accord had revealed  
 9 when that scenario was tested and it may be that the  
 10 evidence will reveal that that's the very thing that  
 11 eventuated on the night of the arena attack.

12 I do want to come back in due course to your candid  
 13 concession that you didn't at the time fully grasp the  
 14 pressure that the FDO might be under, but before we get  
 15 to that, I just want to understand a little bit more  
 16 about what you were told after Exercise Winchester  
 17 Accord.

18 Even if you weren't made fully aware of the problem  
 19 that had been experienced with the FDO, were you made  
 20 aware of a separate difficulty? I'm at paragraph 43 of  
 21 your statement.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In general terms, first of all, how were you made aware  
 24 of that separate issue?

25 A. John Fletcher sent me an email.

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1 Q. This is Mr Fletcher of the --  
 2 A. Fire and Rescue, sorry, yes.

3 Q. So we'll look at the email that he sent to you. It's  
 4 {INQ004520/1}. I'm hoping to limit the number of  
 5 documents that we actually need to look at. If you  
 6 think I'm skipping over one that's particularly  
 7 important, you must tell me.

8 A. Okay, thank you.

9 Q. Mr Fletcher to you on 13 May, and Winchester Accord,  
 10 I think, was the 9th, 10th and 11th. So it's following  
 11 on very quickly afterwards. It is sent to you and also  
 12 someone called Joe Barrett. Joe Barrett being?

13 A. Joe Barrett was from the HART team from North West  
 14 Ambulance Service.

15 Q. This is an email within representatives, at a senior  
 16 level, of all three emergency services?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. "Following the exercise on Monday and not wishing to  
 19 circumvent the debrief process, I was wondering if you  
 20 would be up for a meeting with myself and Joe to cover  
 21 an issue with the command and control situation. As I  
 22 said, I am not wishing to bypass the debrief process but  
 23 an issue for us from Monday was the linkage in,  
 24 particularly in the initial stages of the incident, with  
 25 the tactical firearms commander and the GMFRS/NWAS

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1 commanders.  
 2 "Quite understandably, the police firearms tac  
 3 commander was located in the control room of the TC with  
 4 access to CCTV, etc. However, there was only a  
 5 monitoring officer deployed to the initial RVP to liaise  
 6 with GMFRS/NWAS commanders. This officer had no  
 7 knowledge of our capabilities and linkage with the tac  
 8 commander was very limited. This led to an excessive  
 9 delay in FRS and NWAS resources moving forward and it  
 10 was approximately 2.5 hours before personnel were  
 11 committed to carry out triage and rescues. If this was  
 12 a firearms ops commander this might have been a little  
 13 slicker .  
 14 "As with everything it all works much better when  
 15 individuals know each other and the exercise last year  
 16 at the Arndale ran differently die to the commanders  
 17 knowing each other quite well."  
 18 And they are then identified:  
 19 "As a potential development going forward, I would  
 20 welcome your views on perhaps putting together a 1-day  
 21 awareness course for commanders from the emergency  
 22 services ."  
 23 And he indicates a desire to speak to you about  
 24 that:  
 25 "I realise this is a big ask, but think it would go

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1 a long way in stopping repetition of the same learning  
 2 outcomes from multiple exercises. Joe does support this  
 3 from the NWAS perspective."  
 4 And then can we either go down the page or on to the  
 5 next page:  
 6 "Happy to discuss."  
 7 So what was the message that you took from that  
 8 email?

9 A. Certainly that interoperability JESIP principles  
 10 probably weren't applied on the day and there was  
 11 certainly what appeared to be a lack of communication on  
 12 the ground to ensure that Fire and Rescue and  
 13 ambulance service resources were used to their best  
 14 ability .  
 15 Q. That might be a diplomatic way of putting it. The  
 16 practical consequence of a failure to adhere to JESIP  
 17 appeared during the exercise to have been that the Fire  
 18 and Rescue Service and the ambulance didn't get there  
 19 for 2.5 hours.

20 A. An excessive delay, quite clearly, which would have had  
 21 horrendous consequences potentially.

22 Q. That was the point I was going to invite you to agree --  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's what was said at the debrief,  
 24 that it could have resulted in loss of life in real  
 25 life. In the email, saying "it could have been a bit

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1 slicker", which is either a deliberate understatement or  
 2 sarcastic --  
 3 A. I'm reading that as an understatement, sir.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you understood it that way?  
 5 A. Yes, I knew John Fletcher so I think he was just being  
 6 diplomatic on that email.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine, thank you.  
 8 MR GREANEY: He seemed to be being diplomatic because he  
 9 rather seemed to blame GMP for what had gone wrong and  
 10 it was obvious and, as you've accepted, obvious to you  
 11 that if things went wrong in the real world, that that  
 12 was capable of --  
 13 A. Absolutely.  
 14 Q. -- causing loss of life, potentially on a significant  
 15 scale.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. You responded positively to that email from  
 18 John Fletcher, did you not?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. And co-operated with him, and let it be said co-operated  
 21 with him extensively, over this?  
 22 A. I like to think so, yes.  
 23 Q. And is that because you were concerned?  
 24 A. Number 1, I was concerned and, number 2, I think we had  
 25 a really good relationship that -- the three blue lights

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1 services. So I think, had I had any issues with Fire  
 2 and Rescue and North West Ambulance Service, I'd have  
 3 been able to flag them up with him as well, so we had  
 4 that kind of relationship.  
 5 Q. I understand you responded in that way to those  
 6 connected reasons: first, this really was concerning  
 7 and, secondly, this was an organisation or these were  
 8 organisations that you had a good relationship  
 9 (overspeaking)?  
 10 A. Absolutely.  
 11 Q. They were asking something of you --  
 12 A. Absolutely.  
 13 Q. And so you were going to comply?  
 14 A. Absolutely.  
 15 Q. I see.  
 16 What was it -- I appreciate we could look at a tonne  
 17 of emails, but what was it ultimately that emerged out  
 18 of that first email from John Fletcher on 13 May?  
 19 A. Sorry, I'm not quite following. To set up the meeting  
 20 to --  
 21 Q. What of a concrete nature came out of that first email?  
 22 What happened?  
 23 A. We met, Joe, John and I., but it wasn't until the end of  
 24 June. If you look through the email chain, and I don't  
 25 know if you need to flag it up -- I think initially

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1 we were going to be meeting on 3 June --  
 2 Q. Exactly.  
 3 A. -- in case you were asking why it took such a long time.  
 4 But the process was indicative of the role I was in and  
 5 the operational commitments I still had that on 3 June,  
 6 at very short notice, I had to deal with two firearms  
 7 incidents I was commanding and therefore I wasn't able  
 8 to make the meeting. I gave them as much notice as  
 9 possibly but unfortunately that was out of my hands.  
 10 Q. I wasn't going to identify any criticism or potential  
 11 criticism arising out of the delay, I have seen the  
 12 emails, I know there was a good reason for delaying the  
 13 meeting, and in any event, when the meeting did take  
 14 place, it was still the best part of a year before the  
 15 arena attack.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. So there was time to get things right, it might be  
 18 thought.  
 19 Ultimately, did the blue light forum emerge from the  
 20 discussions that you had with your contemporaries at the  
 21 Fire and Rescue Service?  
 22 A. No, I think the blue light forum pre-dated me -- when  
 23 I moved over to the force event section. But when  
 24 I first sat on it, it wasn't a JESIP group as such. So  
 25 I think at my first meeting we discussed changing that,

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1 so the blue light forum became -- I think it was the  
 2 JESIP working group.  
 3 Q. Okay. I misunderstood but you've put me right.  
 4 Would it be fair to say that what emerged from  
 5 Mr Fletcher's email was more formal discussion between  
 6 the three services about JESIP issues?  
 7 A. Yes. I think it was smartened up from that blue light  
 8 forum to being JESIP specific -- and again, timings --  
 9 that first meeting, in effect, that I went to took place  
 10 on 28 June 2016 and we actually met to discuss the  
 11 issues off the back of Winchester Accord I think the  
 12 (sic) day later. I think, if memory serves me  
 13 correctly, Winchester Accord would have been discussed  
 14 at that meeting as well.  
 15 Q. In the result, we don't need to put precise dates on  
 16 this because it's all a long time before 22 May 2017,  
 17 what emerged was, have I understood correctly, first of  
 18 all, a JESIP working party?  
 19 A. I think that was what we called it, yes.  
 20 Q. And then ultimately was something called the JESIP user  
 21 group established? I am at paragraph 45 of your  
 22 statement.  
 23 A. I think I'm probably getting myself a bit complicated  
 24 here. No, I think that the blue light group became the  
 25 JESIP user group. That's what it was. I think I've

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1 used the wrong terminology earlier on. But one of the  
 2 issues that I'd flagged up was there wasn't a strategic  
 3 group, so in effect we were a tactical level but there  
 4 wasn't a JESIP strategic group, and I think at that  
 5 meeting we discussed that we should go away and identify  
 6 strategic leads from each of our organisations and then  
 7 put together that strategic group because we were fine  
 8 at a tactical level but I think we needed that strategic  
 9 umbrella, if you like.

10 Q. We are now very familiar with the various levels :  
 11 strategic at the top and then tactical then  
 12 operational --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. You thought you were okay so far as tactical level was  
 15 concerned?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. But what was needed, you thought, was something that was  
 18 more strategic?

19 A. I think so, yes.

20 Q. And did -- I hesitate before asking -- the JESIP user  
 21 group emerge as that strategic group?

22 A. No, the JESIP user group was the tactical group, sorry,  
 23 then there would have been the overarching strategic  
 24 group.

25 Q. Which of those groups, or was it both, were you a member

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1 of?

2 A. The user group, the tactical group.

3 Q. And indeed, did you agree, initially at least, to chair  
 4 that group?

5 A. I did with the caveat that I wouldn't be there for long.

6 Q. And you have perhaps anticipated my next question.  
 7 You'll be aware that Mr Fletcher has observed that you  
 8 attended and chaired a few meetings and then retired?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. So I'll ask you the questions, because if I don't others  
 11 will, does that reflect anything about your commitment  
 12 to that role?

13 A. Absolutely not. The group didn't exist in that form  
 14 before I took over, it wasn't a JESIP group as such, and  
 15 there were still police representation even if I'd gone,  
 16 but I was clear that I was approaching the end of my  
 17 service and I wouldn't be there for that long, but  
 18 absolutely it wouldn't have -- no, had I not been  
 19 committed to it, I wouldn't have taken on that role.

20 Q. What was your view overall of JESIP and its importance  
 21 or otherwise?

22 A. Absolutely vital. In fact, within Greater Manchester,  
 23 we'd done so much work that pre-dated JESIP, joint  
 24 training with the NWS HART teams and Greater Manchester  
 25 Fire and Rescue Service -- we'd put on displays for

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1 them, what firearms tactics look like, we had military  
 2 come in to give them inputs. So we did an awful lot of  
 3 work which pre-dated JESIP. It was quite obvious that  
 4 we'd always have to very, very closely together, not  
 5 just in a, you know, high level MTFA kind of incident,  
 6 but almost on a day-to-day basis. So because of the  
 7 work we'd done, when JESIP did come in, I think that  
 8 Greater Manchester as a whole -- and I'm not talking  
 9 about Greater Manchester Police -- Greater Manchester as  
 10 a whole was in a real good position.

11 Q. Indeed, this is something that you observed in your  
 12 first witness statement at paragraph 14:

13 "I organised numerous training sessions for all  
 14 services to work alongside GMP authorised firearms  
 15 officers and we jointly exercised with the military too.  
 16 As a result, Greater Manchester was in an excellent  
 17 position when JESIP principles were introduced."

18 A. I believe so, yes.

19 Q. Bearing in mind that -- I should add the follow-on  
 20 question: did Greater Manchester continue, in your view,  
 21 once JESIP had been introduced to be in an excellent  
 22 position?

23 A. I think so, yes.

24 Q. Bearing in mind that general observation that you've  
 25 made, do you have any insight into why JESIP didn't seem

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1 to have worked properly at Exercise Winchester Accord?

2 A. No.

3 Q. And do you have any insight into why JESIP appears not  
 4 to have worked or worked properly on 22 May 2017?

5 A. I don't, no.

6 Q. Ultimately, was it determined by the JESIP user group  
 7 that training should take place? I'm now at  
 8 paragraph 49.

9 A. That was the meeting I had with John Fletcher and  
 10 Joe Barrett where we discussed the training because that  
 11 was in effect the 29 June meeting with the three of us,  
 12 I don't think it was specifically at the JESIP user  
 13 group.

14 Q. It was something that emerged out of the discussions at  
 15 any rate that followed on from Mr Fletcher's email of  
 16 (overspeaking) of May?

17 A. Absolutely, yes.

18 Q. And for whom was it determined that training should be  
 19 taken?

20 A. Well, it was commander training, so it would be  
 21 commanders from all the JESIP organisations.

22 Q. And this was to be training in what?

23 A. Command of -- well, in effect, command of incidents that  
 24 would involve the JESIP principles.

25 Q. In the result, did you have any involvement in the

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1 training itself ?  
 2 A. No, I didn't do the package, and again it's another  
 3 example of my other commitments. There were three dates  
 4 that were selected for the actual training sessions in  
 5 the January and the February of 2017. The January,  
 6 I was in Japan on a personal visit. The February, I was  
 7 on leave, but unfortunately I was going to be on the  
 8 January, the middle course, but I was the Silver  
 9 commander for a funeral of a retired, very high-profile  
 10 police officer who'd unfortunately died and I was the  
 11 Silver commander for her funeral and I had a significant  
 12 planning meeting that day, so unfortunately my  
 13 operational commitments took me away from the actual  
 14 training.  
 15 Q. So in the result, you personally took no part in the  
 16 training sessions?  
 17 A. No, I was aware -- Simon Lear had sent me an email in  
 18 regards to the names of people who were going to be  
 19 attending in case I needed to give him some support in  
 20 case people weren't attending, but he indicated to me  
 21 that there were sufficient individuals.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just one of the things that motivated  
 23 the training, looking at the beginning of paragraph 49,  
 24 was that there were clearly issues with co-location.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Co-location seems to me to be absolutely  
 2 vital to JESIP.  
 3 A. Absolutely, absolutely.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if you get a situation where no one  
 5 turns up to the same RVP point, no one turns up to  
 6 an FCP point, or certainly not to start with, actually  
 7 then if there is no co-location, can JESIP work?  
 8 A. It falls down at the first hurdle, sir.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And there's no, as it were, back-up for  
 10 it? "We're in different places, what are we going to  
 11 do?"  
 12 A. The unsatisfactory back-up would be radio communications  
 13 or telephone communications, which is just not  
 14 practical. So no, co-location is absolutely key, and  
 15 it's one of the core principles of JESIP.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And clearly, it's something that you  
 17 were aware of as a real problem, how JESIP was going.  
 18 A. Yes, in my notes I have made a diary note -- sorry, a  
 19 daybook note and I recall that I had put, "Same mistake  
 20 every time along co-location". I can't remember  
 21 specifically what that referred to, I don't think that  
 22 would have referred to a live incident, that would have  
 23 referred to training --  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It could have referred to  
 25 Winchester Accord.

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1 A. Yes, but I think John and myself and Joe have discussed  
 2 that and it is not the first time that that has been  
 3 found wanting at an exercise. That's my interpretation  
 4 of what I wrote but I can't be more specific than that,  
 5 I'm afraid.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 7 MR GREANEY: What you have recorded in your statement at  
 8 paragraph 49 is:  
 9 "I can see that in my notes [the notes on your  
 10 daybook] I have written 'co-location' alongside the  
 11 words 'same mistake every time'."  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. So you plainly weren't just referring to Winchester  
 14 Accord?  
 15 A. That's correct.  
 16 Q. You were presumably talking about Winchester Accord --  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. -- and another thing or other things? You went on to  
 19 add:  
 20 "I take this to mean that co-location had been  
 21 an issue during several exercises. This was clearly of  
 22 concern to me as I had put an asterisk in front of the  
 23 word 'co-location' and two exclamation marks after it."  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. As you have explained to the chairman, this was a big

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1 issue, hence the exclamation marks?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Because if co-location wasn't achieved, it was going to  
 4 fall down at the first hurdle?  
 5 A. That's correct, potentially. I would suggest it would  
 6 be likely to fall down, yes.  
 7 Q. That's all I wanted to ask you about the third issue,  
 8 Winchester Accord.  
 9 The fourth issue, and indeed the final issue I'm  
 10 going to ask you about, is the Greater Manchester Police  
 11 MTF A plan, which I'm sure you'll know was referred to as  
 12 SOP 47.  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. You want to make clear, I believe, and you have made  
 15 clear in your statement, that you at this distance in  
 16 time cannot recall a great deal about the plans.  
 17 A. That's correct.  
 18 Q. That's a direct quote from paragraph 62 of your second  
 19 statement. Let me do what I can to try and jog your  
 20 memory.  
 21 There were various iterations of SOP 47; do you  
 22 recall that?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And most relevantly for the questions I have for you,  
 25 we have v4, which had been prepared by Police

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1 Sergeant Wright in October 2014. I'm sure you'd have  
 2 looked at that before going into the witness box.  
 3 A. The word prepared is probably not correct. It would  
 4 have been written by --- I can't remember who it was ---  
 5 Q. Inspector Fitton, I think.  
 6 A. --- yes, Inspector Fitton --- and then reviewed, I think  
 7 it was, by Sergeant Wright.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 In fact, before it got to Sergeant Wright it had  
 10 been reviewed by other people, including version 3,  
 11 which has never been found by Inspector Roby. But  
 12 I quite take your point, someone wrote it and then it  
 13 was ---  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. --- reviewed and updated, which was very much the  
 16 approach that you adopted I know.  
 17 So we've got v4, which has been prepared by  
 18 Sergeant Wright in October 2014. You were tasked with  
 19 preparing v5; is that correct?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. Was that as the result of an email that you had received  
 22 from ACC Hankinson?  
 23 A. That is correct, yes.  
 24 Q. At that stage --- and I should say that stage is October  
 25 of 2016 --- what was the role of ACC Hankinson?

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1 A. I believe that she'd then taken over responsibility for,  
 2 amongst other things, the specialist operations branch.  
 3 She will have taken over from John O'Hare.  
 4 Q. What I'm going to do is to look at the changes that you  
 5 made to v4 by having two documents on the screen at the  
 6 same time. The two documents are {INQ040146/1}, that's  
 7 version 4, and the second document, this is, Mr Giladi,  
 8 your version, version 5, {INQ039970/1}.  
 9 We'll work through these. There are a relatively  
 10 small number of changes, am I right?  
 11 A. That's correct.  
 12 Q. So on the left we've got version 4 and on the right  
 13 we've got version 5.  
 14 Essentially, the first page, the cover sheet, is  
 15 identical, albeit set out slightly differently.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. If we then go to page 2, please {INQ040146/2}  
 18 {INQ039970/2}, we can see that the version control has  
 19 been updated.  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. The layout is slightly different as again we can see.  
 22 There are a number of differences within the reference  
 23 documents, am I right?  
 24 A. That's correct. I would also like to point out that  
 25 I think this review should have taken place a year

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1 earlier. I'm not sure why that didn't happen. That's  
 2 another responsibility of the Policy Compliance Unit.  
 3 So this was October 2016, I think it should have been  
 4 reviewed in October 2015. I don't know why that wasn't.  
 5 Q. You're absolutely right and that does feature somewhere  
 6 within version 4. Yes, we can see on the left-hand  
 7 side:  
 8 "Date approved, 25 July 2012. Date of next review,  
 9 October 2015."  
 10 But that had never occurred and the next review  
 11 after October 2014 was yours in October 2016?  
 12 A. I think so, yes.  
 13 Q. So in terms of the changes to reference documents, first  
 14 of all the first bullet point:  
 15 "Responding to a marauding terrorist firearms  
 16 attack. Joint operating principles for the emergency  
 17 services, edition 2."  
 18 A. I put that, but that's a mistake.  
 19 Q. It should have been ---  
 20 A. Edition 3.  
 21 Q. --- which had been in force since January 2016. But  
 22 I think the point you make is that those to whom this  
 23 was going to be circulated would know which version of  
 24 JOPs was in force?  
 25 A. Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. Then we have at the bottom of the list two new reference  
 2 documents:  
 3 "NPCC Force Leads Letter from ACC Chris Shead ---  
 4 mobilisation of neighbouring forces armed assets to  
 5 support MTFA deployments."  
 6 And:  
 7 "Operation Temperer [north-west] region document,  
 8 December 2015?  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. I believe it is relevant for us to understand those two  
 11 documents without looking at them and why they've been  
 12 added to the plan.  
 13 A. Okay, well, the first one from ACC Chris Shead changed  
 14 the responsibility of neighbouring forces with regard to  
 15 what armed assets would be sent to a force in light of  
 16 an MTFA. I don't know if I can go into the ---  
 17 Q. No, I don't think you should go into the detail.  
 18 But it was about sharing of assets in the event of  
 19 an incident?  
 20 A. That's correct. It's what assets would be provided but  
 21 that had changed from previous guidance.  
 22 Q. Was that change in guidance the main reason, as you  
 23 understood it, why you were being asked to update the  
 24 guidance?  
 25 A. Yes, it was.

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1 Q. And let's be clear about it: that was in circumstances  
 2 in which the Inspectorate was about to visit?  
 3 A. Yes. That was the email I'd got from  
 4 Catherine Hankinson.  
 5 Q. So you were being told: you, superintendent, need to get  
 6 this updated because the Inspectorate are going to be in  
 7 within the next few days?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. You were the superintendent with lots of  
 10 responsibilities, weren't you?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Was this a job you could have done without frankly?  
 13 A. This was a job I would have given to the chief inspector  
 14 in the Policy Compliance Unit.  
 15 Q. Just whilst we're dealing with the reference documents:  
 16 Operation Temperer, I think you can tell us in very  
 17 general terms what that was.  
 18 A. That's about deployment if -- provided of (sic) military  
 19 assets and where they'd be deployed to within  
 20 Greater Manchester.  
 21 Q. At page 3, and this is a bit tricky because the pages  
 22 aren't all identical in terms of the information. But  
 23 there is a heading "Information". The material under  
 24 that heading remained the same in your document?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And indeed under the heading "Assessment", again the  
 2 information remained the same, did it not?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Over the page, page 4. Again, "Powers" and "Policy"  
 5 remained identical, as did "Options" and  
 6 "Contingencies"?  
 7 A. That's correct.  
 8 Q. Over the page, page 5. At the bottom of both pages,  
 9 I don't think that this difference is really one of any  
 10 significance. We can see that under "military  
 11 assistance", there has been a change of terminology from  
 12 "MACP" to "MACA"?  
 13 A. It's significant in that it changed from just providing  
 14 military support to the police to providing military  
 15 support to wider civil authorities. So it's  
 16 a significant issue, it needed to be updated.  
 17 Q. I understand. Page 6 next, please.  
 18 A. So there is another slight change on that previous page.  
 19 Q. Let's go back, Mr Lopez.  
 20 A. If you can see just above the irrelevant and sensitive  
 21 box --  
 22 Q. Which one?  
 23 A. Sorry, the one at the bottom of the page. It's just  
 24 about the deployment of the FST. It's not drastically  
 25 changed.

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1 Q. But there is nonetheless an alteration?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. I can see. Thank you for drawing that to our attention.  
 4 Over the page to page 6. We're still under the  
 5 heading of military assistance. You have added in your  
 6 version, for reasons we'll understand:  
 7 "Consideration must be given to the activation of  
 8 Operation Temperer."  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. And this isn't a change, but I'm going to draw it to  
 11 your attention because I'll have a question about it,  
 12 I hope before 4 o'clock. Under "Force duty officer  
 13 actions", it states:  
 14 "The following actions are not exhaustive and the  
 15 FDO will need strong support from the OCB team."  
 16 A. Correct.  
 17 Q. Over the page to page 7. You have added, I think, just  
 18 one task to the list for the FDO, namely:  
 19 "Consider the activation of Operation Temperer."  
 20 A. Yes -- sorry -- yes, but I did the new documentation as  
 21 well.  
 22 Q. Yes, indeed. This is a document, your v5, that you were  
 23 being required to produce under pressure of time?  
 24 A. That's correct.  
 25 Q. It was a document that addressed the role and

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1 responsibilities of the force duty officer?  
 2 A. Amongst others, yes.  
 3 Q. Amongst others?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Quite so. Yet, as you've told us, you did not fully  
 6 grasp at that time the pressures that would be upon  
 7 an FDO --  
 8 A. That's correct.  
 9 Q. -- in a real-world major incident --  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. -- event?  
 12 Do you think it would be fair to say, and this may  
 13 well be a criticism not of you but of others more  
 14 senior, that you were not the best person to be  
 15 reviewing and updating this policy, this plan?  
 16 A. Yes, that's potentially correct.  
 17 Q. Did you, before preparing your version, consult anyone  
 18 in the OCB?  
 19 A. I don't recall.  
 20 Q. Do you recall whether you gave any consideration to the  
 21 overloading issue which you had some limited knowledge  
 22 of?  
 23 A. No.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are two ways you could have looked  
 25 at this job. You could have had a look at the whole

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1 thing to review it , or you could have looked at the  
2 specific things that the assistant chief constable asked  
3 you to look at --  
4 A. That's correct.  
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- ACC Hankinson. Which was it?  
6 A. I think it would have been the latter, but ideally the  
7 whole thing should have been reviewed.  
8 MR GREANEY: The whole thing should have been reviewed  
9 a year earlier .  
10 A. Absolutely.  
11 Q. Do you think it was a result of the pressure of time  
12 that you didn't review this in more detail?  
13 A. Yes, that's probably fair .  
14 Q. In due course, Inspector Lear prepared a further plan,  
15 and you're aware of that, are you not?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. For reasons that he's given to us, he described it as an  
18 NWAPC Operation Plato plan v2. It's dated 4 May 2017.  
19 I'll give the INQ reference but we don't need it on the  
20 screen. It's {INQ029178/1}.  
21 What I want to do is, whilst not looking at the  
22 document, look at the chain of emails that resulted  
23 in that plan being prepared.  
24 This is {INQ040408/4}. There are some email  
25 addresses on this page, but I have checked and it has

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1 been confirmed that there's no problem with that at all.  
2 The start of this chain is an email dated  
3 28 March 2017 from Francis Habgood to a number of very  
4 senior police officers , including all chief officers ,  
5 and you have seen these emails before have you not?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. Was Francis Habgood the Chief Constable of Thames Valley  
8 Police?  
9 A. I believe so. I didn't know Mr Habgood.  
10 Q. I think we do discover from the email that's the  
11 position .  
12 And without reading through every word of it, this  
13 email, do you agree, to the chief constables identified  
14 the fact that the refreshed CTPHQ MTFA guidance had been  
15 circulated the week before?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. If we go next to page 3 and the bottom half, please  
18 {INQ040408/3}. We can see that the same day, the  
19 chief constable of Greater Manchester Police, at that  
20 stage Mr Hopkins, sent the email on to Ian Pilling and  
21 Robert Potts?  
22 A. Correct.  
23 Q. Who were Mr Pilling and Mr Potts?  
24 A. Ian Pilling , the deputy chief constable, and  
25 Robert Potts was an assistant chief constable.

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1 Q. And the email is addressed specifically to the assistant  
2 chief constable:  
3 "This is the full detail I emailed you about this  
4 morning. I suggest you task a couple of people formally  
5 to ensure our plans include all of the information  
6 suggested. Then get them to formally report back via  
7 COG (part 2) so we have an audit trail."  
8 COG (part 2) being?  
9 A. COG was the Chief Officers Group, so it would be  
10 attended by the chief constable and his command team  
11 and, I believe, some chief superintendents as well  
12 (overspeaking) police staff, senior police staff as  
13 well, sorry.  
14 Q. Then the middle of that page, please. Later that same  
15 day, ACC Potts then forwarded the email to you and  
16 David Sugden?  
17 A. That's correct.  
18 Q. David Sugden being?  
19 A. He was a sergeant in the Counter Terrorist Policing  
20 branch.  
21 Q. And what was said to you was:  
22 "Can you arrange the report back to COG (part 2) as  
23 below re our review of MTFA please?"  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Was this the first time that you had been asked to do

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1 anything in relation to this particular issue?  
2 A. The first thing to my memory, yes.  
3 Q. Did you understand that you were being asked in fact to  
4 do two things: ensure that the plan for an MTFA  
5 reflected the information and, two, to ensure that the  
6 Chief Officer Group was reported back to?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. Then if we go to page 2, please, {INQ040408/2}, and the  
9 very bottom of that page. We see an email, again from  
10 ACC Potts to you, but now we've moved on in time, just  
11 over a calendar month, to 29 April 2017. If we go to  
12 the top of page 3, you're being asked:  
13 "Can we get a part 2 Plato paper as below to the May  
14 COG if possible please."  
15 Is it a fair conclusion to draw from that that you  
16 were being chased a month later?  
17 A. Yes. I don't know what's happened within that month  
18 period, whether I've tasked something out -- I would not  
19 ordinarily ignore an instruction from an ACC, so I don't  
20 know exactly what happened within that time.  
21 Q. As we'll appreciate, you'll have been very busy, but it  
22 looks like a month has been lost?  
23 A. It does look like that, yes, but, as I say, I can't be  
24 any clearer than that, I'm afraid.  
25 Q. You have been very clear that your memory of all of this

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1 is very much less than perfect.  
 2 Let's go back to page 2. Mr Lopez, again the bottom  
 3 half of the page. {INQ040408/2}.  
 4 We see that you are now drawing Mr Lear into this.  
 5 On 2 May he's copied into the chain:  
 6 "Simon. Sorry, but need the review ASAP. If you  
 7 scroll down it needs to cover as many of the questions  
 8 as possible."  
 9 So this is you, having been tasked with this  
 10 responsibility, now tasking Inspector Lear to do it?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. It's now 2 May, a month or so on. Is this one of those  
 13 tasks that you've told us about that you would have  
 14 delegated to the chief inspector?  
 15 A. Absolutely.  
 16 Q. But you weren't able to do that.  
 17 If we go up that page, please, Mr Lear within  
 18 6 minutes, in fact, emails you back:  
 19 "Sir, noted. When is the May COG? Just trying to  
 20 manage level of panic."  
 21 I dare say you understood what he meant when he said  
 22 "level of panic", did you?  
 23 A. I did. As I said earlier on, Simon wore his heart on  
 24 his sleeve and that's the kind of comment I would have  
 25 expected him potentially to make, but it wouldn't

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1 necessarily have caused me a massive amount of concern.  
 2 Q. No, I understand that. But what is undoubtedly being  
 3 communicated to you, do you agree, is that this is  
 4 something, on the face of it significant, that he is  
 5 being required to do under --  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. -- considerable pressure of time? At the top of that  
 8 page, you then replied on 2 May, a minute later:  
 9 "I've tried to address that with Mr Potts."  
 10 So I think this is the question of when the May COG  
 11 is going to be. You identify that you're going to be  
 12 elsewhere next week:  
 13 "So I think we'll struggle. How far are we on with  
 14 it?"  
 15 Then to page 1 {INQ040408/1}.  
 16 A. Can I just say, I think that word should have been  
 17 redacted.  
 18 Q. I entirely agree, which is why I passed over it. I'm  
 19 going to ask Mr Suter, who will be watching these  
 20 proceedings remotely, or anyone else, to ensure that  
 21 that does not find its way into the YouTube feed. You  
 22 were very careful not to mention that word.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. At all events, if we look at the bottom of page 1,  
 25 {INQ040408/1}, Mr Lear responds to you at 10.37, so very

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1 quickly again:  
 2 "Just starting to go through the new document and  
 3 answer the questions prior to reading. I have something  
 4 in whatever form by Friday if okay?"  
 5 And you reply, as we can see:  
 6 "Perfect."  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. That appears to have been sent the minute before you got  
 9 the message to which you're replying. That's obviously  
 10 something to do with the timing on your computers.  
 11 On 4 May we have an email from Simon Lear to  
 12 David Whittle and we know that 4 May is the date upon  
 13 which Inspector Lear produced his version of the MTFA  
 14 plan. We can take that from the screen.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I just check that it's working,  
 16 getting things off YouTube? Thank you very much. You  
 17 just referred it to Mr Suter, who's actually not here to  
 18 do it, as it happens.  
 19 MR GREANEY: He isn't, but I knew that he would be in the  
 20 back room watching our proceedings. At all events --  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's being done, that's all that  
 22 matters.  
 23 MR GREANEY: I'm sure it will be done by somebody.  
 24 Where we seem to have reached -- and I'm sorry to  
 25 have gone through that rather lengthy exercise -- is

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1 that a need to produce an updated MTFA plan had been  
 2 identified.  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. In part because of the new national MTFA plan, the  
 5 refreshed guidance which had been issued?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. That had been tasked out by the senior command team of  
 8 Greater Manchester Police --  
 9 A. That's correct.  
 10 Q. -- at the end of March 2017.  
 11 A. Mm-hm.  
 12 Q. For whatever reason, there was then a delay, about  
 13 a month, and I'm not raising that as a criticism of you,  
 14 who knows what the explanation is, but at all events  
 15 there was a delay of a calendar month.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. And then Inspector Lear, with all of his other  
 18 responsibilities, is being required to produce this  
 19 within days?  
 20 A. That's correct.  
 21 Q. To use a phrase I've used a number of times in the last  
 22 couple of days, that sounds like a situation that was  
 23 much less than ideal?  
 24 A. Absolutely.  
 25 Q. After all, he was being given the job of producing

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1 something that was very important?  
 2 A. Absolutely.  
 3 Q. Inspector Lear circulated his document to the FDOs on  
 4 12 May 2017. That obviously doesn't leave very much  
 5 time between then and the arena attack. Do you think  
 6 that those 10 days were an adequate period for the FDOs  
 7 to become aware of it and, moreover, digest and  
 8 understand it?  
 9 A. No, and unfortunately my recollection is particularly  
 10 poor in this area. I'm not sure that it was approved.  
 11 A new policy would have to go through the Firearms  
 12 Policy Group, so for example if you are reviewing  
 13 a policy, like I did with version 5, I'm not writing it  
 14 from scratch, that's fine. But if it's a completely  
 15 rewritten policy, that would ordinarily have to go  
 16 through the Firearms Policy Group, which is in effect  
 17 the internal governing group within GMP.  
 18 So to answer your question, no, it wouldn't have  
 19 been enough time, although people would have been able  
 20 to see it. But number 2, it wouldn't have been trained,  
 21 it wouldn't have been explained, nobody would have had  
 22 an opportunity to go into the weeds.  
 23 Q. So in short, was it your view that as of 22 May that was  
 24 not the MTFFA policy and plan?  
 25 A. For the last 4 weeks, since I've realised I was going to

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1 be coming here, I've spent some considerable time trying  
 2 to remember, and it's really difficult, but on the face  
 3 of it I would say that the original plan was the one  
 4 that was in place, but it's really difficult for me to  
 5 say with absolute accuracy.  
 6 Q. It may be that this illustrates a problem, do you agree,  
 7 that on the one hand there exist two policies at around  
 8 this time?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Your version 5 and the document that had been prepared  
 11 by --  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. -- Inspector Lear. They are different --  
 14 A. That's correct.  
 15 Q. -- in some significant respects and, in particular, as  
 16 we saw with Inspector Lear when he gave his evidence,  
 17 his document actually added to the responsibilities of  
 18 the FDO?  
 19 A. Yes, that's correct. Following the national guidelines,  
 20 it added, that's correct.  
 21 Q. And it removed the reference that was in your version  
 22 and earlier versions to the FDO needing a lot of  
 23 support?  
 24 A. Correct.  
 25 Q. And if sitting here, years later, with all of your

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1 experience and knowledge, you're not really very clear  
 2 about which policy was in force at the time, how was  
 3 an FDO on the ground at the time supposed to know?  
 4 A. I accept that.  
 5 MR GREANEY: Mr Giladi, thank you very much for answering my  
 6 questions. Those are all that I have at this stage.  
 7 Just before 4 o'clock.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Very good.  
 9 MR GREANEY: I don't know if you have any questions, sir.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, I don't.  
 11 Thank you, Mr Giladi. I'm sorry you have to come  
 12 back, I hope you understand.  
 13 Mr Greaney, we're not sitting again until a week on  
 14 Monday. So it's an opportunity again for me to thank  
 15 everyone concerned with the inquiry for all the hard  
 16 work that has gone into it since we last had a break,  
 17 and that includes those who have attended so patiently  
 18 as well.  
 19 Can I particularly thank those behind the scenes who  
 20 we actually take for granted. Also, the stenographers  
 21 who do a simply fantastic job. We take advantage of  
 22 them on a regular basis by overrunning their time limits  
 23 and they always get, as far as I'm concerned, the  
 24 transcripts out in very good time. So they do a really  
 25 good job.

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1 I thank Mr Lopez as well, who between you, you can  
 2 now get two documents to compare side by side, which no  
 3 doubt we'll see more of as the weeks go on, and the IT  
 4 team and the ushers and the other people behind the  
 5 scenes who work so hard to try and make the inquiry  
 6 work.  
 7 MR GREANEY: Thank you, sir. Those are very thoughtful  
 8 remarks, if I may say so.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And of course the lawyers.  
 10 MR GREANEY: Most of all the lawyers!  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, I'm not saying that! I hope you'll  
 12 get a decent break of some sort and some time off  
 13 working on the inquiry.  
 14 MR GREANEY: Thank you, sir.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 16 (4.01 pm)  
 17 (The inquiry adjourned until Monday, 12 April 2021)  
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1 I N D E X

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4 (continued)

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