

# OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 103

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Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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Thursday, 13 May 2021

1  
2 (9.30 am)  
3 INSPECTOR MICHAEL SMITH (continued)  
4 Questions from MR DE LA POER (continued)  
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr de la Poer.  
6 MR DE LA POER: Sir, good morning.  
7 We are going to resume the evidence of Inspector  
8 Michael Smith and I'm going to do so by taking us to the  
9 last slide that we looked at yesterday to remind us of  
10 the point we had reached in your evidence, inspector.  
11 Mr Lopez, if you can please bring up {INQ035612/114}  
12 of the emergency response SoE. We already covered,  
13 Inspector Smith, do you agree, the conversation as you  
14 recall it with those firearms officers?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. And we spent a little time considering the dynamic risk  
17 assessment you performed which led you to conclude it  
18 was safe enough to remain.  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. So bearing all of those matters in mind and noting the  
21 time of 22.48.06, we can move forward, leaving that on  
22 the screen for the time being, to the audio schedule and  
23 entry 2271. We have there a radio broadcast and do you  
24 agree, inspector, that what you say is:  
25 "Update for you. We are in the booking office which

1

1 is over the bridge from main entrance of  
2 Victoria Station. So far? I've got an update for you.  
3 When the booking office switches sort of -- I was at  
4 a bridge from the main entrance of Victoria Station..."  
5 Pausing there, you are just describing that walkway  
6 that you'd come across in order to get access to the  
7 City Room?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really sorry, you couldn't just tell  
10 me the reference again?  
11 MR DE LA POER: 2271. The time is 22.48.39.  
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
13 MR DE LA POER: Having given that further information to  
14 help rescuers find you, no doubt, you say this:  
15 "It looks to be like a bomb's gone off here.  
16 I would say there's about 30 casualties. Could you have  
17 every available ambulance to me, please?"  
18 Then there's an alternative transcription of that,  
19 which is what that dash -- this is not a repeat, this is  
20 just an alternative by the transcriber because of  
21 slightly indistinct speaking:  
22 "And it looked just to me, like a bomb's gone off,  
23 here. I would say there's about 30 casualties.  
24 Literally, could we have every available ambulance to  
25 me, please?"

2

1 So the main difference is whether or not you said  
2 the word "literally". I think that's the only matter of  
3 any potential substance --  
4 A. Yes.  
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that a word you use?  
6 A. I wouldn't say so, sir, from reading that. I'd  
7 obviously have to listen to the actual audio to  
8 interpret it.  
9 MR DE LA POER: Either way, "Every ambulance to me"?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Were you seeking to convey by "to me" that they should  
12 come to the complex or that they should come to the  
13 City Room?  
14 A. I would say to Victoria Station. Obviously, it's  
15 unrealistic to have ambulances to where I was at that  
16 time, but to the station is what I wanted to convey  
17 there.  
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, it is, but it could mean,  
19 obviously, ambulances can't come up, but actually the  
20 paramedics should come to you?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There's no reason why they shouldn't in  
23 your mind, was there?  
24 A. No, and I think possibly some of the audio later on may  
25 cover that, sir.

3

1 MR DE LA POER: Did you want the paramedics to come into the  
2 City Room?  
3 A. Yes, I would say my expectation then was that I wanted  
4 them to come into where I was.  
5 Q. Bearing in mind the risk assessment that you performed  
6 and the conclusions that you reached, were you confining  
7 that only to those who were members of the Hazardous  
8 Area Response Team or did you have in mind all  
9 paramedics?  
10 A. I think in that moment I would have in mind any and all.  
11 Q. And certainly you don't at any point, do you, draw  
12 a distinction between paramedics generally and just  
13 those who are trained to go into hazardous areas?  
14 A. No.  
15 Q. Thank you, Mr Lopez. We can take that down from the  
16 screen.  
17 We'll move forward in time just 10 seconds or so  
18 after the audio to {INQ035612/120}, please.  
19 This is entirely blanked out for very good reason,  
20 but the legend tells us that you are standing on the  
21 stairs inside the City Room, appearing to look round the  
22 scene. I understand that is a reference to the  
23 mezzanine level, which gives you an elevated position.  
24 Do you recall very shortly after you went in there going  
25 up on to that area?

4

1 A. I don't recall doing that but I do know at some stage  
 2 I certainly went up those steps, yes.  
 3 Q. Why did you do that?  
 4 A. I think probably for the reason you said, to give a  
 5 better view and perhaps just seeing what was up there as  
 6 well, just trying to get a full idea of what we had.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know the armed police are going round  
 8 looking for a possible gunman. Are you doing that as  
 9 well by going up there or have you really discounted by  
 10 then any realistic possibility of there still being  
 11 a gunman there?  
 12 A. I would say that I had discounted that possibility.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: Next, please, moving forward a few seconds,  
 15 {INQ035612/122}.  
 16 Most of this is indistinct but we can see picked out  
 17 there that you have been identified together with  
 18 Sergeant McGowan as speaking to BTP Sergeant  
 19 Peter Wilcock. I think we covered yesterday the fact  
 20 that you were aware that there was at least one BTP  
 21 sergeant in the room with you.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. And that you spoke to them?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. That there wasn't formality, in a JESIP sense, about

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1 that conversation, but that you took the role of their  
 2 commanding officer?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. So that's 22.49.12. Can I say for everybody listening  
 5 and watching this, that I propose now to play some  
 6 audio. This is your next radio transmission and you can  
 7 be having a look at it just so that you know what I'm  
 8 going to take you to, which is 2402. It is timed at  
 9 22.50.03. At this point, inspector, you are in the  
 10 City Room?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. I have listened to this with a view to assessing whether  
 13 it's appropriate to play. The version that I listened  
 14 to seemed to me was appropriate to play, but there is  
 15 towards the end the indistinct sound of the tannoy and  
 16 although we have heard that already in our proceedings,  
 17 I am aware that that is a particularly distressing sound  
 18 for some of those who were in the City Room and so I'm  
 19 just going to pause for a moment so that anybody who  
 20 wishes to step away can do so or leave this room or any  
 21 other room that they are in. I anticipate that this  
 22 will take approximately 2 minutes in order to be safe,  
 23 although it's shorter than that.  
 24 I'm going to pause for a moment, inspector, for that  
 25 to occur.

6

1 (Pause)  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: While we're having that pause, my  
 3 entries 2402 and 2405 appear to be identical. So is  
 4 2408, I think.  
 5 MR DE LA POER: Assiduously in their work GMP have  
 6 identified every capture. You will see in the far  
 7 right—hand or penultimate right—hand column that they  
 8 are taken from different recordings of the same radio  
 9 channel. I appreciate others may not be following this  
 10 closely because they don't have it in front of them, but  
 11 in short, because it is recorded in more than one place,  
 12 GMP have put it on this schedule. Sometimes it's more  
 13 distinct on one version than on another but they are  
 14 duplicates of the same.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they do appear to be identical so  
 16 far as I can tell. Thank you.  
 17 MR DE LA POER: Mr Lopez, {INQ018644\_C2/1}.  
 18 (Audio played to the inquiry)  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have no doubt been told, but the  
 20 recipient of that call from you, who you're calling up,  
 21 is a police officer called Mark Hilton?  
 22 A. I don't know whether that's a police officer, sir. It  
 23 may be a police staff employee.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So who are you speaking to?  
 25 A. A radio comms operator.

7

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you're talking to a control room?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which control room?  
 4 A. I can tell you, but I believe that's...  
 5 MR DE LA POER: Is it the OCR Mr Sexton is based in?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 8 MR DE LA POER: The particular phrase I just highlight here  
 9 that I just ask you to speak to and acknowledge is at  
 10 the end of that we heard you say:  
 11 "So every — I need ever NNAS facility that we've  
 12 got in here, please, directly in here."  
 13 I think you referred to this a moment ago in terms  
 14 of where you wanted the paramedics.  
 15 A. Yes. So at that time, making that transmission, my  
 16 expectation was that any paramedic that arrived would  
 17 come to me.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you wouldn't have said that unless  
 19 you were as satisfied as you could be in your own mind  
 20 that it was safe for them to come in there?  
 21 A. Safe enough, sir.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, safe enough, yes.  
 23 MR DE LA POER: So that's timed at 22.50.03. Next,  
 24 Mr Lopez, back, please, to the SoE, sequence of events,  
 25 {INQ035612/134}. We're going to see, less than a minute

8

1 later, you are identified as in conversation with  
 2 a number of GMP officers. I don't for a moment expect  
 3 you to remember this particular conversation, but does  
 4 this illustrate the fact that, at various points in the  
 5 evening, you gave instructions or had reports made to  
 6 you by staff within the City Room?  
 7 A. Yes, and I think it illustrates as well, within quite  
 8 a short space of time, that officers are arriving,  
 9 they're coming to me as a focal point, if you like, and  
 10 I'm -- although I can't remember the detail of the  
 11 conversation, I would like to think I'm asking them to  
 12 do certain things.  
 13 Q. We remind ourselves, of course, that it's your belief --  
 14 and I'm not suggesting by that that it's not right --  
 15 that you were the first GMP officer into the City Room,  
 16 is that right, or just behind Sergeant McGowan?  
 17 A. Unarmed, I think so, yes.  
 18 Q. So at about the time that this huddle is occurring,  
 19 we have a capture at 2473 from some body-worn footage.  
 20 You will see it's timed at 22.50.50 and although you may  
 21 not have been able to recall this conversation, this may  
 22 help your recollection.  
 23 This is taken from --  
 24 MR ATKINSON: I understand entirely why these images are  
 25 being put up (inaudible: distorted) for as short a time

1 --  
 2 MR DE LA POER: Mr Atkinson, that's an extremely helpful  
 3 observation, thank you very much indeed.  
 4 Whilst you are engaged in that discussion, do we see  
 5 at 2473 that, as is described by the summary, you take  
 6 command and control?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. You begin by issuing instructions:  
 9 "Can you go round the outside and make sure the  
 10 station is sealed off"; is that right?  
 11 A. Yes, that's to Sergeant Darren Prince.  
 12 Q. To Sergeant Darren Prince. Why were you giving that  
 13 instruction?  
 14 A. Other than Sergeant McGowan, he was the next sergeant to  
 15 arrive.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because the instruction is said in order  
 17 to stop people coming into the station while this  
 18 emergency is going on?  
 19 A. Yes, sir.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that what the question was about?  
 21 MR DE LA POER: Exactly. We can see that in your next  
 22 follow-up and then it's the third thing recorded that  
 23 you say:  
 24 "ARVs are going round, trying to seal it as well.  
 25 Just make sure the ambulance, any ambulance, come in.

1 Get them straight up."  
 2 And the next bit is inaudible, to which  
 3 Sergeant Prince says:  
 4 "Do you need me in here?"  
 5 And you say:  
 6 "Just do the outside."  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. We've lost some of what is said there, but what is  
 9 captured is:  
 10 "Just make sure the ambulance..."  
 11 And then a missing part and then:  
 12 "... any ambulance come in, get them straight up."  
 13 Who were you addressing that instruction to so far  
 14 as you can recall? There is also a PC identified as  
 15 being present.  
 16 A. Whoever was captured on that body-worn, it shows  
 17 Sergeant Prince and PC Williams. On the still obviously  
 18 it looks like there were one or two more officers there,  
 19 but whoever was there, I think I was asking  
 20 Sergeant Prince to take those officers and set up that  
 21 kind of -- seal off the station.  
 22 Q. What, if anything, were you envisaging that they would  
 23 do in furtherance of your instruction of "making sure  
 24 the ambulance come in"?  
 25 A. Probably for one of them to be at the main entrance to

1 Victoria Station, where the concourse is, and the first  
 2 ambulance that arrived, to explain what we had and to  
 3 ask them to make their way up to where we were.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were you wearing body-worn video?  
 5 A. No, sir.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's captured from other officers?  
 7 A. I think when body-worn video was introduced --  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It really doesn't matter; I just needed  
 9 to know who had it. Thank you.  
 10 MR DE LA POER: That is the instruction you give to officers  
 11 on the ground, so having told control that you want them  
 12 to tell the ambulance that they must come up to you  
 13 in the City Room, you then tasked at least one officer  
 14 on the ground to try and make that happen for those  
 15 arriving?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Next we are going to look at the entry at row 2498,  
 18 22.51.00. This is not a call you participate in but  
 19 it is an important part of the chronology and bearing in  
 20 mind what you had said to control, I just want to show  
 21 you this and seek your comment on whether or not the  
 22 message that you had given them was conveyed as you  
 23 intended to be. All right? So this is a call between  
 24 GMP Control and NWAS Control, can you see, about a third  
 25 of the way down. GMP's recorded:

1 "Our inspector is saying can we have all available  
 2 ambulances, please, to Hunts Bank. Hang on let me find  
 3 it. I've lost the exact location. The booking office,  
 4 which is over the bridge to the main entrance, it looks  
 5 like that's where the bomb has gone off. They need  
 6 every available ambulance."

7 Then if you just read that next bit through and I'll  
 8 just pick out the next bit from the -- we have GMP  
 9 saying:

10 "Yeah. Over the bridge from Victoria Station."

11 Then:  
 12 "Right."

13 From GMP:

14 "Yeah, the booking office over the bridge to the  
 15 main entrance."

16 And then from GMP:

17 "Yeah, and our inspector, inspector [and it gives  
 18 your collar number] is asking for all ambulances there,  
 19 as many as you can get, please. We've got at least  
 20 30 wounded, possibly up to six dead."

21 Then they ask:

22 "Is it confirmed a bomb?"

23 "We don't know yet. It's not been confirmed. We've  
 24 still got all our patrols getting there -- well, all our  
 25 patrols are there trying to sort out the casualties."

13

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So you spoke to Mr Hilton, we don't have identified who  
 3 the speaker is here, but this appears to arise directly  
 4 out of what you said to control just seconds earlier.  
 5 Was the message that you conveyed to control adequately  
 6 conveyed to NWAS?

7 A. Yes, I think it's captured in those exchanges there,  
 8 yes.

9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we go, I just want to get some  
 10 impression now we're 22.50. Police officers, unarmed  
 11 police officers, have come in from where? And who  
 12 summoned them?

13 A. Well, in terms of summoning them I think the messages --  
 14 they'd be able to hear that on that radio --

15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The original one which brought you in in  
 16 the first place?

17 A. Yes. Some of the officers who were working on that  
 18 particular channel, so that covers the city centre and  
 19 really just slightly south of the city centre as well,  
 20 the Longsight offices. Some of the others were coming  
 21 from Central Park, which is just north of the city  
 22 centre --

23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are they being directed by their own  
 24 control rooms to go there or are they self-deploying?

25 A. I would say they are probably hearing the transmissions

14

1 and they're on their way and some of them will have  
 2 said, "We're on our way", "We're here", "We'll be there  
 3 in 5 minutes", or whatever else.

4 The total exchanges I haven't got but I would -- my  
 5 expectation, and I think most officers, are pretty  
 6 motivated, and they would have gone without being told  
 7 or asked.

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you're not actually saying to  
 9 anybody, "I need X numbers of police officers here", we  
 10 just got all hands on deck, basically?

11 A. I'd say so yes.

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: By 22.50 can you give me any rough idea  
 13 of the number of unarmed police officers you've got  
 14 there ready and willing to help?

15 A. Guesswork -- I would guess by that stage of the last  
 16 still that we saw, which I think was round about that  
 17 time, maybe at that time about ten.

18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: As time goes on, do you know what it  
 19 gets up to?

20 A. Within the City Room I think it gets up to 30-ish.

21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just in the City Room?

22 A. Yes and outside people were on cordons and things around  
 23 it. The exact number I'm sure is available somewhere  
 24 but that will be my best guess.

25 MR DE LA POER: We know that, shortly before 11, two

15

1 tactical aid units, one of them headed by Sergeant Hare,  
 2 arrive and that is when significant numbers start coming  
 3 in as a body.

4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that is when we get the numbers up to  
 5 about 30 in the City Room?

6 A. I would say so, yes.

7 MR DE LA POER: Next transmission, please, at the next  
 8 entry 2512. Again captured from the body-worn camera.  
 9 This is timed at 22.51.10. Can you confirm that you are  
 10 recorded as saying on that body-worn camera:

11 "ARVs are en route. Make sure the ambulances have  
 12 access, get them in straightaway"?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The next entry is just 9 seconds later, again this time  
 15 on the Talk Group. You see at 22.51.19 you spoke to  
 16 control and say:

17 "31733 is going to be the sergeant, just to ensure  
 18 that all these entrances to the station are sealed off.  
 19 Sent one of the PCs outside to tell any NWAS staff they  
 20 need to get in here as soon as."

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you recall which PC you sent outside?

23 A. No, because I think I asked Sergeant Prince to nominate  
 24 one, really.

25 Q. So you gave the order to the sergeant and he was to make

16

1 it happen by directing one of the constables?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. But having seen that, there can be no doubt that that is  
 4 a step that you undoubtedly took to try and ensure as  
 5 many paramedics could come into the City Room as  
 6 possible?  
 7 A. Yes, it's certainly one I've asked to take place,  
 8 definitely .  
 9 Q. Next we're going to return to the sequence of events  
 10 very briefly to show this slide , please. Just enough to  
 11 capture it and then take it down, please, Mr Lopez.  
 12 {INQ035612/141}. About a minute and a half after  
 13 you have broadcast that to control, you are recorded,  
 14 22.52.45, as running out on to the footbridge to a point  
 15 where Mr Ennis is.  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Take that down, please.  
 18 {INQ035612/143}. We can see that 16 seconds later  
 19 you're back in the City Room in company with Mr Ennis.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Take that down, please.  
 22 So do you recall seeing Mr Ennis out on the raised  
 23 footbridge?  
 24 A. Well, certainly the stills jog my memory on that.  
 25 I think literally I must have seen him coming towards

17

1 me. I've gone outside the doors and we have met there  
 2 and we have walked back in together, so in that sense,  
 3 yes.  
 4 Q. One inference from the fact that you ran to meet him was  
 5 there was a real urgency in your mind about speaking to  
 6 him?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Do you recall having such urgency?  
 9 A. I did, yes.  
 10 Q. I'm just going to invite you to have a look at  
 11 paragraph 54 of your second statement, where you deal  
 12 with a conversation that you had with Mr Ennis. If  
 13 you'd just like to read that to yourself .  
 14 (Pause)  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Inspector, we know because Mr Ennis' movements have been  
 17 closely tracked that he initially comes into the  
 18 City Room, he speaks to you, he then goes back out, he  
 19 speaks to NAWAS colleagues down on the station concourse,  
 20 and then he comes back up.  
 21 A. Right.  
 22 Q. I want to recognise in my questioning here that you may  
 23 find it difficult to separate the various times that you  
 24 spoke to Mr Ennis.  
 25 So just as much as you can recall, that first

18

1 contact with him, do you remember what passed between  
 2 the two of you?  
 3 A. No. I can't remember the exact detail of it, and  
 4 I think that paragraph in my statement covers, having  
 5 read it now, quite a period of time.  
 6 Q. Yes.  
 7 A. So the initial conversation, no, I can't remember.  
 8 I can surmise that we discussed what we had here and  
 9 what we were going to do jointly.  
 10 Q. Up until this point you have said a number of times that  
 11 you want paramedics in the City Room.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Did you say that to Mr Ennis?  
 14 A. I would think so because my judgement then would not  
 15 have changed just by his arrival .  
 16 Q. What you go on to say, as you summarised a number of the  
 17 conversations you had with Mr Ennis, was that he told  
 18 you that the casualties clearing centre had been set up  
 19 on the concourse.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Understanding the chronology as you do now, do you think  
 22 that that was in your first conversation with him or do  
 23 you think that was something he would have said to you  
 24 later?  
 25 A. Later because, as far as I know, there were no

19

1 ambulances had arrived at that stage because we're still  
 2 talking quite a short time after .  
 3 Q. As a matter of fact that is absolutely right, isn't it?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. At the time you spoke to him there weren't any other  
 6 paramedics in?  
 7 A. He may have said, "Our plan is to set up a casualty  
 8 clearing station", but I can't remember exactly whether  
 9 that was in that first conversation or later .  
 10 Q. At any point in your conversations with you, did he tell  
 11 you whether or not he was expecting more paramedics than  
 12 him to come into the City Room?  
 13 A. I don't know whether he did say that. If you're in his  
 14 shoes you probably would expect that.  
 15 Q. We can seek to explore it with you in this way: if  
 16 Mr Ennis had said, "I'm going to be the only paramedic  
 17 up here until the Hazardous Area Response Team arrives",  
 18 do you think that's something you would have challenged  
 19 him on or would you just have accepted that from him?  
 20 A. No, I think I would have challenged him on it because  
 21 there were clearly people there who were very badly  
 22 injured and needed some treatment. And I think  
 23 subsequently, I did direct officers to go down and see  
 24 if they could get hold of some more paramedics and  
 25 I think that is in the audio later on. It's very

20

1 difficult now to know what those conversations were  
 2 about.  
 3 Q. Absolutely, but what seems clear, if I may so, is that  
 4 up to the point of you speaking to Mr Ennis you had had  
 5 one clear thought that you had repeated on a number of  
 6 times which was paramedics in the City Room?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And really what I'm asking you to consider is whether  
 9 in the conversations with Mr Ennis you would have said  
 10 anything different to that.  
 11 A. I don't think so, when he initially arrived, because  
 12 that -- a minute before he arrived, that's what  
 13 I wanted. So if he then tells me, which he obviously  
 14 did do later, about the plan that they had, then that's  
 15 probably when my expectations were changed slightly.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We're being obviously unrealistic,  
 17 expecting you to deal with individual conversations in  
 18 this situation, so please forgive us, and obviously  
 19 don't speculate. Would you have said anything about  
 20 zoning to him?  
 21 A. No, sir.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because that really wasn't in your mind,  
 23 was it?  
 24 A. No.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But what was in your mind was whether it

1 seemed safe for people to operate in there and you had  
 2 got your own officers operating in there at the time.  
 3 A. Yes, and I think already in terms of the practicalities  
 4 of where we were, we were on a mezzanine level, we were  
 5 up some stairs. I'd come in that way, kind of, you  
 6 know -- I don't want to say tunnel vision, but the route  
 7 I came in, so I know the layout there, I've asked for  
 8 that road to be sealed off, it's the natural place for  
 9 ambulances to come. So therefore that's the natural way  
 10 to take casualties out so already that flow of  
 11 casualties had started, the walking wounded, if you  
 12 like.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. So there was no reason in your  
 14 mind for saying to them, "You really can't come in  
 15 here"?  
 16 A. No.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In fact, the opposite?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 MR DE LA POER: We can get a sense of how long that first  
 20 conversation with Mr Ennis was. Page {INQ035612/145},  
 21 just to establish that at 22.53.24 you were walking away  
 22 from Mr Ennis, so that's 23 seconds after you're seen in  
 23 the City Room. That's page 145 please.  
 24 Thank you. Just 23 seconds at that point. Then  
 25 we can return to the audio schedule which is 5 seconds

1 after you have walked away from Mr Ennis. It's  
 2 row 2737. 22.53.29. Do you see this, inspector?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. "Paramedic Bronze has just arrived now. He's just  
 5 having a look round to assess but still if we get any  
 6 more NWAS resources, send them in as soon as, please."  
 7 That's a broadcast to control by you?  
 8 A. Yes. I think possibly at this point it's worth pointing  
 9 out that our radio channel works on -- it's called talk  
 10 through, so everyone on that channel can hear what  
 11 everyone else is saying. So by giving that message, any  
 12 officer who's there and listening in would be able to  
 13 hear that.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So when you're saying, "He's just  
 15 having a look round to assess", do you know now what you  
 16 meant by that? Assess what? It may be obvious to you  
 17 and, if so, just tell us the obvious, but what was he  
 18 assessing?  
 19 A. I'd say making an assessment of the number of  
 20 casualties, the seriousness of them, and --  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are two possibilities. There is  
 22 assessing casualties, which is what you surmised and  
 23 what one would expect. The other alternative is  
 24 assessing the room as to whether it's safe for  
 25 paramedics to be in there.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Your understanding was the first, he's  
 3 looking at the casualties and what's needed?  
 4 A. Yes, I would say so.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 6 MR DE LA POER: Next briefly, please, {INQ035612/147} to  
 7 establish at 22.54.19, having made that broadcast, you  
 8 are speaking to BTP officers, Sergeant Wilcock again,  
 9 and a Detective Constable Haviland.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Then we're going to look at the audio, 22.55.46,  
 12 line 2994. At this point we can see that Sergeant Hare  
 13 and his Tactical Aid Unit officers have arrived. Do you  
 14 give instruction to Sergeant Hare?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you sent -- these are public  
 17 order --  
 18 A. Specialists, sir.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you sent for them?  
 20 A. No, but again they may have --  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They would respond --  
 22 A. If they were in the city centre, they may have been  
 23 listening to the channel and just responded themselves.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Having a number of officers arriving all  
 25 together was good for you?

1 A. Good for me. I spent 5 years in that unit as a  
 2 sergeant, so I understand the capabilities. They're  
 3 a can-do team, so it was good to see them arrive.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: Inspector Smith, I need you to deal with one  
 5 thing that you say. It is a very distressing thing to  
 6 be heard, particularly in a setting like this with the  
 7 people who are watching it, but it is an important part  
 8 of the instruction that you gave that night. You are  
 9 not the only one to issue such an instruction. So I'm  
 10 just going to pause for a moment, we'll deal with this,  
 11 it'll take just a minute for us to deal with,  
 12 I anticipate. I'm going to read out what you say in  
 13 line 3015. Do you have that.  
 14 A. I do.  
 15 Q. I'm just going to ask you, in as short as form as  
 16 possible, to tell us why. I'm sure it will be perfectly  
 17 obvious but it forms part of the instructions you gave  
 18 that night. So at 22.55.56, you gave an instruction to  
 19 Sergeant Hare:  
 20 "If they are obviously dead, just leave them."  
 21 A. Yes. Our role there was really to preserve life. It  
 22 sounds very harsh and cold to say that, but what  
 23 I wanted the officers there to concentrate on was on the  
 24 living and getting them to a position where they could  
 25 be given potentially life-saving care and treatment.

25

1 Q. Thank you. Next, we're going to look at line 3122,  
 2 22.56.28. You are speaking to control again. I'm not  
 3 going to read out everything you say, I'm just going to  
 4 pick out what's said in the third line. You say this:  
 5 "At the minute the only NAWAS unit who's here is  
 6 the --- I think the NAWAS Bronze is here, so any others  
 7 that arrive, you can direct them in here again, please."  
 8 And there is "in here, please" as an alternative  
 9 rendition of that.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. So another message from you about the need for  
 12 paramedics in the City Room?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And it's being given to?  
 15 A. Well, it's on that open channel.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're actually calling up 6694?  
 17 A. That's me, that, sir.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm so sorry, right. The person who  
 19 answers is ---  
 20 A. A radio operator.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, right. Thank you. That helps.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: At 22.57.35, page 156, please  
 23 {INQ035612/156}, we don't need to linger over this,  
 24 you are captured speaking to a BTP officer.  
 25 At {INQ035612/158}, 22.57.59, you are identified as

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1 speaking to Mr Ennis again and arena medic  
 2 Ryan Billington. Do you have a recollection of speaking  
 3 to any the arena medics that night?  
 4 A. Yes. There were quite a few of them in that room, they  
 5 were wearing green shirts, similar to NAWAS paramedics,  
 6 so, yes, I was aware that some of them were there.  
 7 I don't remember particularly speaking to Mr Billington,  
 8 though.  
 9 Q. For what reason did you speak to arena medics that  
 10 night?  
 11 A. I would think to encourage them in what they were doing.  
 12 Q. 22.59.22, {INQ35612/167}. Again, you can show it and  
 13 then take it down.  
 14 Do we establish there you were speaking to  
 15 Sergeant Linney?  
 16 A. Linney.  
 17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Lopez.  
 18 A minute after that, audio line 3632, 23.00.26,  
 19 we've seen you speak to a BTP officer. We have seen you  
 20 speak to Sergeant Linney of GMP, and you say, as is  
 21 captured on the recording of the radio channel, so  
 22 you're speaking to Mr Hilton again at control:  
 23 "BTP sergeant 2202 has been approached by a male who  
 24 said it was an Asian male, put down a rucksack, and ran  
 25 out of the area. Can I give you a description?"

27

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. I'm sure that speaks for itself, but had you been given  
 3 information by a BTP sergeant that the perpetrator may  
 4 still be at large?  
 5 A. Yes. That was the information that he'd been given by  
 6 I think a member of the public.  
 7 Q. We don't need to read it out but you can refresh your  
 8 memory from 3719. As part of that radio broadcast,  
 9 do you give a description as it had been provided to  
 10 you?  
 11 A. (Pause). Yes.  
 12 Q. That was of a person wearing glasses, a cap, with  
 13 a large black rucksack, which he said was hidden by the  
 14 wall?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. Did you understand by "the wall" what that was  
 17 a reference to or were you just relaying verbatim what  
 18 you'd been told?  
 19 A. I think I was just relaying what I'd been told, yes.  
 20 I don't know which wall that may have been referring to.  
 21 Q. There may be a clue but that is timed at 23.01.16. At  
 22 23.01.47, page 184, please, Mr Lopez {INQ035612/184},  
 23 you are captured going back up on to the mezzanine.  
 24 Bearing in mind that you have just talked about the  
 25 wall, and then within seconds you're walking up on the

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1 mezzanine, does that help your recollection at all?  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think he is leading you in a certain  
 3 direction.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: I am inviting him to consider the  
 5 juxtaposition of those two but certainly not to  
 6 speculate or guess.  
 7 A. That might have been the reason, but I can't remember.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want a bit of an overall picture  
 9 now. You have told us that the walking wounded were  
 10 making their way out, down.  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know that a stage is reached when  
 13 people who are unable to walk are being assisted out and  
 14 some are being carried out on makeshift stretchers. Has  
 15 that started yet by this time or not?  
 16 A. I don't think so, sir, because I think some of it is  
 17 within the schedule that perhaps I am going to be taken  
 18 to.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, we're going to come to it in  
 20 a minute. Thank you.  
 21 MR DE LA POER: We're going to come to a broadcast that you  
 22 made to control at 23.05.23. It's entry 4299. In this  
 23 you are told by control:  
 24 "I've got you 11 ambulances en route."  
 25 To which you say:

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1 "Are they coming to the front entrance?"  
 2 Mr Hilton says:  
 3 "Get them to the front entrance, was that?"  
 4 And you reply:  
 5 "Got that. Can I give you an update as well?"  
 6 I think we may well have found our bomber."  
 7 Then you go on to say:  
 8 "He's very dead."  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. At this point we know that within the station complex,  
 11 in addition to Mr Ennis, there is consultant paramedic  
 12 Dan Smith, Dr Michael Daley, paramedics Martyn Nealon,  
 13 Callum Gill and Leigh—Sa Smith and I think he's  
 14 an advanced paramedic, Derek Poland. Did you know that  
 15 those paramedics were downstairs at this point?  
 16 A. I don't know whether this is the point where Paddy Ennis  
 17 told me that the casualty clearing station was being set  
 18 up on the concourse. If all those individuals were  
 19 there, I suspect that might have been around that time  
 20 where he tells me that.  
 21 Q. Let's just deal with that now then. He told you that  
 22 a casualty clearing station was being set up on the  
 23 concourse. Did you understand what a casualty clearing  
 24 station was?  
 25 A. Yes. It's a place where triage can be carried out,

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1 priorities can be put on where the patients go, and then  
 2 they can organise those patients going into ambulances  
 3 and to the hospital that is best suited to treat them.  
 4 Q. The fact that that was being set up on the station  
 5 concourse, did you think that the fact of its location  
 6 being away from the City Room would have any impact on  
 7 how many paramedics would come into the City Room?  
 8 A. Again, unless Mr Ennis told me what I should expect or  
 9 what we collectively should expect after that, I'm not  
 10 sure. But certainly as an area for — it's a larger  
 11 open area, it's right by the exit of the station. It  
 12 seemed to make sense to me as being the most suitable  
 13 place to have that casualty clearing station.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you ever been involved in an  
 15 incident which has required a casualty clearing station  
 16 before?  
 17 A. No, sir, not that I can recall.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you learnt about it as part of your  
 19 training?  
 20 A. I would say possibly on the JESIP course, albeit it was  
 21 years beforehand. And again, what I described  
 22 yesterday, sort of an overview of a major incident plan,  
 23 it is within that.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This definitely wasn't the first time  
 25 you'd heard it?

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1 A. No, it wasn't the first time I'd heard it, no.  
 2 MR DE LA POER: That broadcast that we just looked at, and  
 3 I think you said it may be about this time that you  
 4 understood about the casualty clearing station, that  
 5 broadcast was at 23.05.23.  
 6 {INQ035612/203}, please, Mr Lopez. At 23.05.30, so  
 7 7 seconds after you make that broadcast, we can see that  
 8 Mr Ennis has come back in and is speaking to people. So  
 9 this is when he has returned. So it is, as you say,  
 10 around this time that he's had the opportunity to speak  
 11 to those who are downstairs and had the conversations  
 12 that he's had with them.  
 13 We are going to be able to move slightly more  
 14 quickly than we have as we've passed that first half  
 15 hour. We're certainly not going to rush this.  
 16 The next entry that I want you to consider is at  
 17 4885. This is timed at 23.09.50.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 4485?  
 19 MR DE LA POER: 4885. It may be that...  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Give us the number again.  
 21 MR DE LA POER: Can I give you the time because it's very  
 22 difficult to read as it's come out of the printer. It  
 23 is 23.09.50.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's 4865.  
 25 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed.

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1 Do we see there a broadcast by you, inspector, about  
 2 an explo dog, as you describe it?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. I'm sure it's perfectly obvious, but please tell us why  
 5 were you sending that broadcast?  
 6 A. Requesting, really, an explosives-trained search dog.  
 7 I think the officer that I'm with, PC Hilton, is a dog  
 8 handler, X-ray Delta is a dog handler designation, but  
 9 from that I would say that his dog wasn't explo trained.  
 10 Q. You wanted an explo dog, did you?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're telling control. Who do you  
 13 expect them to tell? Who are you expecting is running  
 14 this from control?  
 15 A. Well, the operator, the person who's on the radio,  
 16 I wouldn't expect them to be making any phone calls.  
 17 Behind the scenes there's a whole control room full of  
 18 people, I suppose --  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know the FDO is in charge of the  
 20 control room.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So would it be him you're expecting  
 23 these messages to go to to activate?  
 24 A. I think we come on a little bit later about me  
 25 requesting whether -- if we haven't got explo dogs on,

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1 whether other forces can do that. So some of the radio  
 2 assistants who are listening to it, reading it off the  
 3 screen, will make those phone calls.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.  
 5 MR DE LA POER: I am just going to pause for a moment, sir.  
 6 I have been told that one of the screens at the back is  
 7 no longer working. I just want to check that people are  
 8 still able to follow the evidence despite that.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You can't follow it? One's gone off.  
 10 MR DE LA POER: I think I'm getting nods that it can still  
 11 be followed. I think, sir, what I propose is that --  
 12 I don't understand that there's a request for us to  
 13 stop, but we will seek --  
 14 MR COOPER: I will take instructions. It might be easier.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thanks.  
 16 (Pause)  
 17 MR COOPER: One screen is definitely off, but I'm having  
 18 indications from the families that they are content to  
 19 go ahead.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'll fix it as soon as we can,  
 21 thank you.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: That was explo dogs at 23.09.50. The next  
 23 entry, please, in the audio schedule is 2 minutes later,  
 24 5021, 23.11.19. You provide an update over the Talk  
 25 Group; is that right?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. You provide information about how many people you think  
 3 have died, which at that time you believe is around 15?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you are talking, saying, "The  
 6 injured have gradually been moved out now". Does that  
 7 include people on improvised stretchers? We know people  
 8 are being helped out, the walking wounded.  
 9 A. Yes. I don't know at what point.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 11 A. The improvised stretchers came into it, sir, but  
 12 I certainly did say to people, I don't know whether it's  
 13 captured in this, use whatever you can, use --  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you were giving the instruction to do  
 15 that?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 18 MR DE LA POER: We need to deal with the improvised  
 19 stretchers at some point, so let's address that now,  
 20 please.  
 21 You were obviously faced with a very difficult  
 22 situation; is that right?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And so far as you could see, there were no stretchers,  
 25 ie items designed for that purpose, readily at hand?

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1 A. No.  
 2 Q. There were items that could be used to improvise?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. And there were undoubtedly people who would not be able  
 5 to move themselves or even be assisted on their feet?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. So you were presented with that challenge in  
 8 circumstances where you had been told that the casualty  
 9 clearing station was down in the station?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. As you thought about how you would manage that, did you  
 12 have any conversation with Mr Ennis about the fact that  
 13 there was going to be a delay in moving some people  
 14 because of the lack of equipment and therefore more  
 15 paramedics needed to come up to cover that period of  
 16 delay?  
 17 A. Again, the detail I can't really remember, but I think  
 18 that maybe by that stage, he was involved in triage,  
 19 assisting people, trying to identify who were the most  
 20 seriously injured. So I would hope, yes, that we did  
 21 discuss that. But quite how to do it, my view was,  
 22 well, we need to get them out as quickly as possible and  
 23 we'll use whatever we can to do that.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you have ambulances downstairs and  
 25 paramedics arriving and you're expecting them to come

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1 upstairs, you'd expect them to come up with stretchers?  
 2 A. You would, sir, but the stretchers they use from  
 3 ambulances are not really practical to do that because  
 4 they are generally like a trolley stretcher, so  
 5 obviously we had a flight of stairs to get up, so that  
 6 would be almost impossible and ---  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And this was part of your mental process  
 8 at the time?  
 9 A. I think so because obviously I'd been to lots of  
 10 incidents where you see paramedics bring the trolley  
 11 stretcher out of the ambulance. They're difficult  
 12 things to use, that you probably have to have some  
 13 familiarity with using them. For them to be used,  
 14 you've got to get them up a flight of 20 stairs or  
 15 whatever it was.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.  
 17 MR DE LA POER: Those stairs, you knew because you'd come up  
 18 them ---  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. --- presented an obstacle for people who were not able to  
 21 move themselves?  
 22 A. Definitely. But for me, and there are various  
 23 entrances, aren't there? For me, there was never any  
 24 possibility of using the other entrances. That was the  
 25 route in and out because that was where the ambulances

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1 were coming to. So we had to find a way to get people  
 2 down those stairs and I think everyone who was involved  
 3 did their very best to do that. It was an extremely  
 4 difficult manoeuvre to make, really.  
 5 Q. And none of my questions are intended to cast doubt on  
 6 the fact that everybody who was there did their absolute  
 7 best with what they had. We touched on yesterday the  
 8 fact that your understanding about the capability of the  
 9 Fire and Rescue Service has developed since this  
 10 incident.  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. You clearly discounted NWS's own trolley stretchers  
 13 because of the staircase. Did you know in May 2017 that  
 14 the Fire and Rescue Service had stretchers particularly  
 15 designed to extract people from difficult and  
 16 challenging situations?  
 17 A. I would say not. I think... I didn't specifically ask  
 18 for the Fire and Rescue Service to come to the scene.  
 19 I was aware early on that they had been told because  
 20 that came out as a radio communication. I don't think  
 21 at any point I thought to myself, "Where are they?  
 22 They've got a stock of stretchers". I don't think  
 23 anybody else said to me, "Boss, where are the fires?  
 24 They could do this". I don't think Paddy Ennis said  
 25 that to me. I don't think there was anyone who gave me

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1 a prompt to say, "Fire and Rescue Service could help us  
 2 with this because they've got a stack of stretchers on  
 3 every fire appliance". That didn't happen.  
 4 Q. We know it took over an hour for the final casualty to  
 5 be taken out of the City Room.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Over an hour from 10.30?  
 7 MR DE LA POER: From 10.31. Obviously a very long time  
 8 indeed for anybody with serious injuries, a long time  
 9 for them to experience and a long time in terms of  
 10 increasing risk to them. As this was all unfolding, did  
 11 you have a sense that time was passing to that extent or  
 12 did you have the impression it was all happening very  
 13 quickly indeed?  
 14 A. I think my impression was that it was happening very  
 15 quickly indeed. There was a lot going on, a lot of  
 16 radio traffic that I was answering or giving out  
 17 directions, and lots of people coming to me. I think  
 18 the whole thing --- it's probably the most intense hour,  
 19 hour and a half of my life, certainly professional life,  
 20 but it did not seem to last to me all that long.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I hope it remains that way, too.  
 22 A. I do too, sir.  
 23 MR DE LA POER: I think we have reached in our chronology  
 24 just after 23.10. Mr Lopez, simply to show it, to mark  
 25 what is going on at 23.11.24, {INQ035612/236}, you are

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1 recorded as speaking to Sergeant McGowan.  
 2 Next, {INQ035612/243}, 23.12.35, speaking to  
 3 Paddy Ennis.  
 4 Then audio broadcast 5199, so that still image was  
 5 at 23.12.35, and at 23.12.54, you contact control and  
 6 say:  
 7 "I've just spoken to the ambulance Bronze now. He's  
 8 saying they've set up a casualty clearing at the  
 9 entrance to Victoria, so casualties could be going to  
 10 various hospitals, so if you cancel those two officers  
 11 at the moment until we find out where everyone is likely  
 12 to go, I don't think there's any rush on that."  
 13 That "cancel those two officers", that was because  
 14 earlier you had dispatched two officers to hospital in  
 15 order to warn the hospitals, I think, about casualties  
 16 coming in; is that right?  
 17 A. Yes, and I think to sort of start to get a list of who's  
 18 actually going to each of those hospitals as a casualty.  
 19 I think later on we may come to that, but (inaudible)  
 20 officers did that.  
 21 Q. We don't need to look at all these stills, but can you  
 22 confirm having reviewed the sequence of events that over  
 23 the next 20 minutes or so you speak to various GMP and  
 24 BTP officers?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. For example, {INQ035612/256}, we'll just take that one.  
 2 You are seen speaking to an Inspector McDonald and  
 3 a Sergeant Corrigan, 23.14.28, who immediately walk out  
 4 following your conversation. Would you have given them  
 5 some sort of instruction?  
 6 A. I did. On that particular night for the City of  
 7 Manchester division, there were two response inspectors  
 8 on, myself and Phil McDonald. Phil had come from his  
 9 station, in the south of the division, and came to me  
 10 and asked me what he wanted -- what he wanted...  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we find that picked up on the  
 12 body-worn video.  
 13 MR DE LA POER: Yes.  
 14 A. Do you want me to expand on that then? Because what  
 15 I asked him to do was can he carry on with business as  
 16 usual, really, could he cover the whole division -- and  
 17 clearly, you know, we've got an extremely serious event  
 18 here, but anywhere else on the division there are still  
 19 things happening that the police would be expected to go  
 20 to, so Phil agreed he would cover the whole division as  
 21 the response inspector.  
 22 Q. Can I just ask you to keep your voice up very slightly?  
 23 A. Sorry.  
 24 Q. Next we're going to look at 23.17.53, line 5673.  
 25 You are in conversation with Sergeant Hare captured on

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1 body-worn camera within the City Room. Sergeant Hare  
 2 says:  
 3 "Boss, we are happy now, which is any injured  
 4 parties we can take out and get first aid."  
 5 Then he says next after you've said something he  
 6 says:  
 7 "We need more paramedics, we need them in here now."  
 8 And then you say:  
 9 "They have a casualty clearing area out there which  
 10 is fine but we need them in here. He's just gone to go  
 11 get them."  
 12 That's at 23.17.53. What were you talking about  
 13 there?  
 14 A. A line earlier, I'd sent one of the BTP cops down for  
 15 two particular casualties. From that, I think it's  
 16 because I had some concerns about how seriously they  
 17 were injured and the fact they were still here. So it  
 18 reads to me there I sent a BTP officer down to try and  
 19 encourage some paramedics to come into the room.  
 20 Q. So even at 23.17.53, and even though you knew that there  
 21 was a casualty clearing area out on the station  
 22 concourse, you still thought paramedics needed to come  
 23 into the City Room?  
 24 A. Yes, and that may have been as a result of one of the  
 25 officers there saying to me, "Boss, those two need some

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1 extra attention".  
 2 Q. Next, we're going to look at {INQ035612/280}, which is  
 3 slightly under 2 minutes after you have said that.  
 4 You are captured in the City Room at 23.19.41 speaking  
 5 to Mr Ennis.  
 6 Again, I don't want to ask you to do something  
 7 that isn't possible, but looking at the sequence you  
 8 appear to have tasked a BTP officer to try and get some  
 9 more paramedics up there. You have it clearly in your  
 10 mind that you want more paramedics in the City Room at  
 11 23.17.53. Less than 2 minutes later, you're speaking to  
 12 Mr Ennis. Is that something you might have said to him,  
 13 that you can recall saying to him, or can you just not  
 14 say?  
 15 A. I can't say exactly, but I think from that previous  
 16 radio message I still had concerns that some of the  
 17 people in that room were very badly injured and it was  
 18 possibly beyond the capabilities of the first aid skills  
 19 of the officers and others who were there.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you wanted paramedics in for some  
 21 time, you sent officers down to ask at the casualty  
 22 clearing station, or wherever the paramedics are, to  
 23 bring them up, you probably have spoken to Paddy Ennis  
 24 about it too. What response were you getting to your --  
 25 I know they don't come, but what verbal response -- are

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1 you being told they are not going to come, they may  
 2 come, they will come?  
 3 A. I think for that, sir, I don't know what the officers  
 4 were told when they got to the casualty clearing station  
 5 because I presume they have asked for that and I don't  
 6 know what --  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You didn't get a report back from them?  
 8 A. No, not that I --  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know it's difficult.  
 10 A. (Overspeaking).  
 11 MR DE LA POER: We do know that by the time you are speaking  
 12 to Mr Ennis, there are in fact two more paramedics,  
 13 members of the Hazardous Area Response Team, in the form  
 14 of Ms Vaughan and Mr Hargreaves. Were you aware of  
 15 their arrival?  
 16 A. Yes, because, as I mentioned yesterday, distinctive  
 17 because of their green helmets, so I do remember two of  
 18 them in there and that is covered in my statement,  
 19 I think.  
 20 Q. It is. Was that enough, so far as you were concerned,  
 21 the point that you had three at just after quarter past  
 22 11?  
 23 A. Well, I don't know how many people were left in the room  
 24 at that point, but in the ideal world, if they work in  
 25 pairs, you'd want a pair for each of those people who

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1 were still there because by that stage they were  
 2 probably either the most seriously injured or the most  
 3 difficult to move, possibly.  
 4 Q. We're going to look at two connected pieces of audio,  
 5 the first is at row 6189, 23.22.50. Refresh your memory  
 6 from that, sergeant (sic). Can you confirm that that  
 7 was a radio broadcast about explo dogs, explosives dogs?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. If we look at the next entry that I want you to look at,  
 10 6349, so it's moving over one, and you say this at  
 11 23.24.27:  
 12 "Have you any update on the GMP dogs? Can you see  
 13 if the FDO can contact BTP or Merseyside or Cheshire to  
 14 see if they've got any actually on duty, explo dogs, who  
 15 might be able to get in here quicker?"  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. I think you have already foreshadowed that in your  
 18 evidence by indicating that you suggested they went out  
 19 of area in order to get those dogs in.  
 20 A. Yes. So on-duty ones would obviously be able to respond  
 21 quicker than anybody who's turned out from home.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you expect there to be an  
 23 explosion dog on duty in Manchester?  
 24 A. I wouldn't expect one, sir. There'd certainly be dog  
 25 handlers on duty.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If I'm not allowed to know any of  
 2 this --  
 3 A. I don't actually know, but not all dog handlers have an  
 4 explo-trained dog.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you wouldn't know the number that  
 6 there are? Or perhaps you wouldn't be allowed to tell  
 7 me, anyway.  
 8 A. The numbers I simply don't know. A dog handler on  
 9 duty -- whoever is on duty that night would know whether  
 10 he, she or their colleagues had an explo dog as well as  
 11 a general purpose dog.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you had to call out an explosion  
 13 dog before?  
 14 A. For an incident?  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 16 A. I wouldn't say so for an incident. I obviously used  
 17 them -- when I was in the PoISA role we used them a lot  
 18 for defensive searches of buildings.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you.  
 20 MR DE LA POER: {INQ035612/312}, please, just to establish  
 21 what can be seen at 23.25.53. This is Chief Inspector  
 22 Dexter walking past you in the City Room.  
 23 Then {INQ035612/315}. Chief Inspector Dexter again  
 24 walking past you. You both appear to notice him and to  
 25 turn to walk towards him.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Do you recall seeing Chief Inspector Dexter that night?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. I appreciate that you spoke to him a number of times.  
 5 We've got the dictaphone and I'm not proposing to take  
 6 you through that dictaphone. Have you had a chance to  
 7 see that dictaphone to see yourself on it?  
 8 A. Yes, I think some of the extracts are in here, aren't  
 9 they?  
 10 Q. Yes. Just summarise for us, please, what you were  
 11 speaking to Chief Inspector Dexter about at this early  
 12 stage?  
 13 A. Well, again I can't remember the exact conversations,  
 14 but I think I was aware he was there as the  
 15 ground-assigned tactical firearms commander, probably  
 16 along the lines of, is the search still going on, which  
 17 was in the arena, which I think I mentioned yesterday,  
 18 kind of separate to what we were doing. That would be,  
 19 in summary really, probably what we spoke about.  
 20 I probably gave an update on what we'd been doing.  
 21 I also think I gave him an update, and he might have  
 22 seen it for himself, on where the casualties were being  
 23 treated near to the entrance.  
 24 Q. What you say in your statement -- you can look at it if  
 25 you want to refresh your memory as to the context, it's

1 your second statement paragraph 45, but I'll quote it to  
 2 you -- is that:  
 3 "Chief Inspector Dexter took the JESIP role."  
 4 A. Well, I would say that again we were talkers before  
 5 about timing-wise in the statements. Probably the  
 6 reason I said that was later on, when everybody had been  
 7 removed from the City Room and I went down to the  
 8 concourse area, he was then at the sort of main entrance  
 9 and by then the Fire Service had arrived and the  
 10 Ambulance Service. So in terms of that JESIP role, the  
 11 tactical commanders getting together, that looked to me  
 12 as though that was a tactical commanders' gathering or  
 13 huddle -- it's termed a huddle in the JESIP policy,  
 14 isn't it -- so that's probably what I meant by that. At  
 15 that moment when he arrived, no, we didn't discuss the  
 16 sort of JESIP roles, I don't think.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you all hear at the back all right?  
 18 Okay. I find it occasionally a bit difficult. I'm  
 19 really sorry, because I don't want to make life any more  
 20 difficult, but what you're saying is really important.  
 21 A. I'm sorry.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: Row 6704, please, within the audio schedule,  
 23 timed at 23.28.38. There is contact with you over the  
 24 radio about an enquiry from Network Rail wanting to know  
 25 where is the command post. What you say is in the final

1 line:  
 2 "Yes, I think at the moment we're just trying to  
 3 clear any casualties from the hall, so I don't want any  
 4 more coming into the entrance hall as well who haven't  
 5 already been in here. I think once the dust settles  
 6 we'll see him at the front entrance."  
 7 So did you have in mind that that, at that stage in  
 8 the evening, once you had done what you were engaged in,  
 9 would be the right place for a command post?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. You are, of course, at 23.30 still in the City Room,  
 12 aren't you?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. We'll see that on slide 339, please {INQ035612/339}.  
 15 You are there again speaking to Mr Ennis.  
 16 7406, just after that contact, at 23.36, again  
 17 mention of an explosives dog, that time from control to  
 18 you.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Then at 7511, 23.36.55, we can see an entry with  
 21 Mr Nawaz's name against. So we are now an hour and  
 22 nearly 6 minutes after the explosion. Mr Nawaz says:  
 23 "Silver."  
 24 To which control says:  
 25 "Night Silver, go ahead."

1 And he says:  
 2 "Can you just ask Inspector Smith, I'm going to ring  
 3 him now, can he answer his phone?"  
 4 And then that message is relayed to you and you pass  
 5 your number.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Prior to 23.36.55, had you had any direct contact with  
 8 Superintendent Nawaz?  
 9 A. No.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And from your point of view, the reason  
 11 for speaking on the phone rather than your radio?  
 12 A. For him to contact me, do you mean?  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is there one? Is it just easier for you  
 14 to talk to the phone?  
 15 A. There is a facility on the phone -- on the radio to --  
 16 point-to-point it's called, so he can speak directly to  
 17 my handset. But my guess is from that exchange that he  
 18 wanted to speak to me on my phone. And it was in my  
 19 pocket so in the noise and things going on he wanted me  
 20 to make sure I was going to answer it there and then.  
 21 MR DE LA POER: We're going to see later in the evening, as  
 22 one of the last entries we look at, that there's  
 23 a similar request made over the radio involving  
 24 Superintendent Nawaz. Did you speak to him at this  
 25 point in the evening?

1 A. Um...  
 2 Q. Of course if it was by telephone it wouldn't necessarily  
 3 be captured.  
 4 A. Certainly the next entry is only 6 seconds, so my guess  
 5 would be he might have phoned and I have not got it out  
 6 of my pocket quick enough. But a couple of entries  
 7 further down there's a 3-minute conversation there,  
 8 isn't there?  
 9 Q. There is within the mobile telephone records. Do you  
 10 recall that conversation?  
 11 A. Well, in general terms the content of it I think was he  
 12 just wanted an update of what was happening.  
 13 Q. So the timing of that, just for the record, is 23.38 for  
 14 a period, as you say, of 3 minutes and 3 seconds.  
 15 Next, INQ --  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, just for my benefit, he's been  
 17 replaced as Night Silver, is that right, as far as this  
 18 operation is concerned?  
 19 MR DE LA POER: I think Superintendent Hill didn't take over  
 20 until midnight or just before.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: Did you understand him to be the Silver  
 23 commander at that time?  
 24 A. Mr Nawaz?  
 25 Q. Yes.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Did he convey any tactical plan to you at that stage?  
 3 A. No.  
 4 Q. Did you give you any command decision or instruction?  
 5 A. No, I don't think so.  
 6 Q. Next we're going to look at {INQ035612/382}. 23.43.46.  
 7 You are speaking with Mr Ennis.  
 8 Then at 23.47.03 in our audio schedule, please, this  
 9 is otherwise confirmed as having taken place a little  
 10 earlier than this, but this is the point at which you  
 11 broadcast it. It's at 23.47.03, entry 8341. You  
 12 broadcast -- I'm sorry, it's not an easy document to  
 13 manipulate:  
 14 "All the injured are out of the booking hall now."  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. That gives us a moment in time there, although, as I  
 17 say, in fact, that had happened slightly earlier than  
 18 that as we can see from CCTV.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you're talking to a radio operator  
 20 again?  
 21 A. Yes, sir. The expectation there is that they'll be  
 22 typing that on the log so if anybody -- all of these  
 23 entries, really, if anybody wants to read it, it's on  
 24 that log.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

1 MR DE LA POER: There are further occasions on which you  
 2 speak to Chief Inspector Dexter. I don't propose to go  
 3 into the detail of those given the time and given the  
 4 fact that we'll deal with him in relation to his audio  
 5 as far as those conversations are necessary when he  
 6 comes to give evidence. But we can see on the sequence  
 7 of events — we won't bring it up — but at one point  
 8 you are speaking to Detective Inspector Dalby.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Why were you speaking to her?  
 11 A. She was the detective inspector on nights. There's one  
 12 detective inspector that covers the force on nights and  
 13 Natalie Dalby was on that night.  
 14 Q. Was she present there as part of the criminal  
 15 investigation response by GMP?  
 16 A. Yes, the start of that, yes.  
 17 Q. We're going to go to just after midnight with the last  
 18 few entries that you and I are going to deal with.  
 19 00.04.01, {INQ035612/429}. We looked at this with Chief  
 20 Inspector Graham of British Transport Police. We can  
 21 see there that she is on the screen; do you see that?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Thank you very much indeed. That is captured by some  
 24 audio, the reference is 9056, inspector. We've looked  
 25 at them already with Chief Inspector Graham, but might

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1 it be summarised in this way? Did you have  
 2 a constructive and professional conversation with her?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. In which she offered you BTP officers?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. She outranked you?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Help us with your perspective. Was she in charge of you  
 9 at that point, had she taken over by reason of her rank,  
 10 or was there some other relationship between you?  
 11 A. I don't think she'd taken over from me. I don't think  
 12 she came to me saying, "I am the BTP Silver, Bronze or  
 13 whatever". I think she was just wanted again an update,  
 14 similar to Mr Nawaz, of where we were up to, really.  
 15 Q. Did you coordinate, do you think?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. I'll deal with the rest by way of summary with you and  
 18 then we'll come to some final matters. Is it right that  
 19 you spoke to officers from the explosive ordinance  
 20 disposal unit?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. You also spoke to Superintendent Worth, who I think was  
 23 the supervisor of Inspector Dalby?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. And at just before 1 o'clock, the final slide that

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1 I will show, {INQ035612/531}, are you speaking to  
 2 a large number of officers in the City Room?  
 3 A. Yes. It's not clear from there where I'm speaking to  
 4 them, but I'll go with what the narrative says.  
 5 Q. Thank you very much indeed.  
 6 Did you continue to remain on duty and at the  
 7 Victoria Exchange complex for some time?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. About what time, to the best of your recollection, did  
 10 you leave?  
 11 A. I think about 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning, something  
 12 like that. I can't be sure.  
 13 Q. Did you remain on duty after you left or was that the  
 14 conclusion of that shift?  
 15 A. No, I went back to Longsight, which was my home station  
 16 then, and I was there for a short time afterwards.  
 17 I think a normal shift was from 9 pm to 7 am and I think  
 18 I finished before 7 am.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that's reasonable!  
 20 A. Thank you, sir.  
 21 MR DE LA POER: We're now going to look at some of the  
 22 matters you raised in debrief documents and we will,  
 23 at the conclusion of that, just deal with one matter  
 24 that I know that you wish to say —  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you deal with that,

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1 interaction with Chief Inspector Dexter. So you talked  
 2 to him on a few occasions. Were you just exchanging  
 3 information and then carrying on with you dealing with  
 4 unarmed and him dealing with armed or was he giving you  
 5 direction as a senior officer? Can you, just in general  
 6 terms, tell me?  
 7 A. I don't think ... I think certainly there were two  
 8 separate — we had two separate commands: I had the  
 9 unarmed officers, he had the armed officers, that's  
 10 something that was still ongoing, the search and so on,  
 11 so I think probably his focus was more on that. I think  
 12 he was reasonably satisfied with what was happening in  
 13 my world, if you like, with the evacuation of the  
 14 casualties.  
 15 It's very difficult to know exactly what we were  
 16 talking about. I know his dictaphone does capture some  
 17 of that, the conversations with me, but it's hard to  
 18 give detail on what we were saying really.  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, thank you.  
 20 MR DE LA POER: The first debrief is a handwritten one,  
 21 {INQ000739/3}.  
 22 This is under the heading of "What did not go well":  
 23 "Radio communications."  
 24 You'll be able to read your own handwriting better  
 25 than I can. What point were you seeking to make when

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1 you put this into the debrief. I should say that it is  
 2 dated 26 July 2017.  
 3 A. I think the first point there, any information that was  
 4 coming in to BTP, there may be a danger there of that  
 5 not being given to us and equally any extra information  
 6 we were getting might not have been going out to all  
 7 their patrols. I think in terms of the City Room itself  
 8 I'm happy with the contact I had with the sergeants and  
 9 the PCs there, that they were getting the information  
 10 that they needed there.  
 11 But I think this incident, probably unluckily,  
 12 happened in an area where two police forces had some  
 13 kind of involvement. Had it been out on Deansgate,  
 14 solely GMP, BTP wouldn't have been involved at all. Any  
 15 extra agency creates slightly more complication and  
 16 I think that's probably what I was trying to get across  
 17 in that.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there's difficulty in communication,  
 19 stuff coming in on BTP wouldn't get to you and  
 20 vice versa?  
 21 A. No, unless we actually spoke to each other about it  
 22 (overspeaking).  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What's the solution?  
 24 A. One channel is not a solution, in my view, sir. I'm not  
 25 a comms expert, but we have to have separate channels

1 for each. I know within JESIP there's a suggestion of  
 2 a command channel, one channel that will be given out  
 3 that every agency will go on to. I think there are  
 4 difficulties in that where there's different protocols  
 5 amongst even us and BTP.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not an expert either, but is there  
 7 any possibility of linking one into the other, just  
 8 connecting them together?  
 9 A. I don't know whether that can be done, but in normal  
 10 times --  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't need it?  
 12 A. Absolutely. We're in our own separate --  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But then you did need it?  
 14 A. Yes. For everybody to have that -- the situational  
 15 awareness is the phrase. For every cop who's there,  
 16 whether from BTP or GMP, could they have heard all the  
 17 information that was going out? No, they couldn't,  
 18 because BTP (overspeaking).  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have heard from people on the ground  
 20 that, never mind about who's got primacy, when you're  
 21 actually there, you do what a senior officer tells you  
 22 to do when it's appropriate. Obviously, at the latter  
 23 end it may not have been appropriate for  
 24 a chief inspector from BTP to take over because you've  
 25 been running the show for a long time.

1 A. Yes.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But if they're all actually acting  
 3 together, they're all policemen, then they all need to  
 4 be connected on the same radio system in some way.  
 5 A. Yeah. That would help and, you know, I think in terms  
 6 of who was in charge, we mentioned it before, but  
 7 certainly one of those BTP sergeants, I think  
 8 Sergeant Cawley, afterwards came to me and said, "I've  
 9 never been happier to see some pips turn up on a job",  
 10 so he wasn't distinguishing, and he thought, I'm an  
 11 inspector and that's my (overspeaking) responsibility.  
 12 But, yes, if everyone had the same information  
 13 coming out over the air that would be helpful  
 14 (overspeaking).  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Then you would be directing everybody?  
 16 A. Yes, I think within the room we were all working  
 17 definitely as one team. Outside of that -- I know there  
 18 were other BTP officers outside of that and maybe ones  
 19 who were coming en route wouldn't have been able to hear  
 20 what was actually at the scene as they're not on our  
 21 channel. The technicalities and the practicalities of  
 22 everyone being on that channel are probably --  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You'll leave that to others?  
 24 A. Difficult to overcome, I would say.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Point 2. I don't think we

1 need to worry too much --  
 2 MR DE LA POER: I'm not cornered about that, sir. I was  
 3 just going to invite the inspector -- whether there's  
 4 anything he wants to expand on what he's said already  
 5 about lack of equipment, stretchers.  
 6 A. No, other than I'm sure, in a large venue like that,  
 7 probably one of the recommendations may be for the chair  
 8 to say that they should have a stock of simple  
 9 stretchers there.  
 10 Q. Lack of trauma training, we dealt with this at the  
 11 beginning of your evidence.  
 12 This document you filled out before you went and  
 13 took part in a round table structured debrief; is that  
 14 right?  
 15 A. Yes, it was to sort of feed into that, if you like.  
 16 Q. Yes. So we'll see over the page -- I know we will come  
 17 back to this -- one of the things you regard as having  
 18 gone well is great team work. Can I reassure you,  
 19 inspector, that we will come back to that at the  
 20 conclusion of your evidence. But you recorded it there  
 21 as your second point.  
 22 And then on {INQ000739/5}, the last matter to look  
 23 at in this document, you go back to the radio comms and  
 24 you comment upon JESIP. Again, if you could just  
 25 summarise what you were trying to communicate there.



1 A. Yes, I think that point there is JESIP obviously is  
 2 a tri—service arrangement. Really, I think I had quite  
 3 close liaison with the only other service that was  
 4 there, which was NWAS in the form of Mr Ennis. Had the  
 5 Fire Service been there, I have no doubt that we would  
 6 also have worked as a team, and I understand the  
 7 frustrations fully of the fire officers who weren't  
 8 there.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You didn't work as a team, did you, with  
 10 NWAS in reality? You're asking to have more paramedics  
 11 up there, you saw no reason why not, and they weren't  
 12 coming. So to say you were working together, I'm not  
 13 being critical of you, but is that realistic?  
 14 A. I was in the sense of working together with the — my  
 15 equivalent, I regarded him as my equivalent, so in terms  
 16 of commanders he and I, I thought —  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is Mr Ennis we're talking about?  
 18 A. Yes. He may have been equally as keen as me to have  
 19 paramedics in there, I'm sure that'll come out in his  
 20 evidence, and it may be that he was constrained by  
 21 whatever was happening —  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, whatever, but to say that the two  
 23 organisations worked together hand—in—glove there...  
 24 A. Well, I think we did. We did. And certainly I saw only  
 25 the bit of it initially, only the bit in the City Room,

1 and then the officers who were working with me, who  
 2 helped the casualties out, saw a lot more of it at the  
 3 casualty clearing station. I didn't see that until  
 4 right towards the conclusion.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not saying at the moment who's right  
 6 or who's wrong or indeed how you could improve it.  
 7 I was just remarking on the fact that actually you  
 8 wanted more paramedics up there and you didn't get them  
 9 for what you thought was no good reason.  
 10 A. Yes. Certainly initially.  
 11 MR DE LA POER: Thank you, Mr Smith. We're going to look at  
 12 one last document, you and I. We will not look at every  
 13 part of it, {INQ000734/1}. This is the structured  
 14 debrief where you and others are in a room, you are  
 15 number 4 on this, and we're going to go straight to  
 16 {INQ000734/4}.  
 17 I'm going to pick out those — this is an area for  
 18 improvement against number 4:  
 19 "There was general awareness of the initial staff  
 20 responding around what Plato meant."  
 21 I didn't quite understand that. I appreciate that's  
 22 somebody else who has rendered what you have said in  
 23 discussion. Can you help us with what it was you were  
 24 saying about Plato in the course of that debrief?  
 25 A. Yes, I think there's something missing there, possibly

1 the words "lack of", because I think the gist of what  
 2 I was saying was there was a general lack of awareness  
 3 with the initial staff and that was, as we covered  
 4 yesterday, including me.  
 5 Q. Yes. {INQ000734/5}, again picking out particular of  
 6 these. We may have covered it, but the third one down:  
 7 "Initially not many paramedics attended the scene  
 8 and came upstairs to where the casualties were, but set  
 9 up triage areas down two flights of stairs. Ambulance  
 10 crews at North Manchester Hospital were not aware of the  
 11 incident."  
 12 I think we have probably covered that, other than  
 13 that last sentence?  
 14 A. That last sentence wouldn't have come from me because I  
 15 didn't go to North Manchester (overspeaking) it's one of  
 16 the other officers.  
 17 Q. We can see there are two other contributors to that  
 18 point. Have you said all that you have to say about  
 19 paramedics in the City Room?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Two down from that:  
 22 "No Silver arrived at the scene to take over the  
 23 police incident command JESIP role, which meant that the  
 24 firearms ground command dual—hatted which was not  
 25 ideal."

1 You are there referring, firstly, to Mr Nawaz,  
 2 I think, and secondly to Mr Dexter?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Why was it not ideal that Mr Dexter was dual—hatted?  
 5 A. Well, I think his focus, certainly initially, was  
 6 command of the firearms officers and the search that  
 7 they were doing. I think, as I mentioned earlier on,  
 8 I know that later on he did go and carry out a tactical  
 9 commander's briefing really because I know he gave  
 10 updates about priority of casualties, how many had gone  
 11 to hospital and so on. So if there had been another  
 12 Silver commander there that role perhaps would have been  
 13 done earlier on.  
 14 Q. {INQ000734/6}, please. We can see the differing radio  
 15 channels. I think that was the point you made in your  
 16 handwritten — and we can also see Plato, which I think  
 17 you have dealt with earlier on in this document.  
 18 {INQ000734/7}, please. This is the final matter  
 19 that I wish to ask you about. You've already touched on  
 20 team working and the chairman has asked you some  
 21 questions about it. Under "Process", two down:  
 22 "Can—do attitudes of all officers who attended  
 23 scene."  
 24 You told me before you gave evidence yesterday that  
 25 there was something in particular that was included in

1 your witness statement that you wanted to have the  
 2 opportunity to say and I said that I would give you that  
 3 opportunity, so this is that opportunities, please,  
 4 inspector. We can take that down from the screen.  
 5 A. I think I realised that I am here because of my role but  
 6 I'm also representing quite a lot of people who did  
 7 a lot on that night in that room and within a day and  
 8 a half after this incident, I made some notes which  
 9 formed the basis of my first statement. So the sort of  
 10 sentiments that I put in that statement were sort of  
 11 very fresh to me then, a day and a half afterwards.  
 12 There was just one paragraph that I would like to  
 13 read out verbatim because I thought probably long and  
 14 hard about it and hopefully that captures some of what  
 15 we did and some of the sentiment there and perhaps gives  
 16 some reassurance to people.  
 17 Q. Do you want to do that now? It is the bottom of page 5  
 18 of your first statement.  
 19 A. There's one other line to add, probably first of all:  
 20 "The events of Monday, 22 May 2017 were by far and  
 21 away the most challenging, traumatic and haunting of my  
 22 career. I saw for myself the actions of police  
 23 officers, paramedics and members of the public who  
 24 worked together as one big team to do their very best to  
 25 help the injured, comfort the dying, and give help to

1 the relatives and friends of those affected in the  
 2 immediate aftermath of this tragic incident, and I am  
 3 proud to have been part of that team effort."  
 4 That was reason 4 years ago, I think. My  
 5 sentiments, and I think those of everyone who was  
 6 involved, are exactly the same now.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. We will all certainly  
 8 remember the good things that came out of this as well  
 9 as hopefully finding some things which can be improved.  
 10 A. Thank you, sir.  
 11 MR DE LA POER: That concludes my questioning. Would that  
 12 be a convenient moment for a break?  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When I've asked one question, and you  
 14 can think about it over the break if you like. We have  
 15 been looking, as you are aware, in great detail at what  
 16 some people might regard as great tomes of major  
 17 incident directions, Plato directions, this, that and  
 18 the other. Has it all got too complicated, do you  
 19 think? Would a bit of simplicity be a good idea?  
 20 A. In a word, yes.  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you. Quarter of an hour.  
 22 (11.07 am)  
 23 (A short break)  
 24 (11.25 am)  
 25 MR DE LA POER: Sir, can I first call upon Mr Wood who

1 represents the interests of Mr Sexton and Mr Dexter.  
 2 Questions from MR WOOD  
 3 MR WOOD: Inspector Smith, I have one topic to explore with  
 4 you, please, which will take I think about 5 minutes.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. This is going to be even more  
 6 difficult. Bearing in mind we are not finding it that  
 7 easy to hear you all the time. So if you look at  
 8 Mr Wood all the time, then there's just no hope,  
 9 I think.  
 10 MR WOOD: I won't be remotely offended if you don't look at  
 11 me at all for the purpose of these questions.  
 12 In fact, could you start, please, by taking up the  
 13 audio schedule because the topic I want to explore is  
 14 your identification of the front area to Victoria  
 15 Station as a command post. All right?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Could you go to line 6666 on that schedule, please.  
 18 You've been taken to this before. Just to familiarise  
 19 you with it what we see here, I think, is transmissions  
 20 on the A Division radio channel. There is a request, in  
 21 fact from PC Moore, that says:  
 22 "We've got the rail incident officer from  
 23 Network Rail. They're asking where the command post is.  
 24 Am I able to pass on because I don't know where it is?"  
 25 Do you see that?

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Then I think control asked the question:  
 3 "Where is the command post? We've got someone from  
 4 North-west Rail needs to liaise."  
 5 Inspector Cooklynn says:  
 6 "Unfortunately, I don't know that at the moment.  
 7 I'm sorry, I don't know whether Smithy could help you."  
 8 Which we can assume is you, I think.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. You are then asked that question:  
 11 "Where are we having the command post? North-west  
 12 Rail need to liaise with us."  
 13 And you say:  
 14 "Yeah, I think at the moment we're just trying to  
 15 clear any casualties from the hall. I don't want any  
 16 more coming in to entrance hall as well who haven't  
 17 already been in here. I think once the dust settles  
 18 we'll see them at the front entrance."  
 19 Control say:  
 20 "Boss, confirmed."  
 21 Can you go a little further down to line 6837:  
 22 "Boss, confirm that's the front entrance to the  
 23 arena?"  
 24 And you say:  
 25 "No, no, the railway station."

1 The response:  
 2 "Front entrance to the railway station?"  
 3 "Roger 3027."  
 4 Do you see that?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. I don't want it brought up on screen because there's  
 7 a reference to a young person on it, but on the FWIN,  
 8 the incident log for which our INQ reference is 7214, on  
 9 page 28 {INQ007214/28}, that then goes on to the FWIN  
 10 and I'm going to read the entry to you. It says:  
 11 "Inspector 6694 [which is you], command post will be  
 12 the front entrance to Victoria Railway Station."  
 13 All right?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Can you go a bit further back up the audio schedule to  
 16 line 6478, please. That's the wrong reference, I'm  
 17 sorry -- no, it is 6478, so the bottom of the page,  
 18 about two pages (sic) up. This is timed at 23.25.56.  
 19 You were in fact shown the extract from the CCTV  
 20 schedule showing this, but I'm just going to read this  
 21 commentary because it's the same. It says:  
 22 "As GMP police Chief Inspector Mark Dexter walked  
 23 past police Inspector Michael Smith and GMP Police  
 24 Sergeant James McGowan, they both appear to notice him  
 25 and turn and walk towards him and they appear to have

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1 a brief conversation, standing on the extreme left of  
 2 this CCTV image."  
 3 You were asked some questions by Mr de la Poer about  
 4 the conversations with Mr Dexter over the course of the  
 5 night.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. I just want to ask you this: is it possible that your  
 8 identification of the command post as the front entrance  
 9 to the railway station was in any way influenced by your  
 10 previous brief discussion with Mr Dexter or was it  
 11 a completely independent selection by you of a command  
 12 post or can't you remember?  
 13 A. I can't remember, but I would think that is the most  
 14 sensible place to have it bearing in mind what was  
 15 happening there.  
 16 MR WOOD: Thank you very much, inspector.  
 17 Sir, that's all I ask.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Wood.  
 19 MR DE LA POER: Next I am going to turn to Ms Roberts  
 20 Queen's Counsel on behalf of NWS.  
 21 (Pause)  
 22 Ms Roberts was kind enough to indicate that there  
 23 were some technical issues with her feed. I can see  
 24 that those persist. I wonder if she could be given some  
 25 assistance behind the scenes and I will turn instead to

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1 -- I think it will be Ms Johnson on behalf of  
 2 Greater Manchester Combined Authority.  
 3 Questions from MS JOHNSON  
 4 MS JOHNSON: I'm going to ask you some questions on behalf  
 5 of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service.  
 6 Three short topics. The first one is the role of  
 7 fire. You very candidly said that you weren't aware on  
 8 the night that some Fire Service personnel were trauma  
 9 trained or of the SRT capability and the stretchers that  
 10 they carry. Does it follow from that that you also  
 11 didn't have a full understanding of the role that the  
 12 Fire Service would expect to play in helping to extract  
 13 casualties from the warm zone in an incident like this?  
 14 A. Yes, because, as I think I said yesterday, my knowledge  
 15 of Plato was quite limited really. I certainly had  
 16 never been involved in any training exercise where  
 17 I might have seen them in action.  
 18 Q. The second topic that I wanted to ask you about was the  
 19 forward command post. You have told the inquiry that,  
 20 in the first hour or so, the FCP wasn't at the forefront  
 21 of your mind but you explained that you spoke to the  
 22 commanders who were present from NWS and BTP. Did it  
 23 occur to you at any point in that hour that the Fire  
 24 Service commander wasn't present?  
 25 A. No, I think -- again, I mentioned this earlier on this

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1 morning -- I was aware from one of the earlier  
 2 transmissions that NWS and the Fire Service had been  
 3 informed. Really, I -- there was no point during that  
 4 first hour, hour and a half, where I thought: where are  
 5 the Fire Service? Nobody else prompted me to ask where  
 6 they were and nothing came from comms at all to prompt  
 7 me about that. So them not being there, it may sound  
 8 surprising now, but their not being there didn't cause  
 9 me any concern, it probably never even crossed my mind  
 10 after that despite, I accept, that JESIP relies on  
 11 a tri-service approach.  
 12 Q. From what you now know, having looked, I think, at some  
 13 of these policies and procedures in more detail, do you  
 14 think it should have occurred to you, bearing in mind  
 15 your role, that the fire commander wasn't there and  
 16 perhaps something should be done to call them to the  
 17 scene?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. The final topic I want to ask you about is about the  
 20 RVP. We heard yesterday that you gave the Cathedral car  
 21 park as the RVP at 22.36 and then we looked at the  
 22 second transmission at 22.40.18, where you redirected  
 23 officers to come to the scene. You agreed yesterday  
 24 with Mr de la Poer Queen's Counsel that, as far as you  
 25 were concerned, the effect of that second transmission

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1 was to cancel the Cathedral car park RVP and you said it  
 2 was your expectation, following that, that the police  
 3 and ambulance resources would go directly to the arena.  
 4 The question I wanted to ask you is this: I appreciate  
 5 you have said you didn't think about the Fire Service,  
 6 but if you had done, would it have been your expectation  
 7 that Police Control would have passed on that  
 8 information to Fire Control that the Cathedral car park  
 9 RVP had been cancelled and that the new instruction was  
 10 that they should proceed directly to the arena?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 MS JOHNSON: Thank you. Those are my questions.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Ms Johnson.  
 14 MR DE LA POER: I understand there's a good prospect that we  
 15 might be able to go to Ms Roberts Queen's Counsel now on  
 16 behalf of NWAS.  
 17 Questions from MS ROBERTS  
 18 MS ROBERTS: Can you see me and hear me?  
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can see you and we can hear you.  
 20 Thank you.  
 21 MS ROBERTS: Thank you very much.  
 22 Mr Smith, I would like to pick up on something that  
 23 you said yesterday in answer to questions from  
 24 Mr de la Poer. Before I do that, can I just establish  
 25 that, so far as your arrival at scene is concerned, can

1 we time that at around 22.47?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. All right. So that was within a quarter of an hour or  
 4 so of the explosion taking place?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. What you said yesterday afternoon in answer to questions  
 7 from Mr de la Poer was that you had a plan and that your  
 8 plan was clear, that it was evident that an explosion  
 9 had taken place and that there were badly injured  
 10 people. That became immediately apparent to you, did it  
 11 not?  
 12 A. As soon as I walked in the City Room, yes.  
 13 Q. Absolutely. And you formed a strategy, did you not, on  
 14 how best to deal with the situation that you faced?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. In those early stages, you told us yesterday, those  
 17 early stages being within a quarter of an hour or so of  
 18 the explosion taking place, your strategy was, you told  
 19 us, to get them out, by which you meant the casualties  
 20 who were in the City Room?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. You told us also that you had formed the view, very  
 23 promptly and correctly, if I may say so, that you were  
 24 dealing with a crime scene.  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. That it needed sealing, in other words securing, and  
 2 therefore did that galvanise your decision to get them  
 3 out, to get the casualties out?  
 4 A. It didn't galvanise my decision. The first priority was  
 5 to get the casualties out and get them to a position  
 6 where they could receive proper medical treatment and  
 7 that would be at a hospital.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 A. So that was my first priority. Once that is done, the  
 10 investigation side would start to kick in, and the first  
 11 thing to do would be to preserve what is a major crime  
 12 scene.  
 13 Q. To preserve a major crime scene, but also, you told us,  
 14 to preserve life?  
 15 A. Yes, that's part of my first priority, preserving life  
 16 (inaudible: distorted) suitable treatment (inaudible:  
 17 distorted).  
 18 Q. So to get the casualties out, I think you told us, so  
 19 they could be treated properly?  
 20 A. Yes, some of them clearly had injuries that needed  
 21 treatment at hospital rather than (inaudible: distorted)  
 22 where they were there and then. That's just first aid,  
 23 really, isn't it (inaudible: distorted)?  
 24 Q. Absolutely. Mr Smith, you told us again today that as  
 25 well as forming that view, you also formed the view,

1 quite understandably, that you wanted any and all medics  
 2 to go into the City Room. I just want to ask you,  
 3 is that a view that you formed when you immediately  
 4 entered the City Room?  
 5 A. Yes, I would say so. You want the most expert people in  
 6 there to treat those injuries, stabilise them, or  
 7 whatever term you want to use.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 A. The experts are paramedics from NWAS.  
 10 Q. The phrase you used this morning, when giving your  
 11 evidence, was that was the decision that you had taken  
 12 "at that moment". And I just want to ask you whether  
 13 your decision to get the paramedics in, any and all  
 14 paramedics in at that moment, by that do you mean the  
 15 time before you spoke to Paddy Ennis, before you saw him  
 16 in the City Room?  
 17 A. Well, at that moment -- you can't say the incident, but  
 18 as soon after I arrived there as possible and had seen  
 19 how many injured casualties there were and the extent of  
 20 some of their injuries, yes, that's what I wanted to  
 21 happen.  
 22 Q. Nobody doubts, Mr Smith, that you wanted to do your very  
 23 best for those who remained in the City Room and who  
 24 required quite urgent medical treatment. But I want to  
 25 ask you whether that plan that you have formulated in

1 your mind, to get any and all medics into the City Room,  
 2 whether that changed at some point at around about the  
 3 time, or in fact following, the discussions that you had  
 4 with Paddy Ennis?  
 5 A. I would say the idea of removing them from the room  
 6 never changed. Some people I probably still felt needed  
 7 some expert treatment rather than the first aid  
 8 treatment that they were getting. So whilst it wouldn't  
 9 have been a case to have any and every paramedic in  
 10 there, because there weren't simply that many people  
 11 left after a period of time, I still fundamentally felt  
 12 that there were people in there who needed some  
 13 paramedic treatment rather than the first aid treatment  
 14 that was being provided (inaudible: distorted).  
 15 Q. You told us that you had discounted the possibility of  
 16 a gunman within the room and that, in your opinion, you  
 17 felt that it was safe or safe enough to consider to  
 18 continue to operate within that room. Did you tell  
 19 either of those things to Mr Ennis?  
 20 A. I don't know whether I told him specifically (inaudible:  
 21 distorted) it wasn't safe to be there (inaudible:  
 22 distorted) in the room (inaudible: distorted) would have  
 23 changed what we did (inaudible: distorted) wasn't one,  
 24 there was only one suggestion to my mind ever of there  
 25 being any kind of gunshot injuries and that was very,

1 very quickly discounted, as I said yesterday.  
 2 Q. Thank you. Did you say or articulate to Paddy Ennis  
 3 that you wanted any or all NWS or paramedics to go into  
 4 the City Room? We know that you articulated that over  
 5 your radio and you also apparently articulated that to  
 6 your fellow police officers, but did you specifically  
 7 say that to him or can you not recall?  
 8 A. I can't remember now.  
 9 Q. Would you accept, Mr Smith, as a general principle that  
 10 paramedics are better placed than you to determine where  
 11 casualties should be treated to ensure the best possible  
 12 outcome?  
 13 A. Yes, paramedics are more highly trained in first aid  
 14 than me so, yes, I would agree with that.  
 15 Q. When you articulated your hope and your expectation that  
 16 "you wanted all ambulances in here", by which presumably  
 17 you meant paramedics to go into the City Room, not  
 18 ambulances themselves obviously, and you articulated  
 19 that to your fellow police officers, do you know from  
 20 anything that they said to you whether they told NWS  
 21 personnel that that's what you were saying?  
 22 A. I don't know that because you're asking me to answer on  
 23 behalf of my officers, so I can't say that for sure.  
 24 Q. Did any of them say, "It's all right, boss, we've spoken  
 25 to the NWS we have seen downstairs and they're all on

1 their way up", or, "They've refused to come up", or,  
 2 "There aren't any there"? Did any of them report back  
 3 to you anything?  
 4 A. I don't remember anybody saying to me they're refusing  
 5 to come up, no (inaudible: distorted).  
 6 Q. No. It might help us, Mr Smith, if we were to just  
 7 recap on the chronology to a certain extent. We know  
 8 from what you've told us that you were at scene by  
 9 22.47. We know — this is more for the benefit of the  
 10 chairman and those who are listening — that  
 11 Mr Paddy Ennis is pictured entering Victoria Station  
 12 about 2 minutes after you, so at 22.49, by which time,  
 13 I think you were upstairs within the City Room; is that  
 14 right?  
 15 A. Yes, I went directly from entering the station to the  
 16 City Room.  
 17 Q. From Mr Ennis entering the Victoria Station entrance at  
 18 about 22.49, at 22.53.01, as we know from the evidence  
 19 you have given this morning, you and Paddy Ennis are  
 20 captured within the City Room. As I understand your  
 21 evidence, you told us that you can't be clear now,  
 22 perhaps you weren't even clear then, specifically  
 23 what was said between you.  
 24 A. No, it's impossible to remember individual conversations  
 25 and the only ones that I can remember, I accept that

1 happened, are the ones that were recorded on the  
 2 body-worn video of other officers.  
 3 Q. So that initial conversation then at 22.53.01, and it  
 4 wasn't a continuous conversation or one that lasted any  
 5 length, was it?  
 6 A. Well, I don't know. I can't tell you how long. We  
 7 spoke, over a period, several times. I don't know how  
 8 long each interaction was and what was said.  
 9 Q. Because what we do know, again I'm not sure you've been  
 10 referred to this this morning, Mr Smith, but we know  
 11 that at 22.57.13, Mr Ennis is captured within the  
 12 City Room advising your colleagues  
 13 PC Christopher Dawson:  
 14 "In a minute, we need to start thinking about  
 15 getting some casualties moved out."  
 16 So that's within about 4 minutes of the conversation  
 17 that you and Paddy Ennis have had, that he is talking to  
 18 one of your colleagues and clearly articulating there  
 19 the need to get the casualties out of the City Room.  
 20 A. And that's what I could see taking place within a short  
 21 space of time of officers arriving there.  
 22 Q. Yes. We know within seconds of that conversation, so at  
 23 22.57.59, which for those who are following is at  
 24 {INQ035612/158} of the sequence of events, that  
 25 Mr Ennis, you and EMT UK first aider Ryan Billington are

1 captured within the City Room in discussion. Again  
 2 can you remember what was being said in that  
 3 conversation?  
 4 A. No, I can't, but I think that slide was (inaudible:  
 5 distorted) remember exactly what was said, no.  
 6 Q. One of the things you said, Mr Smith, is that you  
 7 appreciated that, as desperate as you were to get  
 8 paramedics at scene and into the City Room, you  
 9 appreciated that they couldn't be there immediately,  
 10 could they?  
 11 A. No, they couldn't.  
 12 Q. And in fact, it was not until 22.58.28 that the arrival  
 13 of the first ambulance is logged. We have the  
 14 documents, Mr Smith, and I don't intend to show them to  
 15 you now. So that was some 11 minutes or so after you  
 16 had arrived that the first ambulance was able to get to  
 17 scene. That would be because, as you told us yesterday,  
 18 and again today, your words, "It takes a time for them  
 19 to get there". So you knew it would take some time for  
 20 them to get to scene?  
 21 A. Yes, and nothing happens instantly, does it? In that  
 22 intervening period, I think what do we do? Do we do  
 23 nothing, wait for them to arrive, or do we do something  
 24 positive to try and preserve life and help people, do we  
 25 start getting them out of that room? I think that's

1 what did happen.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you would have no idea how long  
 3 it would take the first ambulance to arrive, it could be  
 4 round the corner, it could be further away (inaudible:  
 5 distorted) how far they are away at the time?  
 6 A. It does, sir (overspeaking) and I think what actually  
 7 happened is they met up and came in a convoy,  
 8 effectively .  
 9 MS ROBERTS: As you have already said, the flow of  
 10 casualties, your phrase, a very apt one, if I may say  
 11 so, had already started, and that was the walking  
 12 wounded, what we know as the P3, the priority 3. Those  
 13 had already started to move away from the seat of the  
 14 explosion and move themselves out of the City Room.  
 15 That was already happening, wasn't it?  
 16 A. Yes, and it may even be people who were higher priority  
 17 than P3, if officers, members of the public, were  
 18 assisting them.  
 19 Q. Yes. What we do know, Mr Smith, you were referred to  
 20 a conversation, but the conversation was not repeated to  
 21 you this morning, so I do so. For reference, sir, I'm  
 22 at -- not to go on the screen -- {INQ032824/39}. It's  
 23 the transcript. It's a conversation, Mr Smith, that you  
 24 had with your colleague Police Sergeant Linney. This is  
 25 at 22.59.22. So we know again, just paddling back

1 a little bit, the first conversation with Mr Ennis is at  
 2 22.53.01. By 22.57.13, Mr Ennis is advising Mr Dawson  
 3 to start thinking about getting casualties moved out.  
 4 And at 22.57.59, you and Paddy Ennis were in discussion  
 5 with Mr Billington.  
 6 And although, Mr Smith, quite understandably, you  
 7 can't recall with any specificity what was caused at  
 8 22.57.59 between yourself, Mr Ennis and Mr Billington,  
 9 within a minute and a half of that discussion, at  
 10 22.59.22, you say to Mr Linney, Police Sergeant Linney  
 11 this:  
 12 "If they can get" --  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you stop for a moment? This is  
 14 3494 if you want to follow it. I am just allowing the  
 15 witness to see what is being said.  
 16 MS ROBERTS: Thank you very much, sir.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It is quite a long question so far, so  
 18 I thought we would have a break. Now carry on, thank  
 19 you.  
 20 MS ROBERTS: Here's the question. Is this what you said:  
 21 "If they can get them out, you know, with tables or  
 22 whatever, and just take them out to the entrance"?  
 23 Forgive me, I don't have the line reference, but the  
 24 following message is timed at 22.59.37. It's you to  
 25 Police Sergeant Beasley:

1 "Just anybody who is injured and can go, if they can  
 2 carry them out, tables or anything, we can do that."  
 3 Mr Smith, what you were doing was, in effect,  
 4 putting into place a rescue operation, a mission to get  
 5 these people, these critically injured people, out of  
 6 the City Room as effectively as possible; that's what  
 7 was taking place, isn't it?  
 8 A. I hope so, yes, but once that had happened there were  
 9 people in there who I felt needed some more expert  
 10 treatment than we could provide.  
 11 Q. Absolutely. And that remained your view, as you've told  
 12 us. So the walking wounded had started to make their  
 13 way out already. And we know, Mr Smith, that by 23.07,  
 14 so within 7 or 8 minutes of that instruction to simply  
 15 get those casualties out of the City Room, that the  
 16 first of 38 seriously ill people have been evacuated, as  
 17 per your plan, from the City Room and that within  
 18 35 minutes, Mr Smith, by 23.42, all 38 P1 and P2  
 19 casualties had been evacuated.  
 20 It was suggested to you earlier, Mr Smith, that the  
 21 evacuation of those people from the City Room took --  
 22 I think the phrase used by Mr de la Poer was "a long  
 23 time", in other words an hour and 10 minutes or so  
 24 following the explosion itself. But if we are right  
 25 about this, and the timings do bear this out, don't

1 they, that in fact that evacuation process was  
 2 concluded, upon your instruction, within 35 minutes? Do  
 3 you agree with that?  
 4 A. Well, they're the timings, so I would agree, wouldn't I,  
 5 if they're the timings?  
 6 Q. Okay. In the period between your arrival, some minutes  
 7 passed before you and Mr Ennis are captured speaking to  
 8 each other. The evacuation plan is then put into place  
 9 and we know that thereafter, as you've told us, your  
 10 hope was that that notwithstanding, other paramedics  
 11 would come into the City Room to offer their assistance.  
 12 Would it help you to know, Mr Smith, that at 23.07, when  
 13 the evacuation of those P1 and P2 casualties was taking  
 14 place, only 10 paramedics had been able to attend the  
 15 scene and they were downstairs within the station  
 16 concourse? I'm giving you those numbers because I am  
 17 assuming, Mr Smith, because you've not said otherwise,  
 18 that you hadn't been told by any of your colleagues at  
 19 that stage how many NWAS personnel there were  
 20 downstairs.  
 21 A. I don't know whether I was told or not.  
 22 Q. Can you remember?  
 23 A. No.  
 24 Q. We heard a radio transmission, I think, at about  
 25 23.17.53, which was you encouraging paramedics

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1 (inaudible: no audio). By 23.17, did you know that  
 2 there were already 11 P1 and P2 casualties downstairs in  
 3 what was and what became the casualty clearing station?  
 4 Did you know of the numbers of people that were there  
 5 and who required urgent medical care?  
 6 A. No, I didn't have any update on numbers from the  
 7 casualty clearing station because that's not really my  
 8 sphere of responsibility, is it?  
 9 Q. Did you recall, Mr Smith, the two HART paramedics coming  
 10 into the City Room?  
 11 A. I do, yes, it's in my statement.  
 12 Q. And in fact, we know that by 23.17, two HART paramedics  
 13 were in the City Room alongside Mr Ennis, and you recall  
 14 the presence of all three of them within the City Room  
 15 at that time, do you?  
 16 A. The time I don't know. I'll accept from the schedule  
 17 the time that they came, but certainly it's within my  
 18 schedule that I saw HART paramedics in there and they  
 19 are recognisable, as I've said before, by their green  
 20 helmets, so I knew who they were.  
 21 Q. Thank you.  
 22 Just finally, Mr Smith, you have been asked a number  
 23 of questions about the teamwork that existed between you  
 24 and NWAS, those NWAS personnel you dealt with in the  
 25 City Room and those that you saw subsequently, as

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1 I understand that you did, in the casualty clearing  
 2 station. A suggestion was made by the chairman earlier  
 3 that perhaps there wasn't good teamwork between the two  
 4 organisations because you wanted the paramedics, more of  
 5 them, to go into the City Room, and they weren't. Do  
 6 you think that you and Paddy Ennis worked well together  
 7 as a team?  
 8 A. I do, yes.  
 9 Q. Did you ever have any doubt, Mr Smith, that both you  
 10 and -- well, that Mr Ennis and the HART paramedics who  
 11 went into the City Room -- did you doubt at any moment  
 12 that they were doing their very best for those who were  
 13 within the City Room?  
 14 A. No, I think everybody in the City Room did their very  
 15 best and I would include them in that.  
 16 Q. You read, Mr Smith, if I may so, a very moving paragraph  
 17 from your statement towards the end of the questions  
 18 that you had with Mr de la Poer. Is it your abiding  
 19 view that those within the City Room, and I include  
 20 in that of course Mr Ennis, with whom you primarily  
 21 dealt, that you worked well together alongside each  
 22 other to do your very best to preserve life?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 MS ROBERTS: Thank you very much.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you leave, I just want to --

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1 we know, which you may not know, that four HART medics  
 2 arrived, not just two, four arrived at the same time and  
 3 a designation was made for two of them to stay  
 4 downstairs and two came upstairs. Obviously, we'll have  
 5 to look at all the circumstances of that.  
 6 After the two HART medics arrived, would a further  
 7 two have been of use to you or use to people in the  
 8 City Room?  
 9 A. I don't know at that stage, sir, how many injured people  
 10 were left, but yes, the more the better, really.  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Do you want to ask anything more  
 12 about that, Ms Roberts?  
 13 MS ROBERTS: No, thank you very much.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 15 MR DE LA POER: Sir, can I then turn to the advocates  
 16 representing the bereaved families and begin, please,  
 17 with Mr Weatherby Queen's Counsel.  
 18 Questions from MR WEATHERBY  
 19 MR WEATHERBY: Mr Smith, can you see and hear me?  
 20 A. I can, yes.  
 21 Q. Can I make clear at the outset that the families  
 22 recognise your selfless attempts to assist the  
 23 casualties and thank you on their behalf for the efforts  
 24 that you made on the night. Okay?  
 25 A. Thank you.

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1 Q. On their behalf I have only a few topics in addition to  
 2 the questions you've been very properly asked regarding  
 3 what happened and a few about what might have been done  
 4 better primarily by other people. Can I say that in  
 5 asking those questions, I fully understand and  
 6 acknowledge that you were reacting to a huge and  
 7 uncertain unfolding incident whilst we in the inquiry  
 8 are able to consider the evidence in the round and at  
 9 leisure and from different sources. Okay?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. The chair asked you just before the break an important  
 12 question, with respect, about the need for simplicity  
 13 and I think you agreed that it's all very well having  
 14 detailed plans and policies, but there really is a need  
 15 for simplicity when reacting to a dreadful situation  
 16 like this; is that right?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. That's an abiding and difficult problem, isn't it, the  
 19 need for proper policies but also the need to be able to  
 20 translate them into an operational response?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. The starting point is that you need clear, fully  
 23 worked-out policies and plans, written in plain English  
 24 so that everybody can understand them, and available so  
 25 that everybody knows which version of which policy or

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1 plan is in force?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. The next stage is that staff relevant to those policies  
 4 need to be aware of them, trained in them, and fully  
 5 exercised so that they can have a fighting chance of  
 6 applying those policies in real life?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Then operationally, there needs to be a clear pathway  
 9 for applying those policies and plans with the training  
 10 and exercising so that they can be effective  
 11 operationally; yes?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. There are various ways of doing this. For example, by  
 14 providing action cards and checklists for people  
 15 undertaking different roles?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. But also, operationally, another important aspect of it,  
 18 of this problem, is to establish as soon as possible an  
 19 effective and robust command structure where there's  
 20 a two-way flow from the operational commanders, you, the  
 21 tactical and strategic commanders, both in terms of  
 22 situational awareness and things that need to be done?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Applying that, that's really going to be the need of the  
 25 few questions I have for you, the need for an effective

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1 command structure, but let me start with METHANE.  
 2 You were asked yesterday about METHANE and you very  
 3 fairly agreed that you'd not broadcast the information  
 4 in the form of METHANE but in fact you'd covered most of  
 5 it in your transmissions; yes?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. But you did acknowledge that not having done it as  
 8 a METHANE, the issue of declaring a major incident was  
 9 overlooked by you; is that fair?  
 10 A. Yes, it's fair, yes.  
 11 Q. And again, being fair to you, you went on to note, with  
 12 that concession, that in fact neither the force duty  
 13 officer or the Silver commander, or indeed anybody else,  
 14 had declared the major incident until much later on, and  
 15 of course they could have done so as well; that's right,  
 16 isn't it?  
 17 A. It is, yes.  
 18 Q. You have told us already, I think, that you didn't in  
 19 fact speak to the FDO at all on the evening; is that  
 20 right?  
 21 A. That's right, I didn't speak to him.  
 22 Q. And you only spoke to Mr Nawaz 1 hour and 6 minutes,  
 23 I think, or thereabouts, after the explosion?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. So no contact with the two key tactical commanders from

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1 GMP until after the golden hour?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. They apparently didn't try to make contact with you  
 4 during that period?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. Despite the fact that you had asked the control room to  
 7 alert Silver, Mr Nawaz?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And despite the fact that it wouldn't have taken much to  
 10 work out that you had assumed Bronze command from the  
 11 FWIN, which was available to the FDO?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Dealing with the command structure, you were the city  
 14 centre response inspector, and on being told about the  
 15 start of the incident or the reports, initial reports,  
 16 you realised that it was for you to head down there and  
 17 probably to deploy yourself at the scene in a command  
 18 role?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. Of course, it's possible you'd have got there and there  
 21 would have been a more senior commander and you wouldn't  
 22 have had to do so, but that was your entry point, if you  
 23 like, that was your starting understanding, forgetting  
 24 the report; is that right?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Despite the fact that you alerted Silver at 22.37, or  
 2 asked the control room to alert Silver, as to what was  
 3 happening and what you were doing, and despite the fact  
 4 that the FWIN would have alerted the FDO to what you  
 5 were doing, no contact was made with you and therefore  
 6 no line of command between you and either of those  
 7 tactical commanders was established?  
 8 A. No.  
 9 Q. Would it be right that, in the knowledge that you'd  
 10 indicated effectively to the Silver night commander what  
 11 you were doing and it was obvious to the FDO from the  
 12 FWIN, given you were heading down to the sharp end of  
 13 the scene, if I can put it that way, was it effectively  
 14 your view that they should make contact with you and  
 15 establish the line of command?  
 16 A. Rather than the other way round?  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 A. Yes. They would contact me because I would -- clearly  
 19 as soon as I got there have quite a lot of things  
 20 (overspeaking).  
 21 Q. Yes, absolutely. So although it wouldn't have been  
 22 impossible for you to have said to control, "Can I speak  
 23 to the FDO", or, "Can you get Mr Nawaz to contact me",  
 24 really having alerted them, it was for them to contact  
 25 you?

1 A. If they wanted to. I was happy that the information  
 2 I was giving would be on that FWIN and available to  
 3 either of --  
 4 Q. Yes.  
 5 A. -- those two officers to read.  
 6 Q. As you said, once you get there you were dealing with  
 7 a devastating scene and you were fully occupied,  
 8 organising teams of officers who were arriving and  
 9 dealing with casualties as best you could?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. If there had been contact made by the FDO or the Silver  
 12 commander, that would have maximised the situational  
 13 awareness of the tactical command of GMP, wouldn't it?  
 14 A. Yes -- I mean, I'm aware the FDO was getting situational  
 15 awareness from the firearms teams because he was on  
 16 their channel. But in terms of Superintendent Nawaz,  
 17 it would have given him some direct information from the  
 18 scene, ie from me.  
 19 Q. Yes. You were supplying information which was going on  
 20 the FWIN. The FDO, as you've properly said, was in  
 21 touch with the armed officers. But it's not mutually  
 22 exclusive, is it? To gain full situational awareness,  
 23 it would have been much better for them to have  
 24 contacted you as well?  
 25 A. Yes, it perhaps would have given him my slant on it,

1 what I was dealing with, rather than what the firearms  
 2 teams were dealing with.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, do you mind? This is an  
 4 interesting topic to me and I just want to pursue it  
 5 slightly.  
 6 Lots of contact is going on between the FDO and  
 7 firearms officers and indeed there seems to be a lot of  
 8 it going on generally with the firearms teams. And  
 9 really, you're bringing in to report things you think  
 10 will help the FDO or the command and things you want.  
 11 But actually, as Mr Weatherby's pointed out, no one's  
 12 actually contacting you. Would it have helped if they  
 13 did or was it better that you were left to get on with  
 14 it?  
 15 A. I think there is an element of that, sir. They probably  
 16 would be aware that I was busy and think --  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't want to look at this from their  
 18 point of view because we'll see about that. I think  
 19 actually everyone was dealing with everything as quickly  
 20 as they could, so it may be they were never even  
 21 thinking about you, as it were. So from your point of  
 22 view, would it have helped for you to have been having  
 23 some instruction or something from tactical commanders  
 24 as to what you should be doing?  
 25 A. No, I think I had my plan, which we have covered,

1 haven't we, about what the priorities were for that.  
 2 Had Superintendent Nawaz phoned me, said, "Mike, do you  
 3 think I should come down", we're 4 years later, I think  
 4 I would have said yes and I think my answer would be yes  
 5 now.  
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The help for that would have been,  
 7 particularly, he could handle a forward command post in  
 8 particular and direct people from down there?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So from a tactical point of view, that  
 11 would have been really quite useful to you? You could  
 12 know there was someone down there.  
 13 A. Yes, it would have given somebody who was slightly away  
 14 from it, slightly --  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Able to stand back?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And also perhaps have a better idea of  
 18 what was going on with NWAS?  
 19 A. Possibly. The discussions we've had before about how  
 20 many of them were there, what were they doing, perhaps  
 21 that could have moved that along slightly.  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And perhaps clarify the situation of  
 23 whether it was completely safe for them to go up there?  
 24 A. Yes, and also it might have been more glaringly obvious  
 25 to him, than perhaps had occurred to me, that the Fire

1 Service weren't there.  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So perhaps, I'm not saying less  
 3 concentration on the firearms people, but perhaps  
 4 somehow provide more concentration on the unarmed assets  
 5 who were down there doing a very valuable job as well?  
 6 A. Yes, he would have been able to do that and the FDO was  
 7 fully engaged with the firearms teams, so he had that  
 8 and then there would have been three us, really,  
 9 wouldn't there, whereas it felt ...  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The idea that it has to be Night  
 11 Silver — I think we're going to hear it's really useful  
 12 to have Night Silver still at headquarters, but you  
 13 could have another Silver, presumably, down at the  
 14 scene, it doesn't have to be the person who's also the  
 15 Night Silver.  
 16 A. No. I think other senior officers were turned out  
 17 pretty quickly from home, as happened with  
 18 Superintendent Hill, who came into Silver control.  
 19 There may have been a bit of a gap setting it up,  
 20 setting the channel up and so on, but...  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So for the future, it is really useful  
 22 having someone in a Silver role, whoever he may be, down  
 23 there at the scene?  
 24 A. I think so and that is, as I said yesterday, is quite  
 25 unusual in that Silver role because the normal sort of

1 pre-planned stuff that we do, footballs, demonstrations  
 2 and so on, the Silver will never be on the scene,  
 3 whereas this is something different, isn't it? It's  
 4 a major incident.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's really helpful. Thank you,  
 6 Mr Weatherby.  
 7 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you.  
 8 Essentially, what I'm picking up from is a comment  
 9 you made yesterday, where you said that, initially at  
 10 least, you were taking strategic and tactical decisions  
 11 as well as undertaking the operational command that  
 12 you've described to us. There was no line of command  
 13 in that first hour that was established, so far as you  
 14 were involved with, was there? Not your fault.  
 15 A. No, and some of it is around timing, isn't it? I was  
 16 there very quickly, wasn't I? So if there were — what  
 17 I outlined yesterday about strategic and tactical  
 18 decisions, I was there to make them so —  
 19 Q. I'm not criticising you for making them, I'm just  
 20 exploring with you the lack of a line of command here.  
 21 If you had been in contact, if they had made contact  
 22 with you, the Silver commander and/or the FDO, then the  
 23 situational awareness that you would be able to add to  
 24 other information they had would also have gone up the  
 25 line to the strategic commander and, no doubt,

1 horizontally to other emergency tactical command levels  
 2 elsewhere; yes?  
 3 A. Yes, that's possible, yes.  
 4 Q. So firstly, just to recap on that, you would have been  
 5 able to, if they'd made contact with you after you'd  
 6 arrived in the City Room, inform them of your dynamic  
 7 risk assessment that it was sufficiently safe for you to  
 8 operate in as an unarmed commander and for your unarmed  
 9 officers to operate in and therefore that would suggest  
 10 it was safe for other emergency services assets to work  
 11 in as well. So that's the first point if a line of  
 12 command had been established. You'd have been able to  
 13 communicate that to them?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Secondly, if they'd established the line of command with  
 16 you, then that may have facilitated connecting you to  
 17 arriving commanders from other emergency services; yes?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. And thirdly, as I think I've already put, it would allow  
 20 them, the Silver level, FDO and the Night Silver, to  
 21 alert and give maximum situational awareness to the  
 22 tactical commanders of the other services?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Which would facilitate the earliest possible response by  
 25 them?

1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. Also, again picking up the simplicity point, the  
 3 importance of a line of command is that those higher up  
 4 the line of command are able to prompt you to do things  
 5 that you may have overlooked?  
 6 A. Yes. That's that point about somebody with a step back  
 7 from what's actually taking place operationally.  
 8 Q. Exactly. So you might have expected — we know that  
 9 neither Mr Sexton or Mr Nawaz declared a major incident  
 10 themselves, but you might have expected, given what you  
 11 were faced with, and your very fair concession that you  
 12 overlooked the declaration of a major incident, you  
 13 might have expected, in a line of command, for one of  
 14 them to have said, "Have we declared a major incident"?  
 15 A. Yes, and also I think I mentioned yesterday, I probably  
 16 made that wrong assumption that one of those two would  
 17 have already done that.  
 18 Q. Yes, and as you've said, they perhaps should have done.  
 19 I'm certainly not being critical of you, Mr Smith.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Weatherby, I am going to interrupt  
 21 you once more, I just want to go back on something.  
 22 Mr Weatherby's pointed out to you that if you had  
 23 this link to the line of command, which wasn't present,  
 24 you could give your situational awareness of any risk  
 25 from your point of view of other services working in the

1 City Room. The other people working on this are the  
 2 armed police officers who are operating around you. Did  
 3 you ever have a conversation with any of them about what  
 4 they thought the remaining risk was and, if not, would  
 5 it have been a good idea for that to have been done  
 6 before you were to pass on a risk assessment?  
 7 A. Yes, but I think, sir, where they were geographically  
 8 working was away from where I was, really. They were on  
 9 the concourse in the arena itself .  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So they have left?  
 11 A. So I kind of thought: well, they're doing that bit,  
 12 we're doing this bit. So yes, there was certainly --  
 13 I think we've covered already I did speak to firearms  
 14 officers but it was a little bit like, let them do what  
 15 they're doing, because they're on a different channel.  
 16 I can't really -- I don't know what they're doing  
 17 because I'm not listening to the same channel. My  
 18 concern is more with what my cops are doing on my  
 19 channel that I can hear.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just wonder whether there's some way  
 21 of allowing it for -- they may have information which  
 22 you don't have. It's not coming back to you from the  
 23 FDO or the Silver commander, and I wonder whether you  
 24 needed to know before you could say absolutely it's  
 25 clear to come in, whether you needed to have spoken to

1 them about how far they'd got and how they saw the  
 2 threat.  
 3 A. Yes. The detail I don't remember having with them, but  
 4 I would hope, you know, if they'd come across some  
 5 threat and gauged a threat that one of them would have  
 6 told me personally, would have come to me personally  
 7 because they know as well we're not on the same channel,  
 8 not on the same radio transmission.  
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you can't communicate at all by  
 10 radio?  
 11 A. Only if we went on to their channel or they came on to  
 12 ours and we just wouldn't --  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That doesn't happen?  
 14 A. No, we wouldn't do that, no. Whereas if I knew and  
 15 individual -- as I think I said before, if I knew  
 16 individual one of them, I could point-to-point with them  
 17 if I knew their PIN number, but again that's unlikely.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That would be by chance rather than  
 19 design?  
 20 A. Yes, unlikely .  
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Weatherby.  
 22 MR WEATHERBY: Just picking up that point, when you arrived  
 23 I think armed officers had already arrived at scene,  
 24 hadn't they?  
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And so if there had been -- if they had assessed threat  
 2 that you hadn't seen when you were doing your dynamic  
 3 risk assessment, frankly, you would expect them to tell  
 4 you?  
 5 A. I would hope so. And to take -- if they'd come across  
 6 somebody with a firearm, to take hard cover somewhere.  
 7 Q. Yes. It was certainly obvious to them that you were  
 8 there and they could have said, "Please hang back,  
 9 there's an active threat"; that would have been open to  
 10 them?  
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The reality is, Mr Weatherby, as we  
 12 know, they were actually assessing that area as warm,  
 13 which means people should not go in it without ballistic  
 14 protection of some sort. Anyway, whatever happened,  
 15 this was not communicated between the two of you?  
 16 A. No. And there's certainly no direction from them,  
 17 "Don't go any further than here, we've not cleared it,  
 18 we're not happy". There was nothing along those  
 19 lines --  
 20 MR WEATHERBY: There was no communication that they were  
 21 unhappy with you being in there. I think they were  
 22 declaring it warm in order to facilitate you and other  
 23 services assisting the casualties. I think that was the  
 24 evidence. Is that your understanding, Mr Smith?  
 25 A. Well, I don't think there was any discussion about warm

1 or anything else, it was --  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You can only get this from consideration  
 3 of the evidence they've given and you can leave that to  
 4 us.  
 5 A. Yes, and the only -- if they'd said do not go in there,  
 6 we'd obviously ask them why, but there was never any  
 7 prohibition on where I could go.  
 8 MR WEATHERBY: No, indeed.  
 9 Picking up again the thread of the line of command,  
 10 Mr Sexton or Mr Nawaz could have prompted you to do  
 11 things that you might have overlooked. But they might  
 12 have also used you as kind of eyes and ears for things  
 13 like a forward command post. They might have said to  
 14 you, "We need to set up a forward command post, we're  
 15 not there, is there an obvious point that we should  
 16 declare a forward command post?" That would have been  
 17 available to them had they been in contact with you,  
 18 yes?  
 19 A. Yes, and I think I would have suggested the one that  
 20 I did propose and was used ultimately which is the  
 21 entrance to Victoria Station concourse.  
 22 Q. Eventually, yes, but that was some time later, wasn't  
 23 it? Now, in terms of the other way, had they  
 24 established a line of command with you, then your  
 25 persistent requests, which I'll come to in a little

1 while, for more paramedics and for perhaps stretchers  
 2 and trauma kits would have been much more immediate to  
 3 them? If there'd been a line of command established,  
 4 you'd have been talking directly to them rather than  
 5 through the control room; yes?  
 6 A. Yes, but I'm not so sure that that line of command would  
 7 have made stretchers arrive any time soon. It might  
 8 have made -- you know, we discussed before about the  
 9 Fire Service having some stretchers, that might have  
 10 made that --  
 11 Q. Yes. If you'd been able to have a discussion or you'd  
 12 been involved in a line of command discussion, you would  
 13 no doubt have raised with the tactical commanders the  
 14 fact that you were having to take noticeboards down and  
 15 use crash barriers and tables to move very seriously  
 16 injured people out of the City Room and they would be  
 17 able to seek as urgent a solution as possible. That  
 18 would have been an important part of a line of  
 19 (inaudible: distorted).  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm afraid you froze, Mr Weatherby,  
 21 mid-question. "It would have been an important part",  
 22 and then you froze. Would you like to try again with  
 23 the question?  
 24 MR WEATHERBY: I'm very sorry. I'll start again.  
 25 If a line of command had been established, then you

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1 would have been able to alert the tactical command level  
 2 of the fact you were having to use tables and  
 3 noticeboards and crash barriers to move seriously  
 4 injured people and at a tactical level they could have  
 5 sought an urgent solution; is that right?  
 6 A. Yes, it might have triggered something with them to say,  
 7 "I know that the Fire Service got stretchers because  
 8 I've seen them in action doing it", and in that sense,  
 9 yes, it might have triggered some alternative like that.  
 10 Q. Yes, it may well have triggered a direction for somebody  
 11 to contact the station to see whether there were  
 12 stretchers available. It would probably have triggered  
 13 a request to the Fire and Rescue Service and it would  
 14 have triggered a discussion with NWS as to whether they  
 15 in fact did have other stretchers other than the trolley  
 16 ones that you've referred to.  
 17 A. Yes, I could say it may have done that.  
 18 Q. Yes. Can I suggest -- I'm not being critical of you,  
 19 I'm just exploring with you the lack of a line of  
 20 command. You have been asked questions about command  
 21 at the scene and you have been asked whether you  
 22 expected the Silver commander to be at the scene. And  
 23 on reflection, you've said that the Silver commander  
 24 probably should have attended; yes?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And being very fair, you've said that more usually, on  
 2 planned operations in particular, you wouldn't expect  
 3 the Silver to be there, but on this occasion you think  
 4 it would have been appropriate?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. If the Silver commander had deployed to the scene or, as  
 7 the chair put to you a little while ago, a  
 8 Silver commander, because there could have been more  
 9 than one, then that would have assisted with the  
 10 coordination of the emergency response at the scene,  
 11 wouldn't it?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. We'll come on to it in a little while, but you were  
 14 sending officers down to ask for paramedics to come up  
 15 to the scene. If a Silver had been at the station,  
 16 that's something, again line of command, you would have  
 17 referred to him or her, and they would have been able to  
 18 deal with it at a tactical level and that's how it  
 19 should work, isn't it?  
 20 A. Yes, that's how it should work under the JESIP  
 21 principles, yes.  
 22 Q. Yes. In the context that we are looking at, it's  
 23 difficult to see, isn't it, how a Silver commander only  
 24 at HQ could do much that was useful to you at the scene?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. No direct contact with you, not at the scene, the  
 2 commander would have little information, little contact  
 3 with others, and could add little to the command of the  
 4 operation?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Would it be fair to say that, in fact, the command  
 7 structure was more or less non-existent as far as you  
 8 were concerned for the whole of the golden hour?  
 9 A. Non-existent, did you say?  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 11 A. No, I disagree.  
 12 MR WEATHERBY: Well, you had no --  
 13 A. In terms -- do you mean was there any command at the  
 14 scene?  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, a command structure coming down to  
 16 you.  
 17 A. Sorry, could you put the question again, please?  
 18 MR WEATHERBY: You had no assistance from a command  
 19 structure. If there was a command structure, so far as  
 20 you were concerned as the operational commander, the  
 21 Bronze, it wasn't effective?  
 22 A. Above me?  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, it started with you, the command  
 24 structure, effectively, during that hour?  
 25 A. Yes, I'd agree with that then.

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1 MR WEATHERBY: Can I leave that subject and move on to  
 2 a point of detail really about the rendezvous point.  
 3 It's not complicated it's just literally a point of  
 4 detail. You set a rendezvous point in the car on the  
 5 way down to the scene using your local knowledge as the  
 6 city centre inspector?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And you did so having in mind attending Greater  
 9 Manchester Police officers — you were setting that  
 10 rendezvous point for your police officers, yes?  
 11 A. Yes. I was setting it as a sort of initial place for  
 12 them to go until I knew exactly what was going on. And  
 13 once I knew exactly what was going on, I revised that,  
 14 albeit as we covered yesterday, I didn't specifically  
 15 say, "Cancel RVP 1, RVP 2 is this".  
 16 Q. I'm not criticising you for a reason I'll come on to in  
 17 a moment, but I just want to understand and make sure we  
 18 all understand it. You were going down to a scene of  
 19 a bombing with multiple casualties. You had no idea  
 20 what you were going into, and you wanted to ensure that  
 21 the Greater Manchester Police officers that you would  
 22 expect to command, and in fact you did command, weren't  
 23 just going in the scene before you could conduct  
 24 a dynamic risk assessment. Was that your thought  
 25 process?

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1 A. Yes, to be in an area that was pretty nearby, that they  
 2 could get to, was quite accessible, until I decided  
 3 should they come down. I think the way things worked  
 4 out, some of them probably chose to just go there  
 5 directly anyway and that's why some were there quite  
 6 rapidly.  
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just need to clarify: you are simply  
 8 setting this RVP for your officers, not for ambulance or  
 9 fire — or did you have them in mind as well?  
 10 A. I would have them in mind as well because I thought that  
 11 the car park was suitable if it ended up where, I don't  
 12 know, the whole of the front of the building had come  
 13 down on Victoria Station Approach.  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you did have that in mind?  
 15 A. Yes (overspeaking).  
 16 MR WEATHERBY: I'm going to come on to that point in  
 17 a minute, but you set it perfectly reasonably so that  
 18 your officers weren't rushing into a place that you  
 19 hadn't assessed because you weren't there. And once you  
 20 had got there and conducted your dynamic risk  
 21 assessment, your thought process was it was no longer  
 22 needed for your officers and therefore effectively you  
 23 rescinded the RVP and asked for your officers to come  
 24 straight to you as indeed they did. Have I got that  
 25 right?

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1 A. Exactly right, yes.  
 2 Q. In terms of the other emergency services, whereas  
 3 of course if you had set a sensible RVP that might well  
 4 have ended up being a proper and appropriate rendezvous  
 5 point for them. That wasn't in fact your job, was it,  
 6 that was a job for the FDO?  
 7 A. Well, my guess is from the question that the policy says  
 8 that. In practical terms, I was there, wasn't I, he was  
 9 in the control room, so it would seem more sensible for  
 10 me to set it. I can't disagree with the policy, can I,  
 11 but it doesn't make practical and pragmatic sense to me  
 12 for him to set that when he doesn't really know very  
 13 much about what is going on.  
 14 Q. Okay. I'm not suggesting that the FDO shouldn't have  
 15 spoken to you or read the FWIN and seen the RVP and  
 16 adopted it. That may well be entirely the right way to  
 17 do it. But in fact, your thought process was to deal  
 18 with your officers. You weren't commanding or liaising  
 19 with the other emergency services at that point, were  
 20 you? You were responding to a request from your control  
 21 room dealing with police officers? No criticism, I'm  
 22 just trying to establish your thought process.  
 23 A. Yes. And the other alternative open to me — bearing in  
 24 mind I was driving at whatever speed, 60 miles an hour,  
 25 blues and twos, they're asking me to give them an RVP

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1 straightaway, I could have said, "I'm not going to give  
 2 it you yet, let me get there, let me assess it, and then  
 3 I'll give you one", but (overspeaking) —  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the important point is — and  
 5 I just want to make sure what Mr Smith is actually  
 6 agreeing with and what he isn't is: for who do you  
 7 believe at the time you're fixing an RVP for? Never  
 8 mind the policy, who did you believe you were fixing it  
 9 for?  
 10 A. Initially my officers.  
 11 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you very much. I was just trying to  
 12 clarify that. I wasn't in any way being critical.  
 13 The final topic, and it's been dealt with by  
 14 Mr de la Poer in some detail, so I'll deal with it very  
 15 quickly. It's about the call for paramedics.  
 16 In the City Room you were organising your officers  
 17 to give first aid, which was of course limited by their  
 18 training. Then when Mr Ennis arrived, he was conducting  
 19 a basic triage and you were assisted by a number of  
 20 members of the public and ETUK medics or first aiders;  
 21 yes?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. You were also organising the evacuation and the points  
 24 about stretchers with the limited personnel that you  
 25 had, so quite understandably, more or less from when you

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1 got there to the scene and started to get it organised,  
 2 you were persistently calling for paramedics and NWS  
 3 staff to come to the scene; yes?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. I just want to put up four pieces of the audio because  
 6 it all comes through on one channel. I just want to  
 7 make it clear what the train of this is.  
 8 Could we have {INQ018644T/1}, please, Mr Lopez.  
 9 Just to orientate us, this is the first page of it,  
 10 and this is the divisional channel that you were on.  
 11 The tape times start at 22.31.48, as we can see from the  
 12 top. So this is the channel on which you were making  
 13 these requests, at least initially ; yes?  
 14 A. Yes. So it's several minutes into --  
 15 Q. Don't worry about that. {INQ018644T/9}, please,  
 16 Mr Lopez. It's the long section towards the bottom. We  
 17 don't need to read it through again, you'll be familiar  
 18 with it.  
 19 This is at a time which I think is 22.50, and you're  
 20 communicating to your control room, and this is before  
 21 Mr Ennis gets there, and you're saying:  
 22 "I need every NWS facility that we've got in here,  
 23 please."  
 24 Yes?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. So you're making quite clear to the control room that  
 2 that's what you want. In fact, we know that the control  
 3 room does act on these calls because they do contact the  
 4 control room of NWS, don't we?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. This is the control room rather than a line of command,  
 7 isn't it?  
 8 A. Yes, this is --  
 9 Q. You're reporting back to radio operators?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. But this is the control room where the FDO is actually  
 12 located?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. So would you agree that this is a message that should be  
 15 passed up to the FDO given that you're the  
 16 Bronze commander and the FDO is responsible for the  
 17 joint tactical operation with the other emergency  
 18 services?  
 19 A. Do you mean passed up in the sense of endorsed on to the  
 20 FWIN?  
 21 Q. Well, I mean -- indeed. No doubt some of the messages  
 22 go on to the FWIN, but there was a need, wasn't there,  
 23 for your reports to the control room to go directly to  
 24 the tactical commander who was responsible for  
 25 initiating the multi-agency response?

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1 A. Yes, I don't know whether that was done on the FWIN, but  
 2 what I -- from my knowledge of that, what I expected is  
 3 that if that message -- the gist of that message was  
 4 typed on the FWIN, they can switch it to the FDO and  
 5 I did hear his evidence and I know that he explained  
 6 that to the inquiry to say messages come up at the  
 7 bottom of his screen but there's only five that can be  
 8 there at any one time --  
 9 Q. So perfectly reasonably (overspeaking) --  
 10 A. -- gist of that message had gone to the FDO via that  
 11 method, yes.  
 12 Q. Your only real means of communication here was  
 13 communicating with your control room, wasn't it?  
 14 A. For me?  
 15 Q. Yes. You could have used your mobile phone, but your  
 16 real method of communication was your radio to the  
 17 control room?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. So you're asking for NWS, but had there been a line of  
 20 command established and you were speaking to the FDO or  
 21 the Silver commander, this is a message that would have  
 22 gone directly to them?  
 23 A. Do you mean if I was on the phone to them?  
 24 Q. Well, however, whether the FDO had established a line of  
 25 contact with you point-to-point, back-to-back, on

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1 a mobile, whatever. But if there was a communication  
 2 between the two of you, then Bronze would be speaking to  
 3 Silver or the tactical commander responsible for  
 4 initiating the joint emergency response in this  
 5 circumstance, and that would have got this message with  
 6 the urgency through to the FDO?  
 7 A. Yes, had he'd been on the phone to me there and then,  
 8 but I think, knowing the practicalities of it, I'd  
 9 literally just arrived there the radio is going to be my  
 10 primary means of communication there and I expect when  
 11 I've given that radio message it goes on the log and the  
 12 operator switches it to whoever needs it and if that's  
 13 the FDO, yes, that message may have been available to  
 14 him.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's not the only important message  
 16 though, is it, the needing NWS? The first sentence is  
 17 presumably quite important:  
 18 "I need the station sealing off, please."  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you need officers directed to seal  
 21 off the station?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which indeed does happen from the FDO.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So he needs -- someone in authority

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1 needs to see that message?  
 2 A. Yes. As it happened, officers came to me and  
 3 I effectively sent them back out to do that with  
 4 Sergeant Prince.  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes. I think there was, I seem to  
 6 recall, a message from the FDO somewhere directing  
 7 people to seal off the front of the station, they needed  
 8 people down there to do that, but everybody is looking  
 9 vacant about that at the moment so we'll need to check  
 10 whether that actually happened or not. It could be a  
 11 figment of my imagination.  
 12 MR WEATHERBY: It may have happened as a result of this or  
 13 it may have happened as a result of something else, but  
 14 this was a message that might have been passed by the  
 15 radio operator up to the FDO by a variety of methods, it  
 16 may have been put on the FWIN and passed to him so that  
 17 he may have read it, and he may have been on the phone  
 18 to somebody else at the time and may have not seen it.  
 19 So all of those are possibilities, aren't they?  
 20 A. Yes, and he may well have been on the radio directing  
 21 the firearms teams at that time.  
 22 Q. Yes, absolutely. I reiterate I'm not being critical of  
 23 you but the fact that there is no line of communication  
 24 between commanders here means that the message that  
 25 you're passing up here, which is a very urgent message,

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1 may or may not get through to the person who really  
 2 needs to see it. And that's a problem, isn't it?  
 3 A. Yes, put in those terms, it is.  
 4 Q. Then the next page, again we've looked at this. It's  
 5 counter time 19:40 on the next page, Mr Lopez.  
 6 Again, this is you on your radio, 19:40. It's  
 7 a third of the way down, half of the way down. We've  
 8 looked at this before so I'll be very brief with it.  
 9 Again, this is a very important message and it's counter  
 10 time 19:40 which I think is about 22.51. This is where  
 11 you are communicating to control, again about the  
 12 station being sealed off, but you're also saying:  
 13 "I have sent one of the PCs outside to firmly tell  
 14 any NWAS staff they need to get in here as soon as."  
 15 You're obviously quite stressed, perfectly  
 16 reasonably, by getting paramedics to help at that point  
 17 at that time; yes?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Perfectly reasonably. Again, you're communicating that  
 20 into the control room where the tactical commander is  
 21 and again the lack of a line of communication or a clear  
 22 line of communication, he may see that, it may be drawn  
 23 to his attention, or he may not?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Then further messages likewise on the next page at

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1 {INQ018644T/11}. It's at the bottom of the page, the  
 2 penultimate entry. This is the point again. We are at  
 3 about 22.53. You're referring to Mr Ennis arriving.  
 4 You refer to him as Bronze. We know that was not quite  
 5 right. You're still calling for further NWAS resources  
 6 and again, same point, it's the same channel into the  
 7 same control room with the FDO, and again he may or may  
 8 not be aware of it because no direct contact has been  
 9 established between the two of you.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And finally, {INQ018644T/13}. Towards the bottom of the  
 12 page, please, Mr Lopez. It's the counter time 24:43,  
 13 which is 22.56 or thereabouts. You're referring to only  
 14 Mr -- effectively only Mr Ennis being there and again,  
 15 "Can you direct them up?" It's exactly the same point  
 16 I make, so all of these messages are going into the  
 17 control room where the FDO is and, again, no line of  
 18 contact, so he may or may not have got them. Again,  
 19 that illustrates the point I'm making, which is that  
 20 there is -- whatever command structure there is, it's  
 21 not being effective, your being left to operate on your  
 22 own; yes?  
 23 A. Yes, I accept your point, yes. The information was  
 24 there, either the FDO or Superintendent Nawaz as the two  
 25 Silver commanders could have picked up on that

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1 information if the information was on the log. Is that  
 2 what you're guiding me to? I agree.  
 3 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you. Those are my questions, Mr Smith.  
 4 Thank you very much indeed.  
 5 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we've been going for just short of  
 6 an hour and a half since we resumed. It's probably  
 7 worth spending, I hope, less than a minute taking stock.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.  
 9 MR DE LA POER: As I understand it, between Mr Atkinson, who  
 10 had divided some matters with Mr Weatherby within their  
 11 time estimate, and Mr Cooper, who has made an  
 12 application, which we are going to invite you to accede  
 13 to, there will be less than 15 minutes of questioning  
 14 left. That's as I understand it. Then it is simply  
 15 a question of Mr Horwell to conclude, and I don't know  
 16 whether he's in a position yet to give an approximation.  
 17 We're obviously at a moment when we can take lunch now  
 18 or a short break or we can continue until conclusion.  
 19 MR HORWELL: 10 to 15 minutes.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So about half an hour more evidence?  
 21 I'll leave you the choice. We can either take  
 22 a 10-minute break now or we can have an hour's break for  
 23 lunch. I leave it entirely to you. You're the one  
 24 answering the questions and it's been quite, no doubt,  
 25 however nice the advocates, quite a gruelling experience

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1 and it's important we get the best evidence from you  
 2 that we can. You choose.  
 3 A. Do you mean to carry on?  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You choose whether we have a 10-minute  
 5 break and then we carry on for the half an hour or  
 6 we have an hour's break and then we do the half an hour.  
 7 A. A 10-minute break and carry on.  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that acceptable to everyone else?  
 9 Thank you.  
 10 (12.52 pm)  
 11 (A short break)  
 12 (1.02 pm)  
 13 MR DE LA POER: Sir, next can I call upon Mr Atkinson  
 14 Queen's Counsel.  
 15 Questions from MR ATKINSON  
 16 MR ATKINSON: Two very brief topics, Mr Smith. The first is  
 17 in relation to communications. It's picking up on, as  
 18 indeed both my points are, matters you raised in that  
 19 handwritten debrief note where you wrote everything very  
 20 helpfully in capitals.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Would that others had followed that example.  
 23 In terms of communication with those above you  
 24 in the command chain, Silver in particular, at  
 25 a prearranged event where you would expect Silver to be

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1 in the command control room rather than on scene,  
 2 presumably your means of communication with Silver would  
 3 have been agreed in advance?  
 4 A. Yes, on a prearranged public order event as the  
 5 Bronze commander, I'd have a tactical adviser with me  
 6 and a loggist as well. So Silver would have the similar  
 7 arrangement in the Silver control room, so often a lot  
 8 of the communications are between the loggists, so the  
 9 Silver commander will ask the loggist to phone my  
 10 loggist, if that makes sense.  
 11 Q. And equally, in a prearranged incident, where Silver was  
 12 in his or her control room, contact, where it was  
 13 identified as being necessary with the other emergency  
 14 services, would also have been arranged in advance, who  
 15 opposite numbers were for the other services, and how  
 16 you would get hold of them?  
 17 A. In a large-scale event, those commanders would be in the  
 18 Silver control room, so they would literally be able to  
 19 speak to them and they would be able to then contact  
 20 their crews on the ground.  
 21 Q. Because all that would be prearranged in advance?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. One aspect in this regard of the major incident plan,  
 24 which clearly is at least in part dealing with  
 25 situations where none of that pre-planning can have

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1 happened, because something happens spontaneously, but  
 2 would you agree that the need to establish that kind of  
 3 communication remains whether it's planned or not, it's  
 4 just you need to set it up after it's happened rather  
 5 than having it already in place beforehand?  
 6 A. Do you mean would the control room have a point of  
 7 contact for NAWAS or the Fire Service?  
 8 Q. It's my fault, as always. Clearly, if it's  
 9 a prearranged event you get these lines of  
 10 communications set out in advance because it's  
 11 recognised you're going to need to have them.  
 12 A. Mm.  
 13 Q. If something happens spontaneously, you are still going  
 14 to need to have them, it is just that you won't have  
 15 them set up already?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Mr Lopez, it's {INQ007279/78}. It's the last paragraph  
 18 on the page. Just to give you the context, Mr Smith,  
 19 this is part of the section of the major incident plan  
 20 that sets out what the Silver commander should either do  
 21 or should consider doing; all right?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. One of the things that a Silver commander should  
 24 consider doing is the activation of a particular type of  
 25 Airwave channel.

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1 A. Mm-hm.  
 2 Q. That, as we understand it, would have allowed, subject  
 3 to how it was set up, communication between the  
 4 category 1 responders, so the different emergency  
 5 services, by a dedicated channel.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. If that had happened on this occasion it would have  
 8 established, as we understand it, a means of  
 9 communication between the emergency services.  
 10 A. Between the control rooms, you're talking about?  
 11 Q. Well, it would depend on how it was set up as to who had  
 12 access to the relevant channel and therefore whether it  
 13 would be between control rooms or between those who had  
 14 access to that channel wherever they were. If there was  
 15 a channel set up very early on that put you, for  
 16 example, in contact with directly with your Silver  
 17 commander or directly with NAWAS, would that have helped?  
 18 A. I'm not aware in any kind of situation where that would  
 19 be -- I've got no experience of something like that  
 20 happening before. When we were talking about  
 21 pre-arranged events before, there would be a Silver  
 22 control channel. Here, we had city centre channel and  
 23 later on in the evening the Silver control dedicated  
 24 channel was set up so everybody who was working on the  
 25 incident later on -- I think it was well after

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1 midnight -- went on to that channel and business as  
 2 usual could carry on on the city centre channel.  
 3 Q. If you'd received a message early on to say, if you go  
 4 on to channel whatever, which was a channel that was  
 5 being set up to put those in command roles of the  
 6 various responders in touch with each other so that you  
 7 would have, via that channel, communication direct with  
 8 the Silver control room but also direct with those in  
 9 comparable command positions in relation to the other  
 10 services, wouldn't that have helped you to communicate  
 11 directly with them rather than having to go through  
 12 a series of others, either people or control rooms, to  
 13 tell them what you needed from them and tell them what  
 14 they needed to know from you?  
 15 A. In theory, yes. Me going on to that channel means I'm  
 16 not on a channel where all my officers are, so in  
 17 practical terms I wouldn't do that. It might be the  
 18 case where I could have got somebody else to stand  
 19 alongside me, effectively like a loggist, who would go  
 20 on to that channel and pass the information. What I --  
 21 Q. As you would have done if this had been a planned  
 22 incident when you'd have had a loggist with you?  
 23 A. Yes. So you've got, effectively as part of your little  
 24 command team, a spare pair of hands there, haven't you.  
 25 So would that have worked? It could have worked, yes.

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1 In theory, yes, it could, but for me personally to be on  
 2 that channel --  
 3 Q. Would have been difficult?  
 4 A. I just wouldn't have done it because --  
 5 Q. You are cutting yourself off from others?  
 6 A. -- I need to be on my own channel -- yes, but having  
 7 someone alongside me who I can speak to, yes, in theory  
 8 that would be possible.  
 9 Q. Thank you.  
 10 The other topic and it's something that is raised on  
 11 that same page of your debrief, which was in relation to  
 12 clarity of command and control and what you said -- and  
 13 I don't ask for it to be put up necessarily -- is that  
 14 you were satisfied that you were the Bronze commander  
 15 for the foyer, but you were unsure, when the BTP  
 16 chief inspector arrived later, what her role became.  
 17 This is just the question of primacy, very briefly.  
 18 You were the city inspector so far as GMP was concerned  
 19 and this wasn't just that day, that was your job. Had  
 20 there been any understanding that you had reached or  
 21 that you had been told about as to how you, GMP, and BTP  
 22 would respond in relation to incidents at the arena  
 23 before all of this?  
 24 A. No. Not that I'd been a party to. If there was any  
 25 kind of memorandum of understanding, do you mean,

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1 something like that?  
 2 Q. Or even just as simple as: if there's a major incident  
 3 at the arena, this is who you need to speak to, this is  
 4 what needs to happen, this is who will be in charge?  
 5 A. No, nothing -- because, day to day, it will be different  
 6 personalities, really.  
 7 Q. Day to day and the pre-planned on the one hand and the  
 8 spontaneous on the other?  
 9 A. Mm--hm.  
 10 Q. You still need to have that kind of understanding as to  
 11 who's in charge, don't you?  
 12 A. Yes, but -- is the question did I know who was in charge  
 13 from BTP before --  
 14 Q. I suppose the question is: would it have helped you, and  
 15 no doubt them, to have known in advance that if  
 16 something goes wrong at the arena, this is who will take  
 17 charge of it in terms of whether it's GMP or BTP?  
 18 A. Well, yes, anything that provides more clarity I'd agree  
 19 with you.  
 20 MR ATKINSON: Thank you very much. That's all I ask,  
 21 thank you.  
 22 MR DE LA POER: Finally on behalf of the bereaved families,  
 23 Mr Cooper Queen's Counsel and his team have made an  
 24 application based on evidence arising. We invite you to  
 25 agree to that application. It is a short amount of time

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1 appropriate to the issue.  
 2 Questions from MR COOPER  
 3 MR COOPER: Thank you. Let me say in advance of asking you  
 4 this question I know that you've been alerted by my  
 5 learned friend on the topic that I'm going to ask you  
 6 about as I told him, given the sensitivity of it.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And I know a number of families I have also informed  
 9 about the topic but I should say now that I'm going to  
 10 go in very sensitive detail to your evidence about when  
 11 you consider people obviously dead. I'm going to pause  
 12 very slightly in case there are others watching or  
 13 others in the room who perhaps don't want to hear this  
 14 line of questioning. I can emphasise, we'll be very  
 15 sensitive about it.  
 16 And I am asking you these questions because a number  
 17 of those we represent are particularly anxious to hear  
 18 your answers on that.  
 19 A. I understand that.  
 20 Q. You told us earlier on today that you had the very  
 21 difficult and tragic decision to make in identifying  
 22 a situation whereby if individuals were considered very  
 23 sadly, obviously, dead, they were to be left, and those  
 24 that could be saved should be attended to.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. You indicated that in many respects, this was imperative  
 2 to save lives , which everyone understands. Without  
 3 going into any graphic detail, how did you or how did  
 4 you instruct your officers to assess whether someone was  
 5 obviously dead? I'm not going to ask you to be  
 6 descriptive about this, obviously. Let me help you: was  
 7 it as a result of simply how they appeared or whether  
 8 they were covered up or whether they had tags on them?  
 9 How did you and how did you instruct your officers to  
 10 assess whether an individual was obviously dead?  
 11 A. Well, I didn't instruct them specifically but I would  
 12 expect as part of the first aid training that they've  
 13 had or anybody else there that they would check for  
 14 signs of life .  
 15 Q. I see. So it was clearly important, whatever conclusion  
 16 officers , police officers , reached that they look  
 17 physically at the individual and in accordance with  
 18 their training come to certain conclusions?  
 19 A. Yes. But there were individuals in that room when  
 20 I went in who were already covered up and others  
 21 had clearly made that decision (overspeaking) --  
 22 Q. I understand indeed in your statement you refer to  
 23 individuals being covered with coats, for instance, when  
 24 you first came into the room.  
 25 The training that police officers received in terms

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1 of deciding whether an individual was sadly deceased, do  
 2 they have specific training to isolate that matter or  
 3 were you relying on their general first aid training?  
 4 A. Yes, general first aid training and, being blunt, if  
 5 there was clearly catastrophic injuries --  
 6 Q. I understand.  
 7 A. -- they can --  
 8 Q. If it's obvious, it's obvious, and I'm not going  
 9 anywhere near that. I'm asking you questions about  
 10 perhaps individuals who maybe physically didn't present  
 11 as so catastrophic.  
 12 Did you give your officers any instructions to cover  
 13 people up with coats or other material if they  
 14 considered that they had sadly passed away?  
 15 A. No, nothing as specific as that, no.  
 16 Q. Would it be something that you think would be  
 17 appropriate? I understand humanity says dignity,  
 18 I totally understand that, but would it be something  
 19 that you would think appropriate in the circumstances  
 20 for officers to take the initiative of, to cover someone  
 21 up if they thought they were obviously dead?  
 22 A. Yes, I think that would make sense for anybody else, for  
 23 dignity, and also for anybody else attending to think,  
 24 well, somebody else has already made that judgement and  
 25 that that person, sadly, is dead.

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1 Q. I'm asking you these questions for specific reasons,  
 2 you'll understand, officer, in relation to people who  
 3 were covered who weren't dead. That's why I'm asking  
 4 you the question. Do you understand?  
 5 It is right to say that if anyone saw someone  
 6 covered, that would immediately give an indication that  
 7 paramedics should not attend to them or triage them;  
 8 would that be right?  
 9 A. Well, that'd be a general indicator, yes --  
 10 Q. It's obvious, isn't it? So if a decision had been made  
 11 before paramedics entered the City Room to cover up  
 12 a body, that particular body or individual would not be  
 13 looked at by a paramedic?  
 14 A. I don't know. I can't answer for what the paramedics  
 15 would do.  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We'd better get the answer from  
 17 paramedics. They may have a procedure.  
 18 MR COOPER: All right, sir, I'll leave that there.  
 19 What I'm putting to you directly, and it may not be  
 20 a matter that you can answer, it may be for a paramedic,  
 21 but by a police officer covering up a person, that is  
 22 potentially denying that person of the chance to be  
 23 triaged by paramedics. Would you agree with that as  
 24 a matter of common sense?  
 25 A. Yes, that's possible, isn't it?

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1 MR COOPER: All right. I will leave it there, sir,  
 2 thank you.  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 4 MR DE LA POER: Finally, Mr Horwell Queen's Counsel, please.  
 5 Questions from MR HORWELL  
 6 MR HORWELL: Mr Smith, a number of short topics. First,  
 7 please, you said earlier this morning that you knew that  
 8 ambulance and fire had been informed.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. I just want to take you to what I think must be the  
 11 relevant entry on the communications schedule. Page 1,  
 12 please, if you could turn to it. It's the entry almost  
 13 in the centre of the page, number 1545, at 22.36.52.  
 14 You are speaking to Boden. Is he a member of the  
 15 control room as far as you understand it?  
 16 A. It's a she.  
 17 Q. She, I'm sorry.  
 18 A. But yes, I don't know her, but the way it reads is she's  
 19 one of the radio operators, yes.  
 20 Q. This is where you refer to the cathedral and there's  
 21 a discussion as to the venue. And you're asked  
 22 where's -- you ask:  
 23 "Where's the information about the casualties come  
 24 from, please?"  
 25 And Boden says:

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1 "It's just this log that we've had in, 30 to 40  
 2 people injured. They're calling ambulance and fire.  
 3 They've come from, the original job, from a male on  
 4 a mobile."  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. And looking at that, do you think that is when you  
 7 understood both ambulance and fire had been contacted?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Having been alerted to this incident, what did you think  
 10 ambulance and fire would do?  
 11 A. That they would attend.  
 12 Q. Two points that you raised, sir, during Mr Smith's  
 13 evidence. You asked questions about the timing of  
 14 certain evacuations of casualties. There is a schedule,  
 15 it's not one that can be put on the screen, but if I can  
 16 simply mention it for your benefit.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 18 MR HORWELL: {INQ041154/1}. It is a schedule of casualty  
 19 evacuations.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 21 MR HORWELL: Sir, you also asked a question of Mr Smith  
 22 about the number of officers who were in the City Room  
 23 and you mentioned the time 22.50, just because I'm sure  
 24 it was a time that was being referred to at that stage  
 25 of Mr Smith's evidence. I can inform you from those who

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1 have done all of the work on the SoEs and schedules that  
 2 by 22.50 there were at least 17 officers in the  
 3 City Room, and that's travel officers, BTP officers and  
 4 GMP officers. Seven of the 17 were GMP. I am also  
 5 informed that by 23.00, so 10 minutes later, there were  
 6 27 officers in the City Room. I don't at the moment  
 7 have a breakdown as to BTP, Travel Safe and GMP, but  
 8 those are the numbers that can be identified from the  
 9 CCTV evidence.  
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.  
 11 MR HORWELL: You were asked this morning, Mr Smith, about  
 12 your decision to select the Cathedral car park as the  
 13 RVP. We saw that decision being communicated at 22.36  
 14 in one of the communications. In a question from the  
 15 chairman, you said that that RVP had been selected for  
 16 your officers initially. I just want to ask you  
 17 this: if it was safe for your officers, if you  
 18 considered it safe for your officers, did you consider  
 19 it safe also for NWS and Fire?  
 20 A. Yes, and I'd use the phrase "safe enough", again, that  
 21 I think I've used before. But safe enough --  
 22 Q. I'm going to come back to that expression in a moment,  
 23 but you considered it safe enough for your officers and  
 24 safe enough for the emergency services in general?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And are you surprised to have discovered that that RVP  
 2 was referred to by the GMP control room to the other  
 3 emergency services?  
 4 A. Was I surprised that it was or --  
 5 Q. That wouldn't surprise you?  
 6 A. Oh, it wouldn't surprise me, no. No, no, that's what  
 7 I would expect.  
 8 Q. The decision to evacuate the casualties in the  
 9 City Room, those that couldn't walk, and to take them to  
 10 the casualty clearing station. You've been asked  
 11 a number of questions about that. Was that your  
 12 decision or a joint decision?  
 13 A. I would say initially it was my decision because I got  
 14 there before Paddy Ennis.  
 15 Q. And that was always your objective?  
 16 A. Yes, that, you know --  
 17 Q. To evacuate the casualties?  
 18 A. Yes, yes. That wasn't the place where they could get  
 19 life-saving treatment that some of them needed. For me,  
 20 the route out was to the front of the station and that's  
 21 where ambulances could have easy access and we'd cleared  
 22 that area to allow that access and then go to the most  
 23 suitable hospital after that.  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Horwell, I'm really sorry, do you  
 25 mind? I just want to go back to the RV point.

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1 In the whole structure of things, an RV point, I've  
 2 heard, is really quite important for getting  
 3 coordination between everybody because it's the first  
 4 place that people from all the different rescue services  
 5 will actually turn up and, from that, may come a forward  
 6 control point and we then start all acting in unison.  
 7 This actually failed at the first stage, and this is in  
 8 no way your fault, but whereas clearly there are times  
 9 when there has to be diversion from following the book,  
 10 if I can put it that way, and it's better to divert,  
 11 actually having an RV point where everybody goes to is  
 12 actually quite a good idea, I think, in every  
 13 circumstance, or it might be thought to be.  
 14 A. Mm.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: However it came about, your RV point was  
 16 sent out and was certainly given to the Fire Service and  
 17 they took the view, or the particular officer concerned  
 18 took the view that actually because it was a bomb and  
 19 maybe because there was a marauding firearms element to  
 20 it that this was too close to be safe. Had you taken  
 21 into account when you'd given the initial location, when  
 22 you were on your way there, the question of whether that  
 23 would be far enough to be safe, bearing in mind there  
 24 had been an explosion?  
 25 A. Yes, I think so. I think that was suitable and I think

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1 the person who made that judgement never went -- or  
 2 didn't go until later to the scene itself .  
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They certainly didn't, that's entirely  
 4 right, so --  
 5 A. It might be me being slightly unfair, but perhaps if  
 6 somebody from that organisation did take the initiative  
 7 and had gone down there, we --  
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Certainly as they got more information.  
 9 I just need to see from your point of view how it struck  
 10 you as an RVP point, whether you'd taken into account  
 11 distance away --  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- or whether you were just thinking  
 14 what's a convenient car park to get --  
 15 A. No, I think, sir, it's --  
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- to the arena?  
 17 A. -- you know, a reasonable distance away, I'd say  
 18 probably 100, 200 metres away, and I regard that as safe  
 19 and suitable.  
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. I've interrupted your flow.  
 21 MR HORWELL: Not at all. If I may just follow on from that  
 22 on the RVP point.  
 23 We know from the communication schedule that having  
 24 set the RVP point as the Cathedral car park, 4 minutes  
 25 later, because there was an officer at the scene, you

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1 asked for police officers in fact to go straight to the  
 2 scene --  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. -- of this attack. And why was that?  
 5 A. Because I felt that we had somebody already there, you  
 6 know, the transmissions that he was giving seemed to  
 7 suggest that there was nothing going on outside, other  
 8 than I think he was asking for help with injured people.  
 9 So I felt that that would speed up our attendance,  
 10 really, and it sounded as though it was safe enough for  
 11 people to go direct there.  
 12 Q. Mr Smith, I am sure it's obvious. Once you had  
 13 discovered that somebody was at the scene, if police  
 14 officers had gone to the Cathedral car park first, and  
 15 no doubt there to await instructions, that would have  
 16 caused a delay?  
 17 A. It would, yes.  
 18 Q. And you wanted to avoid that?  
 19 A. Yes, definitely .  
 20 Q. You've been asked a number of questions about strategy  
 21 and tactics, Mr Smith. You said on the first day of  
 22 your evidence, yesterday, that because you were one of  
 23 the first to arrive, you had to make both strategic and  
 24 tactical decisions.  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And you said you had to do that quickly in the first  
 2 minutes.  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. Sometimes the lines between strategy and tactics can  
 5 become blurred. In terms of your overall strategy, you  
 6 said yesterday that your immediate priority was the  
 7 preservation of life .  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. Was the means of achieving that strategy to evacuate  
 10 casualties from the City Room to the casualty clearing  
 11 station?  
 12 A. Well, to provide some first aid, initially .  
 13 Q. Of course, of course.  
 14 A. And then, yes, to do that. I felt that cutting down the  
 15 time between being removed and getting them to hospital  
 16 generally will give people a better chance, better  
 17 outcome for them.  
 18 Q. You also mentioned yesterday, in terms of achieving that  
 19 strategic aim, resources?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. You can't remove, evacuate, casualties without  
 22 resources. And eventually, to seal the City Room as  
 23 a crime scene?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. In terms of your strategic objective, are you satisfied

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1 now that that was the correct strategic objective?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. And are you satisfied now that the tactics you employed  
 4 to achieve that objective were correct?  
 5 A. Yes, I think the tactics that were employed with the  
 6 resources that I had and the facilities that they had  
 7 were the best means of trying to achieve that strategic  
 8 objective, yes.  
 9 Q. On the night, and in answer to a question about command  
 10 and command structures, this morning you said, "Well,  
 11 4 years on..." and you gave your answer.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. So what I want to do, Mr Smith, is to ask you about your  
 14 state of mind on the night. Did you believe at any time  
 15 there was a command vacuum or a lack of command?  
 16 A. No, I felt I was in command of what was happening.  
 17 Q. Were you at any stage waiting for a superintendent to  
 18 come along?  
 19 A. No, I wasn't waiting for one, no. No, definitely not.  
 20 Q. Did you believe that you had sufficient operational  
 21 experience and competence to do what was required to  
 22 save life ?  
 23 A. I did, yes. At that stage I'd been a response inspector  
 24 on the busiest division -- Greater Manchester Police is  
 25 probably one of the busiest command areas in the

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1 country -- and I'd done that for 9 years, so I'd been to  
 2 lots of serious incidents. I think I was well aware of  
 3 the basics of how to deal with a serious incident.  
 4 Clearly, this was on a different scale altogether, but  
 5 I felt operationally competent to be in command of that  
 6 situation.  
 7 Q. We have seen that the FDO was in relatively frequent  
 8 contact with the OFC, Eddie Richardson, who was based in  
 9 large part in the City Room.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Is that what you would have expected?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. That link between the FDO and the OFC?  
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that actually factually right that  
 15 he was based in the City Room for most of the time?  
 16 MR HORWELL: That was the evidence he gave.  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Even after they cleared the City Room?  
 18 They formed a perimeter, as I understood.  
 19 Were you aware of Mr Richardson being there? Let's  
 20 ask you, you were there.  
 21 A. Physically, inside the City Room, I'd say not, sir.  
 22 I think they were operating more between the City Room,  
 23 the doors into the concourse, the concourse and the  
 24 arena, so --  
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They were stopping people getting in,

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1 they were forming a --  
 2 A. Yes, exactly, sir. That's where I was comfortable with  
 3 a (overspeaking).  
 4 MR HORWELL: I'm sorry, that was my recollection --  
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, you may well be entirely correct and  
 6 I may be entirely wrong. That's why I'm trying to  
 7 check.  
 8 MR HORWELL: In any event, wherever he was, there was  
 9 a clear line of communication between the FDO and the  
 10 OFC?  
 11 A. Yes, he was on the firearms channel directing them.  
 12 Q. And that is what you would have expected?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. On the night, during the first hour or so, did you  
 15 expect a call from the FDO?  
 16 A. No.  
 17 Q. Why not?  
 18 A. Because I knew he would be busy with what was going on  
 19 with the firearms officers.  
 20 Q. You've been asked a number of questions about the  
 21 location of Silver. If there had been another attack at  
 22 another site that night, Mr Smith, would the advantages  
 23 of having Silver at force headquarters then have been  
 24 more obvious in your --  
 25 A. It would, yes, in terms of coordination and

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1 understanding what was happening across the force, yes.  
 2 Q. You said this morning that it was your impression that  
 3 it was all happening quickly.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Which will not have come as a surprise to anybody,  
 6 Mr Smith. You described it as the most intense hour or  
 7 hour and a half of your professional life.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. The chairman is going to have to look at individuals and  
 10 individuals who made decisions during that first hour or  
 11 hour and a half.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. How quickly does it pass, Mr Smith?  
 14 A. I don't know, it seemed to go very quickly to me, and  
 15 I think probably because there was so much going on.  
 16 Q. I said I was going to come back to a term that you have  
 17 used and you're not the first witness to have used it.  
 18 "Safe enough". You came to the conclusion that the  
 19 City Room was safe enough, and you said yesterday that  
 20 if it was safe enough for you, it was safe enough for  
 21 others.  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. You never sought to prevent any of the emergency  
 24 services from entering the City Room; is that correct?  
 25 A. Yes, correct.

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1 Q. And you would no doubt be the first to accept that  
 2 making that judgement, "It's safe enough", is a very  
 3 difficult one?  
 4 A. Yes, it is.  
 5 Q. And views are bound to differ?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Mr Smith, many, I am sure, would aspire to be as calm as  
 8 you were that night. But some police officers had  
 9 significant concerns about entering the City Room.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And to Kerslake, you described one police officer, who  
 12 you spoke to after the event, as saying that he thought  
 13 he would not come out alive from the City Room.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. We can see from the witness statements that other police  
 16 officers had concerns about other terrorists, about  
 17 secondary devices, and, in at least one case, the glass  
 18 ceiling, which had broken, falling.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. The pride that you had in your officers that night was  
 21 based on a number of factors, but one is that whatever  
 22 fears or concerns they had, they entered the City Room  
 23 and they did their duty to the best of their ability?  
 24 A. They did, yes.  
 25 Q. As you described it in one of the debriefs, "a can-do

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1 attitude”?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 MR HORWELL: Thank you. That’s all I ask.  
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 5 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I have received assistance from more  
 6 than one source in relation to the issue of  
 7 PC Richardson, the OFC, and the City Room. The  
 8 consensus is that his evidence was that he entered  
 9 shortly after 22.46.24 and he left the City Room at  
 10 23.30.42, or thereabouts, in company with  
 11 Chief Inspector Dexter. So in the intervening  
 12 45 minutes or so, he was a permanent presence in the  
 13 City Room. I hope I’ve been faithful to the information  
 14 that I’ve been told.  
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 16 MR HORWELL: (Inaudible).  
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How very charitable of you, Mr Horwell.  
 18 It looks like you were right and I was wrong.  
 19 MR HORWELL: He was there for longer than you had thought,  
 20 but slightly shorter than I had thought, but I’m very  
 21 grateful for the clarification .  
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you never spoke to him anyway?  
 23 A. Not that I recall , sir . I spoke to several firearms — —  
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.  
 25 MR DE LA POER: I have no further questions, sir.

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1 Do you have any more questions for Inspector Smith?  
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, thank you.  
 3 Inspector Smith, I’m really grateful. I have  
 4 listened to your evidence about your actions on that  
 5 night with great admiration. You have described this as  
 6 the worst experience of your professional life , and I’m  
 7 sure that’s entirely accurate. I very much hope that as  
 8 a result of what you have shared with us today and  
 9 yesterday, we can do something to prevent others having  
 10 to go through what you had to go through.  
 11 A. Thank you, sir.  
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.  
 13 So it is with regret that I have to tell you all  
 14 that we can’t go any further today and we will be  
 15 continuing at — 9.30 on Monday morning?  
 16 MR DE LA POER: I’m looking to Mr Suter. I think 9.30  
 17 again. A consensus has emerged.  
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you all very much.  
 19 (1.41 pm)  
 20 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am  
 21 on Monday, 17 May 2021)  
 22  
 23  
 24  
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