

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 104

May 17, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

Monday, 17 May 2021

(9.30 am)

MR DE LA POER: Sir, good morning. I wonder if we may begin, please, with the witness being sworn.

SUPERINTENDENT ARIF NAWAZ (sworn)

Questions from MR DE LA POER

MR DE LA POER: Please can you state your full name and current rank.

A. My full name is Mohammed Arif Nawaz and I am a superintendent with Greater Manchester Police.

Q. Superintendent, did you join Greater Manchester Police as a constable in 2000?

A. Yes.

Q. In 2003, were you promoted to the rank of acting sergeant?

A. Yes.

Q. And confirmed in that rank the next year?

A. Yes.

Q. In 2007 were you promoted to the rank of acting inspector?

A. Yes.

Q. Having been confirmed into that rank in 2012, were you subsequently promoted again to the rank of chief inspector?

A. That's right, yes.

1

Q. In 2015, were you promoted to temporary superintendent?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. And were you a temporary superintendent in May of 2017?

A. Yes.

Q. Just to complete the picture, in October 2017, so 3 or 4 months after this tragedy, were you confirmed in the full rank of superintendent?

A. Yes.

Q. We turn now to look at your training and experience. We saw that in 2012 you were promoted to the rank of chief inspector. In 2013, did you undertake Bronze commander training?

A. Yes.

Q. In 2015, did you undertake the Silver commander's course?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you an accredited Silver commander from 2016?

A. Yes.

Q. You seem uncertain about that.

A. I was just working out the dates. I think it was 2016, yes.

Q. I have taken this from your statement, but if you're not certain, it's your evidence that's important.

In the course of your training, whether related to your commander training or otherwise, did you receive

2

any training in JESIP?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that, please?

A. 2014.

Q. What was the nature of that training so far as you can recall it?

A. It was a multi-agency training event, I think it lasted a day, and it involved, towards the end of it, a tabletop exercise which I think involved a scenario around a train derailment.

Q. Was that training in your capacity as a police officer generally relevant to your rank or was it tied to your role as a commander?

A. I think the JESIP training was rolled out, I think, for inspectors and above. I can't be 100% on that. It wasn't specifically for my -- it was more my rank, the JESIP training.

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Nawaz, it was a derailment exercise, the tabletop?

A. Yes.

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were BTP involved do you happen to know?

A. I don't think so.

SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.

MR DE LA POER: So having become accredited as

a Silver commander in 2016, did you become part of the

3

GMP Night Silver rota?

A. Yes, so I was part of the Night Silver rota as soon as I became a temporary superintendent.

Q. So that was in 2015?

A. Yes.

Q. And so just -- the Silver commander course that you did in 2015, was that before or after your promotion to temporary superintendent?

A. That was after, so I think there's kind of two points here. One is the Silver commander course is probably called a public safety Silver command and then the night duty superintendent role is different. So as soon as you became a superintendent, you were expected to go on the rota.

Q. So does it follow from that that it wasn't mandatory for you to have undertaken the Silver commander public order training in order to be on that Silver rota?

A. Correct.

Q. Was it simply the fact that you were at that time a temporary superintendent that qualified you for that rota?

A. Yes. I can't remember what rank it came in at, whether it was chief inspector and above could do Silvers, I can't remember that back then. I used to be a Bronze commander and then I moved on to and trained to become

4

1 an accredited Silver commander, but that's public
 2 order/public safety events.
 3 Q. No doubt there will be some overlap between that Silver
 4 commander public order/public safety and the scenario
 5 that you were facing on 22 May 2017, but how closely
 6 aligned are the skill set and principles that you were
 7 trained in on that Silver commander training as against
 8 what you were required to do as Silver on the night of
 9 the attack?
 10 A. There is certainly commonality in terms of, for example,
 11 understanding about the force command module, the Silver
 12 room, what goes into that room, co-locating with
 13 partners during public order events, coordinating and
 14 communicating with partners during those events. So
 15 that is the sort of commonality in terms of what
 16 happened on the night of the attack.
 17 Q. The Silver commander public order/public safety course
 18 that you did, was that predicated on a pre-planned
 19 Silver role or did it also encompass taking that role in
 20 response to a spontaneous incident?
 21 A. Pre-planned.
 22 Q. So to that extent then, not overlapping that area of
 23 commonality --
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. -- although the principles, as you've identified, are

5

1 the same?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. In the course of your witness statement you draw
 4 attention to something called the Night Silver Guide;
 5 is that right?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. That is dated on the face of the document 2010. Do you
 8 recall whether or not you had ever had that document
 9 drawn to your attention before 22 May 2017?
 10 A. I can't be certain.
 11 Q. If you look back to the time at which you joined the
 12 Night Silver rota, what do you recall about the training
 13 or direction that you received from Greater Manchester
 14 Police for undertaking that role?
 15 A. There was no specific training, so it was around your
 16 own experience and professionalism but then linking in
 17 with certain departments, so for example the RIPA unit,
 18 about authorities, and getting some training from them
 19 specifically around that. Then it was also about
 20 shadowing other more experienced superintendents so you
 21 had an understanding of what that role entailed, but
 22 there was no specific training other than the RIPA.
 23 Q. It may or may not be the case that you were aware of the
 24 Night Silver Guide before 22 May?
 25 A. It's possible.

6

1 Q. Do you think that that was a document that you had ever
 2 read before 22 May?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. But have you since read it or at least familiarised
 5 yourself with the content of it?
 6 A. I have, yes.
 7 Q. We're going to bring that document up on screen now and
 8 just have a look at some of the things contained within
 9 it to see how well or otherwise they aligned with what
 10 you thought your role was on the night.
 11 Mr Lopez, {INQ034751/1}. There's this frontispiece
 12 here indicating that it, certainly in the form it was
 13 given to us it, was an online or computer-based
 14 document. But we can go, please, to {INQ034751/8} where
 15 we can see the introduction to this from the then
 16 chief constable. It's the second paragraph in
 17 particular, where the chief constable, as he was then,
 18 says this:
 19 "The reliance on clear decision-making and
 20 leadership is never greater than when superintendents
 21 carry out the duty of Night Silver."
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Was the importance of clear decision-making and
 25 leadership as an essential aspect of your role at the

7

1 forefront of your mind on 22 May?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Next we're going to go please to {INQ034751/10}. Crop
 4 into the top please, 1.1:
 5 "The Night Silver superintendent provides an active
 6 role within the force and attends any serious, major or
 7 unusual events, ensuring incidents are effectively
 8 managed and properly resourced. You will need to
 9 implement appropriate command and control structures,
 10 recognise the potential for an event becoming or
 11 escalating into a critical incident, and protect the
 12 interests/reputation of the force."
 13 You will have noted there, I have no doubt, the word
 14 "attends".
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. This guidance, and you can disagree having familiarised
 17 yourself, if you feel this isn't a correct
 18 characterisation, appears to be predicated on the basis
 19 that the Night Silver will go to the scene. Do you
 20 agree that that is the way it appears to be written?
 21 A. That's how it's written, yes.
 22 Q. Was that your understanding of the role of Night Silver
 23 when you were undertaking it on 22 May 2017?
 24 A. I think we'll probably come on to it a little bit later,
 25 but my initial action was to go to the scene, but I've

8

1 documented in my statement the reasons why --
 2 Q. Absolutely, we'll come to what you did and what you were
 3 planning to do. Before we get to that, as you came on
 4 duty in that role, was it your understanding that the
 5 Night Silver would go to the scene?
 6 A. To scenes of serious incidents, major incidents?
 7 Q. Indeed.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Can we bring back {INQ034751/10}. We'll look at 1.3:
 10 "Some events are beyond your own area of expertise
 11 and the role expects you will know who should be
 12 contacted to deal with the event under your strategic
 13 lead or handover after initial scene management.
 14 Equally, you will be expected to advise the duty
 15 assistant chief constable of incidents requiring a Gold
 16 structure or having significant / critical national or
 17 cross border implications."
 18 A recognition there, do you agree, that you won't
 19 necessarily know everything you might need to know for
 20 a particular incident?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And on 22 May, as you came on duty, did you understand
 23 that it would be important for you to consult with
 24 people if an incident was occurring outside of your
 25 knowledge base?

9

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. {INQ034751/39}. We see at the bottom there, section 3:
 3 "The Silver commander commands and coordinates the
 4 overall tactical response in compliance with the
 5 strategy."
 6 And then this:
 7 "The Silver commander is also responsible for
 8 developing and coordinating the tactical plan in order
 9 to achieve the strategy set by the Gold commander within
 10 any tactical parameters set."
 11 Tactical plan. As you came on duty on 22 May,
 12 superintendent, did you understand that in the event of
 13 an incident, there would be a responsibility for you to
 14 create a tactical plan?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Again, we'll come back to what you did and didn't do on
 17 the night.
 18 {INQ034751/40}, please. We can see other aspects of
 19 it :
 20 "Testing the Gold commander's strategy to ensure
 21 that it is achievable and proportionate to the threat
 22 faced."
 23 Was that, in your understanding, part of your role?
 24 A. Unsure. I don't think so in terms of testing the
 25 Gold commander's strategy. I'd see my role as creating

10

1 a tactical plan that met the Gold strategy.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Suppose you have a situation where Gold
 3 says, "This is out strategy, you start devising
 4 a tactical plan", and you say to yourself, "Actually,
 5 that strategy is impractical", then you'd go back to the
 6 Gold commander and say -- I think that probably meets --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 MR DE LA POER: And the third bullet point:
 9 "Being suitably located in order to maintain
 10 effective tactical command of the incident or
 11 operation."
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Beneath that:
 14 "Ensuring that all decisions are documented in the
 15 command log in order to provide a clear audit trail .
 16 Consider setting up a GSB log [Gold/Silver/Bronze log]
 17 via systems portal on the intranet."
 18 Again, did you understand it was important that your
 19 decisions were documented so there would be an audit
 20 trail ?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Next but one down:
 23 "Reviewing and updating the tactical plan and
 24 ensuring that any changes that are made are communicated
 25 to the Bronze commanders and, where appropriate, the

11

1 Gold commander."
 2 Again, did you understand that there was an
 3 obligation once you'd created a tactical plan to review
 4 it and update it and communicate it?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Finally, third from the bottom:
 7 "Managing and coordinating, where required,
 8 multi-agency resources and activities during the
 9 response to an incident or operation."
 10 Again, very much a JESIP principle there, although
 11 this was written pre-JESIP, did you understand that that
 12 was part of your role in the event of an incident?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. {INQ034751/42}. If you crop into the box entitled,
 15 "Tip" which is under the heading "Performing
 16 a Silver commander role". This is almost written in the
 17 form of a checklist and we can see the first one:
 18 "Take control. Police will coordinate the joint
 19 tactical response of all responding agencies. Make sure
 20 the others know you are fulfilling this coordination
 21 role."
 22 Is that within your understanding of what you should
 23 do when you take over?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. {INQ034751/43}. The question:

12

1 "Is this a major incident?"
 2 And we've had this definition before. We've got it
 3 there:
 4 "A major incident is an emergency requiring the
 5 implementation of special arrangements by one or all
 6 emergency services for ..."
 7 And then a list:
 8 "Rescue and transportation of large numbers of
 9 casualties. Involvement of a large amount of people.
 10 Handling of large numbers of enquiries from the public."
 11 I'm not going to read them all out, you can see them
 12 listed there, superintendent, but did that accord with
 13 your understanding of what a major incident was?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. {INQ034751/44}. We can see here:
 16 "Identifying the following personnel as required."
 17 The second of those is a forward command post
 18 manager. Did you understand that at the appropriate
 19 time, and we'll come to when that might be, it was part
 20 of your obligations to identify a forward command post
 21 manager among a list of others?
 22 A. Yes, I think through the JESIP working principles it is
 23 necessary to identify a forward command post and
 24 a forward command manager. At the time I'm not sure
 25 that was in the forefront of my mind.

13

1 Q. I appreciate you had uncertainty about whether you even
 2 knew about this document and certainly hadn't
 3 necessarily read it. You said it wasn't at the
 4 forefront of your mind. Do you think you might have
 5 been told or taught that before and you simply didn't
 6 bring it to mind on the night or are you saying that you
 7 hadn't had that at all within your contemplation before?
 8 A. I think that would have been taught in the JESIP course.
 9 Q. You've said that that wasn't in the forefront of your
 10 mind on the night?
 11 A. No, that was 2.5/3 years prior, so it didn't ...
 12 Q. {INQ034751/45}. We'll just bring it up although we
 13 don't need to linger on it. You have already
 14 identified -- one of the questions here is:
 15 "Has the forward command post been identified in
 16 liaison with the Fire Service?"
 17 As this was written, it doesn't appear to suggest
 18 you need to consult NAWAS about the forward command post.
 19 Again, I think you've probably covered this in your last
 20 answer, something that you knew from your JESIP training
 21 was an important part of the response but something not
 22 at the forefront of your mind, is that a fair summary,
 23 on the night?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. We can take that down, please. I think we can deal with

14

1 a number of other pages in summary. Do you agree that
 2 throughout this document, having had a chance to look at
 3 it now, there is reinforced the assumption that the
 4 Silver commander will go to the scene in the event of an
 5 incident? So it's not just where we saw right at the
 6 beginning and if you want me to take you to particular
 7 parts I can do.
 8 A. I think the document would suggest that, yes.
 9 Q. Yes, absolutely. I'm entirely focused on the document.
 10 Whether it was in your view now what the document should
 11 have been saying we will come to.
 12 The final section that I want to look at is
 13 {INQ034571/118} where there is a section entitled
 14 "Terrorism".
 15 We can see the various headings there. Have you had
 16 a chance to consider the contents of this section in
 17 particular?
 18 A. At the time or since?
 19 Q. Since.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And no doubt by reason of the date of this document, do
 22 you agree that will there is nothing in the document
 23 about Operation Plato?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. So had you consulted this document on the night, had you

15

1 turned to the section on terrorism, you would not have
 2 found an answer to a question, had you posed it to
 3 yourself, "What is Operation Plato and what is my role
 4 as Night Silver in that operation"?
 5 A. That's correct and they're both questions that I did
 6 pose to myself.
 7 Q. You posed both those questions? Did you think to look
 8 in this document?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. Thank you very much indeed. We can take that down.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just in general terms, now you have read
 12 that section, were most of those matters known to you
 13 from other parts of training? Had you had training on
 14 how to deal with a terrorist event, terrorist attack?
 15 A. I don't think so specifically. It was more -- so the
 16 JESIP training was about dealing with a major incident,
 17 which could be, but the actual exercise we did wasn't,
 18 and I don't recollect being involved in an exercise that
 19 involved terrorism or had specific training about what
 20 my role as a superintendent would be in terms of dealing
 21 with a terrorist attack.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So were you aware of the threat level in
 23 May 2017?
 24 A. I would have been. I know it was really heightened.
 25 I can't remember the exact level.

16

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine. Is that something which
 2 was at the top of your thinking when you were being
 3 Night Silver, the fact of what the threat level was?
 4 A. We were made aware of the threat levels.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That wasn't quite the question.
 6 A. Sorry, sir. Was it at the top of my thinking? I would
 7 say not. It was one of a numerous range of
 8 considerations as a Night Silver.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Terrorist attacks come in all
 10 sorts of different shapes and sizes.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you received any training or did you
 13 know the sort of attacks which terrorists could launch?
 14 A. I think from Mumbai and Paris, it was clear that the
 15 methodology was changing and there were different attack
 16 methods.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Where did you learn about Mumbai and
 18 Paris?
 19 A. I think it's really from news reports. There wasn't
 20 anything specific, I don't recollect.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you read it from a news report rather
 22 than any police organisation sending round any sort of
 23 synopsis for you to look at?
 24 A. Yes. I don't remember being sent anything. I can't say
 25 100% that information wasn't shared, but I don't

17

1 recollect anything specifically to say: these are the
 2 different attack methodologies that we need to be aware
 3 of.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 5 MR DE LA POER: So we come to what is a very important
 6 question, which is entirely at the heart of the
 7 chairman's questioning: did you know what
 8 Operation Plato was on 22 May 2017?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. Did you even know that it was the police response to
 11 a terrorist attack of some sort?
 12 A. No. It might have been that, maybe in the JESIP
 13 training, but again I don't recollect this, the name
 14 Plato might have been mentioned, but I don't recollect
 15 that.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So on that day was your state of mind,
 17 "I think I've heard of it but I don't actually know what
 18 it means"?
 19 A. No.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You just didn't recollect having heard
 21 of it?
 22 A. No.
 23 MR DE LA POER: So if it was mentioned to you, it's
 24 certainly not in a way that lodged in your brain and you
 25 had accessible when you were in that high-pressure

18

1 situation?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Finally before we turn to 22 May, we have seen that
 4 you've been Night Silver since about the time you became
 5 a temporary superintendent. So you had about a year or
 6 so experience in that role. How many times do you think
 7 you had undertaken it, approximately?
 8 A. Probably around four times a year. That's kind of a
 9 best guess, really. I could check, but I think it was
 10 about four times.
 11 Q. It doesn't sound, it sounds to me, that you could say
 12 with confidence that you had performed it fewer than
 13 10 times by 22 May.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Had you undertaken the role of a Silver commander, so
 16 outside of the Night Silver role, prior to 22 May?
 17 A. For pre-planned events.
 18 Q. It was for pre-planned events?
 19 A. Yes, Silver commander for public order/public safety
 20 events, yes.
 21 Q. Those were two pre-planned events and what was the
 22 nature or the scale of those pre-planned events?
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you say a number? Are you saying
 24 you have done it twice?
 25 A. By the time of the attack, I'd done two which were

19

1 assessed, two assessed events, and then one independent
 2 event.
 3 MR DE LA POER: So three, I beg your pardon.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. To give us a sense of the scale of those, were they very
 6 substantial incidents that you were taking that role in?
 7 A. So one was the sort of policing response to large-scale
 8 bonfire events, places like Heaton Park, Platt Fields,
 9 Wythenshawe Park, so involving tens and tens of
 10 thousands people attending. Another was the Great
 11 Manchester Run, and then the independent one was the
 12 Caribbean carnival in Manchester.
 13 Q. Had you, and I'm sorry that I'm going back to the role
 14 of Night Silver, at any stage had an incident of such
 15 gravity as Night Silver that you either had to go to the
 16 Night Silver room or you had to go to the incident
 17 itself in any of those few occasions that you had
 18 undertaken that role?
 19 A. I think I would have attended some scenes. I can't
 20 remember specifics, but in terms of whether it was
 21 following a firearms discharge or there was a murder,
 22 any sort of serious incidents like that, but nothing of
 23 the gravity of what happened on the 22nd.
 24 Q. Had you had cause to consult the GMP major incident plan
 25 at any point before 22 May?

20

1 A. I think so, for the JESIP training.
 2 Q. We're going back to 2014/2015?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And do you think that was a document that you had read
 5 cover to cover or picked parts out of or received
 6 training on? What do you think your interaction was
 7 with that?
 8 A. I think it would have been role-specific parts I have
 9 picked out. It's a 220-page document. I can't say in
 10 all honesty I read it cover to cover back then.
 11 Q. Have you since had an opportunity to familiarise
 12 yourself with the content of that document?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Again we can deal with it by way of summary. Is it your
 15 view, having read that, that again it is predicated on
 16 an assumption that the Silver commander will go to the
 17 scene?
 18 A. I think the major incident plan, it does say, I think
 19 early on, that -- it does talk about the commander going
 20 to the scene absolutely, but it also says: this isn't
 21 a rigid set of instructions that absolutely must be
 22 followed.
 23 Q. So did you have either or both of those in your mind as
 24 arising from the GMP major incident plan when you came
 25 on duty on 22 May?

21

1 A. I think my initial kind of intuitive response was to go,
 2 but then, for what I believe are logical reasons,
 3 I didn't.
 4 Q. It may be that there will be parts we need to look at as
 5 we now turn to 22 May, or we may have covered them,
 6 we'll see.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's obviously useful having a major
 8 incident plan for pre-planned events that are happening,
 9 whatever, that you know are going to be major incidents.
 10 Having that major incident plan there for spontaneous
 11 incidents, does it actually help?
 12 A. Sir, I think when -- under that sort of intensity and
 13 pressure, you go to what you know, and I don't know if
 14 I should come to this later around JESIP as an example,
 15 so the JESIP principles I think are absolutely sound,
 16 they're built with the right intent to get that really
 17 quick coordination, but clearly, not just in this
 18 tragedy but in other major incidents, it doesn't seem to
 19 always work.
 20 For me, what GMP have done is fantastic in terms of
 21 an app they've provided which then gives me all the
 22 information I need about JESIP at my fingertips
 23 instantly. As a commander that's an incredibly useful
 24 tool.
 25 The other bit that's lacking, and that's why the

22

1 JESIP principles didn't necessarily all come flooding to
 2 the forefront of my mind and I'm thinking, "These are
 3 the bits I've got to do", is the fact there's not enough
 4 exercising of JESIP in a multi-agency format, where
 5 mercifully they're very rare events but because, by the
 6 very nature of them being rare, your experience is
 7 incredibly limited and I hadn't done any exercising in
 8 JESIP other than that one 2.5/3 years prior to the
 9 attack.
 10 So I think periodic multi-agency exercising to get
 11 that into the forefront of commanders' minds is what
 12 I think could be an option.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Am I right in thinking that the app
 14 which you now have post-dates 22 May 2017?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's as a result of, maybe?
 17 A. Potentially. I think it has been designed by the
 18 College of Policing.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, thank you.
 20 MR DE LA POER: So on 22 May, at the time that you first
 21 became aware that an incident had taken place, where
 22 were you?
 23 A. I was at Central Park Police Station.
 24 Q. And why had you chosen to be there?
 25 A. I had a meeting with a special chief inspector, who was

23

1 a volunteer helping in policing and communities. I had
 2 arranged to meet with him in the evening and I also
 3 had -- at the time she was a fast-track sergeant who was
 4 shadowing me, and she's also based at Central Park.
 5 I had access to an office at Central Park even though my
 6 main office was at Longsight.
 7 Q. So let's be clear about the role of Night Silver. Does
 8 it require you to be on call throughout the duration or
 9 on duty ready to respond?
 10 A. At the time it was on duty, I think, from 7 pm...
 11 Q. I don't think we need to go into the timings of it.
 12 Certainly there was a period whilst you were the Night
 13 Silver, you were on duty, no question of you being able
 14 to go home and go to bed with your telephone by your
 15 bed, you are on duty?
 16 A. That happens now. After a certain time, you can
 17 potentially -- if there's nothing that requires your
 18 attention, then you can finish the rest of the tour from
 19 home.
 20 Q. If nothing requires your attention?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. So if I've understood this correctly, might it have been
 23 the case that had this incident, and we're talking very
 24 much in 2017, occurred later into your tour, you would
 25 have been at home rather than on duty and awake?

24

1 A. There is a possibility and I can't remember what time --
 2 in what period the force changed the process a little
 3 bit. So I'm not sure.
 4 Q. I certainly don't want to go into how it is now. But at
 5 all events, you were on duty and undertaking activities
 6 as a police officer --
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. -- when you became aware of it?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think this all started really from
 11 a question which was: if you're on duty, do you need to
 12 be at a particular police station or can you be
 13 generally around the place?
 14 A. Within the GMP area, at a police station.
 15 MR DE LA POER: Yes. One of the things that you had to do
 16 that night, having, as we will come to, been instructed
 17 by the Gold commander to go to force HQ, is to travel --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- from where you were.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. You happened to be where you were for the reasons that
 22 you have given us, but there was a travel period, wasn't
 23 there, before you were in a position to take up
 24 a command role in a meaningful sense?
 25 A. I'm sorry, I don't quite understand.

1 Q. You weren't based at force HQ so that you were ready to
 2 open the Silver room if that's what was required --
 3 A. No, no.
 4 Q. -- immediately?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. There was a period, because of the fact that you could
 7 be within the GMP area --
 8 A. That's right.
 9 Q. -- and you were where you were, you had to travel?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Would it be impractical, given the other
 12 responsibilities that you might have, for the Night
 13 Silver to be based close to or in the Silver room
 14 throughout their tour so they are ready to respond? Is
 15 that an unrealistic expectation bearing in mind what
 16 other duties you might have to do? Because one
 17 potential upside from that, I'm sure you can readily
 18 see, is it would cut out any potential travel time and
 19 you'd be ready to take over much faster?
 20 A. Potentially. That wasn't the practice at the time and
 21 the Silver room wasn't up and ready, you have to build
 22 and get resources and people in there. The situation is
 23 completely different now, as I'm sure you're aware. So
 24 at the time, no, it wasn't the standard practice to sit
 25 in the Silver room. And the list of duties a Night

1 Silver does, when I've looked at it for the inquiry,
 2 clearly, there's over 30 different elements to it.
 3 Q. Absolutely. That's really why I was asking the question
 4 in terms of whether that is impractical bearing in mind
 5 we are very much focused on the thing that happened on
 6 22 May but you didn't know that when you came on duty
 7 and you obviously had other duties to perform.
 8 A. That's right. As I have said, I met those two people,
 9 there was telephone call from the Serious organised
 10 Crime Group to discuss an investigation and potential
 11 authority. So that's just typical of what could occur.
 12 And then it's the other authorities that you'd have to
 13 review and consider and, as I've said, it's a very long
 14 list.
 15 Q. Did you know that night, before you spoke to Mr Randall,
 16 that there was an Ariana Grande concert taking place
 17 at the arena involving in excess of 14,000 attendees?
 18 A. Not that I remember, no.
 19 Q. Do you think it would have helped you at all if that had
 20 been information you'd known beforehand or in fact, once
 21 you were told, did it sufficiently inform your actions
 22 that it didn't require or cause any delay?
 23 A. I think the inquiry has already heard in terms of,
 24 routinely, any concerts or events at the arena were
 25 policed by British Transport Police. Only if it was --

1 I think there might have been some boxing matches or
 2 something that was deemed significant, would they inform
 3 GMP.
 4 Q. I understand that that was the practice, but it's really
 5 just trying to get to the bottom of whether or not
 6 it would have helped you on the night to have known that
 7 in advance or whether or not, in fact, it's 10 seconds
 8 of conversation and then you know all you need to know
 9 once it's occurred.
 10 A. I think it ... I mean, it's in terms of... It could be
 11 helpful in terms of understanding the crowd that was
 12 attending, which could then potentially have helped.
 13 I'm not sure really if it would have made a significant
 14 difference to my activities and actions that night.
 15 Q. Let's come to that call now involving Mr Randall. We're
 16 going to play it. It's approximately 2 minutes long.
 17 It appears in the audio schedule. Mr Lopez, I hope, is
 18 going to be able to bring up the transcript.
 19 {INQ018839A/1} for the audio from 9:30, {INQ018839T/1}
 20 for the transcript, from {INQ018839T/5}.
 21 We can see there on the transcript, about a quarter
 22 of the way down, the telephone call begins.
 23 (Audio recording played to the inquiry)
 10:14:07 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The inaudible bit at 00:11:02 would
 25 appear to be Debbie Ford.

1 MR DE LA POER: That's what I was going to ask.
 2 Do you agree?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Why would you have in mind to call Debbie Ford?
 5 A. So Debbie Ford was the duty ACC, the Gold commander on
 6 the night.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be obvious or, if it's a secret,
 8 don't tell me, but what's a box?
 9 A. It's a computer system. It's a computer, effectively,
 10 and access to the FWIN, so I think at that particular
 11 moment I might have been on a different computer.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You could see the FWIN if you had that?
 13 A. Yes. I might have been away from my desk. I'm not
 14 sure.
 15 MR DE LA POER: That's the initial information you were
 16 given. What did you do as a result of that call?
 17 A. So this is where I've started to mentally form my plan.
 18 The first thing is I understood that events at the arena
 19 were routinely policed by British Transport Police, so
 20 I wanted to ensure that they're notified and in
 21 attendance. It's likely they would have had officers
 22 at the scene already. I also wanted to ensure resources
 23 were going to the arena and the force duty supervisor
 24 confirmed that he'd requested a lot of resources to go.
 25 So that was ongoing.

1 I also — because I knew the BTP routinely policed
 2 the arena, I wasn't familiar with it, so I looked on
 3 a database where there are hundreds of operational
 4 plans. I think I got a little frustrated because it had
 5 the old name, so it was a little bit harder to search,
 6 it was the Phones4U Arena. I had referred to it as an
 7 evacuation plan, the actual title is "contingency plan",
 8 so I printed that off.
 9 Then, in terms of my timings, I've reviewed this,
 10 and I think it was at this point I told the sergeant who
 11 was with me to go and get her car, get her kit, we're
 12 going to the scene.
 13 Q. This is the sergeant who was on the fast-track programme
 14 who was shadowing you?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Let's have a look at some of the parts of what your
 17 thinking was. I'm certainly not intending to cut you
 18 off saying anything and we will move through this a
 19 slowly as we need to. One of the things you mentioned
 20 was that you had searched for and found a contingency
 21 plan for the arena and you printed it off. So we're
 22 going to bring that up on screen now. We looked at this
 23 with Constable Hughes before Christmas, but it would be
 24 convenient for us to do so again. {INQ007219/1}.
 25 As you say, it is headed "contingency plan" with the

1 name of the arena has it had been previously, the
 2 Phones4U Arena. If we go to that page there,
 3 {INQ007219/2}, we can see the version is dated June 2013
 4 and the next review date is June 2016, although as we
 5 heard from Constable Hughes, it in fact hadn't been
 6 updated such that a new version was available and in
 7 force by May of 2017.
 8 Next we'll go to {INQ007219/3} — I'm so sorry, it's
 9 page 3 of the document. We can see in the preface there
 10 the second sentence:
 11 "It must be used in conjunction with the GMP major
 12 incident plan."
 13 Was that something that you noted at the time once
 14 you had printed it off that it said that?
 15 A. I can't remember. If I did, it would... it would have
 16 made me pause. There are a couple of things that made
 17 me pause in terms of the plan that we'll probably get on
 18 to later that changed some of my thinking.
 19 Q. We're going to have a look at {INQ007219/5}, bottom
 20 right-hand corner.
 21 There is a major incident checklist embedded within
 22 this plan and we can just look at the first four items.
 23 The first is:
 24 "Declare a major incident."
 25 The second:

1 "Ensure other emergency services and support
 2 agencies are aware."
 3 The third:
 4 "Request OCR to assign a Talk Group."
 5 The fourth:
 6 "Identify a forward control post."
 7 Obviously it goes on. We don't need to look at all
 8 those. We'll take that down although we'll come back to
 9 other parts of this document in a moment.
 10 When you printed it out did you note to yourself
 11 that there was a checklist for you of actions that you
 12 might undertake?
 13 A. I can't remember because I'm not sure how much of the
 14 plan I actually read because — so the time between the
 15 call from the FDS and then getting the call from... I'm
 16 not sure if I tried to call the FDO or whether the FDO
 17 called me... In that time, I had been able to instruct
 18 my sergeant, I'd been able to print off the plan and
 19 start to try and build some situational awareness,
 20 understanding what's happening on the force-wide
 21 incident number, the incident log, which is, as you
 22 probably are aware, is a central repository for a huge
 23 amount of information that's flooding in, be that from
 24 officers at the scene or members of the public or, later
 25 on, partner agencies or there might be research on an

1 individual or a vehicle. It's just literally flooding
 2 in on to that incident log.
 3 Q. We ought to bookend this time period because we are
 4 going to come in a moment to that call between you and
 5 the FDO and that is at 22.50, so there is a period of,
 6 taking account the end of that call with Mr Randall,
 7 about 9 minutes between the end of that call and when
 8 you end up speaking to the FDO. Is that the time period
 9 that you are describing those actions?
 10 A. Yes, and one of the probably -- I'm not sure how long it
 11 took me to get hold of that plan because of the name.
 12 But it was -- so it was getting hold of the plan,
 13 instructing the sergeant, and starting to review the
 14 FWIN.
 15 Q. We'll go back to the plan and then we'll discuss what
 16 you did with it at various points in the evening. If
 17 we can go back to page 8, please, {INQ007219/8}. We can
 18 see that there is information provided there about the
 19 site in the third paragraph, that -- where the location
 20 of Whiskey Control is within the arena. Do you agree?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. {INQ007219/9}. We can see in the middle there that
 23 there are four suggested RVPs and marshalling areas and
 24 we should note that underneath that it says:
 25 "However, depending on the nature of the incident

1 then a local RVP can be arranged as designated by the
 2 Bronze commander."
 3 At any point in the evening was that a part of the
 4 document that you consulted or considered in terms of
 5 rendezvous points?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. {INQ007219/11}. I hope my numbering is correct. If we
 8 go over to {INQ007219/12}, forgive me.
 9 We can see that there is a location map of the site
 10 plan. Did you consult that at any point?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. In fact, that doesn't identify the City Room or the
 13 foyer, as it was sometimes referred to on the night, or
 14 any access to it; do you agree?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And in fact, because this plan was dated in June 2013,
 17 it pre-dates the station refurbishment which took place
 18 in 2014/2015, where the access to the City Room was
 19 reconfigured. I don't know if you're aware of any of
 20 that or had any of that in your mind on the night?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. We can see over on the next page {INQ007219/13} that
 23 it is plainly created -- that's perhaps not the most
 24 helpful image. Certainly it didn't happen like that on
 25 my screen. No, that is entirely unhelpful. I don't

1 know why it appears like that. You'll have to take it
 2 from me, superintendent, that that photograph makes it
 3 apparent that it is pre-refurbishment.
 4 A. Right.
 5 Q. So you didn't have a chance, as I've understood your
 6 evidence, to consult that plan in any detail before you
 7 spoke to the FDO. What did you do with that plan once
 8 it was printed out?
 9 A. I collected the plan, I don't think I read it in any
 10 specific detail because then I'm having a conversation
 11 with the FDO. So I think I probably would have put it
 12 in my daybook, but I don't know.
 13 Q. Did you take it to the Silver control room?
 14 A. Possibly, yes. I would have thought I would have done
 15 that.
 16 Q. Did you consult it at any point after you'd spoken to
 17 the FDO?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. In your first witness statement, you mentioned BTP
 20 a number of times and we can see that BTP was one of
 21 your first thoughts when you were discussing with the
 22 FDS. Can you invite you please to turn to paragraph 27
 23 of your first statement, just the final sentence.
 24 I think it begins five lines up from the bottom.
 25 Do you have that?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. We've already touched on the fact that BTP had primacy
 3 for the policing of events. What was your thinking
 4 at the point at which you had your discussion with the
 5 FDS about who would have primacy for any response that
 6 might be required to this incident?
 7 A. So at that point, I don't think I did consider primacy.
 8 For me, at that point, after that initial call, it was
 9 about ensuring we got as many resources to the location
 10 as possible and BTP, I'd imagine, would have had
 11 officers there.
 12 Q. Did it occur to you at any point in this initial period
 13 before you spoke to the FDO, or shortly thereafter, that
 14 you speaking to BTP might be a useful thing?
 15 A. The quickest way of getting hold of BTP would have been
 16 through the control room. So for speed, that was the
 17 quickest way. So I hadn't thought about contacting them
 18 myself at that point.
 19 Q. Let's come to the call with the FDO. Before we play
 20 this, I would like to give this warning so that people
 21 can step away if they wish to or prepare themselves if
 22 they wish to remain. This transcript does contain
 23 references to the content of the device, and so may be
 24 particularly distressing for some to hear. It lasts for
 25 less than 2 minutes. But I'm going to pause for

1 a moment, superintendent, before I ask for it to be
 2 played so that if anybody wants to step away for that
 3 2 minutes or so, they can make their arrangements now.
 4 (Pause)
 5 Mr Lopez, {INQ018855A/1} for the audio from 14:40
 6 and the same reference, {INQ018855T/2}, please. We are
 7 looking in the bottom third.
 8 (Audio recording played to the inquiry)
 9 So we can see there the exchange between you and
 10 Inspector Sexton. He tells you that he has declared
 11 Op Plato, as he terms it. Your response:
 12 "Op what?"
 13 He says:
 14 "Op Plato."
 15 And he tells you that it's a response to a terrorist
 16 incident and you say, "Yeah".
 17 Superintendent Nawaz, you have told us already that
 18 Op Plato meant nothing to you. Did you understand at
 19 that point that you were going to have a role to play in
 20 this incident?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. If you didn't understand what Operation Plato was, why
 23 didn't you ask Inspector Sexton to explain further?
 24 A. I think when he made that declaration or explained that
 25 he declared Operation Plato, it just completely threw my

1 thinking. I'm trying to draw out: is it something I've
 2 missed, what is it I need to do? So that's where I draw
 3 on my experience, and we'll come through it, but where
 4 the plan I'm devising is what I would expect to happen,
 5 but I didn't know what my role in Plato was. So
 6 I reasoned that there will be --- and he describes in the
 7 call that he's deployed ARVs to do an emergency
 8 search --- that there would be a firearms command around
 9 a response to a terrorist attack. And I know the FDO's
 10 the initial TFC who will take command and control around
 11 that. But it was just this incredible feeling of
 12 uncertainty when he described Operation Plato.
 13 Q. So you are uncertain. A solution to that uncertainty is
 14 just to say to him, "Can just tell me a bit more about
 15 that?" Would that have been an appropriate thing for
 16 you to ask him?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Do you think you should have asked him that?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Bearing in mind that that was, as we can hear,
 21 a conversation that takes place at pace in the middle of
 22 an unfolding incident, once that call has concluded and
 23 you are in that state of uncertainty, did it occur to
 24 you that there might be others that you could ask to
 25 assist you with what Operation Plato was?

1 A. My next step was to phone Gold commander and then share
 2 the information that I'd received to that point and
 3 brief the Gold commander and then take some instruction,
 4 of which there were four points.
 5 Q. We're going to come to that call at 22.52. It may be
 6 convenient to look at it now. Your next step was to
 7 phone ACC Debbie Ford.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Did you ask her ---
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are we leaving that conversation?
 11 MR DE LA POER: It's all of a piece but, sir, it may be
 12 convenient if you ---
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There was a mention of an emergency
 14 search there, which we now have learned has something of
 15 a technical meaning. Were you aware at the time what
 16 that technical meaning was, an emergency search?
 17 A. No.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is, we have heard, very much in the
 19 early stages, a firearms-type incident, they're the
 20 first ones to deal with it, as you have just said. Had
 21 you have any firearms command experience?
 22 A. No.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you, of course you'd have known what
 24 an emergency search was and you'd have known what Plato
 25 was?

1 A. Yes.
 2 MR DE LA POER: In your call to Debbie Ford did you ask her,
 3 "Ma'am, what is an Operation Plato"?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. Again bearing in mind your state of uncertainty at that
 6 time, would that have been an appropriate thing for you
 7 to ask her?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Do you think you should have asked her that?
 10 A. On reflection, yes.
 11 Q. Bearing in mind your state of uncertainty, did you ask
 12 ACC Ford, "What's my role in this?", or anything to that
 13 effect?
 14 A. I can't remember the exact conversation, but I do
 15 recollect asking her what she wanted me to do and she
 16 gave me sort of four actions, which was to obtain more
 17 information from the FDO, ensure that the SIO was
 18 en route, the senior investigating officer, ensure that
 19 the press officer was en route, and I know the inquiry's
 20 heard, at that time I did know out-of-hours media
 21 enquiries go to the force duty officer's line. Shortly
 22 --- I can't remember if... the exact time, whether this
 23 was immediately after --- I think it was after I spoke to
 24 ACC Ford --- my wife rang me and said, "Are you okay?",
 25 I said, "I'm fine, I can't talk now", and I hung up.

1 That made me think this is already in the public domain
 2 which made that action even more important, really, to
 3 get that media officer in who could take some pressure
 4 off the FDO, but more importantly could get public
 5 messaging out.
 6 Then the other fourth action was set up the Silver
 7 room and, "I'll see you there shortly".
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So there's lots of things going on.
 9 People are obviously acting very quickly, no doubt there
 10 was urgency in the voice of Debbie Ford as well dealing
 11 with this. So obviously you could have asked questions
 12 about what is meant by a Plato and an emergency search,
 13 but perhaps knowing what those things were in advance
 14 would have been rather better?
 15 A. Sir, absolutely. I think it's almost too late to try
 16 and unpick it in that pressure and when things are
 17 moving at such pace.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're selecting: do I slow these people
 19 down from what they're trying to do to give me an
 20 explanation or do I ask so I actually have some idea
 21 what I'm doing.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's quite difficult to know what you're
 24 really doing, commanding an incident without knowing
 25 what Plato and the emergency search are.

1 A. Yes. As I've said, sir, it was drawing on my experience
 2 in terms of: right, I know this people have to be
 3 notified, I know we have to get resources in. There
 4 were certain elements I knew would support the response
 5 and command.
 6 MR DE LA POER: Just so that we get the timing and duration
 7 of that call, if you have a look at your audio schedule,
 8 the A3 copy, we can see at the bottom of page 1,
 9 entry 2599, there is recorded a call of just short of
 10 3 minutes between you and ACC Ford.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Is that the call in which those four points were given
 13 to you by her?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you know where she was at the time?
 16 Do you remember? We will hear from her, but if you
 17 happen to remember.
 18 A. There's a cover arrangement -- so I'm not sure. I think
 19 she might have been home by that time.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: She could have been at home, she could
 21 have been on her way in, she could have been --
 22 A. In fairness to Gold, they cover effectively 24 hours, so
 23 they're clearly not expected to be in the police station
 24 for all that time.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no.

1 MR DE LA POER: Can I just invite to you turn to the very
 2 end of your second statement, just so that we can
 3 understand how the uncertainty impacted upon you. It's
 4 paragraphs 60 and 61.
 5 In paragraph 60 you say what you've told us already:
 6 "Ultimately, I had never heard of or been trained
 7 in relation to Operation Plato."
 8 And you noted that fact as part of your debrief to
 9 feed back to the force to make improvements for the
 10 future.
 11 Then you say:
 12 "It would have been irresponsible for me to
 13 unilaterally make decisions in relation to a plan that
 14 was obviously intended for situations like this, the
 15 details of which I was not aware of. Had I made
 16 decisions under such circumstances they may even have
 17 hindered GMP's response and caused confusion."
 18 Just help us to understand a little bit more what
 19 you're saying there.
 20 A. I think it's specifically in relation to Plato and the
 21 response to that and the command and control of what's
 22 expected from Operation Plato. With that lack of
 23 understanding of it, I don't think it would have been
 24 right for me to then create a plan specifically around
 25 Plato. But as I've said, what I could do was draw on my

1 experience and know actually what resources are
 2 required, how quickly can we get that command and
 3 control in a force command module, set up a Silver room,
 4 get those other resources and partner agencies into that
 5 room so we can coordinate, co-locate, start to
 6 communicate, and build that response to the event, the
 7 attack.
 8 Q. Was there any discussion between you and Debbie Ford
 9 about a major incident declaration?
 10 A. I don't recollect there was.
 11 Q. We've seen from the definition of a major incident that
 12 it is one which may involve a substantial number of
 13 casualties. I'm paraphrasing there, but hopefully
 14 satisfactorily. The firearms response, which you had
 15 a sense of under the banner of Operation Plato, did you
 16 give any thought to what might be happening around the
 17 casualties?
 18 A. So clearly, right from the off, the single primary focus
 19 was about saving life, so really important to get North
 20 West Ambulance Service personnel in there to help with
 21 that. Absolutely critical, the number one priority. On
 22 the FWIN, and when I viewed it, it says I think there
 23 was eight or on another one it might have said 11
 24 ambulances were en route. I think there was a paramedic
 25 already on scene, there were more coming, so in my mind,

1 that help and support was being built and delivered.
 2 Q. Finally, in relation to your call with ACC Ford, you've
 3 mentioned already her instruction to you to go to force
 4 HQ --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. -- which was contrary to what you were gearing up to do
 7 at that point. Just walk us through that part of the
 8 conversation. Did that emanate from her? Did that come
 9 from you? Were you questioning where you should go?
 10 How did that evolve?
 11 A. I think I asked what she wanted me to do and we had that
 12 conversation about those four points, one of which was
 13 to set up the Silver room and, "I'll see you in there
 14 shortly".
 15 Q. Bearing in mind that that was different to what you had
 16 initially thought you might do, did you question that
 17 decision or explore that decision with her at all?
 18 A. I questioned it in my mind, and actually I formulated
 19 that that was a logical decision, built on my previous
 20 command experience for pre-planned events. But
 21 I understood the capability of the force command module,
 22 how you can get those partner agencies in, other police
 23 specialisms in, a separate dedicated channel to help to
 24 start support the response.
 25 Q. You have told me before you came in to give evidence

1 that one of the people you had the opportunity to
 2 consider giving evidence was Inspector Smith. Did you
 3 hear the part of his evidence where he mentioned how
 4 having an unarmed tactical commander may have assisted
 5 him, had they been at the scene?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So you know what you did on the night. Having heard his
 8 perspective on it and knowing what your own perspective
 9 is, do you think it was the best decision for you to go
 10 to the Silver room to set it up or, with the benefit of
 11 hindsight, do you think it would have been better for
 12 you to have gone to the scene?
 13 A. The setting-up of Silver wasn't physically done by me,
 14 it was my location in Silver. I'd had a conversation
 15 with the FDS who said he was calling out people to do
 16 that setting-up function. Given the capabilities
 17 in that room, the co-location, the requests from Gold,
 18 I think that was the right place for me to go.
 19 Q. It may be your answer incorporates this, but I'm not
 20 looking to see whether that was what you thought was the
 21 right place to go at the time. I am now saying, with
 22 the benefit of hindsight, knowing all that you did but
 23 hearing the perspective of somebody at the scene who has
 24 raised the fact that a tactical commander may have
 25 assisted him, doing your best to balance that with

1 hindsight, do you have a perspective on where it would
 2 have been best for you to go?
 3 A. I still think the force command module. I understand it
 4 kind of sometimes can feel a little counter-intuitive
 5 because your initial reaction as a police officer is to
 6 go. But then actually, as a Silver commander, it's
 7 about a step back, a more holistic view of everything
 8 and actually what's going to provide the very best
 9 response. So whilst it might feel a little bit
 10 unnatural, I think it's the right thing.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It has been posed as an either/or.
 12 Actually, if you decide to go to the force command
 13 module, is there any reason why someone else couldn't be
 14 quickly called out to go to the scene, another
 15 superintendent?
 16 A. I think potentially, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You can see how both are of benefit?
 18 A. Yes, yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So actually in those circumstances, it
 20 may be you could have said to Debbie Ford, when she said
 21 this to you, "Shall I get someone else out to go to the
 22 scene"? A possible conversation?
 23 A. Absolutely, it is, yes. I looked at the FWIN and knew
 24 kind of who was at the scene in terms of command
 25 perspective, but there wasn't a superintendent there.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. One of the problems that has come
 2 up again and again, when you're saying, as everyone else
 3 has, and I understand and accept entirely, the first
 4 priority is saving life. The question is, there are
 5 a number of different people's lives who potentially
 6 need to be saved. So there are the people in there who
 7 are injured at the moment, who want the best possible
 8 medical attention and got out and got to hospital as
 9 soon as possible. Then there are people from other
 10 services who are coming to the scene -- you yourself are
 11 talking about a possible secondary device -- for whom it
 12 may be dangerous for them to go in immediately and their
 13 lives may be endangered. You've got members of the
 14 public in there, whose lives may be in danger if they
 15 stay there. Do these things cross your mind at the time
 16 you're thinking about all this? And if they cross your
 17 mind, what is your reasoning to do something about it?
 18 A. Absolutely they crossed my mind on the night. I was
 19 basing it on the information I had at that time and it
 20 was built on a few elements. One, resources are already
 21 deployed by the time I became aware of it. There was no
 22 mention, in my conversation with the force duty officer,
 23 that there was any evidence of an active shooter or
 24 somebody -- there's no mention of firearms other than
 25 we're deploying firearms to keep the location safe, so

1 that in itself provides a degree of protection for
 2 people who are at the scene.
 3 These are incredibly difficult risk assessments in
 4 terms of the desperate need to help versus the equally
 5 important need to protect people that are going. And so
 6 it was --- there was no mention of a firearm or somebody
 7 with a firearm, and the FDO said, on the face of it, it
 8 looks like a lone actor who detonated a device. So
 9 built on that, that initial risk assessment is:
 10 actually, we've got to continue.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which actually shows the danger of not
 12 knowing what Plato is because Plato is predicated on the
 13 risk of there being a lone gunman.
 14 A. Yes, and zones.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 16 MR DE LA POER: I'm going to move forward now to listen to
 17 the third and final call. We can do a short summary
 18 before we get to that. If you have a look at the audio
 19 schedule over on the next page, we can note that there
 20 was a call between you and the person you were mentoring
 21 that night.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And also a call with ACC Ford's staff officer, those
 24 both taking place shortly before or at 11 o'clock. Then
 25 we come to the call that I would like to deal with,

1 please. This is a call with Ian Randall at 23.00.20.
 2 We're going to listen to it and have it on the screen so
 3 that we can follow it.
 4 Mr Lopez, {INQ018840A/1} from 0:20 to 2:04, please,
 5 and {INQ018840T/1}.
 6 (Audio recording played to the inquiry)
 7 We can summarise that call together. There were
 8 a number of people you had in mind who needed to be
 9 contacted?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And, with the exception of CTU, Mr Randall, I think, had
 12 already done that which needed to be done?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Where were you when that conversation took place at
 15 11 o'clock, do you think?
 16 A. Either still at Central Park or making my way to
 17 headquarters.
 18 Q. So you hadn't arrived at Silver by that point?
 19 A. I don't think so, no.
 20 Q. You say at one point:
 21 "We're going to set up a command and control room at
 22 HQ."
 23 Which might suggest you weren't there yet ---
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. --- but it's far from clear. But your recollection is

1 that at 11 o'clock you hadn't yet arrived at force
 2 headquarters?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Had you gone to the scene at the point at which you were
 5 ready to depart from the police station, how long would
 6 it have taken to go there?
 7 A. From there to the arena, 8 minutes.
 8 Q. Do you think you might have been able to get to the
 9 arena for about 11 o'clock or do you think it would have
 10 been after that?
 11 A. Yes, I think so.
 12 Q. Around 11?
 13 A. Around 11, yes.
 14 Q. But at all events, you were on your way to Silver or ---
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. --- were about to depart from that. Just talk us through
 17 your arrival at force HQ.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before you do that, had you instructed
 19 anyone at force HQ to do anything on setting up Silver?
 20 A. I checked that it was being done.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: With whom?
 22 A. The force duty supervisor. So in that conversation I'm
 23 saying, "We have got to set up" ---
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He said --- he told you it was being
 25 done, in fact, I think, rather than checking --- but

1 anyway, you got that information. But you're already on
 2 your way in by then?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have you any idea that you can give me
 5 an explanation of why the setting-up of Silver has to be
 6 done by people who are a 20-minute car journey away
 7 rather than someone at force HQ?
 8 A. I think it's in relation to setting up the radio
 9 channels.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is there anyone at force HQ who can do
 11 that?
 12 A. At the time I don't think OCB were there, so the command
 13 centre wasn't at force headquarters, it was remote.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 15 MR DE LA POER: So what time do you think it was that you
 16 arrived at force HQ?
 17 A. I think I've had another two telephone calls with
 18 Gold commander, so I can't remember if I had those
 19 in the room, so I would estimate around 23.10.
 20 Q. If we look at the audio schedule, I think those two are
 21 on it. There is an entry 4485, which is over the page,
 22 and there's a 13-second contact between your telephone
 23 and ACC Ford, and then, 2 minutes later, what appears to
 24 be a rather more substantial contact, 1 minute and
 25 50 seconds, between you and ACC Ford. So your

1 recollection is that those calls are taking place at
 2 around the time that you are arriving --
 3 A. Around the time I am getting to headquarters.
 4 Q. Were you the first person to enter the Silver room?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. What needed to be done when you arrived?
 7 A. When I arrived, I had to access a terminal. I then made
 8 a telephone call to the DI from the City of Manchester,
 9 which I think -- I tried on mobile, but then I've noted
 10 in my daybook an extension number, so I think I would
 11 have phoned from a landline.
 12 Q. Does that appear in our schedule? There was a call at
 13 23.16 between you and somebody called Tony Lee?
 14 A. DI Lee, yes. That call looks like it didn't go through,
 15 I think. Is it 3 seconds?
 16 Q. It is 3 seconds.
 17 A. Yes. But I do recollect having a conversation with
 18 Tony, DI Lee, because he was a City of Manchester
 19 detective, I knew that the response inspector had
 20 already deployed to the scene, so I wanted to see if
 21 it would get any more resources from DI Lee from City of
 22 Manchester.
 23 Q. So from point of view of timing your arrival, at the
 24 time that you are seeking to make contact with DI Lee at
 25 23.16 hours, by then had you arrived in Silver, switched

1 on your terminal, and been in a position to make that
 2 call?
 3 A. I think so, yes, and I think it was from a landline.
 4 Q. Do you recall who arrived once you were in situ?
 5 A. I can't remember when... It's around this time
 6 Ben Ashworth and Sergeant Thornton arrived, but I also
 7 know the Gold commander and the NWS tactical commander
 8 arrived shortly after me.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just to remind people, Ben Ashworth is
 10 the press officer?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 MR DE LA POER: The NWS Silver commander, a woman by the
 13 name of Annemarie Rooney?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Is it your recollection that ACC Ford and Ms Rooney
 16 arrived at about the same time?
 17 A. I think so, or very similar. Virtually ...
 18 Q. Approximately how long after you had arrived do you
 19 think that was?
 20 A. A few minutes, 5 minutes maybe.
 21 Q. So by about 23.20?
 22 A. I think by 23.20 I was briefing them.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're still waiting for the comms team
 24 to turn up?
 25 A. I think so. I think she came after half past, maybe 20

1 to.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Nothing operationally could be done
 3 in the Silver command room until they arrived and set it
 4 up? Contacting other services?
 5 A. Other services are already been notified and that was
 6 logged on the FWIN.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But actually liaising with them?
 8 A. Not until they arrived physically and I could liaise
 9 with them.
 10 MR DE LA POER: Obviously BTP are a national force. Did it
 11 occur to you that there may be a delay in the arrival of
 12 somebody representing BTP to the Silver room?
 13 A. I now understand that, but I think at the time I hadn't
 14 considered it.
 15 Q. Did you have, as you were sitting there, before ACC Ford
 16 and Ms Rooney arrived, any information to indicate when
 17 representatives of other agencies would arrive?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. So for example, the Fire and Rescue Service. Did you
 20 have in your mind, based on any information you had,
 21 when they would be getting there?
 22 A. No. I know they'd been notified, so I thought they
 23 would come as quickly as they potentially could. Same
 24 with NWS.
 25 Q. Would it have been inappropriate for you, pending their

1 arrival, to try and make contact with the other tactical
 2 commanders or was it necessary to wait for them to
 3 arrive?
 4 A. I made contact with the NWS tactical commander.
 5 Q. At 20 past, yes.
 6 A. But I didn't make contact with the Fire Service tactical
 7 commander.
 8 Q. What I'm trying to understand is: would it have been
 9 inappropriate for you to have tried to do that --
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. -- bearing in mind you didn't have any information about
 12 when they were going to arrive?
 13 A. No, I could have requested that through the comms room.
 14 Q. So your briefing to ACC Ford and Ms Rooney, was it to
 15 the two of them together?
 16 A. I can't be certain. I think it was together.
 17 Q. And what did you say to them?
 18 A. I explained the information I'd got from the FWIN, from
 19 the force duty officer at that time, in terms of the
 20 incident, what had occurred, the fact that at that
 21 moment it appeared on the face of it to be one actor.
 22 I think I explained that ARVs had been deployed.
 23 I certainly told the Gold commander about
 24 Operation Plato.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, say that again?

1 A. I told the commander, but that was in my telephone call.
 2 I don't know if I've repeated that then in the
 3 face-to-face briefing.
 4 MR DE LA POER: Did you say words to the effect that it was
 5 not a shooting incident?
 6 A. Possibly. There was nothing --- I certainly would have
 7 explained that from what information I've reviewed there
 8 was no confirmation of it being a shooting.
 9 Q. But you aren't sure whether or not you mentioned the
 10 term Operation Plato at that stage?
 11 A. I'm not sure.
 12 Q. What, if anything, did ACC Ford say in reply to your
 13 briefing?
 14 A. I can't remember.
 15 Q. In the case of Ms Rooney, do you recall her saying
 16 anything in response?
 17 A. It was a conversation. I think there might have been
 18 some checking questions and building situational
 19 awareness from her perspective to gain that information
 20 from me.
 21 Q. At this moment did you regard yourself as the
 22 Silver commander?
 23 A. Yes, with that degree of confusion that Plato caused.
 24 Q. We know that the practice is that the initial tactical
 25 firearms commander will be the FDO.

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And they will also concurrently hold the role of Silver .
 3 If at this stage you regarded yourself as the
 4 Silver commander, had you said anything to the FDO to
 5 inform him that that was your role?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. What was your expectation at that point about what the
 8 FDO would think that you were doing and the role that
 9 you were playing?
 10 A. I think he would know about co-locating, the fact that
 11 I was going to the force command module, that I'd be
 12 liaising with other agencies in there, but obviously not
 13 taking part in any of the firearms command.
 14 Q. That conversation at 22.50, was that in your mind
 15 a handover of the Silver commander role between you and
 16 the FDO or had it happened at some point between that
 17 conversation and when you are speaking to ACC Ford?
 18 A. I think in my mind I thought I had the Silver commander
 19 role at that point.
 20 Q. Which point?
 21 A. After the phone call with the FDO.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's why you introduced yourself as
 23 a Night Silver commander presumably?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you would expect that the Night

1 Silver commander would be the Silver commander of the
 2 incident?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's what they're there for?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 MR DE LA POER: Some evidence that we have heard is that
 7 taking up a commander role --- I think this was BTP
 8 wouldn't --- wouldn't occur until they were in a position
 9 to command. And we heard for example in relation to BTP
 10 that Chief Superintendent Gregory didn't take over until
 11 he felt satisfied that he was in a position to do so.
 12 Was that sort of thinking in your mind or was it: having
 13 spoken to the FDO, I am now the Silver commander for
 14 this?
 15 A. I think I was trying to build up the ability to command
 16 in terms of through the room and other partner agencies
 17 and that developed as time went on. But I thought after
 18 the call with the FDO, actually I'm the Night Silver,
 19 that's my responsibility .
 20 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we've been going an hour and a half.
 21 I don't have very many more questions for the
 22 superintendent about the night, but this might be
 23 a convenient moment to break.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We'll have a quarter of an hour.
 25 Thank you.

1 (11.03 am)
 2 (A short break)
 3 (11.20 am)
 4 MR DE LA POER: Superintendent, we're going to begin this
 5 session by just summarising the next 40 minutes in terms
 6 of what we can see from the audio schedule. Once we've
 7 identified those data points, you can tell us about what
 8 you were doing and about those conversations.
 9 So you have seen, I think, from the audio schedule
 10 that at about 23.34, you tried to get hold of
 11 Inspector Smith. And that you ultimately ended up
 12 speaking to him for 3 minutes at 23.38. We will come
 13 back to that call .
 14 I think at midnight you attempted contact with
 15 somebody who is identified as Steve Howard. What was
 16 his connection to this, please?
 17 A. I'm not sure if it was the deputy chief or the assistant
 18 chief had asked me to try and get hold of more members
 19 of senior leadership teams and Steve Howard and I worked
 20 together.
 21 Q. Those are two important contacts within that next
 22 40-minute period after you had spoken to ACC Ford. Do
 23 you agree that, around midnight, you conducted
 24 a handover with Superintendent Hill of the
 25 Silver commander role?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. So I've picked out those two. We've got 40 minutes up
 3 to that point. Just talk us through what you did in the
 4 Silver control room, please, from 20 past until
 5 midnight.
 6 A. So the room started to fill exponentially. Lots of
 7 people started to come in. Some officers were
 8 self-deploying, so I can't remember the exact time, but
 9 there was an inspector, Inspector Pegram, who came and
 10 presented himself to me.
 11 I'd been asked to set up a welfare cell, so that was
 12 about looking at -- mapping out the resources that were
 13 on duty, because clearly people had remained on duty
 14 beyond their tour. So it was understanding who exactly
 15 was at the arena, how long those officers had been on
 16 duty, so I'd briefed him, and I think Sergeant Yasin as
 17 well, to say: can you start to establish that welfare
 18 cell and start to map out that resourcing, so we get an
 19 understanding of how long people had been on and working
 20 out a plan around replacements.
 21 Q. That is looking after the welfare of the GMP staff?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. At any point, did you instruct that the casualty bureau
 24 be opened?
 25 A. No.

61

1 Q. That's obviously concerned with the management of those
 2 who have been injured. Was the opening of a casualty
 3 bureau something that you regarded as falling within the
 4 role of the Silver commander?
 5 A. I thought it was a Gold command decision.
 6 Q. Did you raise it with the Gold commander at any point
 7 before midnight?
 8 A. I don't think I did.
 9 Q. So you have spoken to those two officers you've told us
 10 about, the welfare cell. Did that occupy you before or
 11 after your call with Inspector Smith or did it cross
 12 both periods?
 13 A. It could have crossed. There was another inspector who
 14 presented, again I don't know the exact time, Inspector
 15 Harrison. I can't be certain what instruction I gave to
 16 him. It might have been around contingency support for
 17 demand for the City of Manchester but I'm not 100% on
 18 that. There were other people coming in, I think this
 19 might have been later, and it's really hard to unpick
 20 the timings of this. There were certainly another two
 21 inspectors that I had briefed, I think I might have
 22 briefed them to go to the -- it might have been later
 23 because they went to an RVP at Thompson Street
 24 Fire Station, I think.
 25 There were conversations happening continually

62

1 in that room. People coming to me, me asking others for
 2 information. I've made a really large volume of phone
 3 calls throughout the -- up to the period the inquiry is
 4 looking at. I think on my mobile billing there's
 5 40 calls, not all of them are answered, but then there's
 6 probably an equal or greater amount on landlines, calls
 7 coming into me, me making calls out, all of which is for
 8 a very specific purpose which is supporting the response
 9 to the attack, whether it's me providing information,
 10 receiving information, providing instruction, receiving
 11 instruction, assessing ongoing risk and threat.
 12 So with that sheer volume, the point I'm trying to
 13 make is it's really difficult to unpick all that and
 14 understand precisely who I spoke to and when. But
 15 all -- there wasn't a moment of calm in that 40-minute
 16 period.
 17 Q. What, if any, command decisions did you make during that
 18 40-minute period?
 19 A. Earlier I'd called operational response and that had
 20 been put in place. All these requests I've put in to
 21 ensure the right people are coming into the Silver room
 22 or going to the scene, these are all decisions that are
 23 being made to ensure or actions that I'm undertaking to
 24 ensure that there's proper structure and processes in
 25 place.

63

1 Q. What about any decision-making relevant to JESIP?
 2 A. The elements I think I did, and I can't say it was
 3 specifically a conscious JESIP decision but that are
 4 consistent with JESIP is the co-location, the
 5 communication and the coordination. That's primarily
 6 with North West Ambulance Service.
 7 Q. That's with Ms Rooney who was in the room with you?
 8 A. Yes, and I think there was somebody else later from
 9 NWAS. There was certainly more than one person at some
 10 point.
 11 Q. Beyond the initial briefing that you gave Ms Rooney,
 12 what other conversation in that 40-minute period was
 13 there between you and her or the other representative
 14 from NWAS?
 15 A. I think we started to look at where victims and
 16 casualties had gone to in terms of hospitals. I started
 17 to have conversations -- again, I'm not sure of the
 18 timings but about having police resources at those
 19 hospitals. So dealing with the sheer volume of
 20 casualties being spread across GM at different hospital
 21 locations.
 22 Q. Were you acting decisively as a Silver commander, do you
 23 believe?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Was the activity that you have described as undertaking

64

1 all activity that as a Silver commander you should be
 2 undertaking?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. During that period what, if any, impact did your
 5 uncertainty around Operation Plato have on your
 6 decision—making?
 7 A. It certainly impacted my thinking quite significantly in
 8 terms of just the huge degree of uncertainty it created
 9 for me.
 10 Q. Did you at any point consult with ACC Ford about that
 11 uncertainty and resolving the way in which it might be
 12 affecting you?
 13 A. No, I think at one point whilst I was in the Silver room
 14 I may have tried to find an Op Plato plan from the
 15 database. I don't think I found it.
 16 Q. I'm going to come to your call now, which occurred
 17 approximately in the middle of that period, with
 18 Inspector Smith. Why did you want to speak to
 19 Inspector Smith?
 20 A. I knew Inspector Smith was the Bronze on the ground, so
 21 it was about a situation report and updates and then
 22 also I think a conversation around resourcing.
 23 Q. You had initially thought to go to the scene, had been
 24 instructed otherwise, and you were, in your own mind,
 25 the Silver commander from 22.50. Why did it take you

1 45 minutes to contact the Bronze commander?
 2 A. There was so much other activity and information coming
 3 in and things that I had to do, that's the first point
 4 I felt I had to be able to contact him.
 5 Q. Obviously, you have a lot to do and you must create
 6 a priority list. Looking back on it, do you think that
 7 that was the appropriate time to seek to contact him or
 8 should you have done so sooner than that?
 9 A. I could have done so sooner.
 10 Q. Should you, do you think?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Why do you say that?
 13 A. To get that situational report so that — the
 14 situational awareness I was gaining was from
 15 conversations I've had with the FDO, the FDS and
 16 reviewing the incident log. I think speaking to the
 17 Bronze commander at the scene would have given me
 18 additional situational awareness.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The impression I've got, and it may be
 20 entirely wrong, and of course I will keep it under
 21 review, is what the FDO is principally concerned with in
 22 these early stages is armed police and he's talking to
 23 them on the channel all the time. Unarmed police seem
 24 to be perhaps left without much control and command,
 25 apart from Inspector Smith at the scene. He's the

1 person who actually knows what he needs most, isn't he?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So that may be a justification for how
 4 it would have been preferential to speak to him earlier.
 5 A. Yes, and some of his requests had gone on to the FWIN,
 6 I think, the initial request being paramedics and
 7 resources. I knew NWAS had been contacted and I knew
 8 we were requesting resources from across the force and
 9 other districts were getting resources in, but I
 10 absolutely accept —
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: One thing he has told us, and you'll
 12 have listened to his evidence, is what he wanted was
 13 paramedics in the City Room —
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: — and that's what he wasn't getting.
 16 Had you ever got that from the FWIN or anything like
 17 that?
 18 A. No.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And of course with you, with Ms Rooney
 20 there as well, you might have been able to do something
 21 about that.
 22 A. Yes. Initially I got the sense from the updates on the
 23 FWIN he wanted paramedics in there and the updates were
 24 they were en route. I wasn't aware at that time what
 25 Inspector Smith was explaining in terms of what he felt

1 was some of the delay, I suppose, of what he wanted.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 3 MR DE LA POER: Had you formed a view about whether there
 4 was or was not anywhere within the arena that was unsafe
 5 for unarmed personnel?
 6 A. Right at the beginning, so looking at the information
 7 and intelligence that had come in, with that sort of
 8 working strategy about saving lives and making that risk
 9 assessment that actually there was no evidence of an
 10 individual with a firearm, it appeared on the face of it
 11 a lone actor, nevertheless a secondary device could not
 12 be ruled out. So whilst the risk remained high, and it
 13 did, at that time I still felt it was the right decision
 14 in terms of continuing, if that makes sense.
 15 Q. Was that your thought process given the factors you've
 16 described at 22.50 when you took over?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. The inquiry has heard evidence from Inspector Sexton,
 19 who perhaps took a different view, although I'm not
 20 going to seek to summarise his evidence further than
 21 that about where may or may not be safe, or certainly
 22 a more nuanced view. So in your mind as
 23 Silver commander it was, to borrow a phrase from
 24 Inspector Smith, safe enough for unarmed personnel to be
 25 present throughout the Victoria Exchange complex?

1 A. Yes, with the caveat that I didn't know --- so there'd
 2 been no mention to me about a potential individual with
 3 a firearm or that Plato was at that time an MTFA.
 4 Q. Was the first time that you shared that conclusion with
 5 anyone from another agency when you spoke to
 6 Annemarie Rooney or did you not mention that to her?
 7 A. Yes. So my --- when I discussed it with the
 8 NWAS tactical commander it was explaining the
 9 information that I had and that there was nothing to
 10 indicate a shooter.
 11 Q. You've already frankly conceded that JESIP wasn't at the
 12 forefront of your mind. Did you ever speak to the Fire
 13 and Rescue Service Silver commander or NILO whilst you
 14 were the Silver commander?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Presumably, had you spoken to them at any point after
 17 22.50, you would have told them, if asked, "It's safe
 18 enough for unarmed personnel to be at the
 19 Victoria Exchange complex"?
 20 A. I would have provided the risk assessment we've just
 21 gone through.
 22 Q. Similarly, in terms of BTP, did you speak to any
 23 representative of BTP in your capacity as
 24 Silver commander?
 25 A. Prior to midnight?

1 Q. Yes.
 2 A. No.
 3 Q. You have described a lot of things that you were doing.
 4 I'd just like to go back to that question of priorities .
 5 Is it an unreasonable expectation on a Silver commander
 6 in your position to have at the top of their priority
 7 list sharing their situational awareness, making joint
 8 decisions with other tactical commanders, earlier than
 9 you did, at least so far as NWAS was concerned?
 10 A. Sorry, could you just repeat that?
 11 Q. Yes, it was a long question. I apologise for that. You
 12 had the experience that you had on the night and you've
 13 described to us that you were busy. JESIP expects early
 14 sharing of information, joint decision-making, and joint
 15 risk assessment. You've told us that whilst you were
 16 the tactical commander, you shared that with
 17 Annemarie Rooney, the Silver from NWAS, at 11.20. You
 18 did not share that with Fire and Rescue, you didn't
 19 share that with BTP?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Right so far?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. What I'm trying to get at in terms of lessons for the
 24 future is: would it have been unrealistic to expect you
 25 to have prioritised that sharing of information earlier

1 than you did?
 2 A. I think JESIP is designed to allow for that earlier
 3 sharing when it talks about the forward command post or
 4 whether that being the force command module. I don't
 5 think it would be unreasonable to say that could
 6 absolutely have been a consideration to have shared that
 7 earlier in terms of the prioritisation . When I look at
 8 the myriad of things that were coming in and I was
 9 dealing with, I hadn't prioritised that earlier .
 10 Q. And do you think that was just because there were so
 11 many more important things for you to do or because
 12 JESIP wasn't at the forefront of your mind or for some
 13 or reason?
 14 A. I think JESIP wasn't at the forefront of my mind.
 15 Q. We can deal briefly now with your conversation with
 16 Inspector Smith. What passed between you in those
 17 3 minutes and 3 seconds at shortly before 11.40?
 18 A. So it was a situation report, a update from
 19 Inspector Smith. He described the attacker, the number
 20 of injuries , where people were going, I think in terms
 21 of the casualty clearing station and then on to
 22 hospital. Then I think I had a conversation about if he
 23 required additional resourcing. I don't know if he did
 24 request it , I'm not sure.
 25 Q. When did you first become aware that you were going to

1 be relieved as Silver commander by Superintendent Hill?
 2 A. When Superintendent Hill arrived at the force command
 3 module.
 4 Q. Did you hear it first from him?
 5 A. Yes, I think so.
 6 Q. What was your thinking behind him relieving you of
 7 Silver command?
 8 A. I had an understanding around his experience and at that
 9 point he was a very experienced public order/public
 10 safety commander. I think he was a tactical firearms
 11 commander and, if I'm right, I think he might have been
 12 a member of the senior leadership team in the
 13 operational communications branch, so had a greater
 14 degree of experience. So it seemed a logical decision .
 15 But at that point I couldn't step away because the
 16 incident was so vast and demanding that I continued in
 17 a Silver support role, which I think in his tactical
 18 plan he later describes as City Centre Silver, if I'm
 19 not mistaken.
 20 Q. Was there a handover between the two of you?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Help us, what did that handover consist of?
 23 A. It would have explained the activity I had done up to
 24 that point, about BTP awareness, the ARVs at the scene,
 25 the declaration of Operation Plato, the contact and the

1 call-out for the senior investigating officer, for the
 2 press officer, clearly the fact that we've established
 3 a Silver control room in the force command module.
 4 I think by then I had the welfare cell up and running.
 5 I think when I've looked at it, on reflection, I think
 6 there were 20 points. I'm not sure I handed all
 7 20 points over in such a formal way, but there were
 8 20 points of activity and actions that I took and that
 9 would have formed part of that conversation.
 10 Q. Did you hand over a tactical plan?
 11 A. A documented plan, no.
 12 Q. An undocumented plan?
 13 A. I think it was just explaining those elements that I'd
 14 done.
 15 Q. At the point that you handed over, the incident had been
 16 ongoing for just short of 90 minutes and you had been
 17 Silver commander for over 60 of those. Had you
 18 developed a tactical plan?
 19 A. I'd developed this 20-point plan, which was about
 20 getting the right people in, as I've said, the
 21 declaration around Operation Plato, ensuring the right
 22 resources are where they need to be, briefing partner
 23 agencies.
 24 Q. Was it a tactical plan?
 25 A. I think so.

73

1 Q. As such, was it capable of being reduced to something
 2 short that could be documented?
 3 A. I think it could be, but I didn't.
 4 Q. Why didn't you?
 5 A. I didn't have time to stop, pause, document a short
 6 tactical plan, condense that into a short plan. There
 7 just ... I didn't have time to take that pause.
 8 Q. Given what you say about not having time to take that
 9 pause, do you think that your activity was reactive as
 10 opposed to stopping and formulating a strategy or
 11 is that not a fair characterisation of your involvement
 12 on the night?
 13 A. I don't think so. I think strategy-wise, I think, as
 14 we've discussed, the strategy was clear, the priority in
 15 terms of the strategy, what was trying to be achieved.
 16 Q. Is preparing a written tactical plan, short as it will
 17 necessarily be, an unrealistic expectation by that stage
 18 of an incident?
 19 A. It felt it for me in terms of -- because there was so
 20 much going on. Time moves incredibly quickly. I hadn't
 21 probably consciously realised how much time had passed.
 22 So I didn't feel I could have done that by that point.
 23 Is it unrealistic? I don't know.
 24 Q. Had you taken the time it would have taken to just mark
 25 out in short form your tactical plan, do you think that

74

1 would have been of assistance to you on the night, with
 2 the benefit of hindsight, had you stopped, done that and
 3 then worked to that?
 4 A. I don't know if it would have changed anything in terms
 5 of assistance.
 6 Q. One of the things you might have identified is
 7 multi-agency communication.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Had you identified that in your plan, might that not
 10 have then driven your actions towards prioritising that?
 11 A. So that multi-agency communication, in my mind, was
 12 going to be through the force command module as the
 13 other agencies would physically be there.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But if GMFRS, for whatever reason,
 15 aren't there, there are other ways of getting hold of
 16 them than them being there.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did that occur to you?
 19 A. No.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Might it have, if you'd had this very
 21 short plan, reminded you, perhaps as time went on, it
 22 was time to see where on earth they are?
 23 A. Absolutely, sir. I think when I've looked at the FWIN,
 24 it's got logs on there saying "Fire Service contacted".
 25 So that's in my mind a mental check: contacted, they're

75

1 going to do what they need to do in terms of resourcing
 2 and deployment. NWAS contacted, same for them.
 3 I didn't go back and check that those things had
 4 happened.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. It's a different thing to them
 6 being contacted and them actually coming to Silver
 7 command?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were you aware of the degree of help
 10 that the Fire Service can give to getting injured people
 11 out of somewhere like the arena?
 12 A. Not in specific detail, not like now where we have this
 13 tri-agency video and real detail about some of the
 14 specialisms and the capabilities of the other services.
 15 At the time I would have reasoned that, actually,
 16 invariably they could provide help, I would have
 17 thought.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There's two ways. You can think, "No
 19 fire, who needs a fire engine?" On the other hand, you
 20 may feel actually they're really useful in getting
 21 people out.
 22 A. Yes. That's a reasonable view, that they would have
 23 equipment. I wouldn't know the detail of it, but
 24 it would have been reasonable to say they will have
 25 equipment that will help.

76

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The FDM had his dictaphone on. There is
 2 no record of what you were doing.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not saying there should have been
 5 necessarily except for the fact that, after all these
 6 occasions, after something like this, lessons are
 7 inevitably going to be learned and if everyone actually
 8 knows exactly what you are doing and when you are doing
 9 it, then it is easier to learn the lessons.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You could have had a dictaphone, writing
 12 it down may well have been unrealistic, you could have
 13 had a loggist, presumably. So why none of those things?
 14 A. So when you look at my daybook, it's just short, brief
 15 notes, it's not an NDM-framed decision—making record and
 16 that's just because of speed and time. A loggist did
 17 arrive, I think around 11.40, I think, if I've got my
 18 timeline right, who then started to log for myself and,
 19 later on, for Superintendent Hill. Again, and I don't
 20 know if you'll come to those, but it's more information
 21 capture about what was going on. Again, I don't think
 22 I'd stopped and done a documented NDM-framed
 23 decision-making.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. So clearly, having a loggist was
 25 something which occurred to somebody some time. Why not

1 until -- 11.40, did you say?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Why not until then? You're in force
 4 headquarters.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There are presumably police officers in
 7 there and people who are capable of making a note.
 8 A. Invariably there probably would have been, yes. I think
 9 it was just pressure and the sort of the volume and
 10 velocity of information that was coming at me.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So no one thought to ask, is that what
 12 you're saying, until 11.40 or it took them until 11.40
 13 to get there?
 14 A. No, I didn't think to ask.
 15 MR DE LA POER: You were accompanied for much of the evening
 16 by the mentee that you had, the sergeant on the fast
 17 track programme, did it occur to you that you could ask
 18 them to log things or is specialist training required
 19 for that role?
 20 A. Under those circumstances, absolutely I could have done.
 21 There is a specialist -- there is a course for loggists
 22 and there's some training that's required, but under
 23 those circumstances, yes, I could have.
 24 Q. That wasn't something that you requested of that person?
 25 A. No, no.

1 Q. I'm not going to deal in any detail with what occurred
 2 after midnight, but I think you've described that role
 3 as being an assistant to Superintendent Hill; is that
 4 correct?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Did that involve you continuing to make telephone calls
 7 to, among others, Inspector Smith and Chief Inspector
 8 Dexter?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. What time did your involvement in the incident end on
 11 the 23rd?
 12 A. At 8 am.
 13 Q. Had you remained in the Silver room until you went off
 14 duty?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Finally, superintendent, to the extent that we've not
 17 dealt with them already, and it may be that you feel
 18 you've said everything you want to about it but that's
 19 not to prevent you from adding if you think that's
 20 necessary, I'm going to deal with what the policing
 21 experts say to give you an opportunity to deal with
 22 that.
 23 The first criticism connected with you is the fact
 24 that you didn't go to the scene so that there was no
 25 unarmed Silver commander at the scene. Is there

1 anything you want to add to what you have said already
 2 about that?
 3 A. I would just reiterate the rationale that I have already
 4 explained in terms of my command experience at that
 5 point, Gold commander had asked me, and the awareness of
 6 the capability of the force -- the Silver room in the
 7 force command module.
 8 Q. Next, they observe that you did not provide any
 9 meaningful tactical command. What is your response to
 10 that insofar as you haven't already addressed it?
 11 A. Again, there's a list of 20 points that I would say that
 12 I think we've discussed that demonstrates that I have.
 13 Q. We haven't discussed them as a 20, the list. So I'm
 14 just concerned to make sure that we haven't missed any.
 15 Do you want to just ensure, so that when your evidence
 16 is finished, it's clear whether there are any on those
 17 list that you haven't yet spoken to or put into the
 18 public domain?
 19 A. I'm sorry, I think there probably will be, but I can't
 20 remember the --
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If it occurs to you later, by all means
 22 write them down and let me have them in written form.
 23 MR DE LA POER: Are they reduced anywhere as a list?
 24 A. I have a note of them.
 25 Q. You have a note of them?

1 A. Not with me, but --
 2 Q. And when was that note created?
 3 A. I've created that -- since I was given the material...
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The police expert report?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We need to know your response so by all
 7 means write it down.
 8 MR DE LA POER: If you have distilled it to that, because
 9 I don't think, as it appears in the statement you
 10 prepared in response, that it is distilled as 20
 11 individual points and I think it would be helpful for us
 12 to achieve that. As the chairman says, we don't need to
 13 deal with it now, but if you've reduced it to writing,
 14 please could we have it.
 15 A. I don't know if this is relevant, but I've also put down
 16 what I think the night duty superintendent does in
 17 30 points, if you'd want that.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Anything documented, let us look at it,
 19 we'll show them to the police experts, and we can then
 20 take it into account. Thank you.
 21 MR DE LA POER: Failing to construct or circulate a tactical
 22 plan. Is there anything for you to add to what you've
 23 said already about that?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. As I understand it, could have tasked someone else to

81

1 set up the Silver control room.
 2 A. I did.
 3 Q. Who did you task?
 4 A. Well, sorry, that's probably slightly incorrect.
 5 I verified that that was underway and that was through
 6 the force duty supervisor.
 7 Q. Did you regard yourself as setting up the Silver control
 8 room?
 9 A. No, I think that's probably inaccurate language maybe in
 10 my initial statement. I was basing myself in the Silver
 11 control room and the force command module. The physical
 12 setting it up was being done by other staff who were
 13 trained to do that.
 14 Q. And finally, failing to set up the casualty bureau.
 15 A. I didn't set up the casualty bureau. I understood that
 16 was an ACC's authority.
 17 Q. That's all I'm going to say about the policing experts
 18 unless there's anything else because I want to give you
 19 the opportunity to add to that before I turn to very one
 20 short matter that you asked me to raise with you. Is
 21 there anything else you want --
 22 A. No, sir.
 23 MR COOPER: Perhaps I can just raise this at this moment:
 24 whilst my learned friend was dealing with other matters
 25 or other details that the witness can provide, I'll

82

1 mention it now as it's contemporaneous, the witness
 2 referred to a tri-agency video which, I've checked with
 3 my team, we've not seen and I wonder whether I could
 4 make that request through you, sir, that we could see
 5 that as well if the witness is gathering other materials
 6 together.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. This is the tri?
 8 A. Tri-agency video for emergency responders to help us
 9 understand what each other's capabilities are.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that. That's happened
 11 since --
 12 A. Yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Certainly can we ask it's made available
 14 to us? Thank you very much.
 15 MR DE LA POER: Inspector Smith raised that very point.
 16 So to the extent, superintendent, that you haven't
 17 already dealt with this, I know that you have in mind,
 18 arising from your reflection on the incident,
 19 a recommendation or recommendations that you would like
 20 the chairman to take into account. Do you want to just
 21 address those now?
 22 A. Yes. I think I mentioned it earlier, it's in relation
 23 to JESIP, it's the importance of the app and the
 24 importance of frequent, maybe annual, multi-agency
 25 exercising.

83

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. One of the problems with that is
 2 resources.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Because people have to carry on with the
 5 ordinary day-to-day policing. But you think that could
 6 be done and could work?
 7 A. I think potentially it could, yes. It would certainly
 8 help bring it to the forefront of commanders' thinking.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Other people call it part of the muscle
 10 memory, which I think is the phrase we've been having.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So it becomes automatic, really?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, superintendent.
 15 Those are all the questions I intend to ask you at this
 16 stage. I see that at least one of those who has made
 17 a request no longer needs to ask those questions.
 18 Can I please turn to Greater Manchester Fire and
 19 Rescue Service and Mr Warnock Queen's Counsel.
 20 MR WARNOCK: In fact I don't have any questions either, sir.
 21 MR DE LA POER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Warnock.
 22 Next then, can I turn to Counter-terrorism Policing
 23 Headquarters and Mr Butt Queen's Counsel.
 24 (Pause)
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. If Mr Butt is hearing this and

84

1 is having difficulty , perhaps he can contact Mr Suter to
 2 see if we can arrange it and in the meantime we'll move
 3 on.
 4 MR DE LA POER: Then can I turn next to the bereaved
 5 families' representative , Ms Morris is taking the lead.
 6 Questions from MS MORRIS
 7 MS MORRIS: Thank you, Mr de la Poer.
 8 Superintendent, can you see me and hear me?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Thank you. I ask questions this afternoon on behalf of
 11 the families . I have three topics to seek your
 12 clarification on, please. The first is in respect of
 13 your training . This has been covered in some detail
 14 already, but I want to just pull one thread, please, and
 15 that's in respect of your Silver public order commander
 16 accreditation .
 17 You said in your first statement that that
 18 accreditation was achieved through, first of all ,
 19 a course and then, secondly, through a portfolio of
 20 experience you gained through doing planned public order
 21 events; is that correct?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And you described it in your statement, it's
 24 paragraph 15 for the chair's note, as occupational
 25 competence achieved through the testing from the course;

85

1 yes?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And operational competence, which was the portfolio, the
 4 experience, the shadowing and the doing; is that fair?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And after you'd achieved both occupational and
 7 operational competence, you were signed off, so to
 8 speak, as a Silver public order commander; correct?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Thank you. And that was in 2016, as we know from your
 11 evidence. I wanted to contrast that to the role that
 12 you undertook on 22 May, that of Night Silver commander.
 13 And to be fair to you, you said in your statement, your
 14 second statement, at paragraph 9, that that required
 15 what you described as a different set of skills ; is that
 16 fair?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Different to those you had through your accreditation as
 19 a Silver public order commander?
 20 A. I think the accreditation as a Silver public order
 21 commander and the skills I've learned there are helpful ,
 22 but the Night Silver role is a much broader, different
 23 role to being a public order commander.
 24 Q. And it includes that -- the Night Silver role includes
 25 what you described as spontaneous and wide-ranging

86

1 incidents; is that fair?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. So when it came to performing that Night Silver
 4 commander role, in order to get that different set of
 5 skills , did GMP arrange for you to undertake any
 6 additional training in respect of responding to
 7 spontaneous incidents or major incidents?
 8 A. No. So the major incident training was linked to JESIP
 9 a few years prior to 22 May.
 10 Q. Okay. That's 2014; is that right?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Okay. I'll come back to that in a moment, if I may.
 13 You said to Mr de la Poer this morning that you'd
 14 gained the experience as Night Silver commander by
 15 shadowing; is that right?
 16 A. Certain elements. So I hadn't shadowed on a set of
 17 nights; I'd shadowed individuals, for example, for
 18 a custody extension.
 19 Q. I see.
 20 A. And also the training I'd got around how to deal with
 21 RIPA authorities.
 22 Q. I see. So for those two specific elements, you had
 23 shadowed a superintendent?
 24 A. Sorry, the custody extensions were shadowing. The RIPA
 25 was going to the RIPA unit and getting some training

87

1 from them, and then there is conversations with
 2 superintendent colleagues --
 3 Q. I see.
 4 A. -- about issues that might arise.
 5 Q. That was going to be my question because you said in
 6 your statement at paragraph 12 that what you describe is
 7 you discussed expectations with other superintendents
 8 about the Night Silver command role; is that right?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. So no specific shadowing, is this correct , in terms of
 11 performing that Night Silver commander role as it may
 12 pertain to spontaneous incidents, for example, or
 13 a major incident?
 14 A. No.
 15 Q. You describe that you had done, I think you said, around
 16 four a year in that Night Silver command role before
 17 22 May 2017. And you described in your statement that
 18 they included incidents of wounding, allegations of
 19 murder and threats to life. Had they included any
 20 firearms operations?
 21 A. Firearms?
 22 Q. Operations, spontaneous firearms operations.
 23 A. No. Not that I would have had direct command over, no.
 24 Q. Understood. Had it involved being the Night
 25 Silver commander in respect of a major incident?

88

1 A. No.
 2 Q. That's helpful, thank you. So what you were dealing
 3 with on 22 May, you became aware was, first of all, an
 4 Operation Plato declaration; correct?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. A major incident?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And an operation where the JESIP principles would apply;
 9 correct?
 10 A. Yes. But as I've said, the JESIP principles weren't in
 11 my thinking necessarily.
 12 Q. I'm going to deal with that JESIP training now, if
 13 I may. You undertook that training in 2014. Am I right
 14 that at that time you were still a Bronze commander?
 15 A. Yes, I think that'd be right, yes.
 16 Q. If it assists, can I just ask Mr Lopez, please, to put
 17 on the screen one of your training records. It's
 18 {INQ029071/2}, please, Mr Lopez.
 19 It's the bottom third of that page,
 20 Superintendent Nawaz. On the left-hand side:
 21 "JESIP -- operational. 2 September 2014."
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Is operational a reference to the kind of role you
 24 perform as a Bronze commander, an operational role?
 25 A. Yes. So without look at the actual training material,

1 on the face of it, it looks like that was for
 2 operational commanders.
 3 Q. Understood, thank you. That's the clarification I was
 4 looking for.
 5 So the JESIP training you did have in 2014, you
 6 think was to help you in your role at that time as an
 7 operational commander?
 8 A. Based on that, I would suggest, yes, but I'd have to see
 9 the training material to be certain.
 10 Q. Understood. Your memory may assist, but do you remember
 11 whether any of that training at that time as
 12 a Bronze commander, were you thinking or assimilating or
 13 understanding the part of it which would have assisted
 14 as a Silver commander, do you think?
 15 A. I would have thought there would be an element around
 16 what a Silver commander does in that course because
 17 clearly it's interlinked with what the operational
 18 commander does.
 19 Q. Understood. But given at the time you were a Bronze
 20 commander, is it more likely that you were assimilating
 21 and focusing on the learning of what would affect the
 22 operational Bronze commander, is that fair to say?
 23 A. Yes, I think so.
 24 Q. Once you had moved into that role of Silver commander,
 25 post 2015, did you have any additional JESIP training

1 specifically addressing the learning that you needed to
 2 be a Silver commander with JESIP principles?
 3 A. I think I did an e-learning package, but I can't
 4 remember the content of it, as in whether it was
 5 specifically split that way.
 6 Q. Understood. I'm asking you these in relation to an
 7 answer you gave to Mr de la Poer, when he asked you if
 8 JESIP was at the forefront of your mind and you said it
 9 didn't come flooding back to you. I'm just seeking your
 10 clarification whether it didn't come flooding back to
 11 you because you had only ever received it in an
 12 operational capacity.
 13 A. I think it was just JESIP per se, so whether that would
 14 have been operational or tactical, the point I was
 15 trying to get across is it wasn't in my -- right at the
 16 front of my thinking.
 17 Q. Okay. Is that because you hadn't, at the time of
 18 22 May, received any JESIP training which was focused on
 19 or delivered at the time you were in fact
 20 a Silver commander?
 21 A. Possibly. I think it was just the infrequency of major
 22 incidents and then having to employ the learning into
 23 practice.
 24 Q. Understood. Were you invited to attend the JESIP
 25 commanders' training that was scheduled for January and

1 February 2017? Can you recall?
 2 A. I don't think so. I don't know. I don't know.
 3 Q. Moving away from JESIP and just a few questions about
 4 Operation Plato. You've very candidly said that when
 5 Inspector Sexton told you at 22.50 that this was an
 6 Op Plato declaration, you didn't know what that meant.
 7 You said that it completely threw your thinking and
 8 you weren't clear what it was you needed to do. Part of
 9 your role as Night Silver is, would you accept, to
 10 understand the resources you're going to have to put in
 11 place and particularly specialist resources if you don't
 12 yourself have that specialist knowledge and
 13 understanding; is that fair?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. So at 22.50, given your lack of understanding about
 16 Operation Plato, how did you know what specialist
 17 officers and resources you would need to deploy?
 18 A. That's built on professional experience, so I knew an
 19 investigative capacity and command around that.
 20 Clearly, firearms officers needed to go to the scene,
 21 and then that list that I kind of started to talk
 22 through in terms of what additional resources and sort
 23 of escalation did I put in place to help support the
 24 response, knowing that we've got specialist capabilities
 25 on call that we can -- that I can bring in is what

1 I did.
 2 Q. But you've accepted, in respect of the issue of zoning
 3 and risk assessment, that wasn't something you were or
 4 had been trained to be familiar with; is that fair?
 5 A. Yes. I hadn't heard of zoning in that context.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Ms Morris, I just want to ask something
 7 to follow up on one of your questions.
 8 We know from the FDO that he was summoning in armed
 9 police officers from all over the place. Did you
 10 actually concern yourself with that at all?
 11 A. No, I think in my initial review I didn't realise they
 12 were coming from everywhere. I think initially it was:
 13 he's bringing in additional armed response vehicles and
 14 officers from the airport, I think he said, initially .
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But he was obviously dealing with that.
 16 In your answer just now you indicated you might have had
 17 something to do with making sure there was enough
 18 capacity of firearms officers .
 19 A. Sorry, sir, it wasn't capacity, it was satisfying myself
 20 that there was armed response officers going to the
 21 scene because we are dealing with a terrorist incident
 22 and my view would be that's what would happen.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you got that from your conversation
 24 with the FDO, did you?
 25 A. Two places, from the FDO and the FWIN.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Ms Morris.
 2 MS MORRIS: In terms of what you needed to do at the time
 3 you became aware that you were going to be Silver
 4 commander for the scene, without that specialist
 5 knowledge of Operation Plato, how did you envisage that
 6 you'd be able to take control of the scene and the
 7 resources that were needed there?
 8 A. I couldn't take control of the armed assets, I knew
 9 that, but I worked on the fact that the unarmed assets
 10 and additional support that they required through other
 11 agencies or more resourcing was something that I could
 12 do.
 13 Q. Would you accept there's a difference between ensuring
 14 things are deployed and taking command and control of
 15 what is happening at a scene?
 16 A. Not necessarily. I think part of that command and
 17 control is ensuring that we've got the right resources
 18 in the right place or en route and the right
 19 notifications are happening and the structures are being
 20 set up.
 21 Q. We'll come back to the issue of structures in a moment.
 22 I wanted to ask you a few questions, please, about
 23 the major incident plan. Again you've been candid and
 24 said that you think you might have seen the GMP major
 25 incident plan specifically at around the same time as

1 your JESIP training, that being 2014; is that correct?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. A similar clarification is sought here then, please: is
 4 it likely, given at that time, in 2014, if you had seen
 5 a major incident plan, you would have been focused on
 6 how it would have applied to you as a Bronze commander
 7 at that time?
 8 A. Yes, probably. That's probably reasonable, yes.
 9 Q. After becoming a Silver commander, did you ever take the
 10 time to familiarise yourself with the GMP major incident
 11 plan and understand the expectations and roles of
 12 a Silver commander?
 13 A. I can't say, I don't know.
 14 Q. I ask you those questions because you'll know from being
 15 taken to it by Mr de la Poer that the Night Silver role
 16 specifically indicates that that individual be attending
 17 any serious major or unusual events in the GMP
 18 jurisdiction; is that fair?
 19 A. Yes, in the Night Silver Guide?
 20 Q. Yes.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. So I'm trying to understand from you as to, without that
 23 understanding of the major incident plan as it pertains
 24 to a Silver commander, without understanding JESIP as it
 25 pertains to a Silver commander, and without

1 understanding Operation Plato, how you were able to
 2 perform that role on the night.
 3 A. Drawing on my experience at that point in terms of
 4 having dealt with other, clearly not of the nature and
 5 scale of this attack, but having dealt with other
 6 serious incidents and then knowing how to bring in the
 7 specialisms and what's required.
 8 Q. So going back to that thread of operational and
 9 occupational competence, in order to perform this Night
 10 Silver commander role you were required to be accredited
 11 as a Silver commander; that's the occupational
 12 competence aspect, isn't it?
 13 A. Sorry, for that Night Silver role?
 14 Q. Yes.
 15 A. No. So the Night Silver role is distinct from the
 16 public order/public safety role.
 17 Q. So you had to be a superintendent?
 18 A. For Night Silver duties, yes.
 19 Q. Yes. So that's the occupational competence, that's the
 20 thing you have to have to be able to perform that role,
 21 and you can't perform it without that; is that fair?
 22 A. Sorry, I'm a little confused in terms of the
 23 occupational competence part.
 24 Q. In order to perform the Night Silver role, you had to be
 25 of the rank of superintendent; yes?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And that is the accreditation, the qualification, the
 3 rank you had to have to perform that role?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. That is like having the occupational competence, that is
 6 the box that has to be ticked, you have to have that
 7 accreditation to become a Night Silver commander;
 8 is that right?
 9 A. Yes, you have to be a superintendent.
 10 Q. Yes. I am trying to explore with you whether you think
 11 you had enough experience or training in this different
 12 set of skills that the Night Silver commander role
 13 demanded to be operationally competent in the role you
 14 were performing on 22 May.
 15 A. I believe I developed experience over the -- is it
 16 2 years -- since I'd been acting as a temporary
 17 superintendent. So I had built professional experience
 18 and I think started to develop that occupational
 19 competency. Was I specifically trained in a kind of
 20 robust way or effective way? I would say possibly not,
 21 but the operational or occupational sort of competence
 22 then develops as time goes on.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's examine that a bit, if we may.
 24 You have already agreed, I think, that you had no
 25 training in how to deal with a terrorist incident.

1 Obviously, this terrorist incident is on scale which is
 2 a very large terrorist incident, but do you think that
 3 without training you were in a position to act as
 4 a Night Silver commander on a terrorist incident of any
 5 sort? Does your general experience do that?
 6 A. You're not going in cold, so I have developed my skills
 7 and experience over the years I've been a police officer
 8 in differing ranks. That helps to build my professional
 9 competence and understanding. But as I've said in terms
 10 of, was I -- do I feel I was trained effectively to deal
 11 with that incident particularly around Plato? No.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're dealing with a distinction of
 13 terrorist compared with other criminals, terrorists are
 14 often prepared to sacrifice their own lives in order to
 15 kill other people.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: This is not a normal situation, that's
 18 a completely different set of circumstances than you're
 19 normally dealing with?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you think that without any training
 22 or experience of dealing with that that you're in
 23 a position as a Night Silver to deal with a terrorist
 24 incident?
 25 A. No.

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The other thing is that they're very
 2 much an armed police led incident, and your policing
 3 experience hasn't led you into armed policing, which is
 4 perfectly fair enough. So again, to deal with
 5 a terrorist incident as a Night Silver do you think you
 6 should have some training or should it only be people
 7 who have some training in firearms who deal with this
 8 sort of incident?
 9 A. I think on reflection, there's a distinction between the
 10 armed response and the unarmed response.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.
 12 A. As a Night Silver, I think the unarmed response --
 13 particularly now we've had some additional training to
 14 understand how operations such as Plato interact with
 15 the major incident plan and what the roles and
 16 responsibilities are, but that's now, so at the time no.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's different from what it was
 18 at the time?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you, Ms Morris, sorry to
 21 interrupt.
 22 MS MORRIS: Not at all, sir, thank you.
 23 Just one further question, if I may, on that issue
 24 of your -- to be fair, I think you use the phrase
 25 "developing experience" up until 22 May. Did anybody to

1 use a colloquial, sign you off to perform the role as
 2 Night Silver or is it simply that anybody who achieves
 3 that rank of superintendent can perform that role on
 4 a rota?
 5 A. Yes. You're expected to perform that role on a rota if
 6 you're a superintendent.
 7 Q. In that way does it differ from the accreditation to be
 8 a Silver commander for public order, for planned events,
 9 where you have to attend a course and also have to
 10 provide your portfolio of shadowing and actual
 11 experience of being in command and control?
 12 A. Yes, and you have to maintain annual operational
 13 competence for a public order commander. So you have to
 14 at least command two events per annum, you have to do
 15 continuous professional development each year, you're
 16 given updates around anything relevant from other
 17 experience across the country in terms of other forces,
 18 you're given updates around any legislative changes that
 19 might be relevant to public order command. It's not the
 20 same for the Night Silver. However, that's changed now
 21 inasmuch as there's a lot more support and training in
 22 place.
 23 Q. So there was a significant difference between
 24 (inaudible: distorted) for the two roles as of May 2017?
 25 Is that a fair summary?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Thank you. I'll move on to my next topic now, please,
 3 which is connected with the theme of training, but it's
 4 a topic of debriefs. Because the question of training
 5 and skills was something that you identified in your
 6 debrief in July 2017, I believe. I'm just going to ask
 7 Mr Lopez, please, to put the GMP structured debrief on
 8 the screen. That's {INQ000790/2}.
 9 Can we start with page 1 to identify that the
 10 superintendent took part in this structured debrief?
 11 Thank you very much.
 12 We see there the date: 26 July 2017:
 13 "Debrief commissioned by Chief Superintendent
 14 O'Hare."
 15 And the debrief participants are yourself,
 16 Mr Dexter, Mr Sexton, Mr Randall, ACC Ford, Laura Lewis,
 17 and two other names, further names who aren't relevant
 18 to the command and control on 22 May. But you see
 19 yourself there, is that correct, superintendent?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Thank you. {INQ000790/2}, please, first of all, on this
 22 theme of training and skills.
 23 Recommendation D4. I think you'd recognise this as
 24 a recommendation from your evidence. At D4:
 25 "There's an array of contingency plans held within

1 the GMP shared drive. Consider a way of highlighting
 2 critical plans for use by the Silver commander."
 3 And:
 4 "Consider awareness training for Silver to ensure
 5 there is a greater understanding of their role within
 6 major plans."
 7 Is that a recommendation that you contributed to,
 8 recognise, support?
 9 A. I certainly support it. I think steps have been taken
 10 to help provide that additional support through what
 11 superintendents now get.
 12 Q. Thank you.
 13 On the screen, please, Mr Lopez, again D5 on the
 14 same page:
 15 "Consider an awareness training package for Silver
 16 nights on-call role which could include an operational
 17 mentoring and shadowing scheme."
 18 Is that a recommendation which you contributed to,
 19 support?
 20 A. Possibly contributed to, certainly support. Again,
 21 steps have been taken.
 22 Q. Okay. So we see there, don't we, mention of operational
 23 mentoring and shadowing, as we've been discussing, as
 24 part of that operational competence that, would you
 25 agree, is important to the effective performance of

1 a Night Silver commander role?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Thank you. Just for completeness, I think D10 on that
 4 page, recommendation D10:
 5 "GMP to consider skills review of Gold/Silver
 6 qualified staff. Considering increasing numbers as/if
 7 required. Deployment of a Silver commander to scene
 8 should happen at all major incidents."
 9 Two parts to that, I suggest. The first:
 10 "GMP to consider a skills review of Gold/Silver
 11 qualified staff."
 12 Again, did you contribute to that recommendation,
 13 support that recommendation?
 14 A. Possibly, yes.
 15 Q. Were you one of the Silver qualified staff that that
 16 recommendation refers to, do you think?
 17 A. As in should my skills be reviewed?
 18 Q. Yes.
 19 A. Yes. But the point was if I did contribute to that --
 20 it's getting that understanding of actually where are
 21 our Silver and Gold commanders in terms of development
 22 and that then allows us to focus on those who might need
 23 additional support or training.
 24 Q. That's fair. Thank you.
 25 The second part of that D10 recommendation was the

1 recommendation that there be:
 2 "Deployment of Silver commander to scene at all
 3 major incidents."
 4 I'll park that and return to that question with you
 5 under my third topic.
 6 Page 4 of the same document {INQ000790/4}. This is
 7 actually the areas for improvement identified. Is it
 8 right that you were participant 6 on this structured
 9 debrief? Can you assist with that?
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I doubt if he knows, but if you've
 11 checked that, Ms Morris, I am sure he will take it from
 12 you.
 13 MS MORRIS: It was on the evidence proposal, sir, so I am
 14 asking the superintendent if he --
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If it's wrong (overspeaking) to someone
 16 else.
 17 MS MORRIS: Thank you.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's take it as being right. If you
 19 don't think they are your recommendations, then say so.
 20 A. Is that "identified by" column or is it the
 21 recommendation number column?
 22 MS MORRIS: Number 6 in the identified column. I'm going to
 23 work on the basis that that's yourself. If not, I'm
 24 sure I'll be corrected if I am wrong.
 25 There's recommendations or areas for improvement

1 identified there. The significant one I was going to
 2 ask you about is:
 3 " ... shortage of experience in communications room
 4 setting up the Airwaves channel."
 5 And ask you to expand on that, please.
 6 MR HORWELL: I'm only rising -- in the evidence proposal for
 7 this document, it is suggested that that Mr Nawaz is
 8 participant number 10. That may have changed, but it's
 9 the final version of the evidence proposal.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Perhaps we can go to
 11 Mr de la Poer for arbitration on this matter: 6 or 10?
 12 MR DE LA POER: I have no reason to think that the final
 13 evidence proposal will not be correct. It may be that
 14 Ms Morris has different information that she is drawing
 15 upon. I wonder if she could just check what her source
 16 is.
 17 MS MORRIS: I think it's actually the identification in
 18 terms of role that's relevant, so the participant may be
 19 less so. I have no reason to doubt Mr Horwell is
 20 correct on the identification by number. But if I can
 21 ask the superintendent about the issue about Airwaves,
 22 if he has knowledge of it, that would be helpful. If
 23 not, I can ask another witness.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can certainly ask him whether he
 25 agrees with it, can't we?

105

1 MS MORRIS: Yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you're looking at that one:
 3 "The shortage of experience in communications room
 4 in setting up Airwave channels."
 5 Whether it was your idea or not, do you agree with
 6 it?
 7 A. I don't know. I don't think I was aware of it.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, okay.
 9 A. I'm not sure I was aware on the night that that had been
 10 an issue specifically .
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Certainly the one below, which is
 12 attached to number 10, looks like it could well come
 13 from you.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 MS MORRIS: That's helpful. In fact, it's the one below and
 16 the one at the top that I was going to ask
 17 Superintendent Nawaz about specifically because that's
 18 role specific . So again, numbers may matter less but I
 19 am grateful for the clarification on the detail .
 20 The one below:
 21 "The knowledge of the implications of Plato and its
 22 terminology and impacts at Silver level was low."
 23 If it's right that you're number 10, in any event
 24 you were the Silver on the night, would you accept that
 25 was an area for improvement identified as part of this

106

1 debrief?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Thank you. Then again at the top:
 4 "Experience of Silvers used at night--time for
 5 on-call role [that was your role] is low."
 6 A. I'm not sure. I don't think I quite understand the
 7 feedback in that, because I wouldn't have been on call;
 8 I was on duty.
 9 Q. Okay.
 10 A. I'm not sure I quite understand the point being made.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just looking at the last one, the
 12 knowledge and implication of the Plato, it's not only --
 13 it's vital, isn't it --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- that any person carrying out the
 16 Night Silver role knows exactly what Plato is and what
 17 the implications are?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 MS MORRIS: Thank you.
 20 Just one final matter on this debrief, over to the
 21 next page, please, {INQ000790/5}. In the middle of that
 22 page, the fourth entry down there:
 23 "There is a shortage around major incident
 24 commanders within the force trained in the JESIP model
 25 and no Silver arrived at the scene to act as the police

107

1 commander."
 2 So the first part of that:
 3 "Shortage around major incident commanders within
 4 the force trained in JESIP model."
 5 Is that an area of improvement that you would
 6 recognise and accept?
 7 A. Yes, but I don't know where we are now as a force in
 8 terms of training and how many commanders we've got that
 9 have had that training now, so I don't know.
 10 Q. Understood. Certainly as part of that debrief, that was
 11 identified as an issue?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. And we've talked about your own training as JESIP being
 14 delivered to you when you were a Bronze commander;
 15 correct?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Again, as part of that, it says about:
 18 "No Silver arriving at the scene to act as police
 19 commander."
 20 And I will come back to that.
 21 I want to move now to the third topic, my final
 22 topic, about your decisions and actions as
 23 Silver commander on 22 May. Mr de la Poer has dealt
 24 with this in great detail so I wanted just to highlight
 25 and clarify a few points with you, please.

108

1 Mr de la Poer took you through the Night Silver's
 2 guide and, in particular, the former chief constable's
 3 introduction is about the significance of that role in
 4 responding to a major incident. I just wanted to
 5 highlight part of that introduction and see if you agree
 6 with it, that it highlighted the reliance on clear
 7 decision-making and leadership. The full sentence was:
 8 "Reliance on clear decision-making and leadership is
 9 never greater than when superintendents carry out the
 10 duty of Night Silver."
 11 And I think you recognise and accept that; yes?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Thank you. Mr de la Poer took you to page 10 and some
 14 of the individual aspects of what was expected of Night
 15 Silver and I won't ask for it to be put on the screen,
 16 but I think you'd accept from me that one of the key
 17 aspects of that role was to implement an appropriate
 18 command and control structure; correct?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. It has been explored with you, both by Mr de la Poer and
 21 by the chair, there are three potential ways to achieve
 22 that objective. Number 1, your first thought, is to go
 23 to the scene; yes?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. The second option, as the chair put to you, is to send

109

1 somebody else to the scene to perform that Silver
 2 commander role; correct?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And third is to manage the scene remotely as
 5 Silver commander from the force command module from
 6 Silver command; yes?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. So what's clear, I suggest, when Mr de la Poer took you
 9 to page 40 of that document, the tip, if you like, was
 10 that you must take control of the incident; yes?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You spoke to Mr Sexton at 22.50, and it's already been
 13 put to you that you didn't tell him at that stage that
 14 you considered yourself to be the Silver commander at
 15 that time; is that fair?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. But you would accept that's what you were there for,
 18 that was going to be your role; yes?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And in fact, when you had your debrief in July 2017,
 21 your individual debrief, you accepted that on 22 May
 22 you were the Silver commander for the scene; is that
 23 right?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. You've always considered that was your role from at

110

1 least 22.50; correct?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Okay. We know you didn't attend the scene and you have
 4 given your reasons for that. Just touching on that
 5 conversation with at that time Assistant Chief Constable
 6 Ford, when she said to you, "Come in and set up Silver",
 7 you didn't, do you, think to ask, "Well, if I'm not
 8 going to go to scene who is going to be Silver at the
 9 scene"?
 10 A. No, I didn't.
 11 Q. So were you in your mind at that point thinking that
 12 everything that needed to be done by the tactical
 13 Silver commander could and would be done away from the
 14 scene or did it just not cross your mind?
 15 A. That it would be done in the force command module.
 16 Q. Okay. I've already taken you to the GMP structured
 17 debrief and the recommendation in particular which said
 18 that the -- the D10 recommendation, that deployment of
 19 Silver commander to the scene should happen at all major
 20 incidents. From your recollection of that debrief
 21 process, and only say if you can recall, that was
 22 a recommendation formulated from a debrief that involved
 23 yourself, Mr Dexter, Mr Sexton, ACC Ford, and that
 24 recommendation is aimed, I suggest, and you can
 25 disagree, at there being a Silver commander at scene to

111

1 be in command of the unarmed assets. Would you agree?
 2 A. I think that's how it reads, yes.
 3 Q. And you would accept, would you not, that that Silver
 4 command role at 22.50, and until midnight, was being
 5 performed by you; correct?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So does that recommendation suggest that whether it was
 8 your decision, ACC Ford's decision or someone else's
 9 decision for you not to go to the scene, that that was
 10 not correct?
 11 A. The recommendation suggests that. So when you now read
 12 it, it indicates that the feedback was the
 13 Silver commander should go to the scene.
 14 Q. Yes.
 15 A. As I've spoken earlier in terms of do I think that's
 16 correct, I think it's situation dependent, so not
 17 necessarily always without fail.
 18 Q. Right. You have given your reasons as to why you didn't
 19 deploy to the scene. But in terms of command and
 20 control at the Silver level, did you ever speak to
 21 Rachel Buckle who was coming in as cadre TFC?
 22 A. I don't recollect speaking to her.
 23 Q. Or Mr Thompson, who was coming in later to take over
 24 from her?
 25 A. Certainly not when he first came in. I'm not sure if

112

1 I spoke to him at some point, but I can't say with
 2 certainty.
 3 Q. Okay. Moving then to the role you did take, which was
 4 to be Silver commander but not at the scene, you have
 5 made it clear that from 22.50 you were prepared to, if
 6 you like, step back and to use your word, take
 7 a holistic view of what was happening operationally.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. You have described a number of things you said you did
 10 in terms of assessing what resources were going to be
 11 attending the scene, calling for others. We've yet to
 12 seen the 20-point list that you have prepared, but you
 13 have accepted in your evidence already that you didn't
 14 do a number of key things which were required as part of
 15 the tactical Silver commander's role as part of the GMP
 16 major incident plan; correct?
 17 A. There were elements in that major incident plan that
 18 I did not do.
 19 Q. Okay. Just because it hasn't been put to you --
 20 A. Sorry. From the checklist, the MI checklist that
 21 I think we went through earlier, so if you look at that
 22 checklist, I did not undertake all those activities or
 23 actions.
 24 Q. I'm just going to ask you to look at the GMP major
 25 incident plan itself very briefly, please.

113

1 {INQ007279/17}, please.
 2 We see there at 3.1.2 the tactical Silver commander
 3 role. That was your role on the night in respect of the
 4 unarmed assets. This is a suggested initial actions:
 5 "The overarching aim of the tactical commander is to
 6 ensure [and this is important, I suggest] rapid and
 7 effective actions are implemented that save lives,
 8 minimise harm and mitigate the incident."
 9 Do you see that?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. The chair has already explored with you that when it
 12 comes to saving lives, those lives can include the
 13 injured at a scene, casualties who need treatment; yes?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Not just those whose lives may be at risk from active
 16 shooters or further acts of terrorism; is that fair?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Under this heading of the tactical Silver commander we
 19 see a few key roles and they have been explored with you
 20 by Mr de la Poer already, but just significantly, the
 21 fact that they need to be rapid and effective actions,
 22 to be aware and understand the multi-agency command
 23 structure, the commander roles, responsibilities,
 24 requirements and capabilities. Bullet point 3:
 25 "Establish a common view of the situation between

114

1 responder agencies."
 2 I understand your evidence what you did in the
 3 Silver command room to speak to, for example, Ms Rooney
 4 and the steps you took to try and speak to other
 5 agencies, but what rapid and effective actions did you
 6 take to establish that common view of the situation
 7 between responder agencies?
 8 A. I was building my own situational awareness because
 9 I knew when people came into that room, they'd need
 10 a briefing from me to explain what understanding, what
 11 situational awareness did I have at that time so they
 12 could get that quickly.
 13 Q. Understood. So you were aware of the importance of it
 14 being a rapid situational awareness to be able to
 15 perform that role effectively?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. In terms of the timing then, Mr de la Poer has already
 18 established with you that Inspector Smith, the
 19 Bronze commander at the scene, you were aware that he
 20 was the unarmed commander at 23.34. I'm taking that
 21 from the sequence of events. You didn't speak to him in
 22 fact until 23.38; yes?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So it took you some 45 minutes to understand who the
 25 unarmed commander at the scene was, first of all;

115

1 is that fair?
 2 A. No, I think it was documented on the FWIN.
 3 Q. Okay. But you didn't speak to him until an hour and
 4 6 minutes after the explosion?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. He was, would you agree, the best source of information
 7 about what was going on at the arena, particularly in
 8 respect of the unarmed officers and the casualties; yes?
 9 A. He was an incredibly important source of information,
 10 yes.
 11 Q. Yes. But in terms of rapid and effective, you would
 12 agree that that was not a quick time period between
 13 becoming aware of the incident and speaking to him?
 14 A. I agree. I could have done that earlier.
 15 Q. Going back to that important aspect under the major
 16 incident plan of putting in place a command and control
 17 structure, what did you do specifically to put a command
 18 structure above Mr Smith, above the Bronze commander, to
 19 support him in the delivery of a tactical strategic
 20 plan?
 21 A. I was the support. My role was to support him.
 22 Q. When Mr Smith gave evidence, he said that you spoke to
 23 him for a few minutes, but that at no stage did you
 24 convey any command decision or instruction to him; do
 25 you agree?

116

1 A. Possibly, yes, it was a situation report and it was
 2 a conversation about additional resourcing requirements.
 3 So I didn't specifically direct him, I think.
 4 Q. I'm asking you these about rapid and effective actions.
 5 If you didn't give him any command decision or
 6 instruction, what was the effective action that you were
 7 implementing there?
 8 A. I think it was actions that I was implementing prior to
 9 that, which is about ensuring that that broad spectrum
 10 of resources are attending the scene, coming into
 11 Silver, all of which were really important requests and
 12 requirements.
 13 Q. You've told us about the four steps that ACC Ford asked
 14 you to take: the setting-up of Silver, the press liaison
 15 being en route, the SIO being sent to scene, and I think
 16 the first one was speaking to the FDO; yes?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. In terms of a tactical plan, that, you say, is this
 19 right, was part of your role from the beginning of the
 20 incident and was a work in progress, was in motion
 21 throughout; yes?
 22 A. Yes, from the first contact.
 23 Q. The person who needs to know that tactical plan, would
 24 you agree, is the Bronze commander, the operational
 25 commander?

117

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. In this scenario, that is Inspector Smith, is it not?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. But yet Inspector Smith in his evidence said that at no
 5 stage did you convey a tactical plan to him.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So in terms of examining those rapid and effective
 8 actions that you took, Superintendent Nawaz, as
 9 a tactical Silver commander of the scene, how do we
 10 square that?
 11 A. I didn't share the actions I was taking with
 12 Inspector Smith, and on reflection I think I should have
 13 done.
 14 Q. Because without sharing them, how would he have been
 15 able to implement any of them?
 16 A. A lot of them were being implemented outside of the
 17 immediate scene, about providing those additional
 18 resources and support, about ensuring the right people
 19 are en route. But I didn't share that with
 20 Inspector Smith.
 21 Q. Given that you described yourself, both today and as
 22 part of your debrief, as a Silver commander for the
 23 scene, do you think it's acceptable to not provide any
 24 command decision or instruction or tactical plan to the
 25 Bronze commander at scene?

118

1 A. I think probably not.
 2 MR HORWELL: Thank you, superintendent. Those are the
 3 questions that I ask.
 4 Thank you, sir.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 6 Can I just ask you a couple of things. We've
 7 discussed the possibility of having a Silver at the
 8 control room and a Silver at the scene. And there is in
 9 one of the recommendations a remark that no
 10 Silver commander had volunteered or had come in, I can't
 11 remember the exact phrase, but had self-deployed.
 12 A. To the scene?
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, self-deployed anywhere. We can look
 14 it up if necessary. Were you relying on someone,
 15 a Silver commander, to come in voluntarily, as it were?
 16 A. No.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or if you needed one, you could just ask
 18 for it?
 19 A. That hadn't occurred to me, but I know
 20 Superintendent Hill volunteered --
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So he volunteered, did he?
 22 A. Well, you probably need to clarify that with
 23 Superintendent Hill, but I think he volunteered to come
 24 in. In know other superintendents came in.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you need one, presumably you can ask

119

1 for one to come in.
 2 A. Yes. People were phoning me, so Superintendent Saville
 3 as he was at the time, phoned me offering help. I can't
 4 remember the exact conversation, but I asked him to go
 5 and support the welfare cell, so he came in, he
 6 self-deployed. Superintendent Howard came in.
 7 Obviously Superintendent Hill. And there were likely
 8 others.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I well understand that people who
 10 are offering to self-deploy or coming in are doing it
 11 out of the goodness of their hearts in order to help
 12 people. Actually does it help? Did it help when four
 13 inspectors turned up at the Silver command room when you
 14 are trying to do other things and you then have to brief
 15 them to go and do things? Would it be better if people
 16 were taught not to self-deploy but actually to be there
 17 ready to come in as and when required?
 18 A. I think the help was gladly received on the night.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't doubt that. Please, I'm not
 20 impugning anyone's motives. I'm looking at what is
 21 operationally best.
 22 A. Yes. It was a great help having that inspector come in
 23 at that time, who I could then give activity and action
 24 to. Should it be in a more controlled way, I don't
 25 know. Possibly.

120

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're the Night Silver commander there,
 2 you're dealing with it. Is it a help to you to have
 3 lots of people ringing up and saying, "Shall we come in,
 4 what can we do to help", or indeed just turning up?
 5 A. It adds to the demand on one hand, so people are
 6 physically coming up to my desk asking what do I want
 7 them to do, people are phoning, but it also facilitated
 8 some of the work that had to be done.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you could just have rung them up and
 10 asked them to come and do it, couldn't you, or get
 11 someone to ring them up?
 12 A. Possibly, yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have heard in other parts of this
 14 inquiry of people being literally rung up by people
 15 saying, what's going on, can I come and help, which
 16 actually didn't really help as it took up people's time
 17 while, particularly if it's a senior officer, you're
 18 having to explain what's going on, and that's actually
 19 all that happens. Anyway, you have no particular
 20 recommendation in that direction which would be better?
 21 A. On the night it was helpful. Did it take up time? Yes,
 22 it did. Maybe it could be done in a more considered
 23 way, but as I said, on the night I was grateful for the
 24 help.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

121

1 MR DE LA POER: Sir, we've received an application made on
 2 behalf of the Slater & Gordon team arising from the
 3 evidence that's been heard. Counsel to the inquiry's
 4 submission to you is that you should grant this
 5 application. We understand that it relates to two short
 6 matters which arise and is currently timed at 5 minutes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, 5 minutes from now.
 8 MR COOPER: Can I take you, officer --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not just trying to be difficult, but
 10 obviously everyone must understand we need to keep the
 11 structure of the time as best we can. So 5 minutes from
 12 now.
 13 MR COOPER: Absolutely, sir. I hope the questions help.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not suggesting they don't.
 15 Questions from MR COOPER
 16 MR COOPER: Officer, the issue I want to take you to is
 17 simply a matter that occurred a little earlier this
 18 morning. It deals with two issues.
 19 Firstly, bearing in mind the terror alert
 20 effectively that was in existence at the time on 22 May,
 21 that of severe, do you think that as Night Silver you
 22 should have had an awareness around about that time of
 23 significant events taking place at the Manchester Arena,
 24 such as the Ariana Grande concert on this particular
 25 night, during the time that you were on duty, as it

122

1 were? In short, given the state of alertness, should
 2 you have made yourself aware of what was going on that
 3 night at the arena?
 4 A. I absolutely could have done. Now, as Night Silver, you
 5 would get notifications of events that are ongoing. I'm
 6 not saying I got a notification of that particular
 7 concert. They are probably predicated on threat, harm,
 8 risk, and what was considered at that time. So I didn't
 9 seek it out, I didn't seek to find out what was going on
 10 at the Manchester Arena.
 11 Q. Subsidiary to that, do you not think, given the state of
 12 alert at the time, Manchester Arena being an iconic
 13 venue, both nationally and perhaps internationally, you
 14 should have sought out more details about what was going
 15 on, particularly this night when you were on duty?
 16 A. Possibly, yes.
 17 Q. Because that would have helped with an immediate
 18 response, wouldn't it, should, as tragically it did,
 19 a catastrophic event occur; do you agree?
 20 A. I think there was an immediate response.
 21 Q. Well, it would have helped with that response. That's
 22 the question.
 23 A. Yes, it would have built my understanding a bit better
 24 as in what was occurring.
 25 Q. The second question is this, on the same topic. This is

123

1 really dealing with familiarisation visits, if I can
 2 just put it, familiarisation visits. Would it have
 3 helped if you'd had a prior familiarity with the arena,
 4 including of course the City Room, before 22 May to
 5 assist with immediate responses should something occur?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. In short, would it have helped to have familiarised
 8 yourself before 22 May with iconic venues on your patch?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. And had you?
 11 A. Not the Manchester Arena.
 12 Q. Well, this is probably one of the biggest, and I know
 13 Manchester proudly boasts many venues, but the arena was
 14 probably one of the biggest on your patch, wasn't it?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And was there no effort made by you or indeed, as far as
 17 you're aware, by anyone to familiarise themselves with
 18 the layout of the arena and, in particular, in this
 19 case, the City Room?
 20 A. I can't answer for other people. For me, I didn't
 21 familiarise myself with it other than when I visited as
 22 a paying customer. But I didn't familiarise myself with
 23 the arena from a policing perspective.
 24 Q. And do you not think it might have been prudent to do
 25 so? We're not talking about some fringe venue in a side

124

1 street in Manchester, we're talking about Manchester's
 2 premier entertainment place. Do you agree it would have
 3 been very helpful indeed in terms of immediate response
 4 and the implementation of JESIP to have had prior
 5 familiarisation with this iconic venue?
 6 A. Familiarisation would have helped with knowing the site
 7 and RVPs and potentially for FCP.
 8 Q. Last question: is there now a process whereby you or
 9 your colleagues in your position, particularly given the
 10 continuing states of alert that we live under, to all
 11 have prior familiarisation with iconic venues on their
 12 patch?
 13 A. I don't know.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're not aware of one anyway?
 15 A. No, sir. Again, this might be through public order
 16 command, so for example I'm familiar with the Etihad
 17 Stadium, I had visits to there. Similarly, with
 18 Manchester United's football stadium. So it's not
 19 a blanket no. I think it depends on the site. But I'm
 20 not familiar with it happening routinely.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The fact that you weren't familiar with
 22 the arena or hadn't done that sort of visit to it, does
 23 that have anything to do with the fact that BTP policed
 24 it? I'm not saying you should say it did, but does it
 25 have anything to do with it, would it have been any

125

1 different if you had primacy on policing it?
 2 A. I would have thought so, yes. I knew that BTP policed
 3 events at the arena, so they would have the primary
 4 response to it.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right.
 6 MR COOPER: But nonetheless, whether they did or they
 7 didn't, Greater Manchester Police would know they would
 8 play a significant part in any events such as tragically
 9 occurred?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And in answer to the chair's question, there are, as far
 12 as you're aware, familiarisation visits to Old Trafford
 13 or the Etihad, you're sure of that?
 14 A. Yes, at the Etihad and at Old Trafford, as the public
 15 order commander.
 16 Q. Based upon the individuals or the people that would
 17 attend at such events, but was it considered, my last
 18 question, was it considered that perhaps they were not
 19 the same sorts of people with the backgrounds or
 20 interests that attend at the Etihad or Old Trafford who
 21 might be attending at the Ariana Grande concert and
 22 therefore less of an imperative to have
 23 a familiarisation visit? Would that be the logic of it
 24 all?
 25 A. I don't --

126

1 Q. A different clientele than those at the Etihad, say,
 2 compared to an Ariana Grande concert at the arena?
 3 Would that play as to whether familiarisation visits
 4 were paid or not paid to the arena?
 5 A. I don't know.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think you may have upset most of the
 7 population of Manchester by your questions now.
 8 MR COOPER: As a Wolverhampton Wanderers supporter, I think
 9 I can take that.
 10 Further questions from MR DE LA POER
 11 MR DE LA POER: There's one other matter before we turn to
 12 Mr Horwell, just a matter of research that I've been
 13 assisted with arising from the superintendent's
 14 questions. Mr Lopez, can you please bring up
 15 {INQ007279/79}.
 16 This goes to your answers about the casualty bureau,
 17 Superintendent Nawaz, and your understanding that it was
 18 for the Gold commander to authorise.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. The document we're about to look at is part of the major
 21 incident plan.
 22 In the centre of the page, we can see:
 23 "Consider activation of casualty and information
 24 bureau."
 25 And two short paragraphs under that. The second of

127

1 which reads:
 2 "The request for the casualty and information bureau
 3 to be activated is to be made via force duty officer and
 4 requires the authorisation of the ACC."
 5 Does that second part, namely the authorisation of
 6 the ACC, accord with your understanding on 22 May?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. As to the first, which mentions "via the force duty
 9 officer", once you had taken over from the force duty
 10 officer as Silver commander, did you see that as being
 11 part of your role to raise it with the Silver commander
 12 or the ACC or did you regard that as resting with the
 13 force duty officer or did you just not think about it?
 14 A. I'm not sure if I considered the FDO in that.
 15 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez. I turn now, as
 16 I've done before, to Mr Horwell. We have been going for
 17 over an hour and a half by a short margin. Can
 18 I enquire of Mr Horwell how long he thinks he'll be.
 19 MR HORWELL: 10 minutes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind carrying on? Thank you.
 21 Questions from MR HORWELL
 22 MR HORWELL: There are obviously a lot of public
 23 entertainment venues in Manchester, and your visits to
 24 the Etihad and Manchester United grounds, they were in
 25 respect of public order work that you were doing?

128

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. So they had a specific purpose?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. You have said that your instinctive response was to go
 5 to the scene?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. When you decided to go to the scene, what did you
 8 believe had happened at that stage? What type of
 9 emergency did you think that you were going to?
 10 A. I thought it was an explosion, potentially caused by
 11 a gas leak, an electrical fault, equipment failure,
 12 something of that nature.
 13 Q. If you had appreciated that it was a terrorist attack
 14 that was believed to be marauding in its nature, in
 15 other words potentially more than one site, and that
 16 a firearm or firearms were believed to have been
 17 available for use, what decision would you then have
 18 made?
 19 A. I don't know.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the point is being made, if you
 21 are going to have lots of other things which may be
 22 going on within Manchester, it's not much good you being
 23 at one site when you may be need to be managing a whole
 24 lot of things.
 25 A. Yes.

129

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that's the point being made.
 2 MR HORWELL: Yes, sir.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The suggested response I think to
 4 that is you'd have stayed at Silver command?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 MR HORWELL: There was no request from the scene, or
 7 anywhere else, that a superintendent should go to the
 8 scene?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. And in terms of your awareness of what was happening and
 11 who had been told, the FWIN was available to you at
 12 Central Park Police Station?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And you saw it?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And the FWIN was available to you at Silver control?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And you saw it?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. In your second witness statement at paragraph 37, you
 21 said:
 22 "I reviewed the FWIN and ascertained that NWAS and
 23 GMFRS had been notified and that BTP were at the scene.
 24 I am not sure of the exact times I accessed the FWIN."
 25 The FWIN is available for all of us to see,

130

1 Mr Nawaz. I'm not going to go to it in detail now.
 2 Just fleshing out that short paragraph I read from your
 3 statement, it is clear from the FWIN -- and this was
 4 within the first 10 minutes -- that fire had been
 5 contacted, that an RVP had been nominated at the
 6 Cathedral car park, that there had been contact from BTP
 7 and that there had been contact with the
 8 Ambulance Service. Were you aware of that information
 9 at an early stage?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Where did you think fire and ambulance would go?
 12 A. To the scene.
 13 Q. You've been asked about your knowledge of the scene
 14 Bronze, Inspector Smith, and his number on the night was
 15 6694.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Within the first 15 minutes or so of the detonation,
 18 there are a number of communications from him,
 19 indicating that he was aware of what had happened, that
 20 he was making his way to the scene, the nomination by
 21 him of the RVP, and eventually, at 22.49, confirmation
 22 that he was not only at the scene but at the site of the
 23 detonation and he described it in these words:
 24 "Looks like a bomb has gone off."
 25 Would you have been aware of that from the FWIN?

131

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. So you were aware that Smith was the Bronze commander?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. An experienced and competent inspector?
 5 A. Very much so.
 6 Q. In terms of the command structure, there was the FDO.
 7 Would you have been aware that there would be an OFC, an
 8 operational firearms commander --
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. -- appointed at the scene?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. Did you believe a firearms officer would be in command
 13 at the scene --
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. -- from the beginning?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Then two Bronzes, Smith and Cooklynn, Buckle on her way
 18 to force headquarters, and Dexter on his way to the
 19 scene as ground--assigned --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. -- tactical firearms commander. Did you at any stage
 22 believe that there was a command vacuum at the scene?
 23 A. Absolutely not, no.
 24 Q. In terms of the suggestion or the question as to whether
 25 or not you should as Night Silver be permanently based

132

1 in Silver control, first of all if you can assist us
 2 with your many duties that you have told us about as
 3 Night Silver. Certain functions within the law have to
 4 be performed by a superintendent?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. That is why there has to be a superintendent on duty
 7 24 hours a day?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Can you perform all of those functions remotely or
 10 do you on occasions have to go on a police station to
 11 perform them?
 12 A. You have to go to police stations to perform them.
 13 Q. So you can't be based at one location?
 14 A. I think the current situation with COVID has changed
 15 things a little bit.
 16 Q. I'm only asking you about May 2017, Mr Nawaz.
 17 A. No, I'd be expected to travel to different custody sites
 18 for reviews, for example.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You have to be there to do a review,
 20 do you?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 23 A. COVID's changed it a little bit.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Maybe we'll all be changing after COVID
 25 as a result.

133

1 MR HORWELL: You were also asked whether — and again,
 2 Mr Nawaz, May 2017. We all know that the operations
 3 room has changed and its location has changed. But in
 4 2017, you were asked as to whether or not there could or
 5 should be staff at Silver control, able and ready to set
 6 it up on request, and therefore obviating the need to
 7 travel from the operations room to Silver control. Are
 8 you able to help the chairman in your experience as to
 9 how often Silver control was set up to respond to
 10 a spontaneous emergency? It may well be others are
 11 better placed, but as you're in the witness box,
 12 Mr Nawaz, can you give the chairman some idea as to how
 13 frequent or rare an event that was?
 14 A. That's the only occasion I can remember that happening
 15 up to that point.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It may be rare, but the reality is
 17 whenever that rare event happens, it needs to be done
 18 quickly, doesn't it?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 MR HORWELL: And radio controllers had to come from the
 21 operations room?
 22 A. Yes. I'm not sure if some were on call and came in, but
 23 the ones who are on duty are in the operations room.
 24 Q. You were asked to give as much detail as to what you did
 25 and the chairman has kindly given you the opportunity to

134

1 respond in a document setting out the various acts that
 2 you performed that night. But looking at it overall,
 3 and I think you've dealt with this already, but if I can
 4 ask you again, please, was there a moment's calm that
 5 night?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. You were always doing something?
 8 A. At incredible pace, it felt like, and time — it was
 9 just hard getting a grip on time, but absolutely not
 10 a second of calm.
 11 Q. Well, you will respond to the invitation from the chair
 12 as, I think, it's to the 20 points and to the 30 points,
 13 two separate documents?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. You can do that by the end of this week, I am sure, if
 16 not sooner?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Horwell, I just want to take
 19 something up, so don't finish at the moment.
 20 RVP points. So the FDO has said to us for the whole
 21 JESIP thing, the whole coordinated activity to work, he
 22 regarded an RV point to which everybody went as
 23 absolutely critical because from there when people met
 24 they could agree on a forward control point and the
 25 whole thing stemmed from that. We know that

135

1 Inspector Smith nominated a particular RVP point. We
 2 also know he rescinded that pretty quickly. We also
 3 know nobody went there, so there was actually no real
 4 agreed RV point. The contingency plan for the arena
 5 sets out suggested RVP points.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you see that at any time or look for
 8 it at any time?
 9 A. Not on the night, no.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you regard it as part of your job to
 11 deal with the RVP point?
 12 A. I know it's recorded on the FWIN, so I can't say again
 13 with certainty. I think have looked it on the FWIN and
 14 gone: RVP's nominated, tick, move on to the next
 15 activity.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you never got to know that nobody
 17 went there?
 18 A. No.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or that it had been rescinded by
 20 Inspector Smith? Did that go on the FWIN?
 21 A. I'd have to review it, sir.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think it might have done, but we can
 23 look.
 24 MR HORWELL: It doesn't ring any bells to me. I will look
 25 at that and let you know after lunch.

136

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you very much.
 2 MR HORWELL: Thank you.
 3 MR DE LA POER: Unless you any more questions for the
 4 superintendent, that concludes —
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Superintendent, I'm really
 6 grateful for you giving evidence and taking the trouble
 7 to tell us about the things that you think went wrong,
 8 and for your frankness about things because that's the
 9 only way we're going to get things any better.
 10 Thank you. An hour?
 11 MR DE LA POER: Yes, please.
 12 (1.11 pm)
 13 (The lunch adjournment)
 14 (2.10 pm)
 15 SUPERINTENDENT CHRISTOPHER HILL (sworn)
 16 Questions from MR DE LA POER
 17 MR DE LA POER: Please state your full name and rank.
 18 A. Christopher Hill, I'm a superintendent with Greater
 19 Manchester Police.
 20 Q. Did you join Greater Manchester Police in 1994?
 21 A. Yes, sir.
 22 Q. Did you progress through the rank of sergeant, such that
 23 in 2004 you were subsequently promoted to inspector?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 Q. In 2005, did you move to the operational communications

137

1 branch within GMP?
 2 A. Yes, sir.
 3 Q. Two years later, in 2007, were you promoted to
 4 chief inspector for the OCB?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 Q. Having occupied some months in that role, in 2008 did
 7 you become a city centre inspector?
 8 A. Yes, sir.
 9 Q. 2011, were you assigned to the Tactical Aid Unit?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. In your statement you indicate that in 2013 you
 12 undertook project work; what was that?
 13 A. It was called Operation Pegasus and it was a project to
 14 look at using a systems and thinking-based approach to
 15 look at cost savings across the X Department at the
 16 time.
 17 Q. The?
 18 A. The X Department, the specialist department of Greater
 19 Manchester Police.
 20 Q. For how long did you undertake that work?
 21 A. I think it was about a year, maybe a year and a half.
 22 Q. Did you come to work as the Bronze public order
 23 commander for Operation Geraldton?
 24 A. Yes, indeed.
 25 Q. When was that?

138

1 A. Straight after Operation Pegasus.
 2 Q. And Operation Geraldton related to the anti-fracking
 3 process?
 4 A. Yes, indeed.
 5 Q. In 2014, did you transfer back to Rochdale as
 6 a chief inspector?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And in February 2016 were you promoted to the rank of
 9 temporary superintendent?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. I think a few months after this tragedy, November 2017,
 12 you were confirmed as a substantive superintendent?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. At the same time that you were promoted to the rank of
 15 temporary superintendent, did you take up that position
 16 within the OCB?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. What then did that make your role within the OCB?
 19 A. I was the commander of the OCB underneath — working to
 20 the chief superintendent.
 21 Q. Who was the chief superintendent?
 22 A. At the time we had a couple of chief superintendents.
 23 First of all it was Mr Ellison and then Mr O'Hare.
 24 Q. If we just track that chain of command or line
 25 management up, above those two chief superintendents who

139

1 was —
 2 A. ACC Hankinson.
 3 Q. In terms of the Gold/Silver/Bronze structure and other
 4 commander roles, were you accredited as a Bronze public
 5 order commander in 2004?
 6 A. Yes, sir.
 7 Q. I think that you held that accreditation for some years,
 8 but there came a point when you permitted it to lapse so
 9 you could focus on Silver and then Gold?
 10 A. Yes, indeed.
 11 Q. In your witness statement you indicate that you were
 12 accredited as a Silver public order commander in around
 13 2004 or 2005. Have you since reflected upon that and
 14 checked whether that's right?
 15 A. Yes, my apologies, I think it's more 2010 rather than
 16 2004 and 2005.
 17 Q. Again that's an accreditation as a Silver public order
 18 commander?
 19 A. Yes, indeed.
 20 Q. In 2012, did you receive accreditation to act as
 21 a tactical firearms commander?
 22 A. Yes, indeed.
 23 Q. And in 2013 were you accredited as a Gold commander?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Connected with that, did that mean that you attended the

140

1 multi—agency Gold incident command course every year?
 2 A. Yes, sir .
 3 Q. Finally, in relation to just reviewing your CV, at the
 4 time of this attack did you hold an assessor role for
 5 nationally operated Gold, Silver and Bronze courses?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Related to the role of commander, bearing in mind all
 8 your experience and training, you make a comment in your
 9 statement which I'd like you to turn up, please. It is
 10 paragraph 24, which you will know when you see it,
 11 page 6.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. There has been a substantial body of evidence already
 14 given about this and it's a matter that the inquiry is
 15 looking at closely. What you say at paragraph 24 is:
 16 "It is best practice from my training and from
 17 guidance for a Silver commander to operate in the Silver
 18 command room away from the actual event. All
 19 organisations decide where their commanders work from.
 20 Within the police service, the Silver commander was
 21 generally located at the location of the event within
 22 the event control room."
 23 I'm not sure I quite understood that last bit:
 24 "Within the police service the Silver commander was
 25 generally located at the location of the event within

1 the event control room."
 2 I'm sure it's just me, but can you...
 3 A. I'm wondering whether I'm alluding to when I was first
 4 a Silver commander and the Silver would tend to work
 5 from the event control room. I'll give you an example,
 6 Manchester City Football Club, for instance. It was
 7 quite common for the Silver commander to work from the
 8 control room rather than from another control room
 9 elsewhere. And then over time there was some national
 10 guidance that the Silver commander should work elsewhere
 11 than the actual control room within the stadium.
 12 Q. I'm just trying to understand where you settled insofar
 13 as you're speaking generally. From your point of view,
 14 with the training that you'd had, in May 2017 are you
 15 saying the Silver commander should be at the scene,
 16 should be in the control room, or is it more nuanced
 17 than that?
 18 A. So generally for pre—planned events, which within
 19 Greater Manchester Police we do have hundreds a year of
 20 which I have been involved in, the Silver commander will
 21 be at the control room at force headquarters.
 22 Q. You've drawn a clear distinction there between
 23 pre—planned events and, if we call them that,
 24 spontaneous incidents.
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What about for spontaneous incidents?
 2 A. For spontaneous incidents, if it's a major incident, the
 3 major incident plan is really clear there should be
 4 a tactical Silver commander at the scene. I do,
 5 however, think that it depends on the incident, every
 6 incident is different. I'll give you an example,
 7 31 December 2018, I was Silver commander in charge of
 8 New Year's Eve for Manchester city centre celebrations.
 9 We were expecting lots of people in the city, for
 10 fireworks, and obviously to celebrate New Year's Eve and
 11 we had reports of an incident at Victoria Train Station,
 12 you may recall. I was Silver commander there and
 13 I already had Silver open and, even though I was in the
 14 city centre, I returned back to the force command module
 15 to manage the incident from there.
 16 Q. You can perhaps give us the benefit of the fact that you
 17 were both an experienced Silver public order commander
 18 and a tactical firearms commander.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. For a firearms incident, in May 2017, were you familiar
 21 with the term ground—assigned tactical firearms
 22 commander?
 23 A. I think it was a new terminology that was just coming
 24 out at that time.
 25 Q. Do you think you were familiar with it?

1 A. Not at the time, no.
 2 Q. Had you ever, as a tactical firearms commander, played
 3 the role, whether badged as this or not, of
 4 ground—assigned tactical firearms commander or had you
 5 always taken up that role remote from the scene?
 6 A. Usually in all the pre—planned and spontaneous, you will
 7 end up going to a control room to manage the firearms
 8 incident.
 9 Q. You hadn't had experience of acting in the role of
 10 ground—assigned tactical firearms commander?
 11 A. Not that I can recall.
 12 Q. As a tactical firearms commander, bearing in mind the
 13 two things that you've said, firstly that you had never
 14 taken up that role in May 2017 and, secondly, bearing in
 15 mind what you have said about the major incident manual
 16 being very clear about the need for a tactical commander
 17 at the scene --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- would a tactical firearms commander at the scene be
 20 in charge of all police resources or just the firearms?
 21 A. I was quite clear on the night that, as he was at the
 22 time, Chief Inspector Dexter, now Superintendent Dexter,
 23 was in charge of the armed assets at the arena that
 24 night.
 25 Q. That was a conscious thought you had when you became

1 involved in events?
 2 A. Yes, sir .
 3 Q. At that point, and we are jumping very much ahead, but
 4 it 's perhaps, as we are dealing with this as a topic
 5 area, relevant to deal with it now. At that point, did
 6 it strike you that there was no unarmed resource
 7 tactical commander at the scene?
 8 A. I was aware that Inspector Mike Smith was at the scene
 9 and was acting as that inside --- inner cordon, if
 10 you will , commander, Bronze commander, if you will,
 11 at the scene.
 12 Q. That's Bronze, operational.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. I am asking about whether it struck you that there was
 15 no tactical unarmed commander.
 16 A. At the time, I didn't think of that at the moment
 17 because I was having that handover, if you will , from
 18 Superintendent Nawaz.
 19 Q. No doubt we ought to bear in mind that at the time that
 20 handover took place, as we shall see, it was about
 21 midnight and the incident was of a very different
 22 complexion then to how it had been earlier.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Exercise Winchester Accord. Did you participate in that
 25 exercise?

145

1 A. Yes, sir .
 2 Q. It took place on 9 May 2016; is that correct?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. What role did you undertake at that exercise?
 5 A. I was the chief staff officer for the Gold commander.
 6 Q. Just so that we (inaudible: distorted) your involvement,
 7 what does that role entail?
 8 A. So setting the battle rhythm, ensuring there's an
 9 agenda, ensuring that the partners are aware,
 10 situational awareness, ensuring there's an agenda. So
 11 it 's almost like a staff officer , but it just overlaps
 12 a little bit with the Gold commander but it's not being
 13 the Gold commander.
 14 Q. Is one of those roles you have just alluded to ensuring
 15 good multi--agency communication?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. At the time of Exercise Winchester Accord, you had been
 18 in post as the superintendent for the OCB for a couple
 19 of months; is that right?
 20 A. Yes, sir .
 21 Q. Although you were playing the role of chief of staff or
 22 staff officer to Gold, was it within your area of
 23 observation or something you were focusing on how the
 24 OCB did in relation to that incident?
 25 A. No. I volunteered for the role as Gold commander

146

1 because as a Gold commander I wanted to try as much and
 2 experience as much opportunity, if you will , in case
 3 something obviously happened for real. So I volunteered
 4 to be Gold but I got the role of staff officer instead.
 5 Q. So are we to understand that effectively you took off
 6 your day job hat ---
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. --- and you sought to become involved by reason of your
 9 on--call or on--duty rota obligations as a commander?
 10 A. It was just more I volunteered for the role. I was
 11 aware it was happening, so I volunteered for the role .
 12 Q. Having participated in it , were you informed of any of
 13 the feedback that was generated by it in terms of what
 14 went right and what went wrong?
 15 A. I believe I attended a debrief, sir .
 16 Q. Was that a debrief on your own or were there others
 17 participating in it ?
 18 A. Others were there.
 19 Q. From your participation in that, and anything else that
 20 was fed back from you, what did you understand were the
 21 things that went wrong as a result of Exercise
 22 Winchester Accord? This is your understanding at the
 23 time.
 24 A. At the time, I was aware that there was feedback from
 25 partners to suggest that they were kept waiting, they

147

1 weren't aware of the full intelligence picture. The
 2 strategics of the Gold strategy --- there was a delay in
 3 disseminating the Gold strategy. Those were the main
 4 sort of issues that were coming out from the debrief.
 5 Q. Two in particular that the inquiry has been looking at
 6 and I would like to just understand from you how much
 7 they were on your radar and, if they were, in what form.
 8 The first is that there was, as we understand it,
 9 a very substantial delay in relation to the Fire and
 10 Rescue Service attending the scene. Were you aware of
 11 that?
 12 A. No, sir .
 13 Q. That is presumably despite the fact that one of the key
 14 parts of your role was multi--agency communication?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. The other area that the inquiry has been focused on, and
 17 it 's important that I do my best to avoid putting words
 18 in your mouth but hear from you what you thought,
 19 relates to the role of the FDO and how effectively that
 20 was performed.
 21 Do you recall understanding that there were any
 22 difficulties with the FDO role as a result of Exercise
 23 Winchester Accord?
 24 A. I recall the feedback. There was two items of feedback:
 25 one to say they couldn't get through to the FDO and one

148

1 to say that they could get through to the FDO and that
 2 was the only feedback I received on the day.
 3 Q. You were obviously, concurrent to your participation in
 4 this, the superintendent in charge of the OCB.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Have you followed the evidence that's emerged during the
 7 inquiry in relation to the overall picture of feedback
 8 from Operation Winchester Accord?
 9 A. Yes, sir .
 10 Q. Do you feel that you fully understood the sort of
 11 comments that were coming around the FDO role at the
 12 time?
 13 A. Yes, sir .
 14 Q. You feel you did?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. At any point did you understand that Exercise
 17 Winchester Accord demonstrated that the FDO might become
 18 overwhelmed?
 19 A. I didn't get that feeling from the debrief of
 20 Winchester Accord, no.
 21 Q. If I've understood the chronology correctly, and there's
 22 every possibility I haven't, but I think I've got this
 23 right, prior to Exercise Winchester Accord,
 24 Chief Inspector Booth had created some action cards.
 25 A. Yes, sir .

149

1 Q. Did Chief Inspector Booth sit within your direct line
 2 management below you?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. So he was one of your officers in the OCB?
 5 A. Indeed.
 6 Q. Did you know he had created some action cards?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Was that something you'd had any involvement in or was
 9 it just something he'd got on with it and you had come
 10 to hear of it?
 11 A. I think he had been tasked with it and I was aware of
 12 the action cards being put together, yes.
 13 Q. As I understand the state of the evidence, those action
 14 cards were not used in the course of Exercise
 15 Winchester Accord; is that your understanding also?
 16 A. I am now, sir, but I wasn't at the time.
 17 Q. So we've got the order of events correct, you're aware
 18 your chief inspector is creating these action cards for
 19 the benefit of your staff beneath him?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. He does so before Exercise Winchester Accord?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. As a matter of fact they are not used in Exercise
 24 Winchester Accord?
 25 A. Yes.

150

1 Q. But that information never reached you?
 2 A. I wasn't aware, no, sir .
 3 Q. Do you think that that is information that should have
 4 been passed to you?
 5 A. I would suggest so, yes, sir .
 6 Q. Who would be responsible for identifying that?
 7 A. It would have come from debrief notes and a tasking from
 8 whoever was holding the debrief.
 9 Q. After Chief Inspector Booth had created his action
 10 cards, what was your understanding about whether they
 11 had gone live, so to speak?
 12 A. I was aware that Mr Booth sent an email out with
 13 hyperlinks and my understanding was that they were
 14 therefore disseminated to our staff .
 15 Q. Whose responsibility was it, superintendent, to ensure
 16 that they became embedded as part of the practice of
 17 your staff ?
 18 A. I think it's been alluded to in the past that the way
 19 the OCB works, there's little opportunity to test and
 20 train and to ensure continuous professional development
 21 with our staff because of the way the shifts are,
 22 demand, austerity measures, et cetera, in relation to
 23 the numbers, so we didn't test the cards.
 24 Q. That's an explanation as to why it came to be that they
 25 weren't tested. I'm just trying to understand whose

151

1 responsibility it was to ensure. I mean, one of your
 2 officers had taken the trouble to create them.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Clearly a lot of thought went into them and planning
 5 behind rolling them out.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. None of that counts for anything if they're not actually
 8 implemented; do you agree?
 9 A. Yes, indeed.
 10 Q. So again, who would you identify as being responsible
 11 for ensuring that those cards became embedded as part of
 12 the practice of your staff?
 13 A. We used to have a training department within the OCB
 14 when I was there as an inspector. It could have been
 15 part of that training department. Under austerity
 16 measures, we didn't have that department any longer so
 17 there was nobody with that overview, if you will, at the
 18 time.
 19 Q. So the training department couldn't do it because they'd
 20 been abolished?
 21 A. Indeed.
 22 Q. Does that mean that it is just one of those things that
 23 should be permitted to fall between the gaps or doe
 24 someone need to table responsibility for making sure it
 25 happens?

152

1 A. On reflection, sir, they should have been tested, yes.
 2 Q. Who should have arranged for that to happen?
 3 A. It could have come from as high up as the assistant
 4 chief constable, the chief superintendent, myself, or
 5 indeed the chief inspector, so an array of persons.
 6 Q. Would you agree it appears that in fact, from that list
 7 of senior officers, it doesn't appear any of them, so
 8 far as you're aware, actually took that step to make
 9 sure that Chief Inspector Booth's work was implemented?
 10 A. Yes, indeed.
 11 Q. Were you aware of the HMIC inspection in October 2016
 12 into November titled "CT2"?
 13 A. I am now, yes.
 14 Q. Were you aware of it at the time?
 15 A. I don't believe I was.
 16 Q. So CT2 related to GMP's command and control preparedness
 17 for a marauding terrorist firearms attack.
 18 A. Okay.
 19 Q. Bearing in mind that inspection had taken place, and
 20 bearing in mind some of the command and control around
 21 that sat with your department, do you agree --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. -- is that something that you should have been aware of
 24 at the time?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

153

1 Q. We know that ACC Hankinson, your line manager but one
 2 above you, attended a hot debrief, as it's been termed,
 3 with one of the inspectors on 5 November. Does it
 4 follow from your previous answers that as you weren't
 5 aware of the inspection that you did not know that that
 6 had happened?
 7 A. No, sir.
 8 Q. We know also that ACC Hankinson sent an email to chief
 9 officers after that, feeding back some of that which had
 10 been conveyed to her in the meeting. Did that ever
 11 cross your desk or were you aware of any of that
 12 feedback from HMIC?
 13 A. No, sir.
 14 Q. Finally, although again it may be implicit in all your
 15 other answers, but for absolute clarity, one of the
 16 concerns HMIC had was in relation to the burden on the
 17 FDO during a marauding terrorist firearms attack. Were
 18 you aware of that concern at any point before May 2017?
 19 A. No, sir.
 20 Q. Bearing in mind that you were the superintendent in
 21 charge of the OCB, which included the FDO, is that
 22 something that you should have been made aware of?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Hill, it may be perfectly
 25 understandable but I think you're about the first person

154

1 who said they weren't aware that the burdens on an FDO
 2 could become overwhelming. Is there any particular
 3 reason why you didn't seem to know that but everybody
 4 else does seem to know that or is that a comment you
 5 can't really answer?
 6 A. I'm trying to think whether... In Winchester Accord
 7 I was aware of some comments in relation to the FDO, but
 8 those that I've mentioned, so... No, sir, I can't say.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 10 MR DE LA POER: If there was a substantial concern about the
 11 FDO becoming overloaded in a particular circumstance,
 12 is that something that you, as superintendent for the
 13 OCB, should have been told in clear terms?
 14 A. Yes, sir.
 15 Q. Is at least one of the reasons for you to know that
 16 because you might have done something about it?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Sexton told us that he had
 19 a memorandum --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- perhaps you heard this as part of the
 22 evidence, saying:
 23 "Realise your limitations and do what you can before
 24 you're overwhelmed."
 25 But that sort of information never got through to

155

1 you from him or any of his colleagues?
 2 A. I'm aware that he had an aide--memoire in relation to it,
 3 as most of the FDOs do, for responses to incidents and
 4 that was just one of the aide--memoires.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you wouldn't have seen that?
 6 A. I'm aware that some of the other FDOs had one because
 7 I believe I had a copy of it for if I was a TFC at the
 8 time, so I was aware they did have one, yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 10 MR DE LA POER: If you were given one of those was that with
 11 a view to you scrutinising it or was it just for your
 12 information should you find yourself as a TFC?
 13 A. As a TFC, yes.
 14 Q. Were you aware of what we're terming the Whittle
 15 version, the Operation Plato plan, coming out in
 16 May 2017?
 17 A. I don't recall, sir.
 18 Q. One of the matters which seems to be accepted by those
 19 witnesses who have spoken to it is that that plan, if
 20 followed, increased, as against the position before it,
 21 the burden on the FDO. Is that something that you as
 22 superintendent of the OCB ought to have known about?
 23 A. Indeed.
 24 Q. And what mechanisms were there in place to ensure that
 25 you would find out things like that? Can you help us?

156

1 A. Weekly SLT meetings with my SLT.
 2 Q. I'm so sorry --
 3 A. Senior leadership team, sorry. And obviously,
 4 Mr Whittle himself could have contacted me, I'm sure.
 5 Q. At all events, if that's right, as I have characterised
 6 it, it's a matter for the chairman to determine, that
 7 wasn't something that was on your radar?
 8 A. No, sir.
 9 Q. Before the attack?
 10 A. No.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you have done anything about it if
 12 it was?
 13 A. If it was highlighted to me, yes. In my position as the
 14 superintendent of OCB I would have worked with Mr Booth
 15 or my chief superintendent and we could have looked at
 16 more support at that time.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 18 MR DE LA POER: Superintendent, I'm going to turn away from
 19 those matters which have taken us up to May 2017 and
 20 look at your role on 22 May.
 21 A. Okay.
 22 Q. At the time that you learned of the attack, where were
 23 you?
 24 A. I was at home, sir.
 25 Q. Were you on duty or on call in any way at that time?

157

1 A. No. I'd done a full tour of duty, returned home and
 2 I was actually in bed.
 3 Q. How did you become aware of the attack?
 4 A. I tend to read social media or newsfeeds prior to going
 5 to bed, just to make sure there's nothing going on, to
 6 see what I'm going in to next day, from a sense of
 7 pride, if you will. It's always nice to be aware of
 8 something prior to coming in, if you need to come in
 9 earlier, et cetera, so I was just checking the newsfeeds
 10 before and I'd seen that there had been an explosion.
 11 Q. I hope you have access to the audio schedule. I would
 12 like you, please, to look at the first two entries just
 13 to see if you can help us with them. I appreciate you
 14 didn't create this, this is created by Greater
 15 Manchester Police and the Operation Manteline team have
 16 kindly pulled all this information together and it's
 17 been distilled against your name in this schedule.
 18 The first entry, which is 4985, is a telephone call
 19 from mobile telephone records timed at 23.11. It
 20 appears to be a telephone contact that lasted for
 21 2 minutes and 10 seconds. Do you see that?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. The other telephone handset which is engaged with
 24 that is that of Alison Thornton. Who was
 25 Alison Thornton as you understood it on 22 May?

158

1 A. Alison ended up being the staff officer to Gold.
 2 Q. We'll hold that thought for a moment. The next entry
 3 we have at 5054 is timed at 23.11.39 and is the audio
 4 from the FDO line, a conversation between you and
 5 David Myerscough.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So looking at those two together, and doing the best you
 8 can, do you think you in fact spoke to Alison Thornton
 9 in that telephone call? Because the two appear to be
 10 occurring at the same time.
 11 A. Whether I tried to get through and it's been engaged so
 12 I've then gone straightaway to another phone call,
 13 that's potentially what's happened.
 14 Q. If we look at the content of the telephone call to the
 15 FDO line at 23.11.39, answered by Mr Myerscough, what
 16 you say in the middle is:
 17 "I take it it's very busy at the moment."
 18 To which Mr Myerscough supplies:
 19 "Very."
 20 And then you say:
 21 "Yes. Is anything -- I was just reading about it
 22 in the news now. What's gone on?"
 23 So in terms of timing your first awareness of this,
 24 looking at the telephone call we have to Alison Thornton
 25 and the content of what you say at about that time to

159

1 Mr Myerscough, would you have discovered on social media
 2 about the explosion shortly before those two actions?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 Q. The call concludes with Mr Myerscough saying in response
 5 to your question:
 6 "Do we need anyone to turn out or anything?"
 7 And he says:
 8 "At the moment -- I'll ask Mr Sexton. Sorry, sir,
 9 I won't be a minute, he's just speaking with sarge."
 10 That appears to be how far you got on the force duty
 11 officer's line. But within what must have been seconds
 12 of that call ending, do we see entry 5160, which is
 13 a telephone call to the FDS's line, I think, although
 14 it's not entirely clear from this, but I believe it is
 15 a different telephone number. At all events, at
 16 23.12.36 do you speak to Ian Randall, the FDS?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 Q. Is this all part of your efforts to find out what's
 19 going on?
 20 A. And also I think I heard you mention it this morning,
 21 that you don't want commanders just indiscriminately
 22 turning out because it creates an issue with people just
 23 turning up, so I wanted to make sure that there was
 24 a role for me. That's what I was trying to ascertain.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that. Absolutely no

160

1 criticism , I just wonder whether, because phone calls
 2 take time as well , a system of people being called out
 3 as and when needed rather than ringing up and
 4 volunteered --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Done with the best will in the world,
 7 I do understand that, but what would GMP normally do
 8 about that sort of thing?
 9 A. At the moment you probably know now there is in our
 10 system, where there is a text message that an incident
 11 has happened, the force-wide text system, and you will
 12 get a text asking can you turn out in a particular role.
 13 So that's in place now. You're quite right , I phoned
 14 a line , just to see, and at the time there wasn't
 15 anything in place like that, sir , no.
 16 MR DE LA POER: Let's just look briefly at the content of
 17 your conversation with Mr Randall. Can you confirm that
 18 he told you that Mr Dexter, that's Chief Inspector as
 19 he was Dexter at the time and Chief Inspector Buckle are
 20 both in? Is that right?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Does he say in the centre of that entry there:
 23 "It's been declared an Operation Plato incident."
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. You reply:

161

1 "Has it?"
 2 In May 2017, did you know what Operation Plato was?
 3 A. Yes, sir .
 4 Q. I'm not asking for your understanding now. Based on
 5 your understanding on 22 May 2017, what did you think
 6 Operation Plato was?
 7 A. It was a terrorist attack in relation to a marauding
 8 terrorist .
 9 Q. You started with terrorist attack --
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. -- then we had marauding. You haven't mentioned the
 12 word firearms.
 13 A. Sorry, MTFFA, I do apologise.
 14 Q. It's important that we have as much clarity as we can
 15 around this. It's not a criticism at all because
 16 different people have said they have different
 17 understandings about what that was. It's your
 18 understanding that I'm interested in.
 19 A. Yes. It's not in here, but I do recall on the night
 20 saying, "Plato, is that involving a firearm", "Yes".
 21 It's not anywhere here, whether that's just something
 22 I've recalled and it's not written down anywhere but
 23 I do recall asking that question.
 24 Q. Asking that question of whom?
 25 A. I can't recall . It's just some memory that I have to

162

1 clarify the Plato element because obviously the --
 2 that's generally the MTFFA element to it.
 3 Q. Was it your understanding on 22 May 2017 that
 4 Operation Plato involved or may involve zones?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. In May 2017, did you understand those zones to be
 7 optional or mandatory?
 8 A. Mandatory.
 9 Q. In May 2017, who did you understand were permitted to be
 10 within a hot zone?
 11 A. The hot zone was just the AFOs, the armed response
 12 officers .
 13 Q. Again, focusing just in May 2017, who did you understand
 14 could be in a warm zone?
 15 A. Trained officers with protective equipment.
 16 Q. That may, as a description, apply to police officers .
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Did you have an understanding about the other emergency
 19 services and whether they could go into the hot zone or
 20 the warm zone and, if so, in what circumstances?
 21 A. Again, I was aware within the warm zone that our
 22 colleagues from the Fire Service and the
 23 Ambulance Service could go in there with the correct
 24 PPE.
 25 Q. Was all of that, as we've spent a few moments just going

163

1 through, in your mind from 23.12 when this call took
 2 place?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. So all of those concepts, when Mr Randall says
 5 "Operation Plato", you had them at the forefront of your
 6 mind, did you?
 7 A. The zones? Gosh, no. At the moment I'm just thinking:
 8 right, there's been a Plato declared, I need to get in
 9 and offer my support and assistance. I've not even
 10 started to think of zones or anything at that particular
 11 stage.
 12 Q. Why did you think that you needed to get in and offer
 13 your assistance?
 14 A. I've been asked this and my answer is, as I said before,
 15 there's that sense of honour, that sense of -- you know,
 16 to the badge, to the organisation. Policing isn't 8 to
 17 4, Monday to Friday, and that's why I joined the police
 18 service: you don't know literally what is round the next
 19 corner and you're always on duty, always on duty. So
 20 I had the training in relation to the Bronze, the Silver
 21 and the Gold, and I generally do believe that with my
 22 training and experience, I could have offered something
 23 to the people of Greater Manchester.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It does sound like you have more
 25 experience of Gold, Silver and Bronze than other people

164

1 and indeed you're involved in training people or
 2 assessing people for it. A bit of a specialism of
 3 yours, perhaps?
 4 A. Public order was -- within the police service you tend
 5 to go down a number of different specialisms and one of
 6 mine was public order, sir, yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 8 MR DE LA POER: One of the things you might have had to
 9 offer, and we'll come back to this when we reach the
 10 policing experts at the end of my questioning, was as
 11 the supervisor of the OCB. When you self-deployed, was
 12 that one of the things that was in your mind that you
 13 had to offer?
 14 A. Can you repeat that, sorry?
 15 Q. You've identified your commander training.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And therefore the potential for you to act as some form
 18 of commander within the Gold/Silver/Bronze structure,
 19 possibly even the firearms structure.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. But separate to that, your day job was as superintendent
 22 to the OCB.
 23 A. Indeed.
 24 Q. Was giving support to your department among the
 25 contributions that you had in mind you might make?

165

1 A. Yes, and later on, I do recall making a contact call to
 2 ensure that business as usual was maintained to ensure
 3 that we had enough staff in place and I was aware of the
 4 number of 999s and 101 calls that we had, so I wanted to
 5 make sure that business as usual was continuing, if
 6 you will.
 7 Q. Beyond acting as a line manager, did you have any
 8 practical skills or knowledge that you could contribute
 9 to the OCB?
 10 A. No, so if you look at the majority of supervisors and
 11 managers within the OCB from the police side, they
 12 started off, if you will, as a radio operator or a call
 13 handler. As a senior police officer you manage the
 14 business, you work with the staff, et cetera, and you
 15 understand the policies and processes, but the
 16 understanding of the day-to-day stuff, no.
 17 Q. Do we understand by that you didn't have the skills and
 18 training and experience to, for example, take up what
 19 we've seen at BTP, as a senior duty officer supporting
 20 an FDO --
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. -- and taking some of that work --
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. -- away from him?
 25 A. No.

166

1 Q. That wasn't within --
 2 A. No, sir.
 3 Q. -- your competence?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. So having been told Operation Plato had been declared
 6 and concluded your call with Mr Randall, what did you
 7 decide to do?
 8 A. Get changed as soon as and make my way in.
 9 Q. I don't want to know the precise location. How long
 10 would it take you from where you were at that time to
 11 arrive at force HQ?
 12 A. In the region of 45 minutes.
 13 Q. Is it a similar time to get to the OCR?
 14 A. Not dissimilar, not dissimilar. Probably another
 15 5 minutes on top.
 16 Q. Again, a similar time to get to the arena, had you
 17 chosen to go there?
 18 A. The arena, yes, probably the same.
 19 Q. All about the same order of time?
 20 A. Yes. I was just thinking if it was during the day,
 21 definitely not, because getting in the city at peak hour
 22 is -- but at that time I'd probably suggest yes.
 23 Q. Where did you decide that you would deploy to?
 24 A. To the force command module at force headquarters.
 25 Q. Why did you decide to go there?

167

1 A. I've spoken to the Gold commander and said I was going
 2 to -- "What role would you like me to undertake?", and
 3 I've been deployed to the FCM.
 4 Q. So we need to deal with a couple of telephone calls just
 5 to --
 6 A. Sorry.
 7 Q. Not at all. It's me, not you.
 8 Let's have a look at the next two calls on the
 9 schedule that we need to consider.
 10 5298. We can see at the bottom of that first page
 11 is a 37-second contact between your mobile telephone,
 12 I think it is, and that of Chief Inspector Dexter.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Do you recall whether you managed to get through to
 15 Mr Dexter at that time?
 16 A. I don't, no.
 17 Q. Did you call him because Mr Randall had mentioned that
 18 he'd been deployed?
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is he someone you knew?
 21 A. Yes, we were both within the specialist operations
 22 department together.
 23 MR DE LA POER: What we don't see is a call to the other
 24 person mentioned by Mr Randall, namely Chief Inspector
 25 Buckle. Was she someone you knew?

168

1 A. Yes, I knew Rachel Buckle well, yes.
 2 Q. Having tried and potentially failed to get through to
 3 Mr Dexter, certainly not having a very long contact with
 4 him at that time, is there any particular reason why you
 5 didn't contact Chief Inspector Buckle or why you chose
 6 Chief Inspector Dexter?
 7 A. No, I can't think at the time why.
 8 Q. Then I think we catch ourselves up with where we'd got
 9 to in your evidence, which is over the page, 23.15,
 10 we can see a contact with Debbie Ford's phone. That
 11 appears on the face of the schedule, although we may
 12 need to be careful about this because every single
 13 mobile call starts at 00 in our schedule, which seems
 14 inherently unlikely --
 15 A. Okay.
 16 Q. -- but they will all have started at precisely that
 17 second, but we can see a contact of no more than
 18 19 seconds. Do you think you succeeded in speaking to
 19 ACC Ford at that time?
 20 A. Again, I can't recall, sir. I can't recall. But I must
 21 have spoken to either ma'am or her staff officer at some
 22 stage to go to the force command module to take up the
 23 Silver role because I wouldn't have self-deployed and
 24 taken up that role without that conversation.
 25 Q. If we track it through, we can see the next is a contact

169

1 of 2 seconds, so it doesn't look like anything was
 2 spoken about with Chief Inspector Dexter. That's 23.28.
 3 Then at 23.28 we have a 48-second contact with
 4 Craig Thompson.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Do you recall seeking to Superintendent Thompson that
 7 night?
 8 A. Again, no, sir.
 9 Q. It's not made clear from the schedule, although I dare
 10 say we can find out, whether you called him or he called
 11 you. But did you know at that stage of the evening
 12 whether or not Superintendent Thompson was going to play
 13 a role?
 14 A. I didn't at that time, but obviously Craig did turn up
 15 later.
 16 Q. Next we see another 2-second contact between your phone
 17 and Chief Inspector Dexter's; do you see that?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And another one shortly after that.
 20 Then we get to what are identified as text messages
 21 which pass between you and ACC Ford between 23.32 and
 22 23.59. Again, we're just going from the records we have
 23 and seeking to do our best to interpret them. But do
 24 you think, bearing in mind that you arrived shortly
 25 before midnight, and you've described a 45-minute

170

1 journey, it was as late as those text messages that you
 2 were deployed by ACC Ford or did she do it orally?
 3 A. Quite possibly on text and quite possibly orally,
 4 I can't tell.
 5 Q. If she had told you at 23.32 by text that you needed to
 6 deploy, would you have been able to make it to force HQ
 7 by before midnight?
 8 A. No, sir.
 9 Q. So it looks like it was earlier than that?
 10 A. Yes, sir.
 11 Q. All right. Maybe we've not brought any real clarity to
 12 precisely when you spoke to ACC Ford. Can you just help
 13 us with what you understood she was instructing you to
 14 do?
 15 A. To attend the force command module and take up the role
 16 of Silver commander.
 17 Q. When you were instructed to do that, as part of that
 18 instruction, did you know who was undertaking the role
 19 of Silver commander that you'd be taking over from?
 20 A. I don't know if I knew while I was driving in who the
 21 Night Silver was, but I clearly did when I arrived.
 22 Q. Was it your expectation that it would be the Night
 23 Silver that you'd be taking over from?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 Q. Did you have any reason to doubt the wisdom of you

171

1 taking over from whoever the Night Silver was?
 2 A. No, sir.
 3 Q. So was it following that instruction from ACC Ford that
 4 you got in your car or were you already travelling when
 5 you were given that instruction?
 6 A. I can't recall, sir. I would suggest I was already
 7 travelling. Clearly, if I was cancelled then I'd have
 8 turned back round, but at least I was making some
 9 progress in.
 10 Q. There are a number of other contacts just for us to
 11 review briefly before we get to your arrival time.
 12 We can see another attempt -- sorry, a text message
 13 between you and Mr Dexter whilst those text messages
 14 with ACC Ford -- do you see that?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Timed at 23.32. A short 2-second contact with
 17 Mr Thompson's mobile telephone.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Then this that I wanted to ask you about: 23.37, for up
 20 to 51 seconds, contact with Helen Palfrey. Do you have
 21 a recollection of speaking to her?
 22 A. I do, yes. Helen Palfrey is the coordinator, the
 23 north-west coordinator for the casualty bureau. I know
 24 Helen well because I've been trained as a casualty
 25 bureau manager and was supportive of Helen when she was

172

1 pulling the north-west region together, so I know Helen
 2 really well, and I do recall ma'am tasking me to
 3 initiate the casualty bureau, so that's why I contacted
 4 Helen, who answered straightaway.
 5 Q. So the sequence then is this: what prompted you and
 6 authorised you to speak to Ms Palfrey was
 7 a Gold commander?
 8 A. Sir.
 9 Q. That's what we can see you doing there in that entry?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. We can then see what does appear to be meaningful
 12 contact between you and Mr Thompson --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. -- at 23.38 for up to 1 minute and 24 seconds?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Do you recall speaking to Superintendent Thompson as you
 17 were travelling in?
 18 A. Not at all.
 19 Q. Then a new name for us in terms of these public
 20 hearings, although his name appears frequently within
 21 the papers, Neil Evans.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Chief superintendent, was he, at the time?
 24 A. Yes, indeed.
 25 Q. There's what appears to be an up to 50-second contact

173

1 with him at 23.40.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Do you recall that contact with Chief Superintendent
 4 Evans?
 5 A. Yes, indeed.
 6 Q. Did you initiate it?
 7 A. Yes, I phoned Mr Evans, yes.
 8 Q. Why did you call Mr Evans?
 9 A. Again, I recall Gold asking me to contact -- whether it
 10 was to directly contact Mr Evans or can you contact
 11 another Silver to come in to support the force, and
 12 I immediately thought of Mr Evans. I can't remember if
 13 it was a task to contact Mr Evans or another Silver, but
 14 either way, I contacted Mr Evans.
 15 Q. Why was he an appropriate person for you to contact?
 16 A. I just know Mr Evans as being a capable and competent
 17 commander.
 18 Q. In the course of that contact, did you inform him that
 19 he should turn out?
 20 A. Yes, sir.
 21 Q. At that time did you know into what role he would be
 22 stepping?
 23 A. I can't recall, but I know obviously later on he did
 24 take over the Night Silver role.
 25 Q. I think we can just rehearse that now, that the sequence

174

1 of events was you relieved Mr Nawaz of the role of
 2 Silver commander, at which point, for a brief period, he
 3 became Night Silver again?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And he was relieved of that by Chief Superintendent
 6 Evans and throughout that period he remained in the
 7 Silver room, didn't he?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And as he told us earlier this morning, once relieved of
 10 that he then undertook a role supporting you?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. We only need to deal with this briefly given the
 13 inquiry's terms of reference, but did you, as part of
 14 your early actions, involve yourself in attempting to
 15 set up the national mutual aid telephony system?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Is that a system operated at the time by Vodafone?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. And it's perhaps relevant to this inquiry to at least
 20 this extent because you say in your statement that that
 21 dominated your time for a number of hours.
 22 A. Yes, sir.
 23 Q. That's a quotation from your statement.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Is that because that telephony system did not swing into

175

1 operation in a timely fashion so far as you were
 2 concerned?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 Q. Help us so there's no mystery about this. What is the
 5 purpose of that?
 6 A. So the purpose of the casualty bureau is to obviously
 7 identify and locate those who have been involved in an
 8 incident. The casualty bureau has within Greater
 9 Manchester Police at the time 400 members of staff who
 10 are all volunteers. Once activated, they will then come
 11 into a location and then they will obviously use the
 12 telephones to answer those calls from the members of the
 13 public. Now, obviously in a normal telephone only one
 14 member of the public can answer that phone, and I know
 15 that night, we had 20 Greater Manchester Police members
 16 of staff answering those phone calls. Clearly, because
 17 this was a huge incident, we would request or require
 18 the support from other forces, so a national mutual aid
 19 telephone number, which is generally an 0800, means that
 20 other forces can support the host force, so we'd go to
 21 any of the other 42 forces. So it's imperative that we
 22 get those extra lines -- not the lines, the extra
 23 support from the other forces to support members of the
 24 public contacting.
 25 As it was on the night, it did dominate and in

176

1 hindsight, I probably should have got some support, but
 2 I knew how important it was to the members of the
 3 families to be able to get through to my staff, or the
 4 staff in the casualty bureau, to try and locate their
 5 loved ones. So yes, it became one of my top priorities
 6 to get that number out there.
 7 Q. Bearing in mind this inquiry's particular focus, when
 8 you say in your statement "dominated my time for
 9 a number of hours", within that first hour or so of you
 10 becoming aware of the incident, being tasked to attend,
 11 arriving, becoming the Silver commander, and beginning
 12 to operate as Silver commander, how much of that time
 13 was occupied with this particular problem or did that
 14 follow after?
 15 A. It overlapped with dealing with reports of gunfire at
 16 hospitals, with reports of a discarded item, with other
 17 reports. So I was sort of dealing with -- spinning
 18 plates, I suppose, is the right terminology. I was
 19 dealing with it throughout the night at the same time as
 20 dealing with other incidents, pulling(?) round the room,
 21 TCGs, if you will. So it wasn't just I went off and
 22 dealt with that for a couple of hours, it was: make
 23 a phone call, deal with something else, make another
 24 phone call -- and as you can see from the phone records,
 25 I go back to Helen Palfrey for an update to see whether

177

1 my interjection had actually caused the NMAT number to
 2 finally be released.
 3 Q. I would like to focus just on particular periods of
 4 time. Between 11.30 and 12 o'clock, were you aware of
 5 those difficulties? I hope I said the time correctly.
 6 I meant 11.30 and midnight?
 7 A. Between 11.30, when I was travelling in, until midnight
 8 when I arrived, I don't think I was. I had spoken to
 9 Helen, I had tasked her to turn out, tasked her to press
 10 the button, if you will, to get more staff in and at
 11 that stage I don't think Helen had told me that there
 12 was an issue, no, sir.
 13 Q. So no delay to you travelling in, no distraction to you
 14 gaining what situational awareness you could?
 15 A. Yes, sir.
 16 Q. The second and final period of time I would like to
 17 focus upon: between midnight and 12.30, did it occupy
 18 any of your time?
 19 A. I'll have to look at my log. I can't recall whether it
 20 did or it didn't.
 21 Q. May we infer safely from that lack of recollection that
 22 if it did, it wasn't a substantial problem during that
 23 period?
 24 A. No. If I recall, it was more after that period where,
 25 as I say, Helen was still getting the staff out and at

178

1 that stage we weren't aware of the issue.
 2 Q. That's all I want to say about that. Let's move to your
 3 arrival at force HQ. About what time do you think you
 4 arrived in the Silver room?
 5 A. Midnight, sir.
 6 Q. When you arrived, who did you speak to?
 7 A. Upon arrival, there was lots of people in the control
 8 room, so it'd be remiss of me not to say I could have
 9 spoken to anybody. I suppose my first conversation
 10 would have been with the Night Silver.
 11 Q. Superintendent Nawaz?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. He has told us that the first he knew that he was being
 14 relieved of that role was when you spoke to him?
 15 A. Right.
 16 Q. Was that the impression you formed?
 17 A. I can't recall, sorry.
 18 Q. Having told him that you were taking over, was there any
 19 handover?
 20 A. Yes. If I recall, reading my notes, there was
 21 a handover in relation to situational awareness of the
 22 incident.
 23 Q. Did he hand over to you a tactical plan?
 24 A. There was some actions that Arif had undertaken, but if
 25 you're referring to a tactical plan per se, one that's

179

1 written down and that follows the national
 2 decision-making model, no, sir.
 3 Q. So nothing in writing by way of a tactical plan. What
 4 about an oral briefing framed as a tactical plan?
 5 A. If you look at information and intelligence, I was aware
 6 of that. If you look at resources, I was aware of
 7 commanders. So there was elements of the national
 8 decision-making model, if you will, within the briefing
 9 that the superintendent gave me.
 10 Q. As Superintendent Nawaz has candidly accepted, he was
 11 not experienced in dealing with an incident of this
 12 nature. You, I think, had rather more experience acting
 13 as a Silver commander; is that fair?
 14 A. Yes, sir.
 15 Q. And in addition to that, as the chairman has observed,
 16 you also had a national role providing training to such
 17 people wishing to undertake that role?
 18 A. Not training, sorry, I do apologise, assessing.
 19 Q. Sorry.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I may have said it was part of the
 21 training.
 22 MR DE LA POER: Is it acceptable or unacceptable that
 23 90 minutes after this explosion, you, when you took over
 24 as Silver commander, were not given a written tactical
 25 plan?

180

1 A. I think there's something in APP that states that there
 2 is an acceptance within the police service that there
 3 will not always be a written plan utilising the national
 4 decision-making model and eventually I updated and wrote
 5 a tactical plan, sir.
 6 Q. APP recognises that there won't always be. My question
 7 is: knowing what you know about this incident, knowing
 8 what pressures there were, and bearing in mind that
 9 we are at 90 minutes, is that acceptable or
 10 unacceptable?
 11 A. I don't think the word acceptable or unacceptable --
 12 I don't think that's the right terminology. I obviously
 13 wasn't there for that first hour and a half. And
 14 whether my colleague had the time to sit down and write
 15 a tactical plan, I would suggest he probably didn't have
 16 that time. So I can't say -- if you ask me -- if it was
 17 a football and I turned up and took over and there
 18 wasn't a tactical plan in place after an hour and
 19 a half, I would suggest that was unacceptable. But
 20 because this was an unprecedented incident that had
 21 never happened before, certainly in Greater Manchester,
 22 in Greater Manchester Police, I can't say whether that
 23 was unacceptable or not, if you follow.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I do follow. I'm not quite sure
 25 of the distinction between something you are used to

181

1 doing, like a football match, means that you can do
 2 a tactical plan but something you're not used to, you
 3 can't have one, where you might need it rather more.
 4 A. I suppose a football match is a wrong analogy.
 5 A dynamic demonstration. There's a demonstration which
 6 we have in the city centre all the time, a particular
 7 organisation will just turn up in the city centre, and
 8 if I had turned up to the Silver control and after
 9 an hour and a half there was not a tactical plan in
 10 place, I would find that unacceptable.
 11 MR DE LA POER: I think where we have landed is there are
 12 circumstances in your mind where it would clearly be
 13 unacceptable?
 14 A. Yes, sir.
 15 Q. But not having walked in Mr Nawaz's shoes, you don't
 16 feel able to say whether it was or wasn't acceptable
 17 that, at the point you took over, there wasn't a written
 18 tactical plan?
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: From a commander's point of view, what
 21 is the actual advantage of having a written tactical
 22 plan?
 23 A. It's a really good point, sir. The majority of
 24 experienced commanders, and we're really fortunate, you
 25 have already heard from Inspector Smith, Inspector Smith

182

1 is one of our experienced commanders and would enact, if
 2 you will, the tactical plan without even thinking, you
 3 know, he's putting into place things. As an experienced
 4 Silver commander, you know, I've put things into place
 5 in relation to the major incident plan. So having
 6 a tactical plan gives you, as it says on the tin, a plan
 7 to follow, but you'll probably find that later on you've
 8 done the majority of those things anyway.
 9 The other thing as well is, it is there to share
 10 with partners as well. So if you have a tactical plan,
 11 you talk about the JESIP principles, it's sharing that
 12 plan with your colleagues in other services so everybody
 13 knows: this is my strategy, this is where we want to be
 14 and this is how we're going to do it. But unfortunately
 15 in that first hour and a half, if my colleague hasn't
 16 had time to do that, but has done other things, but it
 17 wasn't called a tactical plan, he may have had
 18 a different way of putting that together.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Perhaps wrongly I see a distinction
 20 between Inspector Smith there on the ground really
 21 dealing with things as they come up --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- from the Silver commander at Silver
 24 command, plenty to do --
 25 A. Yes.

183

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- but actually probably in a better
 2 position to have a tactical plan which he can write
 3 down.
 4 A. The Silver commander?
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.
 6 A. Yes. That's why we have a Silver commander, who has
 7 that time to audit things and to pull a plan together.
 8 If you look at a pre-planned operation, which you've
 9 heard of lots, hundreds and hundreds within the
 10 Greater Manchester area, there is that time, if
 11 you will, to do a pre-planned plan, liaise with
 12 partners, and have as many Silver command briefings, if
 13 you will, before. Your Bronze commanders will then put
 14 an operation plan into your tactical pan, which
 15 obviously then feeds into the overall strategic plan.
 16 MR DE LA POER: If we look at one aspect of JESIP which
 17 you have just mentioned, JESIP and indeed the GMP major
 18 incident plan, and indeed the joint operating principles
 19 all envisage the possibility at least of a forward
 20 command point.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. So in terms of the strategic plan, the Gold commander
 23 might say the strategy is to save life?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. When it comes to how that's going to happen, is it

184

1 at the tactical level that the practicalities of needing
 2 to establish a forward command point so the commanders
 3 can co-locate; is that how it works?
 4 A. Yes, the strategy says, "This is what I want to happen",
 5 the tactical plan says, "This is how we're going to do
 6 it", and the operational plan says, "This is how we're
 7 going to implement".
 8 Q. So the establishment of a forward command point wouldn't
 9 appear as a matter of detail in the strategy because
 10 that deals with things at a high level?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. But would it appear in a tactical plan?
 13 A. I'm just trying to think of a day-to-day operational
 14 operation and you wouldn't put in there RVPs, FCPs.
 15 They'd probably appear as an appendix: if this is
 16 required, this is your evacuation plan, and this is
 17 where the FCPs are and the RVPs. The majority of
 18 locations have got a contingency plan in place so it
 19 wouldn't actually be within the body of my tactical
 20 plan.
 21 Q. Is the problem with that analysis that in a pre-planned
 22 operation, at the time of planning, nothing has gone
 23 wrong yet?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. So that is the contingency if something goes wrong?

185

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Here, something has gone wrong.
 3 A. Yes, and therefore you'd refer to the major incident
 4 plan, which does talk about an FCP.
 5 Q. So again, if we look at this spontaneous incident, would
 6 you expect a tactical commander to be identifying in
 7 their plan the importance of an FCP, for example?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you're doing that, do you then say to
 10 yourself: well, I know Inspector Smith actually is miles
 11 away dealing with what he can to deal with casualties,
 12 we need somebody else to be commanding the troops,
 13 unarmed troops, from the FCP? Is that part of the
 14 tactical plan too?
 15 A. Once you've got your situational awareness and I am
 16 aware that Mr Smith, unfortunately, is busy, as he was,
 17 you would want somebody at that FCP to get that common
 18 understanding with your partners, yes.
 19 MR DE LA POER: All of that would follow from making that
 20 tactical plan, would it?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm being really facile at the moment,
 23 but actually doing a strategic plan doesn't seem to me
 24 to be hugely difficult.
 25 A. From the Gold perspective, sir, yes, the Gold will just

186

1 set the priorities, if you will, the objectives. It's
 2 like I say, the tactical plan that's got the --
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the strategic plan is fairly
 4 straightforward; it's the tactical plan which may have
 5 more complications?
 6 A. Sir.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 8 MR DE LA POER: Having received that handover from
 9 Superintendent Nawaz, did you assume the role of Silver
 10 commander?
 11 A. Yes, sir.
 12 Q. And did you feel at the point you took it over that you
 13 had enough information to be able to discharge your
 14 responsibilities within that role?
 15 A. At the time, I thought I did. In hindsight, I think
 16 a longer handover would have been -- and more questions,
 17 has a major incident been declared, for instance, has
 18 a critical incident been declared or not, but I just
 19 wanted to sort of get on with things, if you will. So
 20 in hindsight I think a longer, but not too long,
 21 handover would have been better.
 22 Q. If matters had been documented prior to your arrival,
 23 whether by Mr Nawaz's hand or by a loggist or somebody
 24 who could act at his dictation, might that have made
 25 a handover more efficient?

187

1 A. Yes, sir.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is it the most efficient way to say,
 3 "Right, now I am taking over, you're finished, I am
 4 taking over"? Might it not be best to actually operate
 5 together for a while?
 6 A. Yes. I think that's what did happen, I think my
 7 colleague did stay within the room just to support me.
 8 MR DE LA POER: We're not going to, with no disrespect
 9 intended to the work you did after midnight, deal with
 10 your actions given the hour.
 11 I would like to ask you about 00.18, as that time is
 12 recorded elsewhere. Do you recall speaking shortly
 13 after midnight to a woman called Annemarie Rooney, who
 14 was the NAWAS Silver?
 15 A. I don't recall, sir, no.
 16 Q. I'll see if I can prompt your memory. I'm not doubting
 17 your previous answer, just seeing if I can give you some
 18 help.
 19 If you had that conversation, what might have been
 20 included was the fact that you informed her that
 21 Operation Plato had been declared.
 22 A. Yes, sir.
 23 Q. That she might have questioned that and asked you about
 24 whether or not anything had changed so far as the active
 25 shooter. So that's the sort of thing that was under

188

1 discussion. Does that help your recollection at all?
 2 A. No. There was so much going on, people have said to me
 3 they spoke to me that night and I generally do not
 4 recall, so I'd have that take that as if that did take
 5 place.
 6 Q. Is telling people who needed to know within the Silver
 7 room that Operation Plato had been declared was that
 8 something you would have done without a second's thought
 9 if you thought they needed to know it?
 10 A. Definitely as part of that situational awareness, making
 11 sure the partners are fully aware of what's going on.
 12 Q. At that time of the evening, if you're having
 13 a conversation with somebody about Operation Plato, what
 14 would you have said was your understanding about whether
 15 there was or was not or whether there might be an active
 16 shooter at that stage of the evening?
 17 A. I can't recall, sir. I really can't recall.
 18 Q. Do you recall any time when you were the
 19 Silver commander where you thought there was an active
 20 shooter?
 21 A. My issue as the Silver commander was ongoing threats,
 22 not at the location but throughout Greater Manchester.
 23 Q. I think that we can see from your notes that there came
 24 a point, in fact around 00.20, when you became aware of
 25 a suspect package at a hospital; is that right?

189

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And a report of shots fired at another hospital,
 3 Oldham Hospital?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. While we're dealing with other potential threats, were
 6 you also made aware of a suspicious male?
 7 A. Yes, sir.
 8 Q. You've mentioned already the fact that you did make
 9 contact with the OCR. We can see from your call records
 10 that at 00.22 there was a telephone call to the FDO.
 11 The reference is 9540.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. That conversation includes discussion about NPAS. Help
 14 us with NPAS.
 15 A. Yes, the National Police Air Service.
 16 Q. The helicopter?
 17 A. Helicopter, sorry, yes.
 18 Q. Was this what you were referring to in terms of your
 19 check in with the OCR or did that come later? Was this
 20 a more functional conversation?
 21 A. I think, if you look at it there, I've discussed
 22 a particular FWIN and then about NPAS. Yes, I'm aware
 23 of the benefits that -- the streaming that the
 24 helicopter provides.
 25 Q. So that was very much tied up with your role as

190

1 Silver commander, was it --
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. -- as opposed to wearing your superintendent of the OCR
 4 hat?
 5 A. One of my other hats is NPAS liaison as well, so hence
 6 I knew that benefit of getting NPAS up as soon as
 7 possible.
 8 Q. Three more matters to deal with about that evening.
 9 Firstly, is it right that at 1 am you declared a major
 10 incident?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. I think you've already indicated that arising from your
 13 reflection, that might have been a topic that you had
 14 informed yourself about directly at the handover?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Help us how that came about. Did you suddenly realise
 17 that one hadn't been declared or did you think the point
 18 had been reached at 1 am when this met the criteria?
 19 Why did you declare it at 1 am?
 20 A. I think the criteria had been met a lot earlier, sir.
 21 I think I just literally thought, crikey, no one's
 22 declared a major incident yet, so I'm going to declare
 23 a major incident.
 24 Q. Given that you declared a major incident, just help us
 25 with the overlap, if that's the right word, between

191

1 Operation Plato, the planned response to a marauding
 2 terrorist firearms attack, and a major incident. Are
 3 they different things, are they related? Talk to us
 4 about that relationship, please.
 5 A. The major incident is -- it's not just a term or a word,
 6 it actually puts things into place, so there is --
 7 I think it's already been alluded to -- a 200-page
 8 document. What you have to take into consideration
 9 is that you don't have to read the full document, it's
 10 just your role specific -- so there are role-specific
 11 almost action cards, if you will, about what your
 12 role -- you should undertake but also a guide to what
 13 you -- should be activated and what the police and
 14 partners should be doing and pulling together.
 15 Q. That major incident plan indicates, and to some extent
 16 we're circling back to where we were near the start,
 17 that although it's not set in stone, the tactical
 18 commander should go to the scene.
 19 A. Yes, sir.
 20 Q. Having declared a major incident, we're now at 1 am,
 21 presumably that wasn't in your thinking as something you
 22 needed to do at that stage?
 23 A. No, I think I have heard of the term take a step back
 24 and at that time I think I was in the right place at the
 25 right time to take that step back. We have got --

192

1 I think -- I don't know if the BTP people had arrived at
 2 that stage, but the majority have arrived within the FCM
 3 so that was definitely the right place for me at that
 4 time.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You got another superintendent in to be
 6 Night Silver?
 7 A. Mr Evans has arrived, yes.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you ever think of getting another
 9 superintendent in to go and be the Silver at the scene?
 10 As I've said before, I'm not sure why it should be an
 11 either/or thing.
 12 A. On reflection, it is something that I would potentially
 13 do in the future, to get a superintendent down to the
 14 scene but at the time I didn't think to.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thanks.
 16 MR DE LA POER: So major incident declaration, not just
 17 words but it means something?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. It is a plan, is it not?
 20 A. Yes, and each of the blue light organisations have their
 21 own major incident declaration, if you will, so just
 22 because the police have done it doesn't mean other
 23 organisations can't and I believe they had already
 24 declared.
 25 Q. Just to review two final timings, is it right that at

193

1 2.45 am you held the first tactical coordinating group
 2 meeting?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. By then, you had been Silver commander for 2 hours and
 5 45 minutes?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Why was that meeting not held before that time?
 8 A. It's really hard to explain, but 2 hours and 45 minutes
 9 felt like, I don't know, almost like 2 minutes.
 10 Obviously dealing with other incidents, ongoing, I've
 11 already alluded to two hospitals, one that went into
 12 lockdown, continuous reports coming through via the
 13 force-wide information number, the FWIN, the log, so
 14 continuous updates in relation to suspicious males,
 15 individuals, vehicles, the NMAT that we've discussed, so
 16 there was lots going on and it was almost like it was
 17 the first time I could come up for breath. It really
 18 was as simple as that. I didn't even realise it was
 19 2 hours and 45 minutes, it felt like minutes to me.
 20 Q. Let's just understand what a tactical coordinating group
 21 meeting is. The way you ran that meeting, did it
 22 involve you calling for quiet in the room?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So it doesn't involve anyone convening, it just
 25 involving everybody pausing for a moment?

194

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Then what format does it take?
 3 A. I will make sure there's a staff officer taking notes to
 4 ensure we've got those updates and it's literally going
 5 round everybody in that room so -- it's not just
 6 pinpointing one organisation or partner, everybody in
 7 that room has got something to say, to ensure that they
 8 impart their information and intelligence, so we don't
 9 miss anything, so we have that common understanding,
 10 that shared situational awareness and that threat
 11 assessment.
 12 Q. Although it's 2 hours and 45 minutes after you have
 13 taken over as Silver commander, it's very much longer
 14 than that since the explosion occurred.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Again, although you can only speak for the time you were
 17 in charge, should that meeting have taken place before
 18 then, do you think?
 19 A. If you're alluding to from when I started at midnight,
 20 I would have liked to have got it in a lot earlier, yes,
 21 sir, indeed, yes.
 22 Q. To be frank about this, is there in fact a benefit to
 23 having a tactical coordinating group meeting?
 24 A. Yes. But just to roll back, I don't want you to think
 25 or anybody to think that I wasn't liaising with my blue

195

1 light colleagues. There was ongoing discussions, it
 2 just wasn't as a whole room, if you will, in that formal
 3 TCG response. So I was aware that I'd spoken to
 4 Annemarie Rooney from NWSA, I'm aware I had spoken to
 5 Mick Lawlor from the Fire Service, I'm aware I'd spoken
 6 to the colleague from AGMA and from TfGM. So I've had
 7 initial conversations, I've worked the room, if
 8 you will, but that first official TCG with the structure
 9 around it didn't take place until 2.45, but I don't want
 10 you to think that I had not already been liaising with
 11 partners and colleagues.
 12 Q. That really leads to this question: does it matter, in
 13 your view, that it didn't take place until over 4 hours
 14 post-explosion?
 15 A. If there was something that was urgent that needed to be
 16 brought to my or my colleagues' attention, who was
 17 running it before I took over, you would like to think
 18 the somebody would have raised something before then.
 19 And waiting, if you will, for a structured TCG isn't the
 20 right thing, if you will. So yes and no, if you will.
 21 If there's any learning out of this, if you've got
 22 something that you want to highlight and raise, you
 23 don't have to wait for a structured TCG. Yes, they are
 24 useful. Yes, they are of benefit. I certainly got the
 25 benefit out of it, as I know other colleagues have, and

196

1 I believe there's been some positive feedback from
2 colleagues and from other commanders that we did
3 undertake the TCG/round—the—room meetings.
4 Q. The final time that I want to deal with, with you, is at
5 6.30 am. Did you hand over the role of Silver commander
6 to Superintendent Davies?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Finally from me, Superintendent Hill, you have, I think,
9 had an opportunity to consider the policing expert
10 report insofar as it relates to you.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It may be we've covered this already, certainly
13 in relation to the first one, but I'm just going to put
14 them to you so you can provide us with your observations
15 or comments.
16 So far as the experts are concerned, they indicate
17 that the fact that you volunteered as Silver instead of
18 going to the OCB meant that you didn't go there to
19 provide further support.
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Is that what you understand to be the thrust of their
22 observation about you? What do you say about that?
23 A. I think we discussed it previously, sir, in that
24 I thought my skills were better placed to go — and as
25 directed by Gold.

197

1 Q. The second point is around the review of Plato. Before
2 we come to the question of review of Plato, when you
3 took over as Silver commander, did you ask what zones
4 were in place?
5 A. No, sir.
6 Q. Was that a relevant question for you to ask at that
7 point?
8 A. In hindsight, yes.
9 Q. Bearing in mind that you have told us that you knew
10 zones were mandatory, why is it you think that you
11 didn't ask what zones were in place?
12 A. I think just the magnitude and the fact that it was
13 busy — we've heard that lots of times, but it was
14 really busy — and there was a lot of information and
15 intelligence coming in, as I've already alluded to.
16 Q. Where the zones were, if they were anywhere, do you
17 agree might be important information for you because it
18 would tell you where you could safely deploy unarmed
19 assets?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Did you need to be told formally in terms of zones where
22 was safe and where wasn't or was that obvious from other
23 information you had?
24 A. I was aware of the temperature of the zones after
25 a conversation with Mark Dexter.

198

1 Q. And about when do you think that —
2 A. I think there was a call at around about 00.50.
3 Q. So just a little less than an hour after you took over?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So at that point, you had an indication from the
6 ground—assigned tactical firearms commander, as he was,
7 about zones?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. But before that, you didn't know?
10 A. No, sir.
11 Q. Turning then —
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm afraid I want to pursue that a bit
13 further. The main strategic object is the saving and
14 preservation of life. You knew Operation Plato had been
15 declared. You would know therefore that there were
16 zones. You would know therefore that there had at least
17 at some stage been a hot zone into which only armed
18 police could go and there would be no people going in
19 there to rescue the injured.
20 So why wasn't it absolutely your first priority when
21 you took over to find out was there a hot zone, were
22 there people still in there, casualties who couldn't be
23 got out, because the whole of your tactic would need to
24 be getting rid of the hot zone, getting it cleared as
25 soon as possible, and getting people in there to rescue

199

1 them?
2 A. I suppose in answer to that I've assumed that hot zone
3 is no longer, otherwise I'd have had that on handover,
4 so I have just assumed now that we are either at warm or
5 cold and I have not been able to have the time to liaise
6 with Mark Dexter in relation to that.
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But the person handing over to you
8 didn't even know what Plato was, let alone what the
9 zones were.
10 A. Unfortunately at that time I wasn't aware that
11 Superintendent Nawaz wasn't aware of Plato or the zones.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But he had told you that Plato had been
13 declared; yes?
14 A. I don't know if he had informed me of Plato but I was
15 certainly informed that Plato had been declared.
16 MR DE LA POER: You were informed, in fact, by Mr Randall.
17 A. Yes.
18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, so you knew that. If you're
19 not — can you really just assume that the zones are no
20 longer happening?
21 A. On reflection, sir, no.
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know I sound like I'm being very
23 critical —
24 A. No.
25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You have the strategy. Right at the top

200

1 of the strategy is the saving of life and in a way the
 2 most critical question is not being asked?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 MR DE LA POER: In your comment -- not a suggestion, I make
 5 absolutely clear, but in your comment -- an explanation
 6 for why you didn't ask that is because, on the night,
 7 what Operation Plato meant in practical terms wasn't
 8 at the forefront of your mind?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. Do you think that that is the explanation for it?
 11 A. Yes, sir.
 12 Q. So although you had been trained in what it was?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Although you were able, outside of this environment, to
 15 correctly identify what it meant and what the zones
 16 were --
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. -- in this situation that just wasn't at the forefront
 19 of your mind?
 20 A. No, sir.
 21 Q. Which leads us to the other observation that the
 22 policing experts have made about the review of the Plato
 23 decision. We must bear in mind, do you agree,
 24 superintendent, that you were not the tactical firearms
 25 commander that night?

201

1 A. No, sir.
 2 Q. But you took over as Silver?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Would it be a relevant and appropriate thing for
 5 a person becoming Silver commander in an armed incident
 6 to ask questions around decisions that were being made
 7 in that armed incident?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. Shouldn't go anywhere near it?
 10 A. No, sir.
 11 Q. So can't question the decision-making?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. But you can find out what the outcomes of that
 14 decision-making is; is that a fair reflection of the
 15 division?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. So when it comes to whether or not you should have
 18 prompted a review of the Plato decision, do you think
 19 that that was within what would be appropriate for you
 20 to do in that situation?
 21 A. On reflection it's something I could have asked but it
 22 wasn't, again, at the forefront of my mind. I am
 23 thinking: there's a TFC, there's a ground-assigned
 24 tactical firearms commander, there's an SFC, I am
 25 dealing with unarmed, and you've got the armed.

202

1 Q. So the last thing for us to touch on, which we can do
 2 very briefly indeed, is to turn away from the experts
 3 and just look at a document that has been produced after
 4 the attack.
 5 Mr Lopez, you're going to have to turn this through
 6 90 degrees, I expect, given the format that I've got it
 7 in.
 8 {INQ015742/2}. We are not going to talk through
 9 this in any detail. We're expecting to hear from
 10 Laura Lewis next week and it may be that she can help us
 11 with the content. Would you agree that she would be an
 12 appropriate person to ask about this?
 13 A. Very much so, yes.
 14 Q. Were you involved in this project which I think began on
 15 26 May?
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. You were involved?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 Q. What was the thinking behind it and who drove it?
 20 A. It was a conversation, a meeting with the Fire Service
 21 to ensure that we do have that ability, capability and
 22 capacity to ensure that when we have an incident going
 23 forward, then we have that mutual aid Talk Group.
 24 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Lopez.
 25 So was that being generated by you as superintendent

203

1 of the OCB or from somebody within your department or
 2 was it a consensus across the three services?
 3 A. It was from a meeting with the Fire Service and we came
 4 up with it at that time.
 5 MR DE LA POER: We will no doubt ask others about it in
 6 further detail. Thank you very much indeed,
 7 superintendent. Those are my questions.
 8 Sir, we've been going for 90 minutes. I wonder
 9 whether now would be convenient for the short break.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It would. How much questioning is there
 11 said to be?
 12 MR DE LA POER: From my notes, a little under an hour.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. 3.50, then, please, and we will
 14 obviously aim to finish.
 15 (3.42 pm)
 16 (A short break)
 17 (3.52 pm)
 18 MR DE LA POER: Sir, can I invite questions first please
 19 from Mr Wood on behalf of Chief Inspector Sexton and
 20 Superintendent Dexter.
 21 Questions from MR WOOD
 22 MR WOOD: Superintendent, I have two short topics to deal
 23 with, please. The first is some contact with the FDO,
 24 Inspector Sexton, as he was. The second is in relation
 25 to the topic you were just talking about at the end and

204

1 that is the conversation with now Superintendent Dexter
 2 about zones. All right?
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 4 Q. Dealing with the first of those please. Could you take
 5 up the audio schedule that you've got and go to
 6 line 5160. The timing is 23.12.36.
 7 This is the conversation that you were having with
 8 the force duty supervisor, Ian Randall. You've answered
 9 several questions about your volunteering to take up
 10 a position at Silver. I just want to deal with how it
 11 was actually left when you spoke to Ian Randall in this
 12 call. Can you see towards the bottom of that
 13 conversation, Ian Randall asks you a question:
 14 "So I don't know if you want to come in or
 15 whatever."
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. The response you gave is:
 19 "Dale's obviously up to it, I'll leave Dale alone
 20 and I'll phone ma'am and see if she wants me to turn
 21 out."
 22 And ma'am would be ACC Ford; is that right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So at that point, you haven't actually volunteered to do
 25 anything?

205

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. You've told the force duty supervisor you're going to
 3 call Gold commander, ACC Ford, and find out if she wants
 4 you to turn out; is that right?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. If you then go to, I think, over the page, line 5410,
 7 this is the telephone contact of 19 seconds between you
 8 and Debbie Ford. Having told Ian Randall that you would
 9 phone Debbie Ford, would it make sense, if in fact you
 10 did so and it was in that telephone conversation, she
 11 told you that she wanted you to go and be part of Silver
 12 control?
 13 A. Yes, sir.
 14 Q. And having said to Mr Randall that you'll leave Dale
 15 alone, is that part of the reason -- of course, you
 16 didn't actually get in position until midnight -- why
 17 the first contact you have with Dale Sexton, the FDO
 18 thereafter, is at about 20 minutes past midnight?
 19 Can we just look, please, at lines 9539 and 9540,
 20 which should be on page 2. Do you see that? Dale
 21 Sexton says:
 22 "Force duty officer, Inspector Sexton."
 23 And you say:
 24 "Quick one, mate. You got 2 seconds?"
 25 A. What number are those?

206

1 Q. 9540.
 2 A. Yes, sorry, yes.
 3 Q. The timing is 00.22.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. You're asking about FWIN 23.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Can you remember, was that the gunshots at
 8 Oldham Hospital?
 9 A. I would assume so, yes.
 10 Q. You're contacting him here at 00.22 for the first time
 11 in fact. As it happens, that is after he had handed
 12 over the TFC role to Superintendent Craig Thompson;
 13 is that right?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. That's all I want to ask you about contact with
 16 Mr Sexton.
 17 The second topic, please, is the discussion about
 18 zoning with Chief Inspector Dexter as he was.
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. You have been answering some questions just before the
 21 break about the importance of understanding the
 22 delineation of the zones. Remember that?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And how you can't just leave that alone because it's
 25 important people know what the zones are so that

207

1 casualties can be extracted. All right?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. You had the conversation with Chief Inspector Dexter,
 4 you are right, at 00.51. We'll come to that in
 5 a moment. Is it right that you became -- you took over,
 6 you got the handover at Silver command at midnight?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Before that time, had you had access to the FWIN?
 9 A. Before arriving in Silver?
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 A. No, sir.
 12 Q. Once you arrived in Silver, but before you had the
 13 handover, had you got access to the FWIN?
 14 A. Wouldn't have looked at the FWIN, no.
 15 Q. The reason I ask is because there is an entry on the
 16 FWIN, {INQ007214/31}, it doesn't need to come on the
 17 screen, at 00.47, which says:
 18 "All injured are now out of booking hall."
 19 All right? When you took over at midnight, did you
 20 understand at that time that, whatever the position may
 21 be with removing people who were still being triaged or
 22 on the station concourse, all of the injured people had
 23 been removed from the City Room?
 24 A. I was aware at some stage, but I can't confirm the time.
 25 Q. All right. In any event, you then did have

208

1 a conversation with Chief Inspector Dexter at 00.51.
 2 It is on the audio schedule, so I'm just going to ask us
 3 to look at it, please. It's line 10127. It's on the
 4 third page.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. This is a piece of audio transcript which has come from
 7 Chief Inspector Dexter's dictaphone. All right?
 8 A. Yes, sir.
 9 Q. And the result of that, I think, is that although we can
 10 see his side of the conversation, we can't see yours.
 11 All right?
 12 A. Yes, sir.
 13 Q. The conversation goes in this way he answers his
 14 telephone and says hello and then says:
 15 "I'm on the concourse."
 16 All right?
 17 The next thing he says is:
 18 "I've just been down there, mate. That is the
 19 unarmed Bronze's job, that, mate."
 20 Do you see that?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Is it your recollection that when he says, "I've just
 23 been", you had asked him to go to the forward command
 24 point?
 25 A. It does ring a bell, yes.

209

1 Q. Was this conversation something to do with getting an
 2 update about the process of the clearance of casualties
 3 from the concourse and the arena?
 4 A. Quite possibly, sir.
 5 Q. Because within that conversation, it continues,
 6 Mr Dexter says:
 7 "They need to be down there sorting the casualty
 8 stuff out, but in fairness, mate, I've just been down
 9 there and spoke to them. Yea, yeah, I have been
 10 speaking to them, all the time. Can't remember what his
 11 name is but we'll -- yeah, yeah, Mike Smith's down here
 12 as well. Yeah, yeah, yeah."
 13 Obviously this is his side of the conversation it
 14 doesn't include your words to him. Does it then
 15 continue:
 16 "Yeah, right, from an NWS point of view, mate, it's
 17 going okay. We've cleared the -- what was the hot zone.
 18 That's clear."
 19 He then goes on to give an update about where people
 20 with different categorisations -- I'm not going to read
 21 that into the record unless required. And that
 22 conversation continues. After that update he says:
 23 "I've just had a chat with NWS who are going to
 24 move them with the coaches, get them out of the warm, to
 25 get them out of the scene, basically, so yeah."

210

1 Is that right?
 2 A. Sir.
 3 Q. Then it says:
 4 "No, I probably just need an idea of resources, what
 5 I've got outside. All right, mate. Cheers, pal.
 6 Bye-bye."
 7 So when you told us that you'd had a conversation
 8 with the chief inspector about zones, is that in fact
 9 the conversation to which you were referring?
 10 A. Quite possibly.
 11 MR WOOD: Thank you very much. That's all I ask.
 12 MR DE LA POER: Next Mr Smith Queen's Counsel on behalf of
 13 North West Fire Control.
 14 Questions from MR SMITH
 15 MR SMITH: Superintendent, clearly you knew Station Manager
 16 Mick Lawlor; is that correct?
 17 A. Yes, sir.
 18 Q. And you'd probably known him for quite a long time, had
 19 you?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Do you recall a conversation with him at about 00.15,
 22 shortly after he had arrived in the room, in which you
 23 said to him:
 24 "Mick, are you aware that Operation Plato has been
 25 declared?"

211

1 A. Again, as alluded to before, I don't recall precise
 2 conversations but I'm open to the fact that that could
 3 have taken place.
 4 Q. So does it follow that bearing in mind what you said to
 5 Annemarie Rooney, that at that time, quarter past
 6 midnight, 18 minutes past midnight, you wanted to ensure
 7 that both North West Ambulance Service and the Fire and
 8 Rescue Service were aware that Operation Plato had been
 9 declared?
 10 A. Yes, sir.
 11 Q. Why did you say that to them? What was it about the
 12 history, as you understood it, after your arrival that
 13 caused you to want to pass that information to both of
 14 them?
 15 A. I don't recall, sir.
 16 Q. Did you have any concerns at that stage that they hadn't
 17 been informed so far?
 18 A. No, sir.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I think we're getting, Mr Smith,
 20 with the greatest respect, into double hypotheticals
 21 here. He said, "I don't know whether I said it or not
 22 but I could have done", and you then gave him a reason
 23 for doing it, which he says, "Well, it might have been,
 24 had I done it", and I'm not quite sure it's going to
 25 help me hugely going much further down more

212

1 hypotheticals.
 2 MR SMITH: If it's not going to help you, there's no purpose
 3 in me pursuing it.
 4 Can I just ask one further question, if I may?
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Of course.
 6 MR SMITH: Was there any discussion that you can recall with
 7 Station Manager Lawlor about where the Fire and Rescue
 8 Service appliances and crews were at the time I have
 9 just mentioned?
 10 A. I don't recall that conversation, sir, no.
 11 Q. Did you know?
 12 A. I know now, but at that time I can't say now whether
 13 I knew at that time I knew where the Fire Service had
 14 set their RVP point, no.
 15 Q. Or where they were?
 16 A. Sorry, can you repeat? I might have missed something
 17 then.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or where they were?
 19 A. No, I wasn't aware, sir, no.
 20 MR SMITH: Did you ask?
 21 A. I don't recall asking, no, sir.
 22 MR SMITH: Thank you very much, that's all I want to ask.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 24 MR DE LA POER: Next can I turn please to Ms Morris on
 25 behalf of the bereaved families.

213

1 Questions from MS MORRIS
 2 MS MORRIS: Thank you, Mr de la Poer.
 3 Superintendent, I only have one topic remaining to
 4 ask you some questions about, please, as Mr de la Poer
 5 has covered in detail the questions I had for you about
 6 22 May.
 7 I wanted to ask you some further questions, please,
 8 about your role as superintendent at the OCB. As you're
 9 already aware, the inquiry has heard evidence from
 10 Chief Inspector Booth and we're going to hear evidence
 11 from ACC Hankinson, so I just wanted to expand on a few
 12 documents, please, with you.
 13 The topic is in relation to the action cards that
 14 CI Booth prepared; okay?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Mr Lopez, please can we have on screen an email of
 17 26 April 2016, and that's {INQ032755/1}.
 18 Superintendent, in the bottom half of the email,
 19 we can see it's sent from Mr Booth on 26 April 2016.
 20 It's to a number of individuals, including yourself.
 21 Do you see your name there?
 22 A. Yes, ma'am.
 23 Q. Thank you. This is the email that attaches the
 24 presentation with the action cards for OCB staff. These
 25 are the action cards that Mr de la Poer was asking you

214

1 about with the specific roles and action points for
 2 individuals such as the FDO and radio operators in the
 3 event of an MTFA. Do you agree?
 4 A. Yes, ma'am.
 5 Q. Thank you. That email was sent to you and others and
 6 you were asked a direct question as to whether you knew
 7 that they'd been put into use, trained upon, and you
 8 candidly said you didn't think they were embedded as of
 9 22 May; is that right?
 10 A. Can you repeat that? I didn't think?
 11 Q. They'd been embedded or trained upon as of 22 May; is
 12 that right?
 13 A. Yes, ma'am, sorry.
 14 Q. In explanation for that, you said there was a number of
 15 individuals that could have actioned that, you were one,
 16 but there was also ACC Hankinson, I think you mentioned
 17 ACC Ellison as well. There were others that could have
 18 taken that forward; is that fair?
 19 A. Others, yes.
 20 Q. Thank you. Just to put that into the chronology,
 21 26 April, that email, there was then the
 22 Winchester Accord, and Chief Inspector Booth told the
 23 inquiry that he tweaked those action cards taking on
 24 board the feedback from Winchester Accord. You weren't
 25 aware of that feedback, you have said to the inquiry

215

1 today. Chief Inspector Booth was and he amended those
 2 cards accordingly, is his evidence.
 3 Mr de la Poer asked you about the HMIC inspection.
 4 That was November 2016. Okay? Your evidence today was
 5 that you weren't aware of the inspection, you weren't
 6 aware of the feedback; is that right?
 7 A. I didn't think I was, ma'am, no.
 8 Q. Can you help with clarifying this, though? As of
 9 November 2016, is it your understanding that those
 10 action cards were being used in the OCB?
 11 A. At the time I wasn't aware. In hindsight now, looking
 12 at the emails from Mr Booth, I would have anticipated
 13 that the staff would have been aware of them, of the
 14 action cards, and they would have been uploaded to
 15 Sherlock as mentioned.
 16 Q. I'm going to ask you a little bit about Sherlock.
 17 Is that a screen that, for example, the FDO and others
 18 will have in front of them?
 19 A. It's just, I think as Mr Booth explained, that it's at
 20 a location where we can put documents that are easily
 21 accessed for all our staff, whether that's a call
 22 handler, radio operator or through to the FDO.
 23 Q. Understood. Does it include drop-down menus?
 24 A. I couldn't be 100% sure on that. I just know the
 25 documents are on there.

216

1 Q. The reason I ask the questions in this way is because
 2 when we hear from ACC Hankinson, and her interaction
 3 with Mr Buchan of the HMIC Inspectorate, I want to
 4 understand whether it's right that as of November 2016
 5 there was guidance by the way of drop-down menus and
 6 action cards in the control room with specific actions
 7 in relation to Op Plato. Can you help with your
 8 understanding of that, please?
 9 A. I can't provide specific dates, I can only go off what
 10 Mr Booth has already provided in evidence, ma'am.
 11 Q. Okay. All right. I'll leave that there.
 12 Moving forward then in time to 23 December, I'm just
 13 going to ask for another email to be put on screen,
 14 please. It is {INQ032745/2} of this document I would
 15 like to look at because it comes first chronologically.
 16 At the bottom of page 1 we can see it is from
 17 Mr Booth, 23 December 2016, and the circulation list.
 18 Can you help with this? There's a number of groups of
 19 individuals there, including OCB Force C&C supervisors,
 20 OCB Managers, OCR Duty Inspectors.
 21 Would they include, for example, Inspector Sexton,
 22 Mr Randall, yourself?
 23 A. Yes, that's the OCR duty inspectors.
 24 Q. Thank you. Then in the text on page 2 itself, towards
 25 the bottom, we have the blue hyperlinks there which

217

1 Mr Booth told us contained the action cards via that
 2 draft OCB guidance. So we see here, do we, that the OCB
 3 staff are being provided with an update following
 4 events, terrorist attacks in Germany and in Malta, with
 5 some advice and guidance for staff around terrorist
 6 incidents within GMP? And then they are specifically
 7 told towards the bottom there:
 8 "Whilst we finalise our in-house OCB advice, please
 9 see the links below which provide guidance for roles
 10 within the OCB once the FDO has declared a terrorist
 11 incident."
 12 That last paragraph before it goes into the bold.
 13 Yes?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. "In support of this there is also a glossary of terms
 16 stored on Sherlock..."
 17 Which is the accessible screen you have just told us
 18 about:
 19 "... which staff need to make reference to when
 20 dealing with the outside agencies..."
 21 So that was available to all OCB staff as of the end
 22 of 2016; is that right?
 23 A. Again, I can't confirm the dates but I know that that
 24 was accessible to the OCB staff, yes.
 25 Q. The email has been sent on that date. There's a link

218

1 within it that allows those members of staff access to
 2 those action cards, can we agree, there?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Thank you.
 5 That was in fact forwarded to you again, I think,
 6 going back to page 1 {INQ032745/1} of that document
 7 please, Mr Lopez. The two emails I have taken you to
 8 until now have been sent to a number of individuals.
 9 Here, 24 March 2017, we see emails sent specifically to
 10 you, don't we?
 11 A. Yes, ma'am.
 12 Q. So from Mr Booth to you, importance marked as "high: "
 13 "Sir, can I suggest you pen an HOTP..."
 14 Hot of the press?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. "... for this to go out today [that's 24 March] to
 17 reaffirm our basic advice to staff re MTFFA attacks?"
 18 And he offers to sit down with you today to thrash
 19 something out. Chief Inspector Booth's evidence was
 20 that his expectation, having sent that email, was that
 21 you would send it as a hot off the press update or
 22 reinforcement to members of staff. Did that happen?
 23 A. I can't confirm if I sent it that day, no, ma'am.
 24 Q. Did you send it at all?
 25 A. I remember -- there's another email, I believe, which

219

1 Mr Booth had sent me with the details of the context of
 2 the message that we needed to send out to staff.
 3 It would have been quite simple enough for me to send
 4 that to the PA of the OCB at the time to send out a hot
 5 of the press, so it would have been a really simple
 6 procedure, ie there was no need to write or pen -- as
 7 Mr Booth mentions, he has actually penned it for me, so
 8 I would like to think, even though I can't find it, that
 9 I did send that on to the PA of OCB who sent it out as
 10 an HOTP.
 11 Q. If that's correct, and if it did go out as an HOTP on
 12 24 March, members of the OCB would have had those action
 13 cards at least once and been reminded of again on
 14 24 March; is that fair?
 15 A. Yes, ma'am.
 16 Q. And the significance of 24 March, I suggest, is we know
 17 it's just under 2 months before the attack on 22 May
 18 that resulted in the tragic loss of 22 lives. It is
 19 also 2 days after the terrorist attack on Westminster
 20 Bridge that resulted in the loss of civilian life and a
 21 police officer's life, wasn't it?
 22 A. Yes, ma'am.
 23 Q. And that was also a Plato declaration, we now know. So
 24 there was some significance, wasn't there, to CI Booth
 25 asking for that hot off the press, asking for OCB staff

220

1 to be reminded of actions that they may have to perform
 2 if a Plato declaration was to happen in Manchester?
 3 A. Yes, ma'am.
 4 MS MORRIS: Thank you. Those are all my questions, sir.
 5 Thank you.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can you go to {INQ032745/2} for me,
 7 please? This is entirely incidental to what you've been
 8 asked. In the last paragraph of Mr Booth's email he
 9 refers in the second line to:
 10 "The FDO has declared a terrorist incident."
 11 Would you read that as being an Operation Plato?
 12 A. I believe so, sir, yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is there any other form of declaration
 14 that could be made because of a terrorist incident?
 15 A. I can't think of one, no.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm asking that because suggestions have
 17 been raised that some people may have been confused
 18 between what's an MTFA and a terrorist incident
 19 generally. I wonder whether it's the use of that sort
 20 of language which perhaps leads to that.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 23 A. Can I make reference as well -- I forgot to mention that
 24 on the same day there was an email from Mr Booth to the
 25 FDOs, providing the links again, and updating the FDOs

221

1 that the information provided was still valid. So that
 2 definitely went to the FDOs.
 3 MS MORRIS: That's helpful, thank you.
 4 Thank you, sir.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Ms Morris.
 6 MR DE LA POER: Finally, I think we have time left in the
 7 day to hear from Mr Horwell.
 8 Questions from MR HORWELL
 9 MR HORWELL: Mr Hill, the first page of the communications
 10 schedule, this is the section you've already been asked
 11 about, 5160. You're speaking to the FDS, Ian Randall,
 12 and Mr Randall is saying how busy it is and towards the
 13 bottom of that section you say:
 14 "Well, yeah, it's -- Dale's obviously up to it.
 15 I'll leave Dale alone."
 16 The words I want to ask you about are "Dale's
 17 obviously up to it". A very experienced and competent
 18 FDO?
 19 A. Not only a competent and experienced FDO, but
 20 a colleague who I have a lot of time for. I've worked
 21 with Mr Sexton in another district throughout my career,
 22 over at Rochdale, and he ran a PCU. Exemplary.
 23 Q. And you would expect him to do his duty?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure that's particularly the

222

1 issue. We've gone through this about him possibly being
 2 overloaded and that was something which was not really
 3 part of your awareness, was it?
 4 A. Not at the time.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Certainly, the conversation there
 6 doesn't look like saying, do you need any help, or, can
 7 you cope, or anything like that, you are just saying --
 8 there's no doubt this is right -- Mr Sexton is very
 9 competent and I know him to be very reliable --
 10 A. Yes, sir.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- but not really in the context of:
 12 actually, has he got the staff to deal with it?
 13 MR HORWELL: You mentioned almost at the beginning of your
 14 evidence being on duty on New Year's Eve 2018 and there
 15 was a stabbing.
 16 A. Yes, sir.
 17 Q. Believed possibly to be terrorist in nature?
 18 A. Potentially at the time, yes.
 19 Q. And the moment you discovered that emergency, you
 20 thought the best place for you was force headquarters?
 21 A. On that particular night, again, I was fortunate that
 22 Inspector Smith was sat with me in the city centre when
 23 we had the information, so we agreed I'd go to Silver,
 24 Silver was already open, and Mr Smith would go back to
 25 the scene, so yes.

223

1 Q. And you were obviously happy with that arrangement?
 2 A. Yes, sir.
 3 Q. Mr Smith being Bronze commander at the scene and you
 4 being Silver at force headquarters?
 5 A. Yes, sir.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry to interrupt again, Mr Horwell.
 7 Just from a general perspective, if I'm meant to be
 8 giving or trying to give a recommendation about this,
 9 what is your recommendation, that you don't say on each
 10 occasion the Silver commander should go to the scene or
 11 should go to Silver command and you leave it to the man
 12 on the night to make up his own mind depending on what
 13 the situation is like?
 14 A. There's an element of experience. Informational
 15 intelligence will always be different for every
 16 incident. So there has to be that -- guidelines are
 17 there, the process is there, but you always take in --
 18 what is the informational intelligence? There was
 19 actually a Night Silver on that night who actually made
 20 his way also to Victoria Train Station, so if I had the
 21 need for a Silver dedicated there, then I could have
 22 said, you're going to be my ground, if you will,
 23 tactical Silver, I'm going to open Silver. As it was,
 24 by the time Mr Smith got there, there was a really quick
 25 understanding that there was no other outstanding

224

1 offender and we quickly got on top of that incident.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So in a way you have leave it more to
 3 the individual's discretion than perhaps a major
 4 incident logbook does?
 5 A. I can say with some confidence in relation to my
 6 experience, it'd be difficult to write that into
 7 a report because you have to gain that experience, don't
 8 you, sir? Unfortunately, that's the only issue.
 9 MR HORWELL: In answer to the chairman's question, earlier
 10 in your evidence you said that the location of Silver
 11 has to be situationally dependent, so depending on what
 12 is happening at the scene?
 13 A. So Silver control or Silver commander, sorry?
 14 Q. The location of Silver --
 15 A. The person, Silver?
 16 Q. It depends on the situation, circumstances?
 17 A. Yes, indeed, yes.
 18 Q. Much has been said about the location of Silver, but in
 19 your opinion is it something into which there should be
 20 a degree of flexibility?
 21 A. The major incident plan is really clear, isn't it, and
 22 it says the tactical Silver commander should go to the
 23 scene. There are other forces that have
 24 a Silver commander within a Silver control room, but
 25 then also have a superintendent Bronze commander at the

225

1 scene, so there could be a hybrid model, whereas in
 2 Manchester GMP and others forces don't have that
 3 particular model. So it could be something that you
 4 look at within the command structure of a quite rigid
 5 Gold/Silver/Bronze, and rank orientated as well, is that
 6 Silvers are usually a superintendent, although we do
 7 have some chief inspectors, and I know other forces --
 8 one in particular has a superintendent as a Silver and
 9 a superintendent as a Bronze as well.
 10 Q. You were asked about the FCP and whether or not it
 11 should feature in the tactical plan. Under JOPs 3 there
 12 is no doubt at all that the individuals responsible for
 13 identifying a suitable FCP are the police on-scene
 14 commander in consultation with FRS and ambulance
 15 counterparts. As one might expect, it's something for
 16 those at the scene to determine.
 17 A. Yes, and again it depends what you're dealing with. If
 18 you're dealing with a Plato it will be one particular
 19 location, if you're dealing with a major incident then
 20 it's in another location. But it generally will be for
 21 those at the scene to decide where the FCP is most
 22 suitable to be placed, yes.
 23 Q. Bearing in mind what JOPs 3 says and bearing in mind the
 24 obvious common sense of what it says, I'm asking you the
 25 question: is it a matter for Silver and the tactical

226

1 plan or not?
 2 A. If you look at the major incident plan, an FCP is
 3 required --
 4 Q. We're looking at Plato.
 5 A. Yes. So in relation to Plato, it will be down to the
 6 commander on the ground to decide where the FCP is and
 7 it's on that -- in between the two zones, isn't it?
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I well understand that and it seems
 9 obviously sensible that the people on the ground do
 10 that.
 11 A. Yes.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What I'm wondering more about is: is it
 13 the responsibility of Silver to ensure that it has been
 14 done or --
 15 A. Yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- just, that's nothing to do with me,
 17 I won't even enquire?
 18 A. Yes. I think you mentioned it before, sir. There's an
 19 overlap, isn't there, here between there's a Plato
 20 declared and I've declared a major incident? At some
 21 stage we need an FCP, so is it an FCP under that plan or
 22 is it an FCP under that plan? Either way, there needs
 23 to be an FCP doesn't there?
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, but is it Silver's responsibility
 25 to try and ensure that that has been done or do you just

227

1 rely on the people on the ground to make sure they've
 2 done it?
 3 A. It depends which plan you're looking at, sir,
 4 unfortunately. In the major incident plan, it's the
 5 Silver. If it's the Plato, then it's something else.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's helpful?
 7 MR HORWELL: There's inevitably going to be a degree of
 8 conflict between the two plans or a different approach?
 9 A. A different approach, yes, because the location on both
 10 is prescribed differently.
 11 Q. And Plato being a firearms response to a firearms
 12 incident, should that take precedence?
 13 A. It depends at what time. So when I declared a major
 14 incident, it's -- we're no longer dealing, are we --
 15 because Mr Dexter's already declared it as a warm zone
 16 and that's when I knew it was that, so I would suggest
 17 at that time, if I was deciding it, it would be me as
 18 the Silver commander to prescribe where the FCP would
 19 be.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are you expected on the night to be
 21 sitting there saying which takes preference, Plato or a
 22 major incident?
 23 A. That's what was going through my head, sir. As long as
 24 there's an FCP, you know, I'm not going to argue with
 25 somebody over it.

228

1 MR HORWELL: The importance is to have one?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. You declared a major incident and you've said, as
 4 obviously follows, the declaration of a major incident
 5 sets into train the plan. Had much of that plan already
 6 been put into operation by the time you declared a major
 7 incident?
 8 A. Yes. When we distil the major incident plan -- off the
 9 top of my head, it's something like 16 points that need
 10 to be put into place. One, for instance, is the
 11 casualty bureau. Two is an FCP. I can't remember
 12 exactly how many, but there were some elements of the
 13 major incident plan that had been put into place
 14 already, sir, yes.
 15 Q. The TCG. Is one of the main objectives of a TCG to
 16 share situational awareness?
 17 A. Situational awareness and also the assessment of risk,
 18 yes, and the resources required or is there -- or any
 19 more resources required, sorry, yes.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So we all remember, TCG, tactical
 21 control group. I managed to think of what it was for
 22 myself.
 23 MR HORWELL: Coordinating, sir.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, I hadn't thought of it correctly.
 25 MR HORWELL: You've been asked about the time at which the

229

1 first TCG was held, 2.45. We have heard, and we're
 2 going to hear much more, about the decision to open up
 3 Silver and Gold control in one room. As this event
 4 progressed and the emergency service response was put
 5 into effect, commanders, Gold and Silver, were in that
 6 large room, meeting. So were those objectives being
 7 achieved, situational awareness, assessment of risk,
 8 resources? Were those objectives being discussed and
 9 achieved before 2.45?
 10 A. Officially, the first TCG took place at 2.45.
 11 Q. I'm asking you about the objectives, not the formality
 12 of a meeting, Mr Hill. Were those objectives being
 13 discussed and achieved?
 14 A. I'd like to think so, sir, yes.
 15 Q. And is that one of the purposes of having Gold and
 16 Silver together?
 17 A. Usually, your Gold would be remote, but in a situation
 18 like this I don't think anybody would suggest that they
 19 shouldn't have been in that room to get that situational
 20 awareness.
 21 Q. As early as possible?
 22 A. As early as possible.
 23 Q. You've been asked about your knowledge of zones, and it
 24 was limited. We know that the last casualty was
 25 evacuated from the City Room at 11.39, and you've been

230

1 asked about the entry on the FWIN that was a few minutes
 2 later, 11.47. Had there been any suggestion at any
 3 stage after your arrival at force headquarters that
 4 there was any impediment in the evacuation of
 5 casualties?
 6 A. No, sir.
 7 Q. If there had been any such suggestion, would you have
 8 done something about it?
 9 A. Yes, sir.
 10 MR HORWELL: That's all I ask. Thank you.
 11 A. Sir, can I just mention TCG? 2.45 was the first
 12 official TCG. I was reading the document and it talked
 13 about there is no dedicated -- it's not an agency that
 14 can chair a TCG, if you will, and I think sometimes
 15 within a control room, rightly so, sometimes other
 16 agencies are waiting for the police to chair that TCG
 17 all around the rooms. And I'm just wondering whether
 18 it's something that can be considered going forward that
 19 if clearly the Silver commander is busy and under
 20 pressure, et cetera, that actually one of the other
 21 organisations and agencies seek to chair that TCG to
 22 bring it forward, to get a better understanding, because
 23 clearly I was dealing with other stuff, but I wouldn't
 24 have minded -- it's not for me to say -- but it would
 25 have been probably more efficient and effective for one

231

1 of the other agencies potentially -- and that could have
 2 been TfGM, whoever, you know, I'm just mentioning one,
 3 but one of the organisations to potentially bring that
 4 forward. It's just something for consideration, sir.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. That seems a good idea.
 6 Thank you.
 7 MR DE LA POER: Sir, I don't have any more questions of the
 8 superintendent, unless you do, and that brings us to the
 9 conclusion of our work today.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 11 Mr Hill, thank you very much for coming and giving
 12 your evidence. You volunteered on this night and
 13 you find yourself now sitting in a witness box having to
 14 explain all your actions. I trust that it will not put
 15 you off volunteering in the future, so thank you for
 16 what you did.
 17 A. Thank you.
 18 MR DE LA POER: 9.30, sir?
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: 9.30. Thank you.
 20 (4.33 pm)
 21 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am
 22 on Tuesday, 18 May 2021)
 23
 24
 25

232

1 I N D E X

2

3 SUPERINTENDENT ARIF NAWAZ (sworn)1

4 Questions from MR DE LA POER1

5 Questions from MS MORRIS85

6 Questions from MR COOPER122

7 Further questions from MR DE LA POER127

8 Questions from MR HORWELL128

9

10 SUPERINTENDENT CHRISTOPHER HILL137

11 (sworn)

12 Questions from MR DE LA POER137

13 Questions from MR WOOD204

14 Questions from MR SMITH211

15 Questions from MS MORRIS214

16 Questions from MR HORWELL222

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

233

234

<p>A</p> <p>a3 (1) 42:8</p> <p>ability (2) 59:15 203:21</p> <p>able (20) 24:13 28:18 32:17,18 51:8 66:4 67:20 94:6 96:1,20 115:14 118:15 134:5,8 171:6 177:3 182:16 187:13 200:5 201:4</p> <p>abolished (1) 152:20</p> <p>above (6) 3:15 4:23 116:18,18 139:25 154:2</p> <p>absolute (1) 154:15</p> <p>absolutely (22) 9:2 15:9 21:20,21 22:15 27:3 41:15 44:21 47:23 48:18 67:10 71:6 75:23 78:20 122:13 123:4 132:23 135:9,23 160:25 199:20 201:5</p> <p>acc (38) 29:5 39:7 40:12,24 42:10 45:2 49:23 52:23,25 54:15 55:15 56:14 57:12 58:17 60:22 65:10 101:16 111:23 112:8 117:13 128:4,6,12 140:2 154:1,8 169:19 170:21 171:2,12 172:3,14 205:22 206:3 214:11 215:16,17 217:2</p> <p>accept (10) 48:3 67:10 92:9 94:13 106:24 108:6 109:11,16 110:17 112:3</p> <p>acceptable (5) 118:23 180:22 181:9,11 182:16</p> <p>acceptance (1) 181:2</p> <p>accepted (5) 93:2 110:21 113:13 156:18 180:10</p> <p>access (9) 24:5 29:10 34:14,18 53:7 158:11 208:8,13 219:1</p> <p>accessed (2) 130:24 216:21</p> <p>accessible (3) 18:25 218:17,24</p> <p>accompanied (1) 78:15</p> <p>accord (16) 13:12 128:6 145:24 146:17 147:22 148:23 149:8,17,20,23 150:15,21 224 155:6 215:22,24</p> <p>accordingly (1) 216:2</p> <p>account (3) 33:6 81:20 83:20</p> <p>accreditation (10) 85:16,18 86:18,20 97:2,7 100:7 140:7,17,20</p> <p>accredited (7) 2:17 3:24 5:1 96:10 140:4,12,23</p> <p>accs (1) 82:16</p> <p>achievable (1) 10:21</p> <p>achieve (3) 10:9 81:12 109:21</p> <p>achieved (7) 74:15 85:18,25 86:6 230:7,9,13</p> <p>achieves (1) 100:2</p> <p>across (6) 64:20 67:8 91:15 100:17 138:15 204:2</p> <p>acting (9) 1:14,19 41:9 64:22 97:16 144:9 145:9 166:7 180:12</p> <p>action (23) 8:25 41:2,6 117:6 120:23 149:24 150:6,12,13,18 151:9 192:11 214:13,24,25 215:1,23 216:10,14 217:6 218:1 219:2 220:12</p> <p>actioned (1) 215:15</p> <p>actions (25) 27:21 28:14 32:11 33:9 40:16 63:23 73:8 75:10 108:22 113:23 114:4,7,21 115:5 117:4,8 118:8,11 160:2 175:14 179:24 188:10 217:6 221:1 232:14</p> <p>activated (3) 128:3 176:10 192:13</p> <p>activation (1) 127:23</p> <p>active (6) 8:5 48:23 114:15</p>	<p>188:24 189:15,19</p> <p>activities (4) 12:8 25:5 28:14 113:22</p> <p>activity (9) 64:25 65:1 66:2 72:23 73:8 74:9 120:23 135:21 136:15</p> <p>actor (3) 49:8 56:21 68:11</p> <p>acts (2) 114:16 135:1</p> <p>actual (7) 16:17 30:7 89:25 100:10 141:18 142:11 182:21</p> <p>actually (48) 11:4 18:17 22:11 32:14 41:20 44:1 45:18 47:6,8,12,19 49:10,11 55:7 59:18 67:1 68:9 76:6,15,20 77:7 93:10 103:20 104:7 105:17 120:12,16 121:16,18 136:3 152:7 153:8 158:2 178:1 184:1 185:19 186:10,23 188:4 192:6 205:11,24 206:16 220:7 223:12 224:19,19 231:20</p> <p>add (3) 80:1 81:22 82:19</p> <p>adding (1) 79:19</p> <p>addition (1) 180:15</p> <p>additional (12) 66:18 71:23 87:6 90:25 92:22 93:13 94:10 99:13 102:10 103:23 117:2 118:17</p> <p>address (1) 83:21</p> <p>addressed (1) 80:10</p> <p>addressing (1) 91:1</p> <p>adds (1) 121:5</p> <p>adjourned (1) 232:21</p> <p>adjournment (1) 137:13</p> <p>advance (2) 28:7 41:13</p> <p>advantage (1) 182:21</p> <p>advice (3) 218:5,8 219:17</p> <p>advise (1) 9:14</p> <p>affect (1) 90:21</p> <p>affecting (1) 65:12</p> <p>afos (1) 163:11</p> <p>afraid (1) 199:12</p> <p>after (49) 2:6 4:7,9 9:13 24:16 35:16 36:8 40:23,23 51:10 54:8,18,25 58:21 59:17 60:22 61:21 62:11 69:16 77:5,6 79:2 86:6 95:9 116:4 133:24 136:25 139:1,11 151:9 154:9 170:19 177:14 178:24 180:23 181:18 182:8 188:9,13 195:12 198:24 199:3 203:3 207:11 210:22 211:22 212:12 220:19 231:3</p> <p>afternoon (1) 85:10</p> <p>again (53) 1:23 10:16 11:18 12:2 10:14 19:18 18:13 21:14,15 30:24 40:5 48:2,2 56:25 62:14 64:17 77:19,21 80:11 94:23 99:4 102:13,20 103:12 106:18 107:3 108:17 125:15 134:1 135:4 136:12 140:17 152:10 154:14 163:13,21 167:16 169:20 170:8,22 174:9 175:3 186:5 195:16 202:22 212:1 218:23 219:5 220:13 221:25 223:21 224:6 226:17</p> <p>against (3) 5:7 156:20 158:17</p> <p>agencies (18) 12:19 32:2,25 44:4 45:22 55:17 58:12 59:16 73:23 75:13 94:11 115:1,5,7 218:20 231:16,21 232:1</p> <p>agency (2) 69:5 231:13</p> <p>agenda (2) 146:9,10</p> <p>agma (1) 196:6</p> <p>agree (28) 8:20 9:18 15:1,22 29:2 33:20 34:14 60:23 102:25 106:5 109:5 112:1 116:6,12,14,25 117:24</p>	<p>123:19 125:2 135:24 152:8 153:6,21 198:17 201:23 203:11 215:3 219:2</p> <p>agreed (3) 97:24 136:4 223:23</p> <p>agrees (1) 105:25</p> <p>ahead (1) 145:3</p> <p>aid (4) 138:9 175:15 176:18 203:23</p> <p>aide (1) 156:2</p> <p>aide (1) 156:4</p> <p>aim (2) 114:5 204:14</p> <p>aimed (1) 111:24</p> <p>air (1) 190:15</p> <p>airport (1) 93:14</p> <p>airwave (1) 106:4</p> <p>airwaves (2) 105:4,21</p> <p>alert (3) 122:19 123:12 125:10</p> <p>alertness (1) 123:1</p> <p>aligned (2) 5:6 7:9</p> <p>alison (5) 158:24,25 159:1,8,24</p> <p>allegations (1) 88:18</p> <p>allow (1) 71:2</p> <p>allows (2) 103:22 219:1</p> <p>alluded (6) 146:14 151:18 192:7 194:11 198:15 212:1</p> <p>alluding (2) 142:3 195:19</p> <p>almost (7) 12:16 41:15 146:11 192:11 194:9,16 223:13</p> <p>alone (5) 200:8 205:19 206:15 207:24 222:15</p> <p>already (50) 14:13 27:23 29:22 36:2 37:17 41:1 43:5 44:25 45:3 48:20 50:12 52:1 53:20 55:5 69:11 79:17 80:1,3,10 81:23 83:17 85:14 97:24 110:12 111:16 113:13 114:11,20 115:17 135:3 141:13 143:13 172:4,6 182:25 190:8 191:12 192:7 193:23 194:11 196:10 197:12 198:15 214:9 217:10 222:10 223:24 228:15 229:5,14</p> <p>also (32) 5:19 6:19 10:7 21:20 24:2,4 29:22 30:1 49:23 54:6 58:2 65:22 81:15 87:20 100:9 121:7 134:1 136:2,2 150:15 154:8 160:20 180:16 190:6 192:12 215:16 218:15 220:19,23 224:20 225:25 229:17</p> <p>although (19) 5:25 12:10 14:12 31:4 32:8 68:19 127:2 140:18 160:13 169:11 170:9 173:20 192:17 195:12,16 201:12,14 209:9 226:6 224:15,17</p> <p>ambulance (7) 44:20 64:6 131:8,11 163:23 212:7 226:14</p> <p>ambulances (1) 44:24</p> <p>amended (1) 216:1</p> <p>among (3) 13:21 79:7 165:24</p> <p>amount (3) 13:9 32:23 63:6</p> <p>analogy (1) 182:4</p> <p>analysis (1) 185:21</p> <p>anemarie (6) 54:13 69:6 70:17 188:13 196:4 212:5</p> <p>annual (2) 83:24 100:12</p> <p>annum (1) 100:14</p> <p>another (24) 20:10 44:23 47:14 52:17 62:13,20 69:5 105:23 142:8 159:12 167:14 170:16,19 172:12 174:11,13 177:23 190:2 193:5,8 217:13 219:25</p>	<p>222:21 226:20</p> <p>answer (14) 14:20 16:2 46:19 91:7 93:16 124:20 126:11 155:5 164:14 176:12,14 188:17 200:2 225:9</p> <p>answered (4) 63:5 159:15 173:4 205:8</p> <p>answering (2) 176:16 207:20</p> <p>answers (4) 127:16 154:4,15 209:13</p> <p>anticipated (1) 216:12</p> <p>antifracking (1) 139:2</p> <p>anybody (6) 37:2 99:25 100:2 179:9 195:25 230:18</p> <p>anyone (6) 51:19 52:10 69:5 124:17 160:6 194:24</p> <p>anyones (1) 120:20</p> <p>anything (31) 17:20,24 18:1 30:18 40:12 51:19 57:12,16 58:4 67:16 75:4 80:1 81:18,22 82:18,21 100:16 125:23,25 147:19 152:7 157:11 159:21 160:6 161:15 164:10 170:1 188:24 195:9 205:25 223:7</p> <p>anyway (4) 52:1 121:19 125:14 183:8</p> <p>anywhere (8) 68:4 80:23 119:13 130:7 162:21,22 198:16 202:9</p> <p>apart (1) 66:25</p> <p>apologies (1) 140:15</p> <p>apologise (3) 70:11 162:13 180:18</p> <p>app (5) 22:21 23:13 83:23 181:1,6</p> <p>apparent (1) 35:3</p> <p>appear (9) 14:17 28:24 53:12 153:7 159:9 173:11 185:9,12,15</p> <p>appeared (2) 56:21 68:10</p> <p>appears (12) 8:18,20 28:17 35:1 52:23 81:9 153:6 158:20 160:10 169:11 173:20,25</p> <p>appendix (1) 185:15</p> <p>appliances (1) 213:8</p> <p>application (2) 122:1,5</p> <p>applied (1) 95:6</p> <p>apply (2) 89:8 163:16</p> <p>appointed (1) 132:10</p> <p>appreciate (2) 14:1 158:13</p> <p>appreciated (1) 129:13</p> <p>approach (3) 138:14 228:8,9</p> <p>appropriate (11) 8:9 11:25 13:18 38:15 40:6 66:7 109:17 174:15 202:4,19 203:12</p> <p>approximately (4) 19:7 28:16 54:18 65:17</p> <p>april (3) 214:17,19 215:21</p> <p>arbitration (1) 105:11</p> <p>area (10) 5:22 9:10 25:14 26:7 106:25 108:5 145:5 146:22 148:16 184:10 33:23 104:7,25</p> <p>arena (34) 27:17,24 29:18,23 30:2,6,21 31:1,2 33:20 51:7,9 61:15 68:4 76:11 116:7 122:23 123:3,10,12 124:3,11,13,18,23 125:22 126:3 127:2,4 136:4 144:23 167:16,18 210:3</p> <p>arent (3) 57:9 75:15 101:17</p> <p>argue (1) 228:24</p> <p>ariana (4) 27:16 122:24 126:21 127:2</p> <p>arif (4) 1:5 9:19 24:2 233:3</p> <p>arise (2) 88:4 122:6</p> <p>arising (5) 21:24 83:18 122:2 127:13 191:12</p> <p>armed (14) 66:22 93:8,13,20 94:8 99:2,3,10 144:23 163:11 199:17 202:5,7,25</p> <p>around (46) 3:10 6:15,19 19:8 22:14 25:13 38:8,10</p>	<p>43:24 44:16 51:12,13 52:19 53:2,3 54:5 60:23 61:20 62:16 65:5,22 72:8 73:21 77:17 87:20 88:15 90:15 92:19 94:25 98:11 100:16,18 107:23 108:3 122:22 140:12 149:11 153:20 162:15 189:24 196:9 198:1 199:2 202:6 218:5 231:17</p> <p>arrange (2) 85:2 87:5</p> <p>arranged (3) 24:2 34:1 153:2</p> <p>arrangement (2) 42:18 224:1</p> <p>arrangements (2) 13:5 37:3</p> <p>array (2) 101:25 153:5</p> <p>arrival (10) 51:17 53:23 55:11 56:1 172:11 179:3,7 187:22 212:12 231:3</p> <p>arrive (5) 55:17 56:3,12 77:17 167:11</p> <p>arrived (26) 50:18 51:1 52:16 53:6,7,25 54:4,6,8,16,18 55:3,8,16 72:2 107:25 170:24 171:21 178:8 179:4,6 193:1,2,7 208:12 211:22</p> <p>arriving (4) 53:2 108:18 177:11 208:9</p> <p>arvs (3) 38:7 56:22 72:24</p> <p>ascertain (1) 160:24</p> <p>ascertained (1) 130:22</p> <p>ashworth (2) 54:6,9</p> <p>asif (1) 103:6</p> <p>ask (61) 29:1 37:1,2,3 38:16,24 39:9 40:2,7,11 41:20 78:11,14,17 83:13 84:15,17 85:10 89:16 93:6 94:22 95:14 101:6 105:2,5,21,23,24 106:16 109:15 111:7 113:24 119:3,6,17,25 135:4 160:8 172:19 181:16 188:11 198:3,6,11 201:6 202:6 203:12 204:5 207:15 208:15 209:2 211:11 213:4,20,22 214:4,7 216:16 217:1,13 222:16 231:10</p> <p>asked (30) 38:18 40:9 41:11 45:11 60:18 61:11 69:17 80:5 82:20 91:7 117:13 120:4 121:10 131:13 134:1,4,24 164:14 188:23 201:2 202:21 209:23 215:6 216:3 221:8 222:10 226:10 229:25 230:23 231:1 124:17 125:14 126:12 91:6 104:14 117:4 121:6 133:16 145:14 161:12 162:4,23,24 174:9 207:5 213:21 214:25 220:25,25 221:16 226:24 230:11 156:2,6,8,14 158:3,7 184:16</p> <p>aspects (3) 10:18 109:14,17</p> <p>assessed (2) 20:1,1</p> <p>assessing (4) 63:11 113:10 165:2 180:18</p> <p>assessment (8) 49:9 68:9 69:20 70:15 93:3 195:11 229:17 230:7</p> <p>assessments (1) 49:3</p> <p>assessor (1) 141:4</p> <p>assets (6) 94:8,9 112:1 114:4 144:23 198:19</p> <p>assign (1) 32:4</p> <p>assigned (1) 138:9</p> <p>assimilating (2) 90:12,20</p> <p>assist (5) 38:25 90:10 104:9 124:5 133:1</p> <p>assistance (4) 75:1,5 164:9,13</p> <p>assistant (5) 9:15 60:17 79:3 111:5 153:3</p> <p>assisted (4) 46:4,25 90:13</p>	<p>127:13</p> <p>assistants (1) 89:16</p> <p>assume (3) 187:9 200:19 207:9</p> <p>assumed (2) 200:2,4</p> <p>assumption (2) 15:3 21:16</p> <p>attached (1) 106:12</p> <p>attaches (1) 214:23</p> <p>attack (26) 5:9,16 16:14,21 17:15 18:2,11 19:25 23:9 38:9 44:7 63:9 96:5 129:13 141:4 153:17 154:17 157:9,22 158:3 162:7,9 192:2 203:4 220:17,19</p> <p>attacker (1) 71:19</p> <p>attacks (4) 17:9,13 218:4 219:17</p> <p>attempt (1) 172:12</p> <p>attempted (1) 60:14</p> <p>attempting (1) 175:14</p> <p>attend (7) 91:24 100:9 111:3 126:17,20 171:15 177:10 147:15 154:2</p> <p>attendees (1) 27:17</p> <p>attending (7) 20:10 28:12 95:16 113:11 117:10 126:21 148:10</p> <p>attends (2) 8:6,14</p> <p>attention (6) 6:4,9 24:18,20 48:8 196:16</p> <p>audio (16) 28:17,19,23 37:5,8 42:7 49:18 50:6 52:20 60:6,9 158:11 159:3 205:5 209:6,6</p> <p>audit (3) 11:15,19 184:7</p> <p>austerity (2) 151:22 152:15</p> <p>authorisation (2) 128:4,5</p> <p>authorise (1) 127:18</p> <p>authorised (1) 173:6</p> <p>authorities (3) 2:18 27:12 87:21</p> <p>authority (2) 27:11 82:16</p> <p>automatic (1) 84:12</p> <p>available (7) 31:6 83:13 129:17 130:11,16,25 218:21</p> <p>avoid (1) 148:17</p> <p>awake (1) 24:25</p> <p>aware (87) 6:23 16:22 17:4 18:2 23:21 25:8 26:23 32:2,22 34:19 39:15 43:15 48:21 67:24 71:25 76:9 89:3 94:3 106:7,9 114:22 115:13,19 116:13 123:2 124:17 125:14 126:12 131:8,19,25 132:7 145:8 146:9 147:11,24 148:1,10 150:11,17 151:2,12 153:8,11,14,23 154:5,11,18,22 155:1,7 156:2,6,8,14 158:3,7 163:21 166:3 177:10 178:4 179:1 180:5,6 186:16 189:11,24 190:6,22 196:3,4,5 198:24 200:10,11 208:24 211:24 212:8 213:19 214:9 215:2,5 216:5,6,11,13</p> <p>awareness (26) 32:19 57:19 66:14,18 70:7 72:24 80:5 102:4,15 115:8,11,14 122:22 130:10 146:10 159:23 178:14 179:21 186:15 189:10 195:10 223:3 229:16,17 230:7,20 242:1 243:13 36:21 37:2</p> <p>away (12) 29:15 92:3 111:13 141:18 157:18 166:24 186:11 203:2</p>	<p>60:13 66:6 70:4 76:3 87:12 91:9,10 94:21 96:8 108:20 113:6 116:15 139:5 143:14 147:20 154:9 165:9 172:8 177:25 192:16,23,25 195:24 219:6 223:24</p> <p>backgrounds (1) 126:19</p> <p>badge (1) 164:16</p> <p>badged (1) 144:3</p> <p>balance (1) 46:25</p> <p>banner (1) 44:15</p> <p>base (1) 9:25</p> <p>based (9) 24:4 26:1,13 55:20 90:8 12</p>
--	---	--	---	--	--	---

132:12,22 147:15 153:15	bridge (1) 220:20	61:9 87:3 112:25 115:9	chairmans (2) 18:7 225:9	club (1) 142:6	127:18 128:10,11	218:23 219:23
156:7 160:14 164:21	brief (4) 39:3 77:14 120:14	119:24 120:5,6 134:22	chairs (2) 85:24 126:11	coaches (1) 210:24	132:2,8,21 138:23 139:19	confirmation (2) 57:8 131:21
193:23 197:1 219:25	175:2	140:8 151:24 189:23	chance (3) 15:2,16 35:5	cold (2) 98:6 200:5	140:4,5,12,18,21,23	confirmed (5) 1:17,22 2:6
221:12	briefed (3) 61:16 62:21,22	191:16 204:3	changed (11) 25:2 31:18	colleague (5) 181:14 183:15	141:7,17,20,24	29:24 139:12
believed (3) 129:14,16	briefing (9) 54:22 56:14	cancelled (1) 172:7	75:4 100:20 105:8	188:7 196:6 222:20	142:4,7,10,15,20	conflict (1) 228:8
223:17	57:3,13 64:11 73:22	candid (1) 94:23	133:14,23 134:3,3 167:8	colleagues (10) 88:2 125:9	143:4,7,12,17,18,22	confused (2) 96:22 221:17
bell (1) 209:25	115:10 180:4,8	candidly (3) 92:4 180:10	188:24	156:1 163:22 183:12	144:2,4,10,12,16,19	confusion (2) 43:17 57:23
bells (1) 136:24	briefings (1) 184:12	215:8	changes (2) 11:24 100:18	196:1,11,16,25 197:2	145:7,10,10,15	conjunction (1) 31:11
below (5) 106:11,15,20	briefly (6) 71:15 113:25	cant (62) 3:15 4:22,24 6:10	changing (2) 17:15 133:24	collected (1) 35:9	146:5,12,13,25 147:1,9	connected (3) 79:23 101:3
150:2 218:9	161:16 172:11 175:12	16:25 17:24 20:19 21:9	channel (3) 45:23 66:23	college (1) 23:18	165:15,18 168:1 171:16,19	140:25
ben (2) 54:6,9	203:2	25:1 31:15 32:13	105:4	colloquial (1) 100:1	173:7 174:17 175:2	connection (1) 60:16
beneath (2) 11:13 150:19	bring (12) 7:7 9:9 14:6,12	40:14,22,25 52:18 54:5	channels (2) 52:9 106:4	colocate (2) 44:5 185:3	177:11,12 180:13,24	conscious (2) 64:3 144:25
benefit (10) 46:10,22 47:17	28:18 30:22 84:8 92:25	56:16 57:14 61:8 62:15	characterisation (2) 8:18	colocation (2) 5:12 58:10	183:4,23 184:4,6,22 186:6	consciously (1) 74:21
75:2 143:16 150:19 191:6	96:6 127:14 231:22 232:3	64:2 80:19 91:3 95:13	74:11	colocation (2) 46:17 64:4	187:10 189:19,21 191:1	consensus (1) 204:2
195:22 196:24,25	bringing (1) 93:13	96:21 105:25 113:1 119:10	characterised (1) 157:5	column (3) 104:20,21,22	192:18 194:4 195:13 197:5	consider (13) 11:16 15:16
benefits (1) 190:23	brings (1) 232:8	120:3 124:20 133:13	charge (6) 143:7 144:20,23	come (58) 8:24 9:2 10:16	198:3 199:6 201:25	27:13 36:7 46:2 102:1,4,15
bereaved (2) 85:4 213:25	british (2) 27:25 29:19	136:12 155:5,8 162:25	149:4 203:21 195:17	13:19 15:11 17:9 18:5	202:5,24 206:3 224:3,10	103:5,10 127:23 168:9
best (16) 19:9 46:9,25 47:2,8	broad (1) 117:9	169:7,20,20 171:4 172:6	chat (1) 210:23	22:14 23:1 25:16 28:15	225:13,22,24,25 226:14	197:9
48:7 116:4 120:21 122:11	broader (1) 86:22	174:12,23 178:19 179:17	check (5) 19:9 75:25 76:3	32:8 33:4 36:19 38:3 39:5	227:6 228:18 231:19	consideration (3) 71:6 192:8
141:16 148:17 159:7 161:6	bronze (31) 2:12 4:24 11:25	181:16,22 182:3 189:17,17	105:15 190:19	45:8 48:1 49:25 55:23	commanders (25) 2:14	232:4
170:23 188:4 223:20	34:2 65:20 66:1,17	193:23 202:11 207:24	checked (4) 51:20 83:2	60:12 61:7 65:16 68:7	10:20,25 11:25 23:11 56:2	considerations (1) 17:8
better (11) 41:14 46:11	89:14,24 90:12,19,22 95:6	208:24 209:10 210:10	104:11 140:14	77:20 87:12 91:9,10 94:21	70:8 84:8 90:2 91:25	considered (10) 34:4 55:14
130:15 121:20 123:23	108:14 115:19 116:18	213:12 217:9 218:23	checking (3) 51:25 57:18	106:12 108:20 111:6	103:21 107:24 108:3,8	110:14,25 121:22 123:8
124:11 137:9 184:1 187:21	117:24 118:25 131:14	219:23 220:8 221:15	158:9	113:15 141:19 160:21	113:15 141:19 160:21	126:17,18 128:14 231:18
197:24 231:22	132:2 138:22 140:4 141:5	229:11	checklist (6) 12:17 31:21	121:3,10,15 134:20 138:22	180:7 182:20,24 183:1	considering (1) 103:6
between (42) 5:3 32:14	145:10,12 164:20,25	capabilities (5) 46:16 76:14	32:11 113:20,20,22	150:9 151:7 153:3 158:8	184:13 185:2 197:2 230:5	consist (1) 72:22
33:4,7 37:9 42:10 44:8	184:13 224:3 225:25 226:9	83:9 92:24 114:24	cheers (1) 211:5	165:9 174:11 176:10	commanding (2) 41:24	consistent (1) 64:4
49:20 52:22,25 53:13	bronzes (2) 132:17 209:19	capability (3) 45:21 80:6	chief (55) 1:24 2:11 4:23	183:21 190:19 194:17	186:12	constable (8) 1:12 7:16,17
58:15,16 64:13 71:16	brought (2) 171:11 196:16	203:21	7:16,17 9:15 23:25 59:10	198:2 205:14 208:4,16	commands (1) 10:3	9:15 30:23 31:5 111:5
72:20 94:13 99:9 100:23	btp (22) 3:21 30:1 35:19,20	capable (3) 74:1 78:7 174:16	60:17,18 79:7 101:13	209:6	comment (4) 141:8 155:4	153:4
114:25 115:7 116:12	36:2,10,14,15 55:10,12	capacity (7) 3:11 69:23	109:2 111:5 138:4	comes (4) 114:12 184:25	201:4,5	constables (1) 109:2
142:22 152:23 159:4	59:7,9 69:22,23 70:19	91:12 92:19 93:18,19	139:6,20,21,22,25 144:22	202:17 217:15	comments (3) 149:11 155:7	construct (1) 81:21
168:11 170:16,21,21	72:24 125:23 126:2 130:23	203:22	146:5,21 149:24 150:1,18	coming (24) 44:25 48:10	197:15	consult (7) 9:23 14:18 20:24
172:13 173:12 178:4,7,17	131:6 166:19 193:1	capture (1) 77:21	151:9 153:4,4,5,9 154:8	62:18 63:1,7,21 66:2 71:8	commissioned (1) 101:13	34:10 35:6,16 65:10
181:25 183:20 191:25	buchan (1) 217:3	172:4	157:15 161:18,19	76:6 78:10 93:12	common (6) 114:25 115:6	consultation (1) 226:14
206:7 221:18 227:7,19	buckle (6) 112:21 132:17	cards (20) 149:24	168:12,24 169:5,6	112:21,23 117:10 120:10	142:7 186:17 195:9 226:24	consulted (2) 15:25 34:4
228:8	161:19 168:25 169:1,5	car (4) 30:11 52:6 131:6	170:2,17 173:23 174:3	121:6 143:23 148:4 149:11	commonality (3) 5:10,15,23	contact (41) 52:22,24 53:24
beyond (4) 9:10 61:14 64:11	build (5) 26:21 32:19 44:6	150:6,12,14,18 151:10,23	175:5 204:19 207:18 208:3	156:15 158:8 194:12	comms (2) 54:23 56:13	56:1,4,6 60:14 66:1,4,7
166:7	59:15 98:8	152:11 192:11	209:17 211:8 214:10	198:15 232:11	communicate (2) 12:4 44:6	67:7 85:1 117:22 131:6,7
biggest (2) 124:12,14	building (2) 57:18 115:8	214:13,24,25 215:23	215:22 216:1 219:19 226:7	command (93) 4:11 5:11 8:9	communicated (1) 11:24	158:20 166:1 168:11
billing (1) 63:4	built (8) 22:16 45:1,19 48:20	216:2,10,14 217:6 218:1	chose (1) 169:5	11:10,15 13:17,20,23,24	communicating (1) 5:14	169:3,5,10,17,25 170:3,16
bit (17) 8:24 22:25 25:3	49:9 92:18 97:17 123:23	219:2 220:13	chosen (2) 23:24 167:17	14:15,18 25:24 38:8,10	communication (5) 64:5	172:16,20 173:12,25
28:23 30:5 38:14 43:18	bullet (2) 11:8 114:24	career (1) 222:21	christmas (1) 30:23	39:21 42:5 43:21 44:2,3	75:7,11 146:15 148:14	174:3,9,10,10,13,15,18
47:9 97:23 123:23	burden (2) 154:16 156:21	careful (1) 169:12	christopher (3) 137:15,18	45:20,21 47:3,12,24 50:21	communications (6) 72:13	190:9 204:23 206:7,17
133:15,23 141:23 146:12	burdens (1) 155:1	caribbean (1) 20:12	233:10	52:12 55:3 58:11,13	105:3 106:3 131:18 137:25	207:15
165:2 199:12 216:16	bureau (14) 61:23 62:3	carnival (1) 20:12	chronologically (1) 217:15	59:15 62:5 63:17 66:24	222:9	contacted (11) 9:12 50:9
bits (1) 23:3	82:14,15 127:16,24 128:2	carry (3) 7:21 84:4 109:9	chronology (2) 149:21	71:3,4 72:2,7 73:3 75:12	communities (1) 24:1	67:7 75:24,25 76:2,6 131:5
blanket (1) 125:19	172:23,25 173:3 176:6,8	carrying (2) 107:15 128:20	215:20	76:7 80:4,7,9 82:11	compared (2) 98:13 127:2	154:7 173:3 174:14
blue (3) 193:20 195:25	177:4 229:11	casualties (12) 13:9 44:13,17	ci (2) 214:14 220:24	88:8,16,23 92:19 94:14,16	competence (13) 85:25	contacting (4) 36:17 55:4
217:25	business (3) 166:2,5,14	64:16,20 114:13 116:8	circling (1) 192:16	100:11,14,19 101:18	86:3,7 96:9,12,19,23	176:24 207:10
board (1) 215:24	busy (7) 70:13 159:17 186:16	186:11 199:22 208:1 210:2	circulate (1) 81:21	109:18 110:5,6 111:15	97:5,21 98:9 100:13	contacts (2) 60:21 172:10
boasts (1) 124:13	198:13,14 222:12 231:19	231:5	circulation (1) 217:17	112:1,4,19 114:22 115:3	102:24 167:3	contain (1) 36:22
body (2) 141:13 185:19	butt (2) 84:23,25	casualty (17) 61:23 62:2	circumstance (1) 155:11	116:16,17,24 117:5 118:24	competency (1) 97:19	contained (2) 7:8 218:1
bold (1) 218:12	button (1) 178:10	71:21 82:14,15 127:16,23	circumstances (8) 43:16	120:13 125:16 130:4	competent (6) 97:13 132:4	contemplation (1) 14:7
bomb (1) 131:24	byebye (1) 211:6	128:2 172:23,24 173:3	47:19 78:20,23 98:18	132:6,12,22 139:24	174:16 222:17,19 223:9	contemporaneous (1) 83:1
bonfire (1) 20:8		176:6,8 177:4 210:7	163:20 182:12 225:16	141:1,18 143:14 153:16,20	complete (1) 2:5	content (8) 7:5 21:12 36:23
bookend (1) 33:3		229:11 230:24	city (21) 34:12,18 53:8,18,21	167:24 169:22 171:15	completely (4) 26:23 37:25	91:4 159:14,25 161:16
booking (1) 208:18		catastrophic (1) 123:19	62:17 67:13 72:18	183:24 184:12,20 185:2,8	92:7 98:18	203:11
booth (20) 149:24 150:1	cadre (1) 112:21	catch (1) 169:8	124:4,19 138:7 142:6	208:6 209:23 224:11 226:4	completeness (1) 103:3	contents (1) 15:16
151:9,12 157:14	call (68) 24:8 27:9 28:15,22	categorisations (1) 210:20	143:8,9,14 167:21 182:6,7	commander (228) 2:12,17,25	complex (2) 68:25 69:19	context (3) 93:5 220:1
214:10,14,19 215:22	29:4,16 32:15,15,16	cathedral (1) 131:6	208:23 223:22 230:25	3:13,25 4:6,10,16,25	complexion (1) 145:22	223:11
216:1,12,19 217:10,17	33:4,6,7 36:8,19 38:7,22	cause (2) 20:24 27:22	civilian (1) 220:20	5:1,4,7,17 10:3,7,9 11:6	compliance (1) 10:4	contingency (8) 30:7,20,25
218:1 219:12 220:1,7,24	39:5 40:2 42:7,9,12 45:2	caused (5) 43:17 57:23	clarification (5) 85:12 90:3	12:1,16 15:4 19:15,19	complications (1) 187:5	62:16 101:25 136:4
221:24	49:17,20,23,25 50:1,7	129:10 178:1 212:13	91:10 95:3 106:19	21:16,19 22:23 25:17 29:5	computer (3) 29:9,11	185:18,25
booths (3) 153:9 219:19	53:8,12,14 54:2 57:1 58:21	caveat (1) 69:1	clarify (3) 108:25 119:22	34:2 39:1,3 46:4,24 47:6	computerbased (1) 7:13	continually (1) 69:20
221:8	59:18 60:13 62:11 65:16	cc (1) 217:19	163:1	52:18 54:7,7,12 56:4,7,23	conceded (1) 69:11	continue (2) 42:10 210:15
border (1) 9:17	84:9 92:25 107:7 134:22	celebrate (1) 143:10	clarifying (1) 216:8	57:1,22,25 58:4,15,18,23	concepts (1) 164:4	continued (1) 72:16
borrow (1) 68:23	142:23 157:25 158:18	celebrations (1) 143:8	clarity (3) 154:15 162:14	59:1,1,7,13 60:25 62:4,6	concern (3) 93:10 154:18	continues (2) 210:5,22
both (16) 16:5,7 21:23 47:17	159:9,12,14,24	cell (5) 61:11,18 62:10 73:4	171:11	64:2		

135:24 141:22
 142:1.5,8,8,11,16,21 144:7
 153:16,20 179:7 182:8
 206:12 211:13 217:6
 225:13,24 229:21 230:3
 231:15
controlled (1) 120:24
controllers (1) 134:20
convenient (5) 30:24 39:6,12
 59:23 204:9
convening (1) 194:24
conversation (52) 28:8 35:10
 38:21 39:10 40:14 45:8,12
 46:14 47:22 48:22 50:14
 51:22 53:17 57:17
 58:14,17 64:12 65:22
 71:15,22 73:9 93:23 111:5
 117:2 120:4 159:4 161:17
 169:24 179:9 188:19
 189:13 190:13,20 198:25
 203:20 205:1,7,13 206:10
 208:3 209:1,10,13
 210:1,5,13,22 211:7,9,21
 213:10 223:5
conversations (7) 60:8 62:25
 64:17 66:15 88:1 196:7
 212:2
convey (2) 116:24 118:5
conveyed (1) 154:10
cooklynn (1) 132:17
cooper (9) 82:23
 122:7,8,13,15,16 126:6
 127:8 233:6
coordinate (2) 12:18 44:5
coordinated (1) 135:21
coordinates (1) 10:3
coordinating (7) 5:13 10:8
 12:7 194:1,20 195:23
 229:23
coordination (3) 12:20 22:17
 64:5
coordinator (2) 172:22,23
cope (1) 223:7
copy (2) 42:8 156:7
cordon (1) 145:9
corner (2) 31:20 164:19
correct (28) 4:18 8:17 16:5
 19:2 34:7 79:4 85:21 86:8
 88:10 89:4,9 95:1 101:19
 105:13,20 108:15 109:18
 110:2 111:1 112:5,10,16
 113:16 146:2 150:17
 163:23 211:16 220:11
corrected (1) 104:24
correctly (5) 24:22 149:21
 178:5 201:15 229:24
cost (1) 138:15
couldnt (8) 47:13 72:15 94:8
 121:10 148:25 152:19
 199:22 216:24
counsel (4) 84:19,23 122:3
 211:12
counterintuitive (1) 47:4
counterparts (1) 226:15
counterterrorism (1) 84:22
country (1) 100:17
counts (1) 152:7
couple (6) 31:16 119:6
 139:22 146:18 168:4
 177:22
course (21) 2:15,24 4:6,10
 5:17 6:3 14:8 39:23 66:20
 67:19 78:21 85:19,25
 90:16 100:9 124:4 141:1
 150:14 174:18 206:15
 213:5
courses (1) 141:5
cover (6) 21:5,5,10,10
 42:18,22
covered (5) 14:19 22:5 85:13
 197:12 214:5
covid (2) 133:14,24
covids (1) 133:23
craig (3) 170:4,14 207:12
create (5) 10:14 43:24 66:5
 152:2 158:14

created (9) 12:3 34:23 65:8
 81:2,3 149:24 150:6 151:9
 158:14
creates (1) 160:22
creating (2) 10:25 150:18
crews (1) 213:8
crikey (1) 191:21
crime (1) 27:10
criminals (1) 98:13
criteria (2) 191:18,20
critical (7) 8:11 44:21 102:2
 135:23 187:18 200:23
 201:2
criticism (3) 79:23 161:1
 162:15
crop (2) 8:3 12:14
cross (6) 9:17 48:15,16
 62:11 111:14 154:11
crossed (2) 48:18 62:13
crowd (1) 28:11
ct2 (2) 153:12,16
ctu (1) 50:11
current (2) 1:8 133:14
currently (1) 122:6
custody (3) 87:18,24 133:17
customer (1) 124:22
cut (2) 26:18 30:17
cv (1) 141:3

D

d (1) 233:1
d10 (4) 103:3,4,25 111:18
d4 (2) 101:23,24
d5 (1) 102:13
dale (5) 205:19 206:14,17,20
 222:15
dales (3) 205:19 222:14,16
danger (2) 48:14 49:11
 229:23
dangerous (1) 48:12
dare (1) 170:9
data (1) 60:7
database (2) 30:3 65:15
date (4) 15:21 31:4 101:12
 218:25
dated (3) 6:7 31:3 34:16
dates (3) 2:20 217:9 218:23
dauid (1) 159:5
davies (1) 197:6
day (11) 3:8 18:16 133:7
 147:6 149:2 158:6 165:21
 167:20 219:23 221:24
 222:7
daybook (3) 35:12 53:10
 77:14
days (1) 220:19
daytoday (3) 84:5 166:16
 185:13
de (83) 1:3,6,7 3:24 11:8
 18:5,23 20:3 23:20 25:15
 29:1,15 39:11 40:2 42:6
 43:1 49:16 52:15 54:12
 55:10 57:4 59:6,20 60:4
 68:3 78:15 80:23 81:8,21
 83:15 84:14,21 85:4,7
 87:13 91:7 95:15
 105:11,12 108:23
 109:1,13,20 110:8 114:20
 115:17 122:1 127:10,11
 137:3,11,16,17 155:10
 156:10 157:18 161:16
 165:8 168:23 180:22
 182:11 184:16 186:19
 187:8 188:8 193:16 200:16
 201:4 204:5,12,18 211:12
 213:24 214:2,4,25 216:3
 222:6 232:7,18 233:4,7,12
deal (30) 9:12 14:25 16:14
 21:14 39:20 49:25 71:15
 79:1,20,21 81:13 87:20
 89:12 97:25 98:10,23
 99:4,7 136:11 145:5 168:4
 175:12 177:23 186:11
 188:9 191:8 197:4 204:22
 205:10 223:12
dealing (32) 16:16,20 41:10
 64:19 71:9 82:24 89:2

93:15,21 98:12,19,22
 121:2 124:1 145:4
 177:15,17,19,20 180:11
 183:21 186:11 190:5
 194:10 202:25 205:4
 218:20 226:17,18,19
 228:14 231:23
deals (2) 122:18 185:10
dealt (7) 79:17 83:17 96:4,5
 108:23 135:3 177:22
debbie (11) 28:24 29:4,5
 39:7 40:2 41:10 44:8 47:20
 169:10 206:8,9
debrief (23) 43:8
 101:6,7,10,13,15 104:9
 107:1,20 108:10 110:20,21
 111:17,20,22 118:22
 147:15,16 148:4 149:19
 151:7,8 154:2
debriefs (1) 101:4
december (3) 143:7
 217:12,17
decide (7) 47:12 141:19
 167:7,23,25 226:21 227:6
decided (1) 129:7
deciding (1) 228:17
decision (18) 45:17,17,19
 46:9 62:5 64:3 68:13 72:14
 112:8,8,9 116:24 117:5
 118:24 129:17 201:23
 202:18 230:2
decisionmaking (14) 7:19,24
 64:1 65:6 70:14 77:15,23
d4 (2) 101:23,24
 109:7,8 180:2,8 181:4
 202:11,14
decisions (9) 11:14,19
 43:13,16 63:17,22 70:8
 108:22 202:6
decisively (1) 64:22
declaration (12) 37:24 44:9
 72:25 73:21 89:4 92:6
 193:16,21 220:23 221:2,13
 229:4
declare (3) 31:24 191:19,22
declared (28) 37:10,25
 161:23 164:8 167:5
 187:17,18 188:21 189:7
 191:9,17,22,24 192:20
 193:24 199:15 200:13,15
 211:25 212:9 218:10
 221:10 227:20,20
 228:13,15 229:3,6
dedicated (3) 45:23 224:21
 231:13
deemed (1) 28:2
definitely (4) 167:21 189:10
 193:3 222:2
definition (2) 13:2 44:11
degree (7) 49:1 57:23 65:8
 72:14 76:9 225:20 228:7
degrees (1) 203:6
delay (6) 27:22 55:11 68:1
 148:2,9 178:13
delineation (1) 207:22
delivered (3) 45:1 91:19
 108:14
delivery (1) 116:19
demand (3) 62:17 121:5
 151:22
demandd (1) 97:13
demanding (1) 72:16
demonstrated (1) 149:17
demonstrates (1) 80:12
demonstration (2) 182:5,5
depart (2) 51:5,16
department (11)
 138:15,18,18
 152:13,15,16,19 153:21
 165:24 168:22 204:1
departments (1) 6:17
dependent (2) 112:16 225:11
depending (3) 33:25 224:12
 225:11
depends (6) 125:19 143:5
 225:16 226:17 228:3,13
deploy (5) 92:17 112:19

167:23 171:6 198:18
deployed (8) 38:7 48:21
 53:20 56:22 94:14
 168:3,18 171:2
deploying (1) 48:25
deployment (4) 76:2 103:7
 104:2 111:18
deputy (1) 60:17
derailment (2) 3:10,18
describe (2) 88:6,15
described (15) 38:12 64:25
 68:16 70:3,13 71:19 79:2
 85:23 86:15,25 88:17
 113:9 118:21 131:23
 170:25
describes (2) 38:6 72:18
describing (1) 33:9
description (1) 163:16
designated (1) 34:1
designed (2) 23:17 71:2
desk (3) 29:13 121:6 154:11
desperate (1) 49:4
despite (1) 148:13
detail (15) 35:6,10
 76:12,13,23 79:1 85:13
 106:19 108:24 131:1
 134:24 185:9 203:9 204:6
 214:5
details (4) 43:15 82:25
 123:14 220:1
detective (1) 53:19
determine (2) 157:6 226:16
detonated (1) 49:8
detonation (2) 131:17,23
develop (1) 97:18
developed (5) 59:17
 73:18,19 97:15 98:6
developing (2) 10:8 99:25
development (3) 100:15
 103:21 151:20
develops (1) 97:22
device (4) 36:23 48:11 49:8
 68:11
devising (2) 11:3 38:4
dexter (22) 79:8 101:16
 111:23 132:18 144:22,22
 161:18,19 168:12,15
 196:3,6 170:2 172:13
 198:25 200:6 204:20 205:1
 207:18 208:3 209:1 210:6
dexters (3) 170:17 209:7
 228:15
di (5) 53:8,14,18,21,24
dictaphone (3) 77:1,11 209:7
dictation (1) 187:24
didnt (75) 10:16 14:5,11
 18:20 22:3 23:1 27:6,22
 34:24 35:5 37:22,23 38:5
 53:14 56:6,11 59:10 69:1
 70:18 74:3,4,5,7,22 76:3
 78:14 79:24 82:15 91:9,10
 92:6 93:11 110:13
 111:3,7,10 112:18 113:13
 115:21 116:3 117:3,5
 118:11,19 121:16 123:8,9
 124:20,22 126:7 145:16
 149:19 151:23 152:16
 155:3 158:14 166:17 169:5
 170:14 175:7 178:20
 181:15 193:14 194:18
 196:9,13 197:18 198:11
 199:9,23 201:6 206:16
 215:8,10 216:7
differ (1) 100:7
difference (3) 28:14 94:13
 100:23
different (35) 4:12 17:10,15
 18:2 26:23 27:2 29:11
 45:15 48:5 64:20 68:19
 76:5 86:15,18,22 87:4
 97:11 98:18 99:17 105:14
 126:1 127:1 133:17 143:6
 145:21 160:15 162:16,16
 165:5 183:18 192:3 210:20
 224:15 228:8,9
differently (1) 228:10

differing (1) 98:8
difficult (6) 41:23 49:3 63:13
 122:9 186:24 225:6
difficulties (2) 148:22 178:5
difficulty (1) 85:1
direct (4) 88:23 117:3 150:1
 215:6
directed (1) 197:25
direction (2) 6:13 121:20
directly (2) 174:10 191:14
disagree (2) 8:16 111:25
discarded (1) 177:16
discharge (2) 20:21 187:13
discovered (2) 160:1 223:19
discretion (1) 225:3
discuss (2) 27:10 33:15
discussed (1) 33:9
 80:12,13 88:7 119:7
 190:21 194:15 197:23
 230:8,13
discussing (2) 35:21 102:23
discussion (6) 36:4 44:8
 189:1 190:13 207:17 213:6
discussions (1) 196:1
disrespect (1) 188:8
disseminated (1) 151:14
disseminating (1) 148:3
dissimilar (2) 167:14,14
distil (1) 229:8
distilled (3) 81:8,10 158:17
distinct (1) 96:15
distinction (5) 98:12 99:9
 142:22 181:25 183:19
distorted (2) 100:24 146:6
distraction (1) 178:13
distressing (1) 36:24
district (1) 222:21
districts (1) 67:9
division (1) 202:15
document (32) 6:7,8
 7:1,7,14 14:2
 15:2,8,9,10,21,22,25 16:8
 21:4,9,12 31:9 32:9 34:4
 74:5 104:6 105:7 110:9
 127:20 135:1 192:8,9
 203:3 217:14 219:6 231:12
documented (9) 9:1
 11:14,19 73:11 74:2 77:22
 81:18 116:2 187:22
documents (4) 135:13
 214:12 216:20,25
doe (1) 152:23
does (35) 4:15 21:18,19
 22:11 24:7 27:1 36:22
 53:12 81:16 90:16,18 98:5
 100:7 112:7 120:12
 125:22,24 128:5 146:7
 150:21 152:22 154:3 155:4
 162:22 164:24 173:11
 186:4 189:13 195:2 196:12
 209:25 210:14 212:4
 216:23 225:4
doesn (15) 14:17 19:11
 22:18 34:12 134:18 136:24
 153:7 170:1 186:23 193:22
 194:24 208:16 210:14
 223:6 227:23
doing (21) 41:21,24 46:25
 58:8 60:8 70:3 77:2,8,8
 85:20 86:4 120:10 128:25
 135:7 159:7 173:9 182:1
 186:9,23 192:14 212:23
domain (2) 41:1 80:18
dominate (1) 176:25
dominated (2) 175:21 177:8
done (50) 19:24,25 22:20
 23:7 35:14 46:13 50:12,12
 51:20,25 52:6 53:6 55:2
 66:8,9 72:23 73:14 74:22
 75:2 77:22 78:20 82:12
 84:6 88:15 111:12,13,15
 116:14 118:13 121:8,22
 123:4 125:22 128:16
 134:17 136:22 155:16
 157:11 158:1 161:6
 183:8,16 189:8 193:22

212,22,24 227:14,25 228:2
 231:8
dont (97) 3:22 10:24 14:13
 16:15,18 17:20,24,25
 18:13,14,17 22:13 24:11
 25:4,25 29:8 32:7 34:19,25
 35:9,12 36:7 43:23 44:10
 50:19 52:12 57:2 59:21
 62:8,14 65:15 71:4,23
 74:13,23 75:4 77:19,21
 81:9,12,15 84:20
 92:2,2,11 95:13 102:22
 104:19 106:7,7 107:6
 108:7,9 112:22 120:19,24
 122:14 125:13 126:25
 127:5 129:19 135:19
 153:15 156:17 160:21
 164:18 167:9 168:16,23
 171:20 178:8,11 181:11,12
 182:15 188:15 192:9 193:1
 194:9 195:8,24 196:9,23
 200:14 205:14 212:1,15,21
 213:10,21 219:10 224:9
 225:7 226:2 230:18 232:7
double (1) 212:20
doubt (12) 5:3 8:13 15:21
 41:9 104:10 105:19 120:19
 145:19 171:25 204:5 223:8
 226:12
doubling (1) 188:16
down (24) 11:22 14:25 16:10
 28:22 32:8 41:19 77:12
 80:22 81:7,15 107:22
 162:22 165:5 180:1 181:14
 184:3 193:13 209:18
 210:7,8,11 212:25 219:18
 227:5
draft (1) 218:2
draw (4) 6:3 38:1,2 43:25
drawing (3) 42:1 96:3 105:14
drawn (2) 6:9 142:22
drive (1) 102:1
driven (1) 75:10
driving (1) 171:20
dropout (2) 216:23 217:5
drove (1) 203:19
duration (2) 24:8 42:6
during (10) 5:13,14 12:8
 63:17 65:4 122:25 149:6
 154:17 167:20 178:22
duties (5) 26:16,25 27:7
 96:18 133:2
dues (50) 4:12 7:21
 9:4,14,22 10:11 21:25
 24:9,10,13,15,25 25:5,11
 27:6 29:5,23 40:21 48:22
 51:22 56:19 61:13,13,16
 79:14 81:16 82:6 107:8
 109:10 122:25 123:15
 128:3,8,9,13 133:6 134:23
 157:25 158:1 160:10
 164:19,19 166:19 205:8
 206:2,22 217:20,23 222:23
 223:14
dynamic (1) 182:5

E

e (1) 233:1
earlier (19) 63:19 67:4
 70:8,25 71:2,7,9 83:22
 112:15 113:21 116:14
 122:17 145:22 158:9 171:9
 175:9 191:20 195:20 225:9
early (8) 21:19 39:19 66:22
 70:13 131:9 175:14
 230:21,22
earth (1) 75:22
easier (1) 77:9
easily (1) 216:20
effect (3) 40:13 57:4 230:5
effective (11) 11:10 97:20
 102:25 114:7,21 115:5
 116:11 117:4,6 118:7
 231:25
effectively (8) 8:7 29:9 42:22
 98:10 115:15 122:20 147:5

148:19
efficient (3) 187:25 188:2
 231:25
effort (1) 124:16
efforts (1) 160:18
eight (1) 44:23
either (8) 20:15 21:23 50:16
 84:20 169:21 174:14 200:4
 227:22
eitheror (2) 47:11 193:11
elearning (1) 91:3

essential (1) 7:25
 establish (4) 61:17 114:25
 115:6 185:2
 established (2) 73:2 115:18
 establishment (1) 185:8
 estimate (1) 52:19
 et (4) 151:22 158:9 166:14
 231:20
 etihad (6) 125:16
 126:13,14,20 127:1 128:24
 evacuated (1) 230:25
 evacuated (3) 30:7 185:16
 231:4
 evans (11) 173:21
 174:7,8,10,12,13,14,16
 175:6 193:7
 eve (3) 143:8,10 223:14
 even (13) 14:1 18:10 24:5
 41:2 43:16 143:13 164:9
 165:19 183:2 194:18 200:8
 220:8 227:17
 evening (8) 24:2 33:16 34:3
 78:15 170:11 189:12,16
 191:8
 event (22) 3:7 8:10 9:12
 10:12 12:12 15:4 16:14
 20:2 44:6 106:23 123:19
 134:13,17 141:18,21,22,25
 142:1,5 208:25 215:3
 230:3
 events (38) 5:2,13,14 8:7
 9:10 19:17,18,20,21,22
 20:1,8 22:8 23:5 25:5
 27:24 29:18 36:3 45:20
 51:14 85:21 95:17
 100:8,14 115:21 122:23
 123:5 126:3,8,17
 142:18,23 145:1 150:17
 157:5 160:15 175:1 218:4
 eventually (2) 131:21 181:4
 ever (10) 6:8 7:1 67:16
 69:12 91:11 95:9 112:20
 144:2 154:10 193:8
 every (5) 141:1 143:5 149:22
 169:12 224:15
 everybody (6) 135:22 155:3
 183:12 194:25 195:5,6
 everyone (3) 48:2 77:7
 122:10
 everything (4) 9:19 47:7
 79:18 111:12
 everywhere (1) 93:12
 evidence (38) 2:23 35:6
 45:25 46:2,3 48:23 59:6
 67:12 68:9,18,20 80:15
 86:11 101:24 104:13
 105:6,9,13 113:13 115:2
 116:22 118:4 122:3 137:6
 141:13 149:6 150:13
 155:22 169:9 214:9,10
 216:2,4 217:10 219:19
 223:14 225:10 232:12
 evolve (1) 45:10
 exact (8) 16:25 40:14,22
 61:8 62:14 119:11 120:4
 130:24
 exactly (4) 61:14 77:8
 107:16 229:12
 examine (1) 97:23
 examining (1) 118:7
 example (16) 5:10 6:17
 22:14 55:19 59:9 87:17
 88:12 115:3 125:16 133:18
 142:5 143:6 166:18 186:7
 216:17 217:21
 except (1) 77:5
 exception (1) 50:11
 excess (1) 27:17
 exchange (3) 37:9 68:25
 69:19
 exemplary (1) 222:22
 exercise (15) 3:9,18 16:17,18
 145:24,25 146:4,17 147:21
 148:22 149:16,23
 150:14,21,23
 exercising (4) 23:4,7,10

83:25
 existence (1) 122:20
 expand (2) 105:5 214:11
 expect (7) 38:4 58:25 70:24
 186:6 203:6 222:23 226:15
 expectation (6) 26:15 58:7
 70:5 74:17 171:22 219:20
 expectations (2) 88:7 95:11
 expected (8) 4:13 9:14 42:23
 43:22 100:5 109:14 133:17
 228:20
 expecting (2) 143:9 203:9
 expects (2) 9:11 70:13
 experience (42) 2:9 6:16
 19:6 23:6 38:3 39:21 42:1
 44:1 45:20 70:12 72:8,14
 80:4 85:20 86:4 87:14
 92:18 96:3 97:11,15,17
 98:5,7,22 99:3,25
 100:11,17 105:3 106:3
 107:4 134:8 141:8 144:9
 147:2 164:22,25 166:18
 180:12 224:14 225:6,7
 experienced (10) 6:20 72:9
 132:4 143:17 180:11
 182:24 183:1,3 222:17,19
 expert (2) 81:4 197:9
 expertise (1) 9:10
 experts (7) 79:21 81:19
 82:17 165:10 197:16
 201:22 203:2
 explain (5) 37:23 115:10
 121:18 194:8 232:14
 explained (7) 37:24 56:18,22
 57:7 72:23 80:4 216:19
 explaining (3) 67:25 69:8
 73:13
 explanation (6) 41:20 52:5
 151:24 201:5,10 215:14
 explore (2) 45:17 97:10
 explored (3) 109:20
 114:11,19
 explosion (6) 116:4 129:10
 158:10 160:2 180:23
 195:14
 exponentially (1) 61:6
 extension (2) 53:10 87:18
 extensions (1) 47:23
 extent (5) 5:22 79:16 83:16
 175:20 192:15
 extra (2) 176:22,22
 extracted (1) 208:1

F

face (6) 6:7 49:7 56:21 68:10
 90:1 169:11
 faced (1) 10:22
 facetoface (1) 57:3
 facile (1) 186:22
 facilitated (1) 121:7
 facing (1) 5:5
 factors (1) 68:15
 fail (1) 112:17
 failed (1) 169:2
 failing (2) 81:21 82:14
 failure (1) 129:11
 fair (22) 14:22 74:11
 86:4,13,16 87:1 90:22
 92:13 93:4 95:18 96:21
 99:4,24 100:25 103:24
 110:15 114:16 116:1
 120:13 202:14 215:18
 280:14
 fairly (1) 187:3
 fairness (2) 42:22 210:8
 fall (1) 152:23
 falling (1) 62:3
 familiar (7) 30:2 93:4
 125:16,20,21 143:20,25
 familiarised (8) 124:1,2
 125:5,6,11 126:12,23
 127:3
 familiarise (5) 21:11 95:10
 124:17,21,22
 familiarised (3) 7:4 8:16
 124:7

familiarity (1) 124:3
 families (4) 85:5,11 177:3
 213:25
 fantastic (1) 22:20
 far (12) 3:5 50:25 70:9,21
 124:16 126:11 153:8
 160:10 176:1 188:24
 197:16 212:17
 fashion (1) 176:1
 fast (1) 78:16
 faster (1) 26:19
 fasttrack (2) 24:3 30:13
 fault (1) 129:11
 fcm (2) 168:3 193:2
 fcp (17) 125:7 186:4,7,13,17
 226:10,13,21
 227:2,6,21,21,22,23
 228:18,24 229:11
 fcps (2) 185:14,17
 fdm (1) 77:1
 fdo (53) 32:16,16 33:5,8
 35:7,11,17 36:13,19 40:17
 41:4 49:7 57:25
 58:4,8,16,21 59:13,18
 66:15,21 93:8,24,25
 117:16 128:14 132:6
 135:20 148:19,22,25
 149:1,11,17 154:17,21
 155:1,7,11 156:21
 159:4,15 166:20 190:10
 204:23 206:17 215:2
 216:17,22 218:10 221:10
 222:18,19
 fdos (6) 38:9 156:3,6
 221:25,25 222:2
 fds (7) 32:15 35:22 36:5
 46:15 66:15 160:16 222:11
 fdss (1) 160:13
 feature (1) 226:11
 february (2) 92:1 139:8
 fed (1) 147:20
 feed (1) 43:9
 feedback (13) 107:7 112:12
 147:13,24 148:24,24
 149:2,7 154:12 197:1
 215:24,25 216:6
 feeding (1) 154:9
 feeds (1) 184:15
 feel (11) 8:17 47:4,9 74:22
 76:20 79:17 98:10
 149:10,14 182:16 187:12
 feeling (2) 38:11 149:19
 felt (8) 59:11 66:4 67:25
 68:13 74:19 135:8
 194:9,19
 few (13) 20:17 48:20 54:20
 87:9 92:3 94:22 108:25
 114:19 116:23 139:11
 163:25 214:11 231:1
 fewer (1) 19:12
 fields (1) 20:8
 fill (1) 61:6
 final (10) 15:12 35:23 49:17
 105:9,12 107:20 108:21
 178:16 193:25 197:4
 finalise (1) 218:8
 finally (10) 12:6 19:3 45:2
 79:16 82:14 141:3 154:14
 178:2 197:8 222:6
 find (13) 65:14 123:9
 156:12,25 160:18 170:10
 182:10 183:7 199:21
 202:13 206:3 220:8 232:13
 fine (2) 17:1 40:25
 fingertips (1) 22:22
 finish (3) 24:18 135:19
 204:14
 finished (2) 80:16 188:3
 fire (22) 14:16 55:19 56:6
 62:24 69:12 70:18 75:24
 76:10,19,19 84:18
 131:4,11 148:9 163:22
 196:5 203:20 204:3 211:13
 212:7 213:7,13
 firearm (6) 49:6,7 68:10 69:3
 129:16 162:20

firearms (40) 20:21 38:8
 39:21 44:14 48:24,25
 57:25 58:13 72:10
 88:20,21,22 92:20 93:18
 99:7 129:16 132:8,12,21
 140:21 143:18,20,21
 144:2,4,7,10,12,19,20
 153:17 154:17 162:12
 165:19 192:2 199:6 201:24
 202:24 228:11,11
 firearmstype (1) 39:19
 fired (1) 190:2
 fireworks (1) 143:10
 first (60) 12:17 23:20 29:18
 31:22,23 35:19,21,23
 39:20 48:3 53:4 66:3 69:4
 71:25 72:4 79:23
 85:12,17,18 89:3 101:21
 103:9 108:2 109:22 112:25
 115:25 117:16,22 128:8
 131:4,17 133:1 139:23
 142:3 148:8 154:25
 158:12,18 159:23 168:10
 177:9 179:9,13 181:13
 183:15 194:1,17 196:8
 197:13 199:20 204:18,23
 205:4 206:17 207:10
 217:15 222:9 230:1,10
 231:11
 firstly (3) 122:19 144:13
 191:9
 five (1) 35:24
 fleshing (1) 131:2
 flexibility (1) 225:20
 flooding (5) 23:1 32:23 33:1
 91:9,10
 focus (6) 44:18 103:22 140:9
 177:7 178:3,17
 focused (5) 15:9 27:5 91:18
 95:5 148:16
 focusing (3) 90:21 146:23
 163:13
 follow (10) 4:15 50:3 93:7
 154:4 177:14 181:23,24
 183:7 186:19 212:4
 followed (3) 21:22 149:6
 156:20
 following (4) 13:16 20:21
 172:3 218:3
 follows (2) 180:1 229:4
 football (5) 125:18 142:6
 181:17 182:1,4
 force (6) 5:11 8:6,12
 25:2,17 26:1 29:23 31:7
 40:21 43:9 44:3 45:3,21
 47:3,12 48:22
 51:1,17,19,22
 52:7,10,13,16 55:10 56:19
 58:11 67:8 71:4 72:2 73:3
 75:12 78:3 80:6,7 82:6,11
 107:24 108:4,7 110:5
 111:15 128:3,8,9,13
 132:18 142:21 143:14
 160:10 167:11,24,24
 169:22 171:6,15 174:11
 176:20 179:3 205:8
 206:2,22 217:19 223:20
 224:4 231:3
 forces (8) 100:17
 176:18,20,21,23 225:23
 226:2,7
 forcewide (3) 32:20 161:11
 194:13
 ford (35) 28:24 29:4,5 39:7
 40:2,12,24 41:10 42:10
 44:8 45:2 47:20 52:23,25
 54:15 55:15 56:14 57:12
 58:17 60:22 65:10 101:16
 111:6,23 117:13 169:19
 170:21 171:2,12 172:3,14
 205:22 206:3,8,9
 fords (3) 49:23 112:8 169:10
 forefront (16) 8:1 13:25
 14:4,9,22 23:2,11 69:12
 71:12,14 84:8 91:8 164:5
 201:8,18 202:22

forgive (1) 34:8
 forgot (1) 221:23
 form (8) 7:12 12:17 29:17
 74:25 80:22 148:7 165:17
 221:13
 formal (2) 73:7 196:2
 formality (1) 230:11
 formally (1) 198:21
 format (3) 23:4 195:2 203:6
 formed (3) 68:3 73:9 179:16
 former (1) 109:2
 formulated (2) 45:18 111:22
 formulating (1) 74:10
 fortunate (2) 182:24 223:21
 forward (20) 13:17,20,23,24
 14:15,18 32:6 49:16 71:3
 135:24 184:19 185:2,8
 203:23 209:23 215:18
 217:12 231:18,22 232:4
 forwarded (1) 219:5
 forward (3) 16:2 30:20 65:15
 four (11) 19:8,10 31:22
 33:23 39:4 40:16 42:12
 45:12 88:16 117:13 120:12
 fourth (3) 32:5 41:6 107:22
 foyer (1) 34:13
 framed (1) 180:4
 frank (1) 195:22
 frankly (1) 69:11
 frankness (1) 137:8
 frequent (2) 83:24 134:13
 frequently (1) 173:20
 friday (1) 164:17
 fringe (1) 124:25
 front (2) 91:16 216:18
 frontispiece (1) 7:11
 frs (1) 226:14
 frustrated (1) 30:4
 fulfilling (1) 12:20
 full (8) 1:7,9 2:7 109:7
 137:17 148:1 158:1 192:9
 fully (2) 149:10 189:11
 function (1) 46:16
 functional (1) 190:20
 functions (2) 133:3,9
 further (13) 37:23 68:20
 99:23 101:17 114:16
 127:10 197:19 199:13
 204:6 212:25 213:4 214:7
 233:7
 future (4) 43:10 70:24
 193:13 232:15
 fw (31) 29:10,12 33:14
 44:22 47:23 55:16 56:18
 67:5,16,23 75:23 93:25
 116:2 130:11,16,22,24,25
 131:3,25 136:12,13,20
 190:22 194:13 207:5
 208:8,13,14,16 231:1

G

gain (2) 57:19 225:7
 gained (2) 85:20 87:14
 gaining (2) 66:14 178:14
 gaps (1) 152:23
 gas (1) 129:11
 gathering (1) 83:5
 gave (8) 40:16 62:15 64:11
 91:7 116:22 180:9 205:18
 212:22
 gearing (1) 45:6
 general (3) 16:11 98:5 224:7
 generally (12) 3:12 25:13
 141:21,25 142:13,18 163:2
 164:21 176:19 189:3
 221:19 226:20
 generated (2) 147:13 203:25
 geraldton (2) 138:23 139:2
 germany (1) 218:4
 get (60) 9:3 22:16 23:10
 26:22 28:5 30:11,11 31:17
 33:11 41:3,4 42:3,6
 44:2,4,19 45:22 47:21
 49:18 51:8 53:21 60:10,18
 61:18 66:13 70:23 78:13
 87:4 91:15 102:11 115:12

121:10 123:5 137:9 148:25
 149:1,19 159:11 161:12
 164:8,12 167:8,13,16
 168:14 169:2 170:20
 172:11 176:22 177:3,6
 178:10 186:17 187:19
 193:13 206:16 210:24,25
 230:19 231:22
 getting (24) 6:18 32:15
 33:12 36:15 53:3 55:21
 67:9,15 73:20 75:15
 76:10,20 87:25 103:20
 135:9 167:21 178:25 191:6
 193:8 199:24,24,25 210:1
 212:19
 give (19) 20:5 36:20 41:19
 44:16 45:25 52:4 76:10
 79:21 82:18 117:5 120:23
 134:12,24 142:5 143:6,16
 188:17 210:19 224:8
 given (30) 7:13 25:22 26:11
 29:16 42:12 46:16 66:17
 62:15 74:8 81:3 90:19
 98:15 95:4 100:16,18
 111:4 112:18 118:21
 123:1,11 125:9 134:25
 141:14 156:10 172:5
 175:12 180:24 188:10
 191:24 203:6
 gives (2) 22:21 183:6
 giving (5) 46:2 137:6 165:24
 224:8 232:11
 gladly (1) 120:18
 glossary (1) 218:15
 gm (1) 64:20
 gmfrs (2) 75:14 130:23
 gmp (25) 4:1 20:24 21:24
 22:20 25:14 26:7 28:3
 31:11 61:21 87:5 94:24
 95:10,17 101:7 102:1
 103:5,10 111:16 113:15,24
 138:1 161:7 184:17 218:6
 226:2
 gmrs (2) 43:17 153:16
 goes (8) 5:12 32:7 97:22
 127:16 185:25 209:13
 210:19 218:12
 going (117) 7:7 8:3 13:11
 20:13 21:2,19 22:9
 28:16,18 29:1,23 30:12,22
 31:19 33:4 36:25 37:19
 39:5 41:8 47:8 49:5,16
 50:2,21 56:12 58:11 59:20
 60:4 63:22 55:16 56:18
 71:20,25 74:20 75:12 76:1
 77:7,21 79:1,20 82:17
 87:25 88:5 89:12 92:10
 93:20 94:3 96:8 98:6 101:6
 104:22 105:1 106:16
 110:18 111:8,8 113:10,24
 116:7,15 121:15,18
 123:2,9,14 128:16
 129:9,21,22 131:1 137:9
 144:7 157:18 158:4,5,6
 160:19 163:25 168:1
 170:12,22 183:14 184:25
 185:5,7 188:8 189:2,11
 191:22 194:16 195:4
 197:13,18 199:18
 203:5,8,22 204:8 206:2
 209:2 210:17,20,23
 212:24,25 213:2 214:10
 216:16 217:13 219:6
 224:22,23 228:7,23,24
 230:2 231:18
 gold (50) 9:15 10:9,20,25
 11:1,2,6 12:1 25:17 29:5
 39:1,3 42:22 46:17 52:18
 54:7 56:23 62:5,6 80:5
 103:21 127:18 140:9,23
 141:1,5 146:5,12,13,22,25
 147:1,4 148:2,3 159:1
 164:21,25 168:1 173:7
 174:9 184:22 186:25,25
 197:25 206:3
 230:3,5,15,17

goldsilver (2) 103:5,10
 goldsilverbronze (4) 11:16
 140:3 165:18 226:5
 gone (13) 46:12 51:4 64:16
 67:5 69:21 131:24 136:14
 151:11 159:12,22 185:22
 186:2 223:1
 good (5) 1:3 129:22 146:15
 182:23 232:5
 goodness (1) 120:11
 gordon (1) 122:2
 gosh (1) 164:7
 grande (4) 27:16 122:24
 126:21 127:2
 grant (1) 122:4
 grateful (3) 106:19 121:23
 137:6
 gravity (2) 20:15,23
 great (3) 20:10 108:24
 120:22
 greater (22) 1:10,11 6:13
 7:20 63:6 72:13 84:18
 102:5 109:9 126:7
 137:18,20 138:18 142:19
 158:14 164:23 176:8,15
 181:21,22 184:10 189:22
 greatest (1) 212:20
 gregory (1) 59:10
 grip (1) 135:9
 ground (6) 65:20 183:20
 224:22 227:6,9 228:1
 groundassigned (6) 132:19
 143:21 144:4,10 199:6
 202:23
 grounds (1) 128:24
 group (7) 27:10 32:4

134:14 147:11 200:20 225:12	high (4) 68:12 153:3 185:10 219:12	identified (16) 5:25 14:14,15 60:7,15 75:6,9 101:5	inaccurate (1) 82:9	informational (2) 224:14,18	inspectorate (1) 217:3	89:17,19 90:17 99:17	
happens (5) 24:16 121:19 134:17 152:25 207:11	highlight (3) 108:24 109:5 196:22	104:7,20,22 105:1 106:25 108:11 165:15 170:20	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	informed (7) 147:12 188:20 191:14 200:14,15,16	inspectors (7) 3:15 62:21 120:13 154:3 217:20,23 226:7	100:19 101:3 103:20 104:15 105:8,17 106:15,21,23 107:12,13 110:12 112:16 118:23 121:17 125:18 129:14,22 134:3 135:12 136:12 140:15 141:14 142:2 143:2 145:4 146:11,12 148:17 151:18 154:2 157:6 158:7,16 159:11,17 160:14 161:23	
happy (1) 224:1	highlighted (2) 109:6 157:13	identify (8) 13:20,23 32:6 34:12 101:9 152:10 176:7 201:15	inaudible (3) 28:23 100:24 146:6	initial (16) 8:25 9:13 22:1 29:15 36:8,12 38:10 47:5 49:9 57:24 64:11 67:6 82:10 93:11 114:4 196:7	instance (3) 142:6 187:17 229:10	162:14,15,17,19,21,22,25 168:7 170:9 175:19 176:21 182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4	
hard (3) 62:19 135:9 194:8	highlighting (1) 102:1	ill (16) 41:7 45:13 82:25 87:12 101:2 104:4,24	incident (138) 5:20 8:11 9:20,24 10:13 11:10 12:9,12 13:1,4,13 15:5 16:16 20:14,16,24 21:18,24 22:8,10 23:21 24:23 31:12,21,24 32:21,21 33:2,25 36:6 37:16,20 38:22 39:19 41:24 44:9,11 56:20 57:5 59:2 66:16 72:16 73:15 74:18 79:10 83:18 87:8 88:13,25 89:6 93:21 94:23,25 95:5,10,23 97:25 98:1,2,4,11,24 99:2,5,8,15 107:23 108:3 109:4 110:10 113:16,17,25 114:8 116:13,16 117:20 127:21 141:1 143:2,3,5,6,11,15,20 144:8,15 145:21 146:24 161:10,23 176:8,17 177:10 179:22 180:11 181:7,20 183:5 184:18 186:3,5 187:17,18 191:10,22,23,24 192:2,5,15,20 193:16,21 202:5,7 203:22 218:11 221:10,14,18 224:16 225:1,4,21 226:19 227:2,20 228:4,12,14,22 229:3,4,7,8,13	initially (5) 45:16 65:23 67:22 93:12,14 67:22 93:12,14	intend (1) 84:15	195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4	
harder (1) 30:5	highpressure (1) 18:25	ie (1) 220:6	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injure (7) 48:7 62:2 76:10 114:13 199:19 208:18,22	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4	
harm (2) 114:8 123:7	hill (16) 60:24 72:1,2 77:19 79:3 119:20,23 120:7 137:15,18 154:24 197:8 222:9 230:12 232:11 233:10	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inasmuch (1) 100:21	injuries (1) 71:20	intensity (1) 22:12	intensity (1) 22:12	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
harm (2) 114:8 123:7	himself (2) 61:10 157:4	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	inner (1) 145:9	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
harrison (1) 62:15	hindered (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
hasnt (3) 99:3 113:19 183:15	himselt (2) 61:10 157:4	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
hat (2) 147:6 191:4	hinders (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
hats (1) 191:5	hinders (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
havent (8) 80:10,13,14,17 83:16 149:22 162:11 205:24	hinders (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
having (47) 1:22 3:24 8:16 9:16 15:2 18:20 21:15 22:7,10 25:16 35:10 46:4,7 53:17 59:12 64:18 74:8 77:24 84:10 85:1 91:22 96:4,5 97:5 119:7 120:22 121:18 138:6 145:17 147:12 167:5 169:2,3 179:18 182:15,21 183:5 187:8 189:12 192:20 195:23 205:7 206:8,14 219:20 230:15 232:13	hinders (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 131:1 133:16 134:22 137:5,18 141:23 142:2,3,3,12 151:25 155:6 156:2,6 157:2,4,18 158:6 162:4,18 164:7 181:24 185:13 186:22 188:16 190:22 191:22 193:10 196:4,5 197:13 199:12 200:22 209:2,15 210:20 212:2,24 216:16 217:12 221:16 222:25 224:7,23 226:24 227:12 228:24 230:11 231:17 232:2	inappropriate (2) 55:25 56:9	injury (1) 71:20	intending (1) 30:17	intending (1) 30:17	182:23 183:11 187:1,4 192:5,7,9,17 194:8 195:4,5,12,13 202:21 207:24 209:3,3 210:16 212:24 213:2 214:19,20 216:19 219 217:4 220:17 221:19 222:14 226:15,20 227:7 228:4,5,5,14 229:9 231:13,18,24 232:4
head (2) 228:23 229:9	hinders (1) 43:17	im (125) 13:11,24 15:9 20:13,13 23:2 25:3,25 26:17,23 28:13 29:13 30:17 31:8 32:13,15 33:10 35:10 36:25 38:1,4 40:25 41:21 42:18 44:13 46:19 49:16 51:22 56:8 57:11 59:18 60:17 62:17 63:12,23 64:17 65:16 68:19 70:23 71:24 72:11,18 73:6 77:4 79:1,20 80:13,19 82:17 89:12 91:6,9 95:22 96:22 101:6 104:22,23 105:6 106:9 107:6,10 111:7 112:25 113:24 115:20 117:4 120:19,20 122:9,14 123:5 125:16,19,24 128:14 1					

186:9,22 187:3,7 188:2
193:5,8,15 199:12
200:7,12,18,22,25
204:10,13 212:19
213:5,18,23
221:6,13,16,22 222:5,25
223:5,11 224:6 225:2
227:8,12,16,24 228:6,20
229:20,24 232:5,10,19
join (2) 1:11 137:20
joined (2) 6:11 164:17
joint (5) 12:18 70:7,14,14
184:18
jobs (2) 226:11,23
journey (2) 52:6 171:1
july (3) 101:6,12 110:20
jumping (1) 145:3
june (3) 31:3,4 34:16
jurisdiction (1) 95:18
justification (1) 67:3

K

keep (3) 48:25 66:20 122:10
kept (1) 147:25
key (4) 109:16 113:14
114:19 148:13
kill (1) 98:15
kind (8) 4:9 19:8 22:1
47:4,24 89:23 92:21 97:19
kindly (2) 134:25 158:16
kit (1) 30:11
knew (28) 14:2,20 30:1 42:4
47:23 53:19 65:20 67:7,7
92:18 94:8 115:9 126:2
168:20,25 169:1 171:20
177:2 179:13 191:6 198:9
199:14 200:18 211:15
213:13,13 215:6 228:16
know (124) 3:21 9:11,19,19
12:20 16:24 17:13
18:7,10,17 22:9,13,13
27:6,15 28:8 34:19
35:1,12 38:5,9 40:19,20
41:23 42:2,3,15 44:1 46:7
54:7 55:22 57:2,24 58:10
62:14 69:1 71:23 74:23
75:4 76:23 77:20 81:6,15
83:17 86:10 92:2,2,6,16
93:8 95:13,14 106:7
108:7,9 111:3 117:23
119:19,24 120:25 124:12
125:13 126:7 127:5 129:19
134:2 135:25
136:2,3,12,16,25 141:10
150:6 154:1,5,8 155:3,4,15
161:9 162:2 164:15,18
167:9 170:11 171:18,20
172:23 173:1 174:16,21,23
176:14 181:7 183:3,4
186:10 189:6,9 193:1
194:9 196:25 199:9,15,16
200:8,14,22 205:14 207:25
212:21 213:11,12 216:24
218:23 220:16,23 223:9
226:7 228:24 230:24 232:2
knowing (10) 41:13,24
46:8,22 49:12 92:24 96:6
125:6 181:7,7
knowledge (9) 9:25 92:12
94:5 105:22 106:21 107:12
131:13 166:8 230:23
known (7) 16:12 27:20 28:6
39:23,24 156:22 211:18
knows (5) 67:1 77:8 104:10
107:16 183:13

L

la (83) 1:3,6,7 3:24 11:8
18:5,23 20:3 23:20 25:15
29:1,15 39:11 40:2 42:6
43:1 49:16 52:15 54:12
55:10 57:4 59:6,20 60:4
68:3 78:15 80:23 81:8,21
83:15 84:14,21 85:4,7
87:13 91:7 95:15

105:11,12 108:23
109:1,13,20 110:8 114:20
115:17 122:1 127:10,11
137:3,11,16,17 155:10
156:10 157:18 161:16
165:8 168:23 180:22
182:11 184:16 186:19
187:8 188:8 193:16 200:16
201:4 204:5,12,18 211:12
213:24 214:2,4,25 216:3
222:6 232:7,18 233:4,7,12
lack (3) 43:22 92:15 178:21
lacking (1) 22:25
landed (1) 182:11
landline (2) 53:11 54:3
landlines (1) 63:6
language (2) 82:9 221:20
lapse (1) 140:8
large (6) 13:8,9,10 63:2 98:2
230:6
largescale (1) 20:7
last (9) 14:19 107:11 125:8
126:17 141:23 203:1
218:12 221:8 230:24
lasted (2) 3:7 158:20
lasts (1) 36:24
late (4) 41:15 171:1
later (20) 8:24 22:14 24:24
31:18 32:24 52:23
62:19,22 64:8 72:18 77:19
80:21 112:23 138:3 166:1
170:15 174:23 183:7
190:19 231:2
launch (1) 17:13
laura (2) 101:16 203:10
lawlor (3) 196:5 211:16
213:7
layout (1) 124:18
lead (2) 9:13 85:5
leadership (7) 7:20,25 60:19
72:12 109:7,8 157:3
leads (3) 196:12 201:21
221:20
leak (1) 129:11
learn (2) 17:17 77:9
learned (5) 39:14 77:7 82:24
86:21 157:22
learning (4) 90:21 91:1,22
196:21
least (11) 7:4 70:9 84:16
100:14 111:1 155:15 172:8
175:19 184:19 199:16
220:13
leave (7) 205:19 206:14
207:24 217:11 222:15
224:11 225:2
leaving (1) 39:10
led (2) 99:2,3
lee (5) 53:13,14,18,21,24
left (3) 66:24 205:11 222:6
186:10 189:6,9 193:1
194:9 196:25 199:9,15,16
200:8,14,22 205:14 207:25
212:21 213:11,12 216:24
218:23 220:16,23 223:9
226:7 228:24 230:24 232:2
knowing (10) 41:13,24
46:8,22 49:12 92:24 96:6
125:6 181:7,7
knowledge (9) 9:25 92:12
94:5 105:22 106:21 107:12
131:13 166:8 230:23
known (7) 16:12 27:20 28:6
39:23,24 156:22 211:18
knows (5) 67:1 77:8 104:10
107:16 183:13

83:19 90:1 97:5 106:12
110:9 113:6 131:24 135:8
141:9 146:11 148:6 156:25
158:12 161:15 164:24
168:2 170:1 171:9
178:3,16 182:1 187:2
188:11 194:9,9,16,19
196:17 200:22 217:15
220:8 223:6,7 224:13
229:9 230:14,18
liked (1) 195:20
likely (4) 29:21 90:20 95:4
120:7
limitations (1) 155:23
limited (2) 23:7 230:24
line (14) 40:21 139:24 150:1
154:1 159:4,15 160:11,13
161:14 166:7 205:6 206:6
209:3 221:9
lines (4) 35:24 176:22,22
206:19
linger (1) 14:13
link (1) 218:25
linked (1) 87:8
linking (1) 6:16
links (2) 218:9 221:25
list (14) 13:7,21 26:25 27:14
66:6 70:7 80:11,13,17,23
92:21 113:12 153:6 217:17
listed (1) 13:12
listen (2) 49:16 50:2
listened (1) 67:12
literally (5) 33:1 121:14
164:18 191:21 195:4
little (16) 8:24 25:2 30:4,5
43:18 47:4,9 96:22 122:17
133:15,23 146:12 151:19
199:3 204:12 216:16
live (2) 125:10 151:11
lives (10) 48:5,13,14 68:8
98:14 114:7,12,12,15
220:18
local (1) 34:1
locate (2) 176:7 177:4
located (3) 11:9 141:21,25
location (19) 33:19 34:9
36:9 46:14 48:25 133:13
134:3 141:21,25 167:9
176:11 189:22 216:20
225:10,14,18 226:19,20
228:9
locations (2) 64:21 185:18
lockdown (1) 194:12
lodged (1) 18:24
log (10) 11:15,16,16 32:21
33:2 66:16 77:18 78:18
178:19 194:13
logbook (1) 225:4
logged (1) 55:6
loggist (4) 77:13,16,24
187:23
loggists (1) 78:21
logic (1) 126:23
logical (3) 22:2 45:19 72:14
logs (1) 75:24
lone (3) 49:8,13 68:11
long (15) 27:13 28:16 33:10
51:5 54:18 61:15,19 70:11
128:18 138:20 167:9 169:3
187:20 211:18 228:23
longer (8) 84:17 152:16
187:16,20 195:13 200:3,20
228:14
longsight (1) 24:6
look (52) 2:9 6:11 7:8 9:9
15:2,12 16:7 17:23 22:4
30:16 31:19 32:2 32:7 39:6
42:7 49:18 52:20 64:15
71:7 77:14 81:18 89:25
113:21,24 119:13 127:20
136:7,23,24 138:14,15
157:20 158:12 159:14
161:16 166:10 168:8 170:1
178:19 180:5,6 184:8,16
186:5 190:21 203:3 206:19
209:3 217:15 223:6 226:4

227:2
looked (9) 27:1 30:2,22
47:23 73:5 75:23 136:13
157:15 208:14
looking (19) 37:7 46:20
61:12,21 63:4 66:6 68:6
90:4 106:2 107:11 120:20
135:2 141:15 148:5
159:7,24 216:11 227:4
228:3
looks (6) 49:8 53:14 90:1
106:12 131:24 171:9
lopez (14) 7:11 28:17 37:5
50:4 89:16,18 101:7
102:13 127:14 128:15
203:5,24 214:16 219:7
loss (2) 220:18,20
lot (12) 29:24 66:5 70:3
100:21 118:16 128:22
129:24 152:4 191:20
195:20 198:14 222:20
lots (9) 41:8 61:6 121:3
129:21 143:9 179:7 184:9
194:16 198:13
loved (1) 177:5
love (2) 106:22 107:5
lunch (2) 136:25 137:13

M

maam (15) 40:3 169:21
173:2 205:20,22 214:22
215:4,13 216:7 217:10
219:11,23 220:15,22 221:3
magnitude (1) 198:12
main (4) 24:6 148:3 199:13
229:15
maintain (2) 11:9 100:12
maintained (1) 166:2
major (73) 8:6 9:6 13:1,4,13
16:16 20:24 21:18,24
22:9,10,18 31:11,21,24
44:9,11 87:7,8 88:13,25
89:6 91:21 94:23,24
95:5,10,17,23 99:15 102:6
103:8 104:3 107:23 108:3
109:4 111:19 113:16,17,24
116:15 127:20 142:2,3
144:15 183:5 184:17 186:3
187:17 191:9,22,23,24
192:2,5,15,20 193:16,21
225:3,21 226:19 227:2,20
228:4,13,22 229:3,4,6,8,13
majority (5) 166:10 182:23
183:8 185:17 193:2
makes (2) 35:2 68:14
making (12) 50:16 63:7 68:8
70:7 78:7 93:17 131:20
152:24 166:1 172:8 186:19
189:10
male (1) 190:6
males (1) 194:14
malta (1) 218:4
man (1) 224:11
manage (4) 110:4 143:15
144:7 166:13
managed (3) 8:8 168:14
229:21
management (4) 9:13 62:1
139:25 150:2
manager (8) 13:18,21,24
154:1 166:7 172:25 211:15
213:7
managers (2) 166:11 217:20
managing (2) 12:7 129:23
manchester (38) 1:10,11
6:13 20:11,12 53:8,18,22
62:17 84:18 122:23
123:10,12 124:11,13
125:1,18 126:7 127:7
128:23,24 129:22
137:19,20 138:19 142:6,19
143:8 158:15 164:23
176:9,15 181:21,22 184:10
189:22 221:2 226:2
manchesters (1) 125:1

mandatory (4) 4:15 163:7,8
198:10
manteline (1) 158:15
manual (1) 144:15
many (9) 19:6 36:9 59:21
71:11 108:8 124:13 133:2
184:12 229:12
map (2) 34:9 61:18
mapping (1) 61:12
marauding (6) 129:14 153:17
154:17 162:7,11 192:1
march (5) 219:9,16
220:12,14,16
margin (1) 128:17
mark (3) 74:24 198:25 200:6
marked (1) 219:12
marshalling (1) 33:23
match (2) 182:1,4
matches (1) 28:1
mate (6) 206:24 209:18,19
210:8,16 211:5
material (3) 81:3 89:25 90:9
materials (1) 83:5
matter (13) 82:20 105:11
106:18 107:20 122:17
127:11,12 141:14 150:23
157:6 185:9 196:12 226:25
matters (7) 16:12 82:24
122:6 156:18 157:19
187:22 191:8
maybe (10) 18:12 23:16
54:20,25 82:9 83:24
121:22 133:24 138:21
171:11
mean (5) 28:10 140:25
152:1,22 193:22
meaning (2) 39:15,16
meaningful (3) 25:24 80:9
173:11
means (6) 18:18 80:21 81:7
176:19 182:1 193:17
meant (8) 37:18 41:12 92:6
178:6 197:18 201:7,15
224:7
meantime (1) 85:2
measures (2) 151:22 152:16
mechanisms (1) 156:24
media (4) 40:20 41:3 158:4
160:1
medical (1) 48:8
meet (1) 24:2
meeting (12) 23:25 154:10
194:2,7,21,21 195:17,23
203:20 204:3 230:6,12
meetings (2) 157:1 197:3
meets (1) 11:6
member (2) 72:12 176:14
members (11) 32:24 48:13
60:18 176:9,12,15,23
177:2 219:1,22 220:12
memorandum (1) 155:19
memory (4) 84:10 90:10
162:25 188:16
mental (1) 75:25
mentally (1) 29:17
mentee (1) 78:16
mention (11) 39:13 48:22,24
49:6 69:2,6 83:1 102:22
160:20 221:23 231:11
mentioned (19) 18:14,23
30:19 35:19 45:3 46:3 57:9
83:22 155:8 162:11
168:17,24 184:17 190:8
213:9 215:16 216:15
223:13 227:18
mentioning (1) 232:2
mentions (2) 128:8 220:7
mentoring (3) 49:20
102:17,23
menus (2) 216:23 217:5
mercifully (1) 23:5
message (3) 161:10 172:12
220:2
messages (3) 170:20 171:1
172:13
messaging (1) 41:5

met (5) 11:1 27:8 135:23
191:18,20
methodologies (1) 18:2
methodology (1) 17:15
methods (1) 17:16
mi (1) 113:20
mick (3) 196:5 211:16,24
middle (5) 33:22 38:21 65:17
107:21 159:16
midnight (23) 60:14,23 61:5
62:7 69:25 79:2 112:4
145:21 170:25 171:7
178:6,7,17 179:5 188:9,13
195:19 206:16,18 208:6,19
212:6,6
might (60) 9:19 13:19 14:4
18:12,14 24:22 26:12,16
28:1 29:11,13 32:12,25
36:6,14 38:24 42:19
44:16,23 45:16 47:9 50:23
51:8 57:17 59:22
62:16,19,21,22 65:11
67:20 72:11 75:6,9,20 88:4
93:16 94:24 100:19 103:22
124:24 125:15 126:21
136:22 149:17 155:16
165:8,25 182:3 184:23
187:24 188:4,19,23 189:15
191:13 198:17 212:23
213:16 226:15
mike (2) 145:8 210:11
miles (1) 186:10
mind (65) 8:1 13:25
14:4,6,10,22 18:16 21:23
23:2 26:15 27:4 29:4 34:20
38:20 40:5,11 44:25
45:15,18 48:15,17,18 50:8
55:20 56:11 58:14,18
59:12 65:24 68:22 69:12
71:12,14 75:11,25 83:17
91:8 111:14 122:19
128:20 141:7 144:12,15
145:19 153:19,20 154:20
164:1,6 165:12,25 170:24
177:7 181:8 182:12 198:9
201:8,19,23 202:22 212:4
224:12 226:23,23
mindful (1) 231:24
minds (1) 23:11
mine (1) 165:6
minimise (1) 114:8
minute (3) 52:24 160:9
173:14
minutes (39) 28:16 33:7
36:25 37:3 42:10 51:7
52:23 54:20,20 60:5,12
61:2 66:1 71:17 73:16
115:24 116:4,23
122:6,7,11 128:19
131:4,17 158:21 167:12,15
180:23 181:9
194:5,8,9,19,19 195:12
204:8 206:18 212:6 231:1
miss (1) 195:9
missed (3) 38:2 80:14 213:16
mistaken (1) 78:16
mitigate (1) 114:8
mobile (6) 53:9 63:4 158:19
168:11 169:13 172:17
model (7) 107:24 108:4
180:2,8 181:4 226:1,3
module (18) 5:11 44:3 45:21
47:3,13 58:11 71:4 72:3
73:3 75:12 80:7 82:11
110:5 111:15 143:14
167:24 169:22 171:15
mohammed (1) 29:11
moment (23) 1:9 32:9
33:4 37:1 48:7 56:21 57:21
59:23 63:15 82:23 87:12
94:21 135:19 145:16
159:2,17 160:8 161:9
164:7 186:22 194:25 208:5
223:19
moments (2) 135:4 163:25
monday (2) 1:1 164:17

months (5) 2:6 138:6 139:11
146:19 220:17
more (48) 3:16 6:20 16:15
38:14 40:16 41:2,4 43:18
44:25 47:7 52:24 53:21
59:21 60:18 64:9 68:22
71:11 77:20 90:20 94:11
100:21 120:24 121:22
123:14 129:15 137:3
140:15 142:16 147:10
157:16 164:24 169:17
178:10,24 180:12 182:3
187:5,16,25 190:20 191:8
212:25 225:2 227:12
229:19 230:2 231:25 232:7
morning (5) 1:3 87:13
morning (12) 158:10 175:9
morris (25) 85:5,6,7 93:6
94:1,2 99:20,22
104:11,13,17,22 105:14,17
106:1,15 107:19 213:24
214:1,2 221:4 222:3,5
233:5,15
most (8) 16:12 34:23 67:1
127:6 156:3 188:2 201:2
226:21
motion (1) 117:20
motives (1) 120:20
mouth (1) 148:18
move (9) 30:18 49:16 85:2
101:2 108:21 136:14
137:25 179:2 210:24
moved (2) 4:25 90:24
moves (1) 74:20
moving (4) 41:17 92:3 113:3
217:12
ms (34) 54:15 55:16 56:14
57:15 64:7,11 67:19
85:5,6,7 93:6 94:1,2
99:20 22 104:11,13,17,22

national (10) 9:16 55:10
 142:9 175:15 176:18
 180:1.7,16 181:3 190:15
nationally (2) 123:13 141:5
nature (9) 3:5 19:22 23:6
 33:25 96:4 129:12,14
 180:12 223:17
nawaz (20) 1:5,9 3:18 37:17
 89:20 105:7 106:17 118:8
 127:17 131:1 133:16
 134:2,12 145:18 175:1
 179:11 180:10 187:9
 200:11 233:3
nawazs (2) 182:15 187:23
ndmframed (2) 77:15,22
near (2) 192:16 202:9
necessarily (8) 9:19 14:3
 23:1 74:17 77:5 89:11
 94:16 112:17
necessary (4) 13:23 56:2
 79:20 119:14
need (52) 8:8 9:19 14:13,18
 18:2 22:4,22 24:11 25:11
 28:8 30:19 32:7 38:2 48:6
 49:4,5 73:22 76:1 81:6,12
 92:17 103:22 114:13,21
 115:9 119:22,25 122:10
 129:23 134:6 144:16
 152:24 158:8 160:6 164:8
 168:4,9 169:12 175:12
 182:3 186:12 198:21
 199:23 208:16 210:7 211:4
 218:19 220:6 223:6 224:21
 227:21 229:9
needed (18) 50:8,12 53:6
 91:1 92:8,20 94:2,7 111:12
 119:17 161:3 164:12 171:5
 189:6,9 192:22 196:15
 220:2
needing (1) 185:1
needs (6) 67:1 76:19 84:17
 117:23 134:17 227:22
neil (1) 173:21
never (8) 7:20 43:6 109:9
 136:16 144:13 151:1
 155:25 181:21
nevertheless (1) 68:11
news (3) 17:19,21 159:22
newsfeeds (2) 158:4,9
next (2) 1:17 8:3 11:22
 31:4,8 34:22 39:1,6 49:19
 60:5,21 80:8 84:22 85:4
 101:2 107:21 136:14 158:6
 159:2 164:18 168:8 169:25
 170:16 203:10 209:17
 211:12 213:24
nice (1) 158:7
night (121) 4:1,2,11 5:8,16
 6:4,12,24 7:10,21
 8:5,19,22 9:5 10:17
 14:6,10,23 15:25 16:4
 17:3,8 19:4,16 20:14,15,16
 24:7,12 25:16 26:12,25
 27:15 28:6,14 29:6
 34:13,20 46:7 48:18 49:21
 58:23,25 59:18,22 70:12
 74:12 75:1 81:16
 86:12,22,24 87:3,14
 88:8,11,16,24 92:9
 95:15,19
 96:2,9,13,15,18,24 97:7,12
 98:4,23 99:5,12 100:2,20
 103:1 106:9,24 107:16
 109:1,10,14 114:3 120:18
 121:1,21,23 122:21,25
 123:3,4,15 131:14 132:25
 133:3 135:2,5 136:9
 144:21,24 162:19 170:7
 171:21,22 172:1 174:24
 175:3 176:15,25 177:19
 179:10 189:3 193:6
 201:6,25 223:21
 224:12,19,19 228:20
 232:12
nights (2) 87:17 102:16
nighttime (1) 107:4

nilo (1) 69:13
nmat (2) 178:1 194:15
nobody (3) 136:3,16 152:17
nominated (3) 131:5
 136:1,14
nomination (1) 131:20
none (2) 77:13 152:7
nonetheless (1) 126:6
normal (2) 98:17 176:13
normally (2) 98:19 161:7
north (4) 44:19 64:6 211:13
 212:7
northwest (2) 172:23 173:1
note (8) 32:10 33:24 49:19
 78:7 80:24,25 81:2 85:24
noted (4) 8:13 31:13 43:8
 53:9
notes (6) 77:15 151:7 179:20
 189:23 195:3 204:12
nothing (12) 15:22 20:22
 24:17,20 37:18 55:2 57:6
 69:9 158:5 180:3 185:22
 227:16
notification (1) 123:6
notifications (2) 94:19 123:5
notified (5) 29:20 42:3
 55:5,22 130:23
november (6) 139:11 153:12
 154:3 216:4,9 217:4
npsas (5) 190:13,14,22
 191:5,6
nuanced (2) 68:22 142:16
number (36) 15:1 19:23
 32:21 35:20 44:12,21 48:5
 50:8 53:10 71:19
 104:21,22 105:8,20
 106:12,23 109:22 113:9,14
 131:14,18 160:15 165:5
 166:4 172:10 175:21
 176:19 177:6,9 178:1
 194:13 206:25 214:20
 215:14 217:18 219:8
numbering (1) 34:7
numbers (5) 13:8,10 103:6
 106:18 151:23
numerous (1) 17:7
nwas (17) 14:18 54:7,12
 55:24 56:4 64:9,14 67:7
 69:8 70:9,17 76:2 130:22
 188:14 196:4 210:16,23

O

object (1) 199:13
objective (1) 109:22
objectives (6) 187:1 229:15
 230:6,8,11,12
obligation (1) 12:3
obligations (2) 13:20 147:9
observation (3) 146:23
 197:22 201:21
observations (1) 197:14
observe (1) 80:8
observed (1) 180:15
obtain (1) 40:16
obviating (1) 134:6
obvious (3) 29:7 198:22
 226:24
obviously (36) 22:7 27:7
 32:7 41:9,11 43:14 55:10
 58:12 62:1 66:5 93:15 98:1
 120:7 122:10 128:22
 143:10 147:3 149:3 157:3
 163:1 170:14 174:23
 176:6,11,13 181:12 184:15
 194:10 204:14 205:19
 210:13 222:14,17 224:1
 227:9 229:4
ocb (36) 52:12 138:4
 139:16,18,19 146:18,24
 149:4 150:4 151:19 152:13
 154:21 155:13 156:22
 157:14 165:11,22 166:9,11
 197:18 204:1 214:8,24
 216:10 217:19,20
 218:2,2,8,10,21,24
 220:4,9,12,25

occasion (2) 134:14 224:10
occasions (3) 20:17 77:6
 133:10
occupational (9) 85:24 86:6
 96:9,11,19,23 97:5,18,21
occupied (2) 138:6 177:13
occupy (2) 62:10 178:17
occur (9) 27:11 36:12 38:23
 55:11 59:8 75:18 78:17
 123:19 124:5
occurred (10) 24:24 28:9
 56:20 65:16 77:25 79:1
 119:19 122:17 126:9
 195:14
occurring (3) 9:24 123:24
 159:10
occurs (1) 80:21
oclock (5) 49:24 50:15
 51:1,9 178:4
ocr (7) 32:4 167:13 190:9,19
 191:3 217:20,23
october (2) 2:5 153:11
ofc (1) 132:7
offender (1) 225:1
offer (4) 164:9,12 165:9,13
offered (1) 164:22
offering (2) 120:3,10
offers (1) 219:18
office (2) 24:5,6
officer (31) 3:11 25:6
 40:18,19 41:3 47:5 48:22
 49:23 54:10 56:19 73:1,2
 98:7 121:17 122:8,16
 128:3,9,10,13 132:12
 146:5,11,22 147:4 159:1
 166:13,19 169:21 195:3
 206:22
officers (24) 29:21 32:24
 36:11 40:21 61:7,15 62:9
 78:6 92:17,20
 93:9,14,18,20 116:8 150:4
 152:2 153:7 154:9 160:11
 163:12,15,16 220:21
official (2) 196:8 231:12
officially (1) 230:10
often (2) 98:14 134:9
ohare (2) 101:14 139:23
okay (39) 3:23 17:9 40:24
 48:1 49:15 52:14 59:24
 76:5 84:1,12 87:10,12
 91:17 99:20 102:22 105:10
 106:8,11 107:9 111:3,16
 113:3,19 116:3 120:9
 133:22 137:1 153:18 155:9
 157:21 169:15 204:13
 210:17 212:19 214:14
 216:4 217:11 221:22 232:5
old (4) 30:5 126:12,14,20
oldham (2) 190:3 207:8
oncall (3) 102:16 107:5
 147:9
once (16) 12:3 27:20 28:9
 31:13 35:7 38:22 54:4 60:6
 90:24 128:9 175:9 176:10
 186:15 208:12 218:10
 220:13
onduty (1) 147:9
ones (4) 39:20 134:23 177:5
 191:21
ongoing (7) 29:25 63:11
 73:16 123:5 189:21 194:10
 196:1
online (1) 7:13
onscene (1) 226:13
op (7) 37:11,12,14,18 65:14
 92:6 217:7
open (6) 26:2 143:13 212:2
 223:24 224:23 230:2
opened (1) 61:24
opening (1) 62:2
operate (3) 141:17 177:12
 188:4
operated (2) 141:5 175:17
operating (1) 184:18
operation (53) 11:11 12:9
 15:23 16:3,4 18:8 37:22,25

38:12,25 40:3 43:7,22
 44:15 56:24 57:10 65:5
 72:25 73:21 89:4,8 92:4,16
 94:5 96:1 138:13,23
 139:1,2 149:8 156:15
 158:15 161:23 162:2,6
 163:4 164:5 167:5 176:1
 184:8,14 185:14,22 188:21
 189:7,13 192:1 199:14
 201:7 211:24 212:8 221:11
 229:6
operational (26) 30:3 63:19
 72:13 86:3,7 89:21,23,24
 90:2,7,17,22 91:12,14 96:8
 97:21 100:12 102:16,22,24
 117:24 132:8 137:25
 145:12 185:6,13
operationally (4) 55:2 97:13
 113:7 120:21
operations (9) 88:20,22,22
 99:14 134:2,7,21,23
 168:21
operator (2) 166:12 216:22
operators (1) 215:2
opinion (1) 225:19
opportunity (8) 21:11 46:1
 79:21 82:19 134:25 147:2
 151:19 197:9
opposed (2) 74:10 191:3
option (2) 23:12 109:25
optional (1) 163:7
oral (1) 180:4
orally (2) 171:2,3
order (32) 4:16,17 5:13 10:8
 11:9,15 85:15,20
 86:8,19,20,23 87:4 96:9,24
 98:14 100:8,13,19 120:11
 125:15 126:15 128:25
 138:22 140:5,12,17 143:17
 150:17 165:4,6 167:19
orderpublic (6) 5:2,4,17
 19:19 72:9 96:16
ordinary (1) 84:5
organisation (4) 17:22
 164:16 182:7 195:6
organisations (5) 141:19
 193:20,23 231:21 232:3
organised (1) 27:9
orientated (1) 226:5
others (17) 12:20 13:21
 38:24 63:1 79:7 83:9
 113:11 120:8 134:10
 147:16,18 204:5
 215:5,17,19 216:7 226:2
otherwise (4) 2:25 7:9 65:24
 200:3
ought (3) 33:3 145:19
 156:22
ourselves (1) 169:8
outcomes (1) 202:13
outofhours (1) 40:20
outside (6) 9:24 19:16
 118:16 201:14 211:5
 218:20
outstanding (1) 224:25
over (50) 12:23 26:19 27:2
 34:8,22 49:19 52:21 59:10
 68:16 73:7,10,15,17 88:23
 93:9 97:15 98:7 107:20
 112:23 128:9,17 142:9
 169:9 171:19,23 172:1
 174:24 179:18,23 180:23
 181:17 182:17 187:12
 188:3,4 195:13 196:13,17
 195:9 198:3 199:3,21
 200:7 202:2 206:6 207:12
 208:5,19 222:22 228:25
overall (4) 10:4 135:2 149:7
 184:15
overarching (1) 114:5
overlap (3) 5:3 191:25
 227:19
overlapped (1) 177:15
overlapping (1) 5:22
overlaps (1) 146:11
overloaded (2) 155:11 232:3

overspeaking (1) 104:15
overview (1) 152:17
overwhelmed (2) 149:18
 155:24
overwhelming (1) 155:2
own (10) 6:16 9:10 46:8
 65:24 98:14 108:13 115:8
 147:16 193:21 224:12

P

pa (2) 220:4,9
pace (3) 38:21 41:17 135:8
package (3) 91:3 102:15
 189:25
pages (1) 15:1
paid (2) 127:4,4
pal (1) 211:5
palfrey (4) 172:20,22 173:6
 177:25
pan (1) 184:14
papers (1) 173:21
paragraph (13) 7:16 33:19
 35:22 43:5 85:24 86:14
 88:6 130:20 131:2
 141:10,15 218:12 221:8
paragraphs (2) 43:4 127:25
paramedic (1) 44:24
paramedics (3) 67:6,13,23
parameters (1) 10:10
paraphrasing (1) 44:13
pardon (1) 20:3
paris (2) 17:14,18
park (9) 20:8,9 23:23 24:4,5
 50:16 104:4 130:12 131:6
part (47) 3:25 4:2 10:23
 12:12 13:19 14:21 34:3
 43:8 45:7 46:3 58:13 73:9
 84:9 90:13 92:8 94:16
 96:23 101:10 102:24
 103:25 106:25 108:2,10,17
 109:5 113:14,15 117:19
 118:12 126:8 127:20
 128:5,11 136:10 151:16
 152:11,15 155:21 160:18
 171:17 175:13 180:20
 186:13 189:10 206:11,15
 223:3
participant (3) 104:8
 105:8,18
participants (1) 101:15
participate (1) 145:24
participated (1) 147:12
participating (1) 147:17
participation (2) 147:19
 149:3
particular (28) 7:17 9:20
 15:6,17 25:12 29:10 109:2
 111:17 121:19 122:24
 123:6 124:18 136:1 148:5
 155:2,11 161:12 164:10
 169:4 177:7,13 178:3
 182:6 190:22 223:21
 226:3,8,18
particularly (9) 36:24 92:11
 98:11 99:13 116:7 121:17
 123:15 125:9 222:25
partner (6) 32:25 44:4 45:22
 59:16 73:22 195:6
partners (10) 5:13,14 146:9
 147:25 183:10 184:12
 186:18 189:11 192:14
 196:11
parts (10) 15:7 16:13 21:5,8
 22:4 30:16 32:9 103:9
 121:13 148:14
pass (2) 170:21 212:13
passed (3) 71:16 74:21 151:4
past (7) 54:25 56:5 61:4
 151:18 206:18 212:5,6
patch (3) 124:8,14 125:12
pause (8) 31:16,17 36:25
 37:4 74:5,7,9 84:24
pausing (1) 194:25
paying (1) 124:22
pcu (1) 222:22
peak (1) 167:21

pegasus (2) 138:13 139:1
pegram (1) 61:9
pen (2) 219:13 220:6
pending (1) 55:25
penned (1) 220:7
people (71) 9:24 13:9 20:10
 26:22 27:8 36:20 41:9,18
 42:2 46:1,15 48:6,9 49:2,5
 50:8 52:6 54:9 61:7,13,19
 62:18 63:1,21 71:20 73:20
 76:10,21 78:7 84:4,9 98:15
 99:6 115:9 118:18
 120:2,9,12,15
 121:3,5,7,14,14 124:20
 126:16,19 135:23 143:9
 160:22 161:2 162:16
 164:23,25 165:1,2 179:7
 180:17 189:2,6 193:1
 199:18,22,25 207:25
 208:21,22 210:19 221:17
 227:9 228:1
peoples (2) 48:5 121:16
per (3) 91:13 100:14 179:25
performance (2) 99:4 154:24
perform (17) 27:7 89:24
 96:2,9,20,21,24 97:3
 100:1,3,5 110:1 115:15
 133:9,11,12 221:1
performance (1) 102:25
performed (5) 19:12 112:5
 133:4 135:2 148:20
performing (4) 12:15 87:3
 88:11 97:14
perhaps (18) 34:23 41:13
 66:24 68:19 75:21 82:23
 85:1 105:10 123:13 126:18
 143:16 145:4 155:21 165:3
 175:19 183:19 221:20
 225:3
period (21) 24:12 25:2,22
 26:6 33:3,5,8 36:12 60:22
 63:3,16,18 64:12 65:4,17
 116:12 175:2,6
 178:16,23,24
periodic (1) 23:10
periods (2) 62:12 178:3
permanently (1) 132:25
permitted (3) 140:8 152:23
 163:9
person (14) 49:20 53:4 64:9
 67:1 78:24 107:15 117:23
 154:25 168:24 174:15
 200:7 202:5 203:12 225:15
personnel (5) 13:16 44:20
 68:5,24 69:18
persons (1) 153:5
perspective (9) 46:8,8,23
 47:1,25 57:19 124:23
 186:25 224:7
pertain (1) 88:12
pertains (2) 95:23,25
phone (15) 39:1,7 58:21
 63:2 159:12 161:1 169:10
 170:16 176:14,16
 177:23,24,24 205:20 206:9
phoned (4) 53:11 120:3
 161:13 174:7
phones4u (2) 30:6 31:2
phoning (2) 120:2 121:7
photograph (1) 35:2
phrase (4) 68:23 84:10 99:24
 119:11
physical (1) 82:11
physically (4) 46:13 55:8
 75:13 121:6
picked (3) 21:5,9 61:2
picture (3) 2:5 148:11 149:7
piece (2) 39:11 209:6
pinpointing (1) 195:6
place (47) 23:21 25:13 27:16
 34:17 38:21 46:18,21
 49:24 50:14 53:1 63:20,25
 92:11,23 93:9 94:18
 100:22 116:16 122:23
 125:2 145:20 146:2 153:19
 156:24 161:13,15 164:2

166:3 181:18 182:10
 183:3,4 185:18 189:5
 192:6,24 193:

83:15 84:14,21 85:4,7
87:13 91:7 95:15
105:11,12 108:23
109:1,13,20 110:8 114:20
115:17 122:1 127:10,11
137:3,11,16 157:10
156:10 157:18 161:16
165:8 168:23 180:22
182:11 184:16 186:19
187:8 188:8 193:16 200:16
201:4 204:5,12,18 211:12
213:24 214:2,4,25 216:3
222:6 232:7,18 233:4,7,12
points (2) 4:9 33:16 34:5
39:4 42:12 45:12 60:7
73:6,7,8 80:11 81:11,17
108:25 135:12,12,20 136:5
215:1 229:9
police (56) 1:10,11 3:11 6:14
12:18 17:22 18:10 23:23
25:6,12,14 27:25 29:19
42:23 45:22 47:5 51:5
64:18 66:22,23 78:6
81:4,19 93:9 98:7 99:2
107:25 108:18 126:7
130:12 133:10,12
137:19,20 138:19
141:20,24 142:19 144:20
158:15 163:16 164:17
165:4 166:11,13 176:9,15
181:2,22 190:15 192:13
193:22 199:18 220:21
226:13 231:16
policed (5) 27:25 29:19 30:1
125:23 126:2
policies (1) 166:15
policing (16) 20:7 23:18 24:1
36:3 79:20 82:17 84:5,22
99:2,3 124:23 126:1
164:16 165:10 197:9
201:22
population (1) 127:7
portal (1) 11:17
portfolio (3) 85:19 86:3
100:10
pose (1) 16:6
posed (3) 16:2,7 47:11
position (15) 25:23 54:1
59:8,11 70:6 98:3,23 125:9
139:15 156:20 157:13
184:2 205:10 206:16
208:20
positive (1) 197:1
possibility (4) 25:1 119:7
149:22 184:19
possible (10) 6:25 36:10
47:22 48:7,9,11 191:7
199:25 230:21,22
possibly (17) 35:14 57:6
91:21 97:20 102:20 103:14
117:1 120:25 121:12
123:16 165:19 171:3,3
210:4 211:10 223:1,17
post (9) 13:17,20,23
14:15,18 32:6 71:3 90:25
146:18
postdates (1) 23:14
postexplosion (1) 196:14
potential (8) 8:10 26:17,18
27:10 69:2 109:21 165:17
190:5
potentially (17) 23:17 24:17
26:20 28:12 47:16 48:5
55:23 84:7 125:7
129:10,15 159:13 169:2
193:12 223:18 232:1,3
ppe (1) 163:24
practical (2) 166:8 201:7
practicalities (1) 185:1
practice (8) 26:20,24 28:4
57:24 91:23 141:16 151:16
152:12
precedence (1) 228:12
precise (2) 167:9 212:1
precisely (3) 63:14 169:16
171:12

predates (1) 34:17
predicated (5) 5:18 8:18
21:15 49:12 123:7
preface (1) 31:9
reference (1) 228:21
preferential (1) 67:4
prejesip (1) 12:11
premier (1) 125:2
prepare (1) 36:21
prepared (5) 81:10 98:14
113:5,12 214:14
preparedness (1) 153:16
preparing (1) 74:16
preplanned (14) 5:18,21
19:17,18,21,22 22:8 45:20
142:18,23 144:6 184:8,11
185:21
prefurbishment (1) 35:3
prescribe (1) 228:18
prescribed (1) 228:10
present (1) 68:25
presentation (1) 214:24
presented (2) 61:10 62:14
preservation (1) 199:14
press (9) 40:19 54:10 73:2
117:14 178:9 219:14,21
220:5,25
pressure (5) 22:13 41:3,16
78:9 231:20
pressures (1) 181:8
presumably (7) 58:23 69:16
77:13 78:6 119:25 148:13
192:21
pretty (1) 136:2
prevent (1) 79:19
previous (3) 45:19 154:4
188:17
previously (2) 31:1 197:23
pride (1) 158:7
primacy (4) 36:2,5,7 126:1
primarily (1) 64:5
primary (2) 44:18 126:3
principally (1) 66:21
principle (1) 12:10
principles (10) 5:6,25 13:22
22:15 23:1 89:8,10 91:2
183:11 184:18
print (1) 32:18
printed (5) 30:8,21 31:14
32:10 35:8
prior (13) 14:11 19:16 23:8
69:25 87:9 117:8 124:3
125:4,11 149:23 158:4,8
187:22
priorities (3) 70:4 177:5
187:1
prioritisation (1) 71:7
prioritised (2) 70:25 71:9
prioritising (1) 75:10
priority (6) 44:21 48:4 66:6
70:6 74:14 199:20
probably (34) 4:10 8:24 11:6
14:19 19:8 31:17 32:22
33:10 35:11 63:6 74:21
78:8 80:19 82:4,9 95:8,8
119:1,22 123:7 124:12,14
161:9 167:14,18,22 177:1
181:15 183:7 184:1 185:15
211:4,18 231:25
problem (3) 177:13 178:22
185:21
problems (2) 48:1 84:1
procedure (1) 220:6
process (7) 25:2 68:15
111:21 125:8 139:3 210:2
224:17
processes (2) 63:24 166:15
produced (1) 203:3
professional (5) 92:18 97:17
98:8 100:15 151:20
professionalism (1) 6:16
programme (2) 30:13 78:17
progress (3) 117:20 137:22
172:9
progressed (1) 230:4
project (3) 138:12,13 203:14

promoted (9) 1:14,19,23
2:1,10 137:23 138:3
139:8,14
promotion (1) 4:7
prompt (1) 188:16
prompted (2) 173:5 202:18
proper (1) 63:24
properly (1) 8:8
proportionate (1) 10:21
proposal (4) 104:13
105:6,9,13
protect (2) 8:11 49:5
protection (1) 49:1
protective (1) 163:15
proudly (1) 124:13
provide (12) 11:15 47:8
76:16 80:8 82:25 100:10
102:10 118:23 197:14,19
217:9 218:9
provided (6) 22:21 33:18
69:20 217:10 218:3 222:1
provides (3) 8:5 49:1 190:24
providing (5) 63:9,10 118:17
180:16 221:25
prudent (1) 124:24
public (39) 4:11,16
5:1,4,13,17 13:10 19:19
220:5,25
32:24 41:1,4 48:14 72:9
80:18 85:15,20
86:8,19,20,23 96:16
100:8,13,19 125:15 126:14
128:22,25 138:22
140:4,12,17 143:17
165:4,6 173:19
176:13,14,24
pull (2) 85:14 184:7
pulled (1) 158:16
pulling (3) 173:1 177:20
192:14
purpose (5) 63:8 129:2
176:5,6 213:2
purposes (1) 230:15
pursue (1) 199:12
pursuing (1) 213:3
puts (1) 192:6
putting (4) 116:16 148:17
183:3,18

Q

q (732) 1:11,14,17,19,22
2:1,3,5,9,14,17,19,22
3:3,5,11 4:4,6,15,19
5:3,17,22,25 6:3,7,11,23
7:1,4,7,24 8:3,16,22
9:2,7,9,22 10:2,16
11:13,22 12:6,14,25 13:15
14:1,9,12,25 15:9,19,21,25
16:7,10 18:10
19:3,11,15,18,21
20:5,13,24 21:2,4,11,14,23
22:4 23:24 24:7,11,20,22
25:4,8,19,21 26:1,4,6,9,11
27:3,15,19 28:4,15 29:4
30:13,16 31:19 33:3,15,22
34:7,12,16,22
35:5,13,16,19 36:2,12,19
37:22 38:13,18,20 39:5,9
40:5,9,11 42:12 44:8,11
45:2,6,15,25 46:7,19 49:23
50:11,14,18,20,25
51:4,8,12,14,16 52:20
53:4,6,12,16,23
54:4,15,18,21 55:15,19,25
56:5,8,11,14,17
57:9,12,15,21,24
58:2,7,14,20 60:21
61:2,21,23 62:1,6,9 63:17
64:7,11,22,25
65:4,10,16,23 66:5,10,12
68:15,18 69:4,11,16,22
70:1,3,11,21,23
71:10,15,25 72:4,6,20,22
73:10,12,15,24
74:1,4,8,16,24 75:6,9
78:24 79:1,6,10,13,16
80:8,13,25 81:2,25

82:3,7,14,17 85:10,23
86:3,6,10,18,24
87:3,10,12,19,22
88:3,5,10,15,22,24
89:2,6,8 12:16,23
90:3,10,19,24 91:6,17,24
92:3,15 93:2 94:13,21
95:3,9,14,20,22
96:8,14,17,19,24 97:2,5,10
100:7,23 101:2,21
102:12,22 103:3,15,18,24
107:3,9 108:10,13,17
109:13,20,25
110:4,8,12,17,20,25
111:3,11,16
112:3,7,14,18,23
113:3,9,19,24
114:11,15,18 115:13,17,24
116:3,6,11,15,22
117:4,13,18,23
118:2,7,14,21
123:11,17,21,25
124:7,10,12,16,24 125:8
126:11,16 127:1,20
128:8,15 129:2,4,7,13
130:10,14,16,18,20
131:11,13,17
132:2,4,6,10,12,15,17,21,24
133:6,9,13,16 134:24
135:7,11,15 137:20,22,25
138:3,6,9,11,17,20,22,25
139:2,5,8,11,14,18,21,24
140:3,7,11,17,20,23,25
141:3,7,13 142:12,22
143:1,16,20,25
144:2,9,12,19,25
145:3,12,14,19,24
146:2,4,6,14,17,21
147:5,8,12,16,19
148:5,13,16
149:3,6,10,14,16,21
150:1,4,6,8,13,17,21,23
151:1,3,6,9,15,24
152:4,7,10,19,22
153:2,6,11,14,16,19,23
154:1,8,14,20 155:15
156:14,18,24
157:2,5,9,22,25
158:3,11,23 159:2,7,14
160:4,18 161:22,25
162:4,9,11,14,24
163:3,6,9,13,16,18,25
164:4,12 165:15,17,21,24
166:7,17,22,24
167:1,3,5,9,13,16,19,23,25
168:4,7,14,17
169:2,8,16,25
170:6,9,16,19
171:5,9,11,17,22,25
172:3,10,16,19
173:5,9,11,14,16,19,23,25
174:3,6,8,15,18,21,25
175:5,9,12,17,19,23,25
176:4 177:7
178:3,13,16,21
179:2,6,11,13,16,18,23
180:3,10,15,19 181:6
182:15 184:22,25
185:8,12,21,25 186:2,5
187:12,22 188:16,23
189:6,12,18,23
190:2,5,8,13,16,18,25
191:3,8,12,16,24
192:15,20 193:19,25
194:4,7,20,24
195:2,12,16,22 196:12
197:4,8,12,21
198:1,6,9,16,21
199:1,3,5,9,11
201:10,12,14,18,21
202:2,4,9,11,13,17
203:1,14,17,19,24
205:4,18,24 206:2,6,14
207:1,3,5,7,10,15,20,24
208:3,8,10,12,15,25
209:6,9,13,22 210:1,5

211:3,18,21 212:4,11,16
213:11,15 214:16,23
215:5,11,14,20
216:8,16,23 217:1,11,24
218:15,25 219:4,12,16,24
220:11,16,23 222:23
223:17,19 224:1,3
225:14,16,18 226:10,23
227:4 228:11 229:3,15
230:11,15,21,23 231:7
qualification (1) 97:2
qualified (4) 4:20
103:6,11,15
quarter (3) 28:21 59:24
212:5
queens (3) 84:19,23 211:12
question (35) 12:25 16:2
17:5 18:6 24:13 25:11 27:3
45:16 48:4 70:4,11 88:5
99:23 101:4 104:4
123:22,25 125:8 126:11,18
132:24 160:5 162:23,24
181:6 196:12 198:2,6
201:2 202:11 205:13 213:4
215:6 225:9 226:25
questioned (2) 45:18 188:23
questioning (4) 18:7 45:9
165:10 204:10
questions (51) 1:6 14:14
16:5,7 41:11 57:18 59:21
84:15,17,20 85:6,10 92:3
93:7 94:22 95:14 119:3
122:13,15 127:7,10,14
128:21 137:3,16 187:16
202:6 204:7,18,21 205:9
207:20 211:14 214:1,4,5,7
217:1 221:4 222:8 232:7
233:4,5,6,7,8,12,13,14,15,16
quick (4) 22:17 116:12
206:24 224:24
quickest (2) 36:15,17
quickly (9) 41:9 44:2 47:14
55:23 74:20 115:12 134:18
136:2 225:1
quiet (1) 194:22
quite (19) 17:5 25:25 41:23
65:7 107:6,10 141:23
142:7 144:21 161:13
171:3,3 181:24 210:4
211:10,18 212:24 220:3
226:4
quotation (1) 175:23

R

rachel (2) 112:21 169:1
radar (2) 148:7 157:7
radio (5) 52:8 134:20 166:12
215:2 216:22
raise (5) 62:6 82:20,23
128:11 196:22
raised (4) 46:24 83:15
196:18 221:17
ran (2) 194:21 222:22
randall (21) 27:15 28:15
33:6 50:1,11 101:16
160:16 161:17 164:4 167:6
168:17,24 200:16
205:8,11,13 206:8,14
217:22 222:11,12
rang (1) 40:24
range (1) 17:7
rank (19) 1:8,14,17,19,22,23
2:7,10 3:12,16 4:22 96:25
97:3 100:3 137:17,22
139:8,14 226:5
ranks (1) 98:8
rapid (7) 114:6,21 115:5,14
116:11 117:4 118:7
rare (5) 23:5,6 134:13,16,17
rather (11) 17:21 24:25
41:14 51:25 52:7,24
140:15 142:8 161:3 180:12
182:3
rationale (1) 80:3
re (1) 219:17
reach (1) 165:9

reached (2) 151:1 191:18
reaction (1) 47:5
reactive (1) 74:9
read (17) 7:2,4 13:11 14:3
16:11 17:21 21:4,10,15
32:14 35:9 112:11 131:2
158:4 192:9 210:20 221:11
readily (1) 26:17
reading (3) 159:21 179:20
231:12
reads (2) 112:2 128:1
ready (8) 24:9 26:1,14,19,21
51:5 120:17 134:5
reaffirm (1) 219:17
real (4) 76:13 136:3 147:3
171:11
realise (4) 93:11 155:23
191:16 194:18
realised (1) 74:21
reality (1) 134:16
really (38) 16:24 17:19 19:9
22:16 25:10 27:3 28:4,13
41:2,24 44:19 62:19
63:2,13 76:20 84:12
117:11 121:16 124:1 137:5
143:3 155:5 173:2
182:23,24 183:20 186:22
189:17 194:8,17 196:12
198:14 200:19 220:5
223:2,11 224:24 225:21
reason (14) 15:21 47:13
71:13 75:14 105:12,19
147:8 155:3 169:4 171:25
206:15 208:15 212:22
217:1
reasonable (3) 76:22,24 95:8
reasoned (2) 38:6 76:15
reasoning (1) 48:17
reasons (6) 9:2 25:2 25:21
111:4 112:18 155:15
recall (42) 3:6 6:8,12 54:4
57:15 92:1 111:21 143:12
144:11 148:21,24 156:17
162:19,23,25 166:1 168:14
169:20,20 170:6 172:6
173:2,16 174:3,9,23
178:19,24 179:17,20
188:12 189:4,17,17,18
211:21 212:1,15
213:6,10,21
recalled (1) 162:22
receive (2) 2:25 140:20
received (10) 6:13 17:12
21:5 39:2 91:11,18 120:18
122:1 149:2 187:8
receiving (2) 63:10,10
recognise (5) 8:10 101:23
102:8 108:6 109:11
recognises (1) 181:6
recognition (1) 9:18
recollect (10) 16:18 17:20
18:1,13,14,20 40:15 44:10
53:17 112:22
recollection (8) 50:25 53:1
54:15 111:20 172:21
178:21 189:1 209:22
recommendation (21) 83:19
101:23,24 102:7,18
103:4,12,13,16,25
104:1,21 111:17,18,22,24
112:7,11 121:20 224:8,9
recommendations (4) 83:19
104:19,25 119:9
reconfigured (1) 34:19
record (3) 77:2,15 210:21
recorded (3) 42:9 136:12
188:12
recording (3) 28:23 37:8 50:6
records (5) 89:17 158:19
170:22 177:24 190:9
reduced (3) 74:1 80:23 81:13
refer (1) 186:3
reference (6) 37:6 89:23
175:13 190:11 218:4
221:23
references (1) 36:23

referred (3) 30:6 34:13 83:2
referring (3) 179:25 190:18
211:9
refers (2) 103:16 221:9
reflected (1) 140:13
reflection (11) 40:10 73:5
83:18 99:9 118:12 153:1
191:13 193:12 200:21
202:14,21
refurbishment (1) 34:17
regard (4) 57:21 82:7 128:12
136:10
regarded (3) 58:3 62:3
135:22
region (2) 167:12 173:1
rehearse (1) 174:25
reinforced (1) 15:3
reinforcement (1) 219:22
reiterate (1) 80:3
related (5) 2:24 139:2 141:7
153:16 192:3
relates (3) 122:5 148:19
197:10
relation (28) 43:7,13,20 45:2
52:8 59:9 83:22 91:6 141:3
146:24 148:9 149:7 151:22
154:16 155:7 156:2 162:7
164:20 179:21 183:5
194:14 197:13 200:6
204:24 214:13 217:7 225:5
227:5
relationship (1) 192:4
released (1) 178:2
relevant (11) 3:12 64:1 81:15
100:16,19 101:17 105:18
145:5 175:19 198:6 202:4
reliable (1) 223:9
reliance (3) 7:19 109:6,8
relieved (5) 72:1 175:1,5,9
179:14
relieving (1) 72:6
rely (1) 228:1
relying (1) 119:14
remain (1) 36:22
remained (4) 61:13 68:12
79:13 175:6
remaining (1) 214:3
remark (1) 119:9
remember (30) 4:22,24
16:25 17:24 20:20 25:1
27:18 31:15 32:13
40:14,22 42:16,17 52:18
54:5 57:14 61:8 80:20
90:10 91:4 91:11,18 120:4
134:14 174:12 207:7,22
210:10 219:25 229:11,20
remind (1) 54:9
reminded (3) 75:21 220:13
221:1
remiss (1) 179:8
remote (3) 52:13 144:5
230:17
remotely (2) 110:4 133:9
removed (1) 208:23
removing (1) 208:21
rendezvous (1) 34:5
repeat (4) 70:10 165:14
213:16 215

requesting (1) 67:8
 requests (4) 46:17 63:20
 67:5 117:11
 require (3) 24:8 27:22
 176:17
 required (21) 5:8 12:7 13:16
 26:2 36:6 44:2 71:23
 78:18 122 86:14 94:10
 96:7,10 103:7 113:14
 120:17 185:16 210:21
 227:3 229:18,19
 requirements (3) 114:24
 117:2,12
 requires (3) 24:17,20 128:4
 requiring (2) 9:15 13:4
 rescinded (2) 136:2,19
 rescue (10) 13:8 55:19 69:13
 70:18 84:19 148:10
 199:19,25 212:8 213:7
 research (2) 32:25 127:12
 resolving (1) 65:11
 resource (1) 145:6
 resourced (1) 8:8
 resources (32) 12:8 26:22
 29:22,24 36:9 42:3 44:1,4
 48:20 53:21 61:12 64:18
 67:7,8,9 73:22 84:2
 92:10,11,17,22 94:7,17
 113:10 117:10 118:8
 144:20 180:6 211:4
 229:18,19 230:8
 resourcing (6) 61:18 65:22
 71:23 76:1 94:11 117:2
 respect (9) 85:12,15 87:6
 88:25 93:2 114:3 116:8
 128:25 212:20
 respond (5) 24:9 26:14 134:9
 135:1,11
 responder (2) 115:1,7
 responders (1) 83:8
 responding (3) 12:19 87:6
 109:4
 response (46) 5:20 10:4
 12:9,19 14:21 18:10 20:7
 22:1 36:5 37:11,15 38:9
 42:4 43:17,21 44:6,14
 45:24 47:9 53:19 57:16
 63:8,19 80:9 81:6 10:10 92:24
 93:13,20 99:10,10,12
 123:18,20,21 125:3 126:4
 129:4 130:3 160:4 163:11
 192:1 196:3 205:18 228:11
 230:4
 responses (2) 124:5 156:3
 responsibilities (4) 26:12
 99:16 114:23 187:14
 responsibility (7) 10:13
 59:19 151:15 152:1,24
 227:13,24
 responsible (4) 10:7 151:6
 152:10 226:12
 rest (1) 24:18
 resting (1) 128:12
 result (6) 23:16 29:16 133:25
 147:21 148:22 209:9
 resulted (2) 220:18,20
 return (1) 104:4
 returned (2) 143:14 158:1
 review (16) 12:3 27:13 31:4
 33:13 66:21 93:11
 103:5,10 133:19 136:21
 172:11 193:25 198:1,2
 201:22 202:18
 reviewed (4) 30:9 57:7
 103:17 130:22
 reviewing (3) 11:23 66:16
 141:3
 reviews (1) 133:18
 rhythm (1) 146:8
 rid (1) 199:24
 right-hand (1) 31:20
 rightly (1) 231:15
 rigid (2) 21:21 226:4
 ring (3) 121:11 136:24
 209:25
 ringing (2) 121:3 161:3

ripa (5) 6:17,22 87:21,24,25
 rising (1) 105:6
 risk (13) 49:3,9,13 63:11
 68:8,12 69:20 70:15 93:3
 114:15 123:8 229:17 230:7
 robust (1) 97:20
 rochdale (2) 139:5 222:22
 role (133) 3:13 4:12 5:19,19
 6:14,21 7:10,25 8:6,22
 9:4,11 10:23,25
 12:12,16,21 16:3,20
 19:6,15,16 20:6,13,18 24:7
 25:24 37:19 38:5 40:12
 58:2,5,8,15,19 59:7 60:25
 62:4 72:17 78:19 79:2
 86:11,22,23,24 87:4
 88:8,11,16 89:23,24
 90:6,24 92:9 95:15
 96:2,10,13,15,16,20,24
 97:3,12,13 100:1,3,5
 102:5,16 103:1 105:18
 106:18 107:5,5,16
 109:3,17 110:2,18,25
 112:4 113:3,15 114:3,3
 115:15 116:21 117:19
 128:11 138:6 139:18
 141:4,7 144:3,5,9,14
 146:4,7,21,25 147:4,10,11
 148:14,19,22 149:11
 157:20 160:24 161:12
 168:2 169:23,24 170:13
 171:15,18 174:21,24
 175:1,10 179:14 180:16,17
 187:9,14 190:25 192:10,12
 197:5 207:12 214:8
 roles (9) 95:11 99:15 100:24
 114:19,23 140:4 146:14
 215:1 218:9
 rolespecific (2) 21:8 192:10
 roll (1) 195:24
 rolled (1) 3:14
 rolling (1) 152:5
 room (79) 5:12,12 20:16
 26:2,13,21,25 34:12,18
 35:13 36:16 41:7 44:3,5
 45:13 46:10,17 50:21
 52:19 53:4 55:3,12 56:13
 59:16 61:4,6 63:1,21 64:7
 65:13 67:13 73:3 79:13
 80:6 82:1,8,11 105:3 106:3
 115:3,9 119:8 120:13
 124:4,19 134:3,7,21,23
 141:18,22
 142:1,5,8,8,11,16,21 144:7
 175:7 177:20 179:4,8
 188:7 189:7 194:22
 195:5,7 196:2,7 208:23
 211:22 217:6 225:24
 230:3,6,19,25 231:15
 rooms (1) 231:17
 rooney (14) 54:13,15 55:16
 56:14 57:15 64:7,11 67:19
 69:6 70:17 115:3 188:13
 196:4 212:5
 rota (9) 4:1,2,14,17,21 6:12
 100:4,5 147:9
 round (5) 17:22 164:18
 172:8 177:20 195:5
 route (7) 40:18,19 44:24
 67:24 94:18 117:15 118:19
 routinely (4) 27:24 29:19
 30:1 125:20
 ruled (1) 68:12
 run (1) 20:11
 rung (2) 121:9,14
 running (2) 73:4 196:17
 rv (2) 135:22 136:4
 rvp (9) 34:1 62:23 131:5,21
 135:20 136:1,5,11 213:14
 rvps (5) 33:23 125:7 136:14
 185:14,17

S

sacrifice (1) 98:14
 safe (5) 48:25 68:21,24
 69:17 198:22

safely (2) 178:21 198:18
 safety (7) 4:11 5:2,4,17
 19:19 72:10 96:16
 same (17) 6:1 37:6 54:16
 55:23 76:2 94:25 100:20
 102:14 104:6 123:25
 126:19 139:14 159:10
 167:18,19 177:19 221:24
 sarge (1) 160:9
 sat (2) 153:21 223:22
 satisfactory (1) 44:14
 satisfied (1) 59:11
 satisfying (1) 93:19
 saunders (203) 3:18,21,23
 11:2 16:11,22
 17:1,5,9,12,17,21
 18:4,16,20 19:23 22:7
 23:13,16,19 25:10 28:23
 29:7,12 39:10,13,18,23
 41:8,18,23 42:15,20,25
 47:11,17,19 48:1 49:11,15
 51:18,21,24 52:4,10,14
 54:9,23 55:2,7 56:25
 58:22,25 59:4,24 66:19
 67:3,11,15,19 68:2
 75:14,18,20 76:5,9,18
 77:1,4,11,24 78:3,6,11
 80:21 81:4,6,18 83:7,10,13
 84:1,4,9,12,25 93:6,15,23
 94:1 97:23 98:12,17,21
 99:1,11,17,20
 104:10,15,18 105:10,24
 106:2,8,11 107:11,15
 119:5,13,17,21,25
 120:9,19 121:1,9,13,25
 122:7,9,14 125:14,21
 126:5 127:6 128:20 129:20
 130:1,3 133:19,22,24
 134:16 135:18
 136:7,10,16,19,22 137:1,5
 154:24 155:9,18,21
 156:5,9 157:11,17 160:25
 161:6 164:24 165:7 168:20
 180:20 181:24 182:20
 183:19,23 184:1,5
 186:9,22 187:3,7 188:2
 193:5,8,15 199:12
 200:7,12,18,22,25
 204:10,13 212:19
 213:5,18,23
 221:6,13,16,22 222:5,25
 223:5,11 224:6 225:2
 227:8,12,16,24 228:6,20
 229:20,24 232:5,10,19
 233:1
 save (2) 114:7 184:23
 saved (1) 48:6
 saville (1) 120:2
 saving (6) 44:19 48:4 68:8
 114:12 199:13 201:1
 savings (1) 138:15
 saw (4) 2:10 15:5 130:14,18
 saying (24) 14:6 15:11 19:23
 30:18 43:19 46:21 48:2
 51:23 57:15 75:24 77:4
 78:12 121:3,15 123:6
 125:24 142:15 155:22
 160:4 162:20 222:12
 223:6,7 228:21
 scale (4) 19:22 20:5 96:5
 98:1
 scenario (3) 3:9 5:4 118:2
 scene (97) 8:19,25 9:5,13
 15:4 21:17,20 29:22 30:12
 32:24 44:25 46:5,12,23
 47:14,22,24 48:10 49:2
 51:4 53:20 63:22 65:23
 66:17,25 72:24 79:24,25
 92:20 93:21 94:4,6,15
 103:7 104:2 107:25 108:18
 109:23 110:1,4,22
 111:3,8,9,14,19,25
 112:9,13,19 113:4,11
 114:13 115:19,25
 117:10,15 118:9,17,23,25
 119:8,12 129:5,7
 130:6,8,23

131:12,13,20,22
 132:10,13,19,22 142:15
 143:4 144:5,17,19
 145:7,8,11 148:10 192:18
 193:9,14 210:25 223:25
 224:3,10 225:12,23
 226:1,16,21
 scenes (2) 9:6 20:19
 schedule (16) 28:17 42:7
 49:19 52:20 53:12 60:6,9
 158:11,17 168:9 169:11,13
 170:9 205:5 209:2 222:10
 scheduled (1) 91:25
 scheme (1) 102:17
 screen (13) 7:7 30:22 34:25
 50:2 89:17 101:8 102:13
 109:15 208:17 214:16
 216:17 217:13 218:17
 scrutinising (1) 156:11
 se (2) 91:13 179:25
 search (7) 30:5 38:8
 39:14,16,24 41:12,25
 searched (1) 30:20
 second (19) 7:16 13:17
 31:10,25 43:2 86:14
 103:25 109:25 123:25
 127:25 128:5 130:20
 135:10 169:17 178:16
 198:1 204:24 207:17 221:9
 secondary (2) 48:11 68:11
 secondly (2) 85:19 144:14
 seconds (14) 28:7 52:25
 53:15,16 71:17 158:21
 160:11 169:18 170:1
 172:20 173:14 189:8
 206:7,24
 secret (1) 29:7
 section (8) 10:2 15:12,13,16
 16:1,12 222:10,13
 see (86) 7:9,15,22 10:2,18,25
 12:17 13:11,15 15:15 22:6
 26:18 28:21 29:12 31:3,9
 33:18,22 34:9,22 35:20
 37:9 41:7 42:8 45:13 46:20
 47:17 53:20 60:6 75:22
 83:4 84:16 85:2,8 87:19,22
 88:3 90:8 101:12,18
 102:22 109:5 114:2,9,19
 127:22 128:10 130:25
 136:7 141:10 145:20
 156:6,13,21 160:12 161:14
 168:10,23 169:10,17,25
 170:16,17 172:12,14
 173:9,11 177:24,25 183:19
 188:16 189:23 190:9
 205:12,16,20 206:20
 209:10,10,20 214:19,21
 217:16 218:2,9 219:9
 seeing (1) 188:17
 seek (6) 66:7 68:20 85:11
 123:9,9 231:21
 seeking (4) 53:24 91:9
 170:6,23
 seem (6) 2:19 22:18 66:23
 155:3,4 186:23
 seemed (1) 72:14
 seems (4) 156:18 169:13
 227:8 232:5
 seen (10) 19:3 44:11 60:9
 83:3 94:24 95:4 113:12
 156:5 158:10 166:19
 selecting (1) 41:18
 selfdeploy (2) 120:10,16
 selfdeployed (5) 119:11,13
 120:6 165:11 169:23
 selfdeploying (1) 61:8
 send (6) 109:25 219:21,24
 220:2,4,9
 sending (1) 17:22
 senior (9) 40:18 60:19 72:12
 73:1 121:17 153:7 157:3
 166:13,19
 sense (10) 20:5 25:24 44:15
 67:22 68:14 158:6
 164:15,15 206:9 226:24
 sensible (1) 227:9

sent (14) 17:24 117:15
 151:12 154:8 214:19 215:5
 218:25 219:8,9,20,23
 220:1,3,9
 sentence (3) 31:10 35:23
 109:7
 separate (3) 45:23 135:13
 165:21
 september (1) 89:21
 sequence (3) 115:21 173:5
 174:25
 sergeant (10) 1:15 24:3
 30:10,13 32:18 33:13 54:6
 61:16 78:16 137:22
 serious (6) 8:6 9:6 20:22
 27:9 95:17 96:6
 service (27) 14:16 44:20
 55:19 56:6 64:6 69:13
 75:24 76:10 84:19 131:8
 141:20,24 148:10
 163:22,23 164:18 165:4
 181:2 190:15 196:5 203:20
 203:4 212:7,8 213:8,13
 230:4
 services (9) 13:6 32:1 48:10
 55:4,5 76:14 163:19
 182:12 204:2
 session (1) 60:5
 set (28) 5:6 10:9,10 21:21
 41:6 44:3 45:13 46:10
 50:21 51:23 55:3 61:11
 82:1,14,15 86:15 87:4,16
 94:10 97:12 98:18 111:6
 134:5,9 175:15 187:1
 192:17 213:14
 sets (2) 136:5 229:5
 setting (9) 11:16 51:19 52:8
 82:7,12 105:4 106:4 135:1
 146:8
 settingup (4) 46:13,16 52:5
 117:14
 settled (1) 142:12
 several (1) 205:9
 severe (1) 122:21
 sexton (18) 37:10,23 68:18
 92:5 101:16 110:12 111:23
 155:18 160:8 204:19,24
 206:17,21,22 207:16
 217:21 222:21 223:8
 sfc (1) 202:24
 shadowed (3) 87:16,17,23
 shadowing (10) 6:20 24:4
 30:14 86:4 87:15,24 88:10
 100:10 102:17,23
 shall (3) 47:21 121:3 145:20
 shapes (1) 17:10
 share (7) 39:1 70:18,19
 118:11,19 183:9 229:16
 shared (6) 17:25 69:4 70:16
 71:6 102:1 195:10
 sharing (6) 70:7,14,25 71:3
 118:14 183:11
 sheer (2) 63:12 64:19
 sherlock (3) 216:15,16
 218:16
 shes (1) 24:4
 shifts (1) 151:21
 shoes (1) 182:15
 shooter (5) 48:23 69:10
 188:25 189:16,20
 shooters (1) 114:16
 shooting (2) 57:8
 short (22) 42:9 49:17 60:2
 73:16 74:2,5,6,16,25 75:21
 77:14 82:20 122:5 123:1
 124:7 127:25 128:17 131:2
 172:16 204:9,16,22
 shortage (4) 105:3 106:3
 107:23 108:3
 shortly (12) 36:13 40:21
 41:7 45:14 49:24 54:8
 71:17 160:2 170:19,24
 188:12 211:22
 shots (1) 190:24
 should (58) 9:11 12:22 15:10
 22:14 33:24 38:18 40:9

45:9 65:1 66:8,10 77:4
 99:6 6 103:8,17 111:19
 112:13 118:12 120:24
 122:4,22 123:1,14,18
 124:5 125:24 130:7 132:25
 134:5 142:10,15,16 143:3
 151:3 152:23 153:1,2,23
 154:22 155:13 156:12
 174:19 177:1
 192:12,14,18 193:10
 195:17,20,17 206:20
 224:10,11 225:19,22
 226:11 228:12
 shouldnt (2) 202:9 230:19
 show (1) 81:19
 shows (1) 89:11
 side (5) 89:20 124:25 166:11
 209:10 210:13
 sign (1) 100:1
 signed (1) 86:7
 significance (3) 109:3
 220:16,24
 significant (6) 28:2,13
 100:23 105:1 122:23 126:8
 significantcritical (1) 9:16
 significantly (2) 65:7 114:20
 silver (292) 2:14,17 3:25
 4:1,2,6,10,11,16,17
 5:1,3,7,8,11,17,19
 6:4,12,24 7:21 8:5,19,22
 9:5 10:3,7 12:16 15:4 16:4
 17:3,8 19:4,15,16,19
 20:14,15,16 21:16 24:7,13
 26:2,13,13,21,25 27:1
 35:13 41:6 44:3 45:13
 46:10,13,14 47:6 50:18
 51:14,19 52:5 53:4,25
 54:12 55:3,12 57:22
 139:13 140:6 141:2 145:2
 146:1,20 147:15 148:12
 149:9,13,25 150:16
 151:2,25 153:1,25
 69:13,14,24 70:5,17
 72:1,7,17,18 73:3,17 76:6
 79:13,25 80:6 82:1,7,10
 85:15 86:8,12,19,20,22,24
 87:3,14 88:8,11,16,25
 90:14,16,24 91:2,20 92:9
 94:3 95:9,12,15,19,24,25
 96:10,11,13,15,18,24
 97:7,12 98:4,23 99:5,12
 100:2,8,20 102:2,4,15
 103:1,7,15,21 104:2
 106:22 107:16,25
 108:18,23 109:10,15
 110:1,5,6,14,22
 111:6,8,13,19,25
 112:3,13,20 113:4,15
 114:2,18 115:3 117:11,14
 118:9,22 119:7,8,10,15
 120:13 121:1 122:21 123:4
 128:10,11 130:4,16 132:25
 133:1,3 134:5,7,9
 140:9,12,17
 141:5,17,17,20,24
 142:4,7,10,15,20
 143:4,7,12,13,17
 164:20,25 169:23
 171:16,19,21,23 172:1
 174:11,13,24 175:2,3,7
 177:11,12 179:4,10
 180:13,24 182:8
 183:4,23,23 184:4,6,12
 187:9 188:14 189:6,19,21
 191:1 193:6,9 194:4
 195:13 197:5,17 198:3
 202:2,5 205:10 206:11
 208:6,9,12 223:23,24
 224:4,10,11,19,21,23,23
 225:10,13,13,14,15,18,22,24,24
 226:8,25 227:13 228:5,18
 230:3,5,16 231:19
 silvers (5) 4:23 107:4 109:1
 226:6 227:24
 similar (4) 54:17 95:3
 167:13,16

similarly (2) 69:22 125:17
 simple (3) 194:18 220:3,5
 since (10) 7:4 15:18,19 19:4
 21:11 81:3 83:11 97:16
 140:13 195:14
 single (2) 44:18 169:12
 sio (2) 40:17 117:15
 sir (345) 1:3 3:18,21,23 11:2
 16:11,22
 17:1,5,6,9,12,17,21
 18:4,16,20,19,23 22:7,12
 23:13,16,19 25:10 28:23
 29:7,12 39:10,11,13,18,23
 41:8,15,18,23
 42:1,15,20,25 47:11,17,19
 48:1 49:11,15 51:18,21,24
 52:4,10,14 54:9,23 55:2,7
 56:25 58:22,25 59:4,20,24
 66:19 67:3,11,15,19 68:2
 75:14,18,20,23 76:5,9,18
 77:1,4,11,24 78:3,6,11
 80:21 81:4,6,

133:14 201:18 202:20
 224:13 225:16 230:17
situational (19) 32:19 57:18
 66:13,14,18 70:7
 115:8,11,14 146:10 178:14
 179:21 186:15 189:10
 195:10 229:16,17 230:7,19
situationally (1) 225:11
situations (1) 43:14
sizes (1) 17:10
skill (1) 5:6
skills (13) 86:15,21 87:5
 97:12 98:6 101:5,22
 103:5,10,17 166:8,17
 197:24
slater (1) 122:2
slightly (1) 82:4
slow (1) 41:18
slowly (1) 30:19
slt (2) 157:1,1
smith (44) 46:2 60:11 62:11
 65:18,19,20 66:25 67:25
 68:24 71:16,19 79:7 83:15
 115:18 116:18,22
 118:2,4,12,20 131:14
 132:2,17 136:1,20 145:8
 182:25,25 183:20
 186:10,16 211:12,14,15
 212:19 213:2,6,20,22
 223:22,24 224:3,24 233:14
smiths (1) 210:11
social (2) 158:4 160:1
solution (1) 38:13
somebody (16) 46:23 48:24
 49:6 53:13 55:12 60:15
 64:8 77:25 110:1
 186:12,17 187:23 189:13
 196:18 204:1 228:25
someone (11) 47:13,21 52:7
 81:25 104:15 112:8 119:14
 121:11 152:24 168:20,25
something (64) 6:4 14:20,21
 17:1 28:2 31:13 38:1 39:14
 48:17 62:3 67:20 74:1
 77:6,25 78:24 93:3,6,17
 94:11 101:5 124:5 129:12
 135:7,19 146:23 147:3
 150:8,9 153:23 154:22
 155:12,16 156:21 157:7
 158:8 162:21 164:22
 177:23 181:1,25 182:2
 185:25 186:2 189:8 192:21
 193:12,17 195:7
 196:15,18,22 202:21 210:1
 213:16 219:19 223:2
 225:19 226:3,15 228:5
 229:9 231:8,18 232:4
sometimes (4) 34:13 47:4
 231:14,15
somewhere (1) 76:11
soon (6) 4:2,12 48:9 167:8
 191:6 199:25
sooner (3) 66:8,9 135:16
sort (24) 5:15 17:13,22 18:11
 20:7,22 22:12 40:16 59:12
 68:7 78:9 92:22 97:21 98:5
 99:8 125:22 148:4 149:10
 155:25 161:8 177:17
 187:19 188:25 221:19
sorting (1) 210:7
sorts (2) 17:10 126:19
sought (3) 95:3 123:14 147:8
sound (4) 19:11 22:15
 164:24 200:22
sounds (1) 19:11
source (3) 105:15 116:6,9
speak (15) 65:18 67:4
 69:12 222 86:8 112:20
 115:3,4,21 116:3 151:11
 160:16 173:6 179:6 195:16
speaking (16) 33:8 36:14
 58:17 60:12 66:16 112:22
 116:13 117:16 142:13
 160:9 169:18 172:21
 173:16 188:12 210:10
 222:11

special (2) 13:5 23:25
specialism (1) 165:2
specialisms (4) 45:23 76:14
 96:7 165:5
specialist (9) 78:18,21
 92:11,12,16,24 94:4
 138:18 168:21
specific (15) 6:15,22 16:19
 17:20 35:10 63:8 76:12
 87:22 88:10 106:18 129:2
 192:10 215:1 217:6,9
specifically (18) 3:16 6:19
 16:15 18:1 43:20,24 64:3
 91:5 94:25 95:16 97:19
 106:10,17 116:17 117:3
 218:6 219:9
specifics (1) 20:20
spectrum (1) 117:9
speed (2) 36:16 77:16
spent (1) 163:25
spinning (1) 177:17
split (1) 91:5
spoke (15) 27:15 35:7 36:13
 40:23 63:14 69:5 110:12
 113:1 116:22 159:8 171:12
 179:14 189:3 205:11 210:9
spoken (16) 35:16 59:13
 60:22 62:9 69:16 80:17
 112:15 156:19 168:1
 169:21 170:2 178:8 179:9
 196:3,4,5
spontaneous (12) 5:20 22:10
 86:25 87:7 88:12,22
 134:10 142:24 143:1,2
 144:6 186:5
spread (1) 64:20
square (1) 118:10
stabbing (1) 223:15
stadium (3) 125:17,18
 142:11
staff (42) 49:23 61:21 82:12
 103:6,11,15 134:5
 146:5,11,21,22 147:4
 150:19 151:14,17,21
 152:12 159:1 166:3,14
 169:21 176:9,16 177:3,4
 178:10,25 195:3 214:24
 216:13,21
 218:3,5,19,21,24
 219:1,17,22 220:2,25
 223:12
stage (24) 20:14 57:10 58:3
 74:17 84:16 110:13 116:23
 118:5 129:8 131:9 132:21
 164:11 169:22 170:11
 178:11 179:1 189:16
 192:22 193:2 199:17
 208:24 212:16 227:21
 231:3
stages (2) 39:19 66:22
standard (1) 26:24
start (8) 11:3 32:19 44:5
 45:24 61:17,18 101:9
 192:16
started (14) 25:10 29:17
 61:6,7 64:15,16 77:18
 92:21 97:18 162:9 164:10
 166:12 169:16 195:19
starting (1) 33:13
starts (1) 169:13
statement (22) 2:22 6:3 9:1
 35:19,23 43:2 81:9 82:10
 85:17,23 86:13,14 88:6,17
 130:20 131:3 138:11
 140:11 141:9 175:20,23
 177:8
states (2) 125:10 181:1
station (15) 23:23 25:12,14
 34:17 42:23 51:5 62:24
 71:21 130:12 133:10
 143:11 208:22 211:15
 213:7 224:20
stations (1) 133:12
stay (2) 48:15 188:7
stayed (1) 130:4
stemmed (1) 135:25

step (10) 36:21 37:2 39:1,6
 47:7 72:15 113:6 153:8
 192:23,25
stepping (1) 174:22
steps (4) 102:9,21 115:4
 117:13
steve (2) 60:15,19
still (9) 47:3 50:16 54:23
 68:13 89:14 178:25 199:22
 208:21 222:1
stone (1) 192:17
stop (1) 74:5
stopped (2) 75:2 77:22
stopping (1) 74:10
stored (1) 218:16
straight (1) 139:1
straightaway (2) 159:12
 173:4
straightforward (1) 187:4
strategic (7) 9:12 116:19
 184:15,22 186:23 187:3
 199:13
strategies (1) 148:2
strategy (19) 10:5,9,20,25
 11:1,3,5 68:8 74:10,14,15
 148:2,3 183:13 184:23
 185:4,9 200:25 201:1
strategically (1) 74:13
streaming (1) 190:23
street (2) 62:23 125:1
strike (1) 145:6
struck (1) 145:14
structure (13) 9:16 63:24
 109:18 114:23 116:17,18
 122:11 132:6 140:3
 165:18,19 196:8 226:4
structured (6) 101:7,10
 104:8 111:16 196:19,23
structures (3) 8:9 94:19,21
stuff (3) 166:16 210:8 231:23
subsequently (2) 1:23 137:23
subsidiary (1) 123:11
substantial (7) 20:6 44:12
 52:24 141:13 148:9 155:10
 178:22
substantive (1) 139:12
succeeded (1) 169:18
suddenly (1) 191:16
sufficiently (1) 27:21
suggest (19) 14:17 15:8
 50:23 90:8 103:9 110:8
 111:24 112:7 114:6 147:25
 151:5 167:22 172:6
 181:15,19 219:13 220:16
 228:16 230:18
suggested (5) 33:23 105:7
 114:4 130:3 136:5
suggesting (1) 122:14
suggestion (4) 132:24 201:4
 231:2,7
suggestions (1) 221:16
suggests (1) 112:11
suitable (2) 226:13,22
suitably (1) 11:9
summarise (2) 50:7 68:20
summarising (1) 60:5
summary (5) 14:22 15:1
 21:14 49:17 100:25
summoning (1) 93:8
superintendent (117)
 1:5,10,11 2:1,3,7
 4:3,8,12,13,20 8:5 10:12
 13:12 16:20 19:5 35:2
 37:1,17 47:15,25 59:10,22
 60:4,24 72:1,2 77:19
 79:3,16 81:16 83:16 84:14
 85:8 87:23 88:2 89:20
 96:17,25 97:17 100:3,6
 101:10,13,19 104:14
 105:21 106:17 118:8
 119:2,20,23 120:2,6,7
 127:17 130:7 133:4,6
 137:4,5,15,18
 139:9,12,15,20,21 144:22
 145:18 146:18 149:4
 151:15 153:4 154:20

155:12 156:22
 157:14,15,18 165:21
 170:6,12 173:16,23 174:3
 175:5 179:11 180:9,10
 187:9 191:3 193:5,9,13
 197:6,8 200:11 201:24
 203:25 204:7,20,22 205:1
 207:12 211:15 214:3,8,18
 225:25 226:6,8,9 232:8
 233:3,10
superintendents (9) 6:20
 7:20 88:7 102:11 109:9
 119:24 127:13 139:22,25
supervisor (6) 29:23 51:22
 82:6 165:11 205:8 206:2
supervisors (2) 166:10
 217:19
supplies (1) 159:18
support (33) 32:1 42:4
 45:1,24 62:16 72:17 92:23
 94:10 100:21
 102:8,9,10,19,20
 103:13,23 116:19,21,21
 118:18 120:5 157:16 164:9
 165:24 174:11
 176:18,20,23,23 177:1
 188:7 197:19 218:15
supporter (1) 127:8
supporting (3) 63:8 166:19
 175:10
supportive (1) 172:25
suppose (6) 11:2 68:1
 177:18 179:9 182:4 200:2
sure (46) 12:19 13:24 25:3
 26:17,23 28:13 29:14
 32:13,16 33:10 42:18
 57:9,11 60:17 64:17 71:24
 73:6 80:14 93:17
 104:11,24 106:9 107:6,10
 112:25 126:13 128:14
 130:24 134:22 135:15
 141:23 142:2 152:24 153:9
 157:4 158:5 160:23 166:5
 181:24 189:11 193:10
 195:3 212:24 216:24
 222:25 228:1
suspect (1) 189:25
suspicious (2) 190:6 194:14
suter (1) 85:1
swing (1) 175:25
switched (1) 53:25
sworn (5) 1:4,5 137:15
 233:3,11
synopsis (1) 17:23
system (7) 29:9 161:2,10,11
 175:15,17,25
systems (2) 11:17 138:14

T

152:2 153:19 157:19
 169:24 195:13,17 212:3
 215:18 219:7
takes (2) 38:21 228:21
taking (23) 5:19 20:6 27:16
 33:6 49:24 53:1 58:13 59:7
 85:5 94:14 115:20 118:11
 122:23 137:6 166:22
 171:19,23 172:1 179:18
 188:3,4 195:3 215:23
talk (11) 21:19 32:4 40:25
 51:16 61:3 92:21 183:11
 186:4 192:3 203:8,23
talked (2) 108:13 231:12
talking (6) 24:23 48:11
 66:22 124:25 125:1 204:25
talks (1) 71:3
task (2) 82:3 174:13
tasked (5) 81:25 150:11
 177:10 178:9,9
tasking (2) 151:7 173:2
taught (3) 14:5,8 120:16
tcg (14) 196:3,8,19,23
 229:15,25,26 26:2,8
 231:11,12,14,16,21
tcgroundtheroom (1) 197:3
tcgs (1) 177:21
team (6) 54:23 72:12 83:3
 122:2 157:3 158:15
teams (1) 60:19
technical (2) 39:15,16
telephone (26) 24:14 27:9
 28:22 52:17,22 53:8 57:1
 79:6 158:18,19,20,23
 159:9,14,24 160:13,15
 168:4,11 172:17 176:13,19
 190:10 206:7,10 209:14
telephones (1) 176:12
telephony (2) 175:15,25
telling (1) 189:6
tells (2) 37:10,15
temperature (1) 198:24
temporary (9) 2:1,3 4:3,8,20
 19:5 97:16 139:9,15
ten (3) 142:4 158:4 165:4
tens (2) 20:9,9
term (4) 57:10 143:21
 192:5,23
termed (1) 154:2
terminal (2) 53:7 54:1
termining (1) 156:14
terminology (4) 106:22
 143:23 177:18 181:12
terms (66) 5:10,15 10:24
 16:11,20 20:20 22:20
 27:4,23 28:10,11 30:9
 31:17 34:4 37:11 42:2
 47:24 49:4 56:19 59:16
 60:5 64:16 65:8 67:25
 68:14 69:22 70:23 71:7,20
 74:15,19 75:4 76:1 80:4
 88:10 92:22 94:2 96:3,22
 98:9 100:17 103:21 105:18
 108:8 112:15,19 113:10
 111:4,10,23 12:3,19
 46:4,24 54:7 56:1,4,6
 57:24 69:8 70:8,16
 72:10,17 73:10,18,24
 74:6,16,25 80:9 81:21
 91:14 111:12 113:15
 114:2,5,18 116:19
 117:18,23 118:5,9,24
 132:21 138:9 140:21
 143:4,18,21
 144:2,4,10,12,16,19
 145:7,15 179:23,25
 180:3,4,24 181:5,15,18
 182:2,9,18,21
 183:2,6,10,17 184:2,14
 185:1,5,12,19 186:6,14,20
 187:2,4 192:17 194:1,20
 195:23 199:6 201:24
 202:24 224:23 225:22
 226:11,25 229:20
taken (21) 2:22 23:21 51:6
 74:24,24 95:15 102:9,21
 111:16 128:9 144:5,14

172:12,13 217:24
tfc (7) 38:10 112:21
 156:7,12,13 202:23 207:12
tfgm (2) 196:6 232:2
thank (69) 3:23 16:10 18:4
 23:19 49:15 52:14 59:25
 68:2 81:20 83:14 84:14,21
 85:7,10 86:10 89:2 90:3
 94:1 99:20,22 101:2,11,21
 102:12 103:3,24 104:17
 107:3,19 109:13 119:2,4,5
 121:25 128:15,20 133:22
 137:1,2 150:10 155:9 156:9
 157:17 165:7 187:7 203:24
 204:6 211:11 213:22,23
 214:2,23 215:5,20 217:24
 219:4 221:4,5 222:3,4,5
 231:10
 232:6,10,11,15,17,19
thanks (1) 193:15
thatd (1) 89:15
thats (11) 1:25 2:2,23 5:1
 8:21 16:5 17:1 19:2,8
 22:23,25,26 26:2,8
 27:3,8,11 29:1,15 32:23
 34:23 38:2 58:22 59:4,19
 62:1 64:5,7 66:3 67:15
 75:25 76:22 77:16 78:22
 79:18,19 82:4,9,17 83:10
 85:15 87:10 89:2 90:3
 92:18 93:22 95:8
 96:11,19,19 98:17 99:16
 100:20 101:8 103:24
 104:23 105:18 106:15,17
 110:17 112:2,15 121:18
 122:3 123:21 130:1 134:14
 137:8 140:14,17 145:12
 149:6 151:24 157:5 159:13
 160:24 161:13,18 162:21
 163:2 164:17 170:2
 173:3,9 175:23 179:2,25
 181:12 184:25 187:2
 188:6,25 191:25 207:15
 210:18 211:11 213:22
 214:17 216:21 217:23
 219:16 220:11 222:3,25
 225:8 227:16 228:6,16,23
 231:10
theme (2) 101:3,22
themeselves (2) 36:21 124:17
thereafter (2) 36:13 206:18
thered (1) 69:1
therefore (7) 126:22 134:6
 151:14 165:17 186:3
 199:15,16
theres (49) 4:9 7:11 23:3
 24:17 27:2 41:8 42:18
 48:24 52:22 63:4,5,24
 76:18 78:22 80:11 82:18
 94:13 99:9 100:21 101:25
 104:25 127:11 146:8,10
 149:21 151:19 158:5
 164:8,15 165:15 176:4
 181:1 182:5 195:3 196:21
 197:1 202:23,23,24 213:2
 217:18 218:25 219:25
 223:8 224:14 227:18,19
 228:7,24
theyd (6) 55:22 115:9
 152:19 185:15 215:7,11
theyre (12) 16:5 22:16 23:5
 29:20 39:19 41:19 42:23
 59:4 75:25 76:20 99:1
 152:7
theyve (2) 22:21 228:1
thing (20) 27:5 29:18 36:14
 38:15 40:6 47:10 67:11
 76:5 96:20 99:1 135:21,25
 161:8 183:9 188:25 193:11
 196:20 202:4 203:1 209:17
thinking (24) 17:2,6 23:2,13
 30:17 31:18 36:3 38:1
 48:16 59:12 65:7 72:6 84:8
 89:11 90:12 91:16 92:7
 111:11 164:7 167:20 183:2
 192:21 202:23 203:19

thinkingbased (1) 138:14
thinks (1) 128:18
third (11) 11:8 12:6 32:3
 33:19 37:7 49:17 89:19
 104:5 108:21 110:4 209:4
thompson (8) 62:23 112:23
 170:4,6,12 173:12,16
 207:12
thompsons (1) 172:17
thornton (5) 54:6 158:24,25
 159:8,24
though (4) 24:5 143:13
 216:8 220:8
thought (31) 7:10 35:14
 36:17 44:16 45:16 46:20
 55:22 58:18 59:17 62:5
 65:23 68:15 76:17 78:11
 90:15 109:22 126:2 129:10
 144:25 148:18

<p>192:24,25 193:4,14 194:7,17 195:16 197:4 200:5,10 204:4 207:10 208:8,20,24 210:10 211:18 212:5 213:8,12,13 216:11 217:12 220:4 222:6,20 223:4,18 224:24 228:13,17 229:6,25 timed (4) 122:6 158:19 159:3 172:16 timeline (1) 77:18 timely (1) 176:1 times (7) 19:6,8,10,13 35:20 130:24 198:13 timing (6) 42:6 53:23 115:17 159:23 205:6 207:3 timings (5) 24:11 30:9 62:20 64:18 193:25 tin (1) 183:6 tip (2) 12:15 110:9 title (1) 30:7 titled (1) 153:12 today (6) 118:21 216:1,4 219:16,18 232:9 together (15) 50:7 56:15,16 60:20 83:6 150:12 158:16 159:7 168:22 173:1 183:18 184:7 188:5 192:14 230:16 told (37) 14:5 27:21 30:10 37:17 43:5 45:25 51:24 56:23 57:1 62:9 67:11 69:17 70:15 92:5 117:13 130:11 133:2 155:13,18 161:18 167:5 171:5 175:9 178:11 179:13,18 198:9,21 200:12 206:2,8,11 211:7 215:22 218:1,7,17 tony (2) 53:13,18 too (3) 41:15 186:14 187:20 took (32) 33:11 34:17 50:14 68:16,19 73:8 78:12 101:10 109:1,13 110:8 115:4,24 118:8 121:16 145:20 146:2 147:5 153:8 164:1 180:23 181:17 182:17 187:12 196:17 198:3 199:3,21 202:2 208:5,19 230:10 tool (1) 22:24 topic (12) 101:2,4 104:5 108:21,22 123:25 145:4 191:13 204:25 207:17 214:3,13 topics (2) 85:11 204:22 touch (1) 203:1 touched (1) 36:2 touching (1) 111:4 tour (5) 24:18,24 26:14 61:14 158:1 towards (6) 3:8 75:10 205:12 217:24 218:7 222:12 track (3) 78:17 139:24 169:25 trafford (3) 126:12,14,20 tragedy (3) 2:6 22:18 139:11 tragic (1) 220:18 tragically (2) 123:18 126:8 trail (2) 11:15,20 train (5) 3:10 143:11 151:20 224:20 229:5 trained (14) 4:25 5:7 43:6 82:13 93:4 97:19 98:10 107:24 108:4 163:15 172:24 201:12 215:7,11 training (74) 2:9,12,24,25 3:1,5,7,11,14,17 4:17 5:7 6:12,15,18,22 14:20 16:13,13,16,19 17:12 18:13 21:1,6 78:18,22 85:13 87:6,8,20,25 89:12,13,17,25 90:5,9,11,25 91:18,25 95:1 97:11,25 98:3,21 99:6,7,13 100:21 101:3,4,22 102:4,15 103:23 108:8,9,13 141:8,16</p>	<p>142:14 152:13,15,19 164:20,22 165:1,15 166:18 180:16,18,21 transcript (5) 28:18,20,21 36:22 209:6 transfer (1) 139:5 transport (2) 27:25 29:19 transportation (1) 13:8 travel (6) 25:17,22 26:9,18 133:17 134:7 travelling (5) 172:4,7 173:17 178:7,13 treatment (1) 114:13 tri (1) 83:7 triaged (1) 208:21 triangency (3) 76:13 83:2,8 tried (7) 32:16 53:9 56:9 60:10 65:14 159:11 169:2 troops (2) 186:12,13 trouble (2) 137:6 152:2 trust (1) 232:14 try (8) 32:19 41:15 56:1 60:18 115:4 147:1 177:4 227:25 trying (19) 28:5 38:1 41:19 56:8 59:15 63:12 70:23 74:15 91:15 95:22 97:10 120:14 122:9 142:12 151:25 155:6 160:24 185:13 224:8 tuesday (1) 232:22 turn (25) 2:9 19:3 22:5 35:22 43:1 54:24 82:19 84:18,22 85:4 127:11 128:15 141:9 157:18 160:6 161:12 170:14 174:19 178:9 182:7 203:2,5 205:20 206:4 213:24 turned (5) 16:1 120:13 172:8 181:17 182:8 turning (4) 121:4 160:22,23 199:11 tweaked (1) 215:23 twice (1) 19:24 type (1) 129:8 typical (1) 27:11 U ultimately (2) 43:6 60:11 unacceptable (7) 180:22 181:10,11,19,23 182:10,13 unarmed (20) 46:4 66:23 68:5,24 69:18 79:25 94:9 99:10,12 112:1 114:4 115:20,25 116:8 145:6,15 186:13 198:18 202:25 209:19 uncertain (2) 2:19 38:13 uncertainty (10) 14:1 38:12,13,23 40:5,11 43:3 65:5,8,11 underneath (2) 33:24 139:19 understand (52) 9:22 10:12 11:18 12:2,11 13:18 25:25 28:4 37:18,22 43:3,18 47:3 48:3 55:13 56:8 63:14 81:25 83:9,10 92:10 95:11,22 99:14 107:6,10 114:22 115:2,24 120:9 122:5,10 142:12 147:5,20 148:6,8 149:16 150:13 151:25 160:25 161:7 163:6,9,13 166:15,17 194:20 197:21 208:20 217:4 227:8 understandable (1) 154:25 understanding (45) 5:11 6:21 8:22 9:4 10:23 12:22 13:13 28:11 32:20 43:23 61:14,19 72:8 90:13 92:13,15 95:23,24 96:1 98:9 102:5 103:20 115:10 123:23 127:17 128:6 147:22 148:21 150:15 151:10,13 162:4,5,18 163:3,18 166:16 186:18</p>	<p>189:14 195:9 207:21 216:9 217:8 224:25 231:22 understandings (1) 162:17 understood (20) 24:22 29:18 35:5 45:21 82:15 88:24 90:3,10,19 91:6,24 108:10 115:13 141:23 149:10,21 158:25 171:13 212:12 216:23 undertake (11) 2:11,14 32:12 87:5 113:22 138:20 146:4 168:2 180:17 192:12 197:3 undertaken (5) 4:16 19:7,15 20:18 179:24 undertaking (7) 6:14 8:23 25:5 63:23 64:25 65:2 171:18 undertook (4) 86:12 89:13 138:12 175:10 underway (1) 82:5 undocumented (1) 73:12 unfolding (1) 38:22 unfortunately (5) 183:14 186:16 200:10 225:8 228:4 unhelpful (1) 34:25 unilaterally (1) 43:13 unit (3) 6:17 87:25 138:9 united (1) 128:24 uniteds (1) 125:18 unless (4) 82:18 137:3 210:21 232:8 unlikely (1) 169:14 unnatural (1) 47:10 unpick (3) 41:16 62:19 63:13 unprecedented (1) 181:20 unrealistic (5) 26:15 70:24 74:17,23 77:12 unreasonable (2) 70:5 71:5 unsafe (1) 68:4 unsure (1) 10:24 until (20) 55:3,8 59:8,10 61:4 78:1,3,12,12 79:13 99:25 112:4 115:22 116:3 178:7 196:9,13 206:16 219:8 232:21 unusual (2) 8:7 95:17 update (8) 12:4 71:18 177:25 210:2,19,22 218:3 219:21 updated (2) 31:6 181:4 updates (7) 65:21 67:22,23 100:16,18 194:14 195:4 updating (2) 11:23 221:25 uploaded (1) 216:14 upon (8) 43:3 105:15 126:16 140:13 178:17 179:7 215:7,11 upset (1) 127:6 upside (1) 26:17 urgency (1) 41:10 urgent (1) 196:15 used (9) 4:24 31:11 107:4 150:14,23 152:13 181:25 182:2 216:10 useful (5) 22:7,23 36:14 76:20 196:24 using (1) 138:14 usual (2) 166:2,5 usually (3) 144:6 226:6 230:17 utilising (1) 181:3 V vacuum (1) 132:22 valid (1) 222:1 various (3) 15:15 33:16 135:1 vast (1) 72:16 vehicle (1) 33:1 vehicles (2) 93:13 194:15 velocity (1) 78:10 venue (3) 123:13 124:25 125:5 venues (4) 124:8,13 125:11 128:23</p>	<p>verified (1) 82:5 version (4) 31:3,6 105:9 156:15 versus (1) 49:4 via (5) 11:17 128:3,8 194:12 218:1 victims (1) 64:15 victoria (4) 68:25 69:19 143:11 224:20 video (3) 76:13 83:2,8 viewed (1) 44:22 virtually (1) 54:17 visit (2) 125:22 126:23 visited (1) 124:21 visits (6) 124:1,2 125:17 126:12 127:3 128:23 vital (1) 107:13 vodafone (1) 175:17 voice (1) 41:10 volume (4) 63:2,12 64:19 78:9 voluntarily (1) 119:15 volunteer (1) 24:1 volunteered (12) 119:10,20,21,23 146:25 147:3,10,11 161:4 197:17 205:24 232:12 volunteering (2) 205:9 232:15 volunteers (1) 176:10 W wait (2) 56:2 196:23 waiting (4) 54:23 147:25 196:19 231:16 walk (1) 45:7 walked (1) 182:15 wanderers (1) 127:8 wants (3) 37:2 205:20 206:3 warm (6) 163:14,20,21 200:4 210:24 228:15 warning (1) 36:20 warnock (3) 84:19,20,21 wasnt (53) 3:16 4:15 14:3,9 16:17 17:5,19,25 25:22 26:20,21,24 30:2 46:13 47:25 52:13 63:15 67:15,24 69:11 71:12,14 78:24 91:15 93:3,19 124:14 150:16 151:2 157:7 161:14 167:1 177:21 178:22 181:13,18 182:16,17 183:17 192:21 195:25 196:2 198:22 199:20 200:10,11 201:7,18 202:22 213:19 216:11 220:21,24 way (39) 8:20 18:24 21:14 28:22 36:15,17 42:21 50:16 51:14 52:2 65:11 73:7 91:5 97:20,20 100:7 102:1 120:24 121:23 131:20 132:17,18 137:9 151:18,21 157:25 167:8 174:14 180:3 183:18 188:2 194:21 201:1 209:13 217:1,5 224:20 225:2 227:22 ways (3) 75:15 76:18 109:21 wearing (1) 191:3 wed (2) 169:8 176:20 week (2) 135:15 203:10 weekly (1) 157:1 welfare (6) 61:11,17,21 62:10 73:4 120:5 went (16) 59:17 62:23 75:21 79:13 113:21 135:22 136:3,17 137:7 147:14,14,21 152:4 177:21 194:11 222:2 werent (13) 26:1 50:23 89:10 92:8 125:21 148:1 151:25 154:4 155:1 179:1 215:24 216:5,5 west (4) 44:20 64:6 211:13 212:7</p>	<p>westminster (1) 220:19 weve (35) 13:2,2 36:2 44:11 49:10 59:20 60:6 61:2 69:20 73:2 74:14 79:16 80:12 83:3 84:10 92:24 94:17 99:13 102:23 108:8,13 113:11 119:6 122:1 150:17 163:25 166:19 171:11 194:15 195:4 197:12 198:13 204:8 210:17 223:1 whatever (4) 22:9 75:14 205:15 208:20 whats (14) 29:8 32:20 40:12 43:21 47:8 96:7 110:8 121:15,18 159:13,22 160:18 189:11 221:18 whenever (1) 134:17 whereas (1) 226:1 whereby (1) 125:8 whilst (9) 24:12 47:9 65:13 68:12 69:13 70:15 82:24 172:13 218:8 whiskey (1) 33:20 whittle (2) 156:14 157:4 whoever (3) 151:8 172:1 232:2 whole (6) 129:23 135:20,21,25 196:2 199:23 whom (3) 48:11 51:21 162:24 whose (4) 48:14 114:15 151:15,25 wideranging (1) 86:25 wife (1) 40:24 winchester (14) 145:24 146:17 147:22 148:23 149:8,17,20,23 150:15,21,24 155:6 215:22,24 wisdom (1) 171:25 wish (2) 36:21,22 wishing (1) 180:17 witness (11) 1:4 6:3 35:19 82:25 83:1,5 105:23 130:20 134:11 140:11 232:13 witnesses (1) 156:19 wolverhampton (1) 127:8 woman (2) 54:12 188:13 wonder (6) 1:3 83:3 105:15 161:1 204:8 221:19 wondering (3) 142:3 227:12 231:17 wont (5) 9:18 109:15 160:9 181:6 227:17 wood (5) 204:19,21,22 211:11 233:13 work (19) 22:19 84:6 104:23 117:20 121:8 128:25 135:21 138:12,20,22 141:19 142:4,7,10 153:9 166:14,22 188:9 232:9 worked (6) 60:19 75:3 94:9 157:14 196:7 222:20 working (5) 2:20 13:22 61:19 68:8 139:19 works (2) 151:19 185:3 world (1) 161:6 wouldnt (12) 59:8,8 76:23 107:7 123:18 156:5 169:23 185:8,14,19 208:14 231:23 wounding (1) 88:18 write (6) 80:22 81:7 181:14 184:2 220:6 225:6 writing (3) 77:11 81:13 180:3 written (13) 8:20,21 12:11,16 14:17 74:16 80:22 162:22 180:1,24 181:3 182:17,21 wrong (10) 66:20 104:15,24 137:7 147:14,21 182:4 185:23,25 186:2 wrongly (1) 183:19 wrote (1) 181:4</p>	<p>wythenshawe (1) 20:9 X x (3) 138:15,18 233:1 Y yasin (1) 61:16 yea (1) 210:9 yeah (10) 37:16 210:9,11,11,12,12,12,16,25 222:14 year (9) 1:17 19:5,8 88:16 100:15 138:21,21 141:1 142:19 years (10) 14:11 23:8 87:9 97:16 98:7 138:3 140:7 143:8,10 223:14 yet (7) 50:23 51:1 80:17 113:11 118:4 185:23 191:22 youd (24) 11:5 12:3 26:19 27:12,20 35:16 39:23,24 75:20 81:17 86:6 87:13 94:6 101:23 109:16 124:3 130:4 142:14 150:8 171:19,23 186:3 211:7,18 youll (6) 35:1 67:11 77:20 95:14 183:7 206:14 youre (58) 2:22 25:11 26:23 34:19 41:18,23 43:19 48:2,16 52:1 54:23 78:3,12 92:10 98:6,12,18,22 100:5,6,15,18 106:2,23 121:1,2,17 124:17 125:14 126:12,13 134:11 142:13 150:17 153:8 154:25 155:24 161:13 164:19 165:1 179:25 182:2 186:9 188:3 189:12 195:19 200:18 203:5 206:2 207:5,10 214:8 222:11 224:22 226:17,18,19 228:3 yours (2) 165:3 209:10 yourself (29) 7:5 8:17 11:4 16:3 21:12 32:10 48:10 57:21 58:3,22 82:7 92:12 93:10 95:10 101:15,19 104:23 110:14 111:23 118:21 123:2 124:8 156:12 175:14 186:10 191:14 214:20 217:22 232:13 youve (44) 5:25 14:9,19 19:4 43:5 45:2 48:13 62:9 68:15 69:11 70:12,15 79:2,18 81:13,22 92:4 93:2 94:23 104:10 110:25 117:13 131:13 135:3 142:22 144:13 165:15 170:25 183:7 184:8 186:15 190:8 191:12 196:21 202:25 205:5,8 206:2 221:7 222:10 229:3,25 230:23,25 Z zone (12) 163:10,11,14,19,20,21 199:17,21,24 200:2 210:17 228:15 zones (23) 49:14 163:4,6 164:7,10 198:3,10,11,16,21,24 199:7,16 200:9,11,19 201:15 205:2 207:22,25 211:8 227:7 230:23 zoning (3) 93:2,5 207:18 0 00 (1) 169:13 001102 (1) 28:23 0015 (1) 211:21 0018 (1) 188:11 0020 (1) 189:24 0022 (3) 190:10 207:3,10</p>	<p>0047 (1) 208:17 0050 (1) 199:2 0051 (2) 208:4 209:1 020 (1) 50:4 0800 (1) 176:19 1 1 (13) 42:8 52:24 101:9 109:22 173:14 191:9,18,19 192:20 217:16 219:6 233:3,4 10 (10) 19:13 28:7 105:8,11 106:12,23 109:13 128:19 131:4 158:21 100 (4) 3:15 17:25 62:17 216:24 101 (1) 166:4 10127 (1) 209:3 11 (8) 8:4 44:23 49:24 50:15 51:1,9,12,13 1103 (1) 60:1 111 (1) 137:12 1120 (2) 60:3 70:17 1130 (3) 178:4,6,7 1139 (1) 230:25 1140 (5) 71:17 77:17 78:1,12,12 1147 (1) 231:2 12 (2) 88:6 178:4 122 (1) 233:6 1230 (1) 178:17 127 (1) 233:7 128 (1) 233:8 13 (1) 9:9 137 (2) 233:10,12 13second (1) 52:22 14000 (1) 27:17 1440 (1) 37:5 15 (2) 85:24 131:17 16 (1) 229:9 17 (1) 1:1 18 (2) 212:6 232:22 19 (2) 169:18 206:7 1994 (1) 137:20 2 2 (18) 28:16 36:25 37:3 52:23 89:21 97:16 158:21 170:1 194:4,8,9,19 195:12 206:20,24 217:24 220:17,19 20 (12) 54:25 56:5 61:4 73:6,7,8 80:11,13 81:10 135:12 176:15 206:18 2000 (1) 1:12 2003 (1) 1:14 2004 (4) 137:23 140:5,13,16 2005 (3) 137:25 140:13,16 2007 (2) 1:19 138:3 2008 (1) 138:6 200page (1) 192:7 2010 (2) 6:7 140:15 2011 (1) 138:9 2012 (3) 1:22 2:10 140:20 2013 (5) 2:11 31:3 34:16 138:11 140:23 2014 (8) 3:4 87:10 89:13,21 90:5 95:1,4 139:5 20142015 (2) 21:2 34:18 2015 (5) 2:1,14 4:4,7 90:25 2016 (15) 2:17,20 3:25 31:4 86:10 139:8 146:2 153:11 214:17,19 216:4,9 217:4,17 218:22 2017 (33) 2:3,5 5:5 6:9 8:23 16:23 18:8 23:14 24:24 31:7 88:17 92:1 100:24 101:6,12 110:20 133:16 134:2,4 139:11 142</p>
--	---	---	--	---	--	---

20minute (1) 52:6
 20point (2) 73:19 113:12
 210 (1) 137:14
 211 (1) 233:14
 214 (1) 233:15
 22 (41) 5:5 6:9,24 7:2 8:1,23
 9:22 10:11 18:8 19:3,13,16
 20:25 21:25 22:5 23:14,20
 27:6 86:12 87:9 88:17 89:3
 91:18 97:14 99:25 101:18
 108:23 110:21 122:20
 124:4,8 128:6 157:20
 158:25 162:5 163:3 214:6
 215:9,11 220:17,18
 220page (1) 21:9
 222 (1) 233:16
 2249 (1) 131:21
 2250 (11) 33:5 58:14 65:25
 68:16 69:17 92:5,15
 110:12 111:1 112:4 113:5
 2252 (1) 39:5
 22nd (1) 20:23
 23 (3) 207:5 217:12,17
 230020 (1) 50:1
 2310 (1) 52:19
 2311 (1) 158:19
 231139 (2) 159:3,15
 2312 (1) 164:1
 231236 (2) 160:16 205:6
 2315 (1) 169:9
 2316 (2) 53:13,25
 2320 (2) 54:21,22
 2328 (2) 170:2,3
 2332 (3) 170:21 171:5
 172:16
 2334 (2) 60:10 115:20
 2337 (1) 172:19
 2338 (3) 60:12 115:22
 173:14
 2340 (1) 174:1
 2359 (1) 170:22
 23rd (1) 79:11
 24 (11) 28:23 42:22 133:7
 141:10,15 173:14 219:9,16
 220:12,14,16
 245 (6) 194:1 196:9
 230:1,9,10 231:11
 253 (2) 14:11 23:8
 2599 (1) 42:9
 26 (5) 101:12 203:15
 214:17,19 215:21
 27 (1) 35:22
 2second (2) 170:16 172:16

3

3 (12) 2:5 10:2 31:9 42:10
 53:15,16 60:12 71:17,17
 114:24 226:11,23
 30 (3) 27:2 81:17 135:12
 31 (1) 143:7
 312 (1) 114:2
 342 (1) 204:15
 350 (1) 204:13
 352 (1) 204:17
 37 (1) 130:20
 37second (1) 168:11

4

4 (4) 2:6 104:6 164:17
 196:13
 40 (4) 60:5 61:2 63:5 110:9
 400 (1) 176:9
 40minute (4) 60:22 63:15,18
 64:12
 42 (1) 176:21
 433 (1) 232:20
 4485 (1) 52:21
 45 (7) 66:1 115:24 167:12
 194:5,8,19 195:12
 45minute (1) 170:25
 48second (1) 170:3
 4985 (1) 158:18

5

5 (6) 54:20 122:6,7,11 154:3
 167:15
 50 (1) 52:25
 5054 (1) 159:3
 50second (1) 173:25
 51 (1) 172:20
 5160 (3) 160:12 205:6
 222:11
 5298 (1) 168:10
 5410 (1) 206:6

6

6 (5) 104:8,22 105:11 116:4
 141:11
 60 (3) 43:4,5 73:17
 61 (1) 43:4
 630 (1) 197:5
 6694 (1) 131:15

7

7 (1) 24:10

8

8 (4) 33:17 51:7 79:12
 164:16
 85 (1) 233:5

9

9 (3) 33:7 86:14 146:2
 90 (5) 73:16 180:23 181:9
 203:6 204:8
 930 (5) 1:2 28:19
 232:18,19,21
 9539 (1) 206:19
 9540 (3) 190:11 206:19
 207:1
 999s (1) 166:4