

GMFRS conversations 18 October 2017

Alan Goodwin

Kate Macdonald (notes)

Damian O'Rourke 0900

(unsure of job title/rank but co-ordinated meetings on behalf of GMFRS for review)

Not involved on the night - came in at 6.30/7 am

Pat came in gone 9am.

I have attended/facilitated, co-ordinated internal review/debrief with Kathy Oldham and Kate Green. Have submitted timeline doc and debrief doc to AGMA. GMFRS involved in one of two tactical debriefs - not sure why (Alan explained was for logistical reasons) Damian has liaised with Ellen from NWS - completely confused at end of debrief. NPoC model didnt really fit purpose, use it in house and works 99% of time.

Attended both strategics 2 days later - still loads missing but will focus on the 9 days not the discrepancies in tactical.

We havent 'investigated' or interviewed own staff.

Process of collating timeline showed parts not working properly with other organisations and internally. Also, collating own doc re changes. Mobilising procedures have been changed since but not widely publicised " a good self-audit for us"

Q - will doc be as one with FBU?

A - we keep each other updated but not really their remit. Les has been helpful.

Control Centre not owned by GMFRS but is regional. Not aware this has caused any issue. (Alan - who is point of contact? Damian to let us know, maybe Dave K) they were involved in internal debrief. They are located in Warrington.

Joined by **Pat Johnson** 9.30am

Q- Who was actually in charge?

At 1215 NILO assumed command Ben Leavy, incident commander. Mick and John Fletcher chose to get involved whereas Andy Berry and Paul Etches on 'press button' response

Chief officer rankings sit outside command structure

Pat - mobilising decisions based on 'explosion incident' but when "bomb" used, this changed the Action Card and removes pre-determined attendance.

Damian - only found out PLATO at 1215 through round up brief in the room. NWS agree with time.

Michael (Mick) Lawlor 1020

Intro by Alan re review process

Mick - "gagged at early degree" not had chance to say what happened. Have spoken to Chief. Restricted from holding hot debrief because of ongoing investigations. Welcome review, 1st opportunity to speak about it. "Certain individuals are not being put forward who you would benefit from" Alan explained other participation opportunities.

Mick - came into mix 11.15 (after Andy Berry) We have come in for kicking from crews and social media. Not had opportunity to put our side in first hour and 30 mins. In GM we are "highly skilled cadre of officers, well-versed in other agencies" Mick manages NILOS (12/14 of them) and delivers on national training. Seconded to GMP HQ as part of role, filter for CCRU and CT
Before incident, threat picture was severe/critical. We were well versed in methodology, potential co-ordinated attacks, RVPs and so was BAU(?) Am also on flexible duty rota command role - Incident Commander plus other roles eg HAZMAT, DIM, command support officer, wildfire, ballistically protected and trained, Bronze, part of very specialist cadre highly trained "all predicated on being informed"

2315 notified something unfolding. Off duty and in bed. Phone pinging like mad. NILO What's App group -gets us tuned in...has been some criticism. Didnt know in the preceding 45 mins wouldnt expect to be informed officially as not on duty rota. Tried to contact Andy - couldnt. Contacted John Fletcher. Would expect ^{os} NILOs on duty. Know they would need support for big incident. Phoned ACC Dave Keelan - 2 or 3 calls between us. Agreed Mick would come back on duty as Silver at FCM. John to go to CSR (GMFRS command support room) Dave had watching brief.

Tried to contact Andy on ^{OS} uk wide radio. Mobile engaged. Think he was en route. Had been given Cathedral gardens as RVP ^{OS}. Somewhere in mix 'bomb' gets mentioned, control room bring up Bomb Actions - Mick believes RVP too close to incident

Andy asks for resources to go to Phillips Park (fire station) further away than Thompson st station as the bomb policy says ^{OS} metres, thinks Thompson St is too close. Has also been given 'mobile gunman' info from NW control, via NWAS. Andy gets to Phillips Park at 2245. He's planning towards MTFA; 2 GMFRS MTFA capabilities mobilised from ^{OS}. Andy has tried to get hold of GMP FDO unsuccessfully. Direct Line. Not getting key info. Not aware PLATO declared.

Never got 3 leads together at Forward Control point. Info re FCP lost in NW Control somehow.

1200 moved them to Thompson St - appliances and specialist capabilities, from Phillips Park. (Carlos Meakin also NILO)

Mick arrives FCM 1205. No one from Fire there before. Didnt get official info re Silver - didnt wait for invite, self-deployed. Heard in conversation with Chris from Firearms at 1215 that PLATO declared but didn't know when. Mick got on radio and communicated PLATO ; whole different ball game. Have had MTFA capability since 2012, joint trained with NWAS ever since. At Table top 6 weeks before identified weakness of FDO comms - Fire proactively closed gap. Dedicated airwave radio tested 3 times daily since " Tell us where you need us and we will be there" Laura Lewis Police command room manager has been working on it.

At Westminster Bridge PLATO same fire and ambulance not informed; would have helped if this had been shared.

First hour and a half did not go well for us. We didnt have the information.

Alan - what was the gripe? Too risk averse?

Mick agrees we should have been there but lots of other stuff needed communicating. Didnt have info to make assessment - JESIP principles.

Alan- Is there tension between frontline crews and specialists? Yes. never known this service to be as it is re morale; every officer a target out there. Edge. Crews just want to be out there saving lives - they don't really understand.

Our people on the ground were isolated - no live streaming TV - dozens of police and ambulance there.

Q - How did you decide to move the 3 pumps?

Ben Leavy took decision to move resources to incident ground. Mick had told him was PLATO. Ben decides MTFA resources to go to incident ground - had "casualty management capability" rather than firefighting in warm zone. As soon as declared cold, can move other resources.

Just as about to move them from Thompson st, Chief gets involved. Picture gets more complicated; Steve from NWAS says need standard fire resource. Goes against everything we've been trained for, committing firefighters to warm zone unprotected. Chief stopped Ben mobilising MTFA. Ben challenged Chief but ultimately committed unprotected crews into arena.

Alan- How do crews feel? Trained crews were up in arms seeing untrained (ie non specialist) going in. Ben believes the Chief took command and control of resources.

Of the 3, 2 agencies went against all procedures and training over the years - they committed resources tho no cordon control but outcome was great, saved lives. We (Fire) were disciplined but turned out awful, got a right battering after.

Q - did BTP primacy cause issues? No. i think GMP had primacy, took over incident.

From 2012, we have trained multi-agency a lot. How did GMP and NWAS not spot we were missing? Trained in hubs, targets, crowded places - we have all floor plans off line etc. Pinged them over for rail station and arena to **Irrelevant and sensitive**

After first hour and a half, put NILO in CT hub.

Alan- Was there much to do when crews went in? Not much. Andy managed resources.

Alan- so would have done this if had got in earlier? Yes. Treat/leave or treat/recover directed by medical HART assessments.

Support afterwards? Supported CT, rescue capability etc - all embedded perfect. NILO embedded, do planning, action plan. Fire and Rescue capability on stand-by. HAZMAT and DIM analysis already there, could have advised on PPR

Post -incident : debriefing restricted from talking by Chief and AC. Mick called NILOs in a week later bank hol monday for debrief/chat. Had informed AC of intention. Was just about to start when Dave Keelan said " do not talk about incident" due to review/inquiries

Comms to station afterwards was opportunity missed. Chief went on leave - daughter's wedding. On return, Chief and 2 AC's went to Thompson St and called in stations directly affected and discussed incident; Chief's course of actions, Andy's route. Mick saw it that Chief and AC's seized opportunity to give rationale but they didnt take the command team. They fuelled flames re Andy's route etc. Mick received messages saying Chief had blamed NILO. Since then, Mick had hour and half conversation with Chief who assured him this was not the case.

Alan - How are you now? Mick - first time had opportunity to talk to someone independent. I'm alright. All we can do is move forward. I support Andy with decisions.

3 key areas :

If resources were mobilised, would have had eyes on the ground

Police declaring PLATO, we would have been there early doors

Declaration of FCP never pushed to Andy

Would have different multi-agency response - confident of airwave radio now. All London incidents, Fire and ambulance notified of PLATO in minutes.

Incredible to see Manchester pull together.