

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 139

July 23, 2021

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Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Friday, 23 July 2021
 2 (9.30 am)
 3 (Delay in proceedings)
 4 (9.45 am)
 5 MR GREANEY: Sir, the gentleman in the witness box is
 6 Assistant Chief Constable Sean O'Callaghan of British
 7 Transport Police.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for coming back.
 9 MR GREANEY: As you have just indicated, sir,
 10 ACC O'Callaghan has already given evidence. He did so
 11 on 16 November last year, which was Day 36 of our oral
 12 evidence hearings, and he was of course sworn on that
 13 occasion. May we proceed on the basis that he does not
 14 need to be re-sworn?
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Absolutely.
 16 ACC SEAN O'CALLAGHAN (recalled)
 17 Questions from MR GREANEY
 18 MR GREANEY: What we know from the evidence that you gave
 19 last year is that you joined British Transport Police as
 20 Assistant Chief Constable in June 2018.
 21 A. That is correct, yes.
 22 Q. So just over a year after the arena attack. Prior to
 23 that, you had served for 25 years in Essex Police?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Where you rose to the rank of chief superintendent?

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1 A. That is right, yes.
 2 Q. And certainly as of November last year, within BTP you
 3 were in charge of network policing and specialist
 4 capabilities?
 5 A. That is correct, yes.
 6 Q. Does that remain your role today?
 7 A. It does indeed.
 8 Q. On the last occasion you gave evidence about a series of
 9 topics and there's only one of them, I think, that we'll
 10 need to go back into. Those topics were the legislative
 11 framework for BTP.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. The structure of that force.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. The strategic plan for that force.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. The issue of primacy --
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. -- which is the issue that we will need to return to.
 20 You dealt also with certain training issues.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. With the relationship between British Transport Police
 23 and SMG.
 24 A. Yes, indeed.
 25 Q. The failures of BTP on the day and night of 22 May.

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. By which I am referring to the prolonged absences of
 3 staff from the railway station and so on.
 4 A. Yes, indeed.
 5 Q. And you dealt with the lessons that have been learned by
 6 BTP in relation to our chapter 7 issues, so security
 7 arrangements at the arena.
 8 A. Yes, indeed.
 9 Q. Today, as you will appreciate, you are going to give
 10 evidence about chapter 10 issues --
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. -- so issues relating to the emergency response.
 13 A. Yes, indeed.
 14 Q. Would you just bear with me whilst I check something?
 15 (Pause)
 16 Before we get to the chapter 10 issues, I'm going to
 17 identify certain aspects of your training and background
 18 that may be relevant to your ability to give evidence on
 19 these issues.
 20 Are you accredited by the College of Policing with
 21 occupational and operational competence as a strategic
 22 firearms commander?
 23 A. Yes, I am.
 24 Q. Also as a multi-agency Gold incident commander?
 25 A. Yes, I am.

3

1 Q. And as a public safety Gold commander?
 2 A. Yes, I am.
 3 Q. In the past, have you performed any or all of those
 4 roles?
 5 A. Yes, I have, and continue to do so.
 6 Q. So it would seem to follow that when I ask you about
 7 some of the things that may have gone wrong on the night
 8 in terms of response, you'll be able to talk from
 9 a position of knowledge and experience?
 10 A. Indeed, yes.
 11 Q. The issues that I want to explore with you this morning
 12 over the course of, I hope, no more than 90 minutes are
 13 in broad terms the following, there are three areas:
 14 first of all, BTP's engagement prior to the attack with
 15 the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum; secondly,
 16 what went wrong in the BTP response to the arena attack
 17 to the extent that anything did; and thirdly, and
 18 importantly, changes that have been made by BTP since
 19 the attack that are relevant to the response to an
 20 emergency.
 21 A. I understand.
 22 Q. So that's where we're going. Let's start then with the
 23 engagement by BTP with the GM Resilience Forum, the
 24 GMLRF.
 25 The Cabinet Office document dealing with LRFs

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1 provides guidance as to the purpose of an LRF and the
 2 seniority of the representatives of category 1 responder
 3 organisations attending LRF meetings. I know that
 4 you will know that.
 5 A. Indeed, yes.
 6 Q. This is a document we have looked at with a number of
 7 witnesses but we'll just refresh our memories by looking
 8 at a handful of pages.
 9 Mr Lopez, we'll look first of all at the cover page,
 10 this is {INQ019376/1}. There it is. If we remind
 11 ourselves, this is the iteration, as we've understood
 12 it, that was in force at the time of the attack,
 13 July 2013, v2.
 14 Next, please, {INQ019376/10}, paragraph 34, box 2
 15 sets out the purpose of an LRF:
 16 "The purpose of the LRF process is to ensure
 17 effective delivery of those duties under the act that
 18 need to be developed in a multi-agency environment and
 19 individually as a category 1 responder. In particular,
 20 the LRF process should deliver ..."
 21 Bullet point 1:
 22 "The compilation of agreed risk profiles for the
 23 area through a community risk register."
 24 Bullet point 2:
 25 "A systematic planned and coordinated approach to

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1 encourage category 1 responders, according to their
 2 functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation
 3 to risk and planning for emergencies."
 4 So I have no doubt, assistant chief constable, that
 5 you will agree that a local resilience forum has
 6 a vitally important role in the planning for an event
 7 such as the arena attack?
 8 A. Yes, indeed I do.
 9 Q. Over the page, {INQ019376/11}, paragraph 35:
 10 "In order to fulfil these objectives, the LRF needs
 11 to operate effectively as a collective body, managing
 12 a programme of work and exercising leadership to
 13 establish, test and review necessary plans and
 14 strategies."
 15 Again, therefore, I'm sure you will agree that for
 16 the LRF to fulfil its vitally important function, each
 17 of the emergency response organisations needs to play
 18 its full part?
 19 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.
 20 Q. Paragraph 38:
 21 "The following identifies LRF members' mandatory
 22 requirements and also highlights other issues that need
 23 to be considered as well as indicators of good practice.
 24 "Category 1 responders must cooperate with each
 25 other in connection with the performance of their duties

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1 under the CCA [Civil Contingencies Act]. The LRF based
 2 on each police area shall be the principal mechanism for
 3 multi-agency cooperation."
 4 So emphasising again, you will agree, the vitally
 5 function of the LRF in achieving multi-agency
 6 cooperation?
 7 A. Yes, I agree.
 8 Q. Indeed, all of that that we have just looked at in the
 9 Cabinet Office document is reflected in the terms of
 10 reference of the GMLRF itself. Mr Lopez, this is
 11 {INQ012418/1}, please:
 12 "The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum sits [as it
 13 is put] at the apex of Greater Manchester's civil
 14 protection arrangements. Its overall purpose is to
 15 ensure that there is an appropriate level of
 16 preparedness to enable an effective multi-agency
 17 response to emergency incidents which may have
 18 a significant impact on the communities of Manchester.
 19 "The resilience forum's specific objectives are ..."
 20 And there are there listed a series of matters
 21 including:
 22 "To decide on joint strategic and policy decisions
 23 relating to Greater Manchester's preparedness and
 24 response."
 25 So can we agree that the role of a local resilience

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1 forum is preparing the emergency services to work
 2 together in order to respond to something like the arena
 3 attack can hardly be overstated?
 4 A. I agree with that, yes.
 5 Q. Against that background, can we look at a chart which
 6 sets out who attended the meetings of GMRF in the
 7 2 years or so prior to the arena attack? You may be
 8 aware that we've performed this exercise in relation to
 9 Greater Manchester Police as well and Deputy
 10 Chief Constable Pilling made concessions in relation to
 11 the level at which and the regularity with which GMP
 12 attended these meetings.
 13 What I'm going to show you is taken from the report
 14 of the inquiry's instructed policing experts. Mr Lopez,
 15 we'll see the chart at {INQ035309/55}.
 16 Let's just track this through. When we do so, can
 17 I acknowledge, as will be obvious from what has been
 18 said already, that you were not a BTP officer during
 19 this period of time, were you?
 20 A. That is correct, yes.
 21 Q. Nonetheless, you have come to provide corporate
 22 accountability for what we are going to see?
 23 A. Absolutely.
 24 Q. Date of meeting, 13 March 2015, a little over 2 years
 25 before the attack, attendance by BTP: none.

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1 19 June 2015, attendance: none.
 2 23 September 2015, attendance at chief inspector
 3 level.
 4 11 December 2015. BTP attendance: none.
 5 10 March 2016, BTP attendance at inspector level.
 6 21 July 2016, attendance by Graham Fair and
 7 Inspector Kooper. Graham Fair being?
 8 A. A resilience planning officer.
 9 Q. So a BTP civilian?
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. So attendance at civilian and inspector level.
 12 Over the page, please {INQ035309/56}.
 13 16 September 2016, BTP attendance: none.
 14 9 December 2016. BTP attendance: none.
 15 27 March 2017. BTP attendance: none.
 16 So as you've just seen, assistant chief constable,
 17 of the nine meetings of the local resilience forum over
 18 that period of 2 years and 2 months prior to the attack,
 19 BTP had no attendance at six.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. So in other words, they attended in any form only
 22 a third of them. The most senior ranked officer to
 23 attended the other three was a chief inspector?
 24 A. That is correct, I note that.
 25 Q. Does that, in your judgement, involve a totally

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1 unacceptable level of engagement by BTP with the local
 2 resilience forum?
 3 A. It is certainly not at the standard that I have now put
 4 in place, recognising the importance of the local
 5 resilience forum.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that is not quite the question.
 7 Are you able to answer the question? You don't need to
 8 use the word unacceptable, if you like; it has become
 9 fashionable in the inquiry. It's not very good, is it?
 10 A. I accept that, sir. It was not very good.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And not satisfactory?
 12 A. That is correct, I accept that.
 13 MR GREANEY: Has it improved since you joined the force?
 14 A. Yes, it has.
 15 Q. In what way or ways?
 16 A. As an organisation previously, attendance at a local
 17 resilience forum, of which there are approximately, I'm
 18 sure the inquiry will already be aware of this, there is
 19 effectively one per police force area, a resilience
 20 forum for each police force area, so roughly 43 or 44
 21 for England and Wales, and four in Scotland, which BTP
 22 has a requirement to attend.
 23 Before my arrival in the force, the responsibility
 24 for arranging attendance was at local subdivisional
 25 level across the country, across the force area for

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1 England, Scotland, Wales for British Transport Police.
 2 Changes made as a result of my arrival is we have now
 3 brought in a resilience manager for the force, all of
 4 the resilience planning elements have now come under
 5 a central structure, and we have now put in
 6 a requirement that for each area, the attendance should
 7 be, wherever possible, at superintendent level. Where
 8 a superintendent is not able to attend, I would accept
 9 a deputy at chief inspector level. However, if that was
 10 not possible, it must be then escalated back to the
 11 chief superintendent at the divisional commander level
 12 to show the importance of the attendance, that it can't
 13 be delegated down further.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We all know that you're a different sort
 15 of force because you're a national force.
 16 Chief Inspector Graham, am I right, was a local officer,
 17 is a local officer?
 18 A. That's correct, sir.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you have a locally based
 20 superintendent in Manchester?
 21 A. Yes, we do, sir.
 22 MR GREANEY: That was Superintendent Wylie.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, I remember, thank you.
 24 MR GREANEY: In other words, can the inquiry have confidence
 25 that first of all there is always, save perhaps

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1 exceptionally, attendance by BTP at the meetings of
 2 a local resilience forum?
 3 A. Yes, absolutely. That has been proven now to be the
 4 case through the current pandemic, where there has been
 5 insistence of that attendance throughout all of the
 6 local resilience forums that have met as a result of the
 7 pandemic.
 8 Q. And that attendance will be generally at the level of
 9 a superintendent?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And never at a level of lower than chief inspector?
 12 A. That is the instruction, yes.
 13 Q. So that, no doubt, is a welcome improvement. But the
 14 fact of the matter, can we agree, is that the not very
 15 good level of engagement by BTP with the LRF in the
 16 2 years before the arena attack must inevitably have
 17 meant that BTP was not fulfilling its role of taking
 18 part in joint planning over that period?
 19 A. Yes, I accept that.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The sort of disasters that the
 21 resilience panel have been looking at are things like
 22 rail crashes, for example, where you'd be very much
 23 taking the lead?
 24 A. Yes, absolutely, potentially, sir. A lot of the time
 25 the planning and the forward look was in relation to

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1 environmental disasters and that was part of the problem
 2 that I've had to rectify within the force in terms of
 3 the learning and understanding of the staff, the
 4 importance of attending for even the eventuality of
 5 environmental disasters, such as recent floodings that
 6 have impacted on the railway.
 7 MR GREANEY: Do you know what explanation there is, if there
 8 is an explanation, for the way in which BTP engaged or
 9 didn't engage with the LRF over that period?
 10 A. Initially, it was the position that due to being
 11 a national force, it was not possible to attend at
 12 a senior level to all of the LRFs. My assessment is, in
 13 simplest terms, that a lot of the people that had been
 14 asked to attend simply didn't understand the importance
 15 of an LRF or the benefit of working with partners ahead
 16 of an event.
 17 Q. But you have made certain, as we have understood it,
 18 that that knowledge is now in place?
 19 A. Yes, indeed, hence centralising the structure and
 20 management of the attendance at such forums.
 21 MR GREANEY: Sir, I'm moving away from the local resilience
 22 forum.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's fine, thank you.
 24 MR GREANEY: Topic 2, as you will remember, is, "What went
 25 wrong?" So what I want to consider with you, assistant

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1 chief constable, is whether BTP accepts at a corporate
 2 level that a number of things went wrong or didn't go
 3 well during its emergency response. So I'm just going
 4 to list a series of factors and invite you to indicate
 5 whether you agree or don't agree.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before we start that, can we simply
 7 acknowledge the part played by many BTP officers on the
 8 ground.
 9 MR GREANEY: Sir, you are, if I may say so, quite right to
 10 draw attention to that. I am sure that you would want
 11 it to be said that a number of BTP officers responded
 12 swiftly and bravely, indeed within seconds of the
 13 explosion having occurred.
 14 A. Yes, thank you.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: What we heard yesterday, I think, was
 16 they were prominent among the people first on the scene.
 17 MR GREANEY: We did, sir, yes.
 18 First, do you agree it was obviously important that
 19 the BTP FIM or force incident manager should speak to
 20 the GMP force duty officer?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. As you know, that didn't happen that night.
 23 A. That's correct.
 24 Q. And one of the reasons why is because BTP sought to make
 25 contact via a 999 call?

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1 A. That's my understanding, yes.
 2 Q. Instead they could have used, but did not use, the
 3 police Hailing Talk Group?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And do you accept that the failure to do that was
 6 a mistake?
 7 A. It was certainly an option that was available that
 8 wasn't taken. In terms of a mistake, I would say it was
 9 something that could have been considered that wasn't.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was the evidence of the FIM that he
 11 didn't know of that police Hailing group?
 12 MR GREANEY: I think that was his evidence, yes.
 13 Mr de la Poer, who called the FIM, Mr Dawson --
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That was my recollection and that does
 15 seem to be quite a lack, not even to know about it.
 16 When you say it was an option, it in fact wasn't an
 17 option because he didn't know about it.
 18 A. Yes, I accept that, sir, yes. That was Mr Dawson, yes,
 19 sir.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 21 MR GREANEY: Isn't the simple reality that given the
 22 importance that that contact should occur and given that
 23 it wasn't occurring by the route that was being used,
 24 other means of making contact should have been
 25 attempted?

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1 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.
 2 Q. Secondly, the appointment of the BTP Bronze and Silver
 3 commanders. We'll start what I hope will be a short
 4 analysis by looking at the BTP major incident plan.
 5 Mr Lopez, this is {INQ025700/14}.
 6 The heading of section 2.4 is "BTP roles and
 7 responsibilities".
 8 We don't need to read through the whole of it. It's
 9 the final paragraph under that heading. Do you see it
 10 reads:
 11 "During a major incident, many of the responding
 12 agencies will have their Silver commanders at the scene.
 13 Where the BTP Silver commander is located away from the
 14 scene, it is important to ensure that the BTP commander
 15 on scene is aware of their responsibilities, including
 16 attending (and probably chairing) the Silver
 17 coordinating group meetings"?
 18 First of all, against that background, you will
 19 recall that Chief Superintendent Gregory was appointed
 20 as BTP Silver.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And he went to the force control room in Birmingham?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So in other words, not to the scene?
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. That's not to criticise him because he was, after all,
2 at the time in Birmingham.
3 A. That's correct, yes.
4 Q. The BTP Bronze. Bearing in mind that Silver was not on
5 the scene, do you agree that it was important that
6 Bronze should be on the scene?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. Essentially, the Bronze commander, in circumstances in
9 which Silver is not present, cannot discharge his or her
10 responsibilities properly until at the scene?
11 A. That's correct, yes.
12 Q. In the circumstances of the arena attack, BTP appointed
13 Superintendent Kyle Gordon as Bronze and he was in
14 Blackpool, as you'll recall, and was unable, in the
15 result, to arrive at scene until after 1 am --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- which, I think you'll agree, was a time at which he
18 you could hardly make any difference to the emergency
19 response?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 Q. Do you consider that it was a mistake to appoint
22 Superintendent Gordon as Bronze commander?
23 A. A mistake in terms of not knowing the time, the
24 travelling time and the estimated arrival time at the
25 location, yes.

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1 Q. We've heard repeatedly during the course of chapter 10
2 about the golden hour. Is that a term that you
3 recognise?
4 A. Certainly I recognise golden hour from my criminal
5 investigation background. Generically, it is a term
6 that is attributed to crime investigations, but
7 I understand the concept of the early part of an
8 incident, yes.
9 Q. An early part of an incident perhaps as a matter of
10 common sense is the time at which the emergency
11 responders are likely to be able to make the most
12 difference.
13 A. Yes, absolutely.
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they need to be set off in the right
15 direction.
16 A. Yes.
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And how you start the emergency response
18 is likely to govern how it continues?
19 A. Absolutely, yes.
20 MR GREANEY: So do you accept, in the circumstances of
21 22 May, an officer of BTP needed to be appointed at the
22 scene, at an early stage, even if relieved when someone
23 more senior attended?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And that didn't happen?

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1 A. That didn't happen, no.
2 Q. Thirdly, as you know, the FIM and SDO for BTP were in
3 London and the DFIM and radio operators were in
4 Birmingham.
5 A. That's correct, yes.
6 Q. Did you see or at any rate read a transcript of the
7 thoughtful evidence of Inspector Dawson?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. His view was that it would be a good idea to have both
10 a FIM and deputy FIM in each of those locations, one set
11 in London and one set in Birmingham.
12 A. I saw that, yes.
13 Q. Did that strike you as a good idea?
14 A. From my own position overseeing the entire force,
15 I personally believe that may cause further confusion.
16 I think the role of FIM, by definition of a force
17 incident manager, should be a single seat in a force.
18 Q. I think what he was driving at, or one of the things
19 he was driving at, was it might be thought less than
20 ideal that we have the FIM in one location and the
21 deputy FIM over a considerable distance away in another.
22 So looking at those circumstances, does that present
23 a problem?
24 A. I believe it certainly can cause a problem if
25 communication lines are not open. Some of the changes

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1 made that we've learned through other incidents and
2 through experience is things such as an open phone line
3 for conversation during incidents so that dialogue is
4 there, be it through traditional phone lines or through,
5 now as we now know, through Teams calls. I think the
6 distance element is a hurdle that can be certainly
7 overcome if it is causing a problem.
8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You have to, really, don't you --
9 A. Yes.
10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- as a national force?
11 A. Yes.
12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's just unavoidable that you have to
13 use other means of communication.
14 MR GREANEY: I don't want to go into things that are
15 operationally sensitive and perhaps the better question
16 is: are there now measures in place to ensure that in
17 the event of a major incident, where you have the FIM in
18 one location and the deputy FIM in another, that there
19 can always be open lines of communication?
20 A. Yes.
21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's a change, is it?
22 A. It's certainly a development in the training, sir, yes.
23 MR GREANEY: Fourthly and still dealing at the second stage
24 with what went wrong, did you watch or read a transcript
25 of the evidence of Assistant Chief Constable

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1 Robin Smith?
 2 A. Yes, I did.
 3 Q. That was Day 94, page 90, line 21 {Day94/90:21} and
 4 following.
 5 He, of course, was BTP Gold on the night of the
 6 attack.
 7 A. That's correct, yes.
 8 Q. Do you agree with him that there was, as he put it, a
 9 JESIP failure on 22 May?
 10 A. Yes, I accept that.
 11 Q. In other words, BTP did not, at least at any relevant
 12 time, co-locate --
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. -- at command level? They didn't communicate
 15 effectively?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Nor did they coordinate?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. In the result, they didn't jointly understand risk with
 20 their emergency service partners?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And they didn't share situational awareness?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. So can we just look at a few examples of how it went
 25 wrong under those headings. BTP never passed on its

21

1 major incident declaration?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. It never passed on the METHANE message that
 4 Sergeant Cawley had passed?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which is in a way one of the main shames
 7 about this, because they actually had the best METHANE
 8 message.
 9 A. Yes, sir, I acknowledge that.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They just didn't pass it on.
 11 MR GREANEY: I was about to make exactly the point that
 12 Sergeant Cawley's METHANE message -- have you listened
 13 to it?
 14 A. I have, yes.
 15 Q. And that conversation between the FIM and
 16 Sergeant Cawley might be regarded as a credit to your
 17 force; do you agree?
 18 A. Yes, I do.
 19 Q. As the chairman has said, it's a really excellent
 20 METHANE message. And these were critical pieces of
 21 information, were they not, the declaration of major
 22 incident and the METHANE message?
 23 A. Absolutely.
 24 Q. And they were vital so as to enable your partners to
 25 gain situational awareness; do you agree?

22

1 A. I agree, yes.
 2 Q. And do you accept as well, having listened to the
 3 evidence, that the failure to pass on that information
 4 does appear to have had real world consequences? By
 5 that I mean that the consistent picture in the evidence
 6 that we have heard from the GMFRS NILOs and commanders
 7 is that if they had known of your METHANE message, they
 8 would have deployed to the scene.
 9 A. I accept that as evidence that's been given, yes.
 10 Q. I'm not saying that that absolves them of their
 11 responsibility to have done more, but each of them has
 12 said: if we had known this, there would have been
 13 a reaction.
 14 A. I understand that, yes.
 15 Q. Can we listen together to an example of it, I'm going to
 16 suggest, going wrong. It's a call at 23.17, so well
 17 within the golden hour. It's a call by North West Fire
 18 Control, so fire, to BTP, although as we are going to
 19 see, the transcript is wrongly marked as GMP. So we've
 20 done everything we can and we're satisfied that this is
 21 a call between North West Fire Control and British
 22 Transport Police.
 23 Mr Lopez, I'll give you the INQ references for the
 24 audio and the transcript: the audio is {INQ004351/1} and
 25 the transcript is {INQ001159/1}. It's just a short

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1 call, sir, and, in a sense, that's the point.
 2 As I indicated, where the police are responding it's
 3 marked as GMP, but it's not, it's BTP.
 4 (Audio played)
 5 This is 23.17, so about three-quarters of an hour
 6 after the explosion. The METHANE message isn't given by
 7 BTP, is it?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. Although, to be fair, it's not sought by North West Fire
 10 Control. There's no questioning about the RVP, is
 11 there?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. But what is happening is that information is just being
 14 passively received by BTP?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And do you agree that that seems to be an example of
 17 JESIP just failing that night?
 18 A. Yes, I do.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It is perhaps fair to say that actually,
 20 I'm not saying that information should not have been
 21 passed, believe me, but of information that could be
 22 passed between the two which is relevant to each other,
 23 that's the least important maybe? Perhaps that's an
 24 overstatement.
 25 MR GREANEY: I'm not sure it is, sir. It's an illustration

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1 of it going wrong.
 2 Really, that is all I wanted to ask you about what
 3 went wrong on the night, but perhaps anyone who is
 4 watching your evidence and your reaction to these
 5 questions will see that you recognise that these were
 6 serious failures by the organisation of which you are
 7 now a member.
 8 A. Yes, that is correct, and a number of changes made have
 9 been put in place to address those.
 10 Q. Really, that's what I want to turn to next. The inquiry
 11 and beyond the inquiry, the general public, will want
 12 reassurance that that kind of thing isn't going to
 13 happen again, will they not?
 14 A. Absolutely, yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I know we are dealing with what went
 16 wrong and how we are putting it right, but actually one
 17 of the things which did appear to me, certainly at this
 18 stage, to have gone right is your FIM and having next
 19 door someone who's got a title which (overspeaking).
 20 MR GREANEY: That's correct, sir.
 21 A. The SDO, senior duty officer.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And they were in separate rooms, but as
 23 indicated, worked really well together?
 24 A. Yes, sir.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The senior duty officer took

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1 responsibilities off the FIM.
 2 A. Yes, a support role.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That, it did seem to me, to work maybe
 4 better than the way it did at GMP with the FDO.
 5 MR GREANEY: That's no doubt, a very fair observation by the
 6 chairman.
 7 You'll appreciate that one of the issues, one of the
 8 prominent issues we've been considering during this
 9 chapter has been what went wrong in the GMP control
 10 room --
 11 A. I've been following that evidence, yes.
 12 Q. -- and the overburdening, if that's what it was, of the
 13 FDO.
 14 So let's move to stage 3, and we're well on track to
 15 finish within the 90 minutes I allocated myself.
 16 Stage 3 is changes made. Before we get to the changes,
 17 it may be relevant to understand what approach BTP
 18 adopted to the identification of what went wrong and
 19 what needed to change as a result. Does that question
 20 make sense?
 21 A. It does, yes.
 22 Q. Could you tell us what the approach has been, please?
 23 A. Yes, absolutely. As a force, in terms of an overall
 24 governance position, the deputy chief constable, who is
 25 traditionally in a force is responsible for governance

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1 and compliance, set up and ran what is commonly known as
 2 a Gold group, so a senior meeting to track the activity.
 3 Immediately after the event, there was a number of
 4 debrief sessions that occurred within the organisation
 5 of parties that were present or involved. I believe, as
 6 I articulated in my first appearance, British Transport
 7 Police has a department known as the LXC, or the lessons
 8 exploitation centre, which specifically looks at
 9 incidents where things may or may not have gone right on
 10 events or incidents or policing operations and captures
 11 and audits the actions that have come out of those
 12 debriefs, so they are followed through in the force.
 13 Q. What I am going to do next is just to work through what
 14 I've understood from your various helpful statements are
 15 the changes that have been made.
 16 The first change we'll look at relates to an issue
 17 that we did consider when last you gave evidence and no
 18 doubt this is the reason Mr de la Poer has come into
 19 court this morning. It's the issue of primacy.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. When last you gave evidence, there had been an exchange
 22 of correspondence at deputy chief constable level, as
 23 you will remember, and we'll just remind ourselves about
 24 that.
 25 First of all, GMP had written to BTP on

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1 14 September 2020. INQ037998/1.
 2 We did look at this letter in detail when you last
 3 gave evidence. I just want to look at two short
 4 paragraphs now. INQ037998/3, please, Mr Lopez.
 5 (Pause)
 6 Maybe my reference is wrong. It is. That's my
 7 fault, sorry. It's {INQ036998/3}:
 8 "Of course [writes DCC Pilling] a second option
 9 is that the policing primacy for events moves to GMP as
 10 recommended by the experts and, for the avoidance of
 11 doubt, having considered all the relevant information,
 12 GMP are persuaded by these experts and the evidence as
 13 it has unfolded so far."
 14 And then in bold:
 15 "To be clear, we now formally offer to take on the
 16 policing of the arena footprint to which, if you are
 17 agreeable, a similar though inverted MoU could be
 18 agreed."
 19 So in other words, GMP were suggesting that it
 20 should take primacy for those situations thereafter?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. BTP replied on 12 October. This is, I hope,
 23 INQ037997/1. (Pause). Not to worry.
 24 The upshot was that at that stage on 12 October,
 25 Deputy Chief Constable Hanstock of BTP was unpersuaded

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1 that things should change there and then, but instead
 2 was suggesting that the outcome of the inquiry should be
 3 awaited before change was implemented; do you agree?
 4 A. I do agree, yes.
 5 Q. Obviously, you'll be aware that the chairman published
 6 his volume 1 report on 17 June of this year and it
 7 contained monitored recommendations.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Monitored recommendation or MR9 provided:
 10 "BTP and all Home Office police services should
 11 conduct a review of the areas in which their
 12 jurisdictions overlap. In the case of areas which have
 13 a significant footfall by members of the public which
 14 are not part of the railway estate, a review should be
 15 conducted by both BTP and the Home Office police
 16 services. Following the review, agreement as to primacy
 17 should be reached and reported in writing."
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. We're going to look in one moment about what has been
 20 done in that regard in Greater Manchester. But is that
 21 approach being rolled out generally across the country?
 22 A. Absolutely, sir, and that work was commenced earlier in
 23 this year. We recognised that situation and a lot of
 24 activity has taken place already and will be further
 25 reported obviously in relation to the monitored

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1 recommendation.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, I'm grateful.
 3 MR GREANEY: Obviously, we'll hear more from you or from BTP
 4 about that in due course when we look at how people are
 5 doing as against the MRs.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. In terms of what has been achieved in Manchester,
 8 it would be fair to say that real progress has been made
 9 in this regard in relation to the arena?
 10 A. Yes, indeed.
 11 Q. We can look at a document we looked at with Mr Pilling.
 12 {INQ041628/1}. It is a letter to the chairman dated
 13 2 July:
 14 "Following the publication of volume 1 of the
 15 Manchester Arena Inquiry Report, Greater Manchester
 16 Police and British Transport Police have met at
 17 executive level and agreed to accept your preliminary
 18 recommendations as set out in paragraphs 8.113 to 8.121,
 19 namely that British Transport Police should retain
 20 primacy for routine policing of the City Room and that
 21 Greater Manchester Police should take primacy of the
 22 policing during events at the arena. It is vital that
 23 there is clarity as to the details of this arrangement
 24 and the areas which it covers and urgent work is ongoing
 25 to ensure that such clarity is achieved and that this

30

1 transition takes place as quickly and effectively as
 2 possible."
 3 And it's signed by the deputy chief constables of
 4 each force.
 5 Are you satisfied that that work is progressing
 6 smoothly?
 7 A. Yes, sir, it is. I am personally leading on that work.
 8 Q. One of things that emerged from the evidence of Deputy
 9 Chief Constable Pilling is that some work does remain to
 10 be done, and from what you have told us is being done.
 11 Did you follow Mr Pilling's evidence?
 12 A. Yes, I did.
 13 Q. He explained to us that GMP has a contingency plan for
 14 the arena. We looked at {INQ036998/3}, we can look at
 15 it again, but it indicated, and this was a document that
 16 post-dated the arena attack, that BTP was to have
 17 primacy for the arena. Obviously, now, that will not
 18 always be the case, will it?
 19 A. That is correct, and in fact there is actually now an
 20 updated joint contingency plan in place at the moment.
 21 Q. Is that a plan which reflects the agreement that has now
 22 been reached between BTP and GMP?
 23 A. That needs further amendment, sir, that work needs
 24 ongoing — because that contingency plan was built on
 25 the original memorandum of understanding, which

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1 I believe the inquiry has had sight of in relation to
 2 GMP being responsible for the response to a major
 3 incident at the arena. We now have to continue the work
 4 to develop the contingency plan for GMP policing the
 5 actual events.
 6 Q. So really, this is just what I want to be clear about
 7 because this is or might well be an important issue.
 8 Mr Pilling recognised that there was an urgent need to
 9 update the arena contingency plan —
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. — to reflect the reality, as it now is?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Do you agree with him?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. And has anything been done since DCC Pilling gave that
 16 evidence last Monday to progress that?
 17 A. Yes, it's actually developed even further and talks were
 18 ongoing while Mr Pilling was giving his evidence.
 19 Sir, you acknowledged in volume 1 that there may
 20 well be some detailed work to be undertaken in respect
 21 of the events, and the position we are currently at is
 22 to be looking at moving to GMP taking the policing of
 23 the arena footprint and that element of the
 24 Victoria Exchange complex in entirety, 24/7.
 25 Q. So the situation has developed yet further?

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1 A. Even further, yes.
 2 Q. Again, perhaps no doubt we can hear about that from you
 3 in further detail in due course.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Actually, it very much reflects what
 6 Mr Smith was saying in his evidence: you're extremely
 7 good and expert at dealing with transport, dealing with
 8 the railways, and perhaps your expertise is not in the
 9 way of dealing with places like the arena. Maybe you
 10 don't agree with that.
 11 A. Respectfully, sir, I do not agree with that. It may
 12 assist to understand the reason the position has moved
 13 on is we felt, and we know clearly that was not the
 14 intention, we may have created some further confusion
 15 with GMP just having events when we looked at the event
 16 schedule. For argument's sake, on some days there would
 17 be matinee events and evening events and some days there
 18 would just be a matinee event and it would potentially
 19 bring even further confusion: is it GMP's at 11 o'clock
 20 today or is it at 3 o'clock tomorrow? So the position
 21 we're working to is for total clarity for the entire
 22 footprint to be GMP.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. I understand that. Thank you.
 24 MR GREANEY: That was the first change, the first
 25 improvement that I wanted to ask you about, primacy.

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1 Secondly, I am going to ask you about a topic that
 2 might be globally described as firearms. Obviously
 3 we will need to tread carefully in relation to this
 4 topic so as not to divulge operationally sensitive
 5 material. I'm going to ask you to turn up your fourth
 6 witness statement, fourth of nine statements. This is
 7 in fact, if your bundle is arranged as mine is,
 8 divider 4.
 9 A. Yes, sir.
 10 Q. Would you turn, please, to the third page? I hope
 11 you will have a section F, headed "Firearms".
 12 A. Indeed.
 13 Q. At the time of the arena attack, is it the position that
 14 BTP did have an armed policing capability --
 15 MR COOPER: Sorry to interrupt, but is there an INQ number
 16 for this statement?
 17 MR GREANEY: There is, of course: {INQ032829/3}.
 18 MR COOPER: I'm very grateful.
 19 MR GREANEY: At the time of the arena attack, BTP did have
 20 an armed policing capability?
 21 A. Yes, sir, in London only.
 22 Q. That capability involved armed officers with the ability
 23 to patrol, obviously, but also to respond to an attack?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. We obviously are not going to give an indication of all

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1 of the locations to which that capability has been
 2 extended, but I believe that we can confirm that since
 3 the arena attack, that capability has been extended to
 4 cover Manchester?
 5 A. That is correct.
 6 Q. Does that extension allow BTP to enhance the protective
 7 security arrangements it provides within this city?
 8 A. Yes, it does.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Are we going to deal with explosives
 10 dogs? If not, would you mind me asking a question about
 11 that?
 12 MR GREANEY: Not at all, sir.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When the bomb went off there was
 14 a concern about secondary devices. You can never, as
 15 I understand it, be sure there are no secondary devices
 16 in there until you have got dogs in there and there was
 17 quite a delay -- and I think it was a BTP dog which
 18 eventually did come.
 19 MR GREANEY: It was, it was Mojo, and I think he arrived at
 20 11.44. We'll check that time.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Do you still have the same number
 22 of explosives dogs or do you have more and would it be
 23 possible to get one to the scene quicker?
 24 A. Certainly, sir, we've taken some considerable investment
 25 in that area since 2017. In fact there are now seven

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1 explosive search dogs based from the Manchester hub.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Because I imagine this is the
 3 sort of problem which can occur quite regularly on the
 4 railways and can close you down until you are actually
 5 able to make sure the area is clear.
 6 A. Yes, it is frequent business for British Transport
 7 Police, sir.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 9 MR GREANEY: In fact, when you gave evidence last year,
 10 I asked you where the BTP explosives dog was and
 11 understandably where it had been on the night of the
 12 22nd, and understandably you didn't know. You told us
 13 you'd come back and tell us, but in fact subsequently
 14 the evidence has revealed that Mojo was within the
 15 general area and did arrive, as the chairman has pointed
 16 out, as the first explosives dog on the scene.
 17 A. Yes, in fact, sir, PC Healy, Mojo's handler, was
 18 actually off duty at home at the time, heard about the
 19 attack, and presented him back on duty and attended the
 20 arena.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 22 MR GREANEY: Does that deal with the issue you wanted to ask
 23 about?
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Absolutely, thank you.
 25 MR GREANEY: So I'm going to move on to the third area in

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1 respect of which there have been changes. I'm not
 2 taking these entirely in the order in which they're in
 3 your statement, but I know you'll bear with me. The
 4 first topic relates to first aid training and equipment
 5 for your officers .
 6 In terms of first aid equipment at the time of the
 7 attack, is it the position that some of it was stored in
 8 BTP patrol cars?
 9 A. That is correct , yes.
 10 Q. I believe the position to be that there was a small
 11 green first aid kit bag.
 12 A. Correct.
 13 Q. An orange kit bag?
 14 A. Yes, sir .
 15 Q. And what was described as a fatality bag.
 16 A. The orange kit bag and a fatality bag are one and the
 17 same.
 18 Q. There are separate lists for them but they are the same
 19 bag?
 20 A. Yes, that is my understanding.
 21 Q. The contents -- I am not going to suggest at the moment
 22 this is put on the screen -- are listed at
 23 {INQ025614/23-24}. The important feature that I want
 24 your comment on is that there was not in either of those
 25 bags at the time a tourniquet?

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1 A. That is correct .
 2 Q. Indeed, although new recruits received first aid
 3 training over 4 days, which was refreshed annually with
 4 4 hours of training , there was no training in the use of
 5 a tourniquet?
 6 A. That is correct . I think it might be helpful just to
 7 clarify on the orange kit bag, sir , that because of the
 8 nature of the business of BTP and, sadly, the fatalities
 9 that occur on average on a daily basis nationally within
 10 the force, those orange bags are known as fatality bags
 11 within the force and those bags are purely designed for
 12 the response to somebody who has sadly lost their life
 13 on the railway .
 14 Q. Just to return to that specific issue, which obviously
 15 is an important one, or may be an important one, in the
 16 context of this inquiry: no tourniquet in either bag, no
 17 training to officers in how to improvise or use any
 18 tourniquet. That might be thought to be unsatisfactory.
 19 So may I ask you, are officers now trained in the
 20 application of tourniquets?
 21 A. No, they are not.
 22 Q. Are they now supplied with a tourniquet or tourniquets?
 23 A. Not at this time, no.
 24 Q. Is that something that needs to change?
 25 A. Absolutely, and in fact, in terms of recent reflection ,

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1 it's why I make that last statement. Up until that
 2 point -- I don't know if you're going to come to that,
 3 sir -- the provision of tourniquets was in accordance
 4 with the requirements set by the College of Policing
 5 standard. First aid training for police officers
 6 nationally is governed under the first aid learning
 7 programme set against a number of modules. And for
 8 response officers nationally , that standard is known as
 9 module 2 and the use and training of tourniquets or
 10 splinting is not included in that module. It is
 11 included in module 4 and 5, I believe, which is for
 12 medics, public order trained officers and firearms
 13 officers . That was still the advice from the College of
 14 Policing , is my understanding, if my memory serves me
 15 right, even on the refresh of the first aid learning
 16 programme of January this year.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is it being looked at again?
 18 A. Specifically , I can't answer that question per se, sir .
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Your front line officers are the
 20 people who will be arriving first if it's a disaster on
 21 the railways, you will get there first , you may well
 22 have people who require tourniquets and they will
 23 require them really quickly. And we know, and we have
 24 heard, that it can take some time for paramedics to
 25 actually arrive . I just wonder whether anyone is

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1 considering at the moment, and maybe it's something
 2 we can ask the College of Policing about, or whether you
 3 can -- if you agree then you can put some pressure on
 4 the College of Policing in the light of the evidence
 5 we've had at the inquiry -- whether someone will
 6 reconsider that or whether it would require
 7 a recommendation from us for that to happen or perhaps
 8 the College of Policing would like to tell us why they
 9 don't do it .
 10 A. Certainly, sir , if I may, on --
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: A long-winded question, sorry.
 12 A. I fully respect that. If I may answer that in two
 13 parts --
 14 MR GREANEY: Just before the assistant chief constable does,
 15 sir , the importance of what you have said, if I may say
 16 so, is reinforced by the fact that the evidence the
 17 assistant chief constable has given about this, about
 18 the College of Policing's training , is really remarkably
 19 similar , as I recall it , to what was told to us by
 20 DCC Pilling of Greater Manchester Police.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So that indicates I need to be
 22 told everything twice?
 23 MR GREANEY: The point is there is a similar issue in GMP
 24 and BTP which may indicate this is an issue more
 25 generally .

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 2 A. After the attack and as part of our changes made
 3 procedure, BTP took the advice of a clinical adviser for
 4 major trauma from London Ambulance Service and also from
 5 certainly the then head of first aid training for the
 6 College of Policing. That advice was the position of
 7 module 2, that tourniquets should not be issued.
 8 I have to say that that was my understanding and my
 9 own positioning as late as the start of this week. It
 10 was only after following DCC Pilling's evidence and the
 11 reference to Brigadier Hodgetts' evidence that drew my
 12 attention to the evidence that he has given to this
 13 inquiry. I had not seen that before.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I can understand maybe for police
 15 officers to be carrying around individual tourniquets,
 16 I don't know how difficult that would be, it could be in
 17 their vehicles, but what Brigadier Hodgetts was saying
 18 was members of the public who are the first people
 19 there, it would be a real help if they knew how to use
 20 an improvised tourniquet and apply it. They could do
 21 a great deal of good. Absolutely the same applies to
 22 your officers, who are often among the first at the
 23 scene.
 24 A. Absolutely, sir. I have to say, with all honesty, up
 25 until this week and reading that evidence, I was firmly

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1 of the belief, and probably misinformed through some
 2 myths that I know Brigadier Hodgetts has referred to, of
 3 intensive training, of risks, et cetera. That was my
 4 positioning. I have now changed my position on that
 5 having listened to or watched his evidence and indeed
 6 watching, as I think the inquiry is aware of, the video
 7 on the citizenAID website. I will be taking that
 8 position forward in the next week both to my
 9 chief constable and actually I intend to contact
 10 Brigadier Hodgetts to have a conversation with him.
 11 My intention is that British Transport Police
 12 officers will receive tourniquets and will be trained in
 13 them, but that has been as a result of reflecting on the
 14 information and listening to the evidence of clearly an
 15 expert in that field.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's really good to know. I have
 17 asked for verification, I think through NAWAS, that -- he
 18 seemed a very, very impressive witness to me and I think
 19 everyone who heard him, but we do need to have
 20 confirmation from organisations like NAWAS that they
 21 agree with the position he takes about tourniquets.
 22 A. If I can assist further, sir, at the time British
 23 Transport Police did not have any clinical governance
 24 advisers as part of the force. Another changes made
 25 we have made is we have contracted in the services of

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1 front line clinical governance experts and my
 2 understanding is their positioning and advice to us in
 3 recent weeks is of a similar recommendation.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just finally, I think it's perfectly
 5 clear from BTP officers themselves who were first on the
 6 scene, a degree of frustration that they weren't better
 7 equipped to deal with the situation that they faced on
 8 that night.
 9 A. I accept that, sir.
 10 MR GREANEY: Just to finish off first aid training and
 11 equipment -- I've finished asking my questions about
 12 tourniquets -- within the orange bag was what is
 13 described in the inventory as a carry sheet. Is a carry
 14 sheet a form of stretcher?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Do you know whether any of those were utilised on the
 17 night of the arena attack?
 18 A. I don't know, I can't answer that.
 19 Q. Is that something you can take away and find out?
 20 A. Absolutely. The purpose of that sheet is to, with as
 21 much dignity as possible, remove people who have died on
 22 the railway because quite, uniquely, my understanding
 23 is, outside of the disaster victim identification, known
 24 as DVI, process, British Transport Police is the only
 25 force in the country that actually trains its recruits

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1 in the recovery, body recovery, which is unfortunately
 2 a business--as--usual event for us, week in, week out.
 3 Those sheets are used to remove bodies from the
 4 railway to the roadside to hand over to undertakers, so
 5 they are made for that purpose.
 6 Q. So the point that I'm interested in, just so you know
 7 and can explore it, is I don't believe we've heard so
 8 far, although we have chapter 12 to come, evidence about
 9 BTP carry sheets being used either to remove the living
 10 or the dead. As you will appreciate, an issue that
 11 we have been considering relating to the circumstances
 12 in which people were removed from that room on makeshift
 13 stretchers. And if it's right that carry sheets weren't
 14 used, it may be important to find out why not.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Does that make sense?
 17 A. Yes, I will take that away and report back.
 18 Q. Just finally on this topic, beyond the bags in the cars,
 19 you can confirm, I believe, that it's the position that
 20 there was at the time no additional equipment at the
 21 railway station available specifically for BTP?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. You intend to make further changes, but have changes
 24 already been made in relation to first aid training and
 25 equipment?

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1 A. Yes, they have, sir. Each BTP officer, again on the
 2 clinical advice we received at the time, are now
 3 personally issued with two trauma bandages. The
 4 first aid refresher training has been adapted with
 5 reference to those bandages.
 6 Equally, patrol vehicles have the provision now of
 7 what is commonly termed — and I think the inquiry has
 8 heard before — grab bags with additional bandages
 9 in the BTP patrol vehicles.
 10 Q. So that's what has been done and you've been very clear
 11 about what you intend to achieve from now on?
 12 A. Absolutely.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We do know that Network Rail did have
 14 some medical equipment because we've seen people
 15 grabbing the bags and taking them.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you make allowance for that within
 18 stations as knowing they will be available to BTP
 19 officers or are they not commonly available to them?
 20 A. They certainly are available, but we wanted to have the
 21 position in relation to the grab bags that the officers
 22 knew what equipment was available and didn't have to
 23 rely on knowing if that equipment was there, restocked,
 24 in service. So they're aware and that is included
 25 in the station emergency plans now.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But they would always have been aware
 2 and are aware now of additional equipment which may be
 3 available or is available from Network Rail?
 4 A. Yes, sir, but the only caveat I would give to that in
 5 regard to detail is not all stations nationally are
 6 managed by Network Rail, so that's where we wanted to be
 7 clear about what was available.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 9 MR GREANEY: That's all I propose to ask about first aid
 10 training and equipment.
 11 I'm now going to move to, if you still have the same
 12 page open, your heading G, "Preparedness for
 13 emergencies". So this is change 4.
 14 At the time of the arena attack, did BTP design,
 15 test or maintain any location specific emergency plans?
 16 A. No, they did not.
 17 Q. So at the time, what was the position?
 18 A. The position at the time was to rely on station plans
 19 that were in place in individual stations, but there was
 20 no specific BTP branded or trained—for plans.
 21 Q. Has that changed since 22 May 2017?
 22 A. Yes, it has. It's a programme of work that is in train
 23 and continues at this time.
 24 Q. Has it started with the appointment of a national
 25 position of superintendent for Protect and Prepare?

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1 A. Yes, it has.
 2 Q. And what work has he been tasked with undertaking?
 3 A. So that's in relation to three strands. That's the
 4 setting out of BTP's specific emergency plans and
 5 understanding those plans at a national level. The
 6 second phase is in relation to the exercise and testing
 7 of those plans and initial response. And then the third
 8 point is in relation to a single unit looking at the
 9 planning and command structure for known future events
 10 that the force will respond to.
 11 Q. So what is the intended purpose of this work that has
 12 been done? In other words, what shortcoming has been
 13 identified from what happened on 22 May that you are
 14 seeking to remedy?
 15 A. Local officers already have what I would describe as
 16 muscle memory of the emergency plans and what is
 17 required of them, should a major incident occur, for
 18 where they actually work.
 19 Q. To deal with those components that you identified, is
 20 the first component going to cover the introduction of
 21 detailed emergency plans to a standard template for key
 22 buildings and structures in the environments in which
 23 you work?
 24 A. Yes, it is.
 25 Q. Will those plans be prioritised according to risk?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Does the second component cover the delivery of one
 3 national full—scale live—play exercise and two tabletop
 4 exercises per annum?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. By whom will they be led?
 7 A. That will be led by the superintendent for Protect and
 8 Prepare and a resilience manager, which I mentioned
 9 earlier this morning, who is now in place for the force.
 10 Q. Will those exercises be BTP—specific or also involve
 11 your emergency service partners and railway
 12 stakeholders?
 13 A. Yes, absolutely, all of those partners.
 14 Q. Does the third component ensure that events across the
 15 country have a consistent level of command and control
 16 appropriate to the risk assessment for any particular
 17 event?
 18 A. Yes, indeed, and there's further detail on that point,
 19 I believe, in one of my further changes made statements.
 20 Q. That was what I was going to ask you about in one
 21 moment. Before we get to that, obviously it's one thing
 22 to have plans, it's another to ensure that those who
 23 will have a role under the plan are aware of them and
 24 know where to locate them. Do you agree?
 25 A. I do.

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1 Q. Has anything been done to ensure that that situation is
2 properly managed?
3 A. Yes, it has. I have to say that in checking out some of
4 that understanding, that was not at a level that I would
5 have hoped for and that is why some further work has
6 been launched, which is again covered in a further
7 statement.
8 Q. You have referred now twice to that further statement.
9 Shall we go to that? It's behind divider 9 in your
10 bundle because it is your ninth witness statement. For
11 the benefit of those that do not have this bundle, it's
12 {INQ041663/1}.
13 Under headings B and C, you list railway station
14 emergency plans and BTP station plans. Are these also
15 usefully dealt with under that heading, "Preparedness
16 for emergencies"?
17 A. Yes, they are.
18 Q. So could you tell us anything that you haven't dealt
19 with already in relation to railway station emergency
20 plans that emerges from this ninth statement?
21 A. Yes, certainly. So to date, there are a number of
22 stations across the UK that are categorised in terms of
23 risk. As set out already, we are starting with the most
24 significant high-profile stations and there are
25 approximately 98 of those across the country. To date,

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1 some 35 of those plans have been completed, some further
2 five are in draft and some further are awaiting
3 sign-off.
4 There's some further work been done in relation to
5 those plans through our own testing. On reflection,
6 having give evidence last year, understanding how
7 embedded those plans were, I can state that they were
8 certainly not to the level that I had perceived them to
9 be, and as a result of that, engaged a chief inspector
10 to go and do that testing for me and then to give
11 a force video out in relation to those plans to the
12 officers in charge of each of those stations, reminding
13 them of the importance of knowing the detail of the
14 existing plans.
15 Then there's some further work in terms of the
16 programme which is identified under A, which is how
17 we're actually now going to fully embed that position.
18 Q. So it seems clear therefore, from what you've said, that
19 you've identified the need to have location-specific
20 plans?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You've identified the risk that those with a role under
23 those plans might not fully understand them?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As you put it, in the sense that they aren't embedded,

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1 and you are taking steps to ensure that that danger does
2 not eventuate?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Next, and this is issue 5, and from what you have just
5 said is connected, I was going to ask you to help us
6 with what you describe in your statement as situational
7 awareness, briefing response and events or SABRE. This
8 is a fifth change but connected, I believe, with
9 preparedness for emergencies. What is SABRE?
10 A. Having given evidence previously and I gave evidence
11 that a number of issues were at the forefront of every
12 officer's mind, having reflected and listened to the
13 evidence of a number of BTP officers, other blue light
14 workers, and sir, taking account, even in these early
15 stages of your volume 1 report, we realised that we had
16 to do more to ensure that our strategic intent was
17 actually being delivered at ground level. The reason
18 that we had come up with the SABRE title is — I know
19 this inquiry has heard many mnemonics in police, but
20 they do tend to work, they do tend to stick with
21 officers.
22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's just that we keep forgetting them,
23 it's not that they're not a good idea, I'm sure.
24 A. It was really important for me, leading this programme,
25 that we had an identity, is the way I have described it,

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1 or a branding that the force could be trained in with
2 vigilance at the heart of everything that SABRE is about
3 and that that situational awareness briefing covered
4 both when officers were new to the post, when officers
5 were promoted into a post, when officers are going out
6 on their daily patrols or being deployed to key events,
7 that they had that consistent messaging.
8 Part of this work, having listened to, quite
9 rightly, the chairman's challenge when I sat in this
10 chair before about being fresh in terms briefing people
11 and repeated briefings. This is the structure that
12 we will be able to launch and effectively say to all of
13 our officers through their PDR process, through
14 questioning in promotion processes, through actually
15 walking the floor and asking the question: have you had
16 your SABRE briefing today, what is it, what does it
17 understand? The training and learning and development
18 department can deliver everything through the SABRE
19 title as well.
20 MR GREANEY: So this is about briefing officers at critical
21 times in their careers and in relation to critical
22 events so that they have the key information they need
23 to know?
24 A. Yes. The SABRE programme, which I've brought in
25 an additional superintendent to work — it's not rank

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1 driven, it's role driven — to drive the SABRE programme
 2 for me, it's also supported by a project manager. But
 3 the real key for me in SABRE and some of the reflection
 4 again is I think what has gone wrong has been the
 5 thinking that just because the strategic intent has been
 6 set, it might be at the wrong level or the wrong
 7 thinking. So it's very much the thinking of SABRE that
 8 it's delivered and designed from the ground up, so focus
 9 groups, key individuals from around the country from
 10 a number of BTP locations and advice from external blue
 11 light workers and colleagues will design and drive what
 12 we are actually delivering to officers on the front line
 13 at each of those times.
 14 Q. So part 1 is making sure they have the information they
 15 need, and that would involve giving the officers details
 16 of any relevant emergency plan; is that correct?
 17 A. Correct.
 18 Q. And of any sites that are or may be vulnerable to
 19 terrorist attack?
 20 A. Yes. And we're including points that will include the
 21 understanding of risk assessment, we've already done
 22 work in relation to training of our staff in terms of
 23 risk assessment, that comes under the SABRE brands. In
 24 terms of the opportunities for us in terms of
 25 technology, so the use of relevant apps, and in truth

1 addressing one element which we've described as the
 2 culture in terms of vigilance and alertness of our
 3 officers, and even in that point we've made changes even
 4 as recently as our deployment to the Euros final at
 5 Wembley in relation to the vigilance that I believed was
 6 in place, but my testing has found out it wasn't,
 7 changed our (inaudible: distorted) so that is at the
 8 forefront of my mind and I fully believe that that is
 9 the case in those deployments now and moving forward
 10 through SABRE.
 11 Q. And point 2, it's apparent you have thought of from what
 12 you said earlier, is to make sure the SABRE briefings
 13 remain fresh?
 14 A. Absolutely.
 15 Q. This is a point the chairman explored extensively
 16 himself during the course of chapter 7 that what you
 17 can't have is a situation in which your officers are
 18 sitting there, as if they are passengers on an
 19 aeroplane, listening to the 50th time to safety
 20 information; you need to make sure it's fresh, relevant
 21 and make sure that they're listening.
 22 A. Absolutely, and that was the point that I made before
 23 and quite rightly, sir, you challenged me on that and
 24 I've reflected on that. That is within the intention of
 25 SABRE and also the importance for it to recognise that

1 it's just not the latest thing as such or a fad, is the
 2 SABRE training will be recorded on officers' records on
 3 appointment and in relation to promotions as well so
 4 we've got a clear audit of what we strategically are
 5 actually supporting our officers in delivering front
 6 line policing.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And when you found out how to make it
 8 fresh, you can sell the idea to the airlines, perhaps?
 9 A. Yes, sir.
 10 MR GREANEY: Change 6, and I'm now at page 2 of that ninth
 11 statement, "Awareness of terrorism threat levels". What
 12 change have you implemented in that regard?
 13 A. We recognised that we had certainly done some of the
 14 online training but that was quite flat, in truth, and
 15 was relying on officers to effectively click through
 16 those slides themselves. So as an interim measure
 17 in-house, we have developed a briefing video and to
 18 ensure that the importance is understood at the right
 19 level, I actually do myself an introduction on that
 20 video of saying why it is important to the officers, why
 21 it's important to BTP, acknowledging that they may have
 22 heard the briefings and threat levels before, but we
 23 know now the importance of reviewing them consistently
 24 and the awareness.
 25 Then within that video, a recognised practitioner, a

1 sergeant from our specialist operations department, then
 2 talks through each of the threat levels and what they
 3 actually mean to an operational police officer. That
 4 video has been shared out to all of our stations for
 5 playing to all of the officers. That's what I would
 6 describe as an interim video. We'll then be moving to
 7 a commercial-style product that can be updated, but this
 8 was the initial response to our thinking and reflections
 9 from where we are and what we've heard to date.
 10 Q. And I believe it's your intention that the video should
 11 be refreshed at least each year?
 12 A. Absolutely.
 13 Q. But that if there is any specific event or incident that
 14 requires it to be updated, that will occur at that
 15 stage?
 16 A. Absolutely. In terms of that same briefing as well, the
 17 work that we had currently had in train was for
 18 a specific briefing video for Manchester Arena, which
 19 involved a fly through of drones, so a visual
 20 representation of what officers were going to be
 21 deployed in, showing key points, and we have shared our
 22 thinking for that briefing with our colleagues in GMP as
 23 part of the transition process across to them taking the
 24 events.
 25 MR GREANEY: Sir, I don't know if you have any questions

1 about that.

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I don't.

3 MR GREANEY: Change 7, the event planning strategic

4 oversight unit, the EPSOU. Is that a new unit that sits

5 within the Protect and Prepare portfolio that you have

6 told us about on the last occasion you gave evidence?

7 A. Yes, effectively that was the vision at the time,

8 that is the third part of the original changes made

9 statement. That unit has gone live at the beginning of

10 May and includes a briefing officer specifically

11 dedicated for that role, to keep that matter fresh.

12 I would probably best describe this unit as having

13 oversight to second-guess the plans. So people out on

14 the front line, the planning and operational teams, will

15 set the plans for operations and then it will be checked

16 through this unit to ask those challenging

17 questions: have you thought of A, have you considered B?

18 If the unit believes there are any gaps, then those

19 incidents are talked through and that is actually

20 happening at this moment in time and certainly that unit

21 has already tested the plans that have gone before for

22 BTP's involvement in G7 and also for the Euros

23 competition.

24 Q. Change 8, "The Home Office Homeland Security exercising

25 and testing team". What is there for us to know about

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1 that?

2 A. So that unit, sir, is responsible for the national

3 testing and exercising for CT events nationally and for

4 pre-briefs. And from my experience over the last

5 3 years, many forces are probably not fully sighted on

6 the work of BTP and what BTP can bring to a policing

7 operation. My own experience has found that even in

8 some of the exercises that have taken place, and one

9 involved a train, BTP were not actually invited

10 originally to take part in that operation.

11 So we worked very closely with the Homeland Security

12 Department and have managed to secure the placement of

13 an inspector into that design team so that BTP can be

14 at the forefront of the design of national exercise and

15 testing, so my colleagues, certainly at senior policing

16 levels and at tactical levels, where relevant, will have

17 an understanding of the roles of BTP in operational

18 settings.

19 And as a result of that, as well, a change in line

20 with Homeland Security is as part of some of the

21 pre-briefs for counter-terrorism -- as an example,

22 again, the G7 summit, Homeland Security invited myself

23 to be a key speaker at a briefing for that event, so in

24 advance for the situation, and the relevance due to the

25 site of the summit was again adjacent to BTP property,

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1 that all partners, all strategic partners, in advance

2 had a full understanding of the roles and capabilities

3 of BTP. So that is quite, for me, a significant change

4 and a footprint into the Home Office department

5 responsible for exercising and testing.

6 Q. Just to make sure I've understood this, we know that the

7 emergency services in Greater Manchester and beyond,

8 I am certain, ran live exercises to test their response

9 to, for example, an MTFA.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And it might reasonably be said they didn't always learn

12 the lessons or at least implement the changes that had

13 been identified, but at any rate they did exercise, and

14 one example that you will have heard of is Exercise

15 Winchester Accord --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- which BTP weren't involved in.

18 A. No.

19 Q. That may not be entirely surprising; it didn't feature

20 a railway station. But is what you're saying to us that

21 you now have a BTP inspector embedded in the team

22 that is responsible for the oversight of exercising?

23 A. Certainly the national exercises, yes.

24 Q. And the aim of that, so far as BTP is concerned, is to

25 ensure that railway policing is covered by national

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1 exercising?

2 A. Yes.

3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It is fair to say that BTP were involved

4 in some of the exercises which did take place at the

5 station?

6 A. Yes. But that very much, sir, was about local

7 relationships. The mission, if I can put it that way,

8 is for full understanding across the piece of the

9 involvement and opportunities and support BTP can bring.

10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: In a way it's always going to be

11 a slight problem, isn't it, or maybe, because of the

12 police being divided into their 42 different areas and

13 you being a single police force nationally?

14 A. Very much so. In the simplest terms the marker on my

15 experience, as we go into different events or operations

16 across the country, we almost have to sometimes start

17 again to do that interaction and for understanding,

18 because again you might have a good relationship with

19 one chief officer in a police force, but if it's

20 a different Gold commander you will have to share that

21 information again, yes.

22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

23 MR GREANEY: That's all I propose to ask you about the

24 changes that have been implemented since the arena

25 attack. But there is just one final issue that I'm

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1 going to seek your help in respect of.
 2 As you know, the inquiry has received evidence of
 3 the changes implemented by Greater Manchester Police
 4 from Deputy Chief Constable Pilling --
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. -- and has received comparable evidence of the changes
 7 made by the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
 8 from Assistant County Fire Officer Keelan --
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. -- and by North West Fire Control from Sarah--Jane
 11 Wilson.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. It may have struck you that they each explained that the
 14 evidence they had heard in chapter 10 had caused them to
 15 reflect on whether additional changes were needed.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. That is to say, things have emerged during the course of
 18 our process that had not emerged previously, either in
 19 their processes or in Kerslake. Does that make sense?
 20 A. Yes, it does.
 21 Q. Each of them had concluded that further changes were
 22 necessary and they had undertaken to provide a written
 23 document or statement setting out what they consider
 24 those are. Is it your view that the same goes for BTP,
 25 by which I mean the inquiry has revealed additional

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1 issues that may require additional change?
 2 A. Yes, absolutely.
 3 Q. And indeed, to be fair to you, you've identified one of
 4 them today, namely Brigadier Hodgetts has changed your
 5 mind about first aid training.
 6 A. Absolutely.
 7 Q. So are you also, I'm not going to put you on to the spot
 8 to set out what the additional changes are now, but are
 9 you content to produce a further statement, your tenth,
 10 setting out what additional changes the inquiry has
 11 identified for you as being necessary?
 12 A. Yes, absolutely.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And some of what you have already said
 14 is as a result, as I understand it, of what has come out
 15 in the inquiry.
 16 A. Absolutely, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Which brings me on to something I wanted
 18 to ask you, which I did ask Mr Pilling as well.
 19 Hopefully, inevitably, when you have an inquiry like
 20 this looking at matters in the sort of depth like
 21 we have over a considerable period of time, hopefully
 22 things do come out which people haven't thought of. Has
 23 it caused you, as it did Mr Pilling, to reflect on
 24 whether in fact your own debrief procedure was
 25 satisfactory in revealing the problems?

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1 A. There's certainly work still to be done in that area,
 2 yes, sir. That is what I would say for that, yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And do you think -- actually, this is
 4 something said in relation to the intelligence service
 5 and Lord Anderson's review of that: if you're marking
 6 your own homework, as it were, in your own debrief,
 7 there is always, inevitably, a danger of being
 8 defensive?
 9 A. Absolutely, sir. Part of the reflection of that to date
 10 is that we currently have commissioned a consultancy to
 11 come in to do just that, to have a look at our own
 12 homework, even with these new changes, even to review
 13 the concept of SABRE. Personally, I'm now very
 14 passionate about delivering that within the force and
 15 I'm very much aware that things can still be missed. So
 16 the chief constable of BTP has commissioned what was
 17 a very experienced senior practitioner in public order
 18 and event policing to do just that, to review our
 19 transition to GMP and also for our plans and changes
 20 moving forward and those terms of reference. That
 21 consultancy is in force as we speak.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you for listening to what we have
 23 said.
 24 MR GREANEY: Sir, that concludes my questioning, at least at
 25 this stage. Can I indicate, just before I expect us to

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1 take a break, who has permission to ask questions in
 2 accordance with our Rule 10 procedure.
 3 First of all, SMG, and so I would ask Mr Taylor to
 4 make contact with me during the break to indicate
 5 whether he still does intend to ask questions -- I say
 6 Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor or Mr O'Connor.
 7 I know on behalf of the families Mr Atkinson will
 8 have questions, which he will ask over the link, and
 9 finally Mr Gibbs, on behalf of British Transport Police,
 10 will ask his questions, again over the link.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 12 MR GREANEY: I expect that we will finish before lunch.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 14 (11.13 am)
 15 (A short break)
 16 (11.35 am)
 17 MR GREANEY: Sir, Mr Taylor has been good enough to be in
 18 touch with me to explain that SMG no longer have any
 19 questions, their issues have been covered, and so we can
 20 turn immediately to Mr Atkinson on behalf of the
 21 families.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 23 Questions from MR ATKINSON
 24 MR ATKINSON: Good morning, sir, I hope you can hear me and
 25 see me.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can, Mr Atkinson, thank you.
 2 MR ATKINSON: Good morning, Mr O'Callaghan. As you
 3 understand, I ask questions on behalf of the bereaved
 4 families and can I begin by thanking you for the work
 5 you outlined that BTP is now doing to address a number
 6 of areas of concern. We look forward to hearing further
 7 progress in relation to those in due course.
 8 Would you agree, Mr O'Callaghan, that in various
 9 respects it is a matter of regret that those things had
 10 not been done sooner?
 11 A. In hindsight, now, yes, absolutely.
 12 Q. Just to see whether it is really a matter of hindsight,
 13 in relation to your major incident plan --
 14 {INQ025700/1}, please, Mr Lopez -- this is a document
 15 that was produced in 2011 and was, as we understand it,
 16 still the current document in 2017. Is that also your
 17 understanding, Mr O'Callaghan?
 18 A. Yes, it is, yes.
 19 Q. We can take that down just for a moment, Mr Lopez, but
 20 we'll be coming back to it.
 21 Are you aware, Mr O'Callaghan, of the observations
 22 of the experts in relation to your major incident plan?
 23 A. Generally, yes, sir.
 24 Q. Just to help you with some of them to see if they accord
 25 with your understanding. One is that in important

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1 respects the major incident plan was out of date.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And so, for example, {INQ025700/24}, please, at the
 4 bottom of the page, we can see a heading "SADD CHALETS".
 5 That was a mnemonic that was no longer current in
 6 2017, was it?
 7 A. That's correct, it has been replaced with METHANE.
 8 Q. Yet not in your major incident plan?
 9 A. No, that is correct.
 10 Q. More generally, do you accept that the major incident
 11 plan, as at 2017, did not embrace the JESIP principles
 12 in overt and important ways?
 13 A. Yes, I accept that.
 14 Q. Mr Greaney has taken you through already, under the
 15 heading of things that went wrong, various respects in
 16 which JESIP was not followed. It is not a good start
 17 for that process if the plan that underpins a major
 18 incident response doesn't address JESIP either?
 19 A. I do accept that, yes. Although I do not -- I've
 20 thought about this quite a lot. I do not think that
 21 JESIP failed as a result of it not being within that
 22 plan per se.
 23 Q. The plan clearly identifies the command structure that
 24 BTP is to employ and it's not an unconventional one in
 25 terms of Gold, Silver and Bronze level of command.

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1 Would you agree that BTP faces a particular challenge
 2 in that regard because of your national spread?
 3 A. Potentially, yes, in terms of some of the functions
 4 specifically in terms of some of the Bronze functions,
 5 yes, depending on the location. But I still believe
 6 that those functions can be delivered from a number of
 7 locations.
 8 Q. Just to explore that, because clearly, because you are
 9 a national force so far as the railways are concerned,
 10 incidents anywhere from South Shields to Southampton may
 11 arise that BTP, if it is taking command of such an
 12 operation, will need to provide commanders for who could
 13 be anywhere and everywhere else in the country than
 14 South Shields or Southampton?
 15 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.
 16 Q. And whilst potentially a Gold commander can give an
 17 overall strategy from wherever they are, they have to
 18 depend on their ability to do that on having information
 19 from the scene that answers the questions that they will
 20 need to answer to devise any such strategy?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Equally, a Silver commander -- would you agree that
 23 tactical command is better provided nearer the scene
 24 than further away from it?
 25 A. I would very much say that that depends on the

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1 circumstances. It can be the case more often
 2 in relation to spontaneous events, but many, many
 3 successful operations nationally work very well with
 4 Silver commanders being based remotely.
 5 Q. Would that depend in part on whether they were
 6 operations that you had notice of and could plan for in
 7 advance as opposed to spontaneous matters?
 8 A. Yes, absolutely. So that was the matter I'd be
 9 referring to, depending on the location and the
 10 spontaneous nature of the event, yes.
 11 Q. So, for example, Chief Superintendent Gregory, who was
 12 the Silver commander on this occasion, gave the example
 13 of the opening of New Street Station. Her Majesty did
 14 not just turn up, you knew in advance that she was
 15 coming, and were able to plan for that and therefore the
 16 location of a Silver commander was something you could
 17 take into account in your planning?
 18 A. Absolutely, yes.
 19 Q. When something happens like did happen on 22 May, the
 20 important role that a Silver commander needs to fulfil
 21 can be hampered if they are not at the scene and
 22 therefore deprived of information?
 23 A. I think that very much depends on the ability to be able
 24 to communicate. I think if those lines of communication
 25 are available, it can still work well. When I was here

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1 before, I gave the example of a live train crash where
 2 we were able to deal with the command structure remotely
 3 across a number of blue light services and that incident
 4 occurred out of hours, in the middle of the night. So
 5 it is absolutely possible to deliver an effective
 6 command structure remotely, but I accept fully there are
 7 many times when there are benefits of the
 8 Silver commanders being local to the scene, yes.
 9 Q. And particularly perhaps with an eye to JESIP,
 10 interoperability is going to work better almost
 11 inevitably where the Silver commanders are able actually
 12 to talk to each other?
 13 A. Yes. Communication for me in that interoperability is
 14 key, yes.
 15 Q. The other difficulty for BTP in that regard is you'll be
 16 aware that in the experts' report they quote
 17 Sir Michael Pitt and his observation that:
 18 "Command works better where the commanders already
 19 know each other and have worked together before."
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. That clearly can happen more when the emergency services
 22 are all based in the same city as each other, more
 23 difficult if the police force trying to take command of
 24 an incident is a national one that doesn't have those
 25 local connections?

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1 A. Yes, I absolutely accept that. But equally, I'm aware
 2 due to the structures, due to on-call systems, it was
 3 very much the case that even in local forces, those
 4 relationships may not have already been formed. From my
 5 professional experience, what I tend to find is that
 6 those relationships are in place where portfolios are
 7 aligned, so I will know my colleagues around the country
 8 in the same portfolio. But if there's another chief
 9 officer from a different blue light service who has
 10 a different portfolio, often those relationships won't
 11 already have been formed, even locally, is my
 12 experience.
 13 Q. Taking on board of course the fact that there are 43
 14 Home Office forces and you, is there scope for there to
 15 be identification in advance of who the commanders are
 16 likely to be in relation to particular nights or
 17 particular locations so that there can be that quicker
 18 dialogue between commanders who will know in advance who
 19 they need to talk to?
 20 A. Absolutely. And I think that is certainly achievable
 21 nationally and that is one of the -- why I say minor, is
 22 because it's a simple change that has been made between
 23 GMP and BTP. So at 7.30 every morning now, GMP share
 24 with BTP the contact details of all of the senior
 25 members of the force across Greater Manchester. That is

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1 into our control room at London and Birmingham, so we
 2 now have that in place for Manchester, as an example.
 3 Q. One of the roles for a Silver commander, would you
 4 agree, is to devise the tactical plan?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Indeed, that's an important part of their role?
 7 A. Absolutely.
 8 Q. Because they then rely on the Bronze commander to put
 9 into operational effect that plan?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And so it is a plan that needs to be developed and
 12 implemented early on in an emergency response?
 13 A. Yes, very much so.
 14 Q. So is it a matter of regret that there was no tactical
 15 plan in relation to the emergency response so far as BTP
 16 is concerned to the events of 22 May?
 17 A. Certainly in response to what people would perceive as
 18 a detailed plan, absolutely. But on that very point, if
 19 I may, I think that is one of the points that needs to
 20 be revisited in relation to policing nationally and what
 21 is known as the authorised professional practice for us
 22 to consider. But very much the responsibilities are set
 23 out, which is strategy by Gold, tactical plan by Silver,
 24 Gold sign off the plan. It works extremely well for
 25 pre-planned operations, but there's probably little

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1 account for spontaneous events where things are
 2 unfolding at the time and when people are there.
 3 Q. Would you agree all that does depend on there being
 4 a commander on scene, if not Silver then certainly
 5 Bronze, to take a grip, to use the words of I think one
 6 of your documents, take a grip of things that are
 7 happening there and to ensure that the right information
 8 is going up the chain to the tactical commander?
 9 A. Yes, very much so.
 10 Q. In particular, is it therefore essential that the
 11 identity of a potential Bronze commander is always
 12 readily identifiable, so someone knows within minutes
 13 that they are the person, potentially to be replaced
 14 later, but they are the person in command at the scene?
 15 A. Yes, and that is something that didn't work well for BTP
 16 on the night, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If I may take that up, Mr Atkinson. Are
 18 you saying that on pre-planned events, it's essentially
 19 a top-down, so Gold, Silver and Bronze, strategy from
 20 Gold, the plan set out by Silver and then implemented by
 21 Bronze? If it's a spontaneous event, does it
 22 necessarily have to be bottom-up?
 23 A. No, not at all, sir. It should be reactive to the
 24 situation that's there. I think there's an expectation
 25 that sometimes a tactical plan has to be an extremely

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1 lengthy document, as they are for a pre-planned
 2 operation, where it will go into many, many pages.
 3 I think on a spontaneous event, that should be
 4 a quick reaction and a tactical plan could be a number
 5 of bullet points, it could be a number of lines. It's
 6 exactly what it says in terms of how you're turning
 7 a strategy into an operational delivery.

8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: The strategy on these occasions, perhaps
 9 I'm being facile, would seem to me to be extraordinarily
 10 obvious.
 11 A. Yes, very much so. Very obvious, sir, and very simple.
 12 They get extremely complex and potentially complicated
 13 for pre-planned events because --

14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that. Similarly, the
 15 tactical plan in many ways can be very simple; it's
 16 actually doing it on the ground which sometimes becomes
 17 the problem.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you, Mr Atkinson.
 20 MR ATKINSON: {INQ025700/70}, please.
 21 This is from the major incident manual, this is the
 22 list of responsibilities for the Bronze on-scene
 23 commander, and we can see that it is recognised by the
 24 second bullet point down that the Bronze commander will
 25 adopt many of the roles of the Silver commander. That

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1 presumably allows for what the chair was just asking you
 2 about, which is someone on scene taking command and
 3 adopting the roles of others until those roles are
 4 filled by them?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. We can see at the bottom of the list there is:
 7 "Carry out at scene liaison with the other emergency
 8 services."
 9 Would you agree, really, to give JESIP its proper
 10 bite, that ought to be nearer the top of the list?
 11 A. Absolutely, yes. I accept that.
 12 Q. Clearly, in many instances, and Manchester on 22 May is
 13 a good example of it, the first officers on scene will
 14 not be those who would conventionally adopt any of the
 15 Gold, Silver or Bronze roles, they may be police
 16 constables or at best perhaps a police sergeant.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. But would you agree that it is absolutely essential that
 19 those first at the scene know that there is a role for
 20 them beyond their instinctive one, which is to help
 21 people?
 22 A. Absolutely.
 23 Q. Mr Lopez, {INQ025700/24}, please.
 24 Under the heading of "Initial actions of first
 25 officer on scene", there is a requirement for an initial

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1 assessment of the scene. Would you agree that so far as
 2 BTP is concerned, that's particularly vital because they
 3 need the eyes and ears of the person on the ground to
 4 give them any information that they can base any kind of
 5 planning on?
 6 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.
 7 Q. And it goes on:
 8 "The first officer at the scene must not become
 9 personally involved [from memory]."
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. That is an incredibly difficult thing to ask someone to
 12 do, isn't it?
 13 A. Absolutely.
 14 Q. But it's also an incredibly necessary thing for someone
 15 to do if the organisation, the command structure, is to
 16 have the necessary situational awareness to do anything?
 17 A. Absolutely, yes.
 18 Q. Which is why Mr Cawley's METHANE message was so
 19 important?
 20 A. Yes, indeed.
 21 Q. And why it would have been better, and I hasten to add
 22 absolutely no criticism of him, it would have been
 23 better if it had been delivered earlier?
 24 A. Yes, I do accept that, yes.
 25 Q. And shared with the other emergency services?

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1 A. Absolutely. In my view it is almost useless if it is
 2 not shared into wider services, yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: As it worked out -- let's forget about
 4 the sharing because that's clearly wrong, but in
 5 Mr Cawley's case, as Mr Atkinson's pointed out, the
 6 instinct is going to help people, and as I remember it,
 7 someone actually had to say to him: no, stand back, we
 8 need to know what's going on.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And then he did do that. Thank you.
 11 MR ATKINSON: So isn't that really a critical part of
 12 training, which it may be that the new SABRE mnemonic
 13 will help with, you'll tell us, that those who may
 14 unexpectedly find themselves dealing with the
 15 unimaginable have that muscle memory that means they
 16 know that the first thing they must do is report to
 17 others what they have found before they do anything
 18 else?
 19 A. Yes. That is a critical element of the SABRE programme
 20 as well as, if I may, also, the roles of Bronze on scene
 21 and clearing up any confusion, because I believe there
 22 remains confusion of people's understanding of the role
 23 of Bronze. Gold/Silver/Bronze is often referred to as
 24 a qualification from the College of Policing when in
 25 actual fact it actually means you are the person the

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1 supervisor, whether trained in public order or not or
 2 whatever discipline, but that is the identifier that
 3 those are the responsibilities we are asking you to
 4 undertake at that point. That is another element that
 5 will feature heavily in the SABRE programme.
 6 Q. An observation that a whole series of your officers made
 7 from the police constables who were on scene in the
 8 City Room up was that more hands-on, real role play
 9 situations where they were actually doing things, acting
 10 through such incidents with the other emergency services
 11 would have considerably helped them. Is there scope for
 12 there to be more of that?
 13 A. I think the ideal answer to that is yes. But we know
 14 that they are quite timely and take a lot of time to
 15 plan. I'm trying to be as open-minded as possible with
 16 the new approach to explore new ways of that training
 17 occurring. Certainly through the pandemic, I personally
 18 have been involved in truly international exercises with
 19 colleagues from the continent, taking part in virtual
 20 live-play exercises, so I think there's scope to explore
 21 the new technology we've experienced over the last year
 22 so that those training sessions can certainly be more
 23 frequent but still engage other partners outside of
 24 policing.
 25 Q. Another respect, would you agree, that more could have

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1 been done earlier was in terms of there being
 2 a contingency plan from the BTP for the arena?
 3 A. Certainly in terms of forward control points or the
 4 interoperability between agencies, but having spent many
 5 hours looking at what happened, from my own experience
 6 I don't think there was any gaps from what the officers
 7 did as a result of them not being familiar with a plan
 8 for the officers on the ground.
 9 Q. Because the difficulty that those who were not on the
 10 ground, in control rooms for example and in the senior
 11 command roles, reported in their evidence to the
 12 chairman was that they did not know the arena
 13 themselves, so in terms of the control room, for
 14 example, identifying rendezvous points and forward
 15 command points and the roads around it sufficiently to
 16 have confidence about that and a contingency plan that
 17 identified potential locations would have helped them,
 18 wouldn't it?
 19 A. Yes, absolutely, and this element comes down to personal
 20 viewpoints in terms of contingency plans. Some of the
 21 current thinking in those plans is they should be fairly
 22 brief in terms of what they actually contain. Some of
 23 my own criticism of our own major incident manual is it
 24 runs to just shy of 100 pages. But certainly, I can
 25 inform the inquiry that the contingency plan that

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1 I referred to earlier, the new joint contingency plan
 2 with GMP and BTP already includes suggested RVP points
 3 and forward control points and they didn't exist in
 4 those plans before.
 5 Q. And particularly so far as your force is concerned, the
 6 experts comment on the fact that your major incident
 7 plan is very railway-centric, which is perhaps not very
 8 surprising given what BTP does, but doesn't that
 9 underline the fact that if you were going to police
 10 something that was not a railway station but was an
 11 entertainment venue, it needed a separate planning
 12 exercise to work out how you policed that in a major
 13 incident from how you would otherwise respond to
 14 something on the railways?
 15 A. Yes, I accept that, yes.
 16 Q. And that, with respect, Mr O'Callaghan, is not something
 17 that you needed 22 May to tell you, was it?
 18 A. No is the short answer. I think sometimes there's the
 19 benefit, as I referred to, of the peer review and people
 20 looking over your shoulder to review your plans, because
 21 there's been much talk of action cards involved, and
 22 only last week I walked the floor, so to speak, of the
 23 control room in London and reviewed the action cards and
 24 still there's some development that I discovered last
 25 week that they need amending because they are still

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1 looking railway-specific in some cases. So there's
 2 still more to do and still more observations to be made.
 3 Q. Another area in which, would you agree, things fell
 4 short was in terms of communication on the night, both
 5 between BTP officers and between BTP officers and
 6 anybody else?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. In terms of the control room having access to others,
 9 for example the FDO, it rather appears that the use of
 10 Hailing channels as opposed to the phone doesn't really
 11 appear to have occurred to anyone. Would you agree
 12 that is a matter of regret?
 13 A. As I said earlier, sir, yes, it was certainly an option.
 14 Having been in a number of those roles personally
 15 myself, I think sometimes the view on paper or review
 16 often doesn't necessarily match the reality. What
 17 I mean by that is certainly the Hailing channel could
 18 have been used, but in terms of contact with the FDO for
 19 argument's sake, the reason we couldn't get through to
 20 the FDO on the night, to Mr Sexton, was because he was
 21 already engaged in other communication and there's only
 22 that one point. So whether it's a radio message,
 23 a computer message or a telephone message, there's only
 24 that one point of entry and if that is already in use or
 25 blocked, then that causes problems.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr O'Callaghan, I think if you don't
 2 mind me saying so, that doesn't really cover the problem
 3 entirely because they're ringing 999 essentially .
 4 You have everyone else coming in on the calls to say
 5 this has happened. It's not that the FDO is on the
 6 phone, it's 999 is engaged with lots of calls coming in,
 7 although he probably would have been. So some better
 8 communication was clearly needed than just using the 999
 9 calls that everybody else would be trying to. You are
 10 not alone in not having much knowledge or use of police
 11 Hailing channels. It seems apparent to everybody.
 12 A. I absolutely agree in terms of a spontaneous emergency
 13 situation. I do know that Hailing channels are used on
 14 a daily basis even by PCs, and that's not meant in
 15 a condescending way, but in terms that it's not reserved
 16 for senior officers. I believe it just did not come
 17 into anyone's mind on the night.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: They may not be able to get through, but
 19 what's really surprising is they didn't have a number
 20 for the FDO direct.
 21 A. Absolutely. As you would expect, that is now in place,
 22 that is now shared. But again, my own personal
 23 experience, operational experience, of being
 24 a Gold commander, contacting an equivalent FDO, is even
 25 on a direct number, that number will be picked up by

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1 somebody else and your message will be, "They're talking
 2 to someone else", so that is a real time problem.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It gets you closer though.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Atkinson.
 6 MR ATKINSON: But just staying with the communication point,
 7 even taking on board what you have said about contact
 8 with the FDO, the control room and the FIM who, to start
 9 with, had the role of tactical commander until one was
 10 appointed under the plan, could and should have been
 11 contacting the other people who needed to be brought
 12 into the loop, the Ambulance Service, the Fire Service,
 13 if, as he appeared to think, he was in command of the
 14 incident, and that didn't happen either.
 15 A. No, I accept that.
 16 Q. So one point of blockage should not clog up the whole
 17 system, should it?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. And if BTP thought it was in command of this incident,
 20 contact with ambulance and fire would have, to some
 21 extent, got round the difficulty of not being able to
 22 speak to a particular officer at the GMP?
 23 A. Yes. I accept that, yes.
 24 Q. And again, the officers on the ground all reported the
 25 difficulties they had in terms of communication because

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1 of what Mr Cawley described as "chaos on the radios"
 2 because there were so many people on the regional
 3 channel who were reporting in from other places within
 4 your region 3 that they were on their way or offering to
 5 help rather than being able to hear messages from the
 6 control room as to what they should be doing. Is that
 7 something that has now been dealt with?
 8 A. To a certain degree, yes, in terms of the training and
 9 messages. But again, from experience, I was last
 10 deployed operationally two weekends ago. It's a common
 11 problem. You have an earpiece, there's lots of talking,
 12 in terms of people passing messages, it's a reality of
 13 anyone using two-way radio systems, unfortunately.
 14 Q. You mentioned training there and Mr Greaney mentioned
 15 Winchester Accord. The Winchester Accord, of course, in
 16 fact was an 11th century agreement that established
 17 primacy for the Archbishop of Canterbury, and you'd
 18 agree, I think, Mr O'Callaghan, that primacy is not a
 19 novel —
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Atkinson, we could not have managed
 21 without that information. We're so grateful to you,
 22 thank you so much.
 23 MR ATKINSON: It was for Mr de la Poer's benefit, I have to
 24 say, mainly.
 25 Primacy is not a new concept in the sense that where

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1 there are two persons or organisations that may take
 2 command, it's important in advance to know which of them
 3 actually will .
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. The Home Office had a go in 2002 with their circular,
 6 but would you agree that did not actually answer the
 7 question of: in an emergency who should take command,
 8 BTP or a local force?
 9 A. Yes, I agree, sir .
 10 Q. If we look at your major incident plan in that regard,
 11 {INQ025700/14}, paragraph 2.5, please. This is within
 12 the major incident plan:
 13 "Agreement on responsibilities between BTP and the
 14 local police force will be subject to negotiation with
 15 all relevant local police forces at the outset of any
 16 major incident."
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Would you agree that there would be no reason at all not
 19 to have reached agreement in relation to primacy well in
 20 advance of any incident actually happening?
 21 A. I wouldn't agree with that on the basis of depending on
 22 the level and scale of an incident.
 23 Q. But taking obviously the Manchester Arena as
 24 a particular case in point, this was an entertainment
 25 venue, not a railway station, it was in the middle of

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1 a major city for which another force was responsible,
 2 and in relation to particularly any form of a terrorist
 3 attack, it was inevitable that both forces would have to
 4 be involved in any response, was it not?
 5 A. Yes, it was, yes.
 6 Q. So was it not also obvious that there was a need to
 7 agree in advance how that would be done?
 8 A. I can accept that that is the point that we are at now,
 9 but it wasn't a point that was considered before,
 10 probably on the basis — and it's an assumption
 11 obviously since I have joined the force and been able to
 12 consider the fact — that still the assumption is that,
 13 for instance, on a railway station, certainly on some of
 14 the large InterCity hubs, it would still be the —
 15 primacy would sit with BTP, even with a local force
 16 assisting. I think the reality is due regard hadn't
 17 been given to the arena as a venue as it should have
 18 been.
 19 Q. Because the expertise needed at the arena would not be
 20 railway-centric, would it, it would be geographical?
 21 A. Yes, and the same would apply if a terrorist incident
 22 were to happen at a railway station, that would still be
 23 seen as a Home Office force led event.
 24 Q. I don't know if you have seen Chief Officer Smith's
 25 evidence in relation to the interim memorandum that was

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1 signed on behalf of the BTP by you in March of this year
 2 and the difficulties he foresaw with that as a solution
 3 to the primacy problem. Are you aware of his comments
 4 on that?
 5 A. I'm certainly aware of his comments. I don't agree with
 6 his comments.
 7 Q. If we can look briefly at the interim memorandum,
 8 {INQ040967/3}, please. It's the bottom part of the
 9 page, please, Mr Lopez.
 10 BTP and GMP jointly drafting a contingency plan for
 11 the arena and station, would you agree that would always
 12 have been a good idea?
 13 A. Yes, absolutely.
 14 Q. Joint exercising, do you agree, would be essential?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And far more than had happened before 22 May?
 17 A. Absolutely.
 18 Q. And could have happened before 22 May?
 19 A. Yes, absolutely.
 20 Q. Paragraph 13, which was one that concerned Mr Smith:
 21 "Where a terrorist incident is suspected but not yet
 22 formally declared, the default position is that
 23 Counter-terrorism Policing will have primacy."
 24 What does that actually mean, Mr O'Callaghan?
 25 A. So the specific terms are relevant in terms of

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1 a terrorist attack, so suspected and declared. So the
 2 suspected element would be the assumption from what is
 3 actually before you is highly probable to be a terrorist
 4 attack and you would respond accordingly. The reference
 5 to a declared default position is a position in policing
 6 nationally and at government level, in my understanding,
 7 and from my own training and knowledge there is only
 8 a single officer in the UK that can actually declare an
 9 incident is actually a terrorist attack, and that sits
 10 within the Counter-terrorism Network and is known as the
 11 senior national coordinator.
 12 Q. But would you agree that that little sentence doesn't
 13 really spell any of that out as to who is meant to
 14 declare it and what aspect of Counter-terrorism Policing
 15 is meant to take primacy?
 16 A. I would disagree for this reason, because the MoU is
 17 very much meant to be a senior executive document
 18 between chief officers who understand the context of
 19 that matter and it can be the case that it may be
 20 an incident is not actually declared a terrorist attack
 21 for some days, so it's important to set out that
 22 actually that is the position and that's the
 23 understanding between both forces.
 24 Q. So that doesn't address primacy in the period before
 25 that particular officer declares it to be a terrorist

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1 incident?
 2 A. No, absolutely not, and the reference to
 3 Counter-terrorism Policing is again the third aspect of
 4 the policing function within the arena, so you have
 5 British Transport Police, Greater Manchester Police and
 6 then you have the national Counter-terrorism Policing,
 7 which I know the inquiry heard from, from then
 8 DAC D'Orsi on. This effectively refers to the
 9 investigation phase and response to an attack.
 10 Q. If we could go down the same document, Mr Lopez, to
 11 paragraph 16, please:
 12 "Recognising that in these circumstances both
 13 organisations will provide an immediate response. In
 14 terms of primacy for a major incident both organisations
 15 agree that the default position will be Greater
 16 Manchester Police taking command."
 17 But it goes on at paragraph 18 to say:
 18 "Whilst this will provide guidance to senior
 19 colleagues and therefore operational benefits for the
 20 first few hours, any assumption on command of a major
 21 incident will be subject to urgent discussions between
 22 the on-call Gold commanders who will determine which
 23 organisation is best placed to have primacy."
 24 Would you agree that the risk of paragraph 18 is to
 25 undo the good work of paragraph 16 in terms of clarity

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1 because it will still need a decision between the
2 Gold commanders before primacy is actually resolved?
3 A. Respectfully, no, I would disagree with that. I think
4 the position set out in 16 for a major incident being
5 declared, that it is GMP that takes that primacy. But
6 I think it would be remiss of the document and the
7 agreement if we didn't apply the JESIP principles of
8 that, communicate and coordinate in the response and the
9 decision-making at that time. And the thinking and the
10 discussion groups of drawing up this document is that
11 a major incident by definition is when additional
12 resources by a number of — and I paraphrase —
13 organisations are required. That major incident could
14 be, for argument's sake, a fire at the arena, was our
15 thinking at the time, or two or three people receiving
16 some wounding as a result of some violence.

17 The position and the discussion may be that it is
18 fully contained within the operational response of
19 British Transport Police and actually they may be better
20 placed depending who that was. So that was the thinking
21 between chief officers of both forces as we drew up that
22 document.

23 So to start with, full clarity, it's GMP. As you
24 then go into the decision-making model, the review
25 process, having got together under JESIP, given that

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1 true consideration to the third principle of who should
2 be coordinating, there may be occasions that it would
3 still be BTP, so that isn't excluding that
4 consideration.
5 Q. I'm going to move on to my final topic unless, sir,
6 you have any further questions on that.
7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, thank you very much.
8 MR ATKINSON: That is a new topic of which I know you have
9 notice, Mr O'Callaghan, which is the documentary
10 "Manchester: Night of the Bomb", which was broadcast on
11 the first anniversary of the bombing in 2018.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. There was a major incident review undertaken in relation
14 to BTP's participation in that which resulted in
15 a document which I hope you have seen, which I don't at
16 this stage ask to go on the screen, but it is
17 {INQ030019/1}. Are you familiar with the content of
18 that document?
19 A. Is that the document where the author is Detective
20 Superintendent Richardson?
21 Q. It is indeed, yes.
22 A. Yes, I am familiar with that document, yes.
23 Q. Mr O'Callaghan, I'm going to try not to put the document
24 on the screen because it names any number of people who
25 perhaps don't need to have their names put on the

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1 screen.

2 Does it come to this: that it was identified that
3 the BTP, from rank and file up in the organisation, felt
4 that there had been a lack of acknowledgement in
5 Manchester, particularly by GMP, of the role BTP had
6 played in the night of this atrocity?

7 A. In the initial stages, yes, that would be a fair
8 assumption, yes.

9 Q. So when a request came in from the production company
10 wanting to make a documentary about the arena bomb,
11 there was a keenness in the media arm of the BTP,
12 I think the corporate communications department, for
13 such a documentary to be made so that BTP could get its
14 message across as to what it had done?

15 A. Yes, in terms of making sure that BTP was represented
16 for the part they played, but of course we now know that
17 we were the only blue light service, certainly policing,
18 to take part in that, and that of course is a position
19 which we now regret and are really apologetic for.

20 Q. Also a cause perhaps for concern was that there
21 wasn't — that the request from the production company
22 didn't go up the chain through BTP to get authorisation
23 at a most senior level that this was a good idea?

24 A. Certainly there was processes that were in place that
25 were not followed. It was a number of errors that came

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1 together at once: different people involved in the
2 preparation of that programme or seeking information
3 wrongly assumed that the approval was in place, and
4 again, as a result of that, we participated in the
5 programme without our own protocols in place and we know
6 that caused distress to many and we certainly regret
7 that.

8 Q. I think also, the contract arrangements between BTP and
9 the production company didn't give BTP the oversight of
10 the ultimate programme that ordinarily you would have
11 asked for?

12 A. In truth, that was a greater failing in terms that no
13 contract actually existed. That was the whole problem
14 with the making of the programme. In fact, once the
15 issues were identified, as a force we took great steps
16 to try and address — and in fact the coroner at the
17 time was involved and we actually approached the BBC to
18 withdraw our consent in the programme, but that was
19 ignored and the programme was broadcast.

20 Q. Because I think one of the other things that the review
21 identified was that the coroner should have been
22 informed well in advance of the documentary, and indeed
23 in advance of BTP cooperating with the documentary, that
24 it was contemplated?

25 A. Yes, that is the case, that was a point that was missed

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1 and a revised policy that is now in place that is
 2 clearly stated, that should such an event occur again,
 3 the coroner absolutely will be consulted but, even more
 4 importantly, families and victims involved in any
 5 incident will equally be consulted, and that should have
 6 happened at the time and that did not happen.
 7 Q. One further learning point before we wrap this topic up:
 8 I think it's right that some 3 hours of audio recordings
 9 of BTP officers speaking to their control room were
 10 provided to the production company without anyone at BTP
 11 actually going through that material to check it first .
 12 A. Yes, with real regret, again that was the case. Once
 13 BTP identified that that was the case, we made
 14 a self-referral to the Information Commissioner's
 15 office, declaring the fact and have provided all
 16 relevant assistance for that inquiry and we still await
 17 the outcome of that inquiry.
 18 Q. So in terms of learning from it, because this may in the
 19 future not just apply to BTP, as I'm sure you
 20 understand, it is essential that command level decisions
 21 are made about whether it is a good idea to involve
 22 a force in a programme such as this with proper control
 23 over what is then used and always involvement and
 24 thought as to the impact it may have on those who were
 25 affected by the incident that the programme is about?

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1 A. Yes, absolutely. Our policies have been updated and
 2 a chief officer must be engaged in the decision-making
 3 before any engagement in such productions is made.
 4 Of course, there will be many times when such
 5 productions will be beneficial to the public and to the
 6 police force alike, but in proving that that policy is
 7 now in place, we were approached by a number of media
 8 outlets at a national level ahead of the publication of
 9 volume 1 for us to be involved in commentary, pieces to
 10 camera, updates, and that was reviewed and participation
 11 was declined.
 12 MR ATKINSON: Thank you, Mr O'Callaghan, particularly for
 13 your answers in relation to that topic, which as you'll
 14 understand is of great concern to the families. That's
 15 all I need to ask you.
 16 Thank you very much, sir.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Atkinson.
 18 MR GREANEY: Sir, finally in a moment I will ask Mr Gibbs to
 19 pose his questions, but first it was suggested earlier
 20 in the evidence of Mr O'Callaghan that Inspector Dawson,
 21 the FIM, was unaware on the night of the arena attack of
 22 the police Hailing channel. In fact, the correct
 23 position is that Inspector Dawson has provided a second
 24 statement in which he suggests that he was aware of
 25 that --

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is that subsequent to his evidence?
 2 MR GREANEY: I'm not sure. Yes, it is subsequent to his
 3 evidence.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So it's correcting his evidence? I just
 5 do remember him -- again, I could be absolutely wrong.
 6 MR GREANEY: Can I conclude what I was going to say, sir,
 7 which may explain why you were under that understanding?
 8 As I was saying, the correct position is that
 9 Inspector Dawson has provided, subsequently to his
 10 evidence, a second statement, which suggests that he was
 11 aware of this particular method of communication, that
 12 he did not use it on the night, and that his expectation
 13 was that the communications supervisor at BTP would use
 14 it rather than him. That witness statement is on the
 15 Magnum database, it's {INQ041480/1}. We can all of us
 16 check what in fact he said when he gave his evidence.
 17 Sir, there is a person who gave evidence along the lines
 18 that were referred to earlier and that was
 19 Chief Superintendent Gregory, the Silver commander. To
 20 avoid any mischaracterisation, we ought, we suggest, to
 21 remind ourselves of exactly what was said by
 22 Chief Superintendent Gregory. It was said on Day 94 of
 23 the inquiry oral evidence hearings at page 1 of the
 24 transcript for that date from line 12 {Day94/1:12}.
 25 This was during the course of questioning by Mr Horwell

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1 on behalf of Greater Manchester Police.
 2 "Question: I'm not asking, Mr Gregory, whether it
 3 was foremost in your thoughts, but you were aware of
 4 that Hailing group channel, weren't you?
 5 "Answer: Vaguely, but it wasn't in my thoughts and
 6 I have to maintain that -- so no, it didn't come to
 7 mind."
 8 I can see, sir, that doesn't --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's all right.
 10 MR GREANEY: We will check.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We certainly explored with the inspector
 12 in the control room the fact that he was going through
 13 999 all the time. It seems surprising that we didn't --
 14 we must have presumably explored the fact that he didn't
 15 have a direct line through to the FDO and perhaps
 16 whether he had other means of communication. But we can
 17 look at that and I am relying on my memory, which is
 18 obviously flawed.
 19 MR GREANEY: Not necessarily, sir. My own memory is that
 20 there came a particular time at which the Hailing group
 21 came into sharp focus and it was during the course of
 22 the questioning by Mr Horwell. Whether that was during
 23 the course of Chief Superintendent Gregory's evidence or
 24 during Inspector Dawson's evidence or both, we promise
 25 you we will get to the bottom of.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Absolutely, thank you.
 2 A. To assist on that, I referenced my unannounced visit to
 3 the control room to look at the Hailing groups a couple
 4 of weeks ago and it was the control room supervisor, in
 5 fact, that talked me through and had the Hailing group
 6 in front of him at that time. So that is certainly the
 7 case now, as you said in relation to the supervisor, the
 8 person that currently operates the Hailing group for
 9 BTP.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 11 MR GREANEY: Maybe I've caused more confusion by seeking to
 12 resolve it.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Absolutely not. Thank you.
 14 MR GREANEY: Before I call upon Mr Gibbs, can I say, sir,
 15 that he hasn't invited me to say this, but you ought to
 16 know that he has interrupted a long-standing personal
 17 commitment to ensure that Mr O'Callaghan's evidence
 18 could be concluded today and the inquiry legal team is
 19 grateful to him for doing so. I also know that his
 20 internet connection isn't necessarily as reliable today
 21 as it ordinarily would be and we may not have the
 22 benefit of seeing Mr Gibbs, only hearing him.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We can see you, Mr Gibbs. I don't know
 24 yet whether we can hear you.
 25 MR GIBBS: I hope you can hear me now.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, thank you very much.
 2 Questions from MR GIBBS
 3 MR GIBBS: May I just go back to your question about the
 4 Hailing channel? I think it's possible in
 5 Inspector Dawson's evidence that what was being asked
 6 about was a command channel and I'm going to suggest
 7 that when we go back and look at what he actually said
 8 on the transcript, we distinguish between a command
 9 channel and the Hailing channel.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 11 MR GIBBS: On the question of the Hailing channel,
 12 Mr O'Callaghan, as I've understood it, tell me if I've
 13 got this wrong, it is a tool whereby any officer who
 14 knows about it can establish contact with another force?
 15 A. Absolutely, yes.
 16 Q. It isn't a means by which someone can immediately
 17 establish contact with that force's FDO?
 18 A. No, that is correct.
 19 Q. It's not a hotline to the FDO?
 20 A. No, it is not.
 21 Q. At the time that we are talking about, had BTP managed
 22 to contact GMP?
 23 A. My understanding is yes, from my recollection.
 24 Q. But had it managed to contact the FDO?
 25 A. No.

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1 Q. Would the Hailing channel have assisted with that?
 2 A. My own operational experience is that it may or it may
 3 not have done, it depends who would have answered it.
 4 As per my evidence earlier, that could have been
 5 answered by an operator who would have given the
 6 response that the FDO is busy on another call.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think the point about the Hailing
 8 channel is not that you'd speak directly to the FDO but
 9 at least you could ask would the FDO ring us back.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It might not have happened, but at least
 12 that was a possible way of doing it.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 MR GIBBS: As you remember the evidence, had that request
 15 that the FDO or GMP Silver ring BTP back been made?
 16 A. To my knowledge, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: To your knowledge of the evidence?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, right.
 20 MR GIBBS: Next, please, the major incident manual. You
 21 said about it that in your view, JESIP didn't fail
 22 because the vocabulary in the manual wasn't up to date.
 23 Can you just explain what you mean by that?
 24 A. That officers were aware of JESIP, officers had been
 25 trained in JESIP. The question that I actually have

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1 operationally is: is JESIP actually fit for purpose in
 2 a spontaneous incident? From my knowledge and
 3 recollection, it is often on spontaneous incidents that
 4 JESIP fails because of people not being in the right
 5 place at the right time. So even if it had been in the
 6 manual, I'm certainly of the view that we still could
 7 have been at the same position even if it had been set
 8 out in the manual.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr O'Callaghan, the point about the
 10 manual is that in these days where everything is done
 11 electronically, there is absolutely no excuse for not
 12 keeping something like the major incident manual up to
 13 date.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And I am sure you would agree with that.
 16 No one is suggesting that BTP had not been trained in
 17 JESIP because that was the evidence they gave.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And certainly I think it may have been
 20 one of your officers who said, actually, JESIP is just
 21 impossible in the first half hour. JESIP is clearly,
 22 and everyone accepts, a good idea.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So if your evidence is, "Well, it really
 25 doesn't work in those sort of spontaneous events", we

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1 need to try and think, if it is possible, of some way of
 2 making it work in spontaneous events. If you have any
 3 views on that, I would be really grateful to see them in
 4 writing at a later stage if you'd be good enough.
 5 A. Absolutely, sir, and indeed I do.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, I'm grateful for that.
 7 Thank you, Mr Gibbs.
 8 MR GIBBS: I have three other short topics, please. On the
 9 question of vocabulary, there has been reference today
 10 to the golden hour. In policing, what is that phrase
 11 used for?
 12 A. The golden hour traditionally is used in terms of crime
 13 investigation, usually for serious assault or murder
 14 cases, and it's the fast-tracked actions that need to be
 15 taken to secure evidence at the scene that might be
 16 lost.
 17 Q. So that's not to say, of course, if the golden hour
 18 isn't really quite the right phrase here that the first
 19 hour wasn't important because, plainly, the first hour
 20 was extremely important?
 21 A. Absolutely.
 22 Q. It's just that in policing the golden hour actually
 23 refers to something else, doesn't it?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Gibbs, I think I've actually been

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1 aware of that and noticed it since we've gone along.
 2 We'll obviously think about it, but in some ways when
 3 we're talking about an emergency response, it may be the
 4 golden first half hour which is more important at
 5 actually setting things in process the right way. So
 6 I'm certainly not limiting my review of this to the
 7 first hour or saying that's the most critical.
 8 MR GIBBS: Thank you.
 9 Secondly of the three, the carry sheet in the orange
 10 bags, which you've told us about today and whether that
 11 might be used as an improvised stretcher or carrying
 12 device for the living, although its primary purpose, as
 13 you've described, is for the dead; is that right?
 14 A. That is correct, yes.
 15 Q. Is it solid? What degree of stabilisation would it
 16 provide to someone who was seriously injured?
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Gibbs, I'm going to interrupt you for
 18 a moment, I'm very sorry. It is something I'm
 19 interested in and arose to me at the time. I wonder if
 20 this could be looked at by someone and I could have
 21 a response in writing about it. Would you mind
 22 if we did it that way?
 23 MR GIBBS: Not at all.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you arrange that?
 25 A. Yes, sir.

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1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You know the issue?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 MR GIBBS: And perhaps someone who was medically qualified?
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, absolutely.
 5 MR GIBBS: Lastly, the question of equipment at railway
 6 stations. Is there a BTP office at every railway
 7 station in which equipment, BTP equipment, can be
 8 stored?
 9 A. No, there isn't, and specifically in relation to
 10 Manchester Victoria, there isn't a BTP office at that
 11 station. There wasn't in 2017 and there isn't today.
 12 Q. Is that true of most railway stations?
 13 A. Yes, absolutely. BTP operate from a number of fixed
 14 point locations up and down the network. In fact,
 15 specifically at railway stations — there's over 2,500
 16 railway stations nationally and BTP have approximately
 17 140 bases out of those 2,500.
 18 Q. That's not to say, as you've told us today, that
 19 equipment could not be carried in vehicles, in patrol
 20 vehicles, and that equipment could not be carried on
 21 officers' persons?
 22 A. Absolutely, yes.
 23 Q. But larger equipment, which might require to be stored,
 24 where in a station without a BTP office might you expect
 25 to find that?

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1 A. That could be at the station manager's office, depending
 2 on the nature of the station and the size of the
 3 station, because again not every station will have
 4 a manager's office, not every station is actually
 5 staffed 24 hours a day. So it would be a matter of
 6 accessibility for such equipment.
 7 Q. You described, I think, not all stations as being
 8 managed by Network Rail. But are all stations managed
 9 by at least a train operating company?
 10 A. Yes, they are, yes.
 11 Q. And at many at least of those stations, will the train
 12 operating company have an office or a storeroom?
 13 A. Yes, that is my understanding, absolutely, yes.
 14 Q. What control over those rooms does BTP have?
 15 A. At some locations there's local arrangements for access,
 16 but in general terms that access is reserved for the
 17 train operating company or the track operator.
 18 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Gibbs. If I can
 20 reassure you, until right at the end, that's been about
 21 the best contact we've had with you over a video link,
 22 so your internet connection was clearly better than you
 23 feared it might be.
 24 MR GIBBS: I'm very pleased to hear it.
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1 Further questions from MR GREANEY
 2 MR GREANEY: Sir, I have been asked to raise just one issue
 3 with the assistant chief constable and it may be that
 4 it's better that he deals with this issue not now but
 5 in the further statement or further document that he is
 6 going to create because it is connected.
 7 As you will appreciate, for understandable reason,
 8 there is interest in the general issue of stretchers and
 9 their availability on the night of the arena attack.
 10 A. Yes, I am aware.
 11 Q. And there is a wish to know whether now there are
 12 arrangements in place to ensure that there are
 13 stretchers available at Manchester Victoria railway
 14 station and more generally on the estate that is policed
 15 by British Transport Police.
 16 A. I can report on those matters, yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 18 MR GREANEY: This was raised by Mr Cooper. I hope he finds
 19 that an acceptable way of dealing with it.
 20 MR COOPER: I'm very grateful.
 21 MR GREANEY: Sir, that is the evidence for this week and
 22 I hope that Assistant Chief Constable O'Callaghan will
 23 bear with us for a few moments whilst I provide an
 24 update as to the future.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Before that happens, can I say thank you

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1 very much to you for coming back, thank you for the very
 2 thoughtful approach you and BTP have adopted to it, and
 3 the things you've already put in train. I look forward
 4 to hearing more and any recommendations you have to help
 5 me.
 6 A. Thank you, sir.
 7 Housekeeping
 8 MR GREANEY: As I indicated, that is the evidence for this
 9 week, and in fact the oral evidence hearings of this
 10 inquiry will not resume until Monday, 6 September.
 11 It follows from that that the inquiry will not sit
 12 for a period of 6 weeks, however it needs to be
 13 emphasised that during that period substantial work will
 14 be undertaken, we know, sir, by you, by your legal team
 15 and by the legal teams for the core participants.
 16 That work will be with a view to ensuring that, upon
 17 the resumption of the oral evidence hearings, they
 18 proceed as efficiently and also as thoroughly as
 19 possible.
 20 In a moment, I will indicate what the shape of the
 21 period after the summer break will look like, but first
 22 it seems to your legal team that it is appropriate to
 23 pause and take stock of where we are. The oral evidence
 24 hearings commenced, as we'll all remember, on
 25 7 September last year, and today is the 139th sitting

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1 day.
 2 In the time since September last year, the inquiry
 3 has received a very large quantity of information.
 4 First, the inquiry heard moving and powerful pen
 5 portrait evidence in relation to each of the 22 people
 6 who lost their lives, and this, we believe, served as an
 7 essential reminder of who each person who died was as an
 8 individual and emphasised that they are and must remain
 9 central to this process.
 10 Second, the inquiry has received opening statements,
 11 both written and oral, from counsel to the inquiry and
 12 from core participants, addressing the terms of
 13 reference.
 14 Third, the inquiry has also received closing
 15 statements, both written and oral once more, from core
 16 participants in relation to the security arrangements
 17 for the arena. In other words, the chapter 7 issues.
 18 Fourth, the inquiry has heard live evidence from
 19 over 150 witnesses. These witnesses have covered
 20 a broad range of important issues. They have included
 21 chief and other senior officers from each of the
 22 emergency services, junior officers and civilians, and
 23 yesterday, of course, we heard, if we may say so,
 24 extraordinary and affecting evidence of Claire Booth,
 25 Bradley Hurley and Martin Hibbert.

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1 Fifth, the inquiry has considered literally hundreds
 2 of pages of transcripts and hours of audio evidence from
 3 the night.
 4 Sixth, the inquiry has received into evidence and
 5 published on its website a large volume of other
 6 documents including a significant number of witness
 7 statements.
 8 Sir, we point to three positive consequences of this
 9 progress without, we hope, being self-congratulatory or
 10 without indicating that these are the only positive
 11 consequences.
 12 First, and very importantly, on 17 June this year,
 13 you published volume 1 of your report. This was
 14 a substantial milestone in the course of the inquiry.
 15 It has permitted recommendations to be made, both
 16 without waiting for the oral evidence hearings to have
 17 concluded and without causing any delay or interruption
 18 to the progress of you, sir, receiving evidence relevant
 19 to other chapters of our oral evidence hearings.
 20 Next, substantial progress has been made in relation
 21 to receiving the evidence which will form the basis of
 22 volume 2 of your report. I will return to what remains
 23 of this evidence in a few moments. However, all but
 24 a small amount of factual corporate evidence on the
 25 emergency response has been given and the main

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1 outstanding evidence that bears upon chapter 10 is the
2 expert evidence.
3 Finally, the facts, we suggest, about the events
4 surrounding 22 May have publicly emerged and continue to
5 emerge. While much was known prior to 7 September last
6 year, no one, we suggest, can now be in any doubt that
7 there were myths in existence, misconceptions and
8 knowledge gaps.

9 Moreover, as has been acknowledged by many of the
10 most senior representatives of the emergency services,
11 the process of this inquiry has uncovered significant
12 information which is vital to driving the change that
13 needs to occur so that there is real learning and
14 improvement.

15 Sir, that pursuit of the facts will continue when we
16 return this September. All of that has occurred, of
17 course, during the coronavirus pandemic and two national
18 lockdowns.

19 This has been possible due to many persons. In
20 particular, due to the significant efforts of core
21 participants, their lawyers and all of the support staff
22 here at Manchester Magistrates' Court, including those
23 providing the technical support, which allows evidence
24 to be received from and heard outside of the walls of
25 this hearing room.

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1 We also publicly wish to acknowledge the patience of
2 those who have provided the real time transcript. At
3 times we've had to sit long hours, but everyone involved
4 has engaged constructively and with understanding.

5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Perhaps their patience and skill could
6 be added.

7 MR GREANEY: Indeed, sir.

8 Credit should also be given to many of those who
9 have given evidence, because they have shown flexibility
10 and cooperation around their listing. The inquiry legal
11 team does appreciate that inconvenience has been caused,
12 but we hope all understand how important it has been
13 that we maintain our momentum. But all that said, there
14 is much more important work, sir, for you and all of us
15 to do. It's to that which I turn now.

16 The plan for the hearings from 6 September is as
17 follows. In the 2 weeks following our return, we expect
18 to complete the chapter 10 evidence. As everyone who's
19 been following closely knows, chapter 10 is the section
20 of the oral evidence hearings devoted to the emergency
21 response. What we will hear from 6 September will
22 include the final parts of the factual and corporate
23 evidence. We'll also hear from each of the emergency
24 response expert teams. In order to ensure that
25 chapter 11 starts as scheduled, we will be sitting

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1 5 days of both of those first 2 weeks.

2 On 20 September, we will hear the chapter 11
3 evidence. This will provide an overview of the
4 pathology and blast wave evidence. Immediately
5 following this, on 21 September, we will start
6 chapter 12. It is anticipated that this will take at
7 least 4 weeks.

8 Chapter 12 will address the experience of each of
9 those who died, and this, we fully expect, will be
10 a most moving and important part of the inquiry's oral
11 evidence hearings. A literally huge amount of work has
12 been done to ensure that this part of the inquiry
13 proceeds with the dignity and the sensitivity that it
14 deserves.

15 The inquiry legal team is particularly grateful to
16 Superintendent Theresa Lamb, Inspector Mike Russell and
17 the GMP Operation Manteline team for the very extensive
18 work that has been taking place in the background which
19 supports this aim.

20 We anticipate that the product of that work will
21 shortly be available to core participants so that
22 dialogue can take place over the summer break about how
23 that portion of the evidence is to be managed.

24 Once chapter 12 has concluded, we'll turn to
25 chapters 13 and 14, which concern, as all know,

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1 radicalisation and preventability. As matters stand,
2 it is hoped that some radicalisation evidence can be
3 heard before moving to the preventability evidence,
4 which will need, we expect, to be interposed.

5 Some of the preventability evidence will be heard in
6 open, both in relation to the work of MI5 and that of
7 Counter-terrorism Policing. However, as core
8 participants are already aware, on 1 November the
9 inquiry must conduct a closed hearing. All should be
10 reassured that the inquiry legal team intends to take no
11 different approach to its search for the facts and the
12 truth during that phase of the evidence.

13 The evidence given during that period, chapter 14,
14 will, all can be assured, be tested, and you will, sir,
15 we know, critically evaluate it. The inquiry legal team
16 currently anticipates that once the preventability
17 evidence has concluded, the radicalisation evidence will
18 resume and conclude.

19 Sir, finally, before this year is out, in accordance
20 with what you have said in volume 1, provision will be
21 made to hear oral evidence in relation to the monitored
22 recommendations.

23 So having provided that, we hope, helpful update,
24 unless there is anything that you would wish to say, may
25 I invite you to adjourn until 10.00 on Monday,

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1 6 September, with our hope that all concerned in this
 2 inquiry do have an opportunity for at least some rest.
 3 MR COOPER: Sir, before you do so, may I obviously endorse
 4 what Mr Greaney has said on behalf of the families. Can
 5 I particularly, on their behalf, pay tribute to the
 6 support staff, not only here but in Spinningfields as
 7 well, and the ushers in this court who have been an
 8 absolute rock of stability and sensitivity during the
 9 whole of this process. I'm sure the families will
 10 forgive me for making that observation, to you, sir, and
 11 highlighting their work.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I and they, I'm sure, are very grateful
 13 for that. I have said things similar to that at times
 14 during the inquiry, but thank you for that public
 15 acknowledgement. I'm grateful.
 16 MR GREANEY: Thank you, Mr Cooper.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm grateful for the update, some of
 18 which was news to me, so it's always good for me to know
 19 what's going on in my inquiry as well. Some bits of the
 20 evidence have been very hard to listen to, but they've
 21 obviously been important. I'm sure we can all do with
 22 a break and I hope everyone will do that. I certainly
 23 will take a break, but equally work and preparation will
 24 go on.
 25 I hope that in particular, Mr Atkinson, during the

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1 course of his preparation, will continue with what
 2 I hope will be our education and I would look forward
 3 to, if he has time, a dissertation of no more than
 4 2,000 words on the original Winchester Accord and if he
 5 could put into it as well any differences that there may
 6 be between the later Winchester Accord, with which
 7 we are all familiar, I'm sure we'd all be grateful for
 8 further education at any stage.
 9 Thank you very much. I hope you have a good break.
 10 MR GREANEY: Thank you very much, sir.
 11 (12.53 pm)
 12 (The inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am
 13 on Monday, 6 September 2021)
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