

OPUS2

Manchester Arena Inquiry

Day 158

October 6, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: +44 (0)20 3008 5900

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

Wednesday, 6 October 2021

1
2 (9.30 am)
3 (Delay in proceedings)
4 (9.55 am)
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Good morning.
6 MS CARTWRIGHT: Good morning, sir. Can I apologise to you
7 for the delay starting, but thank you for the extra
8 time.
9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just let me say a couple of things if
10 I may. I do understand the reason for the delay, so
11 I readily understand why that was.
12 Can I also apologise for the fact that we were
13 unable to sit on Monday and Tuesday as planned and
14 again, for what in Mr Greaney's terms is a very good
15 reason, we weren't able to sit. We didn't know of the
16 problem until Sunday, so we were unable to give much
17 notice of the fact that we wouldn't be sitting on Monday
18 and Tuesday. The evidence which was due to be heard on
19 Monday and Tuesday will have to be given at a later
20 stage.
21 Mr Cooper, if I can just address you before we
22 start. The evidence we are going to hear and read over
23 the next few days is going to be very distressing and
24 difficult, in particular for John Atkinson's family to
25 hear and I well appreciate that. So let me just for

1

1 a moment perhaps bring a lighter touch to the mood by
2 asking you to answer the question which the whole nation
3 is asking: did you find somewhere to sleep last night?
4 MR COOPER: Well, sir, yes, I did. I'm grateful to my
5 instructing solicitors for doing so. Can I also take
6 the opportunity of thanking many in Manchester that were
7 offering me a bed for the night.
8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right, thank you.
9 On that note, Ms Cartwright, down to what is
10 undoubtedly serious business. I hope no one minds that
11 slight lightening of the mood.
12 Evidence summary for JOHN ATKINSON
13 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, as you know, over today, tomorrow and
14 Monday and Tuesday next week, we will be hearing the
15 chapter 12 evidence for John Atkinson. As you have
16 already indicated, the evidence to be heard over the
17 next few days is undoubtedly sensitive and very
18 distressing for John's family, but also for others who
19 will be watching. Can I again provide reassurance at
20 the beginning of this chapter 12 evidence for
21 John Atkinson that we will not be showing any CCTV
22 footage or still image.
23 Can I indicate the evidence summary to be read this
24 morning for John Atkinson is lengthy. Sir, as you know,
25 in the opening comments that were made to chapter 12,

2

1 there is an issue to survivability for John Atkinson and
2 the experts have provided an opinion that timely medical
3 intervention, the application of effective bilateral
4 tourniquets, could have made a material difference for
5 John, so that issue will have to be considered with
6 care.
7 Can I then, please, introduce John Atkinson's family
8 present in the hearing room this morning. Present
9 at the back of the room are John's mother and father,
10 Daryl and Kevin Price, and John's sisters, Amy and
11 Laura Atkinson. Watching from home is John's other
12 sister, Stacey Atkinson, and his cousins, Tina and
13 Danny, and John's stepsister, Vanessa. The family are
14 also supported by their legal representatives in the
15 hearing room.
16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I indicate to all of you, if
17 you have any difficulty in hearing anything, can you
18 please indicate and we'll make sure that people speak up
19 or the loudspeaker system is turned up.
20 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you.
21 Please could the photograph of John be displayed?
22 Please can I ask Mr Smith to read the pen portrait
23 summary for the family?
24 SHANE SMITH: John Atkinson was the son of Daryl Price and
25 the brother of Laura, Stacey and Amy. John was born on

3

1 16 November 1988 at Fairfield Hospital, Bury.
2 When John was 4 years old, his mother started a new
3 relationship with Kevin Price, who had since that time
4 been a father to John and his sisters.
5 John was uncle to Taylor, Charlie, Aston, Clayton,
6 Lewis and Kai. John's cousins are Tina and Danny.
7 John's partner was Michael, who is the brother of
8 Gemma O'Donnell. Gemma O'Donnell was John's lifelong
9 friend.
10 John was 28 years old at the time of his death on
11 23 May 2017.
12 Daryl recalls that John had a very caring nature.
13 John's grandma lived on the same street and every
14 morning, without fail, John would go to her house, make
15 sure she was up and make her breakfast. He would do
16 this before he went to school because he said he just
17 needed to know that she was okay.
18 After leaving school, John started work in care
19 homes. Aged 19 to 20 years old, John worked helping
20 young adults with autism and Asperger's syndrome in
21 supported living. John had other jobs, which included
22 working as a healthcare assistant for a short time at
23 Fairfield Hospital on the coronary stroke unit. John
24 always worked in the care system.
25 John was extremely clever with a high IQ. He passed

4

1 all his NVQs and management level by the time he was 25.
 2 Daryl recalls that John was an incredibly hard-working,
 3 caring, strong-willed and generous young man. John's
 4 generosity was shown to her regularly with the purchase
 5 of vouchers and trips to the hairdressers.
 6 Music, fashion and dancing were always at the
 7 forefront of John's life. He loved anything he could
 8 sing along to, especially Whitney Houston and
 9 Tina Turner. He also loved Ariana Grande.
 10 John would go to the gym regularly and swim too. He
 11 periodically went to Slimming World and won
 12 Slimming World's Man of the Year too. Daryl and Kevin
 13 are extremely proud of John and his achievements in
 14 life. John's sister, Amy, described how he was always
 15 there for her when she needed him.
 16 John's sister, Stacey, recalls John as:
 17 "Special in so many ways, too many to write down."
 18 John's sister, Laura, remembers John as:
 19 "A whirlwind as a child, who grew up into the most
 20 thoughtful, loving and caring young man."
 21 The same description used by cousins Danny and Tina
 22 to sum up John.
 23 Laura comments that John's loss for the family is
 24 like losing the "biggest part of our puzzle".
 25 Thank you, sir.

5

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Smith.
 2 MS CARTWRIGHT: We will now read the first section of John's
 3 evidence summary up to the point when a member of the
 4 public, Ronald Blake, who assisted John, leaves him
 5 in the casualty clearing station.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: The final section then will be read
 8 tomorrow.
 9 On Monday, 22 May 2017, John left his home address
 10 to attend the Ariana Grande concert at the
 11 Manchester Arena with his lifelong friend
 12 Gemma O'Donnell. The tickets had been purchased for
 13 John as a Christmas present.
 14 Gemma recalls that John drove them to Manchester in
 15 his red Ford Fiesta. They parked in the multi-storey
 16 car park at the arena and had to park on the top floor,
 17 arriving a little after the concert had been due to
 18 start at 19.00.
 19 Gemma describes the evening and recalls that the
 20 concert was really good and, "We had a lovely time".
 21 John had recently been to a concert at the arena and
 22 recalled it had taken him a long time to get out of the
 23 car park. In view of this he wanted to get to the car
 24 as quickly as possible.
 25 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: As they left the arena, John

6

1 was behind Gemma and had hold of her T-shirt. They went
 2 through the doors that lead to the City Room at
 3 22.30.48.
 4 John and Gemma then walked across the City Room,
 5 heading towards the stairs that lead back downstairs to
 6 the NCP car park.
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: John asked Gemma which way it was to go to
 8 the car park. Gemma pointed that it was just around the
 9 corner from the box office and at this moment, Gemma
 10 describes in her witness statement what she recalls from
 11 the moment of the detonation.
 12 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: John was approximately
 13 6 metres away from the bomber at the time of detonation.
 14 CCTV shows that at 22.31.05, as the smoke cleared
 15 after the explosion, John can be seen on his hands and
 16 knees, crawling along the City Room floor. Gemma is
 17 seen moving towards the exit.
 18 At 22.31.08, as John Atkinson crawls along the
 19 floor, he can be seen to be leaving a large trail of
 20 blood behind him.
 21 At 22.31.19, Gemma is seen to collapse on the floor,
 22 just around the corner from John.
 23 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his witness statement dated 26 May 2017,
 24 Gemma describes that during the explosion, she was hit
 25 in the back and ended up in a corner near to some double

7

1 doors and the stairs that lead down into the car park.
 2 On realising that John wasn't with her, she turned
 3 round to try and find him. However, she did not get
 4 very far as she was in too much pain, having been
 5 injured herself.
 6 Ronald and Lesley Blake were in the City Room at the
 7 time of the detonation, waiting to collect their
 8 daughter and her friend after the concert. In
 9 Ronald Blake's statement, dated 26 May 2017, he
 10 describes seeing a large orange flash about four car
 11 lengths away from where he was stood, followed by a loud
 12 bang.
 13 Ronald Blake felt something hit his right inner
 14 thigh and being laid on the floor looking up towards
 15 Lesley. He got up and went to check on Lesley.
 16 Ronald Blake then describes noticing a man, who he
 17 later confirms was John Atkinson, laid on the floor
 18 covered in blood.
 19 There was a trail of blood underneath him, which
 20 looked as though he had been pulling himself along the
 21 floor. Ronald went over to him and recalls:
 22 "When I knelt down, I noticed a lot of blood pumping
 23 from his right knee. He was initially laid on his front
 24 but he turned himself over."
 25 At 22.31.52, Ronald Blake made a call to 999 and

8

1 passed key information to the call handler before he
 2 placed the phone on the ground to apply a tourniquet to
 3 John.
 4 The call stayed connected after this time and on the
 5 rest of the recording of the call, lots of background
 6 noise can be heard, including the tannoy public
 7 announcement and people talking in the distance.
 8 The 999 call was made within 52 seconds of the bomb
 9 detonating. John Atkinson was identified on this call
 10 specifically, albeit not by name, being "really injured
 11 and with blood pumping from his leg".
 12 Ronald Blake made clear on the call that there were
 13 "loads injured", later clarified as 30 or 40, located
 14 in the City Room of the Manchester Arena. He referred
 15 to an explosion and gave detailed information concerning
 16 his location.
 17 Mr Blake referred to others having sustained
 18 injuries and being in need of urgent life-saving medical
 19 attention.
 20 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: The earliest image which
 21 captures Ronald Blake with John is timed at 22.32.55.
 22 In this image, Mr Blake is seen kneeling next to John
 23 with a mobile phone next to his ear on the 999 call. At
 24 this time John is on his front but can be seen lifting
 25 his head up and moving.

9

1 Travel Safe officer Philip Clegg entered the
 2 City Room at 22.32.55. His body-worn video shows him
 3 approaching John and Ronald Blake whilst Ronald Blake
 4 was speaking to the 999 operator. Philip Clegg's
 5 body-worn video captures part of the 999 call. On
 6 Philip Clegg's arrival, Ronald Blake hands the phone to
 7 him. Whilst Philip Clegg is on the phone to the
 8 operator, Ronald Blake talks to John, telling him not to
 9 move yet and that they are waiting for an ambulance and
 10 he gestures to a person who is with Philip Clegg towards
 11 John's legs, which are bleeding heavily.
 12 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Blake is heard to tell the 999 call
 13 operator that an officer has arrived, but Philip Clegg
 14 confirms that he is not a police officer. Mr Blake
 15 passes Philip Clegg the mobile phone and he has a brief
 16 conversation with the operator. The transcript of the
 17 call shows that he says:
 18 "I'm a Travel Safe officer ... no, I'm not a police
 19 officer, I'm a Travel Safe officer ... there's been an
 20 explosion."
 21 Shortly afterwards, he says:
 22 "I'm going to have to put you back to the guy
 23 because there's people I'm going to have to go and
 24 help... okay."
 25 Philip Clegg then hands the phone back to

10

1 Ronald Blake at approximately 22.33.19 and then walks
 2 off to check on other casualties. John is lifting his
 3 head off the floor at this point.
 4 Philip Clegg's next direct involvement with John is
 5 1 hour and 15 minutes later, at 23.48.23, when he
 6 assists paramedics and wheels John on the stretcher to
 7 the ambulance. As we will hear later, at this point
 8 John is in cardiac arrest.
 9 In a recently received statement Philip Clegg does
 10 not recall his interaction with John or Ronald Blake or
 11 speaking to the police call operator.
 12 The transcript of the 999 call confirms that
 13 Ronald Blake returns to the call. He is heard
 14 reassuring John at this time and advises him to, "Sit
 15 down, stay still", and, "Stay down, mate, you're
 16 bleeding".
 17 After Philip Clegg leaves, Ronald Blake is given
 18 advice over the phone to apply a tourniquet. He tells
 19 the call handler:
 20 "I'm with a man that is really injured. His leg's
 21 pumping."
 22 And received the response:
 23 "You need to put pressure on it, so have you got
 24 anything on you? Have you got something like a tie or
 25 a belt? You need to tie it round the top of his leg,

11

1 all right?"
 2 Ronald Blake is then captured saying:
 3 "Take your belt off."
 4 Ronald Blake identifies in his statement he got the
 5 belt from his wife Lesley. The call handler repeats:
 6 "Okay, you need to tie something round it, like
 7 a belt or something."
 8 And Ronald Blake responds:
 9 "I will do. I'm going to have to put the phone
 10 down."
 11 And:
 12 "You've got my number."
 13 The call handler advises Ronald Blake to:
 14 "Place the phone down next to you but stay on the
 15 line to me. Just tie it round his leg and then come
 16 back to me, all right?"
 17 On the rest of the recording of the call a lot of
 18 background noise can be heard. But Mr Blake can be
 19 heard saying to John:
 20 "Keep talking to me."
 21 Ronald Blake's 999 call is recorded as having
 22 a duration of 8 minutes and 6 seconds. The captured
 23 conversation, how far, only lasts for the first
 24 4 minutes and 33 seconds, as Mr Blake continues to tend
 25 to John.

12

1 Greater Manchester Police's internal note of the
 2 call confirms that the line was cleared as Mr Blake was
 3 no longer responding to the operator.
 4 In his original statement, dated 26 May 2017,
 5 Ronald Blake had thought that he had applied the
 6 tourniquet before he made the 999 call and recalls that
 7 once the tourniquet was applied, this managed to slow
 8 the bleeding down.
 9 Ronald Blake has clarified the timing of the
 10 tourniquet application in his statement dated
 11 25 June 2021. Mr Blake clarified that he can recall
 12 telling the operator about the blood pumping from John's
 13 leg, but does not recall the operator telling him about
 14 using a belt as a tourniquet. He had thought it was
 15 something he had thought of himself, but accepts, having
 16 viewed the footage and the transcript of the 999 call,
 17 that he put the tourniquet on, using his wife's belt,
 18 during the 999 call.
 19 The phone was placed down 4 minutes and 30 seconds
 20 after the call started at 22.31.52.
 21 By around 22.36 to 22.37, approximately 5 to
 22 6 minutes after the detonation, Ronald Blake had applied
 23 a tourniquet to John's right leg.
 24 Ronald Blake gives the following detail in his
 25 statement:

13

1 "In relation to tying the tourniquet, I remember
 2 I placed the belt on John's right leg and pulled it
 3 tight and then wrapped the rest of the belt around my
 4 hand to give extra grip so I could pull it even tighter.
 5 I remember seeing the blood pumping through John's
 6 trousers, but don't remember seeing any wounds and where
 7 it was coming from. I placed the belt above his knee,
 8 higher than where I could see the blood pumping through.
 9 I recall that it did not stop the blood coming from his
 10 leg, but it did help reduce the flow."
 11 Ronald Blake also clarified in his statement that:
 12 "Initially, when I was with John, he was lying on
 13 his front. I think I helped him turn him on his back.
 14 I am not sure what position he was in when I put the
 15 tourniquet on, but believe he was on his back and his
 16 right leg was then nearest me. I remember somebody came
 17 over and looked at the leg and told me to keep it tight
 18 and I think this was before any medics arrived."
 19 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.38.16, the operator of
 20 the CCTV system pans the camera around to survey the
 21 scene. John can be seen lying on the floor near to the
 22 stairway that leads down to the NCP car park. He is
 23 being tended to by Ronald Blake, who is knelt down next
 24 to him, and another member of the public, Gareth
 25 Chapman, is seen close by. In this image the blood

14

1 trail left behind as John crawled across the City Room
 2 floor is clearly visible. The camera then pans away.
 3 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 16 June 2021,
 4 Gareth Chapman describes entering the City Room to look
 5 for his wife and son by the stairs behind the box
 6 office. The first person he saw was John, bleeding
 7 heavily from an artery in his leg, being assisted by
 8 what appeared to be a member of the public.
 9 He could see that John had an artery injury and
 10 a belt was applied to the wound. Mr Chapman states:
 11 "I could see it was not in the right position as the
 12 blood was spurting out. I folded a white T-shirt into
 13 a square and put that over the wound and then moved the
 14 belt that was already on over the T-shirt and pulled it
 15 tight to stop the flow of blood. I then said to the guy
 16 who was already with John to hold it tight and I left to
 17 look for my wife and son."
 18 This encounter was explained in his original
 19 statement, dated 1 June 2017, where he described:
 20 "The first thing I seen was a guy next to the pillar
 21 on my right-hand side, who was bleeding from an artery.
 22 There was a normal bloke who was trying to stop the
 23 bleeding with a belt, but it wasn't working. I told him
 24 to take it off and we used some T-shirts to stop the
 25 bleeding."

15

1 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.44.04, ShowSec employee
 2 Jade Samuels walks into view. She is seen talking to
 3 Lesley Blake. Ronald Blake is tending to John, who's
 4 just out of view of the camera. After talking with
 5 Lesley Blake, Jade walks out of camera view and back
 6 into the City Room.
 7 At 22.44.57, Jade Samuels comes back into view and
 8 is seen to bend down next to John's head. At 22.45.15,
 9 she is then seen to move away from this area.
 10 MS CARTWRIGHT: In her statement dated 9 September 2017,
 11 Jade Samuels describes moving to a man who had leg
 12 injuries, who was being assisted by another man. She
 13 says that she assessed him quickly and noted they had
 14 tightened a belt around his leg, above his injuries, and
 15 were keeping the pressure on his wounds. She says there
 16 was nothing further she could do to assist.
 17 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: John is next seen 3.5 minutes
 18 later at 22.48.25. In this footage, he now appears to
 19 be lying on his back and Ronald Blake remains with him.
 20 There was a large amount of blood around John.
 21 At 22.48.50, a member of the public, Robert Grew, is
 22 captured crouching next to John and appears to be
 23 speaking with him. Robert Grew remains in this position
 24 until 22.50.33. Ronald Blake remains present
 25 throughout.

16

1 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 17 August 2017,
 2 Robert Grew describes that whilst returning to help
 3 a casualty, he was grabbed by the ankle by a man who he
 4 realised later was John.
 5 He describes stopping briefly and that as John was
 6 conscious and shouting, he did not think he was in
 7 as serious need as the other casualty he had been
 8 helping. Robert Grew described trying to calm John, who
 9 he recalls was very vocal and alert at this time.
 10 In his later statement, dated 11 November 2020,
 11 Robert Grew describes John as being in a distressed
 12 state and:
 13 "It looked like he had dragged himself from the
 14 centre of the foyer in the direction of the [Fifty
 15 Pence] staircase. He was bleeding heavily from his leg,
 16 which had a T-shirt tied around. I checked around for
 17 something I could use as a tourniquet, but nothing was
 18 immediately evident. Clearly, the T-shirt was
 19 ineffective and he was losing a lot of blood."
 20 In his statement dated 13 July 2021, Robert Grew
 21 having been shown the still timed at 22.48.50, states
 22 that he cannot definitively remember whether it was
 23 John Atkinson or the person that was with him that
 24 grabbed his ankle, but that he did have a brief
 25 conversation with John. He recalls that John was

17

1 bleeding from his leg and saw that he had a T-shirt tied
 2 around his leg.
 3 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.50.09, PC Thomas
 4 Ho-McKenna approaches where John is positioned and can
 5 then be seen crouched beside John for a few seconds. He
 6 then stands and walks into the City Room.
 7 By 22.50.42, ETUK medic Ryan Billington is seen to
 8 be with John and Mr Blake, although he only remains with
 9 them for approximately 20 seconds.
 10 MS CARTWRIGHT: Ryan Billington has provided a statement
 11 dated 4 August 2021 after being shown images when he is
 12 identified as being near to John.
 13 Mr Billington confirms that he remembers the trail
 14 of blood on the floor as he later slipped on it, but he
 15 does not recall speaking to John or to Ronald Blake. He
 16 does not remember offering advice or giving any
 17 treatment.
 18 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.54.37, the feet of BTP
 19 Constable Thomas Campbell can be seen on PC Whittell's
 20 body-worn video as he approaches and stands by John's
 21 head. A bandage can be seen to be unravelled by PC
 22 Campbell and he is seen applying it to John's chin.
 23 The footage suggests that PC Campbell has moved on
 24 from John at some point shortly after 22.55.01.
 25 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement, dated 24 June 2017,

18

1 PC Thomas Campbell describes noticing a large first aid
 2 bag in the middle of the room and collecting bandages
 3 from it when his attention was drawn to John.
 4 He describes John as bleeding heavily from both legs
 5 and states that someone had wrapped a belt around the
 6 top of his right leg and that he had a large wound under
 7 his chin. He applied a bandage on it his chin and asked
 8 John to hold the bandage there as tight as he could,
 9 which he did. PC Campbell asked John where else it hurt
 10 and he stated that it hurt inside of his stomach, but
 11 PC Campbell could see no obvious injuries and presumed
 12 it must be internal. PC Campbell told John to keep the
 13 bandage where it was and to keep applying pressure and
 14 an ambulance would be with him shortly.
 15 In a further statement, dated 29 July 2021,
 16 PC Thomas Campbell details that he recalled tending to
 17 John and the large cut under his chin that was bleeding.
 18 PC Campbell cannot recall any other injuries, but does
 19 remember that John was in pain.
 20 Ronald Blake clarifies in his 25 June 2021 statement
 21 that, having viewed the image timed at 22.54.45, he
 22 believes that what was applied to John's cut chin was
 23 more of a swab or a bud than a bandage. He recalls
 24 supporting John's arm so that he could hold the dressing
 25 against his chin as he would drop his arm away from time

19

1 to time.
 2 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.57.43, GMP
 3 Sergeant Peter Anwyl is captured with John and
 4 Ronald Blake, and by 22.58.35 Sergeant Anwyl has left.
 5 Ronald Blake remains with John.
 6 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 9 March 2021,
 7 Sergeant Anwyl recalls seeing the two large trails of
 8 blood in the City Room and is now aware that they came
 9 from John.
 10 Sergeant Anwyl does not recall seeing John in the
 11 City Room and can only think that he did not stop to
 12 treat him as he saw other people with him or others
 13 in the room that were in greater need of his help.
 14 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 22.59.45, GMP Constable
 15 Chelsea Meaney is captured heading towards John and
 16 Ronald Blake and is with them by 22.59.46. Her
 17 body-worn video captures her saying to Ronald Blake,
 18 "Are you okay there?" And Ronald Blake replies, "He
 19 can't move".
 20 The footage shows that Ronald Blake is using his
 21 right hand to hold a tourniquet that has been applied to
 22 John's right leg.
 23 At 22.59.54, PC Chelsea Meaney walks around to the
 24 other side of John to speak to him. She says, "What's
 25 your name, sir?", to which he replies, "John". PC:

20

1 Meaney says, "My name's Chelsea, John".
 2 PC Meaney talks with Ronald Blake before John says,
 3 "I'm gonna die". PC Meaney says to John:
 4 "You're not. What I need you to do is keep
 5 breathing for me, keep your eyes open and keep talking,
 6 and you're going to... but you need to keep that leg
 7 still. The ambulances are on their way and they will be
 8 coming. They're not that far off and there are plenty
 9 of them coming in now. So you just need to concentrate
 10 and keep breathing and keep on talking... yeah?"
 11 PC Meaney points to the tourniquet and asks Ronald
 12 Blake how long it has been on for. Ronald Blake replies,
 13 "Since it happened". PC Meaney then gets up and goes to
 14 Lesley Blake.
 15 PC Meaney then gets up and goes to Lesley Blake.
 16 At 23.00.54, PC Meaney moves to speak with
 17 Lesley Blake and offers to escort her out of the
 18 City Room. Mr Blake, who is still holding the
 19 tourniquet around John's leg, states that he will be
 20 fine and remains with John.
 21 At 23.01.10, ETUK medic Ryan Billington approaches
 22 and asks, "Are you walking wounded?" PC Meaney replies,
 23 "No. I'm going to take her outside. Someone just needs
 24 to review him if they can". PC Meaney is understood to
 25 be referring to John Atkinson.

21

1 At 23.01.15, Ryan Billington can then be seen to be
 2 stood over John and speaking to Ronald Blake, but it
 3 cannot be heard what is being said. Ryan Billington has
 4 left their side by 23.01.23.
 5 MS CARTWRIGHT: Ryan Billington was shown an image timed at
 6 23.01.15, when providing his statement of 4 August 2021,
 7 which shows him speaking to Ronald Blake regarding John.
 8 Ryan Billington confirms that he does recall
 9 Ronald Blake and believes the conversation was about
 10 getting John out of the City Room, although is unsure
 11 about this.
 12 He adds:
 13 "I do not recall what aid, if any, I gave to John or
 14 what Ron Blake was doing to assist him. I cannot
 15 remember if John was awake or unconscious or what his
 16 injuries were."
 17 Mr Billington was asked whether he recalled
 18 PC Chelsea Meaney indicating, as captured by her
 19 body-worn video at 23.01.10, that someone needed to
 20 review John. Mr Billington indicates that he does not
 21 recall this conversation.
 22 Mr Billington was shown images of him being present
 23 with John, but he confirmed they did not assist his
 24 recollection. He did recall giving some bandages at
 25 some point, but is unsure if this was to John or

22

1 Mr Blake.
 2 In her statement dated 18 October 2017, PC Meaney
 3 recalls speaking to John in the City Room at a time when
 4 he was laid on the floor in front of the box office and
 5 with a man and a woman. She recalls that the man who
 6 was with John was ex-military and trauma trained and had
 7 applied a belt as a makeshift tourniquet on John's right
 8 thigh.
 9 John was still conscious at that time and she held
 10 his hand. She said:
 11 "He asked me if he was going to die and I told him
 12 he wasn't and that the bleeding had stopped."
 13 PC Meaney then describes the woman with the
 14 ex-military man becoming upset, so left to take her out
 15 of the City Room.
 16 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.01.30, John's friend
 17 Gemma O'Donnell is seen to approach him.
 18 MS CARTWRIGHT: Ronald Blake recalls in his statement, dated
 19 25 June 2021, that a female approached John, who he
 20 thinks is Gemma O'Donnell, having viewed the images.
 21 She said something to John like, "Don't worry, John,
 22 your mum's on her way". In her witness statement, dated
 23 26 May 2017, Gemma O'Donnell details that from where she
 24 had moved to after the explosion, she rang her mum as
 25 she didn't think she would get out. A young girl sat

23

1 with Gemma and did not leave her. The girl was on the
 2 phone to Gemma's mum. Gemma heard her saying that she
 3 was really scared but that she would not leave Gemma.
 4 Gemma recalls how much this meant to her.
 5 Gemma describes panicking as she didn't know where
 6 John was or if he was okay. She says:
 7 "It was like watching a film where everything is
 8 going fast in front of me. It was chaos and I could
 9 hear the alarms ringing."
 10 Gemma describes that she was extremely worried about
 11 John. She showed the young girl a picture of him and
 12 she told Gemma she would go and look for him. Gemma
 13 told her he must be just round the corner. The young
 14 girl found him straightaway, telling Gemma that he was
 15 lying on the floor but he was all right.
 16 Gemma managed to drag herself to John as she didn't
 17 want him to be on his own. She could see that one of
 18 his legs was injured and somebody was holding his leg
 19 trying to help him. She recalls that there was a police
 20 officer giving him first aid. She describes John as,
 21 "Awake, but he looked a bit out of it. He looked as if
 22 he had just woken up from a sleep".
 23 Gemma was speaking to John to reassure him, which he
 24 acknowledged with a nod. She doesn't think that he
 25 could get any words out. She told John to drink some

24

1 water, which he did.
 2 Gemma was asked if she would be able to make it
 3 downstairs with some assistance. She felt that she
 4 could, but was reluctant to leave John. She was told
 5 she needed to get out and was helped by two people.
 6 When she left John in the City Room, she recalls that
 7 his trousers were being cut off him. She saw that
 8 he was trying to protect his modesty so that people
 9 didn't see.
 10 Gemma took comfort from this. She thought that John
 11 was okay because he was moving.
 12 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.01.48, BTP PCSO Jon Paul
 13 Morrey is seen to approach John and Ronald Blake. At
 14 first, he is seen to lean over the two of them, possibly
 15 in conversation, before kneeling on the floor next to
 16 them where he remains for a number of minutes.
 17 At 23.03.14, PCSO Morrey appears to be tending to
 18 John's legs.
 19 At 23.03.47, he picks up a bandage from a medical
 20 kit positioned close to John's head and the body—worn
 21 video footage shows him unravel what appears to be
 22 a white bandage.
 23 By 23.04.04, PCSO Morrey kneels back down, again
 24 next to John's legs, and appears to be tending to them.
 25 He is captured assisting John for the next couple of

25

1 minutes.
 2 At 23.04.49, Jon Paul Morrey appears to be talking
 3 with Gemma O'Donnell as BTP Detective Constable
 4 Mark Haviland arrives and gets PCSO Morrey's attention.
 5 At 23.05.23, Gemma O'Donnell is bent over, appearing
 6 to talk to John. Ronald Blake remains present and is
 7 still holding the tourniquet on John's right leg.
 8 PCSO Morrey is seen to stand up again at around
 9 23.06 and goes briefly out of camera view to the right
 10 of the image before he is seen to be helping
 11 Gemma O'Donnell. PCSO Morrey is not seen to go back to
 12 John Atkinson from this point and goes on to help other
 13 casualties.
 14 At 23.06.25, ETUK medic Marianne Gibson is seen to
 15 approach John and is seen to kneel next down to John and
 16 Ronald Blake. Marianne Gibson is captured on numerous
 17 stills assisting John for just over 6 minutes until just
 18 after 23.12.45.
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: Ronald Blake, in his statement dated
 20 25 June 2021, has the narrative from the image timed at
 21 23.06.25 read to him and confirms that he does recall
 22 a female medic who he now knows is Marianne Gibson, as
 23 she was the one who later raises John's legs on to
 24 a medical bag.
 25 Ronald Blake also believes that Marianne Gibson

26

1 pulled John's T-shirt back to check for any injuries and
 2 told him to keep the tourniquet tight.
 3 Mr Blake confirms that it is Marianne Gibson that
 4 he was referring to in his May 2017 statement who, when
 5 John said to her, "I'm going to die, aren't I?", she
 6 replied, "Not on my watch you're not".
 7 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.07.51, BTP Constable
 8 Jessica Bullough joins in in administering first aid
 9 assistance to John, along with Marianne Gibson and
 10 Ronald Blake. She is seen to kneel down on the floor
 11 next to John. Jessica Bullough is captured assisting
 12 John for just over 10 minutes until 23.17.56.
 13 At 23.09.16, GMP Detective Sergeant
 14 Christopher Broad can be seen to have joined the group
 15 helping John. John's clothing appears to have been
 16 lifted up and at 23.09.27, John's exposed torso and legs
 17 can now be seen more clearly. Detective Sergeant Broad
 18 is captured assisting John for a minute and a half until
 19 23.10.45.
 20 At 23.10.12, Marianne Gibson is seen to place a red
 21 medical kit bag on the floor next to John's feet.
 22 Detective Sergeant Broad remains bent over John's right
 23 leg. He is believed to be holding up his leg at this
 24 point. By 23.10.28, he is crouched down by John and no
 25 longer appears to be holding his leg up. By 23.10.45,

27

1 Detective Sergeant Broad moves away from John and is not
 2 seen to assist him again.
 3 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 15 November 2017,
 4 Detective Sergeant Christopher Broad recalled:
 5 "A female paramedic was working on [a male]... who
 6 was lay on his back. His skin was very pale and had
 7 numerous injuries to his legs, which looked like gunshot
 8 wounds, around 6 feet in front of me and about 20 feet
 9 from the top of the stairs I had just climbed. I asked
 10 her what she needed and she asked me to hold his right
 11 leg in the air as he was suffering from significant
 12 blood loss, which I assumed was from his femoral artery.
 13 "I held his leg in the air while the paramedic
 14 fitted, I assume, a tourniquet and once fitted,
 15 I dragged a paramedic bag and put his leg on the top,
 16 around my knee height."
 17 Detective Sergeant Broad's colleagues then approach
 18 and informed him that Inspector Smith had instructed
 19 them to review the CCTV to identify if there was
 20 a second offender and he then left Marianne Gibson, who
 21 he had described as the paramedic with this male.
 22 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.10.56, Marianne Gibson
 23 is once again seen at the side of John Atkinson and
 24 appears to be looking through the red first aid kit next
 25 to him.

28

1 At 23.11.30, Marianne Gibson is seen to leave John's
 2 side and run across the City Room, heading towards the
 3 arena entrance doors.
 4 Ronald Blake remains knelt on the floor with John.
 5 At 23.11.43, Marianne Gibson returns back to John.
 6 At 23.12.08, N.W.A.S paramedic Patrick Ennis is seen to
 7 approach Gemma O'Donnell, who is sat on the floor
 8 leaning next a pillar close to where John is positioned.
 9 He appears to give instructions to the ShowSec staff who
 10 were with her to have Gemma evacuated because they are
 11 then seen to get up off the floor and start to walk her
 12 out of the City Room. After a brief moment,
 13 Patrick Ennis then walks away from Gemma.
 14 Ronald Blake continues to talk to John, who appears
 15 to be responsive in the footage available at 23.12.13.
 16 John's exposed torso and legs can be seen more clearly
 17 in this image and his legs have been raised on to
 18 a medical kit bag. PC Bullough stands over them.
 19 At 23.12.27, Marianne Gibson is captured, near to
 20 but not with John, searching through a medical bag with
 21 Sergeant Kam Hare, who is stood next to her. She is
 22 captured saying, "There's a full defib in there", and
 23 points to a medical bag which is underneath John's feet.
 24 At 23.12.30, Marianne Gibson and Sergeant Hare
 25 approach John.

1 At 23.12.32, Marianne Gibson says, "Use that defib
 2 there, this guy's all right". Sergeant Hare takes the
 3 defibrillator away with him, but the medical kit bag
 4 remains under John's feet. John's legs are clearly
 5 visible in this image and dressings appear to have been
 6 placed upon them.
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 17 March 2021,
 8 Sergeant Hare, having viewed the still timed at
 9 23.12.32, confirms he approached Marianne Gibson when
 10 searching for defibrillator pads to assist a casualty.
 11 She told him to use the defibrillator under John's foot.
 12 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.12.45, Marianne Gibson
 13 is once again seen at the side of John and Ronald Blake
 14 but leaves John a few seconds afterwards to tend to
 15 other casualties.
 16 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 28 July 2021,
 17 Marianne Gibson indicates that she has no specific
 18 recollection of John or giving him assistance. She,
 19 however, indicates that:
 20 "I may have instructed him to lift his leg so that
 21 blood is less likely to flow out and would go back to
 22 his central organs and his heart."
 23 She also states that her comment, "Use that defib
 24 there, this guy's all right", was made because she felt
 25 John's condition meant he would not require

1 a defibrillator as he was conscious and breathing.
 2 Cutting clothes off would have been done as part of
 3 her casualty assessment and to treat injuries if
 4 necessary, and when with John she would have been
 5 carrying out ABCDE assessments of him and treating
 6 accordingly.
 7 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.12.57, BTP Constable
 8 Michelle Johnson appears to walk around where John is
 9 positioned and, at 23.12.58, takes up a position close
 10 to John's head.
 11 PC Johnson stays with John for 14 minutes until
 12 23.26.10, when she leaves John with the paramedics down
 13 in the casualty clearing station.
 14 At 23.14.02, Gemma O'Donnell is captured being led
 15 out of the City Room by a ShowSec member of staff.
 16 At 23.14.18, John can be seen again. His clothing
 17 has been removed, dressings can be seen to have been
 18 applied to both of his legs, and Ronald Blake is still
 19 holding a tourniquet on John's right leg with his right
 20 hand.
 21 BTP Constable Jessica Bullough and PC Dale Edwards
 22 are also with John. ShowSec supervisor Akeel Butt is
 23 also seen in front of PC Dennison. PC Johnson remains
 24 by John's head.
 25 At 23.14.33, and on numerous stills up to 23.15.50,

1 BTP Constable Johnson can be seen along with PC Bullough
 2 and PC Dale Edwards tending to John. PC Johnson appears
 3 to be holding a long black belt type object in her left
 4 hand. Ronald Blake appears to be talking to John.
 5 At 23.14.44, medical equipment can be seen close to
 6 John's head. As PC Dennison walks past John, a female
 7 voice is heard to say, "Sorry, John".
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: Ronald Blake was read the narrative from the
 9 images timed at 23.14.33 and 23.14.44. In his
 10 25 June 2021 statement, he clarifies the following:
 11 "I can recall someone tying both of John's legs
 12 together, using a belt type object which was wrapped
 13 around both legs together rather than his individual
 14 legs. However, this did not replace the belt I was
 15 using as a tourniquet on John's right leg as I had hold
 16 of it throughout my time with him. I am 100% sure
 17 I kept hold of this belt until I left John in the care
 18 of the paramedics. I don't recall any conversations
 19 that officers were having in relation to this or why it
 20 went around both legs. At the time, I just concentrated
 21 on John and the tourniquet I was holding."
 22 In a statement, dated 22 July 2021, BTP PC Michelle
 23 Johnson recalls that she went to John soon after
 24 assisting another casualty and at that time Constable
 25 Bullough and Constable Edwards were already with John.

1 PC Johnson says that:
 2 "John was conscious and breathing and shouting out
 3 in pain. He was able to talk and tell me his name was
 4 John. I recall he had blood coming from his legs, but
 5 couldn't see exactly where it was coming from."
 6 She recalls seeing a black belt tied above John's
 7 right knee, which had been applied by Ronald Blake.
 8 PC Johnson remembered that she had some leg
 9 restraints with her and used them on John's legs to try
 10 and stop the bleeding. She states:
 11 "I remember at that time that I was aware that the
 12 leg restraints were not a suitable substitute for
 13 a proper tourniquet and also not being trained to treat
 14 such injuries, but it was all I had. I can't recall
 15 what John said as I put the straps on to his legs, but
 16 I know he was shouting in pain."
 17 PC Johnson clarifies that the still timed at
 18 23.14.33 shows her holding a Velcro leg restraint. She
 19 recalls that she had two restraints that night, but only
 20 recalls applying one to John's leg but cannot be sure.
 21 In her statement, dated 22 July 2021, she details
 22 that:
 23 "In my original statement, I said that I had
 24 strapped both his legs above his knees, but now I cannot
 25 recall if the strap went above the knee or below.

1 I remember it hurt John as I put the strap on and
 2 I apologised to him, but I had to try and stop the
 3 bleeding. I recall that PC Bullough helped me to try
 4 and get the strap under his legs. After putting the
 5 strap around both his legs, I pulled it as tight as
 6 I could, but I don't recall the strap doing much to stop
 7 the bleeding from John's legs."
 8 PC Johnson does not recall any other person putting
 9 a tourniquet on John's leg when she was with him, but
 10 remembers that John remained vocal, conscious and
 11 breathing.
 12 BTP PC Jessica Bullough in her statement, dated
 13 28 July 2021, recalls going over to John and seeing that
 14 he had severe shrapnel injuries to his legs, knee and
 15 stomach. PC Bullough remembers using a bandage on
 16 John's knee. John was lying on his back and able to
 17 talk throughout the time she was with him. PC Bullough
 18 recalls John asked her to help him and said that he did
 19 not want to die.
 20 PC Bullough recalls that John was vocal and in pain.
 21 PC Bullough recalls an arena medic, now known to be
 22 Marianne Gibson, coming over to John while she was with
 23 him and that she had thicker bandages, which were used
 24 on John.
 25 PC Bullough cannot recall Ronald Blake or him

1 holding a belt around John's leg when he arrived. The
 2 description of the still timed at 23.14.33 was read to
 3 PC Bullough and she confirmed she does not know
 4 PC Johnson or recall her being there. But she said
 5 that:
 6 "In [her] mind, PC Edwards and I used a strap, which
 7 I believe was PC Edwards' belt, on John's leg.
 8 I remember I put a bandage around his right calf and
 9 kept pressure on it. The belt went over the top of the
 10 bandage to secure it and helped stop the bleeding. This
 11 was not used as a tourniquet. I can only remember this
 12 one belt we put on and don't recall any other belts or
 13 straps being around John's legs."
 14 PC Bullough also states:
 15 "Having heard the description of the piece of
 16 footage and the presence of PC Johnson holding a strap
 17 or belt, I may be mistaken."
 18 In a statement dated 21 July 2021, PC Dale Edwards
 19 confirms that his first memory of John is putting him on
 20 to a board and him then being taken out of the
 21 City Room. He cannot recall anything prior to this.
 22 PC Edwards does not recall anything about John's
 23 injuries nor does he recall a belt or strap being used
 24 on John or being involved in doing this. He said that:
 25 "I have been informed that PC Jessica Bullough has

1 told GMP officers that she believed that I used my belt
 2 to tie around John's leg. However, this is definitely
 3 not the case as I still have the belt that I wore that
 4 night. I do recall using leg restraints on other
 5 casualties but not on John."
 6 PC Dale Edwards states that:
 7 "[He] was aware we needed to get him better medical
 8 help than we could give him in the City Room so he
 9 needed to be taken downstairs. I can't recall who made
 10 the decision, that casualties should be taken
 11 downstairs, but I was aware from someone that there were
 12 paramedics outside the station."
 13 Turning then to the evacuation and journey from the
 14 City Room to the casualty clearing station.
 15 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.16.01, PC Bullough,
 16 PC Johnson and medic Marianne Gibson are close to John.
 17 PC Bullough stands with PC Johnson and points across the
 18 control room towards the exit. It is believed she is
 19 identifying a noticeboard which can be used as
 20 a makeshift stretcher. Arena medic Ian Parry walks
 21 towards them.
 22 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement, dated 22 July 2021,
 23 PC Johnson was shown the still timed at 23.16.01. She
 24 could not recall the conversation but knows that soon
 25 after, they went and got a board to help carry John.

1 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.16.06, PC Bullough and
 2 PC Johnson are captured leaving John and running across
 3 the City Room towards the exit in order to get
 4 a noticeboard to use as a makeshift stretcher for him.
 5 At 23.16.12, PC Bullough and PC Johnson are seen to
 6 pick up the board and then drag it back over to John.
 7 On the still timed at 23.16.21, it can be seen that
 8 something appears to have been tied around John's legs.
 9 Ronald Blake continues to tend to John. Marianne Gibson
 10 is no longer positioned near to John.
 11 At 23.16.27, BTP officers Bullough and Johnson are
 12 seen to carry one of the display boards towards John.
 13 These boards were part of the merchandise stall that was
 14 located along the back wall inside the City Room.
 15 MS CARTWRIGHT: In her statement, dated 22 July 2021, and
 16 having viewed the stills timed at 23.16.12 and 23.16.27,
 17 PC Johnson recalls trying to find a barrier to put John
 18 on "following a discussion or realisation that we had to
 19 evacuate him downstairs. I can't remember whose idea it
 20 was to find a barrier, I just recall him needing to be
 21 moved out.
 22 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.16.30, PC Bullough and
 23 PC Johnson are seen approaching John with the makeshift
 24 stretcher. Ronald Blake has remained with John and is
 25 still knelt beside him. By 23.16.42, BTP Constable

1 Stephen Corke can be seen approaching John and by
 2 23.16.46, a large number of people have started to
 3 gather as they prepare to evacuate him from inside the
 4 City Room.
 5 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 25 June 2021, having
 6 had read to him the narrative of the still timed at
 7 23.16.46, Ronald Blake recalls people coming over to
 8 help evacuate John and an officer sliding a red board
 9 underneath him. Mr Blake recalls that he and the
 10 officers had to drag John on the board until they were
 11 able to put a metal barrier underneath him.
 12 Mr Blake confirms that he continued to hold the
 13 tourniquet as John was moved.
 14 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.16.47, PC Stephen Corke
 15 is seen to kneel down next to John and help slide a red
 16 display board beneath him. A number of officers,
 17 including PC Mark Emberton, PC Michelle Johnson,
 18 PC Dale Edwards, PC Jessica Bullough,
 19 PC Jane Bridgewater and PC Stephen Corke, help to get
 20 John on to the board.
 21 By 23.17.16, John has been placed on to the display
 22 board and is surrounded by police officers.
 23 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 22 July 2021, and
 24 having viewed the narrative on the still timed at
 25 23.16.42, PC Corke states that he does not recall when

1 the decision was made but there was a realisation that
 2 they needed to get people out of the City Room.
 3 PC Corke recalls used display boards from the
 4 merchandise stand and upturned trestle tables. Having
 5 viewed the narrative of him helping to slide John on to
 6 the board, PC Corke recalls that:
 7 "John was well built and initially we tried to lift
 8 him and carry him out, but the board just began to give
 9 way and couldn't take his weight. I recall that
 10 I assisted getting him on to the board and remaining
 11 nearby until he left but I wasn't one of those who took
 12 him out of the City Room. I remember him holding on to
 13 the side of the board as he was taken out and there was
 14 a trail of blood on the floor from his injuries."
 15 In a statement, dated 14 September 2017, PC Emberton
 16 recalls kneeling down to manoeuvre John on to the board
 17 and there being a large volume of blood around him.
 18 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.17.36, PC Johnson is
 19 seen to stand up and move away from the front of the
 20 board. Ian Parry can then be seen in this image at the
 21 front of the board as it is lifted up and John starts to
 22 be evacuated from the City Room.
 23 At 23.17.49, PC Emberton, PC Edwards and Ian Parry
 24 are seen pulling the display board that John was lying
 25 on. Ronald Blake stays with John as they move towards

1 the City Room exit.
 2 On the image timed at 23.17.51, John can be seen
 3 holding on to the board with his right hand as he is
 4 evacuated from the City Room.
 5 Whilst John is being pulled along the floor on the
 6 board, Ronald Blake can be seen to be keeping hold of
 7 the item wrapped around John's upper right leg.
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Blake has confirmed, having had the
 9 narrative read to him, that he continued to hold the
 10 tourniquet as John was moved.
 11 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: A still timed at 23.17.56
 12 captures the moment that John is taken out of the
 13 City Room on a makeshift stretcher. Ronald Blake can be
 14 seen just to the right of John on this image.
 15 PC Johnson can be seen bent over and close to John's
 16 head. Northern Rail employee Stuart Craig can also be
 17 seen and BTP Constable Bullough is walking back towards
 18 the ticket booths and does not assist in taking John out
 19 of the City Room.
 20 MS CARTWRIGHT: In her statement dated 28 July 2021, when
 21 describing the evacuation of John Atkinson, PC Bullough
 22 states that she does not recall any conversation around
 23 the decision but states that:
 24 "We realised that no one was coming to help us and
 25 so it was better to get people downstairs. I remember

1 using boards for a number of casualties as there were no
 2 stretchers and they were the only thing we had, but
 3 I don't specifically recall getting one for John."
 4 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.17.58, GMP Constable
 5 Leon McLaughlin walks back with a display board and
 6 talks to BTP constable Stephen Corke, who asks:
 7 "Is that what we're doing? Taking them out as best
 8 we can?"
 9 PC McLaughlin replies:
 10 "I think so. I think the ambulances are coming in
 11 and we're going to get them moving."
 12 In the background John is seen to be pulled along
 13 the display board towards the exit doors to
 14 Victoria Station. There is a trail of blood along the
 15 route that they have pulled John.
 16 At 23.18.04, GMP Constable Emberton and the group
 17 continue to pull the board holding John Atkinson to the
 18 exit doors of the City Room. At 23.18.15, PC Johnson
 19 and the others evacuating John Atkinson reach the exit
 20 doors of the City Room. At this point, Ian Parry leaves
 21 them and the others pull John through the exit door and
 22 on to the footbridge leading down to Victoria Station.
 23 MS CARTWRIGHT: The available footage shows that
 24 John Atkinson was not triaged, assessed or assisted by
 25 any member of NWAS personnel for the 47 minutes that

41

1 he was in the City Room before he left at 23.18.
 2 It is recorded that Patrick Ennis was in the
 3 City Room between 22.52.45 and 23.00.47 and then again
 4 from 23.05.29 to 23.18, being the time John exited the
 5 City Room.
 6 HART paramedics Lea Vaughan and
 7 Christopher Hargreaves entered the City Room at
 8 23.15.10, which was shortly before John was removed from
 9 the City Room.
 10 Ian Parry, in his statement dated 10 August 2017,
 11 does not provide details of any involvement with John.
 12 In his evidence to the inquiry on 14 and 21 July 2021,
 13 Mr Parry confirmed that for the whole time he was in the
 14 City Room after the detonation he had a combat
 15 application tourniquet in his pocket.
 16 Mr Parry has provided a further statement, following
 17 review of his sequence of events, in which he recalls
 18 seeing a male on a stretcher, but at the time he did not
 19 know this was John. Mr Parry states that:
 20 "I did not give an assessment of John and just
 21 helped to drag the stretcher towards the arena doors."
 22 Mr Parry goes on to explain that he did not leave
 23 the City Room with John because he felt it was more
 24 important for him to remain there.
 25 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.18.32, John is being

42

1 evacuated along the footbridge that leads down to
 2 Victoria Station. He can be clearly seen to be gripping
 3 on to the board that he is being pulled upon with his
 4 right hand. Ronald Blake can be seen holding on to the
 5 tourniquet wrapped around John's right leg.
 6 At 23.18.34, PC Johnson can be heard to say, "Come
 7 on, John... John".
 8 And at 23.18.37, "John lad, come on!" and shouting
 9 other words of encouragement.
 10 MS CARTWRIGHT: PC Emberton, in a statement dated
 11 14 September 2017, recalls that when lifting the board
 12 with John Atkinson on it, it started to break. John was
 13 falling in and out of consciousness and was very pale
 14 and blood was pumping out of his legs and his groin
 15 area.
 16 PC Emberton said that:
 17 "Every time John looked like he was going to faint,
 18 I would say, 'John, John, stay with us, keep awake', and
 19 I told the male in the glasses who had hold of the
 20 tourniquet to keep talking to him to keep him awake."
 21 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.18.37, Ronald Blake is
 22 still holding the tourniquet around John Atkinson's
 23 right leg. Those assisting John at this time are GMP
 24 Constable Emberton, BTP Constable Edwards, PC Johnson,
 25 Ronald Blake and Northern Rail employee Stuart Craig.

43

1 John is seen still holding on to the edge of the board
 2 with his right hand.
 3 At 23.18.56, PC Edwards is seen to run ahead towards
 4 the lift that leads down to Victoria Station and
 5 a second later someone is heard to say that they will
 6 take John down in the lift.
 7 At 23.19.06, GMP Constable Owen Whittell asks the
 8 group, "Do you need hands?" PC Emberton replies no.
 9 Northern Rail employee Stuart Craig tells PC Whittell,
 10 "The board's too flimsy", as they pass him.
 11 John Atkinson is lying on his left side on the
 12 noticeboard, still holding on to the edge of the board
 13 with his right hand, as he is pulled along.
 14 At 23.19.36, PC Edwards is seen waiting for the lift
 15 to arrive so John can be placed within it. And at
 16 23.19.45, he returns back to help the group pull John
 17 towards the lift.
 18 Between 23.19.52 and 23.20.07, PC Emberton and those
 19 with him stop pulling the board that is being used to
 20 move John. PC Edwards joins them to start taking John
 21 towards the lift but they realise that the board
 22 will not fit in. PC Edwards and PC Johnson then go back
 23 to the City Room to collect a metal barrier and Northern
 24 Rail employee Stuart Craig also leaves. PC Emberton
 25 remains with John, as does Ronald Blake, who continues

44

1 to hold the belt acting as a tourniquet on John's leg.
 2 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 21 July 2021,
 3 PC Dale Edwards recalls that:
 4 "We planned to take John to the lift as the board
 5 he was on was just too flimsy to support him being
 6 carried down the stairs. When the lift doors opened,
 7 I knew there was no way the board he was on would have
 8 fitted. I remember going back to the City Room and
 9 seeing the metal barrier, which I knew could be slid
 10 under the board he was on to support him when carrying
 11 him down."
 12 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.20.05, John is seen to
 13 start trying to roll over on to his back and by
 14 23.20.16, there was a clear view of John, who was now
 15 lying on his back. Ronald Blake is kneeling on the
 16 floor next to him, still holding the tourniquet around
 17 John's right leg.
 18 At 23.20.20, GMP Constable McLaughlin approaches
 19 PC Emberton, who remains with John. PC Emberton says to
 20 PC McLaughlin, "He won't get in the lift".
 21 PC McLaughlin asked if John can walk and PC Emberton
 22 replies not and that they need a stretcher. GMP
 23 Constable McLaughlin turns to Special Constable Dalton,
 24 who was out of view, and says:
 25 "Mike, go downstairs and tell an ambulance we need

45

1 either a trolley or a stretcher."
 2 PC McLaughlin then follows Special Constable Dalton
 3 and shouts back to PC Emberton, "Mark, hang on there,
 4 mate, I'll come back to you".
 5 At 23.20.21, John stretches out both of his arms
 6 above his head. He then rolls himself back on to his
 7 stomach.
 8 At 23.20.40, Ronald Blake is captured patting John
 9 on his right shoulder numerous times with his left hand.
 10 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement, dated 25 June 2021,
 11 Ronald Blake remembers John being pulled along on the
 12 board all the way along the footbridge and to near the
 13 lifts at the end of the footbridge but does not recall
 14 any conversation about how John was going to get
 15 downstairs. Mr Blake remembers someone brought over
 16 a metal barrier to slide underneath the board and the
 17 board breaking as John was lifted.
 18 Mr Blake remembers, as John was being carried down,
 19 he banged his hip on the handrail.
 20 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: John continues to be captured
 21 moving. At 23.20.45, John moves his right arm and
 22 places it back towards his head and is then seen trying
 23 to get up. He puts his arms underneath his body and
 24 starts to push himself up with his elbows. PC Emberton
 25 quickly goes to him and encourages him to lie back down

46

1 on the board, which John does, rolling back down on to
 2 his left side at 23.20.52.
 3 At 23.21.05, PC Emberton begins to walk away from
 4 John and Ronald Blake, approaching the top of the stairs
 5 when he is met by PC Johnson and PC Dale Edwards who
 6 were returning with the metal barrier. John is seen to
 7 move his right arm.
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 22 July 2021,
 9 PC Johnson recalls, having read the narrative of the
 10 stills relating to John's evacuation from the City Room,
 11 that the board was slippery, but she does not recall
 12 John grabbing on to it. She confirms that John remained
 13 conscious, alert and responsive throughout.
 14 PC Johnson has no recollection of taking John any
 15 further than the lifts, although she can see from the
 16 sequence of events that she did. She cannot recall
 17 getting the metal barrier, the journey down the stairs
 18 or the time down in the casualty clearing station with
 19 John.
 20 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.21.09, PC McLaughlin and
 21 Special Constable Dalton head outside on to
 22 Victoria Station Approach where there are a number of
 23 ambulances and medical staff. PC McLaughlin approaches
 24 NWAS staff Derek Poland and says:
 25 "I know you're busy but we've got someone stuck on

47

1 the first ..."
 2 Derek Poland points to another member of staff and
 3 appears to indicate that he should instead approach NWAS
 4 paramedic Daniel Smith who's stood near to the station
 5 entrance.
 6 At 23.21.17, PC McLaughlin approaches Daniel Smith
 7 and manages to get his attention, as he was
 8 communicating with someone via his radio. PC McLaughlin
 9 is recorded as saying to Daniel Smith:
 10 "Excuse me, I know you're busy, we've got someone
 11 stuck on the first ground, two fractures to his legs.
 12 We just can't move him."
 13 Part of the conversation is inaudible, but
 14 Daniel Smith replies:
 15 "Just leave him there for now, blanket him up and
 16 leave him there."
 17 To which PC McLaughlin replies:
 18 "Yes, no problem. Is there any blankets anywhere?"
 19 There was no audible response.
 20 Around 30 seconds later, PC McLaughlin is heard
 21 approaching another paramedic and asking if there was
 22 a stash of blankets. He was told there were not.
 23 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 7 July 2021,
 24 Daniel Smith was shown the still and narrative timed at
 25 23.21.17. Mr Smith states he does not recall this

48

1 conversation or the officer approaching him. Whilst not
 2 recalling the specifics of the conversation,
 3 Daniel Smith maintains as follows:
 4 "My response was as would be expected at an incident
 5 of this nature. It was my understanding at this time
 6 that a system was in place to move casualties down the
 7 stairs and that appeared to me to be working. However,
 8 had issues been identified regarding the movement of
 9 casualties, steps would have been taken to ensure that
 10 those issues were dealt with and that the movement of
 11 patients continued down from the City Room to the
 12 casualty clearing station as expeditiously as possible.
 13 I cannot recall any further information being provided
 14 to me regarding the patient I was advised by
 15 PC McLaughlin was stuck and I therefore assumed that the
 16 situation was resolved without the need for any further
 17 intervention from me or one of my colleagues."
 18 PC McLaughlin, in a statement dated 24 March 2021,
 19 provided following a review of the images from the
 20 sequence of events, recalls:
 21 "... going to the casualty clearing area to ask for
 22 help for John, who was stuck at the top of the stairs.
 23 I approached a senior paramedic [who we now know to be
 24 Derek Poland] wearing a tabard and asked for help. He
 25 pointed me to Daniel Smith. I asked Daniel Smith for

49

1 a stretcher for John and was told by Daniel Smith to
 2 blanket him up. I was unsure what was meant by this and
 3 remember feeling that I was ignored by paramedics in the
 4 casualty clearing area. I felt frustrated, but it was
 5 clear that they were not going to move from where they
 6 were on Hunts Bank and provide me with any meaningful
 7 help."
 8 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.21.22, BTP
 9 Constable Edwards and BTP Constable Johnson are seen
 10 following PC Emberton and bringing back a metal crash
 11 barrier to use as a makeshift stretcher. They place the
 12 metal barrier on the floor directly behind where John is
 13 on the walkway leading towards the lift.
 14 John is seen to lift his head up and lean it on his
 15 left arm. At 23.21.51, GMP Constable Emberton, BTP PCs
 16 Michelle Johnson and Edwards, and Ronald Blake begin to
 17 try and slide the board holding John on to the metal
 18 barrier. Then at 23.21.58 they try to lift John on to
 19 the metal barrier but the board he is on starts to
 20 break, giving way, causing John to drop a short distance
 21 on to the metal barrier positioned below him.
 22 PC Emberton is then seen moving the metal rim of the
 23 board along with PC Edwards.
 24 At 23.22.24, a number of officers including
 25 Sergeant Darren Prince then offer their assistance.

50

1 PC Michelle Johnson can be seen with the others trying
 2 to slide the board on the full length of the metal
 3 barrier. PC Johnson can be heard to say, "Come on,
 4 let's go", as they lift and then begin to carry John
 5 towards the stairs down to Victoria Station. PC Johnson
 6 can be heard encouraging John, saying, "Come on, John".
 7 At 23.22.32, this group managed to lift John on to
 8 the metal barrier.
 9 MS CARTWRIGHT: PC Dale Edwards, in a statement dated
 10 21 July 2021, remembers that when they were by the lift
 11 and slid the metal barrier under the board, John shouted
 12 out in pain. He also remembers that there was a trail
 13 of blood being left behind the board as they pulled it
 14 along the footbridge. John was conscious throughout the
 15 time PC Edwards was with him.
 16 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: Whilst trying to get
 17 John Atkinson on to the makeshift stretcher,
 18 Sergeant Prince is captured talking to John at 23.22.34,
 19 asking him, "What's your name, fella, what's your name,
 20 pal?" John replies with his name and when
 21 Sergeant Prince asks where he is injured, he replies,
 22 "Everywhere".
 23 At 23.22.37, the officers lift up the metal barrier.
 24 John can be seen grabbing hold of the board with his
 25 right arm in order to stop himself falling off the

51

1 makeshift stretcher. Thirty seconds later, John comes
 2 into camera view at the top of the stairs leading from
 3 the footbridge to the station concourse. John is seen
 4 to be holding on to the board with both of his hands and
 5 is carried down the stairs into Victoria Train Station.
 6 PC McLaughlin, having seen that John is now being
 7 carried out, returns to the City Room.
 8 At 23.23.17, John is carried down the stairs by
 9 a number of officers as well as a member of the public,
 10 Gareth Chapman. Ronald Blake is still holding
 11 a tourniquet around John's right leg.
 12 MS CARTWRIGHT: In a statement dated 14 December 2017,
 13 PC Bianca Doran, one of those who assisted to carry
 14 John, recalls seeing some officers struggling with
 15 a casualty who had been placed on an improvised
 16 stretcher, so she went to the top of the stairs to help
 17 them.
 18 In a statement dated 9 March 2021, PC Abdirahman
 19 Mohamed, another who assisted recalls:
 20 "I have described in my original statement that
 21 I saw a male brought out of the foyer on a makeshift
 22 stretcher who had injured legs. On reviewing the
 23 sequence of events, I am now aware that this male was
 24 John Atkinson. I am also aware that from the sequence
 25 of events that I assisted with carrying John from the

52

1 footbridge down the stairs to the ground floor.
 2 Although I do not recall having a conversation with
 3 John, I recall that he was very loud.”
 4 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.23.33, as John is being
 5 carried down the flight of stairs , he is seen to lift
 6 his head up slightly and appears to be looking over the
 7 top of the board as if to see where he is being carried
 8 to.
 9 At 23.23.54, John is now at the bottom of the
 10 stairs , still being carried on the makeshift stretcher
 11 about, to be carried over to the war memorial in the
 12 station entrance. Sergeant Prince speaks to John,
 13 saying:
 14 "All right , John, stay awake, son, talk to me.
 15 What's your surname? John, what's your second name?
 16 John, what's your second name?"
 17 John replies but what is said is inaudible.
 18 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement dated 25 June 2021 and
 19 having had the narrative of the image timed at 23.23.54
 20 read to him, Mr Blake confirms that John was able to
 21 talk to and answer when people spoke to him throughout
 22 the time that Mr Blake was with him.
 23 PC Emberton, in a statement dated 14 September 2017,
 24 recalls there was blood all over the board on which John
 25 was carried down and placed at the front of

53

1 Victoria Station.
 2 John's journey from the City Room down to the
 3 casualty clearing station took almost 7 minutes.
 4 Sir, the next period of the summary of evidence to
 5 be read is the period in the casualty clearing station
 6 prior to the cardiac arrest , so that's a period of time
 7 from 23.24 to 23.47.28, but we will only read today up
 8 to the point where Ronald Blake left John Atkinson.
 9 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: Approximately 52 minutes
 10 post–detonation, at 23.24, John arrived in the casualty
 11 clearing station . He is carried through the
 12 Victoria Station concourse heading towards the exit on
 13 to Station Approach.
 14 At 23.24.26 he is placed on the ground on the far
 15 left side close to the exit doors. John remains in this
 16 location for the next 24 minutes.
 17 Gemma O'Donnell, who had arrived in the casualty
 18 clearing station 3 minutes earlier , was told by
 19 Sergeant Darren Prince that they had John.
 20 MS CARTWRIGHT: While she was sat in Victoria Station, Gemma
 21 saw John being brought down the stairs on a stretcher
 22 and recalls that he was taken near to the doors as
 23 he was a priority . She remembers that they were not far
 24 apart. She could see him, but she was not close enough
 25 to see if he was awake.

54

1 Daniel Smith was shown stills timed at 23.24.17 and
 2 23.24.19, which showed him stood in the entrance as John
 3 was brought proximate to him and laid on the ground near
 4 to the war memorial entrance. Daniel Smith states that
 5 he does not recall seeing John being placed in this area
 6 and he would not have been particularly drawn to him as
 7 there were so many casualties being brought to the
 8 casualty clearing station .
 9 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.24.42, those who carried
 10 John down to the casualty clearing station are seen to
 11 return to the direction of the City Room, except for
 12 Ronald Blake, PC Johnson and PC Edwards.
 13 PC Johnson can be seen leant over John and is heard
 14 to say:
 15 "You're all right , mate, I'm not going anywhere,
 16 mate."
 17 Ronald Blake, who was next to PC Johnson, continues
 18 to hold the tourniquet on John's leg.
 19 At 23.24.48, it is apparent that senior paramedic
 20 Philip Keogh is aware of John and moves around the side
 21 of Ronald Blake.
 22 At 23.25.27, PC Johnson, PC Edwards and Ronald Blake
 23 try to slide John Atkinson off the barrier .
 24 Philip Keogh turns and assists in sliding John off the
 25 barrier and then begins tending to him. PC Johnson

55

1 remains with John as does Ronald Blake, who is shown to
 2 continue to hold the tourniquet around John's leg.
 3 At this point, PC Edwards heads back towards the
 4 City Room with the metal barrier. At 23.25.55,
 5 Philip Keogh leans over from his position and is seen to
 6 talk to John. He then appears to gesture with his hand
 7 to PC Johnson, indicating that she can go. PC Johnson
 8 then stands up, walks behind Ronald Blake and says
 9 something to him, before she then stands and heads back
 10 towards the City Room. PC Johnson is not seen to return
 11 to John. Philip Keogh and Ronald Blake remain with
 12 John.
 13 At 23.26.27, Philip Keogh appears to be gesturing
 14 towards the ambulances and, at 23.26.51, he catches the
 15 attention of Daniel Smith whilst he is with John.
 16 A brief conversation takes between Daniel Smith and
 17 Philip Keogh before Daniel Smith walks back into the
 18 direction of Hunts Bank.
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: As detailed in a statement dated
 20 7 July 2021, Daniel Smith was shown the still and
 21 narrative timed at 23.26.51 and does not recall the
 22 conversation with Philip Keogh.
 23 Mr Smith said:
 24 "He and I probably spoke to each other dozens of
 25 times that night and I therefore cannot recall every

56

1 conversation that we had.”
 2 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR RUSSELL: At 23.28.41, Philip Keogh can
 3 be seen tending to John. Ronald Blake is also still
 4 present, however he is no longer holding the tourniquet
 5 that he had been seen to hold previously.
 6 Philip Keogh is pointing outside, possibly
 7 communicating with someone. It is not known from the
 8 body-worn video who this was with or what it was about.
 9 Philip Keogh is still captured pointing outside of the
 10 station at 23.29.
 11 At 23.29.13, John can be seen to have raised his
 12 right hand to his forehead. Philip Keogh is about to
 13 apply a P1 tag on John.
 14 At 23.29.19, a clearer view is seen of John's right
 15 arm raised in the air, resting on his forehead.
 16 After a few seconds, Philip Keogh turns around and
 17 has a brief inaudible conversation with another
 18 paramedic who then shouts, "Mike, come here". NWAS
 19 senior paramedic Michael Ruffles then comes into view
 20 and joins Philip Keogh in tending to John. Michael
 21 Ruffles is seen to be carrying a trauma kit.
 22 At 23.29.33, Ronald Blake, who has been tending to
 23 John since the explosion, is seen to stand up and move
 24 away from him. Mr Blake assisted John for almost
 25 1 hour.

1 Having left John, Ronald Blake is captured at
 2 23.30.41 outside on Victoria Station Approach helping
 3 another injured person.
 4 MS CARTWRIGHT: In his statement, dated 25 June 2021,
 5 Ronald Blake remembers staying with John for a period of
 6 time in the casualty clearing station before he left
 7 John with the paramedics. He said:
 8 "I let go of the tourniquet I had been holding
 9 whilst a paramedic was there after a while as more of
 10 them came over. I felt I was getting in the way and got
 11 up and moved away. John was still talking when I left
 12 and I thought he would be fine."
 13 Ronald Blake stated on 26 May 2017:
 14 "I've never had any first aid training and my
 15 natural instinct at the arena was to try and stop the
 16 blood and keep him conscious. When I left him with the
 17 paramedics, I thought he was going to survive."
 18 Mr Blake confirms that he found out that John had
 19 died when he was at hospital the following day receiving
 20 treatment for his own injuries sustained by the bomb.
 21 The news of John's death greatly upset Mr Blake.
 22 Sir, that concludes the extracts of the evidence
 23 summary to be read today. Please could we now take
 24 a 15-minute morning break and then, after the break,
 25 we will commence with the evidence of Mr Blake?

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 2 (11.28 am)
 3 (A short break)
 4 (12.05 pm)
 5 MS CARTWRIGHT: Good afternoon, sir. The gentleman in the
 6 witness box is Ronald Blake. Could I ask him now to be
 7 sworn, please.
 8 MR RONALD BLAKE (affirmed)
 9 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Have a seat. There is absolutely
 11 nothing for you to be worried about, all right? We just
 12 want to know and the families want to know exactly what
 13 happened and we know you gave a lot of assistance to
 14 Mr Atkinson, for which everyone is very grateful, I'm
 15 sure.
 16 MS CARTWRIGHT: Could you please tell the inquiry your full
 17 name?
 18 A. It's Ronald William Blake.
 19 Q. Mr Blake, it's slightly artificial in the hearing room,
 20 but if you could try and aim your voice to the back
 21 wall, then we can all hear what you have to say.
 22 Mr Blake, before you entered the hearing room to
 23 give evidence today, a detailed summary has been read of
 24 all the assistance you provided to John Atkinson and so
 25 I just want you to be aware that that's taken place, so

1 the questions that I ask of you will necessarily be
 2 focused.
 3 A. Right.
 4 Q. So Mr Blake, can I ask you, first of all, we can see
 5 from your witness statement that you indicate you, prior
 6 to 22 May 2017, had no first aid training.
 7 A. No.
 8 Q. Can I ask you, were you working at that time in
 9 May 2017?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Had you worked in the past?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. What sort of work had you done?
 14 A. Pizza shop manager.
 15 Q. Pizza shop manager?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Was there other work you'd done as well?
 18 A. Just did the Sunday market stalls.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could you just move your seat forward,
 20 sorry. Judges are always deaf, so you'll have to speak
 21 up a bit. Thank you.
 22 MS CARTWRIGHT: We know that you were in the City Room on
 23 22 May at the time of the detonation waiting to collect
 24 your daughter, who had been at the concert.
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you just confirm how old she was at the time? Was
 2 it 15?
 3 A. (Pause).
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: All fathers forget the ages of their
 5 children.
 6 A. 21, I think.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's some way out!
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: I do apologise.
 9 We know that at the time of the detonation you were
 10 also in the City Room with your wife, Lesley?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Can I just ask you, is it right that you play a big
 13 supportive role for Lesley?
 14 A. Yes. I'm her carer at the minute.
 15 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you to deal with the
 16 detonation, but you experienced the effect of the blast,
 17 didn't you?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And you yourself were injured in the detonation?
 20 A. Slightly.
 21 Q. We've already seen from the evidence summary that at
 22 22.32.55, you're first captured at the side of
 23 John Atkinson. So can you assist us, what was it that
 24 you saw that caused you to go to John Atkinson?
 25 A. It were the trail of blood that was coming from the back

61

1 of him.
 2 Q. Are you describing the trail of blood coming from the
 3 back of him?
 4 A. Underneath him, where he'd come from.
 5 Q. So what did that trail of blood that you saw underneath
 6 him indicate to you?
 7 A. That he'd been injured.
 8 Q. So what did you do?
 9 A. I think I turned him over and I noticed he was bleeding
 10 from his leg.
 11 Q. We know that after seeing John's injury, you made a 999
 12 call. The inquiry has already heard that evidence
 13 played on an earlier occasion but also extracts of that
 14 transcript of the 999 call have been read again today.
 15 So when you made that 999 call, what were you trying to
 16 achieve for John Atkinson?
 17 A. Just making them aware that something had happened and
 18 that help were needed.
 19 Q. Can we briefly then deal with what you were wearing
 20 at the time? It's right, isn't it, that you were
 21 wearing jeans and canvas shoes?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Did you have any other equipment to assist you in the
 24 help you gave to John?
 25 A. No.

62

1 Q. We've heard from the evidence read from your statements,
 2 but also from the sequence of events, that you were
 3 advised by the telephone operator to employ a tourniquet
 4 to John's leg.
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. We also know that you used a belt that your wife was
 7 wearing to apply that tourniquet.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Had you ever previously applied a tourniquet to anybody?
 10 A. No, no.
 11 Q. So can you just describe then what you did with the
 12 belt?
 13 A. I saw where he was bleeding from and put the belt round
 14 above that and just wrapped it round and pulled it as
 15 tight as possible.
 16 Q. We know from the sequence of events that you applied the
 17 belt as a tourniquet to John's right leg.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. But it's right, isn't it, that he was also bleeding from
 20 his left leg?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Did you see that?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. We've heard a description of the bleeding. It was
 25 visibly coming through John Atkinson's jeans, wasn't it,

63

1 that he was wearing?
 2 A. His jogging bottoms, yes.
 3 Q. You weren't able to see for the first part of the time
 4 you were with John what the injuries were that he had,
 5 were you?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. When you applied then the belt as a tourniquet, did the
 8 bleeding stop?
 9 A. It seemed to slow down, yes.
 10 Q. It slowed down?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And so you describe that it reduced the flow of the
 13 blood but didn't stop it altogether?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. How was John in himself when you were speaking to him
 16 and providing help?
 17 A. Talking. He told me his name, where he were from, just
 18 talking.
 19 Q. Did you at any point look to see what injuries John had?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. But it's right, isn't it, that the injuries John had
 22 meant he couldn't move, he couldn't walk?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. During the time when you were holding the tourniquet for
 25 John, at any point were you given any gloves to wear?

64

1 A. No.
 2 Q. And at any point did anyone offer you assistance by way
 3 of taking over holding the tourniquet for John?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. We can see that there came a time when your wife was
 6 getting particularly upset in the City Room.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And so can you help the inquiry understand how it was
 9 that you stayed with John rather than leaving when
 10 Lesley left the City Room?
 11 A. I thought it was a policewoman I was talking to and
 12 she -- I had told her that she couldn't be left on her
 13 own and in my mind she was taking her out to meet my
 14 daughter that was outside waiting for her. That's why
 15 I let her go.
 16 Q. So at that point when your wife was taken out of the
 17 City Room, did anyone offer to then to take over holding
 18 the tourniquet to allow you to go with Lesley when she
 19 left the City Room?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. So can I just ask, why did you choose to stay with
 22 John Atkinson when Lesley left?
 23 A. Because I knew Lesley would be safe with my daughter.
 24 Q. Can you tell us then, during the time you were with
 25 John -- we know that you were with him for almost

65

1 an hour up to when you left him in the casualty clearing
 2 station, but at any point was there any change or
 3 improvement in John during the time you were with him?
 4 A. He just went more quiet at times, but I just kept
 5 saying, "Talk to me".
 6 Q. Was John able to speak to you throughout?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. We know from the sequence of events that there came
 9 a time when some BTP officers came to assist John and we
 10 know that it was something you'd been asked about when
 11 you gave a recent statement and that they used a leg
 12 restraint on John.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Can you recall that?
 15 A. It were latish on that they put that round because
 16 I didn't notice he had another injury.
 17 Q. So can you just describe what you saw, where that leg
 18 restraint was on John's body?
 19 A. The lower part, round -- between his ankle and his
 20 knees.
 21 Q. You say between the ankle and his knees, are you
 22 indicating on both of his legs?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And what was the effect of that leg restraint that was
 25 used on John?

66

1 A. It were to raise his legs up on to a bag.
 2 Q. Okay. When that was applied to John's legs, did that
 3 affect whether the bleeding that you've described
 4 continued?
 5 A. I didn't really take notice of that part.
 6 Q. It was described in the witness statement of
 7 Chelsea Meaney that she thought you were from a military
 8 background and had trauma training and that's not right?
 9 A. No.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you ever seen a tourniquet ever used
 11 by anybody?
 12 A. Just like everybody else, on the telly.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you knew you needed to hold it tight
 14 to stop the bleeding?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 17 MS CARTWRIGHT: You've described in your witness statement
 18 that you thought there were paramedics that were
 19 assisting John, but I think you now know they weren't
 20 paramedics, but they were from the arena medics.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Can I ask you, we can see from the sequence of events
 23 that there was a male ETUK medic that came towards you
 24 and John on a couple of occasions early on and can be
 25 seen to be talking to you. We know his name is

67

1 Ryan Billington. Do you recall any of the conversation
 2 you had with Mr Billington?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Do you remember if any of the ETUK individuals in the
 5 green T-shirts at any point advised you to do something
 6 differently with the belt that was being used as
 7 a tourniquet?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. Can I ask, at any point did you see something equivalent
 10 to the tourniquet you had on John's right leg being
 11 applied to John's left leg?
 12 A. Something was put round, but I thought it went round
 13 both legs.
 14 Q. Is that what the BTP officers put on John, with the leg
 15 restraint?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Okay. What you're describing is that went round both of
 18 the legs?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. We know that there came a time where there was
 21 a discussion about needing to take John out of the
 22 City Room. Can you give us any more detail about the
 23 discussion that was taking place about needing to get
 24 John out of the City Room?
 25 A. Somebody mentioned that they were getting ready and

68

1 that's when the board was brought over. I can't recall
 2 who it was.
 3 Q. Okay. It's right, isn't it, that that needed to be
 4 dragged along the floor to get John out of the
 5 City Room ---
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. --- until you got to the lift and I think you could go no
 8 further?
 9 A. I think --- yes. The doors --- they couldn't get the
 10 board out of the doors. The board was too flimsy to
 11 lift and somebody came with a metal barrier.
 12 Q. When you describe the doors there, is that the lift
 13 doors?
 14 A. No, it wouldn't fit in the lift doors. It was too
 15 small.
 16 Q. Okay. So when John was being taken out first of all on
 17 that board, and then placed later on to --- the board was
 18 placed on the railings, was there any discussion about
 19 whether there was something better that John could be
 20 carried out on?
 21 A. Just the railings, somebody brought the railings out,
 22 with it being harder.
 23 Q. How did John seem as he was being taken out of the
 24 City Room and along the footbridge towards the lift?
 25 A. He were conscious, awake, talking, but in a lot of pain.

69

1 Q. Do you recall a police officer going down to try and get
 2 the help of the paramedics down on the station? Do you
 3 recall anything about that?
 4 A. No.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: He was going to get a stretcher,
 6 I think. Do you remember that, anything being said
 7 about getting a stretcher?
 8 A. No.
 9 MS CARTWRIGHT: When you then placed John on to the
 10 railings, can you tell us about how that was, what that
 11 felt like as being one of those assisting in getting
 12 John then down the stairs on the metal barrier?
 13 A. How do you mean?
 14 Q. We know that you were part of the group that helped John
 15 down the stairs and I think it's right you continued to
 16 hold the tourniquet.
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. But as someone that witnessed that first-hand, can you
 19 describe what that looked like for John?
 20 A. I don't know ---
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: How difficult did it seem to be getting
 22 him down the stairs?
 23 A. There were plenty carrying ---
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Plenty people helping?
 25 A. Yes.

70

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, thank you.
 2 MS CARTWRIGHT: But is it right that as you were part of
 3 that group helping John that you yourself banged your
 4 hip on the railings going down the stairs?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. Can I ask, at that any then as you were taking John out
 7 of the City Room as part of that group, did anyone offer
 8 for you to stand down and to take over holding that
 9 tourniquet or helping John?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Do you have any recollection then of what happened once
 12 you got John downstairs and into that casualty clearing
 13 station area at the doorway to the station?
 14 A. There was one paramedic that were there and they were
 15 talking, asking him his name. Then as time went on,
 16 more come in and he got help from them, and that's when
 17 I stepped back and went outside.
 18 Q. I think we've read from your witness statement that
 19 that's the point when you let go of the belt tourniquet?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Can we just be clear, so from the time when you made the
 22 999 call and put the belt around John's leg, had you at
 23 any point let go of that tourniquet up to the point when
 24 you gave it to the paramedics?
 25 A. No.

71

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think we've heard something about it
 2 being repositioned at some stage. Do you remember
 3 anything about that?
 4 A. No.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 6 MS CARTWRIGHT: We know that when John was downstairs,
 7 certainly his clothing had been cut off him, I think,
 8 slightly earlier as he was moved down.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Was there anything in particular you noticed about
 11 John's injuries when his body was all visible?
 12 A. Just that he had more than what I'd previously thought.
 13 Q. We've also heard a description that as John was being
 14 moved, there was still evidence of the trail of blood
 15 wherever John was taken; do you recall that?
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. Okay. We've heard read from your witness statement,
 18 Mr Blake, that you thought when you left John that
 19 he was going to be all right.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. And in fact, you then found out when you attended
 22 hospital the following day for treatment for your own
 23 injuries that John had died?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And that came as a big shock to you?

72

1 A. Yes.
 2 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Blake, if you wait there, there will be
 3 some other questions for you. Mr Cooper, please.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Cooper, I know we have to stop at
 5 20 to if at all possible. For this witness's sake,
 6 I would like to have finished ---
 7 MR COOPER: Let me try and achieve that, sir.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.
 9 Questions from MR COOPER
 10 MR COOPER: Mr Blake, as you will recognise, I ask questions
 11 on behalf of John Atkinson's family. Let me immediately
 12 begin by profoundly thanking you on their behalf for the
 13 hard work, dedication and --- I can think of no better
 14 word than heroics --- that you performed that night
 15 trying to save John. Their heartfelt thanks to you for
 16 that.
 17 I just want to clarify a few matters because
 18 obviously we need to understand as much as possible what
 19 happened to John in those final moments.
 20 You were with John for almost an hour, weren't you?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. You didn't have any first aid equipment on you?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. You weren't trained in first aid?
 25 A. No.

73

1 Q. You were just doing what any decent person would do to
 2 try to save a life. Whilst all this was going on, you
 3 were with your wife, Lesley, who was very distressed at
 4 the time, understandably so. Where was your daughter
 5 at the time?
 6 A. We didn't know at the time.
 7 Q. She was all right in the end though, was she?
 8 A. In the end, yes.
 9 Q. That's good to hear.
 10 During the time that you were dealing with John, it
 11 was obvious, wasn't it, that he was very, very severely
 12 injured?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And you didn't need, for instance, a medical
 15 qualification to see that, did you, it was obvious from
 16 the amount of blood that he was losing?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. In fact, sir, I'm reassured that you have seen certain
 19 images, sir, which we asked of you. Thank you.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes.
 21 MR COOPER: The earliest image of you, Mr Blake, at the time
 22 was at 22.32.55, very shortly after the detonation of
 23 the bomb. And you were with John from the City Room,
 24 across the landing, down to the stairs, and down to the
 25 casualty clearing station. For much of that time, if

74

1 not all of that time, John was conscious, wasn't he?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. During that time it was obvious from start to finish,
 4 wasn't it, that he was in a very serious condition and
 5 again because he was continually, very sadly, losing
 6 blood, wasn't he?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. All the time effectively. Now, during the time that
 9 you were helping John, you had the assistance of
 10 a number of people who came round to you, didn't you?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And for the majority of that time, those people were
 13 either from British Transport Police or from Greater
 14 Manchester Police. Did you know that at the time?
 15 A. Not at the time, no.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But you could tell they were policemen?
 17 A. They had uniforms on, yes.
 18 MR COOPER: Again, certainly, and we'll deal with what
 19 little there was, you had no help or assistance from
 20 NWAS because, quite frankly, NWAS weren't there to be
 21 seen, were they, at this time?
 22 A. No.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have had the exact timings of when
 24 people were there. Obviously I've got that and will
 25 bear that in mind.

75

1 MR COOPER: Indeed, sir, yes, and you have the exact timing,
 2 for instance, of when Mr Ennis appeared.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It was perfectly apparent there was no
 4 assessment of Mr Atkinson by anyone from NWAS.
 5 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.
 6 During this time, officers were again doing their
 7 best, it seemed, to help him; was that what you saw?
 8 A. No. They were more going round seeing who needed the
 9 help.
 10 Q. So was the effective help that John was being given,
 11 being given really by you?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Others were coming and going and trying to do their bit,
 14 but the real substantive help to John was being given by
 15 you and you alone then; is that right?
 16 A. At the time, yes.
 17 Q. Again, as far as you expecting the Ambulance Service to
 18 arrive or specialist people to arrive, were you
 19 expecting them to arrive any minute now, as it were?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Because that would be a natural expectation, wouldn't
 22 it, of any member of the public in such a catastrophe?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was there talk --- I know that people
 25 weren't there all the time with you, but when people

76

1 came, were people saying, "The paramedics will be here
 2 any minute", or is that just something you assumed?
 3 A. It's just something I assumed.
 4 MR COOPER: Could you hear, for instance, any sirens outside
 5 or any emergency — anything sounding from outside?
 6 A. No, the tannoy system were going off.
 7 Q. You told the chair that you had no training at all about
 8 applying tourniquets or anything like that.
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. But it was obvious to you that the bleeding needed to be
 11 stopped and stopped quickly?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. I'm just going to remind you very shortly of something
 14 you said in one of your statements, {INQ041641/1}. You
 15 say at paragraph 11:
 16 "I remember seeing the blood pumping through John's
 17 trousers, but I don't remember seeing any wounds or
 18 where it was coming from. I placed the belt above his
 19 knee, higher than where I could see the blood pumping
 20 through. I didn't take much notice about the wound as
 21 I was trying to talk to my wife as she kept looking
 22 around the arena and I wanted her to focus on me."
 23 Then you say this:
 24 "I recall that it did not stop the blood coming from
 25 his leg but it did help to reduce the flow."

77

1 So the appliance, whatever we want to call it, that
 2 you very sensibly tried to utilise, it didn't stop the
 3 blood but it helped reduce the flow?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Can you help us with how much it helped to reduce the
 6 flow, minimally or a lot?
 7 A. You couldn't see it as much coming through.
 8 Q. Again, you describe — in your statement, you use the
 9 words "blood pumping through John's trousers".
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. So again, not only was it obvious to anyone that would
 12 look at John — and forgive me, the families are aware
 13 I'm going to ask you this question — but there was
 14 a lot of blood around, but it was clearly obvious also
 15 that it wasn't just a wound that had happened, blood was
 16 continually being pumped from John's body?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. If I use the word catastrophic bleeding, that would be
 19 a good expression for it, wouldn't it?
 20 A. There were a lot, yes.
 21 Q. When you had other people coming to help you — let's
 22 deal with Mr Billington first. Mr Billington, we've
 23 been helpfully told this morning, was initially with
 24 John and you for about 20 seconds and he slipped over on
 25 the trail of blood that John was leaving.

78

1 A. I don't know.
 2 Q. Did Mr Billington, because we know this from the
 3 material CTI have read, when Mr Billington did attend at
 4 22.50.42 for 20 seconds and apparently slipped on John's
 5 blood, did he say anything to you about what he saw of
 6 John's wounds?
 7 A. I don't recall, no, nothing being said.
 8 Q. Did he give any acknowledgement to anyone, "Goodness me,
 9 there's so much blood here, I'm slipping over it, we
 10 must help this lad"?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. Nothing at all?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Did he seem concerned in any way over and above,
 15 of course, the general tragedy?
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. You've indicated just before that, a member of the
 18 public, Mr Grew, comments, we hear, that John's bleeding
 19 heavily from his leg, losing a lot of blood. This is
 20 all happening in real time, isn't it, while you're
 21 there?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. We hear of other people arriving. We hear, for
 24 instance, at 22.59.45, of PC Chelsea Meaney arriving.
 25 When these officers arrived, and we'll use PC Meaney as

79

1 an example, did they ask for any information as to what
 2 you'd seen, how long you'd been with him, what his
 3 condition was?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. Did you manage, this is no criticism of you, because as
 6 I've indicated you were working heroically with John,
 7 did you manage to tell them anything about what had
 8 happened before they had arrived to John?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. But again it was obvious, wasn't it? He was pumping out
 11 blood.
 12 During this time John was also conscious, wasn't he?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And if anyone needed extra evidence that John was in
 15 a very, very poor state indeed, without going into the
 16 details, John was saying it himself, wasn't he —
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. — as to his condition and what he thought was happening
 19 to him?
 20 At 23.01.10, we're told, ETUK's Mr Billington again
 21 is present and is told, we hear, from PC Meaney,
 22 "Someone just needs to review him if they can". From
 23 your assessment, again, of seeing what you were seeing,
 24 it was obvious, forget the word review, some paramedic,
 25 some medic, someone from NWSA, the Ambulance Service,

80

1 needed to be there, didn't they?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. I want to ask you very briefly about British Transport
 4 Police's Jon Paul Morrey. He approaches, we learn, at
 5 23.01.48. I want to just ask you again to remind
 6 yourself about what you say of that officer. It's
 7 paragraph 22 of your statement that I just referred to.
 8 You told us that Jon Paul Morrey leaning over,
 9 looking at John Atkinson:
 10 "I do remember this officer, but can't recall what
 11 he specifically did."
 12 Then you say this:
 13 "He didn't do anything to assist or advise me around
 14 looking after John. He didn't do anything to assist or
 15 advise me around looking after John."
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. Did anyone give you any assistance from, we realise NWAS
 18 weren't there to be seen, but I'm asking about other
 19 emergency services at the moment. Did anyone from any
 20 of the other emergency services -- we speak of the
 21 police particularly now because they were there -- give
 22 you any advice or assistance as to what to do about
 23 John?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. And particularly, did they give you --

81

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just stopping for a minute, Mr Cooper.
 2 We know how limited the medical knowledge of the police
 3 was, so I don't want your questions to be in any way
 4 misinterpreted. Clearly, they may not have been in
 5 a position to give much advice.
 6 MR COOPER: I understand, sir, and that really is accepted.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand what you're saying, that it
 8 was NWAS who were needed.
 9 MR COOPER: Yes.
 10 And whatever cursory advice the officers may or may
 11 not have had about first aid, were you given any advice
 12 whatsoever as to how to attend to John?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. So again, the situation we have here is that you're
 15 actually filling in for NWAS, doing the job, trying to
 16 save a man's life, doing your best?
 17 A. Until they got there, yes.
 18 Q. Because they're not there and it's down to a heroic
 19 member of the public to do his bit; yes?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It could be a comment moment, so I'm not
 22 sure you can expect him to agree to being a heroic
 23 member of the public.
 24 MR COOPER: All right.
 25 Again, John is making it very clear indeed, isn't

82

1 he, as to how serious, on his own assessment, he thinks
 2 he is?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. So what we have here, just to draw the threads together,
 5 is that the assessments of John are either being given
 6 by him out of his own mouth and the help being given is
 7 by you, a member of the public, doing your bit?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. And that's it as far as John's concerned. Of course, we
 10 have heard evidence of other police officers attending
 11 and that resumé has already been given and we're aware
 12 that Marianne Gibson attended as well. I'll cut the
 13 questions short. When people were coming and going and
 14 the police were attending, different police officers,
 15 and Marianne Gibson was attending, did any of them speak
 16 to each other, not necessarily with you involved, from
 17 what you saw, did any of these people coming and going,
 18 speak with each other and say, "I've been here with John
 19 for about 3 or 4 minutes and I can tell you now he's
 20 catastrophically bleeding and we need to get him to
 21 hospital"? Did anyone say that?
 22 A. Not that I recall, no.
 23 Q. So for all these people coming and going -- and I will
 24 cut the questions down to their broad minimum here --
 25 for all those people coming and going, whether it's the

83

1 police, whether it's British Transport Police, whether
 2 it's ETUK, from what you saw, no one actually
 3 communicated with each other and said, "He's
 4 catastrophically bleeding, we need to get him to
 5 hospital now"?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. No one said it --
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Let's get some perspective on that if
 9 you don't mind.
 10 Do you think you took note of everything that was
 11 being said around you in the situation you were in?
 12 A. Not on that night, no. Everything was just --
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure it was completely chaotic and
 14 desperate, the whole situation.
 15 MR COOPER: Nonetheless, it's chaotic, as the chair rightly
 16 says, but in the context of chaotic, here is a man -- I
 17 am sorry for the family to hear this but it needs to be
 18 established -- catastrophically bleeding. So it's
 19 chaotic, but here is a big example of someone in real
 20 trouble, isn't there?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And this man, who is in real trouble from what we can
 23 see on the images, from what you could see, and from
 24 what anyone else could see, it must have been obvious to
 25 anyone who saw him, he needed attention, he needed

84

1 hospital now?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. I ask that question to put in context how long it took
 4 for him even to be got to the lift .
 5 We know that 23.12.08 NWAS's Patrick Ennis first
 6 makes an appearance as far as John is concerned --- well,
 7 not quite as far as John is concerned: he goes to
 8 Gemma McDonnell --- Gemma O'Donnell and tells ShowSec
 9 staff to evacuate her and then we hear Mr Ennis walks
 10 away. So that's 23.12.08 when Mr Ennis walks away.
 11 Were you aware of him looking at all at John?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. You've been asked questions about the evacuation, being
 14 taken on the stretcher, if one can call it that.
 15 Effectively, John was put on a board and then a metal
 16 railing and he was in great pain on there, wasn't he?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Not just because of his injuries but because of how
 19 he was positioned on the railing and on the board?
 20 A. I don't know, just in pain.
 21 Q. And we hear that when you got him to the lift, they
 22 couldn't fit him in the lift. Was that because that was
 23 just too wide or too ---
 24 A. Too wide.
 25 Q. Then the board broke. And when it did, John fell a

85

1 short ---
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you see the board break?
 3 A. I don't recall the board.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know it did, but if this witness
 5 didn't actually see it.
 6 MR COOPER: I was going to ask about what he saw, but you're
 7 there ahead of me.
 8 Were you present when John was got to the casualty
 9 clearing station and the paramedics finally applied
 10 their minds to him? We saw Mr Keogh and Mr Smith
 11 talking to each other. Did you see them talking to each
 12 other about John?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Did you hear any of the paramedics when you were down
 15 at the casualty clearing station? Did you hear any of
 16 them talking --- I'm not saying they didn't, but I'm
 17 asking whether you heard any of their conversations.
 18 A. I'd stepped away by then because more had come in.
 19 Q. So you didn't hear any conversations, observations by
 20 the paramedics who were ---
 21 A. Just the one person that was there when we got
 22 downstairs that asked him his name.
 23 Q. They asked you your name?
 24 A. They asked John his name.
 25 Q. Did they ask anything else?

86

1 A. No.
 2 Q. Did they ask, for instance, what his injuries were?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Was John still bleeding out heavily at the time?
 5 A. He was still bleeding, yes, but I couldn't see how ---
 6 Q. So the paramedics simply want John's name and that was
 7 it?
 8 A. While they were assessing and then that's when others
 9 came over and I went outside.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think you're taking the point slightly
 11 too far, if you don't mind any saying so.
 12 MR COOPER: Not at all, sir. If that's the case, I'll leave
 13 it.
 14 Can you bear with me a moment ---
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just before you sit down, just one other
 16 matter and I don't want this question to be taken out of
 17 context.
 18 In relation to Mr Billington, it's a perfectly valid
 19 observation or may be, and we'll hear what he has to
 20 say, as he didn't actually fully appreciate the extent
 21 of the injury there was and that he wasn't as concerned
 22 with getting him out therefore as he should have been.
 23 I don't want that to be interpreted as a general
 24 comment, and I'm sure you wouldn't intend it this way,
 25 that Mr Billington wasn't actually concerned about the

87

1 injured in there on the night.
 2 MR COOPER: Absolutely not, sir. Let me make it clear on
 3 behalf ---
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There were a lot of people doing their
 5 best and doing what they can ---
 6 MR COOPER: Absolutely, absolutely. Doing their best in the
 7 absence of NWAS.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand that point.
 9 MR COOPER: No further question.
 10 Further questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
 11 MS CARTWRIGHT: Can I ask one further question of Mr Blake.
 12 For the period of time after the detonation until
 13 when you left the City Room with John, at any point did
 14 anyone tell you that it was not safe for you to be
 15 in the City Room?
 16 A. No.
 17 Q. And did anyone tell you at any point that you needed to
 18 leave the City Room?
 19 A. No.
 20 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you.
 21 Sir, do you have any other questions for Mr Blake?
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, I haven't, and I'm very grateful.
 23 Let me express too my thanks for what you did that
 24 night.
 25 Mr Cooper said that you were doing no more than any

88

1 ordinary person would do to help. On my view, you were
 2 doing more than what any other person would do to help,
 3 so thank you.
 4 MS CARTWRIGHT: Can we break for an hour now for lunch?
 5 Thank you.
 6 (12.43 pm)
 7 (The lunch adjournment)
 8 (1.47 pm)
 9 MR GARETH CHAPMAN (recalled)
 10 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
 11 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, the gentleman in the witness box,
 12 you will recall from last week, is Mr Chapman. He
 13 doesn't need to be sworn.
 14 Mr Chapman, thank you for coming to give evidence
 15 today and the evidence we will be asking you about today
 16 relates to John Atkinson, who is a male you assisted in
 17 the City Room, but also carried down the stairs into the
 18 casualty clearing station.
 19 Before you came to give evidence today, your
 20 involvement with John has already been read, so I am
 21 going to focus my questions, please, in terms of that
 22 assistance you provided.
 23 A. Yeah, yeah, fine.
 24 Q. You told us when you came to give evidence last week
 25 that you had had first aid training?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And that had been for a potential job working on the oil
 3 rigs?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Can I ask you then, as part of that training, had it
 6 included applying a tourniquet?
 7 A. Well, bandages -- is that a bandage?
 8 Q. Yes.
 9 A. Yes. It was bandages, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure tourniquets and bandaging
 11 is necessarily the same.
 12 A. It's all to do with the first aid training we did.
 13 MS CARTWRIGHT: Had that training included applying
 14 a bandage or a tourniquet in a way to stem a bleed,
 15 a catastrophic bleed, to stop it bleeding?
 16 A. Not really, it's just there -- I just thought it off my
 17 own head.
 18 Q. So that first aid training had included bandages but not
 19 how to apply a tourniquet?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. Thank you. We addressed on the last occasion that you
 22 were down in the station when the bomb detonated --
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. -- and then immediately proceeded into the City Room via
 25 the Fifty Pence Piece entrance.

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. We've already seen that you are then captured with
 3 John Atkinson at a time when Ronald Blake was assisting
 4 him and have provided a witness statement about the male
 5 who was bleeding heavily, John.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So could you just tell us what you saw when the entered
 8 the City Room and went to Mr Atkinson?
 9 A. I seen he had a belt round him, round his leg, trying to
 10 stop the bleeding from the artery. So I took it off and
 11 I wrapped a T-shirt up into a square block, because it
 12 was pumping, they had it -- it was in the wrong place,
 13 it was bleeding too heavy. So I put the -- wrapped the
 14 T-shirt up into a cube, put it into where the hole was
 15 to stop it pumping as much blood, and then strapped
 16 a belt round it and tightened it and made the other
 17 gentleman hold it while I carried on to find where my
 18 own child was and their mum.
 19 Q. What you are just describing is that when you first went
 20 to John Atkinson, you saw that he had a belt applied to
 21 his leg?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. You describe then it was pumping still --
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. -- so it may seem obvious, but can you just describe

1 what you saw at that time, please?
 2 A. Well, where it was tied round his leg -- where it was
 3 tied, I don't think it was in the right place anyway
 4 because it was still pumping out. So when I took the
 5 thingy out and put the T-shirt in and tightened then, it
 6 stopped the pumping of it squirting out, if you
 7 understand what I mean. I'm not very good with words,
 8 I am just trying to explain --
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're doing fine. I think we can all
 10 understand.
 11 MS CARTWRIGHT: You described it in your witness statement
 12 as "an artery in his leg".
 13 A. Yes. I know where your arteries are in your legs.
 14 Q. So you then -- did you loosen the belt to put the
 15 T-shirt over where the blood was coming from?
 16 A. Yes, I had to unloosen (sic) it. It was in the right
 17 place, but not the right place, it wasn't thick enough
 18 to where it was. When I put the T-shirt in and when
 19 I tightened it up, it stemmed the flow of blood.
 20 Q. When you say it stemmed the flow of blood --
 21 A. Just slowed it down, slowed it down.
 22 Q. Slowed it down. So you're saying it slowed it down, did
 23 the bleeding stop altogether?
 24 A. Listen, I didn't stay on to the person. I had to -- the
 25 other gentleman was there. I was too busy to find my

1 own son and his mum. So you know, as soon as I'd done
 2 that, I said -- I asked the other gentleman to keep hold
 3 of the belt tight because I had to find -- that's what
 4 I did: I went straight over to the next person to see if
 5 I could get hold of my own child.
 6 Q. Thank you. Is that the extent of what you recall -- the
 7 assistance you provided to Mr Atkinson?
 8 A. As far as I was aware. Well, yeah, as far as I was
 9 aware --
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You did what you could (overspeaking).
 11 A. Yes, of course, of course.
 12 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you.
 13 You have been asked by the Operation Manteline team
 14 also about any recollection you have about the carrying
 15 of John down the stairs because we can see at 23.22 to
 16 23.24 or thereabouts, you were part of the group that
 17 assist carrying John down the stairs, but I don't think
 18 you can recall doing that.
 19 A. No, it's because I did -- there was a good few people
 20 I carried down the stairs, so I didn't know which person
 21 I dealt with, you know. It was all -- it was non-stop
 22 to tell you the truth, love.
 23 MS CARTWRIGHT: If you wait there, there will be some
 24 questions from Mr Cooper for you.
 25

93

1 Questions from MR COOPER
 2 MR COOPER: Firstly, thanks for your help on behalf of the
 3 families on the night. It was clear, wasn't it, from
 4 your observations that, sadly, Mr Atkinson was in
 5 a very, very serious state --
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. -- because of what you could see with the blood and
 8 because of how he was reacting?
 9 As far as the application of any tourniquets are
 10 concerned, did it look -- or bandages or whatever they
 11 were on Mr Atkinson -- did it look like they were
 12 working?
 13 A. There was no bandages there, mate.
 14 Q. Nothing at all?
 15 A. So that's why I used a T-shirt. There was no --
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There was just the tourniquet, the belt.
 17 A. Yes. Just the belt and a T-shirt.
 18 MR COOPER: Did the belt, from what you saw, look as if it
 19 was working or not?
 20 A. No, it wasn't really working, but it worked better when
 21 I put -- when I packed the T-shirt into a square cube to
 22 where the hole was. There was a hole, you see --
 23 Q. So effectively when you got -- this is no criticism,
 24 of course --
 25 A. Yeah, I know.

94

1 Q. -- whoever was applying the belt, they were doing their
 2 level best in the circumstances.
 3 A. That's what they could do, yes, of course, of course.
 4 Q. I don't want you to misinterpret my questions, but you
 5 saw -- you got there, you saw the belt wasn't working or
 6 wasn't as effective as it should be, and therefore you
 7 took a step to try and correct it? Would that be fair?
 8 A. Because when the -- the gentleman who was there already,
 9 who had put the belt on, yeah? As I -- he's already
 10 down with him. I said, "No, you're doing it wrong",
 11 kind of thing. Do you want I mean? As far as what
 12 I could see he wasn't doing the right thing --
 13 Q. Absolutely.
 14 A. -- so I just tried to do it better than what it was.
 15 Q. And it was left to you, a right-minded member of the
 16 public, to tell him to do that?
 17 A. Well, you know, I just -- I thought it was my own common
 18 sense to help out anyway.
 19 Q. There were no emergency services --
 20 A. No, not at all. Nothing.
 21 MR COOPER: Thank you, sir.
 22 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, do you have any questions?
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, I don't.
 24 Thank you very much for coming back and for what you
 25 did.

95

1 (The witness withdrew)
 2 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, could I ask for a 5-minute break? Then
 3 we should be able to hopefully move through the evidence
 4 this afternoon. Thank you.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 6 (1.55 pm)
 7 (A short break)
 8 (2.03 pm)
 9 MR RYAN BILLINGTON (recalled)
 10 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
 11 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you, sir.
 12 Sir, you well know that the gentleman in the witness
 13 box is Mr Billington, who gave evidence last week and
 14 the week before, and who also give evidence first to the
 15 inquiry back in April of this year.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much for coming back.
 17 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Billington, before we deal with the
 18 specific evidence in relation to your involvement with
 19 John Atkinson on 22 May 2017, can we just recap over
 20 some of the evidence that you gave when you first gave
 21 evidence to the inquiry on 21 April 2021?
 22 A. Yes, of course.
 23 Q. When you gave evidence to the inquiry on that occasion,
 24 you indicated that you were working as a first aider for
 25 ETUK.

96

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. But it's right, isn't it, subsequently you provided
 3 a witness statement, dated 19 August 2021, where I think
 4 you have found the records now that indicate you were
 5 working in the position of an EMT B?
 6 A. Yes, that's right.
 7 Q. An EMT basic. So is there anything else by way of
 8 evidence you want to give about your role as an EMT B on
 9 that night at the arena?
 10 A. No. It was a very similar kind of role -- I wasn't
 11 there that night as clinical lead. I was with Liz, who
 12 was Medic 2, but my role was very much the same, my
 13 skill set was very much the same that night.
 14 Q. When you say Liz, that's Elizabeth Woodcock?
 15 A. I'm sorry, Elizabeth Woodcock.
 16 Q. Thank you. So just to then recap on the evidence you
 17 gave us in April 2021, you told us that you had been
 18 training to be a paramedic at the time?
 19 A. That's right.
 20 Q. So you had received training as part of your IHCD course
 21 at the university of Central Manchester and had done
 22 modules on the treatment of blast and blast injuries?
 23 A. Sorry, just to correct that: I had initially had
 24 a course, the first person on scene qualification, which
 25 is an IHCD qualification. But separate to that as well,

1 I was a student paramedic with the University of Central
 2 Lancashire, so I'd covered it in two separate ways on
 3 two separate courses.
 4 Q. Thank you. You also confirmed to the inquiry on the
 5 last occasion in April 2021 that you had received
 6 training on the use of tourniquets?
 7 A. Yes, that's right.
 8 Q. And I think you also gave evidence that you felt
 9 competent in the application of a tourniquet to stop
 10 a catastrophic bleed?
 11 A. Yes, that's correct.
 12 Q. And confirmed that you believed you'd had sufficient
 13 training in that?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Thank you. I think you also told the inquiry that you
 16 had also wanted ETUK staff to have more training in the
 17 application of trauma dressings and tourniquets for
 18 events when you weren't there because you didn't want
 19 patient care to drop just because you weren't at an
 20 event?
 21 A. That's right. Training in general, not just
 22 specifically around tourniquets, but any kind of
 23 continuous personal development we could do with staff.
 24 Q. Thank you. Now, we've already touched upon in April of
 25 2021 about the instruction that was given and I think

1 the call that you placed over the radio after the bomb
 2 had detonated, which indicated that:
 3 "If people have no pulse, we can't help."
 4 And the direction was, "Treat catastrophic
 5 bleeding".
 6 A. Yes, that's correct. I think I said if the patient
 7 isn't breathing with an open airway, we could
 8 unfortunately not help them, but to treat any
 9 catastrophic bleeding.
 10 Q. Can you just explain the importance from your
 11 perspective, with the knowledge you had at that time, as
 12 to why catastrophic bleeding was so important to be
 13 treated?
 14 A. So apart from airway compromise, catastrophic bleeding
 15 can cause death within minutes if it isn't correctly
 16 controlled.
 17 Q. Would it have been within your knowledge as well that it
 18 is important to stop the bleeding but if there has been
 19 a catastrophic bleed, it can lead to a condition called
 20 hypovolaemia, which can then cause a cardiac arrest?
 21 A. That's correct, yes.
 22 Q. We know from the sequence of events, and also as part of
 23 I think the review that you have done with the
 24 Operation Manteline team, that you are first seen going
 25 to John Atkinson at a time when he was with Mr Blake at

1 22.50.42.
 2 The period of time that you're with John at that
 3 time is somewhere in the order of 20 seconds.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that you've had an opportunity
 6 to review that sequence of events and that encounter
 7 with John Atkinson?
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
 9 Q. It's clear from the sequence of events that there is
 10 significant bleeding around John Atkinson at the time
 11 when you go towards him?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Both by way of the trail of blood that was directly
 14 behind him but also the blood that was gathered around
 15 his body?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. So do you recall seeing John Atkinson at that time as
 18 someone who had catastrophic bleed?
 19 A. I recall seeing John Atkinson in the foyer. There was
 20 lots of blood in the foyer. It was difficult to see
 21 whose blood -- which blood was from which patient, given
 22 the magnitude of what had happened. John Atkinson at
 23 that time, from my perspective, didn't have
 24 a catastrophic bleed. From what I could see, he had
 25 bled substantially but at my time, when I saw him, the

1 bleeding was under control.
 2 Q. So you are distinguishing that he had bled
 3 substantially , but he had not bled catastrophically?
 4 Can you assist us with where the line goes from
 5 substantially to catastrophically?
 6 A. At the time of my assessment, when I put my eyes on
 7 John, he had no active catastrophic bleed at that
 8 moment. By that, I mean there was no bleed that was
 9 actively bleeding, spurting or pouring blood which
 10 needed immediate intervention. However, prior to that,
 11 within a few seconds after detonation, when I wasn't
 12 there, he may have had a bleed at that point. He
 13 obviously did have a bleed at that point.
 14 Q. So we know that you then come upon John at 22.50, which
 15 would have been 19 minutes after the detonation. But
 16 you've sought to indicate that there was a lot of blood,
 17 but to those who have been able to view the stills as to
 18 the blood around John at that time, it is very much
 19 around his body specifically to him, but also in a trail
 20 that leads directly behind where John had come from.
 21 A. Yes, that's correct.
 22 Q. So you sought, it seemed a moment ago, to be
 23 distinguishing that you couldn't identify where that
 24 blood had come from.
 25 A. I could identify that John was bleeding and he was

101

1 surrounded by blood, but there was also lots of other
 2 blood in that area and it was difficult to pinpoint
 3 exactly which blood was from which patient.
 4 Q. So can I ask you, in that scenario, when you are doing
 5 your assessment, we can see from the footage that
 6 you are doing a visual, looking down upon Mr Atkinson.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. But it's right, isn't it, that John is still fully
 9 clothed at that point?
 10 A. From what I can recall, yes, that's correct.
 11 Q. And so in the circumstances where a patient is
 12 positioned around blood, a substantial amount of blood,
 13 it's important to ascertain, as the person providing
 14 assistance, where that blood came from, isn't it?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that during that encounter you
 17 had with John for those 20 seconds, you did not cut away
 18 his clothing?
 19 A. That's correct, yes.
 20 Q. Because that would be the best way to identify the
 21 source of the bleeding, wouldn't it?
 22 A. It would. However, from what I can recall, I can't
 23 recall whether there was tourniquets on his legs, but
 24 I do recall there being dressings there. If I was to
 25 start cutting away at clothing I would then also cut

102

1 away any bandages which are present -- and bearing in
 2 mind his bleeding in my view is already controlled,
 3 I don't want to then cause any further haemorrhage.
 4 Q. The inquiry's heard evidence that the bleeding
 5 continued, so whilst there was a tourniquet that was
 6 applied by way of a belt, but that had not caused the
 7 bleeding to stop. So again, did you observe that on
 8 John?
 9 A. Like I say, I can't recall whether there was tourniquets
 10 or not. But from my perspective, at the time of seeing
 11 Mr Atkinson on both occasions, the bleeding was fully
 12 controlled.
 13 Q. Again, to perform a proper check on a casualty, where
 14 they're surrounded by blood, the way to identify injury
 15 is to cut away the clothing so the body can be examined
 16 to identify the source of the bleeding?
 17 A. That's correct if Mr Atkinson was our only patient, but
 18 in the perspective that it's a major incident, a mass
 19 casualty incident with multiple priority 1 casualties
 20 which we're trying to triage, I was -- at that time
 21 Mr Atkinson was awake, his airway was open, and all
 22 bleeding was controlled. So apart from rapid transport
 23 to definitive care, I didn't feel that I could offer
 24 Mr Atkinson any more interventions at that time.
 25 Q. So let me just be clear then: why is it that you don't

103

1 cut away his clothing?
 2 A. I didn't want to disrupt any of the bandages or anything
 3 that was stopping any bleeding at that time because
 4 I don't feel like he was catastrophically bleeding at
 5 that time.
 6 Q. Can I ask you, did you visually observe the
 7 effectiveness of the tourniquet that was on
 8 John Atkinson's right leg?
 9 A. I don't recall any -- I'm not sure if there was any
 10 tourniquets there or not.
 11 Q. You told the inquiry on the last occasion that you had
 12 access to tourniquets -- I think you had two of your
 13 own -- that you brought in your own medical kit that you
 14 would bring.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Certainly on the sequence of events that's been viewed
 17 by the work of the Operation Manteline team, there is
 18 not evidence on that of you applying a tourniquet to any
 19 casualty on the sequence of events that's been provided.
 20 So can I ask you, because we know from the evidence and
 21 from the sequence of events, that that belt remained on
 22 John's right leg throughout. So I think you're now
 23 saying that you don't recall seeing -- whether you saw
 24 a tourniquet or not?
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think there are about 15 questions in

104

1 all of that.
 2 Do you remember using your tourniquets? Did you use
 3 them on that night?
 4 A. I didn't use them on Mr Atkinson: they were handed out
 5 on that night to other people, other responders that
 6 were there. I went home with none in my bag, but they
 7 weren't used on Mr Atkinson.
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: Can I ask you then, in terms of, just so I'm
 9 clear, about the belt that Mr Blake had applied to
 10 John Atkinson's right leg, did you examine that to
 11 assess how effective that was at stemming the bleeding
 12 from his right leg?
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, just again, I'm really sorry, but
 14 I think you said you didn't see any belt?
 15 A. I don't recall any belts or any kind of makeshift
 16 tourniquets.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So I'm not sure he could answer that
 18 question if he didn't actually see it, could he?
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: I suppose the evidence is that there was
 20 a tourniquet there.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There certainly was a tourniquet there,
 22 that's the evidence we have heard. But you're saying
 23 you were not aware of it or didn't see it?
 24 A. I apologise, I did not see it.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't need to apologise, but if

105

1 I may say so --- you have obviously looked at the
 2 sequence of events stills, and quite rightly too, but
 3 you still need to be reminding us --- doing it from your
 4 memory because otherwise it'll be explanations for
 5 things you've seen subsequently rather than your actual
 6 recollection of what you did and why.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 MS CARTWRIGHT: Having heard your answer that you don't
 9 recall a tourniquet being there, can I just then
 10 explore, if you went to a casualty that night that did
 11 have a tourniquet on them, would it not be important
 12 that you, as someone with first aid training and as an
 13 EMT B, to check how adequate that tourniquet was?
 14 A. Absolutely, yes, and I may have done, but my
 15 recollection of that night is that I couldn't remember
 16 seeing any kind of tourniquet there. I'm not saying
 17 there was or wasn't or whether I checked it or not, but
 18 I dealt with a lot of patients that night, a lot of them
 19 had tourniquets on limbs, and I don't remember
 20 unfortunately if Mr Atkinson was one of them or not.
 21 Q. You've already given your answer as to why you didn't
 22 cut the clothing away.
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. But certainly the trail of blood that was behind
 25 John Atkinson indicated that there was bleeding not just

106

1 from his right leg but also from his left leg and that's
 2 what the trail behind him suggested. Did you give any
 3 consideration to examining his other leg?
 4 A. I didn't. I was content that the blood was controlled
 5 at that time, the bleeding was controlled when I was
 6 there. Like I say, I didn't go into any in-depth
 7 examination, into cutting clothes off. According to the
 8 SoE I was only with him for 20 seconds, so my priorities
 9 at that time was to ensure that he was alive, his airway
 10 was open, and that all bleeding was controlled and there
 11 was no further interventions I could have offered
 12 Mr Atkinson apart from ensuring all bleeding was
 13 controlled at the time.
 14 Q. Can I ask you what had your training taught you about
 15 coming upon a casualty that's surrounded by blood, about
 16 the importance of revealing the body to examine where
 17 the source of the bleeding is coming from?
 18 A. So in a patient that we attend to, if they are our only
 19 patient, then absolutely we must expose and examine
 20 limbs. But from my perspective, like I say, all
 21 bleeding was controlled. I was at risk of disrupting
 22 any blood clots by removing any clothes that were on him
 23 and removing any bandages which could make him bleed
 24 more.
 25 Also I was considering what we call a trauma triad

107

1 of death, which is where if a patient becomes extremely
 2 hypothermic, the blood can become quite acidotic and
 3 they can continue to bleed. And as much as possible
 4 I was trying to stop him bleeding any further. If I was
 5 to provide him with any interventions, they could have
 6 made the picture worse at the time.
 7 Q. We know that shortly after coming upon John for that
 8 20 seconds when Mr Blake is with him, that shortly after
 9 that you are seen then in conversation with
 10 Patrick Ennis. Give me a moment to identify the time.
 11 (Pause)
 12 We know that you're examining --- you're with John
 13 for 20 seconds at 22.50.42 and then we see you speaking
 14 to Mr Ennis at 22.57.59. Can I ask you, when you spoke
 15 to Mr Ennis do you recall whether you drew to his
 16 attention John Atkinson?
 17 A. I don't recall that conversation with Mr Ennis,
 18 unfortunately.
 19 Q. Can I ask you in terms of --- you've given your answers
 20 about why you did what you did, but in circumstances
 21 where a patient's had a heavy bleed, what consideration
 22 do you give about trying to find and ensure that that
 23 patient receives tranexamic acid, so TXA, to help assist
 24 bleeding and assist with clotting?
 25 A. Tranexamic acid, an indication for it is a patient which

108

1 is heavily bleeding within 4 hours of injury . It's
 2 a medication which is to be given and not delaying
 3 transport to hospital by giving this medication.
 4 Generally with major trauma patients we would give it
 5 en route to hospital . It is a helpful medication, but
 6 it is extremely important that we don't delay patient
 7 care by giving this medication.
 8 At the evening, I was not a qualified paramedic and
 9 was unable to administer this medication or autonomously
 10 cannulate a patient. This is definitely something that
 11 we considered with patients that was downstairs in the
 12 casualty clearing area awaiting transport to hospital,
 13 but at the time, in what I thought was a very dangerous
 14 hot zone, as we call it, upstairs, I don't feel that
 15 tranexamic acid would have been appropriate to
 16 administer to patients at that time.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you have it?
 18 A. No.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. So you'd have to have got
 20 someone to get it. Did you have it within the arena?
 21 A. No, I would have had to go downstairs to the casualty
 22 clearing area and ask for a paramedic to come up to
 23 review. But that would have again delayed patient care
 24 as patients need to be moved to a safe location, which
 25 would have been the casualty clearing area. Specialist

109

1 responders are allowed upstairs into the hot zone, but
 2 that is to triage --
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really concerned you may be giving
 4 us information you have gathered after the event and
 5 really what we're concerned with is you at the time.
 6 A. Okay.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand you getting further
 8 information since.
 9 So you'd have had to go and get somebody. I just
 10 want some idea of the general impression for people like
 11 you there. Were you expecting paramedics to arrive?
 12 A. No, no, I was not, sir.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Why?
 14 A. Because only certain specialist responders are allowed
 15 upstairs in that danger zone.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You knew this at the time?
 17 A. Yes, sir, through major incident training.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you had no expectation anyone was
 19 going to come?
 20 A. I did believe a couple of people may come up, but
 21 I didn't expect what the public may perceive as hundreds
 22 of ambulance staff entering that danger zone.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you know about HART teams at that
 24 time?
 25 A. Yes, sir, I did.

110

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. So you would be expecting HART
 2 teams to arrive at any minute?
 3 A. Some responders from HART, yes.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Would you have any idea of the numbers
 5 that might come?
 6 A. No.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you'd expect them to get there
 8 quickly?
 9 A. It would be very much dependent on a situation. The
 10 police -- I was aware that the police would need to make
 11 the scene safe and then --
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Is this all going through your mind
 13 at the time or is this what you have thought of
 14 afterwards?
 15 A. No, I was very much aware of what had happened, an
 16 improvised explosive device had been detonated, and that
 17 it would be a delay for responders to get to us due to
 18 scene safety.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But everybody else is going round
 20 saying, "They will be here any minute", the paramedics.
 21 Were you putting them right?
 22 A. I was explaining to patients that, "We will get you out
 23 as soon as possible", as in, "We will get you out".
 24 I didn't say that anybody was coming, I wouldn't give
 25 any realistic expectations.

111

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But off-duty policemen who were there
 2 helping were saying, because they didn't know what to
 3 do, "Don't worry, the paramedics will be here any
 4 minute". Were you putting them right, saying there's no
 5 chance they will be here?
 6 A. I don't think that would have been helpful in the
 7 situation. I feel like that may have caused unnecessary
 8 panic, whereas I was trying to get as many people
 9 downstairs as possible to the ambulances rather than
 10 bringing staff up into the hot zone.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, but the general impression -- and
 12 I'm sorry to be taking this over -- may be that
 13 everybody, people like the off-duty policemen, who don't
 14 have the training to do this sort of thing and they
 15 don't know whether they should get people out as quickly
 16 as possible or whether they should wait for the
 17 paramedics to come up who they're expecting, and
 18 eventually it seems somebody somewhere makes a decision,
 19 "They ain't coming so we'd better get the patients out".
 20 A. I was going round that night, and I believe Mr Ennis was
 21 as well -- I was physically shouting, "If you're able to
 22 walk and leave, you need to leave, everybody else needs
 23 to help people to go downstairs", and I was going round
 24 shouting that, sir.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

112

1 MS CARTWRIGHT: So then can I just go back a moment when you
 2 had the 20-second encounter with John Atkinson. You may
 3 not have seen the tourniquet on your evidence?
 4 A. That's right.
 5 Q. But Mr Blake is on his knees alongside John Atkinson.
 6 And he's not a specialist responder, he was plainly
 7 a member of the public. Did you tell Mr Blake he had to
 8 leave John Atkinson?
 9 A. No, I don't believe I did. Later in the evening, I had
 10 an encounter -- I think it was a female. I asked, "Are
 11 you walking wounded?" and I believe they said, "No, but
 12 I'm with a patient". I can't be specific if it was
 13 John Atkinson that she was with but I did ask, "If
 14 you are uninjured you need to go to casualty clearing",
 15 but she was -- that lady was stood up talking to me face
 16 to face and wasn't involved in any direct patient care
 17 at that time.
 18 Q. And we're going to come on to that next encounter
 19 because you're next seen by John Atkinson at 23.01.23 at
 20 a time when you have an interaction with John Atkinson,
 21 a police officer called Chelsea Meaney, but also
 22 Ronald Blake's wife, Lesley Blake. The sequence of
 23 events captures you approaching Chelsea Meaney
 24 indicating about walking wounded and it's Mr Blake's
 25 wife that's in fact in a very distressed state. Do you

113

1 remember that?
 2 A. It may well have been that lady that I asked to go to
 3 casualty clearing.
 4 Q. Could you see that she was plainly there waiting for her
 5 husband who was alongside Mr Atkinson?
 6 A. I don't remember the exact conversation. I certainly
 7 don't remember any faces from that evening. I just
 8 remember seeing a lady that was -- she appeared at the
 9 time to be on her own and I tried to get her to casualty
 10 clearing as per our sieve and sort major incident
 11 protocol.
 12 Q. Because in fact PC Meaney on the sequence of events
 13 identifies that she was about to take Lesley Blake
 14 outside, but also indicates towards John and
 15 Ronald Blake on the ground that "somebody needs to
 16 review him" by reference to John.
 17 A. Yes. I remember being asked -- I can't remember who it
 18 was from or where it came from but I do remember being
 19 asked to review a patient who was probably
 20 John Atkinson.
 21 Q. You're not observed to do anything towards
 22 John Atkinson. So can you assist us to what was the
 23 nature of your review of John Atkinson around 23.01?
 24 A. Yes, absolutely. In my head I was re-triaging John, I'd
 25 approached him, I saw that he was alive, his airway was

114

1 open, he was able to talk. I had a quick review and saw
 2 that all bleeding, again, was still controlled, and his
 3 clinical presentation hadn't changed since the last time
 4 that I'd reviewed him. So he remained a priority 1
 5 casualty that needed to be taken out of the arena, but
 6 there was no other clinical interventions to offer at
 7 that point.
 8 Q. Can I ask you then in terms of at that stage when
 9 a police officer herself has just been told by
 10 John Atkinson am I --
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm really sorry. There's a rather
 12 disconcerting noise going on, which is I think is
 13 distracting people from the question you're about to
 14 ask. It appears to have stopped.
 15 MS CARTWRIGHT: We know that Chelsea Meaney on the sequence
 16 of events beforehand has had an encounter with John
 17 where he is captured saying to her, "I'm going to die",
 18 so that's at 22.59.43, which is part of the background
 19 to her then asking you to review John. So did you hear
 20 John at that time expressing statements like, "I'm going
 21 to die"?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. Did you not think then when a police officer herself was
 24 asking you to review John Atkinson that it was important
 25 that there was now a proper head-to-toe examination of

115

1 John Atkinson to understand the extent of his injuries?
 2 A. Absolutely, but again, the best thing Mr Atkinson needed
 3 was rapid transport to a casualty clearing area and then
 4 treatment and then conveying to definitive care at
 5 a major trauma centre. All treatment from my
 6 perspective had been done. I went back over to look if
 7 we had any other bleeds that needed tending to or
 8 whether we had an airway issue. His airway was clear,
 9 he was breathing, and in terms of circulation we had no
 10 catastrophic bleeds or any further bleeding that I could
 11 see from any limbs. And therefore, like I say, he
 12 remained a priority 1 casualty.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Mr Billington, don't think people are
 14 not unsympathetic to your plight, as it were. You were
 15 one of the few people who knew what they were doing in
 16 that room that night and you were dealing with an
 17 enormous number of people so we do understand that.
 18 But you're saying the main thing that needed to be
 19 done for Mr Atkinson was to be got out as quickly as
 20 possible and I don't think anyone is disagreeing with
 21 you about that. But what did you do to get him out?
 22 Not you taking him, but did you get anyone to say, "Get
 23 him out, it's an emergency"?
 24 A. I actually went to one of the merchandise stalls and
 25 tried to rip up a carpet and tried to cut that up to

116

1 make some kind of makeshift stretcher while I had a few
 2 seconds to do so but I was unable to do that, I was
 3 unable to get it up.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you asked anyone else? You have all
 5 these other people to look at, you're one of the few
 6 people with any medical knowledge who can deal with it.
 7 Did say to any of the people around John Atkinson, "Get
 8 something, put him on it, get him out"?
 9 A. I didn't, sir, no.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was that a mistake of yours not to do
 11 that, bearing in mind that was the priority, to get him
 12 out?
 13 A. Yes, I believe that Mr Ennis was triaging and we had --
 14 we was getting people out one by one, all the priority 1
 15 casualties were being taken out one by one. It was
 16 a case of waiting for more barriers to come up to take
 17 people out on. We had a limited number of people
 18 upstairs. The people that were upstairs were focused on
 19 their own individual patients and there was limited
 20 people to do that.
 21 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Billington, you've indicated in answering
 22 your questions on this second encounter with
 23 John Atkinson that all the treatment that John had
 24 needed at that time had been done, but --
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not sure that's quite what he said.

117

1 He thought he couldn't do anything more for him up
 2 there, but he was still saying he needed to be got out
 3 as a category 1 patient.
 4 MS CARTWRIGHT: But you say the treatment John needed was
 5 done, and I may be misparaphrasing what you have just
 6 said by way of evidence, but the expert evidence that's
 7 been received has indicated that what John needed was
 8 effective bilateral tourniquets, so a tourniquet to be
 9 applied to both of his legs --
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. -- that were effective. So again to understand what was
 12 needed for John Atkinson, a man who was positioned in
 13 a pool of blood, it was necessary to remove his clothing
 14 to understand the extent of the injuries, and that would
 15 have revealed the need for further treatment for John at
 16 that time in the City Room?
 17 A. Yes. There was very much a need for further treatment
 18 for John. He did need specialist treatment. The
 19 City Room floor was not the appropriate place to provide
 20 that treatment. Again, I stick by not removing his
 21 clothing for the reason of not disrupting any clots and
 22 causing him to bleed any further and then get cold and
 23 hypothermic. The indications for applying a CAT
 24 tourniquet, a combat application tourniquet, would be
 25 for me to observe an uncontrolled bleed or a bleed that

118

1 wasn't controlled by bandages or a catastrophic bleed.
 2 Like I say, at that time on my assessment, I wasn't
 3 going to put a CAT tourniquet on a patient that was
 4 fully alert, GCS 15, with no active bleeding from what
 5 I could see. At that time when I was assessing John it
 6 wasn't clinically indicated from my perspective.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you have any CAT tourniquets still
 8 with you or had you given them all out by then or can't
 9 you remember?
 10 A. I was aware that there was two in my bag, I wasn't sure
 11 at what point they were taken out of my bag. I can say
 12 100% from my clinical assessment that if Mr Atkinson
 13 needed a tourniquet at that time I would have got one.
 14 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Billington, can I just explore a little
 15 further with you -- still at this time John Atkinson is
 16 fully clothed and certainly the evidence supports that
 17 his trousers were blood-soaked because of the extent of
 18 the haemorrhage. So again, how can you be satisfied
 19 that all bleeding has been stemmed in circumstances
 20 where a patient is wearing blood-soaked clothing?
 21 A. So I believe that -- I can't remember if I put the
 22 dressings on or whether there was already dressings
 23 in situ but there were dressings in place that hadn't
 24 bled through from what I can remember. I apologise if
 25 it's off, but from my memory there were dressings in

119

1 place that hadn't bled through and that was my reasoning
 2 for believing that all limb haemorrhage was controlled
 3 at that time.
 4 Q. Can I ask you what consideration you gave to the
 5 elevation of John Atkinson's legs in a way that
 6 a colleague subsequently did after your encounter?
 7 A. I didn't raise his legs. I don't -- I can't remember
 8 why. I just remember I didn't raise his legs.
 9 Q. And in addition to the bleeding from John Atkinson, did
 10 you observe the other injuries that John had to his leg,
 11 namely fractures and to make an assessment about whether
 12 any splintage was needed?
 13 A. I don't remember any fractures of his legs. Fractures
 14 at that time, unless they was causing a catastrophic
 15 haemorrhage or any kind of haemorrhage, splinting
 16 upstairs I deem wouldn't have been appropriate at that
 17 time.
 18 Q. In not disturbing his legs did you give any
 19 consideration to lifting his upper clothing to identify
 20 any injuries to his body area?
 21 A. I don't recall. All I recall is injuries to his legs.
 22 I can't remember what other assessments I did of his
 23 other -- the rest of his body.
 24 Q. But again, even if you weren't to disturb his clothing
 25 because you'd formed the view that the haemorrhaging had

120

1 stopped, would it not have been incumbent upon you to
 2 remove other aspects of his clothing to examine his
 3 torso?
 4 A. I could see from a visual examination that he had no
 5 obvious bleeding and I think that was it. I don't
 6 recall removing any clothing.
 7 Q. You've already been asked questions by the learned
 8 chairman about what you were practically going to do
 9 then on the analysis that John needed to be extricated
 10 rapidly and you've described about the carpet, but did
 11 you speak to anyone else about the removal of John --
 12 needed as a priority?
 13 A. I'd had various conversations with Mr Ennis throughout
 14 the evenings, just quick check-ins with each other.
 15 I don't specifically remember John Atkinson coming up in
 16 conversation but we had a good idea of who the
 17 priority 1 casualties were and who was to be removed
 18 kind of in which order on the makeshift stretchers.
 19 Q. And how would you then ascertain whether John Atkinson
 20 actually had undergone a triage sieve by the paramedics
 21 to identify what his categorisation had been?
 22 A. I don't remember individual triage sieves that night,
 23 I don't remember which priority was which. From my
 24 understanding, Mr Atkinson was a priority 1 casualty to
 25 be removed as urgently as possible.

121

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who made that assessment of casualty 1?
 2 A. In my head at the time it was me. I made the assessment
 3 that --
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you've had -- as a student paramedic
 5 you'd had adequate training on triaging?
 6 A. I knew the process in my head. I could spell it out in
 7 my head. I'd done multi-agency exercises where we'd
 8 done very similar under different circumstances. I did
 9 feel competent with triage that night.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You didn't have cards --
 11 A. No.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- so you can't put it on, so you need
 13 to tell someone he's category 1.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you know who you told?
 16 A. I don't remember.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 18 A. Sorry.
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: Can I be clear then on what basis you
 20 triaged John as a P1? Because the categorisation for P1
 21 would be a catastrophic bleed, and so when you've
 22 described substantial bleeding earlier, were you
 23 triaging John as a P1 on the basis of catastrophic
 24 bleed?
 25 A. I believed that he -- prior to me seeing him, he would

122

1 have had a catastrophic bleed. At the time I saw him it
 2 was now controlled, but the fact that he was unable to
 3 walk, that he was lay on the floor, and the fact that he
 4 did have a heavy bleed made him a priority 1 casualty.
 5 Q. And we can see that after 23.01, when you were with
 6 John Atkinson, you next approach Mr Ennis with Mr Parry
 7 at 23.09.43. So in circumstances where you've taken it
 8 upon yourself to perform a triage sieve, you've left
 9 nothing with John to indicate that he is a P1 patient,
 10 have you?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. So how then are you communicating your triage of
 13 John Atkinson?
 14 A. It was with conversations with different people around
 15 the room, including Mr Ennis, and ETUK staff. There was
 16 an awareness of who needed to be got out and I think at
 17 that time, so late in the evening, all of the priority 3
 18 casualties had walked out, so anybody else that was on
 19 the floor and unable to get out was at that time
 20 a priority 1 casualty.
 21 Q. So then can I be clear, did you specifically discuss
 22 John Atkinson with Patrick Ennis?
 23 A. I can't remember, I'm sorry.
 24 MS CARTWRIGHT: If you wait there, there will be questions
 25 from Mr Cooper.

123

1 Questions from MR COOPER
 2 MR COOPER: (Pause). That was 20 seconds. That's the
 3 amount of --
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I knew that was stage-managed, it just
 5 looked that way to me.
 6 MR COOPER: You've been around too long, sir.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I think that's probably true. I will
 8 retire in a minute!
 9 Thank you.
 10 MR COOPER: But nonetheless, hopefully an effective
 11 demonstration of what 20 seconds is to what you packed
 12 in to 20 seconds. It's a very short period of time,
 13 isn't it, to be assessing someone in the condition of
 14 Mr Atkinson?
 15 A. It is a short time, but at that time it is what's
 16 required given the situation.
 17 Q. I'm going to persist, with the chair's indulgence, of
 18 just not going down this line again with you, "the
 19 situation". Let me explain to you, if it helps you,
 20 Mr Billington what the situation was. The situation
 21 was -- forgive the families, please -- a man lying in
 22 a pool of blood, who, on the evidence we have heard, was
 23 pumping blood, particularly from his leg, was alert and
 24 expressing his pain and his distress. That was the
 25 situation, wasn't it?

124

1 A. Yes.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just stop for a minute, I'm really
 3 sorry. Obviously the witness is entitled to his own
 4 evidence. His evidence is that it was not pumping blood
 5 at that particular time. He may be wrong, he may be
 6 right, but I don't think you can put it as a fact when
 7 he actually disagrees with it.
 8 MR COOPER: All I'll put it you've heard the evidence of at
 9 least two people, Mr Blake and Mr Chapman, about the
 10 pumping of blood and that it didn't stop quickly. Are
 11 they wrong?
 12 A. I appreciate their comments that he may have been
 13 pumping blood prior to me seeing him, but at the time of
 14 my assessment all bleeding was controlled.
 15 Q. You obviously, when you arrived there and saw all the
 16 blood on the floor -- and the tracks of the blood --
 17 you have seen the photographs -- the first thing you no
 18 doubt said is, "Is this blood from Mr Atkinson", didn't
 19 you?
 20 A. I wasn't sure which blood was from --
 21 Q. I'm sure you weren't, so I'll ask the question again.
 22 I'm sure you therefore said straightaway to Mr Blake or
 23 Mr Chapman, "Is this Mr Atkinson's blood"?
 24 A. No, I didn't say that.
 25 Q. You didn't?

125

1 A. No.
 2 Q. Why not?
 3 A. Because my duty at the time was to control any
 4 catastrophic bleeding. It's really important to know
 5 information regarding the amounts of --
 6 Q. It's what, sorry? I didn't hear.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure you didn't, Mr Cooper.
 8 I understand the concerns of you and the families,
 9 if I may say so, as to whether proper treatment was
 10 being given and you're perfectly properly examining
 11 that. I just want it done in a really forensic way, if
 12 you don't mind.
 13 MR COOPER: I genuinely didn't hear that last part of it.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm not suggesting you didn't.
 15 Forensic, please. You're well capable.
 16 MR COOPER: I suggest to you, on behalf of those we
 17 represent, that the amount of blood that was present
 18 when you arrived on the scene was cause for you at least
 19 to have asked those present, "Where did this blood come
 20 from?"
 21 A. I don't believe at the time it would have made any
 22 difference to patient care.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: That's not actually an answer to the
 24 question. The real thing is we have heard about a lot
 25 of blood. We have seen the pictures. You have seen the

126

1 pictures.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: There is a trail of blood. You may not
 4 have noticed at the time, I don't know. But do you
 5 think that you may have made a mistake when you were
 6 saying, "Well, I don't think he was really bleeding out
 7 catastrophically at the time", and that is an error on
 8 your part? It may be understandable but do you think
 9 you may have made that error?
 10 A. No, sir. I believe all bleeding was under control at
 11 that time and if it wasn't, I would have 100% done
 12 something about it.
 13 MR COOPER: Mr Atkinson was conscious at that time?
 14 A. Yes, I believe so.
 15 Q. Did you know Mr Atkinson had relatively advanced first
 16 aid skills? You probably didn't know that, did you?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. But nonetheless, did you ask him or speak to him, ask
 19 him how he was feeling, where was the pain, was he still
 20 bleeding?
 21 A. I can't remember having a conversation with Mr Atkinson.
 22 Q. Well, why didn't you ask Mr Atkinson, who was conscious
 23 and having conversations with others, why didn't you ask
 24 him, "Are you still bleeding"?
 25 A. I could visually see that he wasn't bleeding.

127

1 I believed from Mr Atkinson's pain that he probably
 2 wouldn't have been able to tell us that he was still
 3 bleeding from his position of being laid down. And
 4 time -- it's better to do it, a physical examination
 5 myself of injuries rather than ask a patient, to allow
 6 us to triage quicker and then stop as much bleeding as
 7 possible, which is the aim throughout the night.
 8 Q. I'm just trying to formulate the question in the most
 9 unprovocative way I can. There is a patient who is
 10 conscious and who is communicating. Why didn't you say
 11 to him in the 20 seconds you gave him, "Are you
 12 bleeding, mate? Where's the bleeding coming from"?
 13 A. I believe he wouldn't have known. He was lay on his
 14 back, he wasn't able to see any bleeding and he was in
 15 a lot of pain. He wouldn't have been able to pinpoint
 16 where his bleeding was coming from.
 17 Q. Would it not have been worth a question -- it took me
 18 0.5 seconds virtually -- in your 20 seconds to ask the
 19 question, "Where are you bleeding from mate? Are you
 20 bleeding"?
 21 A. I don't remember a lot of what I said on that night. So
 22 unfortunately, I didn't ask the question.
 23 Q. Because Mr Atkinson might, given his training, have been
 24 able to say to you, "I'm bleeding from my leg", mightn't
 25 he?

128

1 A. Potentially, but I could see at that point that
 2 he wasn't bleeding from his leg.
 3 Q. You didn't touch him?
 4 A. I can't remember.
 5 Q. You're aware, for instance, that at a later stage others
 6 were cutting his trousers off?
 7 A. I don't recall anybody cutting his trousers off.
 8 Q. Well, we've heard the evidence that he was protecting
 9 his modesty, we've heard that aspect of evidence today.
 10 Were they taking a real risk with his life?
 11 A. I have personally not heard that evidence.
 12 Q. You've heard it now.
 13 A. I would not touch a dressing which was doing its job.
 14 I would not need to modify or mess with that dressing in
 15 case it caused further bleeding.
 16 Q. (Overspeaking).
 17 A. Personally, I wouldn't have done it at that point in the
 18 City Rooms. However, different responders at different
 19 time frames may have had reason to do it, for example if
 20 the bleeding was pouring through other dressings.
 21 Q. Or indeed that responders simply thought that they
 22 needed to examine this man and needed to cut his
 23 clothing away from him; would that be right?
 24 A. They may have cut his clothes off if that's what they
 25 thought. My thoughts was he needed taking immediately

129

1 to casualty clearing and that there was no other
 2 interventions at that point that we could offer him.
 3 Q. Understand this, Mr Billington: no one is indeed trying
 4 to impugn the fact that you were there on the night and
 5 that you were doing work on the night, but you'll
 6 understand that this part of the inquiry is focusing on
 7 John Atkinson.
 8 A. Absolutely.
 9 Q. And I'm going to suggest to you that you made mistakes,
 10 didn't you, as far as your assessment of John Atkinson
 11 was concerned?
 12 A. Personally, I don't feel like I did. I feel like
 13 I followed the protocol and I feel like every
 14 intervention that John Atkinson could have been offered
 15 at that time was given to him from my perspective.
 16 Q. He was given or you gave yourself very little time for
 17 whatever reason, maybe you felt under pressure, but for
 18 whatever reason you gave yourself little time to assess
 19 a man who was potentially dying; would you accept that?
 20 A. Yes. An improvised explosive device had gone off, we
 21 had multiple casualties, lots of people to triage, and
 22 therefore the quicker and more succinct that we
 23 performed that triage and treatment, the more patients
 24 we could see and the more bleeding that we could stop.
 25 Q. Really, just to delve a little deeper into your decision

130

1 not to cut away some clothing to see where he was
 2 bleeding if he was bleeding, what bandage were you
 3 trying to avoid disturbing?
 4 A. From what I can recall there was some bandages on his
 5 legs and I didn't want to cause any further bleeding by
 6 cutting away that clothing and potentially disrupting
 7 any clots that had formed through whatever way.
 8 I didn't feel at that time it was appropriate.
 9 Q. Could he have been bleeding for all you knew, for
 10 instance, from the torso?
 11 A. Potentially, but I don't remember seeing any torso
 12 injuries at that time (overspeaking) --
 13 Q. Could you have, for instance, have cut away the upper
 14 part of his clothing, at least to examine whether he was
 15 injured there? I'm trying to examine your intent
 16 here --
 17 A. Yes, yes.
 18 Q. -- and, putting to one side for a moment your concern
 19 about the bandage on his leg, you've given that
 20 evidence, why didn't you at least cut away his clothing
 21 from the top if you were intent on doing that and
 22 it would have helped?
 23 A. Outside of a major incident, if he was the only patient,
 24 that is something we would absolutely do to get a full
 25 picture and examine the injuries. But from what I could

131

1 see from my assessment, there was no -- the only
 2 treatment I was going to offer Mr Atkinson was treatment
 3 for catastrophic bleeds. At that time that was all we
 4 could offer and from my perspective he wasn't
 5 catastrophically bleeding. I believed that if I was to
 6 cut away his clothing, he would then become hypothermic.
 7 Hypothermia leads to acidosis. Acidosis leads to
 8 a destruction in the blood clotting cascade and then
 9 patients can further bleed out through this process,
 10 which is like a (overspeaking) --
 11 Q. You know what, I'm going to suggest to you -- if it has
 12 to be to do it, I'll do it -- none of this was going
 13 through your head at the time. It may well be what's
 14 gone through your head since to try and explain why you
 15 didn't react correctly. But you weren't thinking all
 16 this in 20 seconds, were you?
 17 A. It's my job, sir, to think that in 20 seconds. I'm very
 18 aware that trauma patients need to be kept warm and stop
 19 any catastrophic bleeding and therefore I wouldn't --
 20 the arena floor is freezing cold, I wouldn't then strip
 21 away clothes, in my mind unnecessarily, which would
 22 potentially be catastrophic for that patient.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay, 20 seconds, we're all agreed is
 24 a very short time?
 25 A. Yes, it is.

132

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have had that amply demonstrated by
 2 Mr Cooper. So it is a very short time to do an
 3 examination for somebody.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And ideally you would take longer over
 6 it, wouldn't you?
 7 A. Absolutely, sir.
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the reality is, had you had more
 9 qualified people up there doing it with you, then you
 10 would have been able to spend more time examining him,
 11 wouldn't you?
 12 A. More responders would mean more intense treatment for
 13 each patient, sir, yes.
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you would spend more time with them?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So the answer to my question is yes,
 17 isn't it?
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But the fact of the matter is it's you
 20 and Mr Ennis at this stage with, I don't know how many
 21 patients we've got in there, but a lot?
 22 A. Yes, sir, there was a lot.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you wish you had had time to look
 24 more closely at Mr Atkinson?
 25 A. Yes. Yes, sir, if we had more time that would have been

133

1 beneficial. But ultimately, like I say, I think he
 2 needed rapid transport to hospital and I don't believe
 3 there were any more interventions to be done.
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Can I be told, Ms Cartwright, how long
 5 it is after this first look at Mr Atkinson by the
 6 witness that he's actually moved from the City Room?
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: I think it's 17 minutes later, I think it's
 8 23.18. Give me a moment, sir.
 9 (Pause)
 10 John is taken out of the City Room at 23.17.56.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the examination we're talking about?
 12 MS CARTWRIGHT: If it's the — the first one or the second
 13 one?
 14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You realised it on the first one, didn't
 15 you? You concluded on your first examination that he
 16 needed to be got out as quickly as possible and he's
 17 category 1.
 18 A. Yes, sir.
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: That first examination is 22.50.42.
 20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Does everyone agree with that?
 21 MR COOPER: Yes, that's right. That's what I got from this
 22 document anyway.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you are saying, "This is category 1
 24 and this person needs to be got out", you're not
 25 expecting anyone to come, you say to help you, it's

134

1 a long time before he gets out, isn't it?
 2 A. Yes, sir (overspeaking) —
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Could more have been done to make sure
 4 that he was moved quickly?
 5 A. I believe that the barriers were being brought up. He
 6 needed moving as quickly as possible and, like I say,
 7 that evening I was going round the room and dealing with
 8 everybody. But if there were more responders then maybe
 9 he could have been brought out quickly or more members
 10 of the public to help or whatever it needed. But
 11 patients were being taken —
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Or even members of NWS coming up with
 13 whatever from downstairs and taking them away?
 14 A. If safe to do so, yes.
 15 MR COOPER: Taking it to the end of the matter, even at
 16 around 23.01.15, you're told again, aren't you, we get
 17 this from the document, that John Atkinson needs to be
 18 got out of the City Room immediately?
 19 A. I don't recall being told that, but that is probable
 20 or ... from the SoE.
 21 Q. That's timed at around 23.01.15. Then at 23.01.25 you
 22 leave. So what did you do after having been told, again
 23 right at the end now of the process, relatively end
 24 (sic) as far as the City Room is concerned, that again
 25 it's urged upon you, "Mr Atkinson needs to be got out of

135

1 the City Room", what did you do as a result of being
 2 told that?
 3 A. I didn't leave the City Room until every patient had
 4 been taken downstairs. So at that point I don't
 5 remember the exact actions that are taken as I don't
 6 remember being given that information. But I believe
 7 I would have tried, as I was doing all evening, to get
 8 people out as fast as possible.
 9 Q. Did you go to anyone during the whole of the process, as
 10 far as Mr Atkinson is concerned, from start to finish,
 11 and say in terms, "I have a man here", referring to
 12 Mr Atkinson, "who needs to go out now"? Did you say
 13 that specifically to anyone during that process?
 14 A. I don't remember.
 15 Q. Well, if you had done, you'd remember it, wouldn't it?
 16 It's something —
 17 A. I can't say that. I had many, multiple priority 1
 18 casualties that needed to leave now, including
 19 Mr Atkinson. Priority 1 casualties were trying to be
 20 taken out as soon as possible, as quickly as possible,
 21 and I don't remember specifically saying anything in
 22 regards to Mr Atkinson, but like I say, all priority 1
 23 casualties were taken out as fast as possible.
 24 Q. Did you at any stage isolate any person to be taken out
 25 immediately?

136

1 A. Priority 1 casualties were to be taken out.
 2 Q. Did you isolate them and say, "This person" -- whether
 3 it 's Mr Atkinson or not, did you stridently and firmly
 4 advise anyone, "This person needs to be taken out now"?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. Why not?
 7 A. Because they are all priority 1 casualties needing
 8 immediate evacuation -- and I was doing my best for
 9 everybody in that room, trying to triage, treat, advise,
 10 counsel, absolutely everything I could for everybody in
 11 there, and I don't remember specifically saying,
 12 "Mr Atkinson needs to be taken out immediately".
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: An impression that maybe comes across
 14 from the general evidence about this evening, and taking
 15 this example of Mr Atkinson, is that there are off-duty
 16 policemen, members of the public, all doing their best
 17 to assist people in there, expecting paramedics to come
 18 up and help them and do the evacuation, I suspect. And
 19 then eventually, it dawns on people that actually the
 20 paramedics aren't coming. And then they have to say:
 21 we've got no alternative, we've got to get them out,
 22 we've got to take them down. And it just doesn't seem
 23 that anyone is saying -- you say you knew the paramedics
 24 wouldn't come, but someone is saying: look, don't wait
 25 for the paramedics, get them out now, as soon as you can

137

1 get whatever you can put them on it and get them out.
 2 I'm not saying it's your responsibility necessarily, but
 3 was anyone organising that and actually saying to the
 4 police, "This is what needs to happen because they ain't
 5 coming"?
 6 A. It was extremely chaotic situation, sir .
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I understand.
 8 A. Me and Mr Ennis were trying to get people out as soon as
 9 possible.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're also looking at patients as well,
 11 aren't you?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It needs someone who's just doing that,
 14 actually going round saying, "These people need to be
 15 got out now"?
 16 A. Just to put some perspective to that room for the people
 17 that weren't there, there was an extremely loud
 18 evacuation tone and siren. You couldn't hear yourself
 19 talk. There was people obviously in agony, people
 20 crying. You couldn't hear anybody if you wasn't exactly
 21 right next to them, hence why we was trying to get round
 22 to everybody and get them out as soon as possible.
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And there is a loudspeaker announcement
 24 going on all the time saying to evacuate the premises.
 25 A. Yes, even with a megaphone.

138

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We understand the difficulty
 2 (overspeaking).
 3 A. But even with a megaphone nobody would have heard them
 4 instructions .
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No. There needs to be planning to deal
 6 with this sort of thing, doesn't there, because if
 7 you have this sort of attack that's exactly what's going
 8 to happen? There will be a lot of noise, lot of
 9 disturbance and someone needs to organise it --
 10 A. Yes, sir .
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- and say, "If they're not going to get
 12 you from downstairs, you have got to get them out".
 13 A. Yes.
 14 MR COOPER: In essence the people who could have been
 15 helping you, NWAS, HART, they weren't there to begin
 16 with, were they?
 17 A. Initially , not to begin with.
 18 Q. No.
 19 A. Mr Ennis came upstairs. The HART team did come up
 20 afterwards, but again it 's surrounding scene safety,
 21 secondary attacks. I understood in my head why NWAS
 22 wasn't there immediately.
 23 Q. I'm sure you understand in your head why they weren't
 24 coming up. The families may understand differently.
 25 I'm not asking you about what you understand in your

139

1 head, I'm just trying to establish the fact, in your
 2 favour, in fact, that you've got a thankless job up
 3 there, which would have been made far easier and far
 4 more effective, and probably far more effective as far
 5 as Mr Atkinson is concerned, if NWAS and HART had been
 6 in there straightaway doing their job, for whatever
 7 reason --
 8 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: At the end of the day you didn't have
 9 any protective clothing, did you?
 10 A. No.
 11 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And you didn't make a run for it?
 12 A. I didn't make a run for it, but I happened in that
 13 situation by chance more than anything else. In terms
 14 of major incidents and NWAS sending specialist
 15 responders in to a zone where an IED had just been
 16 detonated, to put them responders in that situation
 17 immediately if anything else was to happen that could
 18 have caused more casualties.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. We do know the arguments from
 20 NWAS, they're perfectly valid arguments, I'm not
 21 suggesting they're not, and of course they will be fully
 22 considered. But the public actually expects in that
 23 situation that once the Ambulance Service have arrived
 24 at the scene they will actually be there helping people
 25 who are badly injured.

140

1 A. When the Ambulance Service arrived, sir, from my -- from
 2 what I believed they were there helping, they were just
 3 downstairs, outside of the hot zone, in the zone they
 4 were allowed to go in.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Well, I think we're arguing about NWSA's
 6 response now rather than what you did.
 7 MR COOPER: You are working for NWSA now, aren't you, is
 8 that right (overspeaking)?
 9 A. I am a paramedic with NWSA.
 10 Q. With NWSA, yes, that's right.
 11 You mentioned -- well, you gave evidence, not
 12 mentioned -- you gave evidence that you believe that
 13 Mr Ennis was triaging and you relied to some extent on
 14 your assessment of Mr Atkinson, would it be right, based
 15 on the fact that Mr Ennis had triaged him? Would that
 16 be right? Is that the implication --
 17 A. Could you repeat the question?
 18 Q. You told the chair that you believed that Mr Ennis was
 19 triaging --
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. -- in the context of giving evidence about Mr Atkinson.
 22 Can I just clarify: did you think that Mr Ennis had
 23 triaged Mr Atkinson?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You did?

141

1 A. I believed that me and Mr Ennis was triaging every
 2 patient we saw. By triage, I don't mean physically
 3 putting a --
 4 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, no, this is quite important.
 5 You thought Mr Ennis had triaged Mr Atkinson?
 6 A. I'm unsure exactly what Mr Ennis had done. I know that
 7 me and Mr Ennis were going round and looking at patients
 8 and working out what priority they were, sir.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: But when you said that he was
 10 priority 1, Mr Atkinson, was that based on what you
 11 believed Mr Ennis thought or was it based on your own
 12 assessment or both?
 13 A. It was my own assessment, sir.
 14 MR COOPER: I thought you said a minute ago -- I can check
 15 the transcript in case I misheard -- I thought you said
 16 a minute ago Mr Ennis, you thought, had triaged.
 17 Mr Atkinson.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, he did say that.
 19 (Overspeaking)
 20 A. I am sorry if I wasn't as clear as I should be --
 21 MR COOPER: No, it was very clear.
 22 A. I know Mr Ennis was triaging in the City Room. I'm
 23 unsure if it was specifically in regards to Mr Atkinson.
 24 I apologise if I've misled you there, sir. I know that
 25 I triaged Mr Atkinson as a priority 1 casualty.

142

1 Q. You're not trying to protect Mr Ennis, are you, in any
 2 way?
 3 A. No, I would be as open as possible and I have no
 4 alliance --
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You don't need to go on any longer.
 6 MR COOPER: Because Mr Ennis' involvement, effectively as
 7 far as Mr Atkinson was concerned, was advising Gemma
 8 O'Donnell, the partner of Mr Blake (sic), to leave the
 9 City Room. That's Mr Ennis' involvement. Does that
 10 surprise you?
 11 A. I can see where that's came from. From our major
 12 incident protocol anybody that's walking is to leave.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you mind if we leave that? I think
 14 it is getting quite confusing.
 15 MR COOPER: Of course. Then I'll move on.
 16 Another expression you used as well is that you
 17 believed Mr Ennis was triaging, something else you said
 18 that I picked up on was that although you weren't
 19 surprised that NWSA weren't at the scene, you said,
 20 "I believed a couple of people might come up".
 21 "I believed a couple of people might come up." Who were
 22 these people, in the absence of NWSA and HART, who were
 23 these couple of people who you thought, your words,
 24 might come up?
 25 A. Sorry, sir, just to be specific, I do believe NWSA were

143

1 at the scene; they were just downstairs --
 2 Q. Well, I'm talking about the City Room.
 3 A. And I was in the City Room and what I meant by "a couple
 4 of people" was a couple of specialist responders, I'm
 5 unsure of how many numbers, but specialist responders
 6 from the HART team or similar to come up and do triage.
 7 Q. So were you surprised when HART were a little delayed,
 8 shall we put it?
 9 A. I can understand why members of the public might be
 10 surprised by the delay but I was aware that it may take
 11 them a while to get to us --
 12 Q. So when you said, "I believed a couple of people might
 13 come up to the City Room", these were HART? Are these
 14 the couple of people you're referring to? Your words
 15 not mine.
 16 A. That was my belief.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I have to say I actually understood it
 18 that way, Mr Cooper. Maybe I was taking an obtuse view
 19 of it --
 20 MR COOPER: Yes, sir.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: -- but that was my understanding of what
 22 he was meaning by that.
 23 MR COOPER: I was wondering whether it might have been a few
 24 people who might have thought there were coming up
 25 regardless, as it were.

144

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You're desperate for people to get up
2 there to help you, you have you and Mr Ennis dealing
3 with all these people, are you really thinking to
4 yourself: well, I expect HART will come but I know they
5 can be delayed and it might take them a long time to get
6 here? Is that really going through your mind rather
7 than --- I won't use what words I might say --- "Why
8 aren't they here"?

9 A. Yes, sir, although we are desperate for help I was very
10 much aware of the situation of what had happened and the
11 danger surrounding (overspeaking) ---

12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No, no, we are talking about HART people
13 now. We are now talking about HART people going up
14 there.

15 A. Yes.

16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Weren't you just saying, "Please,
17 please, get here, we need you"?

18 A. Yes, sir, we needed all the help possible.

19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I'm sure.

20 MR COOPER: The level of it was, I hadn't appreciated this,
21 my fault, was that you were even cutting up a carpet for
22 a stretcher whilst also trying to deal with stricken
23 people in the City Room. That was how you --- and this
24 is not a criticism of you now --- that's what you were
25 reduced to, having to cut up carpet for a stretcher

145

1 whist simultaneously doing the other work you were
2 doing?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That's where it had got, is it, on that night?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I know Ms Cartwright pressed you a little on this and
7 I want to see whether I can get a little further on the
8 difference between a substantial bleed and
9 a catastrophic bleed, just so I understand the
10 difference. This is a --- you're of the view, are you,
11 that Mr Atkinson had a substantial bleed? Would I be
12 right in that?

13 A. Prior to my arrival he may have had a catastrophic or a
14 substantial bleed. Whilst I was assessing him all
15 bleeding from his limbs was controlled.

16 Q. When you say controlled --- and then I've finished but
17 I need to understand this --- when you say controlled, do
18 you mean stopped or simply slowed down? What do you
19 mean by controlled?

20 A. As in from seeing him he wasn't actively bleeding.

21 Q. So therefore the T-shirt or whatever it was that
22 Mr Chapman applied was doing its job?

23 A. It may have been a T-shirt, it may have been the fact
24 that his systolic blood pressure had dropped, and it may
25 have been the fact that clots had formed, but at that

146

1 point his bleeding was controlled.

2 Q. If his systolic blood pressure had dropped, that's a
3 pretty dangerous sign?

4 A. Yes, sir, it is.

5 Q. So when you saw --- you say --- it's a matter for the
6 chair but I'm not accepting it on behalf of those we
7 represent --- but when you say his bleeding had stopped
8 or was controlled, one of the reasons for his bleeding
9 stopping or being controlled was a condition that could
10 kill him and you knew that?

11 A. I was very aware he was hypovolaemic at the time but all
12 of his bleeding --- I can't remember exactly from
13 whatever means --- was controlled at the time of my
14 assessment.

15 Q. No, no, I understand that, but you did say that one of
16 the reasons it might be controlled is this systolic
17 blood pressure condition which can prove fatal?

18 A. It's ---

19 Q. So if that was a possible reason for his blood being
20 controlled, why didn't you step in and say, "Get this
21 man out now, he's dying"?

22 A. We was trying to remove all priority 1 casualties as
23 quickly as possible ---

24 Q. No, no doubt ---

25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Sorry, don't interrupt him, please.

147

1 MR COOPER: I'm sorry, I didn't notice (overspeaking) ---

2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you are repeating that you were
3 trying to get the priority 1 casualties out?

4 A. As quickly as possible, sir.

5 MR COOPER: Well, sir, you have it, but I don't think me
6 labouring it is going to assist.

7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.

8 Further questions from MS CARTWRIGHT

9 MS CARTWRIGHT: Mr Billington, can I just clarify two
10 matters, please?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You have indicated that you didn't disturb the clothing
13 because there was a bandage that had been applied.
14 Certainly the evidence doesn't suggest that there was
15 a bandage that had been applied to John at either of the
16 occasions when you went to him. But if you are accurate
17 about a bandage, how do you apply bandage to a wound
18 over clothing?

19 A. The same way that you could apply it without clothing
20 being present: you wrap it round and perform pressure on
21 the limb as tightly as possible to stop any bleeding.

22 Q. Then secondly just to be clear, on both occasions when
23 you went to John, you assessed him as being
24 hypovolaemic?

25 A. Possibly hypovolaemic, yes.

148

1 Q. And again, in terms of the substantial bleed or the
2 catastrophic bleed that had occurred, it would be
3 important to understand the volume of blood that John
4 had lost because it would be an urgent life-saving thing
5 that John needed fluid to be placed back in his body?
6 A. Patients that are bleeding need blood; fluid isn't
7 ideal. I agree, he would have needed blood products to
8 be provided to him in that situation but upstairs in the
9 City Room was not an appropriate place to be doing that
10 from my opinion.
11 Q. But certainly in terms of the urgency of the need for
12 treatment for John Atkinson, a patient who's
13 hypovolaemic and has had blood loss needs that fluid,
14 ideally blood, to be replaced, otherwise there's a real
15 risk that patient can go into cardiac arrest?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So time really is of the essence?
18 A. Yes.
19 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you, Mr Billington.
20 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Everyone knows that you are faced
21 in that room with an appalling situation, but we do have
22 to look at what happened and what was done in order to
23 learn lessons for the future. Okay?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, there's no other questions from NWAS,

149

1 so that would conclude Mr Billington's evidence.
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Billington, and
3 thank you for coming.
4 MS CARTWRIGHT: Could I ask for a 10-minute break at this
5 stage?
6 (3.10 pm)
7 (A short break)
8 (3.38 pm)
9 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, the witness in the witness box is
10 Michelle Johnson. Could I ask her to stand while she
11 takes the oath, please.
12 MS MICHELLE JOHNSON (affirmed)
13 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
14 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: If you need to stop at any time, just
15 tell us. Sometimes it's easier to keep going.
16 A. Yes, I will.
17 MS CARTWRIGHT: Could you please tell the inquiry your full
18 name?
19 A. It's Michelle Annette Johnson.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 Ms Johnson, back in May of 2017 you were a serving
22 officer with British Transport Police?
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. You no longer, though, work for British Transport
25 Police?

150

1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. I want to ask you this afternoon -- it's going to focus
3 very much on the assistance you provided to
4 John Atkinson, but before doing that, could you just
5 briefly explain where you were when you found out about
6 an incident happening at the arena, please?
7 A. I was at Preston railway station. That's where I was
8 based. And it came over the radio. We just
9 self-deployed, we were never instructed to go.
10 Q. What came over the radio?
11 A. Initially, it was just -- it wasn't an explosion as
12 such, it was just a large noise that was heard and that
13 can happen on railway stations. So we just hang on for
14 a moment and when we were told there's multiple
15 casualties we instantly got in the car and drove.
16 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you, we're going to come on to
17 deal with some assistance you provided to John with your
18 leg restraints, but can you help us as to what first aid
19 training you'd had with British Transport Police?
20 A. The standard training provided to police officers, which
21 was, I believe, First Aid at Work.
22 Q. As part of that training had you received any training
23 specifically about how to apply a tourniquet?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Or when a tourniquet would be needed?

151

1 A. No.
2 Q. It is clear from the sequence of events that has been
3 prepared in respect of your assistance in that City Room
4 that you provided assistance to a great number of
5 casualties that night and the inquiry means no
6 disrespect to you for all that you did in that room by
7 focusing on the 14 minutes that you spent with
8 John Atkinson.
9 A. Yes, I understand.
10 Q. So just to orientate by way of time, you are captured
11 approaching, walking towards where John is, at 23.12.57.
12 You are then with John for 14 minutes, including a time
13 when he leaves the City Room, gets taken down out of the
14 City Room over the footbridge and down into the casualty
15 clearing station.
16 A. Mm-hm.
17 Q. I want to focus, first of all, please, on you first
18 going to John and your recollection of how John was at
19 that time, please.
20 A. I can't remember the sequence I approached John, but
21 I had potentially dealt with other people before. So
22 I approached John and he clearly had injuries to his
23 legs and I then used one of my leg straps around --
24 I think it was around both of his legs, his lower legs,
25 and I applied just one.

152

1 Q. We'll come on to deal with what you did in a moment.
 2 First of all, the leg straps. What were those leg
 3 straps usually used for?
 4 A. When somebody wasn't complying or kicking out. We
 5 usually utilise them in order to gain compliance from an
 6 individual.
 7 Q. Can you describe what the strap is?
 8 A. It's just Velcro, a long, thin Velcro strap.
 9 Q. What was it that you saw in John that made you think you
 10 needed to use this leg strap?
 11 A. He was bleeding from his legs, so it was the only thing
 12 I could think of to possibly assist in stemming the flow
 13 of blood to his legs.
 14 Q. I think at the time when you approached John --
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Ms Cartwright, for my benefit, and
 16 perhaps some other people, just get the context of this,
 17 where does it relate to when he was seen by the previous
 18 witness?
 19 MS CARTWRIGHT: The previous witness's last encounter with
 20 John was at 23.01. So John is still in the same
 21 location where he was, because he couldn't move because
 22 he couldn't walk. So it's in the same location near to
 23 the box office where John was when this witness went to
 24 attend to John.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just tell me the time again she saw him?

153

1 MS CARTWRIGHT: 23.12.57.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 3 MS CARTWRIGHT: It's right, isn't it, that at the time you
 4 approached John, in fact his trousers had been cut away
 5 from his legs?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. So his legs were exposed?
 8 A. I think so, yes, I could see his skin and there were
 9 little holes on his legs.
 10 Q. You described that his legs were bleeding. Can you
 11 recall and give us any more detail about the nature of
 12 that bleeding, please?
 13 A. I can't recall exactly where he was bleeding from, it
 14 was kind of generally on his legs and I thought the only
 15 thing I could utilise was my leg straps because they are
 16 for using around somebody's legs. I thought I could
 17 pull it tight enough in order to potentially reduce any
 18 bleeding.
 19 Q. Can you then describe what you did with the leg
 20 restraint and how you applied it on John's legs, please?
 21 A. I believe, from my recollection, I was on his left-hand
 22 side, and I put my right arm underneath his legs and
 23 I got the leg strap from the other side and I just
 24 apologised... pulled it... sorry.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You apologised to John for any pain you

154

1 might cause? Okay.
 2 A. Because he did scream out because it did cause him pain.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Just for one moment, sorry. I'm sorry
 4 to stress you more, but just give me some idea of the
 5 quantity of bleeding that is going on. Can you describe
 6 it in some way so I can understand it better?
 7 A. I can't necessarily recall the quantity as such, but it
 8 was certainly enough for me to think that I needed to do
 9 something about it --
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You needed to stem it?
 11 A. -- and it was far more than a little plaster would do.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay.
 13 A. We didn't carry anything that would suffice, so
 14 I thought that could be utilised.
 15 MS CARTWRIGHT: Then in terms of using the leg restraints
 16 in the way you've described over both of the legs, what
 17 were you hoping that that would do for John?
 18 A. Just to help stem the flow of blood, potentially, just
 19 enough so it would assist him.
 20 Q. In describing stemming the flow of blood, were you
 21 wanting the leg restraint to act almost like
 22 a tourniquet?
 23 A. Yes, as if it was a tourniquet, but it wasn't
 24 necessarily strong enough in itself, but at least
 25 I could try and assist with that.

155

1 Q. You've described that you pulled it tight?
 2 A. Yes. If you pull it as tight as you can, Velcro
 3 naturally itself sticks to each other on the actual leg
 4 restraint itself and I remember pulling it as tight as
 5 I could and I rested it then on the leg restraint so
 6 it would stay in place.
 7 Q. Just to be clear about where the leg restraint would
 8 have sat on John's leg? Which part of his leg was it
 9 placed over?
 10 A. I think it was his thigh, so above the knee. Because
 11 we were trained to do one above and one below the knee
 12 and I think this one was above the knee, I think.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: When you say trained, you mean trained
 14 in order to restrain somebody?
 15 A. Sorry, yes, certainly not for this, certainly not.
 16 MS CARTWRIGHT: Then once you'd applied your leg restraint
 17 over John's thigh area, as you described, did you see
 18 whether that assisted in stemming the bleeding that
 19 you'd witnessed?
 20 A. To be honest, I didn't sort of necessarily take the time
 21 to assess whether it assisted. It was a case of --
 22 I tried that and then we tried to assist him out of the
 23 City Room.
 24 Q. And can I ask you, as well as observing the bleeding
 25 coming from John's leg, did you observe the volume of

156

1 blood around John on the ground?
 2 A. To be honest, I can't recall whether there was
 3 a significant amount or not.
 4 Q. Thank you. You've described already that John was
 5 conscious and plainly the act of applying your leg
 6 restraint caused a response in John.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Was John able to speak to you at all or say anything
 9 during the time you were helping him?
 10 A. It was more me asking John a question or me saying,
 11 "Right, come on, let's go", and giving him a little
 12 reassurance that somebody was there and assisting him,
 13 but I don't recall his exact responses.
 14 Q. And I think you described that after you applied the leg
 15 restraint, you wanted to get him moving?
 16 A. Yes, but obviously not walking.
 17 Q. No, no.
 18 A. He was already on a blue board, I don't know where that
 19 came from, but it wasn't sufficient to assist him and to
 20 carry him.
 21 Q. Did you observe anything about -- anything on that blue
 22 board about bleeding?
 23 A. It's only going through the SoE with GMP that I saw,
 24 when he was on the overbridge section, that there was
 25 a significant amount of blood there, but actually on

157

1 scene I can't necessarily recall that.
 2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We have heard about a tourniquet already
 3 in existence with a belt. Did you notice that at the
 4 time?
 5 A. I think it was, again, on one of his upper thighs.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you did notice it being there and
 7 someone holding it?
 8 A. A black belt, but again I thought it was there to help
 9 the flow.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was somebody telling you, "We need to
 11 get him out", or was it you who decided you needed to
 12 get him out?
 13 A. I think it was a collective decision that obviously
 14 something significant had happened, so it was a case of
 15 we need to --
 16 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: And the collective decision between
 17 whom? Are you all police officers?
 18 A. Yes, I do remember a member of the public, but he was
 19 walking, so I, dare I say, assumed that he was okay.
 20 But other than that it was just police and individuals
 21 in a green top who I know now are arena medics.
 22 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Who was actually saying, "Let's get him
 23 out", or do you think you were all saying it, really?
 24 A. We were all kind of collectively saying it. I do
 25 remember a GMP sergeant, I can't recall his name, but

158

1 he was instructing people to go to certain areas to
 2 assist.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay (overspeaking).
 4 A. I was told his name, but I can't recall it.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Don't worry, I'm sure we'll be able to
 6 find that out.
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: Is that Sergeant Hare?
 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
 9 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So he was sort of supervising moving
 10 people, getting them out?
 11 A. Yes, he was kind of directing officers to assist with
 12 somebody so then they could be assisted out.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Had you been expecting paramedics to
 14 turn up?
 15 A. If I'm honest, I was quite surprised that there wasn't
 16 many medics there because it obviously took me just
 17 about over 20 minutes to get there myself, so I just
 18 kind of thought I was going to go with the flow of what
 19 was happening as opposed to being almost one of the
 20 first on scene.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you expected paramedics to be up
 22 there?
 23 A. I did, yes. I have been told that, going through the
 24 SoE, that there were, but I can't actually recall that
 25 myself.

159

1 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Were you thinking -- I mean, the
 2 collective thinking was, was it, that the paramedics
 3 will be here soon, they'll deal with doing the right
 4 thing, or were you, as soon as you got there, thinking,
 5 "We must get them out"?
 6 A. Yes, I think it was a collective decision of "something
 7 significant had happened" and we needed to then, you
 8 know, evacuate everyone as quickly as possible. We
 9 didn't know if there were any secondaries, and certainly
 10 the aspect of a secondary was in my mind, even going to
 11 the event, so I told my colleague that as well.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you.
 13 MS CARTWRIGHT: Just perhaps following on from that about --
 14 you've described, obviously, a prompt arrival on your
 15 journey from Preston to the arena.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. But in your witness statement, you describe that when
 18 you arrived, making a comment, "This is not what was
 19 described on the radio."
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. What do you mean by that?
 22 A. I remember the METHANE message on the BTP radio, but it
 23 didn't really describe the scene as such in the
 24 City Room. I suppose that's what I was relating it to.
 25 It's just something that I said at the time.

160

1 Q. We know at the time when you were applying the leg
 2 restraint in the way you've just described that
 3 PC Bullough and PC Dale Edwards were also in the area
 4 assisting. Is there anything specifically that you
 5 recall as to what they were doing at that time?
 6 A. I think PC Bullough was on the other side of John, and
 7 I don't know whether she assisted in getting the leg
 8 strap all the way round the other side of his legs, but
 9 I do remember -- sorry, I call her Jess -- Jess Bullough
 10 being on the other side.
 11 Q. We've heard evidence from Officer Bullough, but did you
 12 know either of those officers before attending at the
 13 arena that night?
 14 A. Yes, I know both of them officers. I've not
 15 particularly worked very much in Manchester at all, but
 16 I actually started with PC Dale Edwards, and Jess also
 17 had -- she did her training initially at Preston.
 18 Q. Do you recall anything else of the time after you
 19 applied the leg restraint of your time with John before
 20 he left the City Room?
 21 A. No, I think it was -- from my recollection, it was...
 22 I applied the leg restraint and then it was almost,
 23 again, a collective decision to assist John out of the
 24 City Room, but the board he was on wasn't sufficient for
 25 doing that.

161

1 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that the board was dragged
 2 along the ground and --
 3 A. Yes, it was breaking. It was a blue board and it had
 4 a metal edge, but it was just collapsing down, and, as
 5 we were trying to use it to utilise to lift him out, it
 6 was just -- it wasn't supposed to be used for what
 7 we were using it for, so it was just collapsing.
 8 Q. In terms of the time after you've applied your leg
 9 restraint, it's minutes after that that the evacuation
 10 of John from the City Room takes place.
 11 A. Mm--hm.
 12 Q. Was there a reason why that needed to take place so
 13 quickly in your own mind for John?
 14 A. I don't think necessarily it was specific to John,
 15 I think anybody who could have been evacuated from the
 16 City Room was in order for them to get medical
 17 treatment. But obviously, in this case it is specific
 18 to Mr Atkinson, and it was just a case of we did what we
 19 could in the City Room and then we evacuated them
 20 quickly as possible.
 21 Q. I think it's right, isn't it, that you have not got then
 22 a full recollection of your time with John down to the
 23 casualty clearing station?
 24 A. Yes, that's correct. I remember assisting John on the
 25 blue board and then I thought we left him on the

162

1 overbridge section for more assistance to come and lift
 2 him down and then I recall going back into the
 3 City Room. But again, going through the SoE with GMP,
 4 it turns out that that is correct, but then when I went
 5 back into the City Room, I retrieved the barrier and we
 6 used that to assist Mr Atkinson down the stairs.
 7 Q. But in terms of your own memory of your last encounter
 8 with John, where do you have your last memory of your
 9 time with John?
 10 A. I remember John on the overbridge and then I have
 11 recollections of John in the casualty clearing area.
 12 I remember sort of looking over to him, he was in
 13 a slightly different corner to my recollection to the
 14 SoE, but I recall looking in his direction a couple of
 15 times when I was in the casualty clearing area,
 16 assisting.
 17 Q. Can you help us as to, first of all, on the footbridge
 18 then, how did John seem at that time from your
 19 observations?
 20 A. All the time I was with John, he was conscious and
 21 breathing, he was able to respond if I said anything,
 22 and I had no further sort of concerns with his ability
 23 to be conscious.
 24 Q. Thank you. Then your memory as to what you recall from
 25 down in the casualty clearing station, can you just

163

1 assist as to how John seemed when he was down in the
 2 casualty clearing station before you left him?
 3 A. He was always conscious and breathing when I always
 4 looked over to him. If I'm honest, I think I even
 5 assisted him into the ambulance as well and he was still
 6 conscious and breathing.
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: Could you wait there, Ms Johnson, there will
 8 be some questions for you.
 9 MR COOPER: In fact, I have no questions.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you, Mr Cooper.
 11 We've heard about another witness who was
 12 considerably shocked when he heard that Mr Atkinson had
 13 died because he had been conscious and breathing when
 14 he'd seen him. Same for you, was it a shock that he
 15 died or...?
 16 A. I -- sorry.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: It's all right. It wasn't designed to
 18 make you cry, really.
 19 A. I found out earlier this year from an article on
 20 Sky News. I thought all this time that he...
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Okay. Thank you.
 22 MS CARTWRIGHT: Thank you, sir. That would then conclude
 23 the evidence.
 24 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you very much for coming. I'm
 25 sorry to have caused you distress. Thank you for giving

164

1 us your evidence.
 2 (The witness withdrew)
 3 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, could the witness Dale Edwards please
 4 be sworn?
 5 PC DALE EDWARDS (sworn)
 6 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT
 7 MS CARTWRIGHT: Could you please tell the inquiry your full
 8 name.
 9 A. Dale Edwards.
 10 Q. Thank you. It's right, isn't it, that in May of 2017
 11 you were a police constable with British Transport
 12 Police?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. We're going to be focusing today in your evidence on
 15 involvement and interactions you had with John Atkinson.
 16 But before we deal with that interaction, could you
 17 please first of all describe where you were when you
 18 found out about the detonation, please?
 19 A. I was on mobile patrol in the city centre with
 20 PC Jane Bridgewater.
 21 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you, in terms of any first aid
 22 training that you'd had at that time, what had that
 23 amounted to?
 24 A. It's yearly first aid training, which is conducted by
 25 the British Transport Police.

165

1 Q. Thank you. Did that training include application of
 2 tourniquets?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Thank you. The inquiry, before you've come to give
 5 evidence today, has heard a chronology of your
 6 interactions with John and extracts from your witness
 7 statement, and I want to ask you about a time when
 8 you're with John Atkinson in the City Room at 23.14.18,
 9 when you, together with Jessica Bullough and also the
 10 last witness, PC Michelle Johnson, are seen assisting
 11 John. It's right, isn't it, that you have a limited
 12 recollection of that time with John?
 13 A. That's correct.
 14 Q. I think you are not actually able to assist as to
 15 what was taking place in terms of interactions with John
 16 at that time?
 17 A. Unfortunately, I have tried to recollect but I have no
 18 recollection of that.
 19 Q. But I think what you have been able to definitively say
 20 is your belt was not used on John Atkinson because in
 21 fact you still had your belt with you that evening?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. So insofar as Jessica Bullough has recalled your belt
 24 being used as a form of tourniquet, that's not correct?
 25 A. Yes, I did not use my belt that night.

166

1 Q. Thank you. So is it right that the extent of your
 2 recollection of John Atkinson is your recollection of
 3 the evacuation of John from the City Room?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. So can you tell us about what you recall of that time,
 6 please?
 7 A. My recollection was going over to assist the victim,
 8 being John, with PC Stephen Corke -- placed him on to
 9 a plastic board in order to remove him from the
 10 City Rooms in order to get advanced medical treatment
 11 from the paramedics.
 12 Q. Did you observe anything about John's injuries at that
 13 time?
 14 A. I have no recollection of his injuries, unfortunately.
 15 Q. And do you have any recollection about whether John was
 16 bleeding at that time?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. I think it's right, isn't it, that in your witness
 19 statement you describe that you recall that board being
 20 very flimsy?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. So can you then just describe what you recall then of
 23 your involvement with John after that time, please?
 24 A. After removing him from the City Rooms?
 25 Q. Yes, and if you perhaps just describe that and what you

167

1 recall, please.
 2 A. So we moved him from the City Rooms by dragging the
 3 board across the floor. That's the only way we could
 4 use it, we couldn't use it to pick him up. We got to
 5 the top of the stairs, I got to the top of the stairs
 6 and realised there's no way this could be used to take
 7 him down the stairs, it wasn't strong enough. I'd
 8 attempted to go to the lift in order to use that as that
 9 would be the safest option. That was too small. Then
 10 a decision was made to go and get a barrier to take him
 11 down the stairs to the paramedics.
 12 Q. In fact, is it right that you assisted in retrieving
 13 that barrier from the City Room?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Is there anything you recall about how John presented at
 16 that time or how he seemed in that evacuation process
 17 from the City Room?
 18 A. The only recollection I've got was when I got to the top
 19 of the stairs, putting him on to the barrier, he did
 20 shout out that it was painful putting him on to the
 21 barrier. That's the only interaction I can recall.
 22 Q. And I think after taking John out, that's the extent of
 23 your involvement with getting John down into the
 24 casualty clearing station?
 25 A. Yes.

168

1 MS CARTWRIGHT: If you wait there, Mr Edwards, there will be
 2 some further questions from you.
 3 Questions from MR COOPER
 4 MR COOPER: Officer, just a few questions, not many.
 5 I represent the family of John Atkinson today. Just so
 6 we can understand, we've heard this expression of John
 7 being dragged out of the City Room. The physical
 8 mechanism being what, simply he's on the board, is he?
 9 A. Yes, using the board to pull him along the floor, yes.
 10 Q. Please understand this: we recognise you're all doing
 11 what you could on night, it was a difficult time and you
 12 were doing your best to attend to him. But during the
 13 time that that was happening, John was fully conscious
 14 and communicating, wasn't he, at the time?
 15 A. I was happy that he was conscious. I don't know about
 16 communicating, I can't recall that.
 17 Q. All right. When he was transferred from the board to
 18 the metal railing, was there a time when he fell a few
 19 feet as he was being transferred?
 20 A. I don't recall.
 21 Q. I'm just looking at your statement, for those that want
 22 to look at it, there's no need for you to, officer, it's
 23 only a short matter, it's {INQ041748/1}, your
 24 paragraph 14, and you say this, going over the page:
 25 "I can't recall John's injuries, but was aware we

169

1 needed to get him better medical help than we could give
 2 him in the City Room."
 3 What was it, officer, that made you come to the
 4 conclusion that he needed better medical help than he
 5 could be given in the City Room?
 6 A. I'd been in the City Rooms for a considerable amount of
 7 time with no advanced medical people to do the care and
 8 was left with the only option of moving him ourselves to
 9 the paramedics.
 10 Q. So clearly from -- and I understand you're not medics,
 11 but clearly from your assessment of him, including your
 12 experience of being in the police force and seeing
 13 perhaps -- not anything like this, of course, but
 14 injuries, John was in a pretty bad way, wasn't he? It
 15 was obvious. You wouldn't know the detail of it, but it
 16 was obvious that John was in a pretty bad way?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Going towards the end now -- and this is really my last
 19 question -- you tell us in your paragraph 17 that you
 20 got John outside by the entrance to the war memorial.
 21 You say -- you recall:
 22 "... a paramedic came over whilst I was still there,
 23 but I don't remember any conversations or anything they
 24 did with John."
 25 Just to clarify that, are you saying that they

170

1 didn't deal with John or that you simply cannot remember
 2 what they did with John?
 3 A. I don't remember what they did with John.
 4 MR COOPER: All right.
 5 Thank you, sir.
 6 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: I just want to ask you a few more
 7 general questions just to give me a general impression
 8 of what was going on. Where did you come from?
 9 A. The Ardwick area of Manchester.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did you come on your own or --
 11 A. No, with PC Jane Bridgewater.
 12 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Ah, yes, you told me she was with you.
 13 Did you self-deploy?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: So you just heard the message over and
 16 you went?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: No idea what to expect particularly?
 19 A. No. The initial call was from Jess Bullough, asking for
 20 urgent assistance, which was enough for me to attend.
 21 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Yes, right. So you went in, really,
 22 without any idea of what you were going to find in the
 23 City Room?
 24 A. That's correct.
 25 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: We know that there were very few

171

1 paramedics there when you arrived, maybe only one.
 2 A. I didn't see any.
 3 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: You didn't see any?
 4 A. No.
 5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were you expecting them to arrive?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Do you have any idea why they didn't
 8 arrive?
 9 A. No.
 10 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did anyone tell you they weren't going
 11 to arrive?
 12 A. No.
 13 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was it because of the length of time
 14 you'd been there that the decision was made to get
 15 people out?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Was anyone directing you to do that?
 18 A. No.
 19 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Were people saying, "Where are the
 20 paramedics?"
 21 A. Yes, other officers, and my thought process at the time
 22 was: where are the paramedics?
 23 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: From what you saw, had people been aware
 24 there were no paramedics coming and no stretchers going
 25 to arrive, could you have got them out quicker?

172

1 A. Yes.
2 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Did anyone direct the removal of people?
3 Do you understand what I mean?
4 A. Not specifically. I don't recall that, no.
5 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Thank you. Do either of you want to ask
6 anything, following on? No? Okay.
7 Thank you very much for coming. I didn't say this
8 to the last witness and I should have done: you both did
9 a great deal and what you could that night. I'm sure
10 everyone is very grateful for what you did and managed
11 to achieve, so thank you.
12 A. Very kind. Thank you very much.
13 MS CARTWRIGHT: Sir, that then would conclude the evidence
14 for today. We'll commence tomorrow with the evidence
15 summary to its conclusion and then there will be more
16 live evidence tomorrow.
17 SIR JOHN SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you.
18 (4.08 pm)
19 (The inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am
20 on Thursday, 7 October 2021)
21
22
23
24
25

173

I N D E X

1
2
3 Evidence summary for JOHN ATKINSON2
4
5 MR RONALD BLAKE (affirmed)59
6 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT59
7 Questions from MR COOPER73
8 Further questions from MS CARTWRIGHT88
9
10 MR GARETH CHAPMAN (recalled)89
11 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT89
12 Questions from MR COOPER94
13
14 MR RYAN BILLINGTON (recalled)96
15 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT96
16 Questions from MR COOPER124
17 Further questions from MS CARTWRIGHT148
18
19 MS MICHELLE JOHNSON (affirmed)150
20 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT150
21
22 PC DALE EDWARDS (sworn)165
23 Questions from MS CARTWRIGHT165
24 Questions from MR COOPER169
25

174

175

231952 (1) 44:18
 232005 (1) 45:12
 232007 (1) 44:18
 232016 (1) 45:14
 232020 (1) 45:18
 232021 (1) 46:5
 232040 (1) 46:8
 232045 (1) 46:21
 232052 (1) 47:2
 232105 (1) 47:3
 232109 (1) 47:20
 232117 (2) 48:6,25
 232122 (1) 50:8
 232151 (1) 50:15
 232158 (1) 50:18
 2322 (1) 93:15
 232224 (1) 50:24
 232232 (1) 51:7
 232234 (1) 51:18
 232237 (1) 51:23
 232317 (1) 52:8
 232333 (1) 53:4
 232354 (2) 53:9,19
 2324 (3) 54:7,10 93:16
 232417 (1) 55:1
 232419 (1) 55:2
 232426 (1) 54:14
 232442 (1) 55:9
 232448 (1) 55:19
 232527 (1) 55:22
 232555 (1) 56:4
 232610 (1) 31:12
 232627 (1) 56:13
 232651 (2) 56:14,21
 232841 (1) 57:2
 2329 (1) 57:10
 232913 (1) 57:11
 232919 (1) 57:14
 232933 (1) 57:22
 233041 (1) 58:2
 234728 (1) 54:7
 234823 (1) 11:5
 24 (3) 18:25 49:18 54:16
 25 (10) 5:1 13:11 19:20
 23:19 26:20 32:10 38:5
 46:10 53:18 58:4
 26 (5) 7:23 8:9 13:4 23:23
 58:13
 28 (4) 4:10 30:16 34:13
 40:20
 29 (1) 19:15

8 (1) 12:22
 88 (1) 174:8
 89 (2) 174:10,11

9

9 (3) 16:10 20:6 52:18
 930 (2) 1:2 173:19
 94 (1) 174:12
 955 (1) 1:4
 96 (2) 174:14,15
 999 (15) 8:25 9:8,23
 10:4,5,12 11:12 12:21
 13:6,16,18 62:11,14,15
 71:22

3

3 (3) 54:18 83:19 123:17
 30 (3) 9:13 13:19 48:20
 310 (1) 150:6
 33 (1) 12:24
 338 (1) 150:8
 35 (1) 16:17

4

4 (7) 4:2 12:24 13:19 18:11
 22:6 83:19 109:1
 40 (1) 9:13
 408 (1) 173:18
 47 (1) 41:25

5

5 (1) 13:21
 52 (2) 9:8 54:9
 59 (2) 174:5,6
 5minute (1) 96:2

6

6 (6) 1:1 7:13 12:22 13:22
 26:17 28:8

7

7 (4) 48:23 54:3 56:20
 173:20
 73 (1) 174:7

8